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Corporate Governance Implications of Disruptive Technology: An Overview

Niamh M. Brennan, Prof.

PII: S0890-8389(19)30085-X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2019.100860
Reference: YBARE 100860

To appear in: The British Accounting Review

Received Date: 2 September 2019

Revised Date: 16 September 2019
Accepted Date: 19 September 2019

Please cite this article as: Brennan, N.M., Corporate Governance Implications of Disruptive Technology:
An Overview, The British Accounting Review, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2019.100860.

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Abstract
This position paper introduces the special issue on “Innovative Governance and Sustainable
Pathways in a Disruptive Environment”. The paper develops a framework to review the
state of the art in disruptive technology and innovations (DTIs). Then the paper reviews the
common characteristics of DTIs, and their implications for the principles and design of
corporate governance and accounting mechanisms at the organisational level. Following on
from that, the paper identifies the defining features of emergent DTI-related structural
models that shape the demand for and changes to corporate governance and accounting
mechanisms. The contributions of the three papers in the special issue are discussed. The
paper concludes by proposing several research themes for future research on designing
more innovative and sustainable governance systems, drawing on multidisciplinary
theoretical and methodological perspectives. This complements calls for future research in
accounting in our special-issue papers.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Disruptive technologies; Innovation

1. Introduction
A revolutionary paradigm shift is well under way on how we think about business structures
and governance as a consequence of disruptive technology and innovations (DTI).
Technological advances such as artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of Things (IoT), and
distributed ledger systems such as blockchains, have led to unprecedented changes, often
disrupting the way goods and services have traditionally been produced and consumed
(Arnold, 2018; Christensen, Raynor, & McDonald, 2015). The ability to handle large volumes
of digitised data in rapid and complex ways through these technologies has also increased
our dependency on more open, multi-platform, networked structures that enable other
innovations, e.g. shared economies and cryptocurrency markets (Luna, Kruchten, Pedrosa,
de Almeida Neto, & de Moura, 2014; Termeer, 2009). Schwab (2016) characterises this as
the “fourth industrial revolution”, predicting that it will lead to wholesale changes in entire
systems of production, management and governance. Danneels (2004, p. 249) highlights
that a “disruptive technology is a technology that changes the bases of competition by
changing the performance metrics along which firms compete”. Consequently, for
accounting, finance, management and other governance professionals, these developments
present extraordinary pressures for information and governance systems that call for more
agile, complex and futuristic approaches. In other words, it is imperative that organisations
widen their knowledge boundaries about the risks and impacts of DTI and be prepared to
respond accordingly, or be destined to fail.

Past research, however, offers limited insights on the design of appropriate governance
systems for organisations in relation to DTI. In fact, the rapidly evolving and unpredictable
nature of technological innovations are seen to collide with more traditional approaches to
governance which are predominantly hierarchical, i.e. top-down and less self-regulated
(Gans, 2016; Turnbull, 1997). Research efforts so far appear to focus more on the
emergence and management of disruptive technologies, with limited attention paid to the
design and effectiveness of extant corporate governance and accounting mechanisms. For
example, in their review of 1078 papers on disruption research, Hopp, Antons, Kaminski and
Salge (2018) identify only ten papers relating to accounting and finance. Further, they also
highlight that there is a distinct difference in the papers dealing with radical and disruptive
innovations compared with those calling for more research on organisational capabilities for

1
business model transformations. Further insights on DTI governance systems is vital for
effective and efficient policy making by government, governance regulators and related
institutions.

The overarching purpose of this special issue, entitled ‘Innovative Governance and
Sustainable Pathways in a Disruptive Environment’ is to identify and discuss emergent
challenges arising from disruptive technologies and their social impacts for organisational
level governance. The aims of our introduction to this special issue are three-fold:
1. To provide an overview of the characteristics common to DTIs, and their implications
for the principles and design of corporate governance and accounting mechanisms at
the organisational level;
2. To identify the defining features of emergent DTI-related structural models that
shape the demand for and changes to corporate governance and accounting
mechanisms; and
3. To propose several research themes for future research on designing more
innovative and sustainable governance systems, drawing on multidisciplinary
theoretical and methodological perspectives.

Our discussion of the literature related to the governance of DTI is aided by a general
framework comprising the underlying characteristics of such technologies and innovations,
components of governance eco-systems and anticipated outcomes, as depicted in Fig. 1. We
begin by giving an overview of the definition and characteristics of DTI, followed by a
description of several common types of DTI (namely, Big Data, cryptocurrency, Blockchain,
the sharing economy and crowdsourcing (including crowdfunding), and their implications for
corporate governance and accountability, including independence and participation in
decision-making. We also delineate several emergent or alternate forms of DTI (agile,
collaborative, decentralised, and distributed organisational forms) reflecting differing
structural and capability dimensions. We then discuss the implications for the (re)design of
corporate governance and accounting mechanisms to meet the changing demands. Further,
we locate and discuss how the three papers in this special issue (Kurrupu & Lodia, 2019;
Leoni & Parker, 2019; Moll & Yigitbasioglu, 2019) add insights on what works and does not

2
work within evolving DTI governance systems, and the continuing demands posed by highly
dynamic, yet volatile environments.

Fig. 1.
General framework - disruptive technology and innovation governance (DTI) issues

DTI - Characteristics
Unpredictable / Volatile markets: Rapid environmental changes: Complex Technology

Common Technology-based Disruptive Forces

Big Data Blockchain Sharing Economy Cryptocurrency Crowdsourcing/funding

Emergent DTI Attributes and

Organisational Forms
Agile
Collaborative
Decentralised
Distributive/Distributed

GOVERNANCE ECO-SYSTEM

Internal Accountability Mechanisms External Accountability Mechanisms

• Governing Board Direct Stakeholders

• Shareholders • Regulators
• Professional Bodies/ Consultants
Accounting Mechanisms
• Financial Reporting Indirect Stakeholders
• External & Internal Audit • Social Media
• Management Accounting & • Corporate Activists
Performance Evaluation

Corporate Governance Principles

• Accountability – Disclosure/Transparency, Independence, Decision-making Participation
Accounting Principles
• Relevance, Reliability, Consistency

Conceptual Perspectives
3
Stakeholder Theory; Agency theory; Institutional Theory; Critical perspectives; Resource-based Theory; etc
2. Disruptive technology and innovation Issues
In this section, we review DTI characteristics, followed by technological disruptive forces.

2.1 DTI characteristics

Orlikowski (1992, p. 398) argues that
“Early research studies assumed technology to be an objective, external force that
would have deterministic impacts on organizational properties such as structure.
Later researchers focused on the human aspect of technology, seeing it as the
outcome of strategic choice and social action. This paper suggests that either view is
incomplete, and proposes a reconceptualization of technology that takes both
perspectives into account.”

This statement reflects an early naïve view of technology as neutral of technological

determinism: tech does X. The socio technical perspective views the social as important and
examines how the technological and the social interact in a bi-directional way. But this
stream of research tends to focus more on social determinism: human agents using tech do
X. This perspective is also problematic because it affords too much power to the human
agents and too little to the tools. Since then, a third wave has risen adopting a socio-
material lens where a post actor-network theory view of the world is proposed, in which
neither the social nor technical can be understood as primary influencers but both are
entangled or imbricated or assembled. For example, activity theorists generally “underscore
that because of its collective origin, the object of the activity is, by definition, emergent,
fragmented, and contradictory” (Nicolini, Mengis, & Swan, 2012, p. 614). The implication of
this understanding is that we need to approach the role of technology in diverse ways.1

According to Kostoff, Boylan, & Simons (2004 p. 142), “[d]isruptive technologies can be
either a new combination of existing technologies or new technologies whose application to
problem areas or new commercialization challenges (e.g., systems or operations) can cause
major technology product paradigm shifts or create entirely new ones”. Christensen and
Bower (1996, p. 202) define disruptive technologies as “technologies … which disrupt an
established trajectory of performance improvement, or redefine what performance means”.

1
We are grateful to Dr Niamh O’Riordan for her assistance with this material.

4
Examples of disruptive technologies include blockchain technologies, artificial intelligence,
digital technologies, shared economy models, and more. In disruptive environments,
innovations (be they technical, processual or commercial) are often unpredictable, ideas are
radical, outcomes are uncertain and ill-defined, and the justification for investments in them
difficult to make as markets are either not adequately developed or may be non-existent
(Evans, 2017).

The core literature on DTI has burgeoned since Christensen, Baumann, Ruggles, & Sadtler
(2006) (see also, Christensen et al., 2015; Christensen, McDonald, Altman, & Palmer, 2018)
who propose disruptive technology as something that happens when incumbents are
blindsided as they are too busy keeping existing customers happy. In their view, you can
look to the performance trajectories of potential disruptors to single out the ones you need
to worry about. Christensen and colleagues build their arguments based on 77 cases of
disruptions that had catastrophic effects on incumbents.2 In his book “Innovator’s
Dilemma”, Christensen (1997) concluded that there are two types of technological
developments. His first is sustained technology, where the result is improvements in the
rate of product performance, ranging in difficulty from incremental to radical, and led by the
top-performing firms in the industry. His second is disruptive technology, where innovations
disrupted or redefined performance trajectories and arguably resulted in the failure of the
industry's leading firms. The general treatise is that successful organisations risk failure if
they do not recognize the distinction between sustaining technologies and disruptive
technologies, and if they fail to invest in nascent disruptive technologies (Kassicieh et al.,
2002). As further highlighted by Kostoff et al. (2004, p. 144): “Possible reasons for their
demise include: first, disruptive products are simpler and cheaper; they generally promise
lower, not higher, profit margins; second, disruptive technologies typically are first
commercialized in emerging or insignificant markets; and third, leading firms’ most
profitable customers generally do not want, and indeed initially cannot use, products based
on disruptive technologies”.

2
An example is disruption to the mechanical-excavator industry as a result of hydraulics technology.
Christensen (1997) argues that established companies that built cable-operated excavators were slow to
recognise the importance of the hydraulic excavator.

5
In general, the common characteristics of a DTI context involve unpredictable, volatile
markets, rapidly changing environments and complex technologies. Consequently,
researchers have started querying the association between corporate governance and DTIs
with calls for a broader multi-disciplinary, multi-theoretic approaches to designing
governance systems that support organisational decision-making in highly volatile, complex
and dynamic environments (Buterin, 2014; Cockcroft & Russell, 2018; Piazza, 2017). The
evolution of more agile and flexible systems of decision-making also raises issues for basic
corporate governance principles such as accountability, transparency and disclosure and
their inclusion in the evolving governance structures and processes. Further, DTIs also tend
to be enabled by a convergence of technologies which depend on shared networks,
alliances and other collaborative structures and processes (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Belk, 2014;
Rocco, 2008). As such, participative decision-making and issues related to power and
delegation become critical in a DTI eco-system. While some innovations may lead to
technology enabled enhancements to governance systems, it is also likely that there are
risks related to degradation of governance oversight and quality.

2.2 Common technology-based disruptive forces

In this section, we provide an overview of five common technology enabled disruptive
forces that have been instrumental in significantly changing business models in
unprecedented ways. Table 1 presents prior research related to five common, high-profile
aspects associated with DTI: Big Data, cryptocurrency, blockchain, the sharing economy and
crowdsourcing. These disruptive forces can be classified in two ways. First, technological
developments directly relating to the nature of the digitised data and its potential for re-
shaping information for business decision-making or financial transactions such as Big Data
and cryptocurrency, respectively. Second, disruptive technologies affecting the manner in
which business transactions are conducted and recorded through converging technologies
such as decentralised and collaborative platforms, e.g., blockchain, the sharing economy
and crowdsourcing arrangements.

6
Table 1
Prior research on selected features of disruptive technology and innovations (DTI)
Type of DTI Prior research
Big Data Appelbaum, Kogan, & Vasarhelyi (2017); Bhimani & Willcocks (2014); Cockcroft
& Russell (2018); Payne (2014); Salijeni, Samsonova-Taddei, & Turley (2018);
Vasarhelyi, Kogan, & Tuttle (2015); Warren, Moffitt, & Byrnes (2015)
Cryptocurrency Böhme, Christin, Edelman, & Moore (2015); Lazanis (2015); Piazza (2017);
Raiborn & Sivitanides (2015); Ram, Maroun, & Garnett (2016)
Blockchain Byström (2019); Dai & Vasarhelyi (2017); DuPont (2017); Hsieh, Vergne, &
Wang (2018); Lazanis (2015); MacDonald, Allen, & Potts (2016); Piazza (2017);
Rückeshäuser (2017); Wang & Kogan (2017); Yermack (2017)
Sharing Economy Belk (2014); Botsman & Rogers (2010); Cheng (2016); Martin (2016); Schor
(2016)
Crowdsourcing Bergvall-Kåreborn & Howcroft (2013); Chen, Huang, & Liu (2016); Jame,
Johnston, Markov, & Wolfe (2016); Kuppuswamy & Bayus (2017); O'Leary
(2015)

2.2.1 Big Data

In a rather long but comprehensive definition, Boyd and Crawford (2012, p. 663) define Big
Data as:
“…a cultural, technological, and scholarly phenomenon that rests on the interplay of:
(1) Technology: maximizing computation power and algorithmic accuracy to gather,
analyze, link, and compare large data sets.
(2) Analysis: drawing on large data sets to identify patterns in order to make
economic, social, technical, and legal claims.
(3) Mythology: the widespread belief that large data sets offer a higher form of
intelligence and knowledge that can generate insights that were previously
impossible, with the aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy.”

While what is “big” for some firms may not be for others (Vasarhelyi, Kogan, & Tuttle, 2015),
managing and using information from extremely large data sets can help reveal trends and
patterns among people and institutions from various different perspectives. Bhimani and
Willcocks (2014) warn that because of Big Data, sequential linear links between corporate
strategy, firm structure and information systems can no longer be assumed. Commenting on
7
Bhimani & Willcocks (2014), Payne (2014, pp. 493-494) adds that Big Data will cause the
“have lunch, buy a brunch” and HiPPO (Highest Paid Person’s Opinion) practices3 to
decrease in favour of more rigorous, data driven decision making. The way risks are
identified, assessed and dealt with calls for firms to invest in appropriate information and
data management technologies and human resources. For instance, financial data which
comprises the standard financial metrics (such as assets, liabilities, equity and income) will
be associated with other voluminous enterprise data such as marketing, production and
investment portfolios to arrive at decisions, for example, on the nature and amount of
investments a firm makes. Thus, while recognising privacy issues, governance systems need
to encompass more seamless access to enterprise data, calling for governance professionals
to understand the limits and opportunities offered by Big-Data analysis and the need for
cooperation and data management capacities within all parts of organisations.

2.2.2 Cryptocurrency
Cryptocurrency is a type of digitised currency that can be used for all types of transactions,
allowing for instantaneous exchanges. It is disruptive, as there is no single administrator or
central bank, and it can be exchanged on a peer-to-peer network without the need for
intermediaries. A popular cryptocurrency is Bitcoin, “an online communication protocol that
facilitates the use of a virtual currency, including electronic payments” (Böhme, Christin,
Edelman, & Moore, 2015, p. 213). Besides using cryptocurrencies for transaction exchanges,
entities can also invest in bitcoin, akin to a monetary asset. However, Böhme et al. (2015)
warn that bitcoin technology also entails several risks: (i) Bitcoin has no money laundering
know-your-customer responsibilities, (ii) Bitcoin does not restrict the sales of questionable
products, and (iii) payments are irreversible – errors cannot be corrected, and purchases
cannot be cancelled. Grant and Hogan (2015, p. 29) further highlight that “[p]roponents
hype the benefits of Bitcoin transactions as being faster and cheaper than traditional
methods; however, concerns around the lack of a central governing agency, lack of controls
over Bitcoin exchanges, and the volatility of the virtual currency persist”.

3
Meaning data obtained from social interactions over a meal or other intuitive sources in contrast to rigorous
objective sources of data.

8
2.2.3 Blockchain
Blockchain is a digital ledger of transactions (Chartered Professional Accountants (CPA)
Canada, 2016) that enables creation of records that are secure, reliable, transparent and
accessible. Yermack (2017, p. 7) defines blockchain as “a sequential database of information
that is secured by methods of cryptographic proof”. He characterises blockchain as an
alternative to traditional financial ledgers based on classic double entry bookkeeping,
stating (p. 28) that it appears to represent “a leap forward in financial record-keeping not
seen in the introduction of double-entry bookkeeping centuries ago.” CPA Canada (2016)
uses the phrase “triple-entry bookkeeping”, which is traditional double-entry bookkeeping;
together with parties to a transaction recording each side of the transaction in a shared
blockchain ledger, i.e., representing the third entry. Participants in a transaction would
confirm the integrity of the transaction.

There are numerous implications of blockchain technology for governance and accounting
systems. Yermack (2017) and Piazza (2017) predict the use of blockchain to keep records of
share ownership and to keep financial records (possibly through public blockchain as
opposed to “permissioned” blockchain). Blockchain would enable real-time accounting.
Rather than updating the books and records on a monthly or quarterly basis, blockchain
would enable near-instant (daily) updating of accounting information (Byström, 2019).
Because Blockchain is a ledger that cannot be altered and cannot be destroyed, it would
improve the trustworthiness of financial statements (Byström, 2019). Dai and Vasarhelyi
(2017) consider how blockchain could enable real-time, verifiable and transparent
accounting ecosystems, while Wang and Kogan (2017) commend blockchain as an
accounting information system for its power in real-time accounting, continuous monitoring
and continuous auditing, as well as fraud detection.

However, there are limitations to blockchain technology. Rückeshäuser (2017) criticises the
application of blockchain in accounting, questioning the immutability of blockchain through
decentralisation and its technological rigour. She challenges the notion that blockchain will
prevent fraud and discusses ways in which fraud may not be constrained by blockchain, such
that senior management will continue to be able to perpetrate fraud. There are also
warnings regarding the integrity of a blockchain in that it is only as good as the data that

9
gets recorded in the first place. For blockchains to work well they need to be large, but this
could mean transaction costs are higher, and the time taken to process transactions could
be relatively slower compared to present systems (Davidson, De Filippi, & Potts, 2016).

2.2.4 Sharing economy

While defining the sharing economy can be problematic (Martin, 2016, p. 151), Hamari,
Sjöklint and Ukkonen (2016, p. 2047) describe what they call “collaborative consumption” as
“the peer-to-peer-based activity of obtaining, giving, or sharing the access to goods and
services, coordinated through community-based online services”. Ranchordas (2015) notes
that the sharing economy presupposes two elements: the existence of physical shareable
goods that systematically have excess capacity, and a sharing attitude or motivation. Also,
another fundamental assumption underlying sharing economy is that transaction costs
related to the coordination of economic activities will determine sharing behaviours.

Botsman and Rogers (2010) interview business leaders and opinion formers around the
world to identify various collaborative or mediated consumption systems. They highlight
how in the late 1990s and early-mid 2000s online platforms emerged which enabled
individuals to establish peer-to-peer relationships in unprecedented volumes and speed.
Martin (2016) notes that early innovations that provided the foundations for the sharing
economy concept include: Ebay, Craigslist, Freecycle and Couchsurfing. He notes (p. 151)
“business to consumer models of Internet mediated interaction also emerged which
enabled individuals to access (rather than own) assets, perhaps the most prominent of
these being the car rental/sharing service offered by Zipcar”.

Interestingly, Ranchordas (2015 p. 416, p. 443) also argues that while “Uber, Airbnb, Lyft,
and other forms of sharing economy represent growing innovative forms of sharing
underused facilities”, governance systems “may either hinder, delay, or advance
innovation”. Ranchordas acknowledges concerns on public safety, health, and limited
liability of sharing economy practices and that the sharing economy opens the door to
unfair competition. Some of the critical risks include misrepresentation or poor service
delivery, fraudulent behaviours and public liability with traditional legal boundaries still
unclear and legal recourse questionable or uncertain.

10
2.2.5 Crowdsourcing
Brabham (2008, p. 76) defines crowdsourcing as “a new web-based business model that
harnesses the creative solutions of a distributed network of individuals through what
amounts to an open call for proposals.” Examples include: Estimize (Jame, Johnston, Markov
& Wolfe 2016) to crowdsource earnings forecasts, Apple’s crowdsourced labour force
providing digital content (Bergvall-Kåreborn & Howcroft, 2013) and crowdsourced data for
use by external auditors (O’Leary, 2015). Crowdfunding can be used to crowdsource equity
through platforms such as Kickstarter (Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2017) and JD.com in China
(Chen, Huang, & Liu, 2016). Gellers (2013) views technology as a means of crowdsourcing
global environmental governance, thereby overcoming a democratic deficit. Mattingly and
Ponsonby (2016) discuss how crowdsourcing, specifically prediction markets, can improve
governance. Prediction markets are tools for channelling a collective intelligence effect,
coined the “wisdom of crowds”. Boards of directors could use shareholder prediction
markets to crowdsource feedback from shareholders on big corporate strategic decisions
such as mergers, disposals, takeover defences, relocations, etc.

3. The governance eco-system

In this section, we discuss several structural forms associated with DTI and key corporate
governance challenges they face.

3.1 Corporate governance

In traditional corporate governance, distinguishing governance and management is critical.
The governing board comprises directors who hold both fiduciary and strategic duties. Fama
(1980, p. 293) describes directors as “professional referees” overseeing management on
behalf of the shareholders who appointed them for that purpose. In enacting corporate
governance, directors face “complex multifaceted tasks” but are responsible only for
“monitoring and influencing strategy” – not for day-to-day administration and
implementation (Forbes & Milliken, 1999, p. 491-92). However, past literature is often
replete with examples lacking this distinction, applying the term “governance” to what
traditionalists would call management tasks. One such example is use of the term “IT
governance”. For instance, Bowen, Cheung and Rohde (2007) state: “Kaplan (2005) defines

11
IT governance as the set of processes used by the organization to manage IT, i.e., aligning IT
with business objectives, resourcing IT projects, and monitoring IT performance”. They, and
Kaplan (2005) who they cite, clearly do not make the distinction between the management
of IT and the governance of IT. Debreceny (2013, p. 129) puts it well when he asks: “What
role do governing bodies, such as the Board of Directors, play in the oversight and direction
of IT?” and “What roles and responsibilities for IT does the governing body assume and
what is delegated to senior and operational management?”.

For the purposes of our paper, we see corporate governance as setting the parameters of
the system within which people, institutions and other stakeholders behave so that the
organisation (or the social ecosystem) achieves the desired outcomes (Rocco, 2008). For
Rocco (2008), governance includes the processes, conventions and institutions that
determine:
• How power is exercised in view of managing resources and interests;
• How important decisions are made and conflicts resolved; and
• How various stakeholders are accorded participation in these processes.

Put simply, governance is the replacement of traditional ‘‘powers over’’ with contextual
‘‘powers to.’’ The dominant role of the top-down governing approach is replaced by
dominant ‘‘bottom-up’’ and ‘‘horizontal’’ interactions. The Association of Chartered
Certified Accountants (ACCA) (2012) contend that governance approaches within a DTI
context will evolve away from machine-age metaphors of the organisation, and be
increasingly replaced by a biological-era view of the firm as a living, constantly evolving and
adapting ecosystem. Hence the stewardship role will extend to monitoring and nurturing
the health of the firm’s entire ecosystem of partnerships and relationships.

3.2 Emergent DTI attributes and organisational forms

In this section, we delineate several emergent attributes and structural forms arising from
DTI that call for specific governance arrangements and capabilities. We discuss four major
underpinning attributes commonly cited as fundamental for governance in highly dynamic,
volatile environments: agile, collaborative, decentralised, and distributive/global
arrangements. The first two attributes relate to organisational capabilities dealing with

12
agility, adaptiveness, and cooperation which are critical for dealing with uncertainty and
rapid market transformations. The latter two relate to authority, power and decision-
sharing dimensions. Table 2 summarises governance models commonly associated with
DTIs. The rapidly evolving and shifting nature of DTIs has led to a proliferation of terms
attempting to define the approaches to their governance (Durston, Pesce & Wenborn,
2018), such as “joined-up”/“shared”/ “collaborative” governance. Labels such as “disrupting
governance” (Davidson et al., 2016), “digital-era governance”, (Tassabehji, Hackney &
Popovič, 2016), and “global governance” (e.g., Voegtlin & Scherer, 2017) are commonplace.

Table 2
Emergent models of governance
Type of model
Capacity
Agile governance
Collaborative governance
Structural
Decentralised governance
Distributed governance
Description
“the ability of human societies to sense, adapt and respond rapidly and
sustainably to changes in its environment, by means of the coordinated
combination of agile and lean capabilities with governance capabilities,
in order to deliver value faster, better, and cheaper to their core
business.” (Luna et al., 2014, p. 134)
“the processes and structures of public policy decision making and
management that engage people constructively across the boundaries
of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and
civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not
otherwise be accomplished.” (Emerson, Nabachi & Balogh, 2011, p. 2)
Blockchain based concept – “… open, distributed, secure, encrypted
and programmable digital ledgers and enabling secure and fully
decentralized “P2P” [person-to-person] trade. (Arruñada & Garicano,
2018, p. 2)
“Is realised without the need for a central authority … the balance of
integrity and autonomy; decision-rights; control mechanisms; and
incentive structures.” (Zachariadis, Hileman, & Scott (2019, p. 110, p.
114).

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3.2.1 Agile governance
Agility is a critical characteristic denoting the ability to detect and respond to opportunities
in a timely and flexible manner. It supports seizing competitive market opportunities by
assembling requisite assets, knowledge and relationships with speed and surprise
(Sambamurthy, Bharadwaj & Grover, 2003; Goldman, Nagel & Preiss, 1995). The fast pace of
change in technology led to the employment of agile methodologies in software
development. The philosophy of agile project management is now spreading beyond
software. Similar to the agile responses adopted to software development and business
operations more generally, Schwab (2016) recommends embracing ’agile’ governance. Luna
et al. (2014) review the literature and identify several definitions of agile governance where
the common characteristics of such systems are to be strategic, integrated and fast. For
example, Luna, Costa, Maura and Novaes (2010, p. S60) define agile governance as “the
process of defining and implementing the ICT infrastructure that provides support to
strategic business objectives of the organization, which is jointly owned by ICT and the
various business units and instructed to direct all involved in obtaining competitive
differential strategic advantage through the values and principles of the Agile Software
Development Manifesto”. They further clarify that agile governance does not replace
conventional models and frameworks.

3.2.2 Collaborative (Consensual) governance

Collaborative governance emphasises the capacity to be able to work together. This capacity
involves bringing people together across different levels of decision-making, both within and
outside organisations. For example, it “…brings public and private stakeholders together in
collective forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision making.”
(Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 543). Gaining consensus and moving into new markets or product
developments is a critical capacity, which will also support adaptive behaviours needed in
disruptive environments.

For example, based on a digital platform perspective, Constantinides, Henfridsson, and

Parker (2018) argue that while structural complexity can be managed through technological
solutions, governance systems can reduce behavioural complexity within platform
structures that often rely on collaborative arrangements. Drawing on Tiwana (2014) who

14
broadly defines governance platforms as dealing with ‘who decides what’, Constantinides
et. al. (2018) highlight governance as encompassing three facets: (i) How decision rights are
divided between the platform owner and third-party developers, (ii) what types of formal
and informal control mechanisms are used by the platform owner (e.g., gatekeeping,
performance metrics, processes that developers are expected to follow), and (iii) incentive
structures. While the layered, modular “architecture can reduce structural complexity,
governance can reduce behavioral complexity” (Tiwana 2014, p. 118).

3.2.3 Decentralised governance

Blockchain represents a new “institutional governance technology of decentralization”
(MacDonald et al., 2016, p. 284). Atzori (2017, p. 46) argues that blockchain governance
would involve citizens self-creating their own systems of governance “in which
centralisation, coercion and socio-political hierarchies are replaced by mechanisms of
distributed consensus.”

Hsieh, Vergne and Wang (2018) observe that blockchain governance involves clarity on who
has authority (internal and external parties) over the blockchain; the nature of the authority
of these parties (e.g. ownership rights vs. decision authority), the form of governance
(formal and informal) and the level at which it operates (Narayanan, Bonneau, Felten, Miller
& Goldfeder, 2016). Hsieh et al. (2018, p. 50) add that blockchain technology may lead to
novel organisational forms such as “decentralized autonomous organizations” (DAO)
(Buterin, 2014; DuPont, 2017).

For Hsieh et al. (2018), blockchain-based organisations disrupt traditional principal-agent

relationships by placing machines (i.e. the blockchain software program) at the core of
organisational governance, and stakeholders at the edges (Buterin, 2014). Instead of CEOs
or senior managers, it is developers who write the rules (i.e., the software code), in a
decentralised fashion. It is miners (or validators), rather than employees, who verify the
validity of economic transactions and maintain a digitally shared, distributed ledger
recording their history.4 There are no headquarters or subsidiaries, but rather a network

4
Each transaction must be verified. With blockchain, however, that job is left to a network of computers.
These networks often consist of thousands (or in the case of Bitcoin, about 5 million) computers spread across

15
distributed in cyberspace that is inherently global and borderless. Stakeholders have power
and govern the blockchain at varying levels in different ways (Narayanan et al., 2016;
Yermack, 2017). Thus, blockchain governance revises understanding about power and
control in organisations. Governance is not only borderless but also decentralised (to
various extents) (Atzori, 2017; Yermack, 2017). Anyone can “join” a public cryptocurrency
organisation, maintain and update the open ledger based on “competitive bookkeeping”
such as mining or other consensus mechanisms (Yermack, 2017). Decentralisation
distinguishes blockchain-based corporate governance from the traditional model based on
hierarchies. With decentralisation, governance decisions are made without centralised
authorities, but rather through consensus mechanisms in a non-hierarchical fashion.
Blockchain-based corporate governance forms need to be considered in terms of their
degrees of decentralisation.

3.2.4 Distributive/distributed governance

Detomasi (2002) reflects the machine-age metaphor perspective. In the context of
globalisation, Detomasi (2002, p. 423) defines distributive governance (also called
“distributed governance”) occurring when:
“…formal governing authority is shared by a variety of interested actors operating in
the public, private, and nongovernmental spheres. Distributive governance
buttresses—but does not replace—independent national or organizational authority
with a combination of involved state and nonstate actors that work collaboratively to
shape norms, to develop sanctions for governance transgressors …”

Detomasi (2002) describes people working cooperatively in a distributed governance model

to shape governance behaviour and outcomes, differentiating distributive governance
models from existing models. Detomasi’s (2002) description of the way Japanese firms use
relational rather than arms’ length contracting is more like a model based on symbiosis than
competition. In a similar vein, the term horizontal governance has been adopted referring to
working through networks in place of hierarchies through interdependence rather than

the globe. The cost of this activity (validation or ‘mining’) could be prohibitive and it is not clear how the cost
will be covered. Apart from cryptocurrencies, where the result of the mining/validation is a currency unit that
can be sold, blockchain has not had much application in practice, despite the benefits claimed.
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp

16
power relationships; negotiation rather than control; and enablement rather than
management (Phillips, 2004).

Another critical aspect of some of the emergent organisational forms such as collaborative,
de-centralised and distributed governance is that these models engage stakeholders, but far
beyond the traditional approach or the way we currently think about them. The
stakeholders themselves can hold a different type of power. They can control data quality
and integrity, including how much and what they would like to share. Consequently, this can
further shape internal governance mechanisms and their design.

In this special issue, Leoni and Parker (2019) investigate governance and control issues
within Airbnb which is a digitised shared-economy platform for hosts offering
accommodation to guests. Leoni and Parker contend that sharing economy platforms have
recently surged as popular venues of business, enabling people around the world to digitally
interact and temporarily exchange their under-utilised assets. Through a netnographic
method, their analysis reveals platform owners using predominantly formal bureaucratic
control systems as mechanisms to govern and control its host and guest users.5 Through
users’ compliance, they and their activities are made visible to the platform owner, which in
turn maintains control over the value-creation process. Some key revelations of Leoni and
Parker’s study are that accounting systems play a critical role as mechanisms of surveillance,
monitoring control over digital host and guest users worldwide, while traditional
technologies of governance continue to influence how power and control are maintained by
the platform owners.

Kuruppu and Lodhia (2019) deal with changes arising from policy advocacy activism which
generate disruptive innovations in a non-governmental (NGO) setting. Guided by Laughlin's
(1991) model of organisational change, they review changes in the case NGO's interpretive
schemes, design archetypes and organisational sub-systems using a case study of a large
NGO operating in Sri Lanka. Drawing on data collected through semi-structured interviews,

5
Netnography is an interpretive research method that adapts traditional, in-person participant-
observation techniques of anthropology to the study of interactions and experiences manifesting
through digital communication (Kozinets, 1998).

17
document analysis and participant and non-participant observations, they find that the
NGO's governance systems and processes are being moulded in ways that may not achieve
the overall purpose of the organisation. Their paper introduces “protective reconfiguration”
as a new change pathway to Laughlin's model of organisational change. They contend that
more deliberative, fluid and less organisation-centric governance structures are necessary
for NGOs operating in the policy advocacy space.

4. DTI - Governance eco-system

In this section, we consider three key corporate governance mechanisms, together with
implications for management of DTI.

4.1 Financial reporting

Financial reporting is an important accountability mechanism. Directors hold a fiduciary duty
of disclosure to report company financial affairs faithfully and in compliance with regulatory
requirements. Big Data can strengthen financial reporting measurement processes through
new forms of evidence to support how management accounts for transactions (Warren,
Moffitt & Byrnes, 2015).

Blockchains could potentially improve the quality of financial reporting in two ways: by
making financial statement information (i) more trustworthy and (ii) more timely (Byström,
2019). Blockchain has the potential of enhancing the timeliness of, and access to,
accounting information (Piazza, 2017). Also, because users of accounting information could
be given access to information, blockchain would increase trust in the quality of the data.

Tan and Low (2017) address the question of how to account for the cryptocurrency bitcoin,
noting that no official guidance has come from accounting standard setters,
notwithstanding that guidance for tax purposes has been available since 2014. They discuss
the challenges for standard setters of accounting for a decentralised currency rather than a
reporting currency. Ram, Maroun and Garnett (2016) asked 40 financial accounting experts
to complete a correspondence analysis, which is an exploratory tool to present the relations
between the characteristics of bitcoin and the themes drawn from an inductive thematic
analysis of prior literature on bitcoin. They supplement their analysis with ten semi-

18
structured interviews. Their correspondence analysis and interviews reveal that although
cost and fair value may be conceptual opposites, “in the eyes of respondents, these need to
be used to achieve the single goal of communicating the economic rationale for holding the
Bitcoin” (p.2). In a detailed analysis, Raiborn and Sivitanides (2015) identify six issues for
accounting standard setters to address in accounting for bitcoin: asset classification, mining
activity, investment holdings, exchanges, merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, and
disclosure.

4.2 External audit

Lazanis (2015) predicts that the accounting profession will be completely transformed
because of blockchain. Auditors’ role will be greatly reduced or even completely eliminated.
Appelbaum, Kogan and Vasarhelyi (2017) consider the opportunities for auditors to
modernise their audit procedures by taking advantage of the capabilities of Big Data.

If companies kept all their transactions and balances on a blockchain, then the blockchain
could eliminate the need for auditors to provide an opinion on the financial statements.
Since transactions in the blockchain cannot be tampered with, mistrust leading to the
requirement for audit is removed (Byström, 2019). The advent of crowdsourcing has led to
phrases such as “armchair auditors”, coined by former UK prime minister, David Cameron,
“sidewalk auditors” and “social audits” (i.e. using the public as auditors) (O’Leary, 2015). In
interviews with Big Four audit partners, Trompeter and Wright (2010) find evidence of the
expanded use of more powerful technology in audits resulting in greater use of, and reliance
on, analytics. Caringe and Holm (2017) interviewed 15 external auditors to investigate
external auditors’ role in a technological environment. They find that the monitoring role of
external auditors is reduced by the increased information environment. The technological
environment allows auditors to provide assurance services beyond the audit of the financial
statements, giving them more opportunities for value-adding activities.

4.3 Internal audit

Internal audit relates to assurance activities undertaken by either staff within companies or
service providers external to companies with the aim of adding value and improving
organisational operations. The key function of internal audit is to improve the effectiveness

19
of risk management, control, and governance processes of organisations. Vasarhelyi, Kogan
& Tuttle (2015) predict that auditing will increasingly rely on external sources of
information, like blockchain and Big Data. Internal auditors of companies using blockchain
could conduct continuous internal audits, with audit trails and account analysis at the push
of a button. Rooney, Aiken and Rooney (2017) consider the challenge of blockchain for
internal auditors: they will have to access information in new formats, they will have to
maximise the value of real-time continuous information, internal auditors from multiple
organisations will need to work collaboratively. Zhang, Yang and Appelbaum (2015) predict
that with the advent of Big Data, auditing will become a continuous process, while Yoon,
Hoogduin and Zhang (2015) call for the use of Big Data as complementary audit evidence.
Mattingly and Ponsonby (2016) describe how internal auditing and external auditing could
use prediction markets as pre-diagnostic tools for eliciting accurate information and for
forecasting.

4.4 Management accounting and performance evaluation

Management accounting and performance evaluation systems play a critical role in
producing information for decision-making and performance indicators to assess and
control performance where possible. However, as highlighted by Beaubien (2013) and
Elbashir et al. (2011), such systems (e.g. enterprise-resource planning, and business
intelligence systems) have become largely automated, thus enabling access to large
amounts of data (Big Data) in a very short period of time, if not instantaneously.

As highlighted by Arnold (2018, p. 14), “once data are entered into the ERP [enterprise
resource planning] system, the BI [business intelligence] system can make all of the
management accounting and management control information instantly available and
disseminate it throughout the organisation, whether it is information for an operational
manager’s digital dashboards or CEO’s smartphones”. However, Arnold (2018) also warns
that there is a cost to the use of data in this more open manner – which is likely to be a loss
of privacy, raising challenges on how good governance principals (e.g. accountability
towards data ownership, having a voice in questioning data integrity or privacy around
performance evaluations and assurance of such data) become critical.

20
5. Future research
Overall, the design of governance mechanisms within disruptive environments appears to
demand greater flexibility, agility, openness and a multi-layered framework. In this special
issue, Moll and Yigitbasioglu (2019) comprehensively review the accounting literature on
several potential and actual disruptive impacts caused by four Internet-related technologies:
cloud, Big Data, blockchain and artificial intelligence (AI). For example, access to distributed
ledgers (blockchain) and Big Data supported by cloud-based analytics tools and AI will
automate decision making to a large extent. They argue that these technologies may
significantly improve financial visibility and allow more timely intervention due to the
perpetual nature of accounting. However, given the number of tasks of which technology
has relieved accountants, these technologies may also lead to concerns about the
profession's legitimacy and the role of accountants. Their findings suggest that scholars have
not given sufficient attention to these technologies and how these technologies affect the
everyday work of accountants. Moll and Yigitbasioglu also present several more avenues for
further research.

We add to Moll and Yigitbasioglu’s (2019) line of suggestions for future studies in this area
by broadening the field of inquiry to include the role of other governance stakeholders who
either affect or are affected by accounting mechanisms. In this paper, we offer five areas
ripe for the study of disruptive innovation (DTI) and governance.

First: Having the right governance culture for adaptivity

Sustaining innovations relative to disruptive innovations entail less uncertainty in both
technological and business model change. The use of more traditional monitoring and
incentive schemes based on say budget forecasting or waterfall production methods are
likely to be matched with information needs and decision-making needs. However,
disruptive innovations are much more challenging as both technology and business models
that have been successful can become defunct quite suddenly. As such, the cultural aspects
of governance that support the capability to rapidly transform to new markets and
production that support agile and future-oriented thinking becomes vital. While past studies
have focused on governance of sustaining innovations, more research is needed on how
organisational learning and change management in disruptive environments can be

21
managed. This will include finding both human and financial resources to have the right
leadership and resources to act upon ‘unprecedented’ opportunities.

Second: Technologies themselves need to converge

There are a multitude of technologies that shape organisation’s capacity to strategically
govern DTIs, and often these technologies need to work in tandem. For example, decision
making on investing in a particular technology or market could be supported by the use of
Big data aided by artificial intelligence, but that may need data or regulatory support from a
blockchain network. Consequently, governance systems involving rights to access data and
costs of data-creation and sharing become vital. Rocco (2008) calls for four key functions in
a framework for governance of converging technologies:
• Supporting the transformative impact of the new technologies;
• Advancing responsible development that includes health, safety and ethical
concerns;
• Encouraging national and global partnerships; and
• Establishing commitments to long-term planning and investments centred on human
development.

Research in this area is scant and researchers from multi-disciplinary backgrounds are
potentially needed in this area.

Third: Social implications of disruptive technologies

While disruptive technology has been hailed for the innovative changes that it brings, some
significant (unintended) social implications have already surfaced as a result of the
disruptions. A theme recurring in our paper is the distribution of power and its implications
for access to the benefits of DTI or related ethical issues. Power relations lie at the heart of
corporate governance and DTI is changing these power relations, moving from more
hierarchical traditional governance approaches to self-governance approaches. These
changing power relations deserve further study.

For example, in terms of changing social implications and the sharing economy, Airbnb (and
other accommodation sharing services), while providing interesting and more economic

22
alternatives to hotels for travellers, has led to housing shortages in some tourist cities. A
daily rate for accommodation is normally much more attractive for landlords than renting
out on a long-term basis to local inhabitants. This resulted in locals not being able to find
affordable accommodation in their own neighbourhoods and close to their workplaces. This
(unintended) consequence has caused some cities (e.g., Barcelona) to limit the amount of
accommodation that can be offered on this basis in order to protect local inhabitants from
exorbitant prices and accommodation shortages. Another consequence is that some
landlords would vacate their premises over summer months (or in high season) to rent it on
an accommodation sharing platform over this period. Again, this causes a lot of disruption
for long-term tenants that want continuity of tenancy.6

The appeal of cryptocurrency like bitcoin has been undermined by its reputation as a fringe
alternative to traditional financial systems, as well as by volatility, security issues and lack of
regulation. For example, Cryptocurrency is often used for illegal transactions, for example
transactions on the dark web, due to it being impossible to track. This has been detrimental
to its general acceptance as an international currency, replacing for example the US$. Taken
with the (high levels of) volatility of cryptocurrency, and the reality that if the code is lost7
the cryptocurrency investment cannot ever be recovered, made cryptocurrency a high-risk
proposition with a flavour of illegal activities, without the benefits of a trusted authority or
central server. However, cryptocurrencies like Facebook’s Libra, a digital currency that will
be accessible via a digital wallet in Messenger and WhatsApp, could change the image of
cryptocurrencies by being underwritten by ‘trusted’ companies.8 Facebook's bid to get its
2.4 billion users to use Libra could help legitimize a sector that struggles to garner broader
public interest and confidence.

Another issue is the tax implications of some of these disruptive technologies. The nature of
the sharing economy often results in the actors (i.e., accommodation providers or ride

6
While the sharing economy also puts pressure on traditional businesses, i.e., accommodation sharing like Air
BNB puts pressure on the hotel industry while ride sharing like Uber and Ola put pressure on taxi companies,
this is the consequences of more competition in the field.
7
If for example you lose the laptop or USB with the crypto code, you can never recover your cryptocurrency.
8
Facebook is framing Libra as an alternative to traditional financial services for the billions of people
worldwide who lack access to banking. It's backed by 28 companies and non-for-profits, including finance and
tech giants such as Mastercard and Uber.

23
providers) being individuals, not declaring these activities for income tax purposes and/or
paying rates and other taxes as commercial operators. While this results in governments
and local councils losing out on taxes, it also creates unfair advantage at the cost of the
taxpayer as the formal providers of these services (i.e., hotels and taxi companies), being
commercial enterprises, have to pay these taxes. In some jurisdictions, governments are
trying to tax, for example, private accommodation providers renting out parts of their own
homes. Arguably of greater concern is the failure of Big-Tech companies to pay their fair
share of taxes (Toplensky, 2018). In July 2019, France introduced a digital services tax
(White, 2019).

Fourth: Governance stakeholder challenges

More specifically, we propose further study on how three other governance stakeholder
groups: board of directors; shareholders and regulatory bodies, may bridge the gap
between the needs arising from disruptive technologies and traditional regulatory models
and approaches. In addition, further study is required to better understand how corporate
governance can support Christensen’s (1997) two types of technological developments:
sustained technology and disruptive technology.

Board of directors
The board of directors are charged with both fiduciary duties and strategic development
responsibilities. Evans (2017, p. 217) argues that “[e]ach company will need to implement
effective oversight of the technology to even stay competitive, requiring a much deeper
understanding from existing board members than appears within current literature”.
Questions boards face include: What are the types of risks faced by my organisation
emanating from disruptive technologies? How can boards be better prepared to address
these risks? Will boards have to change their composition? Arguably, one suggestion is that
the solution to the technological disruption problem is to add a technical expert to the
board of directors (e.g., Bravard, 2015; Moyo, 2016). An interesting alternate view is that by
Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles (2005, p. S14) in relation to non-executive directors who contend
that independence and some distance from day-to-day management can enhance board
functioning: “In practice, such experienced ignorance can be a very valuable resource for a

24
board”. Overall the question of board composition, culture and board dynamics will need
review.

Shareholders
Shareholders can function as a critical monitoring mechanism over managerial decisions.
However, the benefits of doing so is often proportionately related to the percentage of
shares owned (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).

Yermack (2017) and Piazza (2017) predict that blockchain will affect shareholders. If it is
used to record shareholdings, it will result in timely and accurate recording of ownership,
providing transparency to identify who owns shares and debt in companies, thereby
reducing opportunistic behaviour by companies, stock exchanges and regulators. It would
not be so easy to build secret positions in companies and make a killing. Yermack (2017) also
expects that with blockchain, trading would become cheaper and quicker, with consequent
easier entry and exit by major shareholders. Blockchain might also impact managerial stock
options, for example, by reducing their ability to use insider information for personal profit.

Regulators
Regulators play a critical role in setting the boundaries and standards of governance. How
regulators view and deal with disruptive innovations will also need to expand into real-time
and ‘agile’ policymaking. For example, regulators could be provided blockchain access to
review transactions in real time. (CPA Canada, 2016). Yermack (2017) also cautions that a
new model of governance will be required to govern the blockchain itself, with a
governance process in which users agree to protocols for the underlying software code to
be changed. Society will require new rules, controls, best-practice models and skills to
facilitate a smooth transition to a blockchain-enabled future (CPA Canada, 2016).

Some of the issues researchers could focus on include – ‘How will government policies and
regulatory changes, say taxation developments, affect approaches by boards to risks from
disruptive technology? To what extent with hard laws and soft laws such as rules,
international treaties, or codes of conduct remain fit for purpose? For example, regulation
of banks focusses on regulations, while the outside world moves on. The regulations are not

25
fit for purpose for the new world and reflect status quo thinking. The regulatory framework
is behind, playing catch up, solving yesterday’s problems.

In particular, we consider studies on the social practice and the impacts disruptive
technologies and innovations have on governance mechanisms such as the board of
directors, financial reporting, audit committees, internal and external auditing, shareholders
and regulation.

Fifth: Theoretical development

Dealing with DTI involves capacity to adapt and transform appropriately at both the
individual and organisational levels. Past studies relating to governance behaviours under
highly uncertain and complex environments have adopted multiple conceptual stances in
understanding managerial and firm behaviours e.g., agency, organisational psychology,
stewardship, stakeholder, and resource dependency theories to name a few (Aghion et. al.,
2013; Kapoor and Klueter, 2017; Gans, 2016). However, many studies have not examined
how individual predispositions towards risk and accountability affect organisational level
outcomes. Given that good governance of DTI is dependent on attributes such as agility and
collaboration, individual and organisational-level psychology theories, e.g., adaptive
capacity and social network theories (Bhimani and Wilcocks, 2014; Camps and Marques,
2014) may be relevant.

Further, future studies may also use multiple theories to better understand how accounting
information and performance indicators may become invalid when transaction processing
and business models change dramatically. For example, more rigorous and real-time
performance indicators may be needed when using cryptocurrencies. Further, Kapoor and
Klueter (2017, p. 86) conclude, based on a two-year field study of the pharmaceutical
industry in the US, that “when evaluating emerging technologies, managers should assess
not only the new functionality and associated competences that their companies may need
to develop but also whether the emerging technology has a significantly different customer
value proposition and profit equation”. Their findings signal the need for more research on
the different theories of organisational change models to determine how governance
mechanisms can help transform business models to make the needed change. Additional

26
research on how managerial incentives, particularly those based on bonuses and financial
performance affect the propensity or use of different accountability mechanisms in highly
volatile and ambiguous situations, can be helpful for understanding good governance.

Consequently, future studies that research the manner in which risk management at both
the individual and organisational levels become important to understand how governance
systems can be better designed to help organisations deal with unprecedented business
model transformations.

6. Conclusion
Disruptive technology poses both challenges and opportunities for enhancing corporate
governance. This special issue provides fruit for thought and action, calling on insights from
three distinct papers and related literature, on how to better design and utilise corporate
governance and accounting mechanisms within DTI contextual settings. Agile, collaborative
and expeditious decision-making are not only valuable but necessities for effective and
efficient governance. Governance stakeholders both within and external to the
organisations need to be knowledgeable and proactive in assessing and responding to the
risks and opportunities offered by DTI. The challenge for researchers is to identify and foster
governance design and systems that balance human and technical demands created by
rapidly shifting waves of technology and societal needs.

27
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