TWP 99

Global impacts of abrupt climate change:
an initial assessment�
Nigel W. Arnell
May 2006
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Working Paper 99

Global impacts of abrupt climate change: an initial assessment
Nigel W. Arnell
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research
School of Geography
University of Southampton
Tyndall working Paper 99
Please note that Tyndall working papers are "work in progress". Whilst they are commented on by Tyndall
researchers, they have not been subject to a full peer review.The accuracy of this work and the conclusions
reached are the responsibility of the author(s)alone and not the Tyndall Centre.
Executive summary
This report describes the potential global-scale implications of three types of abrupt
climate – collapse of the thermohaline circulation, leading to lower temperatures across
Europe and parts of North America, and precipitation changes globally (but with effects
depending on the degree of warming at the time of collapse), accelerated climate change,
leading to very high rates of change in temperature and precipitation, and regime change,
where the climate shifts into a state with a permanent El Nino, a permanently wet south
Asian monsoon, or a permanently dry south Asian monsoon. Quantitative scenarios, with
a high degree of uncertainty, are constructed for each of these types of abrupt change, and
used to inform the assessment of potential impacts. The assessment combines some
numerical simulations (for water scarcity and energy demand) with interpretation of
published studies into the impacts of gradual climate change: the literature on impacts of
abrupt climate change is extremely limited.
The main implications of the abrupt climate changes are summarised in tables by sector
(water, energy, health, agriculture, biodiversity and settlements/infrastructure) and
continent, and the concluding section summarises the main implications of each scenario.
The most generalised conclusions are:
Both thermohaline circulation collapse and accelerated climate change potentially have
global-scale consequences, dependent not just on temperature changes but also the
pattern of precipitation change. The effects of regime change are more regional, but each
of the regime changes considered have the potential to affect world food markets, and
hence risk of hunger even in areas not directly affected.
The large potential impacts, combined with the non-trivial likelihoods of abrupt climate
changes occurring, mean that there is an urgent need for more comprehensive
quantitative assessments of abrupt climate change at local and global scales, which can
inform more generalised integrated assessments of climate policy.
The report does not explicitly consider adaptation, but it is clear that the implications of
abrupt climate change for the characteristics of adaptation strategies, and the feasibility of
specific adaptation actions, are very large.
Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 1
1. Introduction: scope and purpose of report
This report provides a summary of the impacts, across the global domain, of a set of
defined abrupt climate changes. Virtually all climate change impact assessments have
assumed that over the next century climate will change gradually – albeit at an
historically extremely fast rate – and "smoothly". However, it is known that the climate
system has in the last few thousand years undergone a number of rapid or step changes, at
regional and global scales, where climate has either changed very rapidly or switched to a
different state. Examples of such abrupt climate changes 1 include:
• regional cooling following a shutdown of the thermohaline circulation in the

North Atlantic;
• accelerated change due to positive feedbacks in the climate system exaggerating
the radiative effects of increased anthropogenic emissions, and
• "regime change", such as a switch to a permanent ENSO state.
Whilst there has been some research into the drivers of such abrupt changes – particularly
changes to the thermohaline circulation – there has been very little research into the
potential impacts of abrupt change (see Arnell et al, 2005; Higgins & Vellinga, 2004;
Higgins & Schneider, 2005). This review of potential impacts is based on these few
published studies, on some new model calculations, and on interpretation of results of
studies into the impact of gradual climate change. The review is structured around the
UN's "WEHAB" sectors (Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture and Biodiversity), with the
addition of settlements and infrastructure. The world is divided into the six continents,
with regional differences within continents emphasised where possible. Section 2
describes the scenarios for abrupt climate change used to assess potential impacts.
2. Scenarios for abrupt climate change
2.1 Collapse of the thermohaline circulation
Abrupt shifts in the thermohaline circulation in the North Atlantic have been implicated
in many abrupt climate changes in the past (Clark et al., 2002), most significantly during
around 12,700 years BP (the Younger Dryas) and at 8,200 years BP (the 8.2 ka event).
The thermohaline circulation can be seen as a pump, bringing warm water across the
North Atlantic towards Europe. The pump is driven by this warm salty water cooling,
becoming more dense, and then sinking to flow southwards at depth. A large input of
freshwater into the North Atlantic may reduce surface density, prevent further sinking
and essentially switch off the transport of warm water north eastwards across the
Atlantic: temperatures across Europe could fall by around 3oC in little more than a decade
(Vellinga & Wood, 2002). Inputs of freshwater have in the past come from catastrophic
releases from ice-dammed lakes in North America during deglaciation, and these of
course no longer exist. Other possible sources of freshwater include increased rainfall
1
Rapid sea level rise due to deglaciation of Greenland or West Antarctica are not considered in this report

over the Arctic and North Atlantic Oceans, increased runoff from rivers draining the
Arctic, or accelerated melt of the Greenland ice sheet. The likelihood of the collapse of
the thermohaline circulation during the coming century is currently very uncertain: it is
not clear how close the circulation is to a threshold of collapse, and how much extra
freshwater may become available. A survey of experts revealed subjective probabilities
of between 0 and 30% for collapse by 2050, and between 5 and 75% for collapse by 2100
(Arnell et al., 2006); two subsequent model-based studies estimate likelihood of collapse
by 2100 at around 45% (Schlesinger et al., 2006) and 30-40% (Challenor et al., 2006).
Most climate model simulations of climate in the 21st century show a slowdown in the
thermohaline circulation, but not a collapse. Collapse within climate models can
generally only be induced by artificially dumping large volumes of freshwater into the
North Atlantic. Wood et al. (2003) used this approach and showed that collapse in 2050,
following increasing greenhouse gas concentrations, would lead to temperatures across
Europe falling to between 1 and 2oC below present values (after having risen by 1-2oC up
to 2050). This scenario is not currently available in digital form. The indicative effects of
a collapse of the thermohaline circulation are therefore based on adding the changes in
climate with collapse but no climate change (available from Vellinga & Wood's (2002)
simulation) to the changes in climate simulated by the same climate model (HadCM3)
assuming the SRES A2 emissions scenario, assuming collapse in 2015, 2035 and 2055.
This is inevitably an approximation, for three reasons. First, the effects of the two drivers
of change are unlikely to be additive (although the patterns of change are similar to those
reported in Wood et al., 2003). Second, the approach does not take into account the
continuing increase in greenhouse gases after collapse. Third, the collapse scenario is
based on an instantaneous influx of freshwater, rather than a gradual but prolonged
increase. Also, different climate models would give a different spatial pattern of change.
Figure 1 shows the change in average annual temperature and average annual
precipitation by the 2050s, under A2 emissions ("gradual" climate change), and A2 plus
thermohaline circulation collapse in 2015 and 2035; Figure 2 shows the same for the
2080s, together with thermohaline circulation collapse in 2055. Figure 3 shows the
change in annual temperature for six locations under each scenario, plus the average
global land surface temperature change.
2.2 Accelerated climate change
The climate system is characterised by a large number of feedbacks, both positive and
negative. Some are included within current climate simulation models, but others are only
poorly understood. For example, higher temperatures may lead to increased emissions of
methane from thawing permafrost or warmer sea beds (Ehhalt & Prather, 2001); higher
temperatures could also increase the rate at which carbon is released from the soil (Knorr
et al., 2005).

Figure 1: Change in average annual temperature and precipitation by the 2050s,
under A2 emissions, thermohaline circulation collapse in 2015 and 2035, and accelerated
climate change (based on HadCM3 climate model scenarios)

Figure 2: Change in average annual temperature and precipitation by the 2080s,
under A2 emissions, thermohaline circulation collapse in 2015, 2035 and 2085, and
accelerated climate change (based on HadCM3 climate model scenarios)

Figure 3: Change in average annual temperature under A2 emissions, thermohaline
circulation collapse in 2015, 2035 and 2085, and accelerated climate change for six
sample locations

An expert survey revealed subjective likelihoods between 1 and 20% that the rate of
climate change would exceed 0.5oC/decade, with one outlier at 90% (Arnell et al., 2006).
Simulations using simple models which incorporate some of the uncertainties suggest
low likelihoods of high rates of change (Wigley & Raper, 2001; Webster et al., 2003);
simulations using more complex models incorporating more uncertainties suggest higher
likelihoods (a 4% chance that the warming following a doubling of CO2 would exceed
8oC, for example (Stainforth et al. (2005)).
Accelerated climate change in the current study is characterised by simply rescaling the
pattern of change simulated by the HadCM3 climate model with A2 emissions to
represent a doubled rate of change. Specifically, this results in increases in global mean
temperature, relative to the 1961-1990 mean, of 2oC by the 2020s, 4.2oC by the 2050s,
and 7.2oC by the 2080s. The spatial patterns of change in temperature and precipitation
under this accelerated change scenario are shown in Figures 1 and 2, and the rate of
change at six locations summarised in Figure 3.
2.3 Regime change
The climate system is characterised by a number of consistent patterns, known as modes

of climatic variability. The most well-known is the El Nino/Southern Oscillation
(ENSO), which influences spatial and temporal patterns of temperature and rainfall
around the Pacific Ocean and into the Indian Ocean. During an ENSO event rainfall is
anomalously high in the eastern Pacific, and low in the west; the south and east Asian
monsoons are weaker. Some climate models project shifts in modes of variability so that
the climate switches to a "permanent El Nino" mode.
There are currently no numerical climate scenarios demonstrating "regime change". The
approach adopted in this assessment was to calculate the composite precipitation anomaly
from a number of years with anomalous behaviour, apply this anomaly to the 1961-1990
mean monthly precipitation, and assume that this altered precipitation pattern represented
the long-term mean. Composite precipitation anomalies were extracted from the
NCEP/NCAR global reanalysis output (http://www.cdc.noaa.gov/cgi-
bin/Composites/printpage.pl) for El Nino years (1958, 1966, 1969, 1973, 1983, 1987,
1992 and 1998, November to March only), wet South Asian monsoon (1956, 1970, 1973,
1978, 1990 and 1994, June to August only) and dry South Asian monsoon (1951, 1965,
1966, 1972, 1987 and 1999, June to August only) years.
Figure 4 shows the difference in annual precipitation from the 1961-1990 mean during a
composite El Nino event (between 40oS and 40oN only), a permanent wet South Asian
monsoon and a permanent dry South Asian monsoon. The South Asian monsoon maps
show only the South Asian window, for the same reason: there is very little correlation
between anomalous South Asian monsoon rainfall and rainfall in other parts of the world.
The scenarios describing regime changes are therefore to be treated with extreme
caution.

Figure 4: Change in average annual precipitation assuming permanent El Nino, a
wet South Asian monsoon, and a dry South Asian monsoon.
3. Impacts of abrupt climate change
3.1 Introduction
The potential impacts of abrupt climate change are summarised by table for the
WEHAB+ sectors in the following sections. Most of the analysis is qualitative – and
necessarily speculative - based on interpretation of impact studies which have in most
cases not considered explicitly the effects of abrupt climate change. In three sectors –
water, energy and agriculture – some of the analysis is based on quantitative assessments
carried out for the current study.
3.2 Water
The implications of the abrupt climate change scenarios for water resource availability
were assessed for the current study using a macro-scale hydrological model to simulate
runoff and by calculating indicators of water resources stress at the watershed scale

(Arnell, 2004). A watershed is assumed to be exposed to water stress if it has less than
1000m3/capita/year (Falkenmark et al., 1989). The numbers of people living in
watersheds exposed to an increase in water stress due to climate change is the sum of
people living in watersheds that become stressed (availability falls below
1000m3/capita/year) due to climate change, and those living in already-stressed
watersheds where climate change produces a significant decrease in runoff (greater than
the standard deviation of long-term average annual runoff, which typically varies
between 5 and 10% of average annual runoff). Climate change also increases runoff in
some watersheds: in some stressed watersheds runoff increases significantly, and in some
of these availability rises above 1000m3/capita/year. People living in these watersheds
have an apparent decrease in water resources stress, but in practice the extra water may
not alleviate water stress because it may occur largely during increased flood flows. It is
therefore not appropriate to calculate the net numbers of people affected by changes in
water stress. The indicator is not a perfect measure of actual climate change impact, as
the ability of countries to cope with water stress varies.
Figure 5 shows the change in average annual runoff by 2055 and 2085 under A2
emissions, thermohaline circulation collapse, and accelerated climate change. A2
emissions (with the HadCM3 climate model) result in increased runoff in high latitudes,
parts of the tropics, and south and east Asia; runoff decreases in many mid-latitude and
dry regions. Thermohaline circulation collapse leads to further reductions in runoff across
much of Europe, and smaller increases in runoff in high latitudes. It also appears to lead
to reduced runoff across south and east Asia, although it is currently not clear whether
this is an artefact of the way the scenarios were constructed (changes in rainfall in south
and east Asia vary considerably between model runs, and the differences here may be due
to model noise rather than climate change signal).
Table 1 summarises the numbers of people with an increase or decrease in water

resources stress by 2055 and 2085, under the A2, thermohaline circulation and
accelerated climate change scenarios. In the couple of decades after collapse, water
resources stresses increase in Europe, East Asia and, particularly, South Asia (following
the change in runoff), but relative increases in runoff in North America lead to smaller
increases in stress. The numbers of people with a decrease in water stress appears to
reduce significantly following thermohaline circulation collapse, due almost entirely to
the reductions in runoff in South Asia. There are some indications that as climate
recovers from an instantaneous thermohaline circulation collapse, then water resources
scarcity is less than it would have been in the absence of collapse. In Europe, for
example, 236 million people would be exposed to an increase in stress in 2085 under A2
emissions. Collapse in 2055 would increase this to 294 million, but if the collapse had
occurred in 2035 the increase would only be 173 million.

Figure 5: Change in average annual runoff by 2055 and 2085 under A2 emissions,
accelerated climate change, and thermohaline circulation collapse in 2015, 2035 and
2055

Table 1: Regional effect of scenarios on exposure to water scarcity (millions of
people with increase or decrease in water resources stress). The first column shows the
numbers of people in stressed watersheds in the absence of climate change
No
climate THC collapse in THC collapse in THC collapse in Accelerated
change A2 2015 2035 2055 change
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease
in stress in stress in stress in stress in stress in stress in stress in stress in stress in stress
North Africa
2055 270 268 3 263 3 266 1 - - 272 3
2085 303 304 3 195 8 302 1 252 57 305 3
West Africa
2055 137 49 81 98 49 99 40 - - 89 75
2085 135 86 73 104 1 108 49 114 32 155 73
South and East Africa
2055 192 69 134 14 131 13 178. - - 81 134
2085 151 79 83 109 45 17 127 18 90 79 85
South Asia
2055 1664 107 1511 1441 75 1686 210 - - 139 1547
2085 1433 149 1302 767 231 202 401 787 153 151 1303
East Asia
2055 665 1 607 57 167 98 540 - - 0 609
2085 429 0 379 31 219 11 360 0 376 0 379
Australasia
2055 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0
2085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Europe
2055 176 210 0 176 0 278 0 - - 304 2
2085 148 236 2 189 29 173 8 295 2 333 2
Central Asia
2055 11 15 0 4 6 18 2 - - 27 0
2085 9 22 0 1 8 1 6 23 0 27 0
North America
2055 85 66 6 22 25 24 38 - - 87 6
2085 96 84 7 43 8 4 15 27 61 102 35
Caribbean
2055 0 21 0 26 0 36 0 - - 36 0
2085 0 34 0 20 0 24 0 35 0 35 0
Central America
2055 58 34 26 81 26 92 26 - - 101 3
2085 33 65 3 32 0 69 6 83 3 95 5
South America
2055 6 46 6 33 6 33 6 - - 63 6
2085 6 58 6 14 5 33 4 31 6 73 6
West Asia
2055 322 118 177 61 208 118 177 - - 124 158
2085 319 131 145 9 206 92 156 131 154 131 149
Global
2055 3586 1004 2551 2277 696 2762 1218 - - 1323 2543
2085 3061 1248 2002 1515 750 1037 1133 1795 934 1485 2039
A1/B1 population scenario assumed

Accelerated climate change increases the numbers of people with an increase in water
resources stress by 2055 from around 1 billion to approximately 1.3 billion, with most of
the increase occurring in Europe, North and Central America, and West Africa.
Accelerated change has relatively little effect on the numbers of people with an apparent
decrease in water resources stress.
Both thermohaline circulation collapse and accelerated climate change not only alter the
annual volume of runoff, but in large regions change the timing of streamflow through
the year – and this change in timing can have very significant impacts on resource
availability and reliability. Thermohaline circulation collapse, for example, would mean
more winter precipitation falling as snow in maritime western Europe, and runoff delayed
until the snow melts in spring. Accelerated climate change, on the other hand, would lead
to a shift in the timing of peak flows from spring to winter in areas where winter
precipitation currently falls as snow (eastern Europe, and large parts of North America,
for example), and the effective loss of a large free reservoir.
Figure 6 shows the effect of a permanent regime shift on average annual runoff
(assuming no climate change). A permanent El Nino would decrease average annual
runoff in southern Africa and north east Brasil, but increase average annual runoff in
southern parts of North America, western South America, east Africa and (slightly)
southern Asia. Permanent wet or dry monsoons have clear effects on runoff in south Asia.
Table 2 shows the effect of regime shift on the numbers of people with an increase or
decrease in water resources stress in 2055, for selected regions. In each case, the table
shows the effect compared to the 1961-1990 climate of (i) the regime shift rainfall
anomaly and current temperature, (ii) the regime shift rainfall anomaly with 2050s A2
temperature, and (iii) A2 rainfall and temperature change.
Table 2: Millions of people exposed to change in water resources stress by 2055:

regime shift
Precipitation anomaly Precipitation anomaly 2050 A2 temperature
plus 1961-1990 plus 2050 A2 and precipitation
temperature temperature
Increase in Decrease Increase in Decrease Increase in Decrease
stress in stress stress in stress stress in stress
Permanent El Nino
South America 0 6 0 6 46 6
Central America 0 58 29 6 34 26
North America 7 28 62 28 66 6
South and East Africa 8 160 75 100 69 134
South Asia 0 1549 6 1450 106 1511
East Asia 0 642 85 86 1 607
Permanent dry monsoon
South Asia 880 467 888 444 107 1511
East Asia 126 194 383 27 1 607
Permanent wet monsoon
South Asia 0 1555 5 1449 107 1511
East Asia 0 567 85 86 1 607

A permanent El Nino has minimal effect on populations exposed to an increase in water
stress, but by generating (slightly) more runoff in South and East Asia means that large
numbers of people would see an apparent reduction in stress. A permanent dry monsoon
would obviously increase substantially the numbers of people with an increase in water
stress in south and east Asia (adding approximately 1 billion people in 2050); a
permanent wet monsoon would mean that approximately 2 billion people in 2050 would
experience an apparent decrease in water stress.
Figure 6: Effect of regime change (precipitation only) on average annual runoff
Table 3 summarises impacts of abrupt climate change on water resources by continent,

based on the changes in runoff shown in Figure 5.

Table 3: Summary water resources impacts
A2 climate change Thermohaline Accelerated Regime shift
circulation climate change
collapse
Europe Increased flood risk in Increase in drought Substantial increases in
north, and increased potential across most of drought risk across
drought risk in south, Europe (perhaps offset most of Europe,
coupled with increases by reduced irrigation coupled with increases
in demand for demand). Water stored in demand. Reduced
irrigation. Reduced as snow over winter navigation
navigation and released in spring opportunities. Virtual
opportunities due to snowmelt; increase elimination of
lower flows. Shift spring flood risk and snowmelt changes
towards winter altered navigation and significantly power
maximum alters ability power generation generation potential.
to generate opportunities. Increased Lower summer flows
hydropower; lower icing of rivers and reduces availability of
summer flows reduces lakes. cooling water
availability of cooling
water
North America Increased drought risk Increases in runoff in Increased drought risk Permanent El Nino
across much of central east and west lead to across much of north leads to increased risk
and east coast regions. increases in flood risk, America. Virtual of flooding in western
Shift from spring to but reduce drought risk. elimination of spring US
winter maxima reduces Increased drought risk snowmelt leads to
water available for in centre. Shift from major reductions in
irrigation in summer in winter to spring availability of water for
central and western maxima across much of summer irrigation.
regions. Reduction in continent alters timing Reductions in
navigation of flood risk and navigation potential
opportunities. reduces winter along major rivers.
navigation Reduced flood risk.
opportunities. Increase
icing of rivers and
lakes.
South America Reductions in runoff Increased drought risk Major increase in Permanent El Nino
across much of and reduced power drought risk and leads to increased risk
continent lead to generation across much reduction in power of flooding in southern
increased drought risk of continent, but generation potential continent, and increase
and reductions in reduced drought risk in across much of in drought risk in north
hydropower generation eastern Brasil. continent; more east Brasil
potential; more resources (and
resources (and power generation potential) in
generation potential) south.
available in south, but
increased flood risk.
Asia Increase in flood risk in Small changes in Large potential increase Increase in flood risk
south and east Asia; runoff, and hence flood in flood risk in south across south Asia under
increased drought risk and drought risk, across and east Asia, and permanent wet
in central Asia and much of Asia in substantial increase in monsoon; increase in
Middle East. Shift from decades after collapse. drought risk in central drought risk under
spring to winter Increase in drought risk Asia and Middle East. permanent dry
maximum in northern in southern Asia. Elimination of spring monsoon.
parts of region alter peak across much of Increased flood risk in
hydropower generation region reduces east Asia under
potential. availability of water for permanent El Nino;
irrigation and power increased drought risk
generation in south east Asia.
Africa Increase in runoff in Smaller changes in Increase in flood risk Increased drought risk
east Africa lessens runoff than under A2 from east Africa; major in southern Africa
drought risk, but emissions, and increase in drought risk under permanent El
drought risk increased therefore smaller across most of rest of Nino.
in rest of continent. changes in regional continent.
flood and drought risk
Australasia Increase in drought risk Little different from A2 Major increase in Increased drought risk
across most of region emissions drought risk across under permanent El
most of region Nino

4. Energy
Virtually all of the literature on future energy demand is concerned with the effects of
different economic growth rates, the extent of innovation and changing patterns of energy
use: there is relatively little quantitative information on the implications of climate
change for demand. The main effects of climatic variability are on the demand for space
heating fuels and the amount of electricity used for air conditioning and refrigeration.
The extent of the change in the requirement for heating and cooling can be inferred from
changes in the number of heating (HDD) and cooling (CDD) degree days per year,
calculated with respect to a base "comfort" temperature (widely taken to be 18oC (65oF)).
Figure 7 shows the (indicative) change in HDD and CDD by the 2050s, under the A2
emissions scenario, thermohaline circulation collapse, and accelerated climate change.
HDD is calculated from daily mean temperature Ti simply as:
HDD = Σ (18 - Ti) where Ti is less than 18oC
CDD is calculated from:
CDD = Σ (Ti – 18) where Ti is greater than 18 oC
Regional demand for energy for heating and cooling can be estimated by calculating
population-weighted regional heating or cooling degree days, where the regional average
HDD or CDD total is calculated by weighting each cell's HDD or CDD by relative cell
population. Population-weighted regional HDDs and CDDs have been shown to be
related to regional energy consumption (Diaz & Quayle, 1980), although the precise link
between HDDs/CDDs and energy consumption will depend on the energy sources used
and energy efficiency. Figure 8 shows percentage change in population-weighted
regional HDDs and CDDs for the 2050s and 2080s, compared to the 1961-1990 baseline.
Gradual climate change reduces the demands for heating by at least 25% in Europe and
North America by the 2050s, and by more in warm regions; accelerated climate change
has an every greater effect. Thermohaline circulation collapse (superimposed on
warming) would lead to large increases in heating demand relative to the situation
immediately before collapse, bringing demands back to levels expected in the absence of
climate change in Europe, North America and large parts of Asia, although has little
effect on the gradual climate change-induced reductions in heating requirements in warm
areas.

Figure 7: Change in heating and cooling requirements by 2055

Gradual climate change increases cooling demands by very large percentages – 150% by
2050 in Europe and 80% in North America – and accelerated climate change increases
these percentages still more. Thermohaline circulation collapse ameliorates substantially
these increases in cooling demands, particularly in Europe and North America.
Regional heating requirem ent: 2055 Regional cooling requirem ent: 2055
50 400
25
350
300
0 250
-25 200
150
-50
100
-75 50
-100 0
-50
A2 THC2015 THC2035 Accelerat ed A2 THC2015 THC2035 Accelerat ed
Regional heating requirem ent: 2085 Regional cooling requirem ent: 2085
50 400
350
25
300
0 250
-25 200
150
-50
100
-75 50
-100 0
-50
A2 THC2015 THC2035 THC2055 Accelerat ed A2 THC2015 THC2035 THC2055 Accelerat ed
Figure 8: Change in regional heating and cooling energy requirements, by 2055 and
2085
Climate change has five broad impacts on energy production: it affects the viability of
renewable resources, energy from biomass schemes, the availability of cooling water, the
extraction of offshore oil and gas, and the physical infrastructure associated with
production and transmission of energy.
The key renewable resources affected by climate change are hydropower (affected by the
volume and timing of river flows) and wind. Scenarios for change in wind are highly
uncertain, so it is not possible to project changes in wind generation potential. The
viability of energy from biomass depends on biomass productivity, which for the species
most frequently used depends on temperature through the year and, particularly, the
length of the growing season. Thermal power generation (whether fossil or nuclear)
requires cooling water from rivers or the sea; changing river flows (and water
temperatures) will affect reliability of access to cooling water. Both the extraction of
offshore oil and gas and, more generally, infrastructure involved in the production and
distribution of energy are exposed to changes in extreme climatic events, such as the
occurrence of ice storms.

Table 4: Summary energy sector impacts
collapse
Europe Increase in summer Increase in winter Very large increases in
cooling requirements heating requirements; summer cooling
and reduction in heating reduction in requirements and
requirements; reduction hydropower potential in reductions in winter
in hydropower potential many regions, and heating requirements;
in many regions, and reduction in availability major reductions in
reduction in availability of cooling water. hydropower potential
of cooling water in Increased disruption and reduction in
summer from ice storms availability of cooling
water
North America Increase in summer Small increases in Very large increases in Permanent El Nino:
cooling requirements, summer cooling summer cooling potential for increase in
reduction in winter requirements; increases requirements, majr hydropower potential in
heating requirement; in winter heating reduction in winter south west; reduction in
reduction in requirements in north heating requirements. north west
hydropower potential in east. Small change in Reduction in
west; reduction in hydropower potential; hydropower potential in
availability of cooling increased disruption west, and availability of
water from ice storms in east cooling water in east.
South America Reduction in heating Little difference from Major reduction in Permanent El Nino:
requirements in south; A2 emissions heating requirements in potential for increase in
large increase in south; very large hydropower potential in
cooling requirements increase in cooling west
across continent. requirements across
Reduction in continent. Reduction in
hydropower generation hydropower generation
potential in north; potential in north;
increase in south increase in south
Asia Reduction in heating Increase in heating Manor reduction in
requirements in China; requirements in China; heating requirements in
large increase in increase in cooling China; large increase in
cooling requirements. requirements in south cooling requirements.
Increase in hydropower and east Asia. Increased Increase in hydropower
potential in China runoff leads to greater potential in China
hydropower potential in
China.
Africa Reduction in heating Increase in heating Virtual elimination of
requirements; increase requirements in north heating demands; major
in cooling Africa, reduction increase in cooling
requirements. Increased elsewhere coupled with demands. Increased
hydropower potential in increase in cooling hydropower potential in
East Africa, reduced requirements. Increased East Africa, reduced
potential in southern hydropower potential in potential in southern
Africa East Africa, reduced Africa
potential in southern
Africa
Australasia Reduced heating As A2 emissions Virtual elimination of Reduced hydropower
requirements; increase heating requirements; potential under
in cooling needs. major increase in permanent El Nino
Reduced hydropower cooling needs. Reduced
potential. hydropower potential.
5. Health
5.1 Thermal effects on health
Both cold and hot spells lead to an increase in mortality, through exacerbation of
respiratory and circulatory problems, with effects depending on climatic conditions and
degree of acclimatisation and adaptation. In northern Europe, for example, excess
mortality is greater in winter than in summer, whilst in southern Europe most heat-related

deaths occur during hot spells in summer. Increased mortality in summer in northern
Europe under higher temperatures would therefore be offset to a large degree by reduced
mortality in winter; in contrast, higher temperatures in southern Europe would result in
increases in summer mortality far greater than reductions in winter mortality.
Table 5: Summary health sector impacts

collapse
Europe Increased summer Major increase in Major increases in
mortality across winter mortality across summer mortality
Europe; reduced winter Europe, with reduction across Europe, and
mortality in northern in summer mortality. large decreases in
Europe. Increased General reduction in winter mortality in the
potential for many transmission potential north. Increased
disease burdens, but for most major climate- potential for many
controlled through sensitive diseases. disease burdens, but
public health policies controlled through
public health policies
North America Increased summer Slight increase in Large increase in
mortality across winter mortality in summer mortality
continent, offset by north and east, and across continent, offset
reduced winter small decrease in by reduced winter
mortality in the north. summer mortality mortality in the north.
Increased potential for (relative to A2) in first Increased potential for
many disease burdens, few decades. Small many disease burdens,
but controlled through change in transmission but controlled through
public health policies potential. public health policies
South America Increased hot-season Reduction in hot-season Increased hot-season Permanent El Nino:
mortality, and increased mortality, compared to mortality, and increased Increase in flood-
potential for disease A2 emissions. potential for disease related ill-health in west
transmission across transmission across
much of continent. much of continent.
Asia Increased hot-season Low increase in hot- Major increase in hot- Permanent El Nino:
mortality, and increased season mortality and season mortality, and increase in drought-
potential for disease flood-related ill-health, increased potential for related ill-health and
transmission. Increased compared to A2 disease transmission. mortality
risk of flood-related ill- emissions Big increased in risk of Permanent wet
health. flood-related ill-health. monsoon: Increase in
flood-related ill-health
in south and east
Permanent dry
monsoon: increase in
drought-related ill-
health and mortality
Africa Increased hot-season Similar to A2 emissions Increased hot-season Permanent El Nino:
mortality, and increased mortality, and increased increase in drought-
potential for disease potential for disease related ill-health and
transmission transmission mortality in south and
east
Australasia Increased hot-season Similar to A2 emissions Increased hot-season
mortality, and increased mortality, and increased
potential for disease potential for disease
transmission transmission
5.2 Disease and ill-health
Climate change can alter the burden of ill-health through changes in the distribution of
disease vectors and the frequency of extreme events (particularly floods). Many disease
vectors are insensitive to climate, and so climate change has no obvious effect. Other
vectors do have climatic limitations, however, which vary between vectors; some are
limited by high temperatures, but most are limited by low temperatures. The precise

effects of a change in disease transmission potential are heavily determined by the quality
of public health measures in place.
6. Agriculture
6.1 Agricultural productivity
The effects of climate change on crop productivity depend on changes in the seasonal
timing of temperature and water availability, changes in CO2 concentrations, and changes
in the prevalence of pests and diseases. As a general rule, crop productivity increases
where higher temperatures lead to a longer growing season (at the poleward limits of
cultivation of a particular crop), and decreases where higher temperatures increase heat
stress and water shortage (at the equator-ward limits of cultivation). Equatorial and
tropical regions where crop growth is currently temperature-limited (or water-limited) are
therefore likely to experience the greatest reductions in productivity. Increased heat stress
during extreme events can also reduce productivity in temperate regions, and effects on
pests and disease depend on local climatic limits. Increases in CO2 concentration tend to
increase productivity of most key food crops, with effects depending on interactions with
changes in temperature, water availability and nutrient status.
Figure 9 gives an indication of changes in the broad geographic extent of crop suitability
(based on growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evaporation:
Ramankutty et al., 2002) under the scenarios considered. The pattern appears generally
robust, but patterns for individual crops would show greater variability with climate. The
regime change scenarios resulted in the same changes in crop suitability as the A2
emissions scenario.
6.2 Global food production and risk of hunger
Global food prices are related to global production, and (for non-subsistence crops at
least) may not bear much relation to changes in local productivity. Gradual climate
change results in a general shift in world food production to higher latitudes, with
increases in production of cereals in developed countries possibly compensating to a
degree for reductions in production in developing countries (Parry et al., 2004). However,
crop prices would rise under most scenarios, leading to an increase in risk of hunger,
particularly in Africa – although the effect depends on how global food markets operate
in the future.
Accelerated climate change would exaggerate this pattern, leading to greater increases in
food prices. Thermohaline circulation collapse would lead to reductions in production in
high latitudes, again leading to an increase in food prices.
6.3 Forest products
As with agricultural products, the effects of climate change depend on changes in the
growing season, water availability and the prevalence of pests and diseases. With rising

temperatures, potential productivity will increase at the poleward limits of forest growth
– although actual poleward expansion may be limited due to a slow rate of migration –
and will decrease at the warm margins due to heat stress, increased fire risk and water
stress. Under very high rates of change, commercial tropical forest productivity would be
reduced by heat stress and water shortages.
Table 5: Summary agriculture sector impacts

collapse
Europe Decline in crop Decline in crop and Major decline in crop
productivity in south; forest productivity productivity in south,
increase for some crops across Europe and substantial
in north. Decline in increases in north.
forest productivity in Decline in forest
south, and potential for productivity in south,
increase in north and potential for
increase in north
North America Decline in crop Similar effects to A2 Reduction in crop
productivity in parts of emissions productivity in mid-
mid-west due to west, and increase in
increased drought; north
higher productivity in
north
South America Decline in crop Similar effects to A2 Large decline in crop Permanent El Nino:
productivity due to emissions productivity due to reduction in coastal
higher temperatures, higher temperatures, fishery productivity
with major decline in with widespread
north east Brasil. reduction in crop
production in north east
Brasil.
Asia Widespread reduction Reduction in crop Widespread reduction Permanent El Nino:
in crop productivity, productivity in south in crop productivity, reduced agricultural
with major decreases in east Asia due to with major decreases in productivity in south
central Asia; potential reduction in monsoon central Asia; potential and east
for increase in farmed for increase in farmed Permanent dry
area in east Asia area in east Asia monsoon: reduced
agricultural
productivity, and
decline in soil fertility
Permanent wet
monsoon: increased risk
of crop loss in floods
Africa General reduction in Similar effects to A2 General large reduction Permanent El Nino:
crop productivity, with emissions in crop productivity, reduced agricultural
major reductions in with very major productivity in south
south; increase in reductions in south; and east
numbers of people at large increase in
risk of hunger numbers of people at
risk of hunger
Australasia Decrease in crop Similar effects to A2 Decrease in crop Permanent El Nino:
productivity in parts of emissions productivity in parts of reduced agricultural
Australia Australia productivity

Figure 9: Crop suitability change

7. Biodiversity
Climate change will have an effect on biodiversity through changing potential ecosystem
types in an area, and by changing species composition and abundance within an
ecosystem type. As a general rule, the most sensitive ecosystem types or species are those
at the climatic limits of their distributions or with the most specialised requirements.
Biodiversity, however, is challenged not only by climate change, but also by other
pressures such as land cover change, urbanisation and pollution, and large parts of the
land surface are heavily modified by human actions: these actions and pressures may
offset, or exaggerate, the effects of climate change.
A number of studies have examined the regional and global-scale implications of climate
scenarios for ecosystem type or characteristics such as net primary productivity (e.g.
Levy et al., 2004; Leemans & Eickhout, 2004; Bakkenes et al., 2006). In the most general
terms, climate change leads to a poleward or upward shift in many ecosystems; boreal
forests would replace tundra, and temperature forests replace boreal forests. However,
ecosystems (particularly forested ecosystems) cannot adjust at rates greater than around
0.05oC/decade, so extensive migration polewards is unlikely. Where high temperatures
are not limiting factors – in subtropical and tropical regions – the impacts of climate
change will depend on changes in precipitation. Increased drought (and attendant water
shortage and increased fire risk) makes ecosystems around the Mediterranean, for
example, vulnerable to climate change, and under some climate simulations reductions in
rainfall in the Amazon basin in particular lead to major dieback of rain forest (Levy et al.,
2004).
At the finer species scale, a number of studies (e.g. Bakkenes et al., 2002; Thomas et al.,
2002; Thuiller et al., 2005) have demonstrated large changes in abundance with rising
temperatures and changing water availability for many species: approximately a third of
all plant species present in a given location in Europe could disappear from that location
by the middle of the 21st century under gradual climate change (Bakkenes et al., 2002).
Accelerated climate change would obviously increase significantly the risk of ecosystem
or biodiversity change – but no studies have yet examined the effects of very high rates of
change. Thermohaline circulation collapse would lead to large but opposite changes in
ecosystem characteristics (Higgins & Vellinga, 2004; Higgins & Schneider, 2005).
Across Europe and eastern North America these changes would be largely temperature-
driven, with the southward movement of boreal forest into the temperate forest zone (e.g.
in England: Higgins & Schneider, 2005). The precise effects, however, depend not only
on the degree of cooling, but its distribution through the year. Many ecosystems can cope
with lower temperatures during winter, when they are largely dormant, but substantial
reductions in spring and summer temperatures would have much greater adverse impacts.
Across the rest of the world ecosystem characteristics would be affected by the rainfall
changes associated with thermohaline circulation collapse (Higgins & Vellinga, 2004: see

Figures 1 and 2). Similarly, the primary effects of regime change on biodiversity will be
through changes in precipitation volume and timing.
Palaeoecological evidence (e.g. Tinner & Lotter, 2001; Williams et al., 2002 in Europe)
shows substantial changes in vegetation composition following short-duration climatic
shifts during the Holocene, and specifically in response to previous cooling events.
Table 6: Summary biodiversity sector impacts

collapse
Europe Northward shift in Southward shift in Major northward
ecosystems; ecosystems, with shift in
increased fire and expansion of ecosystems, and
drought damage in boreal forests. increase in fire and
southern Europe drought damage.
Loss of high-
altitude
ecosystems. Major
loss of species
diversity
North America Northward shift in Southward Major northward Permanent El
ecosystems; encroachment of shift in Nino: increase in
expansion of boreal forest in ecosystems; loss of forest productivity
desert areas in east; expansion of high altitude in west
south west. forest species into ecosystems. Large
central grasslands increase in desert
extent
South America Change in Reduced rainfall Risk of major Permanent El
precipitation leads threatens forest forest decline due Nino: reduced
to decline in forest ecosystems in to reductions in productivity in
cover; risk of particular rainfall; increased parts of east with
desertification in desertification in reduced rainfall;
south south increased forest
productivity in
west. Reduced
productivity of
Pacific fisheries
Asia Northward shift of Southward Major northward Permanent El
boreal forest in encroachment of shift of boreal Nino: decline in
high latitudes; boreal forest in forest in high tropical forest in
increased north. Smaller latitudes; increased south and east
ecosystem increase in ecosystem Asia;
productivity in ecosystem productivity in
south and east productivity in south and east Permanent dry
Asia; decline in south and east than Asia; decline in monsoon: decline
productivity of under A2 productivity of in forest and
central Asian emissions central Asian grassland
grasslands grasslands productivity in
south Asia
Permanent wet
monsoon: increase
in forest and

grassland
productivity in
south Asia
Africa Increased forest Similar to A2 Increased forest Permanent El
productivity in emissions productivity in Nino: reduction in
tropical regions tropical regions ecosystem
and east; lower and east; lower productivity in east
rainfall results in rainfall results in and south Africa
ecosystem ecosystem
degradation in degradation in
west and south west and south
Australasia Reduced Similar to A2 Reduced
precipitation leads emissions precipitation leads
to increased to increased
desertification; desertification;
loss of high- loss of high-
altitude altitude
ecosystems ecosystems
8. Settlements and infrastructure
The layout, design and construction of urban areas, buildings and transport infrastructure
reflects local climatic conditions. Buildings in cold environments are designed to deal
with low temperatures; buildings in warm environments are designed to cope with high
temperatures, and urban environments in very wet areas are arranged to cope with large
volumes of drainage water. Climate change will affect the performance and integrity of
such infrastructure, affecting for example energy use (heating or cooling), comfort or
system reliability. Many urban environments also have large stocks of old (and
historically-significant) buildings, which may be very difficult to adapt.
Table 7: Summary settlements and infrastructure sector impacts

collapse
Europe Increased heat Increased need for Major increase in
discomfort and heating; increased cooling needs and
need for cooling; cold-related discomfort in
reduced disruption disruption of buildings;
through icing and transport and increased heat-
cold weather, and energy networks related disruption
increased coastal (snow, icing). of transport and
navigation Increased energy networks;
opportunities in disruption to reduced cold-
north. coastal navigation weather disruption
in north due to of transport and
increased ice infrastructure
cover. networks
North America Increased heat Increased need for Major increased
discomfort and heating in east, and heat discomfort
need for cooling; increase in east in and need for
reduced disruption frequency of cold- cooling; reduced
through icing and related disruption disruption through

cold weather; of transport and icing and cold
increased energy networks weather; increased
navigation navigation
opportunities on opportunities on
Great Lakes Great Lakes
South America Increased heat Similar to A2 Increased heat
discomfort and discomfort and
need for cooling need for cooling
Asia Increased heat Increased need for Increased heat Permanent wet
discomfort and heating in north, discomfort and monsoon:
need for cooling; and increase in need for cooling; increased urban
reduced disruption network disruption reduced disruption drainage problems
through icing and due to cold or through icing and
cold weather in icing events; cold weather in
north. Increased similar to A2 in north. Increased
urban drainage south and east Asia urban drainage
problems in south problems in south
and east. and east.
Africa Increased heat Similar to A2 Increased heat
need for cooling. need for cooling.
Australasia Increased heat Similar to A2 Increased heat
need for cooling. need for cooling.
8. Economic and social implications
The impacts of abrupt climate change on water, energy, health, agriculture, biodiversity
and settlements will have regional and global economic impacts, which have not yet been
evaluated using common metrics: integrated assessments have had to make assumptions
about the aggregated economic impact of abrupt events (e.g. Mastrandrea & Schneider,
2001).
The preceding overview of the potential effects of abrupt climate change, however,
suggests the following major global-scale economic impacts:
Thermohaline circulation collapse

• Shift in concentration of economic activity southwards in Europe and North
America;
• Major increases in costs of maintaining and adapting urban and transport
infrastructure in northern Europe and eastern North America;
• Substantial reductions in crop production in North America and central Asia,
affecting global food markets
Accelerated climate change

• Shift in concentration of economic activity northwards in Europe and North
America
• Major increases in costs of maintaining and adapting urban and transport
environments across most of the world

• Reductions in crop productivity in North America and central Asia, affecting
global food markets
• Increased frequency of hazard-related impacts and costs
Regime change
• Permanent El Nino increases flood hazard costs in North and South America
• Permanent El Nino reduces commercial fisheries productivity, and hence
increases world food prices
• Permanent wet monsoon increases flood costs in south Asia
• Permanent dry monsoon threatens security of food supplies in south Asia
Potential impacts of gradual or abrupt climate change on security, population movements

and conflict are extremely speculative. However, climate change will exacerbate existing
tensions between regions and groups within regions, both through differential impacts
and differing abilities to adapt.
10. Conclusions
This desk study has reviewed the potential effects of abrupt climate change across the
world, by sector. There have been very few quantitative assessments of the effects of
abrupt climate change at any scales, and many of the conclusions of the review are highly
speculative. It is also not possible to evaluate the relative importance of each potential
impact. Given the non-trivial likelihood of abrupt climate change occurring, there is
clearly a need for more quantitative assessments across sectors, at both local and global
scales. The report has not considered explicitly the implications of abrupt climate change
for adaptation strategies or indeed the effectiveness of adaptation. However, it is clear
that the implications of abrupt climate change for adaptation actions and strategies need
to be examined in some detail.
The key potential impacts of each potential abrupt climate change considered in this
review are:
Thermohaline circulation collapse
Collapse is superimposed on global warming: the later the collapse, the larger the
warming on which the collapse is superimposed. Impacts of collapse on a world that was
not warming would be greater.
• Impacts will be felt across the world, not just around the North Atlantic
• Collapse increases (relative to gradual climate change) water resources stresses in
Europe and south and east Asia, and changes to the timing of river flows through
the year would affect reliability of existing water resource management systems
• Collapse would lead to a reduction in cooling energy demands relative to the
situation immediately before collapse (but still an increase over demands in the
absence of any climate change), and an increase in heating energy demands

relative to the situation immediately before collapse (back to levels expected in
the absence of climate change).
• Collapse would lead to increases in winter mortality across Europe and parts of
eastern North America and Asia, but decreases in summer mortality in the same
areas. In these regions, the net effect would probably be to increase mortality.
• Collapse would reduce crop productivity across much of Europe and parts of
Asia, increasing burdens on the global food market and adversely affecting poor
regions elsewhere.
• Europe, parts of northern Asia, and eastern North America would experience
major changes in "natural" ecosystems, with a general shift from temperate
toward boreal systems. Ecosystems in other parts of the world would be affected
by changing patterns of precipitation.
• Settlements and infrastructure in Europe and parts of North America would be
exposed to increased cold-weather disruption, although the later the collapse the
less the impact this would have.
• It is possible that collapse would lead to a general southwards shift in the centre
of economic activity in Europe and eastern North America, although again the
effect would depend on when the collapse occurred.
Accelerated climate change
• Accelerated climate change exaggerates considerably the impacts of gradual

climate change, and is would produces changes at rates considerably in excess of
ability of both natural and human systems to adapt.
• Accelerated climate change increases the numbers of people at risk of increased
water scarcity, particularly in Europe, North and Central America, and Africa.
Major reductions in snowfall across large parts of eastern and northern Europe,
North America and northern Asia would lead to significant changes in the timing
of river flows through the year, challenging significantly the reliability of water
resources systems.
• Accelerated climate change leads to very large increases in demands for energy
for cooling, particularly in Europe and western Asia; by the 2050s, cooling
requirements globally would be increased by over 75%, relative to the situation
without climate change. Demands for energy for heating would be reduced by
almost 50%.
• Accelerated climate change would increase substantially heat-related mortality,
and lead to major disruptions in the patterns of many climate-sensitive diseases.
Increases in flooding in south and east Asia in particular would increase the
burden of flood-related ill-health.
• Accelerated climate change would lead to very substantial reductions in crop
productivity, due to heat stress and water shortage, in most crop-producing
regions, although this may be offset to a degree by the effects of higher CO2
concentrations.
• Accelerated climate change would threaten many natural ecosystems, with
widespread poleward movement of potential ecosystem types.

• Higher temperatures in particular would have significant impacts on the comfort
and performance of settlements and infrastructure across the world.
Regime change
The effects of permanent regime change are highly uncertain, and although direct impacts
are likely to be restricted to specific regions, these impacts may have global-scale
consequences.
A shift to a permanent El Nino would increase water resource stress across large parts of
south and east Asia, south and east Africa, and eastern South America, and increase the
frequency of flooding in western South America and the south west of North America. It
would reduce crop productivity in Asia and Africa, leading to increased risk of hunger
and malnutrition; it would also encourage ecosystem degradation. Changes in ocean
characteristics would reduce fisheries production in the eastern Pacific, again affecting
both subsistence economies and world food prices.
A shift to a permanent dry south Asian monsoon would lead to major reductions in crop
productivity in south Asia, and consequent increased risk of hunger and rises in food
prices (and hence impacts on hunger in other poor regions). The reduction in flooding
would reduce flood losses, but would also slow down the rate of deposition of sediments
and result in reductions in soil fertility.
A shift to a permanent wet south Asian monsoon would have the primary effect of
increasing flood losses and reducing harvests, leading also to increased risk of hunger.
Urban drainage problems in south Asian cities, and associated disease and ill-health,
would be exacerbated.

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Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 7
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Global impacts of abrupt climate change:

Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Working Paper 99

Tyndall working Paper 99

• regional cooling following a shutdown of the thermohaline circulation in the

2. Scenarios for abrupt climate change

2.1 Collapse of the thermohaline circulation

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 2

2.2 Accelerated climate change

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 3

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 4

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 5

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 6

2.3 Regime change

The climate system is characterised by a number of consistent patterns, known as modes

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 7

3. Impacts of abrupt climate change

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 8

Table 1 summarises the numbers of people with an increase or decrease in water

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 9

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 10

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 11

Table 2: Millions of people exposed to change in water resources stress by 2055:

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 12

Figure 6: Effect of regime change (precipitation only) on average annual runoff

Table 3 summarises impacts of abrupt climate change on water resources by continent,

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 13

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 14

HDD = Σ (18 - Ti) where Ti is less than 18oC

CDD is calculated from:

CDD = Σ (Ti – 18) where Ti is greater than 18 oC

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 15

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 16

A2 THC2015 THC2035 Accelerat ed A2 THC2015 THC2035 Accelerat ed

A2 THC2015 THC2035 THC2055 Accelerat ed A2 THC2015 THC2035 THC2055 Accelerat ed

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 17

5.1 Thermal effects on health

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 18

Table 5: Summary health sector impacts

5.2 Disease and ill-health

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 19

6.1 Agricultural productivity

6.2 Global food production and risk of hunger

6.3 Forest products

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 20

Table 5: Summary agriculture sector impacts

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 21

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 22

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 23

Table 6: Summary biodiversity sector impacts

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 24

8. Settlements and infrastructure

Table 7: Summary settlements and infrastructure sector impacts

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 25

8. Economic and social implications

Thermohaline circulation collapse

Accelerated climate change

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 26

Potential impacts of gradual or abrupt climate change on security, population movements

Thermohaline circulation collapse

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 27

Accelerated climate change

• Accelerated climate change exaggerates considerably the impacts of gradual

Global impacts of abrupt climate change May 2006 28