Title of the Case AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO

CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent)
Doctrine Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Petition This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the
Resolutions dismissing the petition for certiorari and denying the
motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action.
Facts Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya and
the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo and driven by
petitioner Avelino Casupanan figured in an accident. As a result,
two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the other
hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for
quasi-delict.

When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its
preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case,
filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-
shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The
MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and
dismissed the civil case.

On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted

that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion
for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac,
Branch 66, assailing the MCTC’s Order of dismissal.

Petitioner’s Contention Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which
the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes
a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo
argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim
against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a
separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an
action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the
crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case
can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same
incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal
action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one
who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but
also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a
party in the criminal case.

In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition

raises the legal question of whether there is forum-shopping since

Respondent’s Contention
RTC/Sandiganbayan Ruling &
other motions
(please specify whether such
motions were granted or denied)
CA Ruling & other motions
(please specify whether such
motions were granted or denied)
Issue
Ruling
they filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-
delict against Laroya.
Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not
state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan
and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal
when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya
argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order
of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a
substitute for a lapsed appeal.
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999
dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas
RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a
final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper
remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held
that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise
that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a
pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
the Capas RTC denied the same in the Resolution of August 24,
2000.
Hence, this petition.
N/A
Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless
imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case?
Yes, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the
same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case.
This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the
present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the
accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is
only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from
setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed
instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore
forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the
offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action
for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period
continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right
to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that
the offended party can avail of this remedy which is
independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused
from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while
refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is
to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and
equal protection of the law.
SC Decision
Title of the Case
Doctrine
Petition
Facts
Petitioner’s Contention
Respondent’s Contention
RTC/Sandiganbayan Ruling &
other motions
(please specify whether such
motions were granted or denied)
CA Ruling & other motions
(please specify whether such
motions were granted or denied)
Issue
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in
Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case
No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DEMOCRITO PARAS, Accused-Appellant.
The death of an accused pending his appeal extinguishes both his
criminal and civil liability ex delicto.
On February 15, 2010, the accused-appellant appealed6 the above
decision to this Court.
The accused-appellant Democrito Paras was charged with one
count of rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo
City, Branch 29, which crime was allegedly committed against
AAA1 who was 17 years old at the time.
The R TC rendered its Decision dated October 18, 2005, which
found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the trial
court in a Decision4 dated February 2, 2010 in CA-G.R. CEB CR.-
H.C. No. 00465. The appellate court decreed: WHEREFORE,
premises considered the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, Toledo City, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION
Whether the death of an accused pending his appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil liability ex delicto?
Yes. Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. –
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment[.]
The Court, in People v. Bayotas,11 enunciated the following
guidelines construing the above provision in case the accused
dies before final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in
this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number

2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject
to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a

forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together there with the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitationson the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right
byprescription. (Citations omitted; emphasis ours.)

Thus, upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his

conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is
no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
SC Decision The Court RESOLVES to SET ASIDE its Decision dated June 4,
2014 and DISMISS Criminal Case No. TCS-2729 before the RTC
of Toledo City, Branch 29, by reason of the death of the
accusedappellant Democrito Paras