260
VIRGILIO M. CAÑETE, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION) and VICENTE
TING/V.T. MARKETING, respondents.
Labor Law; Labor Code; Technical rules may be relaxed to prevent
miscarriage of justice.—Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that
technical rules of evidence in courts of law shall not be controlling in any of
the proceedings before the Commission or the Labor Arbiters. Further, the
Commission is required to use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts
without regard to technicalities or procedure. Technical rules may be
relaxed to prevent miscarriage of justice. They must not be allowed to stand
in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights of obligations of
the parties.
FACTS
Petitioner’s version:
Petitioner worked as a helper- utility man for the business of the private
respondent. He alleged that they were made to work from 7:30 am until past
6:00 pm but made to appear in their time cards that they worked the regular
eight hours (8:00 AM – 5:00 PM). Thus, they only received compensation for
8 hours of work and were underpaid.
July 22, 1992, petitioner arrived at the workplace where he saw his co-
employees were already working and he casually remarked “Why are we
working so early when we were supposed to start (at) 7:30 a.m.? In fact, we
(have) already been deprived of half an hour(‘s pay) because our payrolls
indicate that we start (work) at 8:00 a.m.” his remark reached the
management and on the same day he was summoned by the respondent’s
manager, where he was told that he will not report for work the next day, and
that he will be given separation pay of Php 6K. petitioner refused and about a
month later, he filed a case of illegal dismissal, under payment and non-
payment of 13th month pay and damages with the department of labor.
Private respondent’s version:
Private respondent presented another issue where it said that the employee
was not illegally dismissed but the employee was guilty of abandonment. The
employee allegedly did not report for work after being reprimanded of his
repeated and habitual absences. Furthermore, the private respondent said that
they furnished the petitioner a copy of notice of termination, mailed to the
employees’ last known address. Private respondent also submitted to the
NLRC, petitioner’s time records which revealed petitioner’s number of
absences.
The LA: ruled in favor of the petitioner, saying that the petitioner was
illegally dismissed from service. Petitioner was awarded backwages,
separation pay and attorney’s fees. He was also given wage differentials due
to a finding of underpayment of wages.
As per the return of service, Atty. Enrique Chua, private respondent’s
counsel, received a copy of the Decision of the labor arbiter on March 15,
1993. However, private respondent’s appeal to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) was filed only on March 26, 1993, or a day after the
lapse of the ten-day period prescribed by law. Initially, the NLRC dismissed
his appeal.
Private respondent moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of his appeal.
He explained that the copy of the labor arbiter’s Decision sent through
registered mail was not received by him but of a certain Nenette Vasquez
who is in no way connected to his law office.
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration.9 He alleged that service of
the copy of the labor arbiter’s Decision to Vasquez on March 15, 1993
should be deemed as proper service to respondent’s counsel.
the NLRC reversed the Decision of the labor arbiter. It ruled that petitioner
was not illegally dismissed but abandoned his work. Nonetheless, in view of
the willingness of the employer to pay separation pay, the NLRC awarded to
petitioner the amount of Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Fifteen Pesos and
Eighty Centavos (P9,715.80) as separation pay. Petitioner’s claims for
underpayment of wages and damages were found unmeritorious and were
likewise dismissed. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied.11
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
WON the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in: (a) declaring private
respondent’s appeal to have been seasonably filed; (b) holding that petitioner
was not dismissed but abandoned his employment; and, (c) admitting and
considering evidence which had been presented by private respondent for the They must not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
first time on appeal. completely resolving the rights of obligations of the parties.
In the case at bar, petitioner had the opportunity to rebut the truth of
HELD these additional documents. Respondent NLRC correctly accorded
weight to these documents considering their nature and character.
These were daily time records, certifications from the postmaster,
a. NO. We have ruled that where a copy of the decision is served on a etc., whose trustworthiness can be relied upon. Consequently, we
person who is neither a clerk nor one in charge of the attorney’s find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
office, such service is invalid.12 In the case at bar, it is undisputed considering on appeal petitioner’s daily time records and payrolls for
that Nenette Vasquez, the person who received a copy of the labor the period August 1989, December 1989 and April 1990 to rebut the
arbiter’s Decision, was neither a clerk of Atty. Chua, respondent’s charge of underpayment of wages. On the basis of these documents,
counsel, nor a person in charge of Atty. Chua’s office. Hence, her it was sufficiently proved that petitioner received the minimum daily
receipt of said Decision on March 15, 1993 cannot be considered as wage for said period. Perforce, the NLRC correctly dismissed
notice to Atty. Chua. Since a copy of the Decision was actually petitioner’s charge for underpayment of wages.
delivered by Vasquez to Atty. Chua’s clerk only on March 16, 1993,
it was only on this date that the ten-day period for the filing of
respondent’s appeal commenced to run. Thus, respondent’s March
26, 1993 appeal to the NLRC was seasonably filed.
b. YES. petitioner did not abandon his work but was illegally dismissed
from service. We find it incongruous for petitioner to give up his
job after receiving a mere reprimand from his employer. What is
more telling is that on August 19, 1992 or less than a month from the
time he was dismissed from service, petitioner immediately filed a
complaint against his employer for illegal dismissal with a prayer for
reinstatement. Petitioner’s acts negate any inference that he
abandoned his work. Abandonment is a matter of intention and
cannot be lightly inferred or legally presumed from certain equivocal
acts. To constitute abandonment, there must be clear proof of
deliberate and unjustified intent to discontinue the employment.15
The burden of proving abandonment of work as a just cause for
dismissal is on the employer. Private respondent failed to discharge
this burden.
c. NO. Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that technical rules of
evidence in courts of law shall not be controlling in any of the
proceedings before the Commission or the Labor Arbiters. Further,
the Commission is required to use every reasonable means to
ascertain the facts without regard to technicalities or procedure.
Technical rules may be relaxed to prevent miscarriage of justice.
273
TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW
and individual union members DANILO G. MADARA and ROMEO L.
MANAYAO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, as Secretary of Labor and Employment,
and TEMIC TELEFUNKEN MICROELECTRONICS, (PHILS.), INC.,
respondents.
FACTS
A labor dispute started when the company and the union reached deadlock in
their negotiations for a new CBA. Union filed a Notice of Strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
The Acting SOLE intervened and assumed jurisdiction over the dispute An
Order was issued by the said Acting Secretary of Labor enjoining any strike
or lockout, whether actual or intended, between the parties. His Notice of the
Assumption Order was personally served on the representatives of the
Company and twice to the Union President. Despite the assumption Order,
the Union struck, Two (2) days later, the Acting Secretary of Labor issued an
Order directing the striking workers to return to work within twenty-four (24)
hours and for the Company to admit them back to work under the terms and
conditions prevailing prior to the strike.
Notice of the Return-to-Work Order was sent to the striking Union members
but still some of them refused to heed the order and continued with their
picket. Violence erupted in the picket lines. The service bus ferrying non-
striking workers was stoned, causing injuries to its passengers. Thereafter,
complaints for threats, defamation, illegal detention and physical injuries
were filed against the strikers.
The Company issued letters of termination for cause to the workers who did
not report back to work despite the Notice of Assumption and Return-to-
Work Orders issued by the Acting Secretary of DOLE. The Acting Secretary
of Labor issued another Order directing the Company to reinstate all striking
workers “except the Union Officers, shop stewards, and those with pending
criminal charges” while the resolution of the legality of the strike was
pending.
Union filed with the SC a petition for certiorari questioning the exclusions of
the said Order. While the said petition was pending, then Secretary of Labor
Leonardo A. Quisumbing, issued a Writ of Execution for the physical
reinstatement of the remaining striking workers who were not reinstated.
The Company filed a Motion to Quash, Recall or Suspend the Writ of
Execution issued by Secretary Quisumbing. This motion was denied by the
DOLE for lack of merit and, in the same Order, the DOLE directed the
issuance of an Alias Writ to enforce the actual and physical reinstatement of
the workers, or in case the same was not feasible, to effect payroll
reinstatement.
The Company filed with the SC a petition for certiorari, questioning the
denial of its motion for reconsideration and the Alias Writ issued by the
DOLE to enforce the actual and physical reinstatement or the payroll
reinstatement of the workers. The SC rendered a decision after consolidating
the petitions for certiorari of the company and the Union. The company’s
petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit while the Union’s petition was
GRANTED. In this decision, the SC ordered the reinstatement of all striking
workers without exception, also the SC ordered the SOLE to determine the
legality of the strike and the liabilities of individual strikers, if any.
ISSUE
WON the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WON defiance to the assumption and return-to-work orders of the Secretary
of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of the
employment status of any striking union officer or member.
HELD
NO.
The SC see no cogent basis to hold that the Secretary of Labor has abused his
discretion.
Under Art 263 of the Labor Code
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. x x x x x x x x x (g)
When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption per certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as
specified in the assumption or certification order. If one had already taken jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive
place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out processes of a strike. It is well settled that defiance to the assumption and
employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor after he has assumed
immediately resume operations and re-admit all workers under the same jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of the employment status of any
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of striking union officer or member.
Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law The assumption and return-to-work Orders issued by the Secretary of Labor
enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as in the case at bar are not the kind of orders contemplated in the immediately
with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. cited rule of the NLRC because such Orders of the Secretary of Labor did not
yet finally dispose of the labor dispute. As pointed out by the Secretary of
It is clear from the foregoing legal provision that the moment the Secretary of Labor in his Decision, petitioners cannot now feign ignorance of his official
Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable intervention.
to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the
Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing them to return to work.
The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor
automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to
return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order.40 However,
petitioners refused to acknowledge this directive of the Secretary of Labor on
September 8, 1995 thereby necessitating the issuance of another order
expressly directing the striking workers to cease and desist from their actual
strike, and to immediately return to work but which directive the herein
petitionersopted to ignore.

In this connection, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code clearly provides that:

Article 264. Prohibited Activities.

(a) No strike or lock out shall be declared after the assumption of jurisdiction
by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the
dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of
cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. x x x. Any union
officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. Provided, that
mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment even if a replacement had been
hired by the employer during such lawful strike.

The rationale of this prohibition is that once jurisdiction over the labor
dispute has been properly acquired by the competent authority, that