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APPEALS

(1) STOLT-NIELSEN MARINE SERVICES, INC. (now STOLT-NIELSEN


TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC.), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ARIEL C. SANTOS,
RICARDO O. ATIENZA and RAMON ALPINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 147623. December 13, 2005
GARCIA, J p:

FACTS:
Private respondent Ramon Alpino was employed as motorman by petitioner company for its vessel "M/T
Stolt Sincerity." Respondent's employment with petitioner, albeit not continuous, lasted until 1984 when
he was repatriated to the Philippines after diagnose with several illnesses and declared unfit for sea duty.
Respondent then filed several complaints against petitioner company but the same were dismissed.
Undaunted, on July 26, 1994, respondent the filed a case against petitioner with the POEA for recovery of
sickness and disability benefits, allegedly arising from his sickness while under the latter's employ.

Pursuant to Republic Act 8042, the case was transferred to the NCR-Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
Assigned Labor Arbiter Santos rendered a decision declaring “invalid and ineffectual" the SPA executed by
respondent. On July 25, 1997, or seven days after its receipt of the aforementioned Labor Arbiter's
decision, petitioner filed with the respondent NLRC its Appeal with Attached Urgent Motion to Reduce or
be Exempted from Filing Appeal Bond. On appeal, respondent NLRC afirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision
and denied petitioner's Urgent Motion to Reduce or be Exempted from Filing an Appeal Bond on account
of petitioner's failure to post cash or surety bond within the reglementary period. On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed the judgement of NLRC.

ISSUE: WON CA and NLRC erred in not liberally interpreting Art. 223 of the Labor Code with respect to
posting of an appeal bond ass a condition for perfecting an appeal.

RULING:
NO, the SC ruled that the requirement of a cash or surety bond for the perfection of an appeal from the
Labor Arbiter's monetary award is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, and noncompliance
therewith is fatal and has the effect of rendering the award Dnal and executory. Article 223 of the Labor
Code which explicitly states that the appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety
bond.

Relaxation of this rule can only be done where there was substantial compliance of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure or where the party involved, at the very least, demonstrated willingness to abide by the rules
by posting a partial bond. Here, Petitioner did not post a full or partial appeal bond within the prescribed
period.

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(2) SOFIA CANTON, deceased, represented by co-administrators of her
estate, Macaraig Canton, Jr., and Juan V. Bolo, DOMINGO L.
ANTIGUA, ROGELIO UY, and JUAN V. BOLO, petitioners, vs. CITY OF
CEBU and/or METRO CEBU DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, respondents.
G.R. No. 152898. February 12, 2007
CARPIO, J p:

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a case for forcible entry, before the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu. Petitioners
alleged that respondents' agents unlawfully entered their property and demolished their fence.
Petitioners stated that their property is in San Roque, Talisay, Cebu and is outside the South Cebu
Reclamation Project. Petitioners showed tax declarations to prove their ownership of the disputed area.
Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners stating that the only issue raised before it is prior
physical possession and not the right to ownership or possession. On appeal, RTC reversed the decision
of MTC stating that that the disputed area is foreshore land that is not subject of any foreshore lease
agreement between the government and any private individual.

Respondents received the Regional Trial Court's decision on 23 June 2000. On the other hand, petitioners
allegedly received their copy of the Regional Trial Court's decision only on 7 January 2002. Petitioners
filed their petition with the appellate court on 16 January 2002. CA then dismissed the petition outright.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals erred in outright dismissing the petition because copies of the
complaint, answer, parties' position papers filed with the Municipal Trial Court and parties' appeal
memoranda filed with the Regional Trial Court were not attached.

RULING:

No, the SC ruled that the right to appeal is not a natural right. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege,
and it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. Moreover,
Section 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that if petitioner fails to comply with the submission of
"documents which should accompany the petition," it "shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof." In this case, the insufficiency of the supporting documents combined with the unjusti:ed refusal
of petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply with the attachment requirement justi:ed the
dismissal of her petition. (Atillo v. Bombay)

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(3) ASSOCIATION OF INTEGRATED SECURITY FORCE OF BISLIG
(AISFB)-ALU, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PAPER
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 140150. August 22, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

FACTS:
Petitioner Association of Integrated Security Force of Bislig-ALU (AISFB-ALU) is a legitimate labor
organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Its members are the regular company hired security guards
composing the Company Guard Force maintained and operated by private respondent Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP). Circumstances led to the dismissal of the security guard members
of AISFB-ALU. NLRC rendered its questioned decision dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal,
backwages, etc. Petitioner thereafter filed its motion for reconsideration but was denied by the
temporary members of the 5th Division of NLRC.

On 14 November 1994, a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court was commenced by petitioner.
6 The subject petition, however, was referred to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition per resolution. The Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision affirming the findings of the NLRC

Undaunted, petitioner AISFB-ALU filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court challenging the above Decision of the court a quo.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s present petition be granted.

RULING:
No. The SC ruled that a motion for reconsideration of an assailed decision is deemed a plain and adequate
remedy provided by law. Thus, for petitioner's utter failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the court a quo before recourse to this special civil action was made, as a general rule, the
instant petition must be dismissed for failure to comply with a condition precedent in order for said
recourse to lie. While in certain instances, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to
despite the availability of an appeal, such are sadly nonexistent in this case. The petition would still be
dismissed as it is substantially inform for failure of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo.

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(4) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. MIRANT 1
PAGBILAO CORPORATION (formerly SOUTHERN ENERGY QUEZON,
INC.), respondent.
G.R. No. 159593. October 16, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

FACTS:
Respondent Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (MPC) filed its application for tax credit or refund of unutilized
VAT paid on capital goods. Revenue District Officer Penalosa-Asensi submitted a memorandum report in
favor of the application but in reduced amount of P49,616.40 representing unapplied input taxes on
capital goods. The tax court, however, reduced the amount of refund to which MPC was entitled.
Aggrieved, the BIR Commissioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review. The Court of
Appeals found no merit in the BIR Commissioner's Petition. The BIR Commissioner then filed the present
Petition
for Review before this Court on the ground that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
affirming the Decision of the CTA.

ISSUE: WON a party can change his theory of the case on appeal

RULING:
No, It is already well-settled in this jurisdiction that a party may not change his theory of the case on
appeal. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play. In his Petition and Memorandum before this
Court, the BIR Commissioner made no attempt to provide reasonable explanation for his failure to raise
before the CTA the issue of MPC being a public utility subject to franchise tax rather than VAT.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly refused to consider the issues raised by the BIR Commissioner
for the Erst time on appeal. Its discussion on whether the MPC is a public utility and whether it is subject
to VAT or franchise tax is nothing more than obiter dictum. It is best not at all to discuss these issues for
they do not simply involve questions of law, but also closely-related questions of fact which neither the
Court of Appeals nor this Court could presume or garner from the evidence on record.

(5) LORENZO C. DY, ZOSIMO DY, SR., WILLIAM IBERO, RICARDO GARCIA
and RURAL BANK OF AYUNGON, INC. , petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER
ALBERTO L. DALMACION and CARLITO H. VAILOCES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-68544. October 27, 1986
NARVASA, J p:

FACTS:
Private respondent, Carlito H. Vailoces, was the manager of the Rural Bank of
Ayungon (Negros Oriental). Pursuant to Article IV of the bank's by-laws, the new board of executive
officers passed a Resolution relieving Vailoces as bank manager. Vailoces filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages with the Ministry of Labor and Employment against Lorenzo Dy and Zosimo Dy, Sr.

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The Executive Labor Arbiter found that Vailoces was illegally dismissed. Lorenzo Dy, et al. appealed to the
NLRC but the same was dismissed for having been filed late.

ISSUE: WON petitioners are bound by the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

RULING:
No, the SC ruled that as there is no dispute that the position from which private respondent Vailoces
claims to
have been illegally dismissed is an elective corporate office. The case thus falls squarely within the
purview of Section 5, par. (c), No. 902-A which is explicitly declared to be within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Securities
and Exchange Commission

Respondent Vailoces' invocation of estoppel as against petitioners with respect to the issue of jurisdiction
is unavailing. Although rather off handedly, in their
appeal to the NLRC they called attention to the Labor Arbiter's lack of jurisdiction to rule on the validity of
the meeting of July 2, 1983, but the dismissal of the appeal for alleged tardiness effectively precluded
consideration of that or any other question raised in the appeal. More importantly, estoppel cannot be
invoked to prevent this Court from taking up the question of jurisdiction, which has been apparent on the
face of the pleadings since the start of litigation before the Labor Arbiter. It is well settled that the
decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void.

(6) SALVADOR COMILANG, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO BURCENA AND


MARIANO BURCENA, respondents.
G.R. No. 146853. February 13, 2006
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:

FACTS:
Respondents, Francisco Burcena and Mariano Burcena, filed a complaint for
annulment of document with damages against petitioner Comilang. The complaint alleges that
respondents were the owner of the parcel of and in Manueva, Santa, Ilocos Sur as they acquired the same
thorugh their earningngs while working abroad. Petitioners argue that a Deed of Donation was freely and
voluntarily executed by Dominga in consideration of her love and affection for him. During the pendency
of the case and before she could take the witness stand, Dominga died. The RTC rendered a decision in
favor of respondents declaring the donation void. On appeal, the CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence this
present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON CA has the judicial prerogative to rule on matters not assigned as errors in an appeal if
indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of the case.

RULING:
Yes. The SC ruled that an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are
not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting

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jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain
or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to
serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned
as errors on
appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted
which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon
which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.

In this case, since the petitioner directly brought in issue on appeal in his Appellant's Brief the declaration
of the RTC that Dominga could not have validly disposed of the subject property because respondents are
the real owners of the subject property since it was bought with money sent by them, it was well-within
the CA's authority to review and evaluate the propriety of such ruling.

(7) MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO S. GO,


respondent.
G.R. No. 167988. February 6, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

FACTS:
Respondent Antonio Go filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter against Eurotech
Hair Systems, Inc. (EHSI). The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent Go was illegally dismissed from
employment. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of LA. Aggrieved, respondent Go elevated the
adverse decision to the Court of Appeals which set aside the ruling of the NLRC and reinstated that of the
LA.

After the promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision but prior to the receipt of the parties of their
respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case and signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim with
the approval of the Labor Arbiter. In view of the amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order
dismissing the illegal dismissal case with prejudice. Respondent Go, through counsel,filed a Manifestation
with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify said waiver while EHSI filed a Motion with Leave of court to
consider the case settled. Acting on the motions, CA then annulled the said order for LA for lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the CA disregarded the mandatory provision of Rule 71 of The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

RULING:
No. The SC ruled that Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio
by the court; or (2) through a veri8ed petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings. Procedural requirements as outlined must be complied with. Respondent Go 8led a
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, which was unveri8ed and without any supporting particulars and

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documents. Such procedural Maw notwithstanding, the appellate court granted the motion and directed
petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt.

(8) SPOUSES TEODORA and WILFREDO BUENAFLOR , petitioners, vs.


HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED RURAL BANK OF PANAY
ISLAND, INC., represented by its Manager Raul Balandra, and THE
HONORABLE DANILO P. GALVEZ, Acting Presiding Judge of the
Aklan Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan, respondents.
G.R. No. 142021. November 29, 2000
KAPUNAN, J p:

FACTS:
Petitioners Sps. Buenaflor filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession of
realty against respondent United Rural Bank of Panay Island, Inc. The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of the bank. Hence, petitioners filed with the trial court a notice of appeal with postal money order
attached thereto as payment of the appellate docket fees. The postal money orders were payable to the
Clerks of Court of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The clerk of court of the trial court
returned the postal money orders. The trial court issued an order ruling that the appellate docket fee was
not paid in accordance with Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure since the money
orders were not payable to the clerk of the trial court.

ISSUE: WON the actual delivery of the postal money orders to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court as a valid and proper payment of the appellate docket fees.

RULING:
Yes, the SC ruled that he payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory.
Nevertheless, this rule must be qualified, to wit: First, the failure to pay appellate court docket fee within
the reglementary period allows only discretionary dismissal, not automatic dismissal, of the appeal.
Second, such power should be used in the exercise of the Court's sound discretion "in accordance with
the tenets of justice and fair play and with great deal of circumspection considering all attendant
circumstances."

The concept of payment should not be construed in the strict or technical sense. In its general sense,
payment has been defined as a delivery or money or its equivalent in either specific property or services
by one person from whom it is due to another person to whom it is due. In the case at bar, the delivery of
the appellate docket fees to the proper Clerk of Court should be interpreted to mean as the proper
payment thereof or, at least, substantial performance of the obligation to pay the appellate docket fees.

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(9) ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA , petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, SPS. ERNESTO REYES and LORNA REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 111324. July 5, 1996
ROMERO, J p:

FACTS:
The case at bar springs from a lease agreement executed by petitioner-lessor, the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, and private respondent-lessees, spouses Ernesto and Lorna Reyes on August 1,
1985 over a parcel of land located in Intramuros, Manila. The lower court held that private respondent
spouses were indeed obligated to pay rent after having admitted that they deliberately defaulted in
payments. Private respondent spouses filed a notice of appeal and elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. Respondent court stated that the case before it is a single appeal and does not necessitate
multiple appeals even if it involves an October 17, 1990 Order and a Partial Judgment rendered on
October 18, 1990.

ISSUE: WON the case involves multiple appeals which, therefore, necessitates the filing of a record on
appeal for the perfection of the appeal.

RULING:
No, the SC ruled that the case at bar is not one where multiple appeals can be taken or are necessary.
Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting,
in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special
civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than
one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and
distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.

(10) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, represented by


the Royal Embassy of Belgium, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, UNIFIED FIELD CORPORATION, MARILYN G. ONG,
VICTORIA O. ANG, EDNA C. ALFUERTE, MARK DENNIS O. ANG and
ALVIN O. ANG, respondents.
G.R. No. 164150. April 14, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J:

FACTS:
A Complaint for specific performance of contract with damages was filed by
petitioner against respondents. The RTC rendered in a decision in favor of petitioner. On appeal,
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that respondent’s counsel Petitioner claims
that respondent UFC plainly committed fraud in the performance of its clear duty under paragraph 22 of
the Contract of Lease by not returning petitioner's unused two months advance rentals and security
deposit despite repeated demands therefor. For failure to file the brief within the reglementary period,
CA deemed the appeal abandoned.

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ISSUE: WON CA erred in considering the appeal abandoned.

RULING:
No, the SC ruled that respondents finally "attached" their Brief only in their Motion for Reconsideration
filed on 27 October 2003 in the Court of Appeals seeking a
reconsideration of the appellate court's Resolution of 30 September 2003, dismissing their appeal. The
delay in the filing thereof, 57 days after the expiration of the period to file the same on 1 September 2003,
was, indeed, unreasonably long.

(11) DOLORITA C. BEATINGO, petitioner, vs. LILIA BU GASIS, respondent.


G.R. No. 179641. February 9, 2011
NACHURA, J p:

FACTS:
Petitioner Dolorita Beatingo fi led a Complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of Sale, Reconveyance,
Delivery of Title and Damages 4 against respondent Lilia Bu Gasis before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo City. The RTC decided in favor of the defendant stating that the controversy as one of double sale.
Aggrieved, petitioner ;led a Motion for New Trial and Reconsideration 8 on the
ground that she was in possession of the subject property actually and constructively, but the same was
denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Notice of Appeal. CA required petitioner to file an
Appellant's Brief within fortyfive (45) days from receipt of the notice. But due to pressures of work in
equally important cases with other clients, counsel for petitioner requested for an extension of ninety (90)
days within which to file the brief – which was granted. Instead of filing the Appellant's Brief within the
extended period, petitioner twice
moved for extension of time to fie the brief, covering an additional period of sixty (60) days for the same
reasons as those raised in the first motion for extension. On June 2007, CA denied the motions for
extension to file brief. Thus, for failure to file the Appellant's Brief, the appellate court dismissed the
appeal.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in not admitting the appellant’s brief.

RULING:
No, the SC ruled that petitioner's counsel was negligent in failing to file the required brief not only within
45 days from receipt of the notice but also within the extended period of ninety (90) days granted by the
appellate court. Unfortunately, petitioner is bound by the negligence of her counsel. The failure to file the
appellant's Brief, though not jurisdictional, results in the abandonment of the appeal which may be the
cause for its dismissal. It is true that it is not the ministerial duty of the CA to dismiss the appeal. The
appellate court has the
discretion to do so, and such discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each
case.

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(12) SPS. DOLORES MIRANDA PROVOST and JEAN PROVOST, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. VICTOR RAMOS and FE A.
RAMOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 160406. June 26, 2006
QUISUMBING, J p:

FACTS:
Private respondent Sps Ramos spouses filed a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against Sps Provost alleging that Sps Provost encroached on 314
square meters of their lot Mambajao, Camiguin. The
MTC dismissed the complaint and held that the Ramoses failed to prove their ownership and possession
of the disputed area. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision, stating that the claim by the
Ramoses over the property sought to be recovered was based on a disapproved survey plan.The
appellate court reversed the RTC decision

ISSUE: WON Petitioner for Certiorari is the only remedy available.

RULING:
No, the SC ruled that the case involves an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Thus, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not proper. Nevertheless, we shall give due course to the
instant petition as one proper for review under Rule 45.

(13) VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION, petitioner, vs. NIEVES AMIGO,


respondent.
G.R. No. 169793. September 15, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

FACTS:
Two lots located at National Hiway, Cauayan, Isabela were sold to Victoriano Magpantay which which
Amigo allegedly entered and took possession in 1985 without the permission of the owner. In 2001,
Encarnacion sent a letter to Amigo demanding the latter to vacate the land. Amigo refused to heed to
Encarnacion's demand so the latter filed a case for ejectment.
The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of Encarnacion. On appeal, the RTC dismissed the case on the
ground that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case. The CA confirmed the decision of the RTC saying
the accion publiciana and not unlawfult detainer.

ISSUE: WON MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court cited the Court of Appeals decision stating that if petitioners are indeed the
owners of the subject lot and were unlawfully deprived of their right of possession, they should present

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their claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not
before the metropolitan trial court in a summary proceeding for unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal
Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it
has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall
decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the
admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.

(14) MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC. , petitioner, vs. THE


COURT OF APPEALS, BERNARDO, DOMINADOR, HERMOGENA LUCIA,
and MARIA GATCHALIAN, and the HEIRS OF GREGORIO
GATCHALIAN: ROLANDO, CONRADO and ARTURO, all surnamed
GATCHALIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 137122. November 15, 2000
VITUG, J p:

FACTS:
Private respondents filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of parcels of land
against petitioner. After a protracted litigation, the trial court dismissed the complaint. The court ruled
that the claims had been barred by the statute of limitations and laches. Private respondents filed a
motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court. On appeal to the CA, the
records were not transmitted to the appellate court due to missing transcript of stenographic notes.
Thereafter, the respondents filed a motion for new trial since reconstitution of the missing stenographic
notes was no longer possible which was granted by the trial court. Petitioner elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals, insisting that the trial court erred in holding that the petitioner was barred from
assailing the timeliness of the appeal and in granting the motion for new trial. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner was stopped by laches in assailing the notice of
appeal which had been given due course by the trial court.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in not holding that the perfection of an appeal within the time prescribed is
jurisdictional and as such it can be assailed at anytime.

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner could not be faulted for its failure to move for the dismissal
of the appeal at an earlier time acting upon the assumption that the appeal was filed on time relying on
the order of the trial court that the notice of appeal had been filed within the reglementary period. The
legality of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court and the latter is
not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground of its having been filed out of time. The
respondents did not attempt to explain the reason for the delay and instead blamed the petitioner for its
failure to assail the timeliness of the appeal.

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(15) DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO
VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL
MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN,
all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional
Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, respondents.
G.R. No. 141524. September 14, 2005
CORONA, J p:

FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order,
the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day
thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued
another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3,
1998. The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.

ISSUE: WON petitioners perfected their appeal on time.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners seasonably Bled their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

(16) TRANS INTERNATIONAL , petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS;


NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION; PERLA A. SEGOVIA and GILBERTO PASTORAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 128421. January 26, 1998.
MARTINEZ, J p

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against private respondent and two of its
principal officers arising from the rescission of a contract for the supply and delivery of woodpoles. The
trial court rendered a decision sustaining the claim of the petitioner. On June 19, 1996, private
respondents filed their motion for reconsideration which, however, was denied by the trial court on
August 2, 1996. A copy of the aforesaid order was personally delivered to private respondent's office on
August 23, 1996 at 4:54 P.M., Friday and was received by a clerk assigned at the office of the VP-General
Counsel. For failure of the clerk to report for work last August 26 and 27, 1996 due to an illness,

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respondent was able to file their notice of appeal only in the afternoon of August 27, after the said order
was retrieved from the clerk's drawer. The trial court denied private respondent's notice of appeal for
having been filed out of time.

ISSUE: WON the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner corporation should be denied for lack of
merit.

RULING:
No, the SC ruled that as a general rule the appellate jurisdiction of the courts is conferred by law, and
must be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions thereof and such jurisdiction is
acquired by the appellate court over the subject matter and parties by the perfection of the appeal.
Nonetheless, this court has on several occasions relaxed this strict requirement. The peculiar
circumstances attendant in this case strongly demands a review of the decision of the trial court. In
essence, the court is convinced that the test for substantial justice and equity considerations have been
adequately met by respondents to overcome the one day delay in the perfection of their appeal.

(17) NARCISO KHO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL CAMACHO, SHERIFF OF


QUEZON CITY, and HONORABLE OSCAR LEVISTE, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 97, respondents.
G.R. No. 82789. November 21, 1991
FERNAN, C .J p:

FACTS:
In payment of attorney’s fees, petitioner Kho issued in favor of private respondent Atty. Camacho six
postdated checks amounting to P57,349.00. Five checks were negotiatied by Camacho to Philippine
Amanah bank but the same were returned uncleared because Manila Bank had been ordered closed. Kho
refused to replace said checks, hence Atty. Camacho instituted an action for sum of money against him.
Camacho moved for a judgment on the pleadings which respondent Judge Leviste granted and directed
petitioner to pay Camacho. Petitioner seasonably filed a notice of appeal which was duly approved.
Camacho then filed a motion to strike off petitioner’s notice of appeal.

ISSUE: WON Judge Leviste erred in setting aside the previously approved notice of appeal.

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that what respondent Judge should have done under the circumstances
was to sustain his approval of the notice of appeal and leave it to the Court of Appeals to certify the case
to the proper tribunal if warranted.

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(18) SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO
and MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996
REGALADO, J p:

FACTS:
A civil action for an easement of right was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against petitioners. The RTC rendered
its decision ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give Mabasa permanent access to the public
street. Plaintiff, represented by his heirs, appealed to the CA stating that the lower court erred in not
awarding damages to their favor. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision with modification awarding damages in
favor of private respondents.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration be granted/

RULING:
No, the SC ruled that herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not
appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private
respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of
propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.

(19) CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF


APPEALS and WILLIAM SAMARA, respondents
G.R. No. 92591. April 30, 1991
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:

FACTS:
The case arose from a complaint filed by private respondent William Samara, an American who does
business in the Philippines, against petitioner Citytrust and a foreign bank, Marine Midland. Samara
executed a stop-payment order of the bank draft instructing Citytrust to inform Marine Midland about
the order through telex. However, Citytrust credited back Samara's account for U.S. $40,000.00 due to
the non-payment. The trial court rendered a decision finding defendant banks jointly and severally liable
to pay plaintiff. The petitioner and Marine Midland filed separate appeals. The petitioner's appeal was,
however, dismissed for having been filed out of time or fifty-one (51) days after it received a copy of the
trial court decision.
ISSUE: WON the timely appeal of Marine Midland inured to petitioner's benefit.

RULING:
No, the SC ruled that in filing a motion for reconsideration, Marine Midland was in fact acting only for
itself. The rights and liabilities of the two defendants are not so interwoven as to show similarity in

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defenses and warrant reversal of the judgment as to both. Hence, respondent Samara is entitled to
immediate execution when the trial court decision became final and executory as to the petitioner.
Petitioner's argument that execution pending appeal of its co-defendant should not be allowed to
prevent an absurd result in case of possible reversal, the court held that the law is clear that a final
judgment must be executed against a defeated party. Since both defendants are jointly and severally
liable, it is irrelevant whether or not the co-defendant would be absolved.

(20) ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS, INC.,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH ONG,
respondents.
G.R. No. 132197. August 16, 2005
TINGA, J p:

FACTS:

A complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents, the latter alleging the fact of their
ownership over three parcels of land. MTC decided in favor of petitioners. On appeal, RTC affirmed MTC’s
decision. Respondents filed a notice of appeal. However, on the following day, they filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued an Order which concurrently gave due course to respondents' notice of
appeal filed on 8 May 1997; denied their motion for reconsideration dated 9 May 1997,and granted
petitioners' motion for immediate execution pending appeal.

ISSUE: WON the filing of Motion for Reconsideration deemed an effective withdrawal of a defective
Notice of Appeal.

RULING:
Yes, the SC ruled that Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC,
petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC. However, this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration
on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time,
as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee's brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of
the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of
Appeal.

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(21) MACAWIWILI GOLD MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CO., INC. and
OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION , petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILEX MINING CORPORATION ,
respondents
G.R. No. 115104. October 12, 1998
MENDOZA, J p:

FACTS:
Respondent Philex Mining Corporation filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners Macawiwili
Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. and Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation pursuant to PD No.
463. The trial court on the motion of petitioners, dismissed the complaint of Philex Mining. On appeal,
appellate court denied petitioners' motion to dismiss appeal. Without filing a motion for reconsideration,
petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in denying petitioner’s Motion to dismiss Appeal.

RULING:
Yes, the SC ruled that appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the appellant raises only
questions of law. The first four arguments advanced by respondent Philex Mining raise the sole issue of
whether under Presidential Decree No. 463, it has the right to expropriate petitioners' mining claims. Its
final argument raises the issue of whether the rules on the allegation of alternative causes of action in
one pleading under Rule 8, §1 of the Rules of Court are applicable to special civil actions. These are legal
questions whose resolution does not require an examination of the probative weight of the evidence
presented by the parties but a determination of what the law is on the given state of facts. These issues
raise questions of law which should be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
filed directly with
this Court. The Court of Appeals committed a grave error in ruling otherwise

(22) CECILE SAN JUAN DITCHING and MA. CORAZON I. SAN JUAN,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ADRIANO MOTAS ,
respondents
G.R. No. 109834. October 18, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J p:

FACTS:
An ejectment case was filed by petitioners against private respondent Adriano Motas before the MTC of
Calamba Laguna. The MTC ruled that there existed a tenancy relationship between petitioners and
respondent Motas. Hence, MTC had no jurisdiction over the case and thus dismissed the case. On appeal,
the RTC affirmed the MTC decision. Petitioners then filed with the CA a motion for extension of fifteen
days to file a petition for review. CA granted the extension and gave petitioners until May 3,1992 to file a

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petition for review. Petition was filed on April 29, 1992. CA however, found the petition to be filed late as
ascertained from the recitation of the material dates.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the case on sheer technicality by the CA is valid.

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that it was not only the petition which was filed late, but also the motion
for extension of time. a motion for extension of time to file a petition should be filed prior to the
expiration or lapse of the period fixed by law, and beyond dispute, if the motion for extension is filed after
the expiration of the period sought to be extended (i.e, the reglementary period to appeal), then there is
no longer any period to extend, and the judgment or order to be appealed from will have become final
and executory.

(23) LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ARLENE DE LEON


and BERNARDO DE LEON, respondents
G.R. No. 143275. September 10, 2002
CORONA, J p:
FACTS:
Respondents were the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Concepcion, Tarlac. The property
was voluntarily offered for sale to the government, however, the parties did not agree on the value of the
entire properties. The Special Agrarian Court was able to fix the just compensation of the subject
property. From a ruling rendered by a Special Agrarian Court, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) interposed an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: What is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of the RTC sitting as Special Agrarian Courts.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that a petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the
proper procedure in effecting an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special
Agrarian Courts in cases involving the determination of just compensation to the landowners concerned.
Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted.
There is no conIict between Section 60 and 61 of RA 6657 inasmuch as the Rules of Court do not at all
prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the proper mode of appeal for decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts.

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(24) TERESITA G. FABIAN , petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in
his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V.
AGUSTIN, respondents.
G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998
REGALADO, J p:

FACTS:
Private respondent Nestor Agustin was administratively charged for grave misconduct committed by him
as then Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways before the Office of
the Ombudsman. The Graft Investigator found him guilty of the charge and henceforth issued a resolution
ordering his dismissal from the service. The resolution was approved by the Ombudsman, but on motion
for reconsideration, Deputy Ombudsman Jesus Guerrero set aside the resolution and exonerated Agustin.

ISSUE: WON Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of
the aforementioned adjudications of the Office of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI
of the Constitution

RULING:

NO, the SC ruled that the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgments and orders of lower courts," that is,
the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or
agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial
agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that
effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory
court.

(25) LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA, petitioner, vs. WILFRED L. PASCASIO, RAUL


R. ARNAU, ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR., Honorable CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ, all of the O3ce of the Ombudsman; JESUS F.
GUERRERO, PORFIRIO MACARAEG, and GREGORIO A. ARIZALA, all
of the Office of the City Prosecutor, Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. 118141. September 5, 1997
ROMERO, J p:

FACTS:
The controversy arose when Florencio Rueda, husband of herein petitioner died due to lack of care by the
attending physician in administering anaesthesia. A formal complaint for Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was then filed before the Manila City Prosecutors Office. In said office, petitioner's case was
transferred from one prosecutor to another who came out with contradictory recommendations. When
the case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Arizala, the latter resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes

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from any wrongdoing. Aggrieved petitioner filed graft charges against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg
and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes in the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman,
however, dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence.

ISSUE: WON the SC can review findings of the Office of the Ombudsman.

RULING:

Yes, the SC ruled that while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when
there is an abuse of discretion, in which case Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may exceptionally be invoked
pursuant to Section I, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

(26) ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME , petitioner, v s . NATIONAL LABOR


RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents
G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998
REGALADO, J p:

FACTS:
A complaint for illegal dismissal 4led by private respondent Bienvenido Aricayos
against St. Martin Funeral Home. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of St. Martin Funeral Home declaring
that there was no employer-employee relationship that existed between the parties, and therefore, his
office had no jurisdiction over the case. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered a
resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings. After the motion for reconsideration of the herein petitioner was
denied, it filed before this Court the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: What is the proper remedy of the aggrieved party for cases decided by the NLRC?

RULING:
The SC ruled that the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then
seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed
the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Pursuant to BP 129, appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court
of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the
relief desired.

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(27) FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN SOBREPEÑA, and RAFAEL
PEREZ DE TAGLE, JR., petitioners, vs. WILSON GO, respondent
G.R. No. 156081. October 19, 2005.
QUISUMBING, J p:

FACTS:
Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI. Go fully complied with the terms of the
Contract. FEPI, however, failed to develop the property. Go then filed a complaint before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). He likewise filed a separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City against petitioners as officers of FEPI.

After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for estafa. Go
appealed the City Prosecutor's Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which, in turn reversed the
City Prosecutor's findings. petitioners herein filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for review. The
appellate court opined that a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed of as a mode of
appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or officers
exercising quasi-judicial functions.

ISSUE: WON petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the
Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal case.

RULING:
No, the SC ruled that since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose
decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable
to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed petitioners' petition for review. Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to
review unless made with grave abuse of discretion

(28) HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,


HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON,
NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ,
petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
G.R. No. 131457. August 19, 1999
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

FACTS:
The case has its origin from a decision of the Office of the President vesting rights to the land in dispute to
petitioners and those similarly situated and denying benefits to intervenors who were seasonal
farmworkers. Thereon, two motions for reconsideration with motion to refer the matter to the court en

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banc filed by respondents and intervenors assailing the Court's resolution dated November 17, 1998,
otherwise known as "Win-Win" resolution, wherein the division of the Court voted two-two. This
November 17 resolution affirmed the decision of this Court denying intervenors' motion to intervene.

ISSUE: WON the “Win-Win” resolution is valid.

RULING:
No, the SC rule that said resolution has no legal effect considering that the March 29, 1996 decision of
the Office of the President had already become final and executory even prior to the filing of the motion
for reconsideration which became the basis of the said "Win-Win" Resolution. Furthermore, the said
motions for reconsideration necessarily partake of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration
which, according to the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52,
Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is prohibited.

(29) GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF


APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, FACT-FINDING INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB) of
the O/ce of the Ombudsman, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 142261. June 29, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J p:

FACTS:
Petitioner Governor Lapid of Pampanga was charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for demanding and collecting fees for quarrying operations
beyond the P40.00 prescribed under the present provincial ordinance. The Ombudsman rendered a
decision finding petitioner liable for misconduct and ordered the penalty of one year suspension without
pay pursuant to Sec 25 of RA 6770. The decision was brought to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for review with petitioner praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. After the lapse of
the period without the Court of Appeals resolving the issuance of said writ, petitioner filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeking the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and the reversal of the assailed decision.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding herein petitioner administratively liable
for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay is immediately
executory pending appeal.

RULING:
No, the SC ruled that the general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory
only after it has become final and executory, execution pending appeal being an exception to this general
rule. There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are

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immediately executory. Section 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the
appeal will not stay the award, judgment, 8nal order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.

(30) FIVE STAR MARKETING CO., INC., represented by its President


SALVADOR BOOC, petitioner, vs. JAMES L. BOOC, respondent.
G.R. No. 143331. October 5, 2007.
AZCUNA, J p:

FACTS:
Respondent Booc was allowed to use for free one-half of the ground floor of a four-storey building owned
by petitioner company. Several years later, the free-rental privilege given to all the occupants of the
building was terminated. Respondent did not enter into a lease contract with petitioner and, despite
repeated demands, failed to vacate the premises. In 1999, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer
against respondent before the MTCC, Iligan City. MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. On
appeal through Rule 40, RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the proper remedy was an appeal under Rule 40 of the Rules.

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that the considering that the assailed decision was rendered by the RTC in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction as it was brought before it from the MTCC, petitioner should have
elevated the case to the CA under Rule 42 via the second mode of appeal, instead of appealing directly
before this Court under Rule 45.

(31) People vs. Flores

(32) FERNANDO CO (formerly doing business under the name “Nathaniel


Mami House”), * petitioner, vs. LINA B. VARGAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 195167. November 16, 2011

FACTS:
A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by respondent Vargas against petitioner Nathaniel Bakeshop
(owned by petitioner Co). Vargas alleged that she was originally hired as a baker but was sometime
tasked to do household chores for petitioner’s family. An incident where Vargas failed to cook on time
lunch for the Cos led to her being fired. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Vargas. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's Decision. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the "Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
at the time Respondent was working with the Co family, the business was being conducted
at the residence."

ISSUE: WON the issued raised by petitioner is clearly a question of fact.

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RULING:
Yes, the SC ruled that the issue raised by petitioner is clearly a question of fact which requires a review of
the evidence presented. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this Court to
examine, review or evaluate the evidence all over again, specially on evidence raised for the first time on
appeal.
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law.

(33) HEIRS OF ANTONIO FERAREN, REPRESENTED BY ANTONIO


FERAREN, JR., JUSTINA FERAREN-TABORA, LEAH FERARENHONASAN, ELIZABETH MARIE CLAIRE FERAREN-
ARRASTIA, MA.
TERESA FERAREN-GONZALES, JOHANNA MICHELYNNE FERAREN
YABUT, SCHELMA ANTONETTE FERAREN-MENDOZA AND JUAN
MIGUEL FERAREN YABUT , petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(FORMER 12TH DIVISION) AND CECILIA TADIAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 159328. October 5, 2011
PERALTA, J p:

FACTS:
Private respondent Celia Tadiar (Celia) filed with the MTC of San Fernando, La Union a Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer against herein petitioners Heirs of Antonio Feraren. MTC then ordered the parties to
submit their position papers but private respondent did not file a position paper. MTC then dismissed the
complaint for unlawful detainer. On appeal, the RTC affirmed MTC’s decision. CA then reversed the
decision of the RTC and MTC. Hence this present petitioner for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: WON the proper remedy a petition under Rule 45.

RULING:
Yes, the SC ruled that a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court shall, as a general rule, raise only questions of law and that this Court is not duty-bound to analyze
again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below. However, there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or
its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

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(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

In the present case, the findings of the MTC and the RTC are contrary to those made by the CA. Thus, this
Court's review of such findings is warranted.

(34) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ANGELO B.


MALABANAN, PABLO B. MALABANAN, GREENTHUMB REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF
BATANGAS, respondents
G.R. No. 169067. October 6, 2010
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:

FACTS:
Respondents Malabanans were the registered owns of a parcel of land in Talisay, Batangas. Petitioner
however contends that said land is within the unclassified public forest of Batangas. Hence, the Republic
filed a complaint for reversion and cancellation of title against respondents. Malabanans filed a Motion to
Dismiss which was granted by the RTC stating that similar complaint for reversion to the public domain of
the same parcels of land was filed with it and it was likewise dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Republic
then filed a Notice of Appeal from the order of dismissal. The Malabanans then moved to deny said notice
as the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court over the complaint filed by petitioner is a question of law
which should be raised before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: WON the issue surrounding the validity of the order dismissing the complaint involve a question of
fact.

RULING:
Yes, the SC ruled that petitioner's appeal does not only involve a question of law. Aside from the trial
court's ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint, petitioner likewise questioned the other basis
for the trial court's ruling, which refers to previously decided cases allegedly upholding with finality the
ownership of the Malabanans over the disputed property. As correctly argued by petitioner, the question
of whether the ownership of the Malabanans has in fact been sustained with finality is factual in nature as
it requires the presentation of evidence. Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error
can be imputed on petitioner for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal
under Rule 41

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(35) FRANCISCO TAYCO, substituted by LUCRESIA TAYCO and NOEL
TAYCO, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF CONCEPCION TAYCO-FLORES,
namely: LUCELI F. DIAZ, RONELE F. BESA, MONELE FLORES, PERLA
FLORES, RUPERTO FLORES, WENCESLAO FLORES, PURISIMA
FLORES, and FELIPE FLORES, respondents
G.R. No. 168692. December 13, 2010
PERALTA, J

FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Tayco and his sister Consolacion Tayco executed a document called Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares,
transferring their shares on the abovementioned properties to their sister Concepcion Tayco-Flores.
Consolacion and Concepcion died, thereafter Francisco filed a case for nullity of documents and partition
with damages with the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of Francisco. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision
of the RTC. Hence this present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: WON the proper remedy is a Petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

RULING:
Yes, the SC rule that the case falls under one of the exceptions and after a careful review of the facts of
the case – when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court. In the exercise of the Supreme
Court's power of review, this Court is not a trier of facts, and unless there are excepting circumstances, it
does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial of the case. The CA, therefore, erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court
without providing any substantial evidence to support its own findings.

(36) ADELAIDA MENESES (deceased), substituted by her heir MARILYN


M. CARBONEL-GARCIA, petitioner, vs. ROSARIO G. VENTUROZO,
respondent.
G.R. No. 172196. October 19, 2011
PERALTA, J p:

FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint for ownership, possession and damages against Adelaida Menses alleging
that she is the absolute owner of an untitled coconut land in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The RTC rendered a
decision in favor of Adelaida. On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the RTC. Hence this petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to
great respect, and the appellate court should have given weight to the trial court's findings that her
signature on the said Deed of Absolute Sale was a forgery.

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RULING:
Yes, the SC ruled that the trial court found petitioner and her testimony to be credible. It is a well-settled
doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of
witnesses deserve a high degree of respect. Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial,
the trial judge is in a better position to determine the issue of credibility.

(37) FEDERICO "TOTO" NATIVIDAD , petitioner, vs. MOVIE AND


TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD (MTRCB),
represented by its Chairperson MA. CONSOLIZA T. LAGUARDIA;
Spouses THELMA J. CHIONG and DIONISIO F. CHIONG; and
MARICHU S. JIMENEA, respondents.
G.R. No. 161422. December 13, 2007
VELASCO, JR., J p:

FACTS:
The controversy stemmed from the screening of Butakal, a movie about the Chiong sisters’ rape and
murder, while the appeal of the accused was still pending before the SC. Thereon, private respondents
Sps Chiong filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with damages against petitioner and MTRCB. The
RTC ruled in favor of Sps Chiong and ordered the MTRCB to cancel the permit to show Butakal. The TRO
expired and MTRCB recalled the Permit to Exhibit and directed Natividad to submit a second review. Sps
Chiong then filed with the MTRCB an administrative complaint against Natividad to prohibiti the
exhibition of the film. The MTRCB the recalled its permit. Aggrieved, Natividad filed a special civil action
under Rule 65 with the CA which the CA denied as the orders issued by MTRCB were merely interlocutory.

ISSUE: WON Natividad instituted the proper petition.

RULING:
No, the SC ruled that it is a settled ruled that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment,
final order, or resolution of the CA, Sandiganbayan, RTC, or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may Ale with the Court a veriAed petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions
of law which must be distinctly set forth.

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