LABOR RELATIONS LAW
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self‐organization,
PART ONE – INTRODUCTORY MATERIALS
LABOR RELATIONS POLICY: FORMULATION AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. 1987 CONSTITUTION
(1) ART II, SEC. 2,8,10
ARTICLE II - DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
STATE POLICIES
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.
(2) Art. III, Sec. 8
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
(3) Art. IX B, Sec. 2B
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.
(4) Art. XII, Sec. 12 – National Economy and Patrimony
The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
(5) Art XIII, Sec. 3 and 14
Sec. 3, Art. XIII – The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision‐making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including
conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right
of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.
Sec. 14, Art. XIII – The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful
working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in
the service of the nation.
B. LABOR CODE
(1) ART. 3. Declaration of basic policy. –
The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relations between workers
and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
(2) ART (OLD 211) 218 DECLARATION OF POLICY
Article. 211. Declaration of Policy. –
A. It is the policy of the State:
(a) To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations,
including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or
industrial disputes;
(b) To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of democracy
and the promotion of social justice and development;
(c) To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement;
(d) To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as
union members and as employees;
(e) To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the expeditious settlement
of labor or industrial disputes;
(f) To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace; and
(g) To ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting
their rights, duties and welfare.
B. To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the
employers and employees by means of agreements freely entered into through collective
bargaining, no court or administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix
wages, rates of pay, hours of work or other terms and conditions of employment, except as
otherwise provided under this Code.
(3) REPUBLIC ACT No. 10395
AN ACT STRENGTHENING TRIPARTISM, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE
275 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE "LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"
Section 1. Article 275 of the Labor Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"ART. 275. Tripartism, Tripartite Conferences, and Tripartite Industrial Peace Councils. – (a)
Tripartism in labor relations is hereby declared a State policy. Towards this end, workers and
employers shall, as far as practicable, be represented in decision and policy-making bodies
of the government.
"(b) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives may
from time to time call a national, regional, or industrial tripartite conference of
representatives of government, workers and employers, and other interest groups as the
case may be, for the consideration and adoption of voluntary codes of principles designed to
promote industrial peace based on social justice or to align labor movement relations with
established priorities in economic and social development. In calling such conference, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may consult with accredited representatives of workers
and employers.
"(c) A National Tripartite Industrial Peace Council (NTIPC) shall be established, headed by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, with twenty (20) representatives each from the
labor and employers’ sectors to be designated by the President at regular intervals. For this
purpose, a sectoral nomination, selection, and recall process shall be established by the
DOLE in consultation with the sectors observing the ‘most representative’ organization
criteria of ILO Convention No. 144.
"Tripartite Industrial Peace Councils (TIPCs) at the regional or industry level shall also be
established with representatives from government, workers and employers to serve as a
continuing forum for tripartite advisement and consultation in aid of streamlining the role of
government, empowering workers’ and employers’ organizations, enhancing their respective
rights, attaining industrial peace, and improving productivity.1âwphi1
"The TIPCs shall have the following functions:
"(1) Monitor the full implementation and compliance of concerned sectors with the
provisions of all tripartite instruments, including international conventions and declarations,
codes of conduct, and social accords;
"(2) Participate in national, regional or industry-specific tripartite conferences which the
President or the Secretary of Labor and Employment may call from time to time;
"(3) Review existing labor, economic and social policies and evaluate local and international
developments affecting them;
"(4) Formulate, for submission to the President or to Congress, tripartite views,
recommendations and proposals on labor, economic, and social concerns, including the
presentation of tripartite positions on relevant bills pending in Congress;
"(5) Advise the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the formulation or implementation of
policies and legislation affecting labor and employment;
"(6) Serve as a communication channel and a mechanism for undertaking joint programs
among government, workers, employers and their organizations toward enhancing labor-
management relations; and
"(7) Adopt its own program of activities and rules, consistent with development objectives.
CASES
(1) Association de Agricultores vs.Talisay Silay Milling Co.
February 19, 1979, GR No. L-19937
FACTS:
On June 1952, Republic Act 809 was enacted for the purpose of addressing the necessity to
increase the share of planters and laborers in the income derived from the sugar industry.
Said act was to regulate the relations among the persons engaged in the sugar industry.
Under Section 1 thereof, it was provided that in the absence of written milling agreements
between the majority of planters and the millers of sugarcane in any milling district in the
Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced in that district from the milling by any sugar
central of the sugar cane of any sugarcane planter or planterowner, as well as all byproducts
and derivative thereof, shall be divided between them depending on the maximum actual
production. The higher the rate of production, the bigger the percentage given to the
planters.
The Association de Agricultores de TalisayvSilay Inc. and six sugarcane planters (PLANTERS)
filed a petition to the Secretary of Labor, praying that the latter declare the applicability of
the RA 809to the TalisaySilay Mill District (CENTRAL) for every crop year starting from 1952-
1962.
CENTRAL alleged that RA 809 was invalid and unconstitutional and even if it was valid, the
planters had written milling contracts with them at the time the said act went into effect,
and the planters who entered into said contracts did so voluntarily and those voluntary
contracts may not be altered or modified without infringing the constitutional guarantee on
freedom of contracts and non-impairment clause of the Constitution. CENTRAL also alleged
that the law violates the equal protection clause since bigger milling districts should provide
bigger shares than smaller ones.
ISSUE: Whether RA 809 would violate the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and
infringe the Constitutional guarantee on freedom of contracts if applied to the TalisaySilay
Mill District. And whether RA 809 violates the equal protection clause.
HELD:
No. RA 809 is a social justice and police power measure for the promotion of
labor conditions in sugar plantations.Hence, whatever rational degree of constraint it
exerts on freedom of contract and existing contractual obligation as is constitutionally
permissible. The said act was concerned and enacted as a social legislation designed
primarily to ameliorate the condition of the laborers in the sugar plantation. Having in view
its primary objective, to promote the interests of the laborer, it can never be possible that
the State would be bereft of constitutional authority to enact legislations of its kind.
Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution of 1935, under the aegis of which the law in
question was enacted, made it one of the declared principles to which the people committed
themselves that "the promotion of social justice to insure the wellbeing and
economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State." More
specifically in regard to labor, there was also Section 6 of Article XIX, to the effect that "the
State shall afford protection to labor ... and shall regulate the relation between . .
. labor and capital in industry and in agriculture.
With regard to equal protection, the Republic Act did not violate such clause.The obvious
standard used by the legislature is the amount of production in each district. Naturally, the
planters adhered to the bigger centrals should be given bigger shares, considering that the
more a sugar central produces, the bigger its margin of profit which can be correspondingly
cut for the purpose of enlarging the share of the planters. Understandably, the smaller
centrals may not be able to afford to have their shares reduced substantially, which is
evidently the reason why the law has not been made applicable to centrals having a
production of less than 150,000 piculs a year.
(2) PAL v. PALEA, 57 SCRA 489
June 28, 1974, GR No. L-24626
FACTS:
Fidel Gotangco, an employee of Philippine Airlines for almost 17 years, was caught and
apprehended by the authorities of such company trying to slip out a lead material which size
is just 8 x 10 x ½ inches.
Philippine Airlines filed a case of breach of trust and violation of the rules and regulations of
the company before the Court of Industrial Relations.
However such court dismissed the case filed by Philippine airlines and ordered Fidel
Gotangco be reinstated despite a blatant violation of the rules and regulations of such
company.
Hence, Philippine airlines filed an appeal before the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for its decision reinstating Fidel Gotangco despite
a blatant violation of the rules and regulations of such company.
HELD: No. The Court of Industrial Relations did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction for its decision reinstating Fidel Gotangco despite a blatant
violation of the rules and regulations of the company.
The order was proper. The whole controversy is centered around the right of the Court of
Industrial Relations to order the readmission of a laborer who, it is admitted, had been
found derelict in the performance of his duties towards his employer. We concede that the
right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees, is subject to regulation by
the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police power. (Com. Act Nos. 103 and
213). But much as we should expand beyond economic orthodoxy, we hold that an
employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who
admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose
continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interests.'" Its tone of
certitude is unwarranted. The very excerpt cited speaks of the paramount police power as a
limitation on the right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees. Moreover,
while there was an admission that misfeasance or malfeasance could be a ground for
dismissal, the last sentence thereof reads: "The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer,
authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer." Where, therefore, it
could be shown that the result would be neither oppressive nor self-destructive, it cannot be
asserted dogmatically that an outright termination, of employment is justified. n the light of
all the circumstances disclosed, particularly that it was a first offense after seventeen years
of service, reached the conclusion, neither arbitrary nor oppressive, that dismissal was too
severe a penalty, this Court should not view the matter differently. From the facts as found
by respondent Court accepted by petitioner, the offense was "breach of trust and violation
of the rules and regulations of the company." A lead material of negligible size, in the
opinion of respondent Court, its measurement being eight inches by ten inches, with
thickness of one-half inch, not shown to be of any use to the company, hardly of any
pecuniary worth, it would be too harsh an appraisal to view it as constituting theft.
(3) NASECO vs. NLRC, et.al. G.R. No. L-69870 November 29 ,1988
Topic : Illegal Dismissal
FACTS:
Eugenia Credo, Chief of Property and Records of NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION
(NASECO) filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the Ministry of Labor after
having been placed in forced leave without due process. Said forced leave was a product of
her alleged non-compliance of a memorandum coming from a Finance Manager, and other
past acts of misconduct as found by NASECO’s committee on Personnel Affairs.
In the Manager’s office, Credo was made to explain her side in connection with the conducts
for which she is complained of. But because she failed to explain, she was handed a Notice
of Termination. Credo thus filed a supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal and lack of
opportunity to be heard.
ISSUE: Was there an illegal dismissal?
RULING:
Yes.
These guidelines[1] mandate that the employer furnish an employee sought to be dismissed
two (2) written notices of dismissal before a termination of employment can be legally
effected. These are the:
(1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought and
(2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to
dismiss him.
The dictates of procedural due process requires that decision to dismiss can only be handed
after employer has afforded employee concerned ample opportunity to be heard and defend
himself. In the case at bar, the compliance with the injunction to apprise her of the charges
filed against her and to afford her a chance to prepare her defense was dispensed in only a
day. This is not effective compliance with the legal requirements.
[1] As guidelines for employers in the exercise of their power to dismiss employees for just
causes, the law provides that:
“Section 2. Notice of dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish
him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his
dismissal . . .
“Section 5. Answer and Hearing. The worker may answer the allegations stated against
him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with
the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
“Section 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing
of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.”
(4) PLDT v. NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, GR No. L-80609, August 23, 1988
FACTS:
Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT), was accused by two (2) complainants of having demanded and received from the
the total amount of P3,800 in consideration of her promise to facilitate approval of their
applications for telephone installation. Investigated and heard, she was found guilty as
charged and accordingly separated from the service. She went tot he Ministry of Labor and
Employment claiming she had been illegally removed. After the evidence and arguments of
the parties were considered, the company was sustained and the complaint was dismissed
for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter’s decision, however, awarded financial assistance to
Abucay equivalent to one month of pay for every year of service. Both Abucay and PLDT
appealed to the National Labor Relations Borad, which upheld the decision in toto. PLDT
filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the
petition, affirming the decision of the Board except for the grant of separtation pay in the
form of financial assistance, which was disallowed.
ISSUE: Whether Abucay is entitled to financial assistance / separation pay even if she was
removed from employment for just case, on the basis of equity and compassion and due to
previous decisions of the Supreme Court.
HELD: The rule embodied in the Labor Code is that a person dismissed for cause (as
defined therein) is not entitled to separation pay. The case of Firestone Tire vs. Lariosa,
Soco vs. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, Filipino Inc. vs. NLRC, and others, constitute the
exception, based upon considertations of equity. Equity has been defined as justice outside
law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law.
Hence, it cannot prevail against the expressed provision of the labor laws allowing dismissal
of employees for cause and without any provision for separation pay. Still, where the
exception has been applied, the justification for the grant of separation pay and the amount
or rate of such award. has not been consistent. The Court, thus, made distinctions. Where it
comes to such valid but not iniquitous causes as failure to comply with work standards, the
grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee may be both just and compassionate,
particularly if he has worked for some time with the company. Under such circumstances,
the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice
policy even if the separation is for cause. Separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of
social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes
other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. A contrary rule
would have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his
offense. The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply
because it is committed by the underprivileged.
A. STATUTORY SOURCE AND INTERPRETATION
(1) BF Goodrich Confidential and Salaried Employees Union v. BF Goodrich
Philippines, Inc. 49 SCRA 532, GR NO. 34069-70, Feb. 28, 1973
FACTS: The Goodrich Unions were seeking to be recognized as the bargaining agent of BF
Goodrich Phils’ employees so that there could negotiations for a collective contract. BF
Goodrich countered this by filing for two petitions for certification election with the CIR.
Strike notices were sent to the company by the union demanding recognition and soon after
a strike was actually held. The company then filed a case of illegal strike and unfair labor
practice against the unions.
ISSUE: WON the determination of an unfair labor practice case, brought against unions,
must precede the holding of a certification election
HELD: No.
REASONING: - If under the circumstances disclosed, management is allowed to have its
way, the result might be to dilute or fritter away the strength of an organization bent on a
more zealous defense of labor's prerogatives. - This is not to say that management is to be
precluded from filing an unfair labor practice case. It is merely to stress that such a suit
should not be allowed to lend itself as a means, whether intended or not, to prevent a truly
free expression of the will of the labor group as to the organization that will represent it. -
There is no valid reason then for the postponement sought. This is one instance that calls
for the application of the maxim, lex dilationes semper exhorret. (The law abhors delays.) -
The law clearly contemplates all the employees, not only some of them, to take part in the
certification election. (Some of the employees could possibly lose such status, by virtue of a
pending unfair labor practice case, if such case is to be resolved first before the election.) -
Another reason (re: no point in the postponement of said election) is that even if the
company wins in the pending case, it does not mean that the employees involved
automatically would lose their jobs making them ineligible to participate in the cert. election.
(Ergo the respondent court decided in the negative.) Besides, it was said in General
Maritime Stevedores' Union v. South Sea Shipping Line: the question of whether or not a
certification election shall be held "may well be left to the sound discretion of the Court of
Industrial Relations, considering the conditions involved in the case…."
(2) Caltex Filipino Manager and Supervisors Association v. CIR, 44 SCRA
350
FACTS: The Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association is a labor
organization of Filipino managers supervisors in Caltex (Philippines), Inc., respondent
Company in this proceeding. On February 8, 1965 the Association sent a set of
proposals to the Company wherein one of the demands was the recognition of the
Association as the duly authorized bargaining agency for managers and supervisors in
the Company. To this the Company countered stating that a distinction exists between
representatives of management and individuals employed as supervisors and that it is
Company's belief that managerial employees are not qualified for membership in a
labor organization; hence, it is digested that the Association institute a certification
proceeding so as to remove any question with regard to position titles that should be
 included in the bargaining unit. The Association felt disinclined to follow the suggestion
of the Company and so on February 22, 1965 the Company initiated a certification
proceeding docketed as Case 1484- MC. On March 8, 1965 the Association filed notice
to strike. On the basis of the strike notice filed on March 8, 1965 and in view of acts
committed by the Company which the Association considered as constituting unfair
labor practice, the Association struck on April 22, 1965. The Company, filed Case No.
1484-MC(1) praying among others, to declare the strike of Caltex Filipino Managers and
Supervisors Association “illegal”.. The Association's charge for unfair labor practices
against the Company and its officials on September 10, 1965, in Case No. 4344- ULP
against Caltex (Philippines), Inc., W. E. Menefee and B.F. Edwards. According to the
latter, the Company and some of its officials, including B.F. Edwards, inquired into the
organization of the Association and he manifested his antagonism to it and its
President; that another Company official, W.E. Menefee issued a statement of policy
designed to discourage employees and supervisors from joining labor organizations;
that the Company refused to bargain although the Association commands majority
representation; that due to the steps taken by the Company to destroy the Association
or discourage its members from continuing their union membership, the Association
was forced to file a strike notice; that on April 22, 1965 it declared a strike; and that
during the strike the Company and its officers continued their efforts to weaken the
filed with respondent court denied the charges of unfair labor practice.
ISSUE: (a) Whether or not the CIR has jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1); (b) Whether
or not the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal and, incident thereto,
whether respondent court correctly terminated the employee status of Jose Mapa,
Dominador Mangalino and Herminigildo Mandanas and reprimanded and admonished the
other officers of the Association; and (c) Whether or not respondent court correctly absolved
the respondents in Case No. 4344-ULP from the unfair labor practice charge.
HELD: Respondent's court's jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1) has to be tested by the
allegations, reading of said pleading shows that the same is for injunctive relief under
Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 (Magna Carta of Labor); for contempt, obviously
pursuant to See, 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 in conjunction with Sec. 3 (b) of Rule 71
of the Rules of Court; and for forfeiture of the employee status of the strikers by virtue of
their participation in what the Company considered as an "illegal strike." It is well known
that the scheme in Republic Act No. 875 for achieving industrial peace rests essentially on a
free and private agreement between the employer and his employees as to the terms and
conditions under which the employer is to give work and the employees are to furnish labor,
unhampered as far as possible by judicial or administrative intervention. On this premise the
lawmaking body has virtually prohibited the issuance of injunctive relief involving or growing
out of labor disputes. The prohibition to issue labor injunctions is designed to give labor a
comparable bargaining power with capital and must be liberally construed to that end (U.S.
vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 79 F. Supp. 485, Certiorari denied, 69 S. Ct. 137,
335 U.S. 867, cause remanded on other grounds, 174 F. 2nd 160, 85 U.S. App. D.C.,
certiorari denied 70 S. Ct. 140, 338 U.S. 872, 94 L. Ed. 535). It is said that the prohibition
creates substantive and not purely procedural law. (Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation vs.
National Labor Relations Board, 49 F. Supp. 886). Within the purview of our ruling, speaking
through Justice Labrador, in Social Security Employees Association (PAFLU), et al. vs. The
Hon. Edilberto Soriano, et al. (G.R. No. L-20100, July 16, 1964, 11 SCRA 518, 520), there
can be no injunction issued against any strike except in only one instance, that is, when a
labor dispute arises in an industry indispensable to the national interest and such dispute is
certified by the President of the Philippines to the Court of Industrial Relations in compliance
with Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 875. As a corollary to this, an injunction in an uncertified
case must be based on the strict requirement See. 9 (d) of Republic Act No. 875; the
purpose of such injunction is not to enjoin the strike itself, but only unlawful activities. To
the extent, then, that the Company sought injunctive relief under Sec. 9(d) of Republic Act
No.875, respondent court had jurisdiction over the Company's "Urgent Petition" dated April
26, 1965. We now come to the issue as to whether the strike staged by the Association on
April 22, 1965 is illegal. To begin with, we view the return-to-work agreement of May 30,
1965 as in the nature of a partial compromise between the parties and, more important, a
labor contract; consequently, in the latter aspect the same "must yield to the common good"
(Art. 1700, Civil Code of the Philippines) and "(I)n case of doubt ... shall be construed in
favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer" (Art. 1702, ibid). To our mind when the
Company unqualifiedly bound itself in the return-to-work agreement that all employees will
be taken back "with the same employee status prior to April 22, 1965," the Company
thereby made manifest its intention and conformity not to proceed with Case No. 1484-MC,
(c) relating the illegality of the strike incident. For while it is true that there is a reservation
in the return-to-work agreement as follows: 6. The parties agree that all Court cases now
pending shall continue, including CIR Case No. 1484-MC. we think the same is to be
construed bearing in mind the conduct and intention of the parties. The failure to mention
Case No. 1484-MC(1) while specifically mentioning Case No. 1484-MC, in our opinion, bars
the Company from proceeding with the former especially in the light of the additional
specific stipulation that the strikers would be taken back with the same employee status
prior to the strike on April 22, 1965. The records disclose further that, according to Atty.
Domingo E. de Lara when he testified on October 9, 1965, and this is not seriously disputed
by private respondents, the purpose of Paragraph 10 of the return-to-work agreement was,
to quote in part from this witness, "to secure the tenure of employees after the returnto-
work agreement considering that as I understand there were demotions and suspensions of
one or two employees during the strike and, moreover, there was this incident Case No.
1484-MC(1)" (see Brief for the Petition pp. 41-42). To borrow the language of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Citizens Labor Union Pandacan Chapter vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company (G.R.
No. L-7478, May 6, 1955), in so far as the illegality of the strike is concerned in this
proceeding and in the light of the records. ... the matter had become moot. The parties had
both abandoned their original positions and come to a virtual compromise and agreed to
resume unconditionally their former relations. To proceed with the declaration of illegality
would not only breach this understanding, freely arrived at, but to unnecessarily revive
animosities to the prejudice of industrial peace. In addition, it is clear that the strike of the
Association was declared not just for the purpose of gaining recognition but also for
bargaining in bad faith on the part of the Company and by reason of unfair labor practices
committed by its officials. Significantly, in the voluntary return-to-work agreement entered
into between the Company and the Association, thereby ending the strike, the Company
agreed to recognize for membership in the Association the position titles mentioned in
Annex "B" of said agreement. The guilty conduct of the Company before, during after the
strike of April 22, 1965 cannot escape the Court's attention. It will suffice to mention typical
instances by way of illustration. Long prior to the strike, the Company had interferred with
the Cebu Supervisors' Union by enticing Mapa into leaving the Union under the guise of
promotion in Manila; shortly before the strike, B.R. Edwards, Manager-Operations, had
inquired into the formation and organization of the petitioner Association in this case. During
the strike, in addition to the culpable acts of the Company already narrated above, due
significance must be given to the inclusion initially of J.J. Mapa and A. Buenaventura, the
Association's President and Vice-President respectively, in 1965, in two coercion cases filed
at that time and their subsequent elimination from the charges the initiative of the Company
after the settlement of strike; the cutting off of telephone facilities extended Association
members in the refinery; and the use of a member of the Association to spy for the
company. The discriminatory acts practiced by the Company against active unionists after
the strike furnish further evidence that Company committed unfair labor practices as
charged.
B. DEFINITIONS
Labor code, Art (212) 219 DEFINITION
Art. 212. Definitions.
a. “Commission” means the National Labor Relations Commission or any of its
divisions, as the case may be, as provided under this Code.
b. “Bureau” means the Bureau of Labor Relations and/or the Labor Relations
Divisions in the regional offices established under Presidential Decree No. 1, in the
Department of Labor.
c. “Board” means the National Conciliation and Mediation Board established under
Executive Order No. 126.
d. “Council” means the Tripartite Voluntary Arbitration Advisory Council established
under Executive Order No. 126, as amended.
e. “Employer” includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers
or agents except when acting as employer.
f. “Employee” includes any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall not
be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly
states. It shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in
connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if
he has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment.
g. “Labor organization” means any union or association of employees which exists in
whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with
employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.
h. “Legitimate labor organization” means any labor organization duly registered with
the Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local
thereof.
i. “Company union” means any labor organization whose formation, function or
administration has been assisted by any act defined as unfair labor practice by this
Code.
j. “Bargaining representative” means a legitimate labor organization whether or not
employed by the employer.
k. “Unfair labor practice” means any unfair labor practice as expressly defined by the
Code.
l. “Labor dispute” includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and
conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee.
m. “Managerial employee” is one who is vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off,
recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those
who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial
actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature
but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within
any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes
of this Book.
n. “Voluntary Arbitrator” means any person accredited by the Board as such or any
person named or designated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement by the parties
to act as their Voluntary Arbitrator, or one chosen with or without the assistance
of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, pursuant to a selection
procedure agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, or any official that
may be authorized by the Secretary of Labor and Employment to act as Voluntary
 Arbitrator upon the written request and agreement of the parties to a labor
dispute.
o. “Strike” means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.
p. “Lockout” means any temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result
of an industrial or labor dispute.
q. “Internal union dispute” includes all disputes or grievances arising from any
violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by laws of
a union, including any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership
provided for in this Code.
r. “Strike-breaker” means any person who obstructs, impedes, or interferes with by
force, violence, coercion, threats, or intimidation any peaceful picketing affecting
wages, hours or conditions of work or in the exercise of the right of self-
organization or collective bargaining.
s. “Strike area” means the establishment, warehouses, depots, plants or offices,
including the sites or premises used as runaway shops, of the employer struck
against, as well as the immediate vicinity actually used by picketing strikers in
moving to and fro before all points of entrance to and exit from said
establishment. (As amended by Section 4, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
BOOK FIVE Labor Relations RULE I Definition of Terms SECTION 1.
Definition of terms. — (a) "Commission" means the National Labor Relations Commission.
(b) "Bureau" means the Bureau of Labor Relations and/or the Industrial Relations Division in
the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and Employment.
(c) "Board" means the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
(d) "Code" means the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended.
(e) "Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents
except when acting as employer.
(f) "Employee" includes any person in the employ of a particular employer. The term shall
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code so explicitly
states. It shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a result of or in connection
with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice if he has not obtained
any other substantially equivalent and regular employment.
(g) "Labor Organization" means any union or association of employees which exists in whole
or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning
terms and conditions of employment.
(h) "Local Union" means any labor organization operating at the enterprise level.
(i) "National Union/Federation" means any labor organization with at least ten (10) locals or
chapters each of which must be a duly recognized collective bargaining agent.
(j) "Legitimate Labor Organization" means any labor organization duly registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment and includes any branch, local or affiliate thereof.
(k) "Company Union" means any labor organization whose formation, function or
administration has been assisted by any act defined as unfair labor practice by the Code.
(l) "Bargaining Representative" means a legitimate labor organization or any duly authorized
officer or agent of such organization whether or not employed by the employer.
(m) "Unfair Labor Practice" means any unfair labor practice as expressly defined in the
Code.
(n) "Labor or Industrial Dispute" includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or
conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating the
fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging of terms and conditions of employment regardless
of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employers and
employees.
(o) "Managerial Employee" is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down
and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is
not merely routinary or clerical in nature but require the use of independent judgment. All
employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file
employees for purposes of this Book.
(p) "Voluntary Arbitrator" means any person accredited by the Board as such, or any person
named or designated in the collective bargaining agreement, by the parties to act as their
voluntary arbitrator, or one chosen, with or without the assistance of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board, pursuant to a selection procedure agreed upon in the
collective bargaining agreement, or any official that may be authorized by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment to act as voluntary arbitrator upon the written request and
agreement of the parties to a labor dispute.
(q) "Strike" means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as
a result of a labor or industrial dispute.
(r) "Strike-Breaker" means any person who obstructs, impedes, or interferes with by force,
violence, coercion, threats or intimidation any peaceful picketing by employees during any
labor controversy affecting wages, hours or conditions of work or in the exercise of the right
of self-organization or collective bargaining.
(s) "Strike Area" means the establishment, warehouse, depots, plants or offices, including
the sites or premises used as run-away shops, of the employer struck against, as well as the
immediate vicinity actually used by picketing strikers in moving to and fro before all points of
entrance to and exits from said establishment.
(t) "Lockout" means the temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result of a
labor or industry dispute.
(u) "Internal Union Dispute" includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of
or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, including any
violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in this Code.
(v) "Appeal" means the elevation by an aggrieved party of any decision, order or award of a
lower body to a higher body, by means of a pleading which includes the assignment of
errors, memorandum of arguments in support thereof, and the reliefs prayed for. A mere
notice of appeal, therefore, does not constitute the appeal as herein defined and
understood, and shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
(w) "Perfection of an Appeal" includes the filing within the prescribed period, of the
memorandum of appeal containing, among others, the assignment of error/s, the argument
in support thereof, the reliefs sought and posting of the appeal bond.
(x) "Certification Election" means the process of determining, through secret ballot, the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, for
purposes of collective bargaining. (y) "Consent Election" means the election voluntarily
agreed upon by the parties to determine the issue of majority representation of all the
workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit.
(z) "Run-Off" refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two (2) higher
number of voters when a certification election which provides for three (3) or more choices
results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, where the total number of
votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast.
(aa) "Registration of Agreement" refers to the filing of the collective bargaining agreement
with the Regional Office or the Bureau accompanied by verified proof of posting and
ratification and payment of fee.
(bb) "Organized Establishment" refers to a firm or company where there is a recognized or
certified exclusive bargaining agent.
(cc) "Registration Proceedings" refer to proceedings involving the application for registration
of labor organizations.
(dd) "Cancellation Proceeding" is the process leading to the revocation of the registration
certificate of a labor organization after due process. (ee) "Hearing Officers" are officers
appointed/designated in the Regional Office and authorized to hear and decide cases under
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6715 and whose decision is appealable to the Commission.
(ff) "Union Accounts Examiners" are officials in the Bureau or the Industrial Relations
Division in the Regional Office empowered to audit books of accounts of the union.
(gg) "Representation Officer" refer to a person duly authorized to conduct and supervise
certification elections in accordance with Rule VI of this Book.
(hh) "Term of Office" means the tenure of office of elected officials of a labor organization
which is for a fixed period of five (5) years.
(ii) "Cabo" refers to a person or group or persons or to a labor group which, in the guise of
a labor organization, supplies workers to an employer, with or without any monetary or
other consideration whether in the capacity of an agent of the employer or as an ostensible
independent contractor.
(jj) "Collective Bargaining Agreement" refers to the negotiated contract between a
legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all
other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit, including mandatory
provisions for grievances and arbitration machineries.
(kk) "Med-Arbiter" is an official in the Regional Office authorized to hear, conciliate, mediate
and decide representation cases, internal union and inter-union disputes.
(ll) "Administrator" refers to the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration or the National Conciliation and Mediation Board as the context so indicates.
1. EMPLOYER and EMPLOYEE (E) and (F)
Feati University v. Bautista, 18 SCRA 1191
Gr No. L-21278, December 27, 1966
FACTS:
 January 14, 1963: the President of Feati University Faculty Club (PAFLU) wrote a
letter to Mrs. Victoria L. Araneta, President of Feati University informing her that it
registered as a labor union.
 January 22, 1963: PAFLU sent a letter with 26 demands in relation to their
employment and requesting an answer within 10 days from receipt thereof.
 Araneta answered the letters, requesting that she be given at least 30 days to
study thoroughly the different phases of the demands. Meanwhile counsel for
Feati, wrote a letter to the President of PAFLU demanding proof of its majority
status and designation as a bargaining representative
 February 1, 1963: the President of PAFLU rejected the extension of time and filed
a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor due to Feati’s refusal to bargain
collectively.
 Conciliation Division of the Bureau of Labor made efforts to conciliate them but
failed.
 February 18, 1963: PAFLU declared a strike and established picket lines in the
premises of Feati resulting in the disruption of classes in the University.
 March 21, 1963: the President of the Philippines certified to the Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR) the dispute between Feati and PAFLU pursuant to the provisions of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875.
 3 cases were filed with the CIR
 CIR Case No. 41-IPA – PAFLU’s petition to declare in contempt of court
since Feati refused to accept them back to work in violation of the
return-to-work order of March 30, 1963 and has employed professors
and/or instructors to take their places
 CIR Case No. 1183-MC – PAFLU’s petition for certification election
praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative
 Later withdrawn since the Case 41-IPA had already been
certified by the President to the CIR and has absorbed the
issues herein
 CIR Case No. V-30 – PAFLU’s complaint for indirect contempt of court
filed against the administrative officials of the Feati reiterating Case 41-
IPA
 May 10, 1963: Feati filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with writ of preliminary injunction which was issued upon the Feati's filing a bond
of P50,000 (increased from P1,000), ordering CIR Judge Jose S. Bautista to desist
and refrain from further proceeding
 March 23, 1963: On the strength of the presidential certification, Judge Bautista
set the case for hearing
 Feati, thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground that the
CIR has no jurisdiction over the case, because:
1. The Industrial Peace Act is NOT applicable to the University, it being an
educational institution, nor to the members of the Faculty Club, they being
independent contractors;
2. the presidential certification is violative of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace
Act, as the University is not an industrial establishment and there was no
industrial dispute which could be certified to the CIR.
 Judge Bautista denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the strikers to return
immediately to work and the University to take them back under the last terms
and conditions existing before the dispute arose.
 Without the motion for reconsideration having been acted upon by the CIR en
banc, Judge Bautista set the case for hearing on the merits for May 8, 1963 but
was cancelled upon Feati’s petition for certiorari alleging that Judge Jose S.
Bautista acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, in taking cognizance of, and in issuing the questioned orders in, CIR
Cases Nos. 41-IPA 1183-MC and V-30
 Feati claims that it is not an employer within the contemplation of R.A. 875,
because it is not an industrial establishment
 Feati also claims that it is only a lessee of the services of its professors and/or
instructors pursuant to a contract of services entered into between them because
the University does not exercise control over their work
ISSUE: Whether Feati University can be considered as an employer and PAFLU as an
employee to be covered by R.A. 875 and have right to unionize.
HELD: YES. petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in Case G.R.
No. L-21278 is dismissed
 Section 2(c) of R.A. 875:
The term employer include any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include any labor organization (otherwise
than when acting as an employer) or any one acting in the capacity or agent
of such labor organization.
 Congress did not intend to give a complete definition of "employer", but rather
that such definition should be complementary to what is commonly understood as
employer
 Act itself specifically enumerated those who are not included in the term
"employer" and educational institutions are not included; hence, they can be
included in the term "employer". However, those educational institutions that are
not operated for profit are not within the purview of Republic Act No. 875.
 o Feati realizes profits and parts of such earning is distributed as
dividends to private stockholders or individuals.
 It embraces not only those who are usually and ordinarily considered employees,
but also those who have ceased as employees as a consequence of a labor
dispute.
 employee must be one who is engaged in the service of another; who performs
services for another; who works for salary or wages
 "workers" limited to those performing physical labor
o embrace stenographers and bookkeepers
o Teachers are not included
 Feati controls the work of the members of its faculty
o prescribes the courses or subjects that professors teach, and when and
where to teach
o professors' work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a fixed
duration
o professors are compensated for their services by wages and salaries,
rather than by profits
o professors and/or instructors cannot substitute others to do their work
without the consent of the university
o professors can be laid off if their work is found not satisfactory
 Moreover, even if university professors are considered independent contractors,
still they would be covered by Rep. Act No. 875
 Professors, instructors or teachers of private educational institutions who teach to
earn a living are entitled to the protection of our labor laws — and one such law is
Republic Act No. 875.
 The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in
proximate relation of employer and employees.
 To certify a labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under the
law (Because the strike declared by the members of the minority union threatens
a major industry of 18,000 students which affects the national interest), and this
Court will not interfere in, much less curtail, the exercise of that prerogative. The
jurisdiction of the CIR in a certified case is exclusive. The parties involved in the
case may appeal to the Supreme Court from the order or orders thus issued by
the CIR.
 Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 empowers the Court of Industrial Relations to
issue an order "fixing the terms of employment." This clause is broad enough to
authorize the Court to order the strikers to return to work and the employer to
readmit them.
The return-to-work order cannot be considered as an impairment of the contract
entered into with the replacements. Besides, labor contracts must yield to the
common good and such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions,
collective bargaining, strikes and similar subjects.
XxxX
FEATI UNIVERSITY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations and
FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB-PAFLU, respondents.
Facts:
The private respondent wrote a letter to president of petitioner informing her of the
organization of the Faculty Club into a registered labor union.
President of the Faculty Club sent another letter containing twenty-six demands that have
connection with the employment of the members of the Faculty Club by the University, and
requesting an answer within ten days from receipt thereof. The President of the University
answered the two letters, requesting that she be given at least thirty days to study
thoroughly the different phases of the demands.
Meanwhile counsel for the University, to whom the demands were referred, wrote a letter to
the President of the Faculty Club demanding proof of its majority status and designation as a
bargaining representative.
President of the Faculty Club filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor alleging as
reason therefore the refusal of the University to bargain collectively.
The parties were called to conferences but efforts to conciliate them failed.
Members of the Faculty Club declared a strike and established picket lines in the premises of
the University, resulting in the disruption of classes in the University. President of the
Philippines certified to the Court of Industrial Relations the dispute between the
management of the University and the Faculty Club pursuant to the provisions of Section 10
of Republic Act No. 875.

The Judge endeavored to reconcile the part and it was agreed upon that the striking faculty
members would return to work and the University would readmit them under a status quo
arrangement. On that very same day, however, the University, thru counsel filed a motion to
dismiss the case upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the case, because (1)
the Industrial Peace Act is not applicable to the University, it being an educational
institution, nor to the members of the Faculty Club, they being independent contractors; and
(2) the presidential certification is violative of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act, as the
University is not an industrial establishment and there was no industrial dispute which could
be certified to the CIR.
The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. The University filed a motion for
reconsideration by the CIRen banc, without the motion for reconsideration having been
acted upon by the CIR en banc, respondent Judge set the case for hearing but the
University moved the cancellation of the said hearing upon the ground that the court en
banc should first hear the motion for reconsideration and resolve the issues raised therein
before the case is heard on the merits but denied.
Faculty Club filed with the CIR in Case 41-IPA a petition to declare in contempt of court
certain parties, alleging that the University refused to accept back to work the returning
strikers, in violation of the return-to-work order.
The University filed its opposition to the petition for contempt by way of special defense that
there was still the motion for reconsideration which had not yet been acted upon by the CIR
en banc. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not FEATI is an employer within the purview of the Industrial Peace Act.
Held:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Based on RA 875 Section 2(c) The term employer
include any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not
include any labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer) or any one
acting in the capacity or agent of such labor organization.
In this case, the University is operated for profit hence included in the term of employer.
Professors and instructors, who are under contract to teach particular courses and are paid
for their services, are employees under the Industrial Peace Act.
Professors and instructors are not independent contractors. university controls the work of
the members of its faculty; that a university prescribes the courses or subjects that
professors teach, and when and where to teach; that the professors’ work is characterized
by regularity and continuity for a fixed duration; that professors are compensated for their
services by wages and salaries, rather than by profits; that the professors and/or instructors
cannot substitute others to do their work without the consent of the university; and that the
professors can be laid off if their work is found not satisfactory. All these indicate that the
university has control over their work; and professors are, therefore, employees and not
independent contractors.
2. Labor organization – LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION (G) and (H)
(1) Airline Pilots Association, et al. v. CIR, 76 SCRA 274, gr No. L-33705,
April 15, 1977
FACTS:
- ALPAP and PAL were locked in a labor dispute (case #1) with ALPAP members
staging a strike
- CIR issued a return-to-work order several times before the strikers halted
- Two pilots, one of them being Felix Gaston, refused to take the flights
assigned to him which prompted PAL to terminate his services
- A majority of ALPAP members adopted a resolution amending its constitution and by-laws
allowing any active member who shall be forced to retire or forced to resign or otherwise
terminated for union activities to have the option to either continue to be and remain as an
active member in good standing or to resign in writing
- PAL filed an urgent ex parte to enjoin ALPAP members from proceeding with their en
masse resignation/retirement
- Despite a no-work-stoppage order from CIR, a substantial majority (180) of ALPAP
members filed letters or retirement/resignation with PAL
- PAL withheld from them any benefit or privileged them may have been entitled by reason
of employment because of their defiance of the CIR order
- Those who left PAL elected Gaston as president; those who remained with PAL (45 in all)
elected Ben Hur Gomez
- The Gomez faction filed a certification petition with the CIR praying that it be declared as
the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of all pilots then employed by PAL
and were then on active flight and/or operational assignments
- This was opposed by the Gaston group on the ground that the CIR had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter because a certification proceeding in the CIR is not the proper forum for
the adjudication as to who is the lawful president of a legitimate labor organization (Gaston
did not want Gomez faction to take over the corporate name and funds of ALPAP)
- CIR rendered a decision certifying ALPAP as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the abovementioned pilots with Gomez as president
- CIR held that the amendment to the by-laws was illegal because it was not adopted in
accordance with the procedure prescribed and because nonemployees cannot be included as
ALPAP members
Issue(s):
(1)w/n non-employees can represent and be a member of a union of employees of a certain
employer
(2)who between Gomez and Gaston is the true president of ALPAP
Held:
(1) Yes. Procedurally, 221 out of 270 members voted in favor of the member during a
general membership meeting, all in compliance with ALPAP by-laws. Substantively, the
restrictive interpretation made by CIR is erroneous.
Sec. 2(e) of RA 875 defines a “labor organization” as any union “any union or association of
employees which exists, in whole or in part, for the purpose of collective bargaining or of
dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment." The absence of
the condition which the CIR would attach to the statutory concept of a labor organization, as
being limited to the employees of a particular employer is quite evident from the law. The
emphasis of the Industrial Peace Act is clearly on the purposes for which a union or
association of employees is established rather than that membership therein should be
limited only to the employees of a particular employer. Even under Section 2(h)
"representative" is defined as including "a legitimate labor organization or any officer or
agent of such organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employee whom
he represents." It cannot be overemphasized likewise that a labor dispute can exist
"regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee."
Moreover, nothing in the constitution and by-laws of ALPAP restricts membership therein to
PAL pilots alone. Although there has never been an instance where a non-PAL pilot became
a member of ALPAP, the complete lack of any such preconditionfor ALPAP membership
cannot but be interpreted as an unmistakable authority for the association to accept pilots
into its fold though they may not be under PAL's employ. Therefore, CIR’s certification of the
Gomez faction was made with GAD.
(2) As between Gomez and Gaston, the court held that Gomez’s election cannot be valid and
binding. He was elected at a meeting of only 45 ALPAP members called just one day after
the election of Gaston as President of ALPAP who received a majority of 180 votes out of a
total membership of 270.
While SC considers the CIR ruling, on the matter of who has the exclusive rights to the
office, funds and name of ALPAP, as having been erroneously made, it did not hold,
however, that those belonging to the group of Gomez do not possess any right at all over
the office, funds and name of ALPAP of which they are also members.
It is perfectly within the powers and prerogatives of a labor organization, through its duly
elected officers, to authorize a segment of that organization to bargain collectively with a
particular employer, particularly where those constituting the segment share a common and
distinguishable interest, apart from the rest of their fellow union members, on matters that
directly affect the terms and conditions of their particular employment. As the circumstances
pertinent to the case at bar presently stand, ALPAP (Gaston) has extended recognition to
ALPAP (Gomez) to enter and conclude collective bargaining contracts with PAL. Having given
ALPAP (Gomez) this authority, it would be clearly unreasonable on the part of ALPAP
(Gaston) to disallow the former a certain use of the office, funds and name of ALPAP when
such use is necessary or would be required to enable ALPAP (Gomez) to exercise, in a
proper manner, its delegated authority to bargain collectively with PAL. Clearly, an
intelligently considered adjustment of grievances and integration of the diverse and varying
interests that not infrequently and, often, unavoidably permeate the membership of a labor
organization, will go a long way, in achieving peace and harmony within the ranks of ALPAP.
Of course, in the eventuality that the pilots presently employed by PAL and who subscribe to
the leadership of Ben Hur Gomez should consider it to their better interest to have their own
separate office, name and union funds, nothing can prevent them from setting up a
separate labor union. In that eventuality, whatever vested rights, interest or participation
they may have in the assets, including cash funds, of ALPAP as a result of their membership
therein should properly be liquidated in favor of such withdrawing members of the
association
(2) Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, 247 SCRA 1, GR No. L-
93117, August 1, 1995
FACTS:
On July 26, 1989, respondent, National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the
Philippines-TUCP filed to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office
number VI, Bacolod City, a petition for direct certification or for certification election to
determine the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the supervisory
employees of herein petitioner Lopez Sugar Corporation.
NACUSIP-TUCP averred that it was a legitimate national labor organization; that LSC was
employing 55 supervisory employees; the majority of whom were members of the union;
that no other labor org was claiming membership over the supervisory employees and that
there was no existing collective bargaining agreement covering said employees; and that
there was no legal impediment either to direct certification of NACUSIP-TUCP or to the
holding of a certification election.
LSC opposed and contended, dated August 14, 1989, that the petitioner was bereft of any
legal or factual basis; that the petition was nothing more than a useless scrap of paper
designed to harass the company; and that it’s employees above the rank-and-file category
were in truth unaware of the petition.
On August 18, 1989, Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor Organization (CAILO) a
registered labor organization also claiming to count substantial membership among the LSC
supervisory employees, moved to intervene. Thus, GRANTED.
On Sept. 13, 1989, Carlo S. Gevero, asserting a right to represent the “supervisors of LSC”
filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of interest on the part of the supervisory
employees.
Oct. 16 1989 Med- arbiter Felijardo T. Serapio issued an order granting the petition. He
ruled that under Art 257 of the Labor Code, as amended, the Med-Arbiter was left with no
option but to order the conduct of a certification election immediately upon the filing of
petition, holding that the subsequent disaffiliation or withdrawals of members did not
adversely affect the standing of the petition.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it refused to
dismiss a petition for certification election despite clear lack of legal and factual basis for
holding the same.
HELD: Yes. Public respondent Hon. Secretary of Labor and employment committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it refused to dismiss a petition for
certification election despite clear lack of legal and factual basis for holding the same.
The petition for certification of election was filed by the NACUSIP-TUCP, a national
labor organization duly registered with DOLE rendered Certificate no. FED-402-6390-IP. The
legitimate status of NACUSIP-TUCP might be conceded; being merely an agent for the local
organization (NACUSIP TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter, the Federation’s
bona fide status alone would not suffice.
The local chapter should also be a legitimate labor organization in good standing.
Accordingly, in Progressive Development, we elucidated:
A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon
submission of the following to the Bureau of Labor Relations:
1. A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or
national union.
2. The constitution and by laws, a statement on the set of officers and the books of
accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the
case maybe, of such local or chapter and attested to by its president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not
become a legitimate labor organization.
The only document extant on record to establish the legitimacy of the NACUSIP-TUCP
Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter is a charter certificate and nothing else. Hence,
violated, in case of union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements in Rule
II section 3, Book V of the implementing Rules.
The instant petition is granted. The petition for certification of election is dismissed.
XxxxX
Facts
-The Med-Arbiter, sustained by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, has ruled that Art.
257 is mandatory and give him no other choice than to conduct a certification election upon
the receipt of the corresponding petition.
“Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. -In any establishment where there is no
certified bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the
Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization.”
-National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines-TUCP (“NACUSIP-
TUCP”) filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (“DOLE”) a petition for direct
certification or for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the supervisory employees of herein petitioner, Lopez Sugar
Corporation (“LSC”). NACUSIP-TUCP averred that it was a legitimate national labor
organization; that LSC was employing 55 supervisory employees, the majority of whom were
members of the union; that no other labor organization was claiming membershipover the
supervisory employees; that there was no existing collective bargaining agreement covering
said employees; and that there was no
legal impediment either to a direct certification of NACUSIP-TUCP or to the holding of a
certification election.
-LSC contended it. NACUSIP-TUCP submitted Charter Certificate No. 003-89, dated 20 July
1989, of the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter.
-LSC appealed to the DOLE and asseverated that the order was a patent nullity and that the
Med-Arbiter acted with grave abuse of discretion, Sec. of Labor denied it. Petition for
certiorari was filed.
Issue WON the certification election should push through
bargaining power upon labor unions must be balanced with the policy of providing
preventive measures against the commission of fraud.
“A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon submission
of the following to theBLR:

Held No, because the labor organization is not legitimate. It was held in Progressive “1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national
Development Corporation vs. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment: union, and

“But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the automatic conduct of a
certification election in an unorganized establishment, it also requires that the petition for
certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. Article 212(h) defines a
legitimate labor organization as ‘any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and
includes any branch or local thereof.’ Rule 1, Section 1(j), Book V of the Implementing Rules
likewise defines a legitimate labor organization as ‘any labor organization
duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch, local or affiliate thereof .’ “
“2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of
accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may
be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president.
“Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not
become legitimate labor organization.”

The only document extant on record to establish the legitimacy of the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez
Indeed, the law did not reduce the Med-Arbiter to an automaton which can instantly be set Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter is a charter certificate and nothing else.
to impulse by the mere filing of a petition for certification election. He is still tasked to
satisfyhimself that all the conditions of the law are met, and amongthe legal requirements is
that the petitioning union must be legitimate labor organization in good standing. Disposition WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Secretary of Labor, dated 06 March
1990, affirming that of the Med-Arbiter, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petition for
certification election is dismissed. No costs.
The petition for certification election, in the case at bench, was filed by the NACUSIP-TUCP,
a national labor organization duly registered with the DOLE. The legitimate status of
NACUSIPTUCP might be conceded; being merely, however, an agent for the local 3. LABOR DISPUTE (L)
organization (the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter), the
federation’s bona fide status alone would not suffice. The local chapter, as its principal,
shouldalso be a legitimate labor organization in good standing. Definition

Accordingly, in Progressive Development, we elucidated: “In the case of

union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements are found in Rule II,
(1) San Miguel Corporation Employees Union v. Bersamina, 186 SCRA 496
Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing Rules, which we again quote as follows:

“‘(c ) The local or chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a
FACTS:
constitution and by laws, set of officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the
procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or
Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with
national unions shall be observed.’ “Since the ‘procedure governing the reporting
Lipercon and D'Rite (independent contractors duly licensed by the DOLE). In said contracts,
independently registered unions’ refers to the certification
it was expressly understood and agreed that the workers employed by the contractors were
and attestation requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the
to be paid by the latter and that none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of
constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and
SanMig. There was to be no employer-employee relation between the contractors and/or its
chapter must likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring the
workers, on the one hand, and SanMig on the other.
submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists in the case of
union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact compliance with the certification
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO (the Union, for brevity) is the
and attestation requirements because, as previously mentioned,
duly authorized representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of SanMig with
several requirements applicable to independent union registration are no longer required in
whom the latter executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement.
the case of the formation a local or chapter. The policy of the law in conferring greater
In a letter, dated 20 November 1988 (Annex C, Petition), the Union advised SanMig that
some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and sought the
regularization of their employment with SMC.
On 12 January 1989 on the ground that it had failed to receive any favorable response from
SanMig, the Union filed a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union
busting
Beginning 14 February 1989 until 2 March 1989, series of pickets were staged by Lipercon
and D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and offices.
On 6 March 1989, SMC filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages
ISSUE:
Whether, or not the case at bar involves, or is in connection with, or relates to a labor
dispute
HELD:
A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy
or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the
terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee."
A labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relationship of employer and employee"
That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom, what
the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and
D'Rite in effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely
dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure
and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved
bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also seeks to
represent those workers, who have signed up for Union membership, for the purpose of
collective bargaining. SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground that
there is no employer-employee relationship.
(2) Gold City Integrated Port Service Inc. v. NLRC, 245 SCRA 627
Note: A strike can only happen when there is a labor dispute.
FACTS: Early in the morning of April 30, 1985, employees of Gold City Integrated Port
Services Inc, stopped working and gathered in a mass action to express their grievances
regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. On the same morning, the strikers
filed individual notices of strike with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment. With the
failure of conciliation conferences between the company (Gold City Integrated port Services,
Inc., INPORT, for short) and the strikers, the former (INPORT) filed a complaint before the
Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction. The
NLRC issued a temporary restraining order which prompted the strikers to return to work.
The strike staged by the said workers was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal for not
complying with the requirements in Article 246 of the Labor Code. The NLRC affirmed with
the modification the Arbiter’s decision. It held that the concerted action by the workers was
more of a “protest action” than a strike. However, the Commission still affirmed the Labor
Arbiter’s decision which declared the strike illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mass action of the employees is the result of labor dispute
between the parties involved.
HELD: A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or condition or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the
terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employers and employees. Private respondents and their co-
workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their
wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of
work by concerted action resulted from labor dispute
Test for Determining Labor Dispute
(1) RCPI v. Philippine Communications Electronics and Electricity Workers
Federation, 65 SCRA 82
FACTS: In a labor dispute involving RCPI and RCPI employees' union where union members
were dismissed following a strike due to their defiance of a return to work order issued by
the Industrial Court, this Court declared the dismissal illegal and ordered immediate
reinstatement of the illegally dismissed employees. -RCPIEU filed a petition for a modified
judgment to include an award of backwages to the employees concerned in addition to
reinstatement. -RCPI opposed upon the ground that the issue of payment of backwages was
neither raised in nor passed upon by the Industrial Court and not even touched in the
previous pleadings of the respondents. Additionally, the matter is being looked into by
National Relations Board, hence it is not necessary for this Court to take it up.
ISSUE: WON the Court may modify its judgment to include an award of backwages
HELD: -The Industrial Court had no discretion in the matter for there was no issue of fault it
had to decide. If it overlooked the award, that was plain error which is within the Court's
prerogative to correct motu propio, as it is done in appeals by writ of error (sec. 7 rule 51). -
Such award is in order, for it is a logical and inescapable consequence of the order of
reinstatement that one is actually incomplete without the other. -Not ruling on this point
now to leave it for action by the National Labor Relations Board and thereby give rise to
another possible appeal in this Court is to unnecessarily lengthen the process for the
respondents to get what is rightfully due them, contrary to the Constitutional duty to give
protection to labor. Motion of respondent RCPIEU for modification of judgment granted.
possible appeal in this Court is to unnecessarily lengthen the process for the respondents to
get what is rightfully due them, contrary to the Constitutional duty to give protection to
labor. Motion of respondent RCPIEU for modification of judgment granted.

C. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY

(1) Dispute Settlement Methodology

Art (211) 218 (a)

To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations,
including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or
industrial disputes;
(2) Collective Bargaining Agreement o possession of the status of majority representation of the employees'
representative in accordance with any of the means of selection or
designation provided for by the Labor Code;
Kiok Loy v. NLRC, 1414 SCRA 179 o proof of majority representation; and

FACTS:
 The Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa, a legitimate late labor federation, won and
was subsequently certified in a resolution by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice
Cream Plant.
 The Union furnished the Company with two copies of its proposed collective
bargaining agreement. At the same time, it requested the Company for its counter
proposals. Both requests were ignored and remained unacted upon by the
Company.
 Thereafter, the Union filed a "Notice of Strike", with the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR) on ground of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining.
 Conciliation proceedings then followed during the thirty-day statutory cooling-off
period. But all attempts towards an amicable settlement failed.
o a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code.
 A Company's refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the
entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith since the Union's request for a
counter proposal is left unanswered. Besides, petitioner Company's approach and
attitude-stalling the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at
the hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its financial statements,
lead to no other conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an
agreement with the Union.
(3) Trade Unionism
Art (211) 218 (b) (c)
To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of democracy and
the promotion of social justice and development;

 The case was brought to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement;
compulsory arbitration pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended. But
the Company requested for a lot of postponements. NLRC ruled that respondent
Sweden Ice Cream is guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of Section
(g) Article 248 (now Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended. Art (212) 219 (g)

ISSUE: Whether the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain. “Labor organization” means any union or association of employees which exists in whole or
in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning
HELD: Yes. Petition dismissed for lack of merit. terms and conditions of employment

 Collective bargaining is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor
Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to
create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility (4) Worker Enlightenment
of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation.

 Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an
Art (211) 218 (d)
employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as union
work, and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for members and as employees;
adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and
executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party.

 The mechanics of collective bargaining are set in motion only when the following Art. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization (p)
jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely,
It shall be the duty of any labor organization and its officers to inform its members on the
provisions of its constitution and by-laws, collective bargaining agreement, the prevailing
labor relations system and all their rights and obligations under existing labor laws.
Art. 277. Miscellaneous provisions (a)
All unions are authorized to collect reasonable membership fees, union dues, assessments
and fines and other contributions for labor education and research, mutual death and
hospitalization benefits, welfare fund, strike fund and credit and cooperative
undertakings. (As amended by Section 33, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
(1) Davao Integrated Port v. Olvida, 210 SCRA 339
FACTS: The DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT AND STEVEDORING SERVICES CORPORATION
filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
impugns the Decision dated May 19, 1990 of the Voluntary Arbitrator, Alfredo C. Olvida. The
controversy centers on the interpretation of two provisions of the five-year Collective
Bargaining Agreement (effective April 15, 1989 up to April 14, 1994) between the petitioner,
Davao Integrated Port and Stevedoring Services Corporation (or "DIPSSC"), and the
respondent, Association of Trade Unions [ATU-TUCP] (the Union, for short). Those
provisions are: 1. ARTICLE VIII - SICK, VACATION AND EMERGENCY LEAVES. Sec. 4 -
Emergency Leaves. The Company agrees to grant a maximum or six (6) days Emergency
Leave with pay per calendar year to all regular field workers, covered by this agreement
who have rendered at least six months of service (including overtime) per calendar year, are
members of the Regular Labor Pool, upon prior approval by the company. Said Emergency
Leave is not cumulative (sic) nor commutable." (pp. 46-47, Rollo; Emphasis supplied.)
ARTICLE XVII - SPECIAL PROVISIONS. Sec. 4 - Union Education and Training Fund. The
Company agrees to contribute twelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos per year to the Union
Education and Training Fund. (p. 48, Rollo.) According to petitioner Assistant General
Manager Benjamin Marzo, insisted that the above provisions are to be interpreted as: 1.
Under Article VIII, Section 4 (Emergency Leave) - that before the intermittent field workers
who are members of the Regular Labor Pool can avail of the six (6) days Emergency Leave
provided in this provision, the workers must have rendered at least six months of service per
calendar year regardless of their employment status (i.e., regular or probationary). Thus, all
regular (non-intermittent) field workers, who belong to the Regular Labor Pool must have
rendered at least six months of service per calendar year to be entitled to the six days
Emergency Leave Pay. Petitioner pointed out that the phrase "per calendar year" is used
twice in Section 4, the first of which modifies the word "pay" and the second modifies the
phrase "who or rendered at least six months of service." (pp. 130-131.) The entitlement and
enjoyment of the emergency leave must be strictly availed in the calendar year on which the
six months service was rendered. law library 2. Under Article XVII, Section 4 (Union
Education and Training Fund) - petitioner required that the Union should first prepare and
submit a seminar program before it can avail of the Education and Training Fund of
P12,000.00 per annum. After due hearing, respondent arbitrator rendered a decision on
interpretations of Article VIII, Section 4 and Article XVII, Section 4, of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement different to the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the respondent arbitrator is correct on its interpretation of the
provision in the said CBA.
HELD: The Supreme Court agrees to the petitioner contention. The Court finds the
petitioner's interpretation of Section 4, Article VIII (emergency leave) more logical than the
Arbitrator's and the Union's. The provision of the CBA is clear: (1) the employee must be a
member of the Regular Labor Pool; (2) he is entitled to only six (6) days emergency leave
with pay per calendar year; and (3) he must have rendered service for at least six (6)
months during the year when he took his emergency leave. The emergency leave may be
staggered or it may last for any number of days as emergencies arise but the employee is
entitled only to six (6) days of emergency leave "with pay" per year. Since the emergency
leave is allowed to enable the employee to attend to an emergency in his family or
household, it may be taken at any time during the calendar year but he must render at least
six months service for that year to be entitled to collect his wages for the six (6) days of his
emergency leave. Since emergencies are unexpected and unscheduled happenings, it would
be absurd to require the employee to render six (6) months service before being entitled to
take a six-day emergency leave with pay for it would mean that no emergency leave can be
taken by an employee during the first six months of a calendar year. law library With regard
to the provision on Union Education and Training Fund in Section 4, Article XVII of the CBA,
the petitioner's requirement that the Union submit a seminar program for each calendar year
before it may claim the company's P12,000 yearly donation to the fund, is not warranted by
the terms of the CBA. The Arbitrator did not abuse his discretion in ruling that the
respondent company should comply with its obligation to contribute to the Union Education
and Training Fund the amount of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) pesos per year by paying
said amount to the Union at the beginning of each and every year, or contributing P1,000.00
at the end of each and every month during the lifetime or the CBA, at the option of the
company. As correctly observed by the Arbitrator, the employer's demand for the submission
of a seminar program "is foreign to the language of the contract" with the union.
(2) Victoria v. Inciong, 157 SCRA 339
FACTS: Complainant Saturno Victoria is the president of the Far East Broadcasting Company
Employees Union. September 8, 1972 the said Union declared a strike against respondent
company because they were not recognized as a legitimate labor union by such company.
September 11, 1972 respondent filed with the Court Of First Instance of Bulacan, Civil Case
no 750-V for the issuance of an injunction and a prayer that the strike be declared illegal.
October 24 1972, complainant together with the other strikers filed with the ad hoc NLRC
case nos. 0021 and 0285 for reinstatement. The Arbitrator rendered a decision in said case
on December 28 1972, wherein he ordered respondent to reinstate complainants subject to
the following conditions:
 “This order shall, however, be without prejudice whatever the decision of the CFI suspension, lay-off or shutdown which may be effected by the employer w/o prior clearance
of Bulacan may promulgate in Civil case no. 750-v and to the requirements the within 5 days thereafter”
existing order may need of people working with the mass media communications”.

In a decision dated April 23, 1975 in Civil case no. 750-v, promulgated by the CFI of Bulcan,
the strike staged by herein complainant and other strikers was declared illegal. Based on
said decisions, respondent dismisssed complainant from his employment.

Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint for illegal dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not a clearance from the secretary of labor is not necessary before the
petitioner herein could be dismissed considering the restrictive condition in the decision of
the compulsory arbitration in NLRC.

HELD: No. a clearance from the secretary of Labor is not necessary before the petitioner
herein could be dismissed considering the restrictive condition in the decision of the
compulsory arbitration in NLRC.

The court agrees with the Solicitor General, technically speaking, no cleareance was
obtained by private respondent from the then Secretary of Labor, the last step towards full
compliance with the requirements of law on the matter of dismissal of employees.

However, the rationale behind the clearance was fully met. The secretary of Labor was
apprised of private respondents intention to terminate the services of petitioner from
employment. The affirmance of the restrictive condition in the dispositive portion of the
Labor arbiter’s decision in NLRC case no. 0021 and 0285 by the Secretary of Labor and the
Office of the President of the Philippines, signifies a grant of authority to dismiss petitioner
in case the strike be declared illegal by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Consequently,
and as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, private respondent acted in good faith when
it terminated the employment of petitioner upon declaration of illegality of the strike by the
CFI of Bulacan. Moreover, the the Secretary of Labor manifested his conformity to the
dismissal, not once, but twice. In this regard, the mandatory rule on clearance need not be
applied.

The Court also agrees with the acting Secretary of Labor that what was required in the case
of petitioner’s dismissal was only a report as provided under section 11(f) of Rule XIV of the
Rules and Regulation implementing the Labor code which provides:

“Every employer shall submit a report to the regional office in accordance with the form
presented by the Department on the following instances of termination of employment,
1. Machinery Dispute Settlement The Ministry shall help promote and gradually develop, with the agreement of labor
Art. (211) 218 (e) organizations and employers, labor-management cooperation programs at appropriate levels
To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the expeditious settlement of the enterprise based on the shared responsibility and mutual respect in order to ensure
of labor or industrial disputes industrial peace and improvement in productivity, working conditions and the quality of
working life. (Incorporated by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981)
2. Industrial Peace
Art. (211) 218 (f)
To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace; 4. Wage Fixing

Art. (211) 218 (b)

Art. 273. Study of labor-management relations. The Secretary of Labor shall
have the power and it shall be his duty to inquire into: To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of democracy and
the promotion of social justice and development
a. the existing relations between employers and employees in the Philippines;

b. the growth of associations of employees and the effect of such associations upon
employer-employee relations; Art (263) 278 (g) Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
c. the extent and results of the methods of collective bargaining in the determination When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
of terms and conditions of employment; lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to
d. the methods which have been tried by employers and associations of employees
the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the
for maintaining mutually satisfactory relations;
effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in
e. desirable industrial practices which have been developed through collective the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of
bargaining and other voluntary arrangements; assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return-to-
work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under
f. the possible ways of increasing the usefulness and efficiency of collective the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of
bargaining for settling differences; Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement
agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may
g. the possibilities for the adoption of practical and effective methods of labor- issue to enforce the same.
management cooperation;

h. any other aspects of employer-employee relations concerning the promotion of 9.Labor Injunction
harmony and understanding between the parties; and

i. the relevance of labor laws and labor relations to national development.

The Secretary of Labor shall also inquire into the causes of industrial unrest and
take all the necessary steps within his power as may be prescribed by law to
alleviate the same, and shall from time to time recommend the enactment of such
remedial legislation as in his judgment may be desirable for the maintenance and
promotion of industrial peace.
Art. [254] 266 Injunction Prohibited
No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing
out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise
provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 227,
June 1, 1982)

3. Worker Participation in Decision – Making Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. The Commission shall have the power
Art. (211) 218 (g) and authority:
To ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes a. To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of
affecting their rights, duties and welfare. cases before it and its regional branches, as well as those pertaining to its internal
functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
Art. (277) 292 (g) Miscellaneos Provisions purposes of this Code; (As amended by Section 10, Republic Act No. 6715, March
21, 1989)
b. To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such
books, papers, contracts, records, statement of accounts, agreements, and others
as may be material to a just determination of the matter under investigation, and
to testify in any investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this Code;
c. To conduct investigation for the determination of a question, matter or
controversy within its jurisdiction, proceed to hear and determine the disputes in
the absence of any party thereto who has been summoned or served with notice
to appear, conduct its proceedings or any part thereof in public or in private,
adjourn its hearings to any time and place, refer technical matters or accounts to
an expert and to accept his report as evidence after hearing of the parties upon
due notice, direct parties to be joined in or excluded from the proceedings,
correct, amend, or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in substance or
in form, give all such directions as it may deem necessary or expedient in the
determination of the dispute before it, and dismiss any matter or refrain from
further hearing or from determining the dispute or part thereof, where it is trivial
or where further proceedings by the Commission are not necessary or desirable;
and
d. To hold any person in contempt directly or indirectly and impose appropriate
penalties therefor in accordance with law.
A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the Chairman or any
member of the Commission or any Labor Arbiter as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward said officials, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn, or to answer as a witness or
to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be
summarily adjudged in direct contempt by said officials and punished by fine not
exceeding five hundred pesos (P500) or imprisonment not exceeding five (5) days,
or both, if it be the Commission, or a member thereof, or by a fine not exceeding
one hundred pesos (P100) or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if
it be a Labor Arbiter.
The person adjudged in direct contempt by a Labor Arbiter may appeal to the
Commission and the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending the
resolution of the appeal upon the filing by such person of a bond on condition that
he will abide by and perform the judgment of the Commission should the appeal
be decided against him. Judgment of the Commission on direct contempt is
immediately executory and unappealable. Indirect contempt shall be dealt with by
the Commission or Labor Arbiter in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court; and (As amended by Section 10, Republic Act No. 6715,
March 21, 1989)
e. To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all
prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any
labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party: Provided, That no temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving
or growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except
after hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-
examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and
testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of fact by the
Commission, to the effect:
1. That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed
and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining
order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except
against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or
committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the
same after actual knowledge thereof;
2. That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will follow;
3.That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon
complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the
granting of relief;
4. That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
5. That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property
are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been served,
in such manner as the Commission shall direct, to all known persons against
whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief Executive and other public officials of
the province or city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or
committed, charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property: Provided,
however, that if a complainant shall also allege that, unless a temporary
restraining order shall be issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable
injury to complainant’s property will be unavoidable, such a temporary restraining
order may be issued upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify
the Commission in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after notice. Such
a temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than twenty (20)
days and shall become void at the expiration of said twenty (20) days. No such
temporary restraining order or temporary injunction shall be issued except on
condition that complainant shall first file an undertaking with adequate security in
an amount to be fixed by the Commission sufficient to recompense those enjoined
for any loss, expense or damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance
of such order or injunction, including all reasonable costs, together with a
reasonable attorney’s fee, and expense of defense against the order or against the
granting of any injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and subsequently
denied by the Commission.
The undertaking herein mentioned shall be understood to constitute an agreement
entered into by the complainant and the surety upon which an order may be
rendered in the same suit or proceeding against said complainant and surety,
upon a hearing to assess damages, of which hearing, complainant and surety shall
have reasonable notice, the said complainant and surety submitting themselves to
the jurisdiction of the Commission for that purpose. But nothing herein contained
shall deprive any party having a claim or cause of action under or upon such
undertaking from electing to pursue his ordinary remedy by suit at law or in
equity: Provided, further, That the reception of evidence for the application of a
writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters
who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to be
accessible to the parties and their witnesses and shall submit thereafter his
 recommendation to the Commission. (As amended by Section 10, Republic Act No.
6715, March 21, 1989)
Art. 264. Prohibited activities.
a. No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first
having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without
first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the
necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the
Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the
President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the
same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any
unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike
may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the
employer during such lawful strike.
b. No person shall obstruct, impede, or interfere with, by force, violence, coercion,
threats or intimidation, any peaceful picketing by employees during any labor
controversy or in the exercise of the right toself-organization or collective
bargaining, or shall aid or abet such obstruction or interference.
c. No employer shall use or employ any strike-breaker, nor shall any person be
employed as a strike- breaker.
d. No public official or employee, including officers and personnel of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Integrated National Police, or armed
person, shall bring in, introduce or escort in any manner, any individual who seeks
to replace strikers in entering or leaving the premises of a strike area, or work in
place of the strikers. The police force shall keep out of the picket lines unless
actual violence or other criminal acts occur therein: Provided, That nothing herein
shall be interpreted to prevent any public officer from taking any measure
necessary to maintain peace and order, protect life and property, and/or enforce
the law and legal order. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24,
1986)
e. No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises
for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares. (As amended by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 227, June 1, 1982)
Art. [218] 225(e) Powers of the Commission
To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or
unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if
not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party
or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party: Provided, That no temporary or
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute as defined in
this Code shall be issued except after hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity
for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and
testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of fact by the
Commission, to the effect:
1. That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be
continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued
on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except against the person or persons,
association or organization making the threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or
actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;
2. That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will follow;
3.That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon
complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of
relief;
4. That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
5. That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are
unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such
manner as the Commission shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought,
and also to the Chief Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which
the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed, charged with the duty to protect
complainant’s property: Provided, however, that if a complainant shall also allege that,
unless a temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice, a substantial and
irreparable injury to complainant’s property will be unavoidable, such a temporary
restraining order may be issued upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify
the Commission in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after notice. Such a
temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than twenty (20) days and shall
become void at the expiration of said twenty (20) days. No such temporary restraining order
or temporary injunction shall be issued except on condition that complainant shall first file
an undertaking with adequate security in an amount to be fixed by the Commission
sufficient to recompense those enjoined for any loss, expense or damage caused by the
improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunction, including all reasonable costs,
together with a reasonable attorney’s fee, and expense of defense against the order or
against the granting of any injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and subsequently
denied by the Commission.
The undertaking herein mentioned shall be understood to constitute an agreement entered
into by the complainant and the surety upon which an order may be rendered in the same
suit or proceeding against said complainant and surety, upon a hearing to assess damages,
of which hearing, complainant and surety shall have reasonable notice, the said complainant
and surety submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Commission for that purpose. But
nothing herein contained shall deprive any party having a claim or cause of action under or
upon such undertaking from electing to pursue his ordinary remedy by suit at law or in
equity: Provided, further, That the reception of evidence for the application of a writ of
injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall
conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties
and their witnesses and shall submit thereafter his recommendation to the Commission. (As PART TWO – RIGHT TO SELF ORGANIZATION
amended by Section 10, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

A. BASIS OF RIGHT
Art. [266] 281 Requirement for Arrest & Detention

Art. 266. Requirement for arrest and detention. Except on grounds of national security
and public peace or in case of commission of a crime, no union members or union Art. III, Sec. 8, 1987 Constitution
organizers may be arrested or detained for union activities without previous consultations
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
with the Secretary of Labor
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Rationale for Policy on Injunction

Art. XIII, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution
Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association v. CIR, 44 SCRA 350
LABOR
[G.R. No. L-30632-33, April 11, 1972] Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
FACTS: with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
ISSUE: The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including
conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right
HELD: of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.

10. Tripartism
Art. III, Sec. 6, 1935 Constitution
Art. [275] 290 (a), (b)
The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
Art. 275. Tripartism and tripartite conferences. abridged.
a. Tripartism in labor relations is hereby declared a State policy. Towards this end, workers
and employers shall, as far as practicable, be represented in decision and policy-
making bodies of the government. Art. IV, Sec. 7, 1973 Constitution
b. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives may, from
time to time, call a national, regional, or industrial tripartite conference of representatives of The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to the law shall not be
government, workers and employers for the consideration and adoption of voluntary codes abridged.
of principles designed to promote industrial peace based on social justice or to align labor
movement relations with established priorities in economic and social development. In
calling such conference, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may consult with
1. Constitution
accredited representatives of workers and employers. (As amended by Section 32, Republic
Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

Art. III, Sec. 8, 1987 Constitution

The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Art. XIII, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution
LABOR
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including
conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right
of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.
Art. III, Sec. 6, 1935 Constitution
The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
Art. IV, Sec. 7, 1973 Constitution
The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to the law shall not be
abridged.
2. Statutory
Art. [243] 253 Coverage & Employee’s Right to Self-Organization
Art. 243. Coverage and employees’ right to self-organization. All persons employed
in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or
educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for
purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-
employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for their mutual aid and protection. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang
70, May 1, 1980)
Art. [244] 254 Right of Employees in Public Service
Art. 244. Right of employees in the public service. Employees of government
corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to
bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service
shall have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law. (As amended by
Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986)
Art. [245] 255 Managerial & Supervisory Employees
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization;
right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or
form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own. (As amended by Section 18, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21,
1989)
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10911 - AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
ANY INDIVIDUAL IN EMPLOYMENT ON ACCOUNT OF AGE AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES THEREFOR July 21, 2016
Section 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Age Discrimination in
Employment Act".
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policies. The State shall promote equal opportunities in employment
for everyone. To this end, it shall be the policy of the State to:
(a) Promote employment of individuals on the basis of their abilities, knowledge, skills and
qualifications rather than their age.
(b) Prohibit arbitrary age limitations in employment.
(c) Promote the right of all employees and workers, regardless of age, to be treated equally
in terms of compensation, benefits, promotion, training and other employment
opportunities.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:
(a) Employee refers to a person who performs professional, managerial or administrative
work and is paid salaries by the employer as compensation for services rendered;
(b) Employer refers to any person, natural or juridical, employing the services of an
employee or worker and shall include the government and all its branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities, all government-owned and -controlled corporations, and government
financial institutions, as well as nonprofit private institutions or organizations;
(c) Job applicant refers to a person who applies for employment;
(d) Labor contractor refers to any person or an agent of that person who regularly
undertakes, with or without compensation, the procurement of employees or workers for an
employer, or the procurement for employees' or workers' opportunities to work for an
employer;
(e) Labor organization refers to any union or association of employees or workers which
exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or for dealing with
employers concerning terms and conditions of employment;
(f) Publisher refers to any person or juridical entity engaged in the printing of information on
paper and its distribution, buying or securing of airtime or space on television, radio or the
internet, and other similar media; and
(g) Worker refers to a person who performs manual labor involving skilled or unskilled work,
and is paid wages by the employer as compensation for services rendered.
Sec. 4. Coverage. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all employers, labor contractors or
subcontractors, if any, and labor organizations.
Sec. 5. Prohibition of Discrimination in Employment on Account of Age. (a) It shall be
unlawful for an employer to:
(1) Print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, in any form of media, including the
internet, any notice of advertisement relating to employment suggesting preferences,
limitations, specifications, and discrimination based on age;
(2) Require the declaration of age or birth date during the application process;
(3) Decline any employment application because of the individual's age;
(4) Discriminate against an individual in terms of compensation, terms and conditions or
privileges of employment on account of such individual's age;
(5) Deny any employee's or worker's promotion or opportunity for training because of age;
(6) Forcibly lay off an employee or worker because of old age; or
(7) Impose early retirement on the basis of such employee's or worker's age.
(b) It shall be unlawful for a labor contractor or subcontractor, if any, to refuse to refer for
employment or otherwise discriminate against any individual because of such person's age.
(c) It shall be unlawful for a labor organization to:
(1) Deny membership to any individual because of such individual's age;
(2) Exclude from its membership any individual because of such individual's age; or
(3) Cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation
of this Act.
(d) It shall be unlawful for a publisher to print or publish any notice of advertisement
relating to employment suggesting preferences, limitations, specifications, and discrimination
based on age.
Sec. 6. Exceptions. It shall not be unlawful for an employer to set age limitations in
employment if:
(a) Age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary in the normal
operation of a particular business or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age;
(b) The intent is to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system that is not intended to
evade the purpose of this Act;
(c) The intent is to observe the terms of a bona fide employee retirement or a voluntary
early retirement plan consistent with the purpose of this Act: Provided, That such retirement
or voluntary retirement plan is in accordance with the Labor Code, as amended, and other
related laws; or
(d) The action is duly certified by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in accordance
with the purpose of this Act.
Sec. 7. Penalty. Any violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not less than fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but not more than five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than three (3) months but not more than two
(2) years, or both, at the discretion of the court. If the offense is committed by a
corporation, trust, firm, partnership or association or other entity, the penalty shall be
imposed upon the guilty officer or officers of such corporation, trust, firm, partnership or
association or entity.
Sec. 8. Education and Research Programs. The Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) shall:
(a) Conduct studies and researches on minimizing impediments to the employment of older
persons, and furnish such information to employers, labor groups, and the general public;
and
(b) Promote programs, in coordination with public and private agencies, that will further
enhance the knowledge and skills of every individual regardless of age.
Sec. 9. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DOLE shall have the authority to
investigate and require the keeping of records necessary for the administration of this Act.
Within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment shall formulate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the provisions
of this Act.
Singer Sewing Machine Company v. Drilon, 193 SCRA 182
Sec. 10. Separability Clause. Should any provision of this Act be declared unconstitutional,
[G.R. No. L-91307, January 24, 1991]
the remainder thereof not otherwise affected shall remain in full force and effect.

Sec. 11. Repealing Clause. All existing laws, presidential decrees, executive orders,
proclamations or administrative regulations that are inconsistent with the provisions of this SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY vs. HON. FRANKLIN DRILON
Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
193 SCRA 271
VASSAR INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION (VIEU) vs.
HON. FRANCISCO L. ESTRELLA; as Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relatio
ns, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), and VASSAR INDUSTRIES, INC. Facts: Singer Machine Collectors Union-Baguio filed a petition for direct certification as the
G.R. No. L-46562 March 31, 1978 sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all collectors of Singer Sewing Machine. The company
opposed the petition mainly because the union members are not employees but
FACTS: independent contractors as evidenced by the collection agency agreement which they
There was in existence a collective bargaining agreement between private respondents Asso signed.
ciated Labor Unions and Vassar Industries, Inc.. Prior to its expiration, 111 of a total number
of 150 employees of such firm disaffiliated from the former labor organization and formed t
heir own union. Thereafter, they filed an application for registration of their union with the B
ureau of Labor Relations, complying with an the requirements of both the Labor Code and it Med-Arbiter ruled that there exists an employee-employer relationship and granted the
s implementing regulations. While such application was pending, petitioner Union filed a peti certification election which was affirmed by Sec. Drilon. The company files the present
tion for certification as bargaining agent for the rank-and- petition on the determination of the relationship. The union insist that the provisions of the
file employees of the company. The MedArbiter denied their plea on the ground that the uni Collection Agreement belie the company’s position that the union members are independent
on was not duly registered with the Department of Labor. contractors.
The Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, denied, the application for registration
on the ground that there is a registered collective bargaining agent in the company.
Issue: Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an application for registration should be denied just because there is already
a registered collective bargaining agent in the company.
Ruling: The present case calls for the application of the control test, which if not satisfied,
RULING: would lead to the conclusion that no employee-employer relationship exists. If the union
No. As long as an applicant union complies with all of the legal requirements for registration, members are not employees, no right to organize for the purpose of bargaining or as a
it becomes the BLR’s ministerial duty to so register the union. It suffices then to order that bargaining agent cannot be recognized.
petitioner Union be registered, there being no legal obstacle to such a step and the duty of t
he Bureau of Labor Relations being clear. Then there is this ruling in Philippine Labor Allianc
e Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations that calls for application that “once the fact of disaffil
The following elements are generally considered in the determination of the relationship: the
iation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, as in this case, a certification election is the m
selection and engagement of the employee, payment of wages, power of dismissal and the
ost expeditious way of determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargainin
power to control the employee’s conduct which is the most important element.
g representative.” In the meanwhile, if as contended by private respondent labor union the i
nterim collective bargaining agreement which was entered during the pendency of the petiti
on of the petitioner, has much more favorable terms for the workers of private respondent
Vassar Industries, then it should continue in full force and effect until the appropriate bargai The nature of the relationship between a company and its collecting agents depends on the
ning representative is chosen and negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement th circumstances of each particular relationship. Not all collecting agents are employees and
ereafter concluded. This is one way of assuring that both the social justice, and the protectio neither are all collecting agents independent contractors. The agreement confirms the status
n to labor provisions would be effectively implemented without sanctioning an attempt to fru of the collecting agents as independent contractor. The requirement that collection agents
strate the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction in a pending case. utilize only receipt forms and report forms issued by the company and that reports shall be
submitted at least once a week is not necessarily an indication of control over the means by
which the job collection is to be performed. Even if report requirements are to be called
control measures, any control is only with respect to the end result of the collection since
the requirements regulate the things to be done after the performance of the collection job
or the rendition of service.
The plain language of the agreement reveals that the designation as collection agent does
not create an employment relationship and that the applicant is to be considered at all times
as an independent contractor.
The court finds that since private respondents are not employees of the company, they are
not entitled to the constitutional right to form or join a labor organization for the purposes of
collective bargaining. There is no constitutional and legal basis for their union to be granted
their petition for direct certification
Metrolab Industries v. Confessor, 254 SCRA 182
[G.R. No. 108855, February 28, 1996]
Topic: Confidential Employees
FACTS:
Private respondent Metro Drug Corporation Employees Association-Federation of Free
Workers (hereinafter referred to as the Union) is a labor organization representing the rank
and file employees of petitioner Metrolab Industries, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Metrolab/MII) and also of Metro Drug, Inc.
The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Metrolab and the Union expired. The
negotiations for a new CBA, however, ended in a deadlock.
The Union filed a notice of strike against Metrolab and Metro Drug Inc.
The parties failed to settle their dispute despite the conciliation efforts of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board.
SECRETARY OF LABOR Ruben D. Torres: issued an assumption order of jurisdiction over the
entire labor dispute at Metro Drug, Inc. - Metro Drug Distribution Division and Metrolab
Industries Inc.
SECRETARY OF LABOR: issued an order resolving all the disputed items in the CBA and
ordered the parties involved to execute a new CBA.
The Union filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR).
During the pendency of the MR, Metrolab laid off 94 of its rank and file employees.
The Union filed a motion for a cease and desist order to enjoin Metrolab from implementing
the mass layoff, alleging that such act violated the prohibition against committing acts that
would exacerbate the dispute as specifically directed in the assumption order.
Metrolab contended that the layoff was temporary and in the exercise of its management
prerogative.
Thereafter, on various dates, Metrolab recalled some of the laid off workers on a temporary
basis due to availability of work in the production lines.
ACTING SEC. OF LABOR Nieves Confesor: a resolution declaring the layoff of Metrolabs 94
rank and file workers illegal and ordered their reinstatement with full backwages.
After exhaustive negotiations, the parties entered into a new CBA. The execution, however,
was without prejudice to the outcome of the issues raised in the reconsideration and
clarification motions submitted for decision to the Secretary of Labor.
The Union filed a motion for execution. Metrolab opposed.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari with application for issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not public respondent Labor Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion
and exceeded her jurisdiction in declaring the subject layoffs instituted by Metrolab illegal on
grounds that these unilateral actions aggravated the conflict between Metrolab and the
Union who were, then, locked in a stalemate in CBA negotiations.
 2. Whether or not the Public Respondent Secretary of DOLE gravely abused her discretion in
including executive secretaries as part of the bargaining unit of the rank and file employees
RULING:
1. NO, because the Secretary of Labor is expressly given the power under the Labor Code to
assume jurisdiction and resolve labor disputes involving industries indispensable to national
interest. The disputed injunction is subsumed under this special grant of authority.
Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code specifically provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to
the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the
effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in
the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to
work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under
the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement
agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may
issue to enforce the same.
2. NO, because Article I (b) of the 1988-1990 CBA provides:
b)Close Shop. - All Qualified Employees must join the Association immediately upon
regularization as a condition for continued employment. This provision shall not apply to: (i)
managerial employees who are excluded from the scope of the bargaining unit; (ii) the
auditors and executive secretaries of senior executive officers, such as, the President,
Executive Vice-President, Vice-President for Finance, Head of Legal, Vice-President for Sales,
who are excluded from membership in the Association; and (iii) those employees who are
referred to in Attachment I hereof, subject, however, to the application of the provision of
Article II, par. (b) hereof. Consequently, the above-specified employees are not required to
join the Association as a condition for their continued employment.
On the other hand, Attachment I provides:
Exclusion from the Scope of the Close Shop Provision
The following positions in the Bargaining Unit are not covered by the Close Shop
provision of the CBA (Article I, par. b):
1. Executive Secretaries of Vice-Presidents, or equivalent positions.
2. Executive Secretary of the Personnel Manager, or equivalent positions.
3. Executive Secretary of the Director for Corporate Planning, or equivalent positions.
4. Some personnel in the Personnel Department, EDP Staff at Head Office, Payroll Staff at
Head Office, Accounting Department at Head Office, and Budget Staff, who because of the
nature of their duties and responsibilities need not join the Association as a condition for
their employment.
5. Newly-hired secretaries of Branch Managers and Regional Managers.
Both Metro Drug and Metrolab read the exclusion of managerial employees and
executive secretaries as exclusion from the bargaining unit. They point out that managerial
employees are lumped under one classification with executive secretaries, so that since the
former are excluded from the bargaining unit, so must the latter be likewise excluded.
The exclusion of managerial employees, in accordance with law, must therefore still
carry the qualifying phrase from the bargaining unit in Article I (b)(i) of the 1988-1990
CBA. In the same manner, the exclusion of executive secretaries should be read together
with the qualifying phrase are excluded from membership in the Association of the same
Article and with the heading of Attachment I. The latter refers to Exclusions from Scope of
Close Shop Provision and provides that [t]he following positions in Bargaining Unit are not
covered by the close shop provision of the CBA.
The basis for the questioned exclusions, it should be noted, is no other than the
previous CBA between Metrolab and the Union. If Metrolab had undergone an organizational
restructuring since then, this is a fact to which we have never been made privy. In any
event, had this been otherwise the result would have been the same. To repeat, we limited
the exclusions to recognize the expanded scope of the right to self-organization as embodied
in the Constitution.
The Court concurs with Metrolab contention that executive secretaries of the General
Manager and the executive secretaries of the Quality Assurance Manager, Product
Development Manager, Finance Director, Management System Manager, Human Resources
Manager, Marketing Director, Engineering Manager, Materials Manager and Production
Manager, who are all members of the company’s Management Committee should not only
be exempted from the closed-shop provision but should be excluded from membership in
the bargaining unit of the rank and file employees as well on grounds that their executive
secretaries are confidential employees, having access to vital labor information.
Confidential employees cannot be classified as rank and file. The nature of
employment of confidential employees is quite distinct from the rank and file, thus,
warranting a separate category. Excluding confidential employees from the rank and file
bargaining unit, therefore, is not tantamount to discrimination.
DISPOSITIVE: Metrolab Industries Inc. partially won. The executive secretaries of
petitioner Metrolabs General Manager and the executive secretaries of the members of its
Management Committee are excluded from the bargaining unit of petitioners rank and file
employees.
DOCTRINE: Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and
assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this
prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of
work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence,
are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.
B. EXTENT AND SCOPE OF RIGHT
Art. [246] 257 Non-Abridgement of Right to Self-Organization
Art. 246. Non-abridgment of right to self-organization. It shall be unlawful for any
person to restrain, coerce, discriminate against or unduly interfere with employees and
workers in their exercise of the right toself-organization. Such right shall include the right to
form, join, or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the
same purpose for their mutual aid and protection, subject to the provisions of Article 264 of
this Code. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980)
Reyes v. Trajano, 209 SCRA 484
[G.R. No. L-84433, June 2, 1992]
FACTS: Public Respondent Trajano as OIC of the Bureau of Labor Relations sustained the
denial by the Med Arbiter of the right to vote of one hundred forty-one members of the
“Iglesia ni Kristo” (INK), all employed in the same company, at a certification election at
which two labor organizations were contesting the right to be the exclusive representative of
the employees in the bargaining unit.
The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations
among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation. The competing unions were Tri-
Union Employees Union-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture
(TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS).
The final tally of the votes showed the following results:
TUPAS 1, TUEU-OLALIA 95, NO UNION 1, SPOILED 1, CHALLENGED 141
The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated and
excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between the competing unions,
reached at the pre-election conference, that the INK members should not be allowed to vote
“because they are not members of any union and refused to participate in the previous
certification elections.”
The INK employees promptly filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that it “was not
fair” and the result thereof did “not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the
employees.” TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition contending that the petitioners “do not
have legal personality to protest the results of the election,” because “they are not members
of either contending unit, but . . . of the INK” which prohibits its followers, on religious
grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization . . . .”
ISSUE: W/N employees who are not part of any union may validly exercise their right to
vote in a certification election
HELD: YES. Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the “right to self-organization and to
form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective
bargaining.” This is made plain by no less than three provisions of the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or
determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in
concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and protection, i.e., the
protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and interests.
The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to
refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one
should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be
compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person has opted to
acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting
to renounce such membership.
The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the
majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented
by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If
the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be
represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union may properly
be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit in dealing
with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment.
The minority employees — who wish to have a union represent them in collective bargaining
— can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification
election and hope that the results will be different. They may not and should not be
permitted, however, to impose their will on the majority — who do not desire to have a
union certified as the exclusive workers’ benefit in the bargaining unit — upon the plea that
they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective
bargaining.
The respondents’ argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because they “are
not constituted into a duly organized labor union” — “but members of the INK which
prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization”
— and “hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive
bargaining representative,” is specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor
jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization
may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible
intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in
the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not.
Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they
“did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that
their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations,” persuade
acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to
vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections.
General Rubber and Footwear Corporation v. BLR, 155 SCRA 283
[G.R. No. L-74262, October 29, 1987]
The appropriate bargaining unit > Determination of appropriate bargaining unit > Effect of
prior agreement
FACTS:
On 15 Oct 1982, General Rubber executed a CBA with General Rubber Workers Union
(Independent). Three years later [17 Jul 1985], the monthly-paid employees formed their
own collective bargaining unit [NATU] and filed a petition for direct certification with the
BLR. General Rubber opposed this. On 02 Sep 1985, the Med-Arbiter issued an order for the
holding of a certification election. A month later, the CBA expired. The daily-paid rank and
file employees formed the SamahangManggagawa sa General Rubber Corporation-ANGLO as
their union for collective bargaining. BLR issued an order that sanctioned the creation of 2
bargaining units in General Rubber.
Main arguments of General Rubber
1. There is already an existing bargaining unit, whose members are represented by
the ANGLOfor collective bargaining purposes, so why did BLR order the creation of
a new bargaining unit?
2. Managerial employees or those employees exercising managerial functions
CANNOT legally form and join a labor organization and be members of the new
bargaining unit.
3. Supervisors, employees performing managerial, confidential and technical
functions and office personnel, who are negotiated by General Rubber to be
excluded from the existing bargaining unit because they are performing vital
functions to management, CANNOT form and join a labor organization and be
members of the new bargaining unit.
Other arguments by General Rubber
1. A policy is in favor of a larger unit and not the creation of smaller units in one
establishment.
2. The monthly-paid-employees are excluded from the first existing bargaining unit
of the daily-paid rank and file employees because in 1963, when the employees
initially started to exercise their right to self-organization, General Rubber
bargained for the exclusion of the monthly-paid employees from the existing
bargaining unit because they are performing vital functions of management.
a. In view of this exclusion, General Rubber took upon itself to take care of
them and directly gave them the benefits or privileges without having to
bargain for them or without the aid of the bargaining arm or force of a
union.
ISSUES& HOLDING
WON the NATU members / monthly-paid employees are rank-and-file employees. YES
WON the monthly-paid employees should be allowed to join the union of the daily-paid
employees. YES
The fact that the employees perform supervisory functions (making recommendation
petitions as to what managerial actions to take in disciplinary cases)does not make them
managerial employees already.It has not been clearly established how effective those
recommendations are.
The proliferation of unions in an employer unit is discouraged as a matter of policy
unless there are compelling reasons which would deny a certain class of employees the right
to self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining. This case does not fall squarely
within the exception. The monthlies who are rank-and-file have been historically excluded
from the bargaining unit composed of daily-paid rank-and-filers. The expired CBA provides:
Section 1.Appropriate bargaining unit. — This Agreement covers all
regular employees and workers employed by the company at its factory
in Malabon, Metro Manila. The words "employee," "laborer" and
"workers" when used in this Agreement shall be deemed to refer to
those employees within the bargaining unit. Employees who occupy
managerial, confidential or technical positions, supervisors, contract
employees, monthly-paid employees, security as wen as office
personnel are excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit.

The NATU members are not managerial employees but merely considered as rank-and-file
employees who have every right to self-organization or to be heard through a duly certified
collective bargaining union. Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the
definition of managerial employees shall become eligible to join or assist the rank-and-file
labor organization, and if none exists, to form or assist in the forming of such organizations.
Perhaps it is unusual for General Rubber to have to deal with two collective
bargaining unions but there is no one to blame except General Rubber itself for creating the
situation it is in. From the beginning of the existence of a bargaining limit, General sought to
suppress the NATU members’ right to self-organization. General Rubber maintained that the
exclusion of the NATU members from the bargaining union of the rank-and-file or from
forming their own union was agreed upon by General Rubber with the previous bargaining
representatives. It has not been shown that NATU was privy to this agreement. Even if it
were so, it can never bind subsequent federations and unions because it is a curtailment of
the right to self-organization. The monthly-paid rank-and-file employees should be allowed
to join the union of the daily-paid-rank-and-file employees so that they can also avail of the
CBA benefits or to form their own rank-and-file union, without prejudice to the certification
election that has been ordered.
Knitjoy v. Calleja, 214 SCRA 174
[G.R. No. L-81883. September 23, 1992]
Katipunan ng mga Manggagawa sa Daungan v. Ferrer-Calleja, 278 SCRA 531
[G.R. No. L-104692, September 5, 1997]
In the bargaining history of KNITJOY, the CBA has been consistently limited to the regular
rank-and-file employees paid on a daily or piece-rate basis (represented by Federation of
Filipino Workers - FFW). On the other hand, the rank-and-file employees paid on a monthly
basis were never included within its scope. Prior to the expiration of the CBA, FFW was split
into 2 factions - the Johnny Tan and the Aranzamendez factions. The latter eventually
became the Confederation of Filipino Workers (CFW) while the former retained the name of
FFW. Respondent KMEUâs membership is limited to the latter class of employees, KMEU
does not seek to dislodge CFW as the exclusive bargaining representative for the former.
The records further disclose that in the certification solicited by TUPAS and during the
elections which followed thereafter, resulting in the certification of CFW as the exclusive
bargaining representative, the monthly-paid employees were expressly excluded. Thus, the
negotiations between CFW and KNITJOY following such a certification could only logically
refer to the rank-and-file employees paid on a daily or piece-rate basis. ISSUE: Is there a
violation of collective right of employees to self-organization? Whether or not petitioner
KNITJOYâs monthly-paid regular rank-and-file employees can constitute an appropriate
bargaining unit separate and distinct from the existing unit composed of daily or piece-rate
paid regular rank-and-file employees, and HELD: Yes. The suggested bias of the Labor Code
on one company-one union policy must yield to the right of the employees to form unions or
associations for purposes not contrary to law, to self-organization and to enter into collective
bargaining negotiations, among others, which the Constitution guarantees.
Knitjoy Manufacturing, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja (214 S 174)
FACTS: CFW is the certified CR of daily-paid rank-&-file
EEs of Knitjoy. While later and CFW were negotiating for
renewal of their CBA, KMEU filed a petition for certification
election among the monthly-paid rank-&-file EEs of knitjoy.
CFW challenged such.
ISSUE/S: WON monthly-paid rank-&-file EEs of Knitjoy can
constitute an ABU separate and distinct from existing unit
composed of daily-paid rank-&-file EEs
HELD: Yes. There can be separate bargaining unit on the
basis of this. The regular monthly-paid rank-&-file EEs of
Knitjoy were never included in the scope of the bargaining
unit of the daily-paid rank-&-file EEs of Knitjoy
Pan-American World Airways, Inc. v. Pan-American Employees Association, 27
SCRA 1202
[G.R. No. L-25094, April 29, 1969]
Pan American World Airways v. Pan American
Employees Association
[G.R. No. L-25094| 29 April 1969]
TOPIC:The Right to Self-Organization
PONENTE: J. Fernando
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The greater offense is to the labor movement itself, more specifically to the right of self-
organization. There is both a constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers have the
right to form unions to take care of their interests vis-à-vis their employers. Their freedom
to form organizations would be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their
own leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain for them.
EMERGENCY RECIT
Basically, the CIR didn’t allow the request of Pan American World Airways to exclude the five
union officials from a return-to-work order (meaning, sila lang yung hindi pinabalik) on the
ground of having led an illegal strike. The Supreme Court said that if they were to allow
their request, the Union would be given injustice in choosing their union officials and would
serve as a threat to their right to collectively bargain. Read ratio for better understanding.
FACTS:
 Respondent union filed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor. Three
days later, they declared and maintained a strike against Pan American World
Airways Inc.
 A month later, the President certified the strike to the CIR as being an industrial
dispute affecting the national interest. Hence, the parties were called to a
conference.
 Several conferences where held. It was the position of the Union that its members
would not resume the performance of their duties unless its officers were likewise
included in the return-to-work order.
 Petitioner disagreed. It agreed to having the workers return to work but not the
five officials of Respondent Union. It averred that the strike was illegal, being
offensive to the no-strike clause of their CBA which results to their possible
dismissal.
 Further, it was not agreeable to their return to the positions held by them prior to
the strike as they would not be only lacking in “incentive and motivation for doing
their work properly” but would likewise have the opportunity to cause “grave and
irreparable injury to the petitioner.”
 However, they did offer to deposit their salaries even if they would not be
working, with the promise that they would not even be required to refund any
amount should the right to remain in their positions be considered as legally
terminated by their calling the alleged illegal strike.
 Nonetheless, the judge issued an order requiring petitioner to accept the five
union officers pending resolution on the merits of the dispute involved in the
strike.
 Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion due to the failure to grant
petitioner’s demand.
ISSUE(S): W/N the request made by the Company to exclude the five officials is valid.
Union of Supervisors (RB NATU) v. Secretary of Labor, 109 SCRA 139
HELD: No. Petition is denied.
[G.R. No. L-39889, November 12, 1981]
RATIO:
 Petitioner, perhaps, without so intending it, betrayed an inexcusable lack of
confidence in the responsibility of union officials and ultimately in the validity of
the collective bargaining process itself. It is the basic premise under which a
regime of collective bargaining was instituted by the Industrial Peace Act that
through the process of industrial democracy, with both union and management
equally deserving of public trust, labor problems could be susceptible of the just
solution and industrial peace attained.
 Implicit in such a concept is the confidence that must be displayed by
management in the sense of responsibility of union officials to assure that the two
indispensable elements in industry and production could work side by side,
attending to the problems of each without neglecting the common welfare that
binds them together.
 The moment management displays what in this case appears to be grave but
unwarranted distrust in the union official discharging their functions just because
a strike was resorted to, then the integrity of the collective bargaining process
itself is called into question. It would have been different if there were a rational
basis for such fears, purely speculative in character. The record is bereft of the
slightest indication that any danger, much less one clear and present, is
to be expected from their return to work. Necessarily, the union officials
have the right to feel offended by the fact that, while they will be paid their
salaries in the meanwhile, they would not be considered as fit persons to perform
the duties pertaining to the positions held by them. Far from being generous, such
an offer could rightfully be considered insulting.
 The greater offense is to the labor movement itself, more specifically to the right
of self-organization. There is both a constitutional and statutory recognition that
laborers have the right to form unions to take care of their interests vis-à-vis their
employers. Their freedom to form organizations would be rendered
nugatory if they could not choose their own leaders to speak on their
behalf and to bargain for them.
 If the petitioner were to succeed in their demand, the laborers in this union would
thus be confronted with the sad spectacle of the leaders of their choice
condemned as irresponsible, possibly even constituting a menace to the
operations of the enterprise.
 What is worse, the result, even if not intended, would be to call into question their
undeniable right to choose their leaders, who must be treated as such with all the
respect to which they are legitimately entitled. The fact that they would be paid
but not allowed to work is, to repeat, to add to the infamy that would thus attach,
to them necessarily, but to respondent union equally.
 The demand would have resulted in the deprivation of the rank and file of their
freedom of choice as to who should represent them. For what use are leaders so
undeserving of the minimum confidence.

C. WORKERS WITH THE RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
1. All Employees
Art. [243] 253
Art. 243. Coverage and employees’ right to self-organization. All persons employed
in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or
educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for
purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-
employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for their mutual aid and protection. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang
70, May 1, 1980)
Alliance of Nationalist, et al. v. Samahan ng mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa sa
Manila Bay Spinning Mills at J.P. Coats (SAMANA BAY), 258 SCRA 371[G.R. No.
118562, July 5, 1996]
LLIANCE OF NATIONALIST (ANGLO)V. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA
G.R. No. 118562, July 5, 1996
FACTS:
In December 1993, SAMANA BAY(Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa saManila
Bay Spinning Mills and J.P. Coats) decided todisaffiliate from ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist
andGenuine Labor Organization) due to the latter’s dereliction of duty to promote the
welfare of SAMANABAY and the alleged case of corruption. ANGLOoverthrew all officers of
the respondent, andappointed new set of officers, for non-remittance offederation dues.
ANGLO contended that thedisaffiliation was void since the freedom period hasnot yet set
in.MED ARBITER: Declared the disaffiliation void butmaintained that the dismissal of officers
was illegal;ON APPEAL TO DOLE: Disaffiliation was VALID,Directed the Company (Manila Bay
Spinning Mills) toremit the dues directly to SAMANA; MR of ANGLOwas DENIED. SC:
Dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disaffiliation of SAMANAwas valid.
HELD: Yes.
As a rule, a labor union may disaffiliatefrom the mother union only within the freedom
period.
(PD 1391
–
“No petition for certification election,for intervention and disaffiliation shall
beentertained or given due course except within the60-
day freedom period…”)
However, under
ARTICLE 239-A,
disaffiliation may be carried out by a vote of
2/3 of its general membership in a meeting duly called for that purpose to
dissolve the organization.
In addition, with respect to theremoval of the officers, a local union does not owe
itsexistence to the federation with which it is affiliated.Having its own personality, the
mother federation hasno license to act independently of the local union.Any act performed
by ANGLO affecting the interestand affairs of SAMANA, including the ouster of
hereinindividual private respondent, is rendered withoutforce and effect.
Bautista v. Inciong, 158 SCRA 655
[G.R. No. L-52824, March 16, 1988]
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed by Associated Labor Unions(ALU) as organizer. Bautista went on le
ave and when he went back to work, he was informed that he was already terminated. The
Director ruled in favor of Bautista. The Deputy Minister of Labor, however, set aside the ord
er of the Director finding that his membership coverage with the SSS which shows that resp
ondent ALU is the one paying the employer’s share in the premiums is not conclusive proof t
hat respondent is the petitioner’s employer because such payments were performed by the r
espondent as a favor for all those who were performing full time union activities with it to en
title them to SSS benefits. He then ruled that there was no emplore-
employee relationship between ALU and Bautista by the fact that ALU is not an entity for pro
fit but a duly registered labor union whose sole purpose is the representation of its bonafide
organization units.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be employer-
employee relationship between a labor union and its member.
HELD:
Yes, the mere fact that the respondent is a labor union does not mean that it cannot be con
sidered an employer of the persons who work for it.
Moreover, the four elements in determining the existence of an employer-
employee relationship was present in the case at bar. The Regional Director correctly found
that the petitioner was an employee of the respondent union as reflected in the latter’s indivi
dual payroll sheets and shown by the petitioner’s membership with the Social Security Syste
m (SSS) and the respondent union’s share of remittances in the petitioner’s favor. Bautista
was selected and hired by the union. ALU had the power to dismiss him as indeed it dismiss
ed him. And definitely, the Union tightly controlled the work of Bautista as one of its organiz
ers.
Kapatiran Sa Meat and Canning Division v. Calleja, 162 SCRA 367[G.R. No. L-
82914, June 20, 1988]
FACTS: From 1984 to 1987 Petitioner Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division (TUPAS) was
the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the workers in the Meat and
Canning Division of the Universal Robina Corporation, with a 3-year collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) which was to expire on November 15, 1987.
Within the freedom period of 60 days prior to the expiration of its CBA, TUPAS filed an
amended notice of strike as a means of pressuring the company to extend, renew, or
negotiate a new CBA with it.
ISSUE: W/N members of a sect who are not allowed by their religion to join a labor union
may form their own union?
HELD: YES. This Court’s decision in Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA
54, upholding the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union
for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from
forming their own union. The public respondent correctly observed that the “recognition
of the tenets of the sect … should not infringe on the basic right of self-
organization granted by the constitution to workers, regardless of religious
affiliation.”
The fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60-day
freedom period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival union, NEW
ULO, to challenge TUPAS’ claim to majority status, by filing a timely petition for certification
election before TUPAS’ old CBA expired and before it signed a new CBA with the company.
As pointed out by Med-Arbiter Abdullah, a “certification election is the best forum in
ascertaining the majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers
themselves can freely choose their bargaining representative thru secret ballot.”
Since it has not been shown that this order is tainted with unfairness, this Court will not
thwart the holding of a certification election (Associated Trade Unions [ATU] vs. Noriel, 88
SCRA 96).
2. Employees of Non-Profit Organizations

On October 8, 1987, the NEW ULO, composed mostly of workers belonging to the IGLESIA
NI KRISTO sect, registered as a labor union.
FEU – Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation, Inc. v. Trajano, 152 SCRA 725
On October 12, 1987, the TUPAS staged a strike. ROBINA obtained an injunction against the
[G.R. No. L-76273, July 31, 1987]
strike, resulting in an agreement to return to work and for the parties to negotiate a new
CBA.

The next day NEW ULO filed a petition for a certification election at the Bureau of Labor
Relations.
Kapatiran, et al. v. Calleja, 162 SCRA 367
TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition claiming among others that the members of the NEW
[G.R. No. L-82914, June 20, 1988]
ULO were mostly members of the Iglesia ni Kristo sect which three years previous refused to
affiliate with any labor union. It also accused the company of using the NEW ULO to defeat
TUPAS’ bargaining rights.

The Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a certification election.

TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. In the meantime, it was able to negotiate
a new 3-year CBA with ROBINA, which was signed on December 3, 1987 and to expire on
November 15, 1990.
On January 27, 1988, respondent BLR Director Calleja dismissed the appeal.
3. Employees of Government Corporations
Art. [244] 254
Art. 244. Right of employees in the public service. Employees of government
corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to
bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service
 shall have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law. (As amended by
Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986)
4. Supervisors
Art. [245] 255
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization;
right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or
form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own. (As amended by Section 18, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21,
1989)
Art. [212] 219 (m)
m. "Managerial employee" is one who is vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down
and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the
interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of
such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of
independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are
considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book.
Test to Determine Supervisory Status
Filoil Refinery Corporation v. Filoil Supervisory and Confidential Employees
Association, 46 SCRA 512 [G.R. No. L-26736, August 18, 1972]
Topic: Workers with right to self organization; supervisors
FACTS:
1. Respondent association is a labor organization duly registered with the Department of
Labor. It is composed exclusively of the supervisory and confidential employees of petitioner
corporation. There exists another entirely distinct labor association composed of the
corporation's rank-and-file employees, the Filoil Employees & Workers Association (FEWA)
with which petitioner executed a collective bargaining agreement. This collective bargaining
agreement expressly excluded from its coverage petitioner's supervisory and confidential
employees, who in turn organized their own labor association, respondent herein.
2. Respondent association filed on February 18, 1965 with the industrial court its petition for
certification as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of all of petitioner's
supervisory and confidential employees working at its refinery in Rosario, Cavite.
3. Petitioner corporation filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of cause
of action and of respondent court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, under its
claim that supervisors are not employees within the meaning of Republic Act 875, the
Industrial Peace Act, and that since they are part of management, they do not have the
right to bargain collectively although they may organize an organization of their own.
4. CIR: denied the dismissal motion. It ruled that under the express provisions of section 3 of
the Industrial Peace Act, "(I)ndividuals employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of employees under their supervision but may form
separate organizations their own."
5. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S: WON the supervisors (and confidential employees) has right to self organization?
RULING: YES, they (both) do.
Petitioner's arguments go in reality to the wisdom and policy of the Industrial Peace Act
which expressly grants supervisors the right to organize and bargain collectively, which are
beyond the Court's power of review. Thus, the argument that "it is axiomatic in the law of
self-interest that an employer must give a "better deal" to those who act in his interest and
in whom he has trust and confidence. These are the supervisors and confidential
employees" and that "In the United States there was a move to have a part of the
supervisory group to be aligned with labor. But the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act put an
end to this move."
1. So with petitioner's thesis that "(T)o then give supervisors the right to compel employers to
bargain would in effect align labor and management together against stockholders and
bondholders (capital) and inexorably tilt the balance of power in favor of these hitherto
confliction forces. This is contrary to the nature and philosophy of free enterprise." This
further serves to point up the validity and rationale of the Industrial Peace Act's provision,
since the supervisors and confidential employees, even though they may exercise the
prerogatives of management as regards the rank and file employees are indeed employees
in relation to their employer, the company which is owned by the "stockholders and
bondholders (capital)" in petitioner's own words, and should therefore be entitled under the
 law to bargain collectively with the top management with respect to their terms and
conditions of employment.

2. Petitioner's argument that the express provisions of section 3 of our Industrial Peace Act
must give way to the intendment of the Taft-Hartley Act which exempts employers from the Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.), Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 300 SCRA 120 [G.R. No.
legal obligation to recognize and negotiate with supervisors is tenuous and groundless. The 131248, December 11, 1998]
language of our own statute is plain and unambiguous and admits of no other
interpretation.

3. The other principal ground of petitioner's appeal questioning the confidential employees'
inclusion in the supevisors bargaining unit is equally untenable. Respondent court correctly
held that since the confidential employee are very few in number and are by practice and
tradition identified with the supervisors in their role as representives of management vis-a-
vis the rank and file employee such identity of interest has allowed their inclusion in the
bargaining unit of supervisors-managers for purposes of collective bargaining in turn as
employees in relation to the company as their employer.
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. Torres, 231 SCRA 335 [G.R. No. 98050, March 17,
4. No arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion can be attributed against respondent court's 1994]
allowing the inclusion of the confidential employees in the supervisors' association for as
admitted by petitioner itself, supra, the supervisors and confidential emplyees enjoy its trust
and confidence. Thisidentity of interest logically calls for their inclusion in the same Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Triumph v. Calleja, 181 SCRA 119 [G.R. No. 85915, January
bargaining unit and at the same time fulfills the law's objective of insuring to them the full 17, 1990]
benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, which could hardly be
accomplished if the respondent association's membership were to be broken up into five
separate ineffective tiny units, as urged by petitioner.
Paper Industries Corp. v. Laguesma, 330 SCRA 295 [G.R. No. 101738, April 12, 2000]

DISPOSITIVE: Filoil supervisors and confidential employees won.

5. Aliens Art. [269] 284

DOCTRINE: Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act "explicitly provides that "employees" —
and this term includes supervisors — "shall have the right to self-organization, and to form,
join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining through representations of their own choosing and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection" and
that "individuals employed as supervisors ... may form separate organizations of their own".
Indeed, it is well settled that "in relation to his employer," a foreman or supervisor "is an
employee within the meaning of the Act" ... For this reason, supervisors are entitled to
engage in union activities and any discrimination against them by reason thereof
constitutes an unfair labor practice."
Article 269. Prohibition against aliens; Exceptions. - All aliens, natural or juridical, as
well as all foreign organizations are strictly prohibited from engaging directly or indirectly in
all forms of trade union activities without prejudice to normal contacts between Philippine
labor unions and recognized international labor centers: Provided, however, That aliens
working in the country with valid permits issued by the Department of Labor and
Employment, may exercise the right to self-organization and join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining: Provided, further,
That said aliens are nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino
workers.

6. Security Guards Organic to Establishment

Toyota Motors Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motors Philippines Corporation United Pepsi Cola Supervisors Union v. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15 [G.R. No.
Labor Union, 268 SCRA 573 [G.R. No. L-121084, February 19, 1997] 122226, March 25, 1998]
D. WORKERS WITH NO RIGHT OF SELF-ORGANIZATION Pier 8 Arrastre, et al. v. Roldan-Confessor, 241 SCRA 294 [G.R. No. 110854,
February 13, 1995]

1. Managerial and Confidential Employees

San Miguel Corporation Supervisors v. Laguesma, 277 SCRA 370 [G.R. No.
110399, August 15, 1997]
Art. [245] 255

Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of United Pepsi Cola Supervisors Union v. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15 [G.R. No.
supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any 122226, March 25, 1998]
labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own. (As amended by RA 6715)
Pepsi Cola v. Secretary of Labor, 312 SCRA 104 [G.R. No 96663, August 10, 1999]

Art. 82
2. Workers/Members of Cooperatives
The provision of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings,
whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field
personnel, members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support,
Coop. Rural Bank of Davao v. Ferrer-Calleja, 165 SCRA 725 [G.R. No. L-77951,
domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another and workers who are paid by
September 26, 1988]
results as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in appropriate regulations.

As used herein, "managerial employees" refers to those whose primary duty consists of the
management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or CENECO v. DOLE, 201 SCRA 584 [G.R. No. 94045, September 13, 1991]
subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff.

"Field personnel" refers to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties
away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual
hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
Southern Philippine Federation of Labor v. Calleja, 172 SCRA 676 [G.R. No.
80882, April 24, 1989]
3. Non-Employees Art. [243] 253
Coverage and employees' right to self-organization. All persons employed in
commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical or
educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for
purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-
employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for the purpose of enhancing and defending their interests and for their
mutual aid and protection.

Philtranco Service Enterprises v. BLR, 174 SCRA 388 [G.R. No. 85343, June 28,
1989]
Singer Sewing Machine Company v. Drilon, 193 SCRA 182 [G.R. No. L-91307,
January 24, 1991]

Golden Farms, Inc. v. Calleja, 175 SCRA 471 [G.R. No. 78755, July 19, 1989]

4. Fiduciary Employees
Metrolab Industries v. Confessor, 254 SCRA 182 [G.R. No. 108855, February 28,
1996]
E. PARTY PROTECTED BY RIGHT
Mactan Workers Union v. Aboitiz, 45 SCRA 577 [G.R. No. L-30241, June 30, 1972]
F. SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF RIGHT
Art. [246] 257
Non-abridgement of right to self-organization. It shall be unlawful for any person to
restrain, coerce, discriminate against or unduly interfere with employees and workers in
their exercise of the right to self-organization. Such right shall include the right to form, join,
or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives
of their own choosing and to engage in lawful aid and protection, subject to the provisions
of Article 246 of this Code
Art. [248] 259 Unfair Labor Practices of Employees
Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any
of the following unfair labor practices:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization;
(b) To require as a condition for employment that a person or an employee shall not join
a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such
will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization;
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other
support to it or its organizers or officers;
(e) To discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall prevent the parties from requiring
membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment,
except of those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the
signing of the collective bargaining agreement. Employees belonging to an appropriate
collective bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining
agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by
members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members
accept the benefits under the collective agreement: Provided, That the individual
authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o), of this Code shall not apply to
non-members of the recognized collective bargaining agent;
(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for
having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
(h) To pay negotiation or attorney's fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of
the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of
corporations, associations, or partnerships who have actually participated in, authorized or
ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable.
Art. [249] 260 Unfair Labor Practices of Labor Organizations
Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. It shall be unlawful for labor
organization, its officers, agents, or representatives to commit any of the following unfair
labor practices;
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization:
Provided, That the labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership;
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee,
including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or terminated on any ground other than the usual terms
and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is made
available to other members;
(c) To violate the duty or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer, provided that
it is the representative of the employees;
(d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or
deliver any money or other things of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services
which are not performed or not to be performed, including the demand for a fee for
union negotiations;
(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorney's fees from employers as part of the
settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers, members of
governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor associations or
organizations who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices
shall be held criminally liable.
Art. [288] 303 Penalties
Penalties. Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or unless the act complained of
hinges on a question of interpretation or implementation of ambiguous provisions of an
existing collective bargaining agreement any violation of the provisions of this Code declared
to be unlawful or penal in nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or
imprisonment of not less than three months nor more than three years, or both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

In addition to such penalty, any alien found guilty shall be summarily deported upon
completion of service of sentence.

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any criminal offense punished in this
Code shall be under the concurrent jurisdiction of the Municipal or Regional Trial Court.

Art. [289] 304 (Who are liable when committed by other than natural persons

Who are liable when committed by other than natural person. If the offense is
committed by a corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or any other entity, the
penalty shall be imposed upon the guilty officer or officers of such corporation, trust, firm,
partnership, association or entity.