Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
CHAPTER II
The word “history” is itself ambiguous. It covers (1) the totality of past human
actions, and (2) the narrative or account we construct of them now.1 –W H Walsh
2.1 Introduction
the historical process” (Vol 7, 386). Unlike historiography that mainly deals with
method, process and various modes of writing history, the philosophy of history
primarily aims at the goal, objective, orientation, nature and scope of history.
Britannica Encyclopedia defines historiography as “the writing of history, especially
the writing of history based on the critical examination of sources, the selection of
particulars from the authentic materials in those sources, and the synthesis of those
particulars into a narrative that will stand the test of critical methods. The term
historiography refers to the theory and history of historical writing” (948-949
Micropeadia). Though historiography and the philosophy of history seem to be
interlinked with each other, they noticeably differ in meaning and motif vis-à-vis the
writing and purpose of history.
2.4.1 Herodotus
Though Herodotus is credited with the production of the first narrative history,
he has been accused of deliberate falsehood, inconsistency, errors of fact and
judgement, undue credulity and easy acceptance of unreliable sources of
information. It is only recently that scholars have begun to appreciate fully his
remarkable fusion of chronology, ethnology, geography and poetry into a
work that is both very readable and an important source of information on the
ancient world. (156)
In other words, Herodotus and his book have been an area of great interest for
scholars, academicians, historians and even literary critics, since history became an
established discipline, particularly from the Enlightenment period. This is partly
because the Herodotean studies unfailingly provides a scope for both positive and
negative criticism of it and partly because Herodotus’s writing is characteristically
marked with both positive and negative features. This can be confirmed from a similar
view on Herodotus expressed by Carolyn Dewald and Johan Marincola in The
Cambridge Companion to Herodotus (2006):
Throughout antiquity we can detect two schools of thought about him, one
seeing him as the ‘father of history’, the first person to put together an accurate
account of the past and to infuse it with meaning by giving causes,
consequences, and the intentions of the participants. But there was also a
persistent strain of criticism that took Herodotus to task for his stories of the
fabulous and the improbable, for the accuracy of his reports of non-Greek
lands, and for his portrayal of a quarrelsome and disunited Greek force. (1)
In the light of these two obviously incompatible views, it can be said that though
criticism to Herodotus and his writings may be valid to some extent, he must be
credited for his method of narration, his intellect for reconciling rational and divine
belief in the Greek historiography and above all, for his beauty of style. Histories
23
contain a remarkable feature which is his manner of narration, since it bears the mark
of a storyteller’s manner. Despite his flaws and errors, he is considered the first
historian of the Western tradition, for he travelled widely and engaged himself in
research before he offered his writing to the world. It is probably for this reason
Herodotus is continued to be read till date.
2.4.2 Thucydides
If the invention of the science of history (an obvious conversion from legend-
writing) made Herodotus the father of history, it was Thucydides who meticulously
emphasized not only the humanistic purpose and the self-revelatory function of
history, but also stressed the importance of evidence5 in history-writing. This is
manifest in History of the Peloponnesian War 6(c. 406 BC) in which Thucydides
provides a comprehensive account of the war between two powerful city-states of
Greece: Athens and Sparta. His work copiously reflects the amount of details and
information that he collected either from his own direct observation or from other
witnesses till the war lasted (for twenty seven years). M I Finley points out, “All
through it he worked away at his book with a remarkable singleness of purpose,
collecting evidence, sifting, checking and double-checking, writing and revising, and
all the time thinking hard about the problems: about the war itself, its causes and
issues, about Pericles, about the Athenian Empire, about politics and man’s behaviour
as a political animal” (7). His strong determination for ascertaining the evidence,
unlike Herodotus who did not consider it de rigueur, apparently distinguished him
from his predecessors and made him an accomplished historian. It appears to be a
revealing intention about the aim of history writing when Thucydides proclaims in
Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War that, “My work is not piece of writing
designed to meet the taste of the immediate public, but was done to last forever” (48).
Thus, this can be said that his work is the earliest example of serious historical
research, because Thucydides displays the same vigour and respect for the truth and
evidence as modern day historians do.
2.4.3 Polybius
covered various other topics, Finley observes that no writer “approached Thucydides
in intellectual rigour or insight. At least five men in the middle or second of half of
the fourth century wrote continuations of Thucydides’ history” (14). After the fifth
century BC in the Hellenistic period, the Greek politics and the historian’s outlook not
only underwent a massive change and but also lacked the epic element which
nourished Herodotus and Thucydides. But it was the Greek-born Roman historian
Polybius who is credited to continue the tradition of the Greek historiography
inaugurated by Herodotus and Thucydides. Finley writes that with a great ambition,
Polybius “undertook to write a ‘universal history’ narrating and analyzing in minute
detail Rome’s conquest of the world from 220 to 168 [BC]…” (441). He wrote the
history of the city of Rome which was at that time politically strong, adult and was
brimming with a zeal of conquest. Thus it was obvious to notice that for Polybius
history was an engagement with politics of the time. Collingwood aptly comments on
Polybius’s motive of writing history, “History, for him, is worth studying not because
it is scientifically true or demonstrative, but because it is a school and training-ground
for political life” (35). In this way, he apparently differs from Herodotus who thought
history as science and from Thucydides who did not raise the question of the value of
history.
As the Roman Empire consolidated its power in Europe, Asia and Africa in
the fourth century AD, Christianity became the dominant religion of the Empire.
Consequently, it gave a new impetus to the growth and development of the Christian
historiography that was influence by the Christian theology and the development of
the Biblical canon. It is remarkable that the Christian historians preferred the written
sources such as the Bible for their history writing whereas the Classical historians
relied mainly on the oral sources. It was based on the idea of world history as the
result of divine intervention in the affairs of men and women. Collingwood provides
an encapsulated view on the Christian historiography and states, “All persons and all
peoples are involved in the working out of God’s purpose, and therefore the historical
process is everywhere and always of the same kind, and every part of it is a part of the
same whole” (49). It was resulted in the creation of a unified chronology that
reconciled all history around the birth of Christ.
From the fifth century to the eleventh century, the monks served as both
annalists and chroniclers and produced a corpus of historical writings fused with
ecclesiastical elements in them. Bede, for example, wrote The Ecclesiastical History
of the English People (731) that consists of an extraordinary combination of
26
chronology and hagiography. In other words, the history was not often written in
objective and rational manner, because those chronicles detail the intervention of God
in human events and the lives of holy men and women. It can be noticed that annals8
were the main product of medieval historiography and the annalist merely set down
the most important events of the current year. However, from the twelfth century to
the fourteenth century, Europe witnessed an intensified progress in culture and
learning. As a result, many encyclopaedic compilations were brought out. The
historiography of this period can be seen as the continuation of Greek learning and
culture. There was a revival of the concept of critical theory and an attention was paid
to rational analysis, cause and effect. History was mainly written by statesmen, high
officials, and prelates. There was a great historical corpus produced by the medieval
chroniclers, that was not fully exploited till recently. In his article “Political Utility in
Medieval Historiography: A Sketch” Gabrielle M Spiegel asserts, “Medieval
historiography offers an excellent subject for investigating the function of the past in
medieval political life, for surely few complex societies have so clearly regulated their
life in accordance with their vision of the past” (315). Though there was no significant
method of writing history, the medieval historiography contributed through the annals
and chronicles in producing extensive historical records of the Medieval Age and
those writings in turn, continued to partially influence the succeeding Renaissance
historiography.
and impulse. History thus became the history of human passions, regarded as
necessary manifestations of human nature” (57). It can be asserted that it was a clear
departure from the fanciful and ill-founded Medieval historiography, although the role
of divinity was not absolutely eliminated.
too by the same token) with the formulation of a “new science”10 in the philosophy of
history that challenged the then prevalent belief that only mathematics and science
were the producers of certain knowledge. In fact, it was the Jewish approach to
history (that was dominated by faith, not by reason) that gave way to the Vico’s ideas
of history which was not only critical in nature, but also observed the general rules of
historiography. In The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, Benedetto Croce makes a
strong point as he writes, “The conflict which for the general consciousness existed
between science and faith reappears in Vico’s treatment of history as a distinction and
opposition between Jewish and Gentile history, sacred history and profane. Jewish
history was not subjected, he believed, to the laws of history in general” (145). It can
be argued that Vico’s determination to defy the existing mode of writing history and
to propagate a scientific historiography through his new science made him a
distinguished philosopher of history in the eighteenth century.
Vico’s historiographical propositions state that man can know what they have
themselves created, not any other external things that are supposed to be left to the
wisdom of God. Nature, for example, is intelligible to God only since this is His
creation and the mathematics can be fully explained by man as he invented it. In other
words, only the makers can know and explain what the thing is and why they are so,
not by any other authority. In Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas
(1976), Isaiah Berlin adds further point, “… [M]en’s knowledge of the external world
which we can observe, describe, classify, reflect upon, and of which we can record the
regularities in time and space, differs in principle from their knowledge of the world
that they themselves imposed on their own creations” (xvii). Thus, it is apparent that
though Vico allows the distinction between the two worlds – of God and of man, his
approach to history seems to have more emphasis on the human creation. In
Collingwood’s words, “History, for Vico, is not concerned with the past as past. It is
concerned, in the first instance, with the actual structure of the society in which we
live; the manners and customs which we share with the people around us” (66).
Hence, it can be argued that unlike Descartes, history for Vico, does not distinguish
between questions about ideas and about facts. In other words, they are reconciled to
bring out better understanding of the knowledge that history provides us. In brief,
history is what the human mind constructs of the past, not the past itself.
29
The Romantic interest in the diversity of customs and manners, in local color,
in the middle ages, in new and remote scenes, is an essential part of the
historical spirit. It marks the breaking down of the abstract Reason of the
previous age, and the return to concrete and living detail. To see life as
conflict and contradiction, as a process of growth and evolution, is to see life
historically, and it is thus that the Romanticists saw it. (318)
On this ground, it can be asserted that the Romantic historiography challenged the
existing abstract human reason of the Enlightenment and favoured the human will
instead, so that the scope of historical thought could be widened. In fact, it started
treating “the entire history of man as a single process of development from a
beginning in savagery to an end in a perfectly rational and civilized society”
(Collingwood 88). It was directed to the discovery of the mute past that was,
according to the Enlightenment historians, mere ages of unintelligible barbarism and
dark superstitions.
Before Ranke, history had mainly been assigned two major functions in
general – to judge the past and to instruct men for the profit of future years. However,
his aspiration was not to achieve such lofty undertakings, rather he wanted to report
wie es eigentlich gewesen.11 Ranke’s intension was to check the distortion of the aims
of history such as moral or political. Gilbert sums it up, “Ranke implies that,
whenever a historian uses the past to present his views about how people ought to
behave and act, the picture of the past becomes distorted and false: the historian ought
not to go beyond the limits of his task- to show how things were in fact” (394). It was
apparent in Ranke’s writing that the representation of facts was made through a
certain structure or pattern (unlike the manner of positivists12), and he was convinced
that the historical books were works of literature. Gilbert tries to demonstrate it by
revealing Ranke’s technique of composition of history:
As far as possible Ranke… avoids summary statements and lets the narrator
disappear from the story so that the reader is directly confronted with facts and
events. Ranke wants the reader to feel himself a participant of the story.
Ranke’s use of literary techniques allowed him to diminish the distance that
separates past from present, to give the story a pattern that changes between
forward movement and description, and, above all, to make work conform to
the primary requisite of a literary work: to tell a story that has a structure.
(395)
This does not necessarily mean that the task of historians ends after setting forth the
story of the past, but it requires them to delve deep beneath and to reach for what is
behind it – its meaning. At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that history is like
31
science, because it is primarily concerned with facts and their causal connection-how
they acted upon each other. For Ranke, “The study of the past has a much greater aim
than the teaching of morals or instruction in the conduct of politics” (Gilbert 397).
As opposed to the colorless and bloodless historiography that existed, the new
historiography should reflect richness, development, and fullness; in short,
human life. As opposed to what Ranke perceived as fragmented and
fragmenting historiography, the new historiography should show the
coherence and unity of human history. As opposed to what Ranke perceived as
the traditional character of existing historiography, that is, its building on the
accumulated perception of events, the new historiography should concern
itself with the original and authentic experience of the event itself. (56)
At this juncture, it can be argued that this kind of historiography was potentially
capable of denying any strong matrix of multiple interpretations by restricting it to
mere facts and their causal connections in an indirect manner. Here is the reason that
may explain this phenomenon: the aim of such historiography was not realisable in
complete sense and as a result, it served a pivotal role in giving way to a different
historiography.
philosophy of history is for him not a philosophical reflection on history but history
itself raised to a higher power and become philosophical as distinct from merely
empirical, that is, history not merely ascertained as so much fact but understood by
apprehending the reasons why the facts happened as they did” (113-14). This concept
of history is explained in Hegel’s enormously ambitious Philosophy of History (1837)
in which he distinguishes three different modes of historical writing: original history,
reflective history and philosophical history.
Hegel further explains the original history that deals with writings of the
ancient historians (Herodotus, Thucydides, etc.) “who have witnessed, experienced,
and lived through the deeds, events and situations they describe, who have themselves
participated in these events and in the spirit which informed them” (12). Such mode
of history writing allows the historical individuals and nations to express for
themselves, and leaves no scope for the historian’s reflection and perspective on the
past events being written. Thus the scope and time covered in history are too limited
and narrow as compared to other modes of history writing. The reflective history
“covers more than just those events which were actually present to the writer; it
depicts not only what was present and alive in this or that age, but that which is
present in spirit, so that its object is in fact the past as whole” (Hegel 16). In other
words, the scope of history was vastly widened from the only present to the past.
Third kind of history, Hegel proposes, is the philosophical history that reflects on
history from a philosophical point of view.
After the first quarter of the last century, the French historiography was almost
dominated by the Annales School of history that emerged in the wake of the various
subdivisions and specialisations of history: economic history, political history, social
history, and history of science and arts. This school of historical thought was
primarily concerned with history for history per se, and was shaped itself as a
resistance to those multiple bifurcations of the core discipline of history. Compared to
the dominant German school of history led by Leopold von Ranke who emphasised
on the narrative structure to history and to the past event (as it actually happened), the
Annales refused it and developed an almost contrary conviction: that is history as
science of the past and science of the present14. Started in the form of a journal by
Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch and later advanced by Fernand Braudel, the
historiography of the Annales aimed at breaking down the barriers among social
sciences by not only incorporating elements from geography, environment, culture,
politics, but also focusing on the different periods of time (hinting at long-term and
short-term).
seize upon them all in some fashion or other to construct its own proper methods and
true domains” (457). He believed that history is as much about the present as about
the past and both past and present illumine each other reciprocally.
Against the backdrop of “history proper” as a discipline that strictly seeks the
continuity from the past to the present and often tries to establish the stable
relationship between them, a new methodology in history formulated by Michel
Foucault appears to locate discontinuity instead. He argues that recent developments
in postmodernist and poststructuralist historiography have substantially exhibited
strong potentiality for proliferation of discontinuity in the history of ideas. Mark
Poster in Foucault, Marxism and History (1984) briefly explains Foucault’s concept
of discontinuity:
36
Foucault attempts to show how the past was different, strange, threatening. He
labors to distance the past from the present, to disrupt the easy, cozy intimacy
that historians have traditionally enjoyed in the relationship of the past to the
present. He strives to alter the position of the historian from one who gives
support to the present by collecting all the meanings of the past and tracing the
line of inevitability through which they are resolved in the present, to one who
breaks off the past from the present and by demonstrating the foreignness of
the past relativizes and undercuts the legitimacy of the present. (74)
interpreted. For White, the historical work is “a verbal structure in the form of a
narrative prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of past structures and
processes in the interest of explaining what they were by representing them” (2).
White argues that historians use three kinds of strategy to gain different kinds of
“explanatory effects” – explanation by formal argument, explanation by emplotment,
and explanation by ideological implication. Within each of these strategies he
identifies four possible modes of articulation. They are, in effect, proved to be
instrumental in ascertaining a particular kind of explanatory effect in a work of
history. In short, he believes that historiography does not differ from fiction but is a
form of it.
Like in fiction, White argues, the role of language is crucial in order to provide
a desired explanation to any historical writing, because the past is invented or
imagined, not found by the historians. Thus, a historical work is designed after a
combination of explanatory strategies and modes of articulation and that combination
in turn, brings a historiographical style of a specific kind to historians who practise it
in their own ways. White’s enterprise is demonstrated in his effort that tries to
establish the relation between narrative discourse and historical representation. Later
he tried to elaborate, reinforce, and improve this theory of narrative and history in his
subsequent books: Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (1978), The
Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (1987),
Figural Realism: Studies in the Mimesis Effects (2000) and Fiction of Narrative:
Essays on History, Literature and Theory 1957-2007 (2010). The detailed and
elaborated discussion of the theory of historiography by White will follow in the next
section.
II
ideology and tropology. After a brief account of the structure of the entire book,
White proceeds with the methodological “Introduction” that specifically delineates
those basic elements which constitute the body of a historical work. White defines the
historical work as “a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that
purports to be a model, or icon, of past structures and processes in the interest of
explaining what they were by representing them” (2 Metahistory). Here we can derive
the idea of narrative from this definition which asserts that narrative is the
indispensable part of any historical work. In other words, narrative is integral to the
historical account, because the representation of the historical data and processes is
cast in the form of narrative. Thus, the interrelationship between narrative and the
historical work can be explained through White’s “theory of the historical work,”
where he distinguishes among the levels of conceptualization in the historical work (5
Metahistory). The followings are the five levels of conceptualization: 1. chronicle; 2.
story; 3. mode of emplotment; 4. mode of argument; and 5. mode of ideological
implication.
While annals represent historical reality as if real events did not display
the form of story, the chronicler represents it as if real events appeared to
human consciousness in the form of unfinished stories. (5)
On the basis of this comparison, it should be understood that the annal does not
directly contribute in making of narrative in absence of strict beginning, middle and
end, whereas the chronicle essentially contains the potential to provide the structure to
a story that in turn, embodies in it the transformative qualities for the structure of
narrative. In other words, the making of story indispensably requires the organization
of historical events in the form of a chronicle, because it facilitates the story with
those events that exhibit certain characteristics of a noticeable beginning, middle and
end.
inventing events according to the will of the writers, though they may use the
historical events as point of reference. On the other hand, “the historical works are
made up of events that exist outside the consciousness of the writer” (6 Metahistory).
It is conspicuous here that the events reported in the fictional work such as a novel are
invented in a particular manner, so that they are intentionally kept out of the domain
of history. White further elaborates this point:
Unlike the novelist, the historian confronts a veritable chaos of events already
constituted, out of which he must choose the elements of the story he would
tell. He makes his story by including some events and excluding others, by
stressing some and subordinating others. This process of exclusion, stress, and
subordination is carried out in the interest of constituting a story of a
particular kind. That is to say, he “emplots” his story. (6 Metahistory)
In that sense, the nature of difference between these two kinds of story – historical
and fictional, brings forth a seriousness in the reconstruction of narrative out of a set
of events that is either existing or invented one. For constructing a plot, historians
have to solely rely on the historically unprocessed data and on the arranged events in
the form of chronicles, whereas novelists are creatively independent to defy such
restrictions by inventing events to suit their narrative. Although the construction of
the plot is common for both historian and novelist, their method of construction,
purpose and organization of events in it have certainly different modus operandi for
them.
Thus, it can be asserted that the association between the explanation and the
emplotment essentially defines the teleological design of the historical work and all
that the historian does is to legitimatize and justify that association. In order to
provide a comprehensive description, the attention is given to the source of the modes
of emplotment or plot structure first, then the kinds of plot structure in the succeeding
paragraphs.
theorists. But it may not be incorrect to put that White selects only four categories of
Frye’s classification –romance, tragedy, comedy and satire for his theory, because he
considers them useful in the analysis of the historical work. It is remarkable to
observe that the foundation and purpose of Frye’s taxonomical efforts is motivated by
the individual (the hero), because he is the fountainhead of all actions in the works of
fiction. Frye writes, “In literary fiction the plot consists of somebody doing
something… Fictions, therefore, may be classified, not morally, but by the hero’s
power of action, which may be greater than ours, less, or roughly the same” (33).
Thus, the ground of classification of plot structure is relatively dependent of the
hero’s strength, performed action and failures as well.
However, White chooses to expand the scope of Frye’s taxonomy and further
uses it to classify the historical work as the whole into a particular plot structure. Here
we should understand that the historical work as a unit is categorized in one of those
four plot structures, though many stories within that historical narrative might be
emplotted in any of those four categories. The statement gains prominence when
White strongly asserts, “The important point is that every history, even the most
‘synchronic’ or ‘structural’ of them, will be emplotted in some way” (8 Metahistory).
Hence, his idea of employing the Frye’s classification of plot structure in the study of
the historical work reveals the interrelationship of literary elements and historical
narrative. Now each of the models of emplotment will be discussed individually.
If superior in degree to other men and to the environment, the hero is the
typical hero of romance, whose actions are marvellous but who himself
identifies as a human being. The hero of romance moves in a world in which
the ordinary laws of nature are slightly suspended: prodigies of courage and
43
endurance, unnatural to us, are natural to him, and enchanted weapons, talking
animals, terrifying ogres and witches, and talismans of miraculous power
violate no rules of probability once the postulates of romance have been
established. (33)
Following these criteria, it can be derived that the romance embodies the actions of
human being through its hero, though he is superior in power and possesses
extraordinary qualities than the ordinary man. On the other hand, White observes
romance in an elevated sense when he writes, “The Romance is fundamentally a
drama of self-identification symbolized by the hero’s transcendence of the world of
experience, his victory over it and his final liberation from it…” (8 Metahistory).
Further he provides examples of the Holy Grail legend and the story of the
resurrection of Christ in Christian mythology. As a result, we can divide the romance
in two forms: a secular form that deals with the chivalry and courtly affairs and a
religious form. But in the historical work, the content of the romance is immaterial,
since the entire concern of the historian is the manner in which the plot structure is
constructed in order to bring a particular explanation to his narrative.
In literary discourse, the tragedy17 is often associated with a drama that deals
with the problems of man in grand, dignified and serious manner, but it concludes
with sorrowful and terrible end. Now it is not confined to the drama, but the literary
narrative (novel) also uses the plot structure of the tragedy. In the tragedy, it is
44
generally considered that the protagonist encounters many agonizing and miserable
events and eventually falls into the fateful end because of his actions. For a definition,
the tragedy is, according to The Oxford Companion to English Literature (2009), “[a]
dramatic (or, by extension, narrative) work in which events move to a fatal or
disastrous conclusion for the protagonist, whose potential greatness is cruelly wasted
through error or the mysterious working of fate” (1002). It is noticeable that in the
tragedy the protagonist is imprisoned through his fate and does not possess any
extraordinary power of the hero of the romance.
Frye’s identification of both the tragic mode and the hero of a tragedy, is
slightly different, for it is based on the relative comparison of the power of the hero
and his natural environment. He distinguishes the hero of the tragedy and writes, “If
superior in degree to other men but not to his natural environment, the hero is a
leader. He has authority, passions, and powers of expression far greater than ours, but
what he does is subject both to social criticism and to the order of nature. This is the
hero of high mimetic mode, of most epic and tragedy…” (33-34). In other words, even
though the hero is endowed with some better qualities than ordinary men, his deeds
lead him to inescapably wretched destiny that makes him collapsed before certain
social and natural forces.
In White’s view, the tragedy represents the struggle of the protagonist to arrive
on certain reconciliations with social norms and natural environments he inhabits.
Therefore, these reconciliations partially embody the forces at play in social and
natural worlds and try to demonstrate the unchangeable circumstances which men
ultimately fail to circumvent. White explains the features of the tragedy:
The reconciliations that occur at the end of Tragedy are much more somber;
they are more in the nature of resignations of men to the conditions under
which they must labor in the world. These conditions, in turn, are asserted to
be inalterable and eternal, and the implication is that man cannot change them
but must work within them. They set the limits on what may be aspired to and
what may be legitimately aimed at in the quest for security and sanity in the
world. (9 Metahistory)
On this ground, it is argued that the edifice of tragedy is erected on the foundation of
conflict, because it is originated in the conflicting forces working between men and its
45
environment – social and natural. Since those forces viciously decimate the efforts of
human redemption from the world, the tragedy seeks to manifest a revelation of the
nature of those forces. The tragedy depicts the seriousness of the mankind in
confronting the conflict and the opposing forces in earnest manner. In this way, the
plot structure of the tragedy appears to be more appropriate in order to elicit a desired
explanation from the historical narrative moulded after the tragic fashion.
Like the tragedy, the comedy is a type of drama or another literary form
(novel, story, etc.), but unlike the former, it underlies the basic principle of
amusement to the audience or readers. It is remarkable that the fundamental
difference between the comedy and the tragedy is that while the former is
teleologically designed to end with a possibility of the solution of the problems the
protagonist encounters with, the latter represents the inescapable conditions which the
hero comes across on his way and finally ends with a sense of despair and suffering.
Although both the comedy and the tragedy are conceived on the similar but
fundamental premise that they contain conflict and contradiction in their origin, their
purposes are manifested with the progress of their respective plots.
According to Frye’s theory of modes, it is obvious that the position, power and
authority of the hero are decisive factors for qualifying as a particular plot-structure.
In case of the comedy, he mentions, “If [he is] superior neither to other men nor to his
environment, the hero is one of us: we respond to a sense of his common humanity,
and demand from the poet the same canon of probability that we find in our own
experience. This gives us the hero of low mimetic mode, of most comedy and of
realistic fiction” (34). Here, the hero is considerably treated inferior to that of the
tragedy and almost equal to us. Thus, it is certain that he must be bound to
compromise with various forces he confronts before he is made capable of securing a
transitory victory over the world by means of reconciliations.
In generic term, the satire is regarded as the literary form of irony or the ironic
mode of writing (literary representation). Unlike the comedy that evokes laughter at
the end, the satire is directed to ridicule, contempt and scorn the subject it deals with.
Through the means of derision, it predominantly aims to censure the human folly,
vice, shortcomings etc. and uses laughter as weapon with an intention to social
reform. As per the categorization by Frye, the plot structure is assigned an ironic
mode “[i]f inferior in power or intelligence to ourselves, so that we have the sense of
looking down on a scene of bondage, frustration, or absurdity, the hero belongs to the
ironic mode” (34). Even though the identification of ironic mode in the fiction by
Frye appears to indicate some discrepancy and inconsistency between his
classification and the traditional understanding of it, they seem to retain their common
underlying purpose that is to reveal weakness, flaw, defect, etc. in the human kind vis-
à-vis the world he lives in.
manifested through the bleak possibilities, gloomy circumstances, and dark forces
working against the destiny of man. Moreover, in the satire the ways of emplotting the
process of reality appear to be exactly opposite to the ways in the romance. White
further observes, “Satirical mode of representation signals a conviction that the world
has grown old. Like philosophy itself, Satire ‘paints its gray on gray’ in the awareness
of its own inadequacy as an image of reality” (10 Metahistory). Thus, it can be argued
that like the tragedy, in the satire also there is no emergence of new forces or
conditions out of the processes, but on the contrary it foregrounds the notion of “the
Same in the Different” (11 Metahistory). It should be seen in contrast with the
romance and the comedy in which the social and natural worlds are altered in
conformity with a changed and transformed order by bringing the temporal triumph
over the existing world.
Now after discussing these four types of emplotment, this is evident that their
roles in characterizing “intended meaning” or “desired explanation” to the narrative –
historical or fictional, are crucial and significant. As far as the historical work is
concerned, a historian exercises his autonomy to mould the narrative in a particular
mode of emplotment, for the ultimate purpose of the historians is to endow their
historical narrative an explanatory effect of a particular kind. While underlining the
importance of the emplotment, White writes:
Thus, the explanation by emplotment provides the historian four modes of the plot-
structure through which he/she actually configures the historical narrative. Further,
these plot-structures facilitate the cognitive operations by which the historian wants to
explain the past events at the next level of conceptualization.
48
For a simple definition of the hypothesis Pepper writes that “In the most
rudimentary common-sense view a hypothesis is identified with a guess or a hunch,
and is considered good if it turns out right, bad if it does not” (71). Further, in
“Finding the Philosophical Core: A Review of Stephen C. Pepper’s World
Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence,” Steven C Hayes et al. define the world
hypothesis, “A world hypothesis is a model of the universe of observations and
inferences” (97). Through his book, Pepper offers “a hypothesis concerning the origin
of world theories – a hypothesis which, if true, shows the connection of these theories
with common sense, illumines the nature of these theories, renders them
distinguishable from one another, and acts as an instrument of criticism for
determining their relative adequacy” (84). Thus for White, Pepper’s four hypotheses
serve as the rubric for establishing valid reasons among the events of the historical
fields in the process of emplotment. Those four theories of formal arguments
mentioned above will be discussed individually in the following passages.
2.16.1 Formism
[T]here are two kinds of truth in formism, depending upon the categorical
status of the objects of reference: historical truth, and scientific truth. The first
refers to existence and consists in descriptions of the qualities and relations of
particular events. The second refers to subsistence and consists in descriptions
of norms and laws. …There is no necessity in historical truths. The historian
describes events as they have occurred. If he finds that they are causally
related, he describes the causal relations as part of the existential events. But
his interest is primarily in the character of the events that occurred, not in the
laws which they may exemplify. (182)
50
In this way, the substructure for erecting the teleological differentiations between the
historical and scientific truth has accentuated the pattern of explanations in the formist
worldview. With the stress on describing the characteristics of the events in history,
this hypothesis deliberately discards the quest for the causal laws between the
historical events.
2.16.2 Mechanism
The mechanistic theory of truth assumes that the universe, like a machine,
consists of parts which can be understood in isolation from the whole. According to
Pepper, “The root metaphor of mechanism is a machine” (186). Through this analogy
of a machine, it can be well understood that the mechanist’s goal is to discover the
parts and the relations among the parts of the existent machine. Steven C Hayes et al.
explain further, “[M]echanists do not simply describe parts in the common-sense
world; rather, they seek to discover the true nature of a given event by specifying
what kind of part it really is and by placing it properly in the machine” (99). Unlike
Formism, Mechanism is integrative in nature, and thus, all the parts are assumed to fit
together to create the whole. Hence, it is remarkable to note that the mechanistic
theory seeks to establish the causal connections among the parts so that they can be
51
understood independently and in turn, their contribution in the making of the whole
can be explained through those connections.
2.16.3 Contextualism
It is the primacy of the context that bears the significance in the contextualist
theory of truth and explanation. Here the context can be understood as the historical
event or act, but not as a dead description of a thing done. Hence, “[T]he root
metaphor of contextualism is the ongoing act in context” (Stevens C Hayes et al. 100).
On the other hand, context, in dictionary manner, is described as circumstances that
form the setting for an event. By the same token, Pepper too argues that the historical
event should be regarded as the origin of contextualism and thus, this can be called as
the root metaphor of this theory (232). In fact, his idea of the historical event does not
52
correspond to a past event – dead or exhumed, but to the real historical event which
means the event in its actuality. In other word, the emphasis is laid on the dynamic
and active act that can be verified in temporal and spatial circumstances in the
present. Pepper further explains, “[C]ontextualism holds tight to the changing present
event…It is this hold that makes contextualism a distinctive philosophical attitude and
a world theory” (233). Thus, it can be argued that the basic premise in the
contextualism is that it works from the present event outward and at the same time, it
privileges the connecting events over the final and wider structure of the world.
The threads are identified and traced outward, into the circumambient natural
and social space within which the event occurred, and both backward in time,
in order to determine the ‘origins’ of the event, and forward in time, in order to
determine its ‘impact’ and ‘influence’ on subsequent events. This tracing
operation ends at the point at which the ‘threads’ either disappear into the
‘context’ of some other ‘event’ or ‘converge’ to cause the occurrence some
new ‘event.’ (18-19 Metahistory)
53
In this context, the intention appears to ascertain the link of the event and to associate
it with the broader context in order to provide a wider explanation to it by setting it in
various contexts. Apart from providing the narrative model of the process in the
historical field, contextualism enacts the hierarchy of signification of the historical
time and it, in turn, affects the construction of the historical narrative.
2.16.4 Organicism
Hence, it is noticeable that the quality of the whole here, unlike in the mechanism, is
destined, intended and designed to be different from its parts. It can be argued that the
historian who prefers this mode is more interested in distinguishing the integrative
process than in describing in isolated events. In other words, this theory can be well
characterized as teleological in its orientation and operation, since it sufficiently
demonstrates the tendency to determine the end or goal towards which all the process
of the historical field are headed for. Moreover, in the organicist strategy of
explanation the constant search for the laws is discarded and the identification of the
principles and ideas is privileged instead.
ideological in particular. Thus, it can be argued that the relevance and significance of
different ideologies in writing history is crucial, since historians are often
ideologically motivated while providing a particular kind of explanation to their
historical narrative.
On the third and last level of the conceptualization of the explanation of the
historical work, White propounds the theory of explanation by the ideological
implication. In fact, the historian who is primarily obliged to favour his or her
ideological positions encodes the implicitness of the ideology in the construction of a
historical narrative. It is evident that some irreducible ideological components can be
identified in every historical account of reality, because history as a discipline is not
considered to be science. Thus, it is essentially true that the presence of such elements
is integral to the non-scientific or proto-scientific disciplines like history. White aptly
explains his concept of ideological implication when he writes, “The ideological
dimensions of a historical account reflect the ethical elements in the historian’s
assumptions of a particular position on the question of the nature of historical
knowledge and the implications that can be drawn from the study of the past events
for the understanding of the present ones” (22 Metahistory). Considering ethical
inclination as influencing factor to the nature of historical knowledge, the structure of
the historical work is impacted by the historian’s covert or overt association with the
particular position in terms of ideology he appears to inadvertently or intentionally
subscribes to.
Further, White declares Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia (1936) as his
main source upon which his edifice of the ideological implication is erected. At the
same time, he reaffirms that there is a complete denial of any affiliation of such
ideologies with those of the political parties, because those four basic ideologies
postulated by him, reflect the underlying connection between the past and the present
that significantly shapes the kind of knowledge of the social praxis and that of present
world. For making it clearer, White defines ideology23 as, “a set of prescriptions for
taking a position in the present world of social praxis and acting upon it (either to
change the world or to maintain it in the current state)…” (22 Metahistory). Thus, for
White, ideology is not considered to be directly or indirectly associated with either
56
political power or social group or class, but it should be understood as the notion that
allows historians to take a particular position while structuring a narrative out of the
past events. He further explains, “Just as every ideology is attended by a specific idea
of history and its processes, so too, I maintain, is every idea of history attended by
specifically determinable ideological implications” (24 Metahistory). Thus, White
brilliantly underlines the significance and influence of the ideology in the construction
of historical works. In order to differentiate it from the political ideology, it would be
appropriate to quote John Schwarzmantel here, “In the widest possible sense an
ideology thus offers answers to the questions of what kind of society is desirable”
(25). Although Mannheim proposes five ideologies including Fascism, White
considers only four of them appropriate to postulate his theory of explanation of the
historical work. According to him, those four ideological positions are conservatism,
liberalism, radicalism and anarchism, but these designators are given by him. Here the
apparent reason for selecting only the four out of them is that these positions
essentially qualify to be scientific, realistic and rational in nature and spirit. These
basic ideological positions are described individually in following passages, although
they have to be discussed in relation to one another. Moreover, the basic criteria upon
which the discourse will follow are the concepts of social change, social congruence,
social transformation, utopia, time orientation, etc.
2.17.1 Conservatism
2.17.2 Liberalism
believes the improvement of the structure is possible in the future time as well.
Mannheim compares liberalism with conservatism: “Whereas for liberalism the future
was everything and the past nothing, the conservative mode of experiencing time
found the best corroboration of its sense of determinateness in discovering the
significance of the past, in the discovery of time as the creator of value” (211). It is
here obvious that the time orientation of liberalism and conservatism is apparently
different in nature. For liberalism, like radicalism, it is possible to study history
rationally and scientifically, since it emphasises the general trends or main drift of
development. Though the liberal envisions the utopian condition of the society in the
remote future, they deliberately refrain from adopting any “radical” means to bring
social change.
2.17.3 Radicalism
to bring this utopia to pass now” (25 Metahistory). It is remarkable to note two points
here – first the revolutionary means and second, the urgency of anticipation of the
utopia. The radical, however, puts the stress on the immediacy of change of the social
order, they certainly differ in the preference of choices of the means that could
possibly help in achieving the utopian condition. Moreover, it is latent in radicalism
that it manifests a tendency towards the social transcendence, although anarchism is
considered to be the most socially transcendent ideological position among all four of
them. Though it is obvious that the radical and the liberal believe in a rational and
scientific historiography, the former always seeks to establish the laws of historical
processes and structures in the historical field. In addition to it, radicalism shows its
firm belief in the structural transformation in the social order through programmatic
destabilization of it.
2.17.4 Anarchism
It would not be much difficult to acknowledge the notion that anarchism is the
antithesis of conservatism to a great extent, since they considerably exhibit many
incompatible characteristic features between them. Further, those features can be
illustrated on various levels such as time-orientation, pace of the change in the
society, the tendency towards social congruence and social transcendence, the
desirability to seek the structural transformation, etc. On the basis of the social
transformation (while comparing with the radical it is quoted in the previous section),
the anarchist believes in the absolute transformation of the structural relationships of
the totality of the whole, because this ideological position refuses to conform to the
existing society per se and desires to substitute it with a community of individuals.
Thus, here the greater degree of the social change is seriously and radically advocated
by the anarchist, for it has, unlike all other ideological positions, the abolition of the
existing society as an important objective.
Now we can observe the time-sense of the anarchist who believe that the ideal
society which is the utopia, is achievable at any given time, provided the men should
exhibit the great potential for humanity. White explains it correctly:
currently find themselves. They, in turn, project this utopia onto what is
effectively a non-temporal plane, viewing it as a possibility of human
achievement at any time, if men will only seize control of their own essential
humanity, either by an act of will or by an act of consciousness which destroys
the socially provided belief in the legitimacy of the current social
establishment. (25 Metahistory)
It is here important to note that the anarchist’s utopia is supposed to exist beyond the
temporal plane and hence, the realization of the ideal society is more the matter of the
human will than of any given time constraints. By the same token, it can be argued
that anarchism is the most socially transcendent ideological position, although it must
be recognized that each of the ideologies represents a combination of elements of both
social congruence and social transcendence. Finally, like the radical, the anarchist also
envisions the pace of change as the cataclysmic transformation, but unlike the former,
it does not display much interest in the power and the means for bringing those
changes in the social order.
After discussing those four basic ideologies, it can be affirmed that their
differences are the matter of emphasis, not of the content. It is remarkable to note that
the consistently underlying theme that characterizes those ideologies is the ethical
consideration or choice of the historian who favours or is inclined to a particular
ideological position in writing of the historical work he has undertaken. At this point
it suggests that the discussion on the basic ideologies above is aimed neither to
underline their merits, demerits, and relative significance, nor to accentuate the
implied hierarchy among them, but it is directed to highlight the implication of those
ideologies in terms of their impact on history writing. White attempts to explain his
design regarding the historical knowledge that these ideologies try to impact upon:
In this context, White indicates the fundamental disagreement among either those
historians who accept history as scientific discipline or those who reject it in favour of
human sciences. He not only dismisses the idea of ranking different conceptions of
history on the basis of realism and scienticity, but also refuses to accept that his
purpose is to analyze them as projections of a given ideological position. He further
reveals his intention: “I am interested only in indicating how ideological
considerations enter into the historian’s attempts to explain the historical field and to
construct a verbal model of its processes in a narrative” (26 Metahistory). It is evident
that the historical work of a given period certainly manifests the impact of ideological
positions of that period in which they are written.
Though White prescribes the tentatively valid combinations here, at the same time he
suggests that these combinations should not necessarily be considered compulsory in
all cases. The justifiability of a particular and valid combination from among these
modes is affirmed through illustrations: for White the comic mode of emplotment is
not compatible with the mechanistic argument and for the same reason, the radical
ideology is inconsonant with the satirical emplotment. On the other hand, he points
out that the prescribed combinations can deliberately be neglected by the historian
through “the dialectical tension which characterizes the work of every master
historian usually arises from the effort to wed a mode of emplotment with a mode of
argument or a mode of ideological implication which is inconsonant with it” (29
Metahistory). Hence, the structural grid of White provides historians the valid base to
gain a desired explanatory effect, but he also favours a scope for digression from the
formulated structural homology.
63
In order to figure ‘What really happened’ in the past, therefore, the historian
must first prefigure as a possible object of knowledge the whole set of events
reported in the documents. This prefigurative act is poetic inasmuch it is
precognitive and precritical in economy of the historian’s own consciousness.
It is also poetic insofar as it is constitutive of the structure that will
subsequently be imaged in the verbal model offered by the historian as a
representation and explanation of ‘what really happened’ in the past. (30-
31Metahistory)
Hence, the entire prefigurative process is characterized by the poetic act which
actually precedes the formal analysis of the historical field. This process of formal
analysis necessarily explores the possibilities for explanatory strategy which the
historian uses to explain the field. However, it is important to point out that the
number of the explanatory strategies is obviously limited and there are four principle
explanatory strategies. White suggests that these four strategies correspond to the four
tropes of poetic language and these tropes serve as the categories for representation
and explanation in historiography.
2.19 Tropology
It is widely understood that tropes are basic and integral components of poetic
or figurative language and tropology is the use of such language. At this stage, White
values the role of tropes and proposes a theory that rules the historiography. For him,
“the theory of tropes provides us with a basis for classifying deep structural forms of
the historical imagination in a given period of its evolution” (31 Metahistory). Hence,
he recognizes four basic tropes namely metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony –
which are identified by the traditional poetics and modern language theory. White is
inclined to utilize the fourfold conception of tropes for distinguishing among different
stylistic conventions within a single tradition of discourse. Here his source of the
theory of tropes can be located in the formulation by Kenneth Burke in the appendix
of his A Grammar of Motives (1945) in which he calls them the master tropes that
represent the poetic or prosaic reality. Both Burke and White agree on the notion that
their emphasis is not only on highlighting the figurative usage of these tropes, but also
on the demonstration of their role in the discovery of the truth. While underlining the
use of the tropes, White believes, “They are especially useful for understanding the
65
2.19.1 Metaphor
White’s analysis of the example (my love, a rose) asserts that the rose
represents the loved one having full capacity to contain the quality of his or her love.
It is remarkable to note both the similarity and difference between two objects, for
they belong to two different realms. He explains, “The loved one is identified with the
rose, but in such a way as to sustain the particularity of the loved one while
suggesting the quality that she (or he) shares with the rose” (34 Metahistory). Thus,
66
having read the phase in figurative manner, it can be said that the loved one is
represented by the rose, but he/she is neither reduced to a rose, (otherwise it would be
the case of metonymy), nor his/her essence is equated to that of the rose (if so it may
be an instance of synecdoche). Here, if the expression may be understood in the
implicitly negative manner and the explicit affirmation is accepted on the literal plane,
this can be considered irony. Metaphor is representational and like other tropes, it
promotes a unique linguistic protocol which is called the languages of identity.
2.19.2 Metonymy
relationship suggests that the ship is partially identifiable with a part of it (the sail)
without which they cannot function. Thus, it is argued that metonymy is reductionist
in nature, for it reduces the object of its representation (the ship) to its part (the sail).
But if the sail is used to represent a quality of the ship, then it would be a case of
synecdoche.
2.19.3 Synecdoche
Like metonymy, in synecdoche too the part stands for the whole, but their
relationship is different from the objects of representation in metonymy. While
defining synecdoche White states, “With Synecdoche, which is regarded by some
theorists as a form of Metonymy, a phenomenon can be characterized by using the
part to symbolize some quality presumed to inhere in totality, as in the expression,
‘He is all heart’” (34 Metahistory). In the analysis of this expression, he argues that
though it appears to be a metonymy on the surface level as the heart is used to
characterize the whole body of the individual, it is a synecdochic use if the term is
understood figuratively here. Nor the heart should be understood as a part of anatomy
whose function can be considered as much necessary as for the whole body, but the
representative of the quality that is possessed by the whole individual. He further
explains, “By the trope of Synecdoche, however, it is possible to construe the two
parts in the manner of an integration within a whole that is qualitatively different
from the sum of the parts and of which the parts are but microcosmic replications” (35
Metahistory). Hence, in the synecdochic usage, the relationship between two objects
is construed in terms of the microcosmic-macrocosmic relationship in which
integration of the individual parts creates an absolutely different whole.
and obviously proves to be a senseless statement. One the one hand, if this expression
is read metonymically, the centrality of the heart is emphasized in functioning of the
body as an organism and it demonstrates the reductionist quality. On the other, if it is
read synecdochically, a qualitative relationship is discernible between those terms that
contribute in making a whole. Taking the expression as the reference point, White
appropriately distinguishes between metonymy and synecdoche:
Thus, it can be argued that in this context, in synecdoche the focus of attention is
concentrated on the quality such as generosity, compassion, etc., whereas in
metonymy, the qualitative aspect is absent and the heart serves as a symbol for the
body. Moreover, synecdoche is integrative as it observes the part-whole relationship,
whereas metonymy is reductionist as it shows the part-part relationship. It is
remarkable to note that if the same expression is uttered in a particular tone and voice
or if the person does not possess the suggested quality, it turns to be ironic statement.
2.19.4 Irony
Like Burke, White too argues that irony is “essentially dialectical, inasmuch as
it represents a self-conscious use of Metaphor in the interest of verbal-negation” (37
Metahistory). The term dialectical is used to signify the problematical nature of
language, for irony suggests latent idiocies in the language itself. He further explains
that the catachresis-literally means misuse- is the basic figurative tactic of irony. It
deliberately assigns the elements of absurdity and inadequacy to the figurative
language in order to characterize it, and in turn, the language-function acquires a dual
role of affirmation at surface level and negation at the deep one. White assesses the
aim of irony as writes, “The aim of ironic statement is to affirm tacitly the negative of
what is on the literal level affirmed positively, or the reverse. It presupposes that the
reader or auditor already knows, or capable of recognizing, the absurdity of
characterization of the thing designated in the Metaphor, Metonymy, or Synecdoche
used to give from it” (37 Metahistory). It should be underlined at this point that the
context in which the statement is related to, should be manifest or partially known to
the intended reader or audience for the reception of the implied message. It would be
appropriate to quote White explaining the relationship between irony as a unique
trope and the linguistic paradigm in which it operates:
Hence, it may be correct to state that irony is radically different form of metaphor and
its usage in the figurative language is brilliantly encoded in double-layered
statements. This can be well illustrated in satire which is the fiction form of irony.
70
Now it is appropriate to mention that the irony is not necessarily used to represent one
ideological position pitched against another, but sometimes it appears to be
transideological. If it can be used to defend the status quo proposed in the
conservative or liberal ideological positions, it can also offensively be used by the
anarchist and radical to oppose the liberal and conservative utopian state. But it would
not be the case with other three basic tropes-metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche.
The trajectory of White’s works reveals his position among the theorists of
historical studies, though his works have been controversial, eliciting a mixture of
both scorn and admiration. His initial books such as Metahistory and Tropics of
Discourse are considered to be standard reading in the courses on historiography and
historical methodologies. Here it is possible to indicate the transformation in the
professional career that he underwent in terms of themes and areas of interest in his
later works such as The Content of the Form and Figural Realism, for these works
have been influential in literary studies and other fields as well. White’s proposition
that the past is invented or imagined rather than found, was well received by the
historiographical and narrative theorists like Louis O Mink, F R Ankersmit, Alun
Munslow, Keith Jenkins, and others, because for the first time it was claimed that
history does not conform or correspond to a pre-existing narrative or story. In other
words, this group of scholars are not in consonant with the idea of the historian’s
discovery of the story, but they believe that the historical narrative endows itself and
the past with meaning. After such a shift in postmodern and poststructuralist
historiography, Alun Munslow proposes a new school of history which is called
deconstructionist history25, for it is considered different from the previous schools of
history which he calls reconstructionist and constructionist history. Thus, White’s
scholarship in narrative historiography continues to influence the contemporary
72
school of historical thought, but at the same time it is correct to mention that his
theory is challenged and rejected by those historians who endorse the non-narrative
and anti-narrative history which is chiefly based on facts and is considered “proper
history.” In short, White is considered to be the foremost and self-reflexive
practitioner of postmodern historiography.
them in many subsequent articles and books. The sharp points of Kansteiner’s
criticism for White are too strong to be neglected here:
For the average historian White’s name symbolizes the use of unnecessary
theoretical jargon, a debilitating relativism, and the denial of evidence and the
possibility of realistic representation in history. Historians have thus rarely
taken notice of the development of White’s thought, be it his defence against
most recent attempts to introduce a more flexible terminology and to rethink
the question of referentiality. (286)
Although these disagreements really appear to be serious in nature, they are certainly
addressed in White’s body of writings that followed the publication of Kansteiner’s
article in 1993. White’s development as a theorist of historiography is reaffirmed by
his two later books – Figural Realism (2000) and The Fiction of Narrative (2010)
which enable him for proper defence to his position as a philosopher of history and as
an advocate of the narrative history in the contemporary historical studies. His ideas
and theory are further perpetuated by a school of historians, literary theorists,
historiographers and scholars from other fields as well and this continuation is
ubiquitously reflected and proved through a body of writings on him.
2.21 Conclusion
the forthcoming chapter is devoted to discuss the city as an entity and its progression
in the course of history.
***
76
1
From W H Walsh’s An Introduction to Philosophy of History. (16)
2
Here two writers are to be quoted. First, Collingwood defines, “History is a Greek word, meaning
simply an investigation or inquiry” (The Idea of History, 18-19). Second, M I Finley, who says,
“History in its root sense means inquiry” (Introduction to The Greek Historians, 1). But the English
word “history” has its cognates in other European languages such as “histoire” in French and
“Geschichte” in German.
3
More vibrant and suitable definition in this context can be found in The Greek Historians (1959, 80)
by M I Finley who explains what a myth is and how it was associated with history in the ancient time.
He asserts, “Myth serves admirably to provide the necessary continuity of life, not only with the past
but with nature and the gods as well. It is rich and vivid, it is concrete and yet full of symbolic
meanings and associations, it explains institutions and rites and feelings, it is instructive- above all, it is
read and true and immediately comprehensible. It served the early Greeks perfectly” (“Introduction” 3).
Besides the Greek epics were also considered a contribution to quasi- history that became manifest in
the epic tradition of Greek poets like Homer.
4
According to Oxford Dictionaries (online edition), theogony means the genealogy of a group or
system of gods. But it is an eponymous poem by Hesiod describing the genealogy or birth of Greek
gods.
5
The point where Thucydides distinctively differs from Herodotus is the evidence in history writing,
according to Collingwood. Collingwood enumerates four characteristics of history viz. a) scientific, or
begins by asking questions, b) humanistic, or asks questions about things done by men in determinate
times in the past, c) rational, or bases the answers which it gives to its questions on grounds, namely
appeal to evidence; and d) self-revelatory, or exists in order to tell man what man is by telling him what
man has done. Herodotus misses the third characteristic (The Idea of History, 18).
6
This book covers the history of the war fought between Athens and Sparta from 431 to 404 BC, with
a temporary but nominal truce for seven years in the middle. Thucydides, in his late twenties, decided
to write history of this war when it broke out.
7
Apologetics is the verbal defence of the Faith, for example by dispelling inaccurate stereotypes or by
re-presenting doctrine in language that is more accessible to non-believers. The goal of apologetics is
to persuasively answer honest objections that keep people from faith in Jesus Christ (Theopedia).
8
The annals are the concise form of historical representation and present the records of events year by
year. But they fall short of history as they lack the social centre. As Hayden White puts it, “The annals
do not conclude; they simply terminate” ( The Content of the Form, 8). He further says, “The chronicle
is like the annals but unlike the history, does not so much conclude as simply terminate…The
Chronicle typically promises closure but does not provide it…” (16).
9
Primarily a mathematician and philosopher, Descartes put the natural science on the front and history
on the side. His historical skepticism, according to Collingwood, adumbrates four points –historical
escapism, historical pyrrhonism, anit-utilitarian idea of history and history as fantasy-building (60).
According to this historiography, history was based on the written authorities, but the historians were
applying the critical methodology by questioning those authorities.
10
The term is the English translation of the Italian work of Vico. It is called Scienza Nuova , the
original title of the book published in 1725. It is an influential work in the philosophy of history.
Hayden White is much influenced by Vico.
11
This oft quoted German remark is roughly translated as “as it really/actually happened.” But Felix
Gilbert sees inadequacy in such translation, especially the word eigentlich. He believes that, “The term
eigentlich is of such an opaque character that all of these translations seem possible. Thus the exact
meaning of the statement seems uncertain, and this explains why the same statement could serve
different, contradictory interpretation” (“Historiography: What Ranke Meant.”, 394).
12
It is philosophy of science that believes that knowledge is derived from the data of experience and
that excludes a priori or metaphysical speculations. In short, it is a system of knowledge.
13
Historical Materialism is the application of Marxist science to historical development. The
fundamental proposition of historical materialism can be summed up in a sentence: “It is not the
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their
consciousness” (Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy [Sources:
www.marxist.com and www.marxists.org ]).
14
This is a loose translation of Lucien Febvre’s aphorism , ‘Histoire science du passé, science du
présent’. It can be compared with the Ranke’s dictum, ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’.
15
This is an English translation of Ecrits sur l’Histoire (1969).
16
Etymologically romance is a Latin word that came into English language through French. It literally
means “the speech of the people” or “the vulgar tongue” in French and “written in vernacular” in Latin.
77
It should be understood as the counter genre of the standard form in Latin or French. Historically it is
found in the Greek literature. But it was brought to English during the French rule and hence became
popular in the Middle Ages and later during the early modern period of English literature. Geoffrey
Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde is a good example of the romance.
17
The classic definition of Aristotle is still considered superior in which he describes tragedy as “the
imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself.” Tragedies of
Greek dramatists like Aeschylus and Sophocles and English dramatists like Shakespeare are great
examples. But here again the concern of Hayden White is focused on the process of the plot structure.
18
The term diremption can be understood in the contrast of another word redemption. White argues
that if the Romance is the drama of redemption, the Satire is the precise opposite of it.
19
The nomological-deductive argument follows the law of the logic in which we have a syllogism with
the major premise, the minor premise and the conclusion. The major premise contains the putatively
universal law of causal relationship, the minor one consists of the boundary condition within which the
law is applied and the conclusion drawn by deducing from the above two premises. The explanations of
the events in the story are provided by the nomological-deductive arguments. This kind of principle is
mostly applied in the physical and natural sciences.
20
While Pepper sets for his root-metaphor theory and examines six world hypotheses viz. animism,
mysticism, formism, mechanism, contextualism, organicism. Out of these six hypotheses, White
dropped first two and chose last four to formulate his historiographical theory.
21
Pepper explains the root metaphor theory in this way, “A man desiring to understand the world looks
about for a clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of commonsense fact and tries if he
cannot understand other areas in terms of this one. This original area becomes then his basic analogy or
root metaphor” (91). In other words, a root metaphor is a commonsense conceptualization of a domain,
in accordance with which categorical concepts have been constructed.
22
Form is the characteristic of the Platonic philosophy. Form should be considered to be similar to the
concept of idea of which Plato claims to be original.
23
Iain MacKenzie writes in his essay “The Idea of Ideology” that “…all ideologies, of whatever hue,
embody an account of social and political reality and an account of how that reality could be
bettered…Every ideology…embodies an account of the basic elements and core dynamic that
constitute and propel social and political life” (Political Ideologies: An Introduction by Robert
Eccleshall et al. 2). But White has used the concept in different manner, for he does not accept ideology
either as a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class or as a set of false ideas
which help to legitimate a dominant political power.
24
Burke has four different names for the master tropes. He believes that the literal or realistic
application of the four tropes go by a set of different names. He calls metaphor as perspective,
metonymy as reduction, synecdoche as representation and irony as dialectic. (503)
25
Alun Munslow’s Deconstructing History (1997) demonstrates how the established historical writing
in the postmodern and poststructuralist time can be contested. He devotes one chapter on Hayden
White.
73
Work Cited
Collingwood, R. G. The Idea of History (1946). Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000.
Print
Dewald, Carolyn, and John Marincola, ed. Introduction. The Cambridge Companion
to Herodotus. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. 1-12. Print.
Doran, Robert. “Choosing the Past: Hayden White and the Philosophy of History.”
Introduction. Philosophy of History after Hayden White. Ed. Doran. London:
Bloomsbury, 2013. 1-33. Print.
Finely, M. I., ed. The Greek Historians: The Essence of Herodotus, Thucydides,
Xenophon, Polybius. London: Penguin, 1959. Print.
Frye, Northrop. Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957.
Print.
74
Gilbert, Felix. “Historiography: What Ranke Meant.” The American Scholar 56.3
(1987): 393-97. JSTOR. Web. 28 September 2013.
Hayes, Steven C, Linda J. Hayes, and Hayne W. Reese. “Finding the Philosophical
Core: A Review of Stephen C. Pepper's World Hypotheses: A Study In
Evidence.” Rev. of World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence, by Stephen C
Pepper. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour 50.1 (July 1988):
97-111. JSTOR. Web. 9 Sept. 2014.
Kansteiner, Wulf. “Hayden White’s Critique of the Writing of History.” History and
Theory 32.3 (October 1993): 273-295. JSTOR. Web. 18 March 2012.
Poster, Mark. Foucault, Marxism and History: Mode of Production versus Mode of
Information. Oxford: Polity, 1984. Print.
Quinn, Edward. A Dictionary of Literary and Thematic Terms. New York: Facts On
File, 2006. Print.
75
“The Study of History.” The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. (Macropaedia). 15th ed.
Vol. 20. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2010. Print.
“Tragedy.” The Oxford Companion to English Literature. 7th ed. 2006. Print.
White, Hayden. The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical
Representation. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1987. Print
---. Tropic of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
UP, 1978. Print.