Supreme Court Rules Search for Missing Wife Insufficient to Declare Presumptive Death

Republic of the Philippines 
SUPREME COURT 
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  

vs. 
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch
10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41
of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who
had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that
Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead,"2 and second,
Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to
circumvent the law on marriage.3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica
Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting
onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they
returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's
contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in
Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment
contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983,
while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica
had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent
claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in
November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England
proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena
Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all
returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet
Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker
despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to
give him such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter
of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her daughter-
in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry
Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique,
respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose,
Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had
given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet
Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She further
claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209,
July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as
presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a
well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently
established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where the
following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a well-founded belief
on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition was a proper case
of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family Code.5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded
belief that his wife is already dead."6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which provides
that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth
in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis
supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded,7 the following
crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to
enable the spouse present to remarry.8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard
than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such
absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.9 The Family Code,
upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391,
Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements.11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he had
complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is
already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing
spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the
defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not
exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he fails
to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived in
the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her whereabouts. He
admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his
suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable
or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of
Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he
secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to
look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London and I went to London to look for
her I could not find her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on
his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference between London
and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one — place in England,
the port where his ship docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave
home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would announce to friends and
relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of destination does not appear
to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and
London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three
hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or
London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there — which is in effect
what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her
personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his
failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his
wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned
letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their
friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony.
The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good
evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not
synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility.
Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse
had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut
short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of
nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983
when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker
without inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why
he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to
find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior
make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a
relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they
make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of
them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on
marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court
in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it
impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still
the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the
law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view
marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the familyand
an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State bas the
strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12
of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes
and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement
destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent
wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's
decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions
are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.
# Footnotes
1 Petition, p. 2; Record, p. 7.
2 Records, p. 13.
3 Records, p. 14.
4 Trial Court Decision, p. 4; Records, p. 39.
5 Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 13.
6 Id.
7 Pertinent portions of Article 83 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any other person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of the contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
8 See A. V. Sempio Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1988), 
p. 48.
9 See generally Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937).
10 Petition, p. 11; Rollo; p. 15.
11 Memorandum for Respondent, p. 4.
12 25 Phil. 71 (1913).
13 25 Phil. at 73.
14 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 16.
15 Id., p. 8.
16 Court of Appeal's Decision, p. 6.
17 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 14.
18 See generally Ramos v. Sandiganbayan, 191 SCRA 671 (1990).
19 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 10.
20 35 Phil. 252 (1919).
21 35 Phil. at 254.
22 81 Phil. 461 (1948).
23 203 SCRA 750 (1991).
24 203 SCRA at 761.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,  

vs. 
MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated
value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William
Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February
1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta
having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed
with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to
be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and
respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed
that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the
deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have
been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had
been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years
before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of
Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent.
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and
respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitioner and against the oppositor whereby
herein petitioner, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico
Calisterio y Cacabelos. 1
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, formulating that —
1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code in the instant case despite the fact
that the controversy arose when the New Civil Code was the law in force.
2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-appellant and the deceased
Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the presumptive death of
her first spouse.
3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at No. 32 Batangas Street, San Francisco
del Monte, Quezon City, is the conjugal property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico
Calisterio.
4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a legal heir of deceased Teodorico
Calisterio.
5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration should be granted solely in favor of
oppositor-appellant. 2
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its
now assailed decision, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a
new one entered declaring as follows:
(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;

(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, belong to
the conjugal partnership property with the concomitant obligation of the partnership to pay the value of the
land to Teodorico's estate as of the time of the taking;
(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is entitled to one half of her husband's estate,
and Teodorico's sister, herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to the other half;
(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of Marietta E. Calisterio to act as administrator
of Teodorico's estate, and if so found competent and willing, that she be appointed as such; otherwise, to
determine who among the deceased's next of kin is competent and willing to become the administrator of
the estate. 3
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, prompting her
to interpose the present appeal. Petitioner asseverates:
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the
decision of the trial court is not in accord with the law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable
Court. 4
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between the deceased Teodorico
and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May
1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03
August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code 5 itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where
it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil Code which
provides:
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is
illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law
gives exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional
cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the
later marriage must have done so in good faith. 6 Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong — it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty
through some motive of interest or ill will. 7 The Court does not find these circumstances to be here
extant.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary8 as long as the prescribed
period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the
explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It
follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger
of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b)
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is,
unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the
spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition
is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as
so provided in Article 41 9 , in relation to Article 40, 10 of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William
Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a
second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence
of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate another
property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of
Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions — one portion going to the
surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in
intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate 11 of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers
and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the
brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces,
however, can only succeed by right of representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon
the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters
exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predecease
or are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the
dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own
mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother.
1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is AFFIRMED
except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof that the children of
petitioner are likewise entitled, along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is
hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to the
exclusion of her own children. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 45.
2 Rollo, pp. 29-30.
3 Rollo, pp. 35-36.
4 Rollo, p. 15.
5 Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
6 The good faith or bad faith of the other contracting party to the subsequent marriage is not all that
consequential (See Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177).
7 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 557.
8 Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.
9 Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
in the provisions of Article 391 of the civil code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
10 Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
11 First deducting to her favor her one-half share of the conjugal property.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005

vs. 
GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Via this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeks the reversal and setting aside
of the decision dated September 23, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73884, which
affirmed on appeal an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at San Mateo, Rizal in a
summary judicial proceeding thereat commenced by the herein respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino for
the declaration of the presumptive death of her absent spouse, Francisco Lorino, Jr., based on the
provisions of Article 41 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage.
The facts may be summarized, as follows:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino (Gloria for brevity), and her husband were married on June 12,
1987. Out of this marriage, she begot three (3) children, namely: Francis Jeno, Fria Lou and Fatima.1a\^/
phi1.net
Before they got married in 1987, Gloria was unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker, possessed
with violent character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out with friends to the extent of being unable
to engage in any gainful work.
Because of her husband’s violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and decided to go
back to her parents together with her three (3) children. In order to support the children, Gloria was
compelled to work abroad.
From the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all.
She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of his relatives.
On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) at San Mateo, Rizal under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the
Family Law provided for in the Family Code, which petition was docketed in the same court as Special
Proceeding No. 325-00 SM.
On August 28, 2000, the RTC issued an order directing, inter alia, the publication of the petition in a
newspaper of general circulation, thus:
A verified petition was filed by herein petitioner through counsel alleging that she married Francisco
Lorino, Jr. on June 12, 1987 but because of the violent character of his husband, she decided to go back
to her parents and lived separately from her husband. After nine (9) years, there was absolutely no news
about him and she believes that he is already dead and is now seeking through this petition for a Court
declaration that her husband is judicially presumed dead for the purpose of remarriage.
Finding the said petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby set for hearing before
this Court on September 18, 2000 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning at which place, date and time, any or all
persons who may claim any interest thereto may appear and show cause why the same should not be
granted.
Let a copy of this Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in this province once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks and be posted in the bulletin boards of the Hall of Justice and the
Municipal Hall, San Mateo, Rizal, all at the expense of the petitioner.1awphi1.nét
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General a copy of this Order together with a copy of the petition.
Further, send a copy of this Order to the last known address of Francisco Lorino, Jr. at 719 Burgos St.,
Sta. Elena, Marikina City.
SO ORDERED1
The evidence in support of the summary judicial proceeding are: the order of publication dated August 28,
2000 (Exhibit "A"); affidavit of publication dated September 16, 2000 (Exhibit "B")2 ; copies of the
newspapers where the order appeared (Exhibits "C" to "E-1")3 ; a deposition dated September 4, 2000 of
Gloria taken in Hong Kong (Exhibit "G")4 ; Gloria’s affidavit dated October 21, 1999, also executed in
Hong Kong (Exhibit "G-1")5 ; and a certification by Department of Foreign Affairs Authentication Officer,
Catalina C. Gonzalez, dated November 3, 1999, therein certifying that the signature of Vice Consul
Adriane Bernie C. Candolada, appearing below the jurat in Gloria’s affidavit of October 21, 1999, is
authentic (Exhibit "G-2")6 .
In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the summary petition, rendered judgment
granting the same, to wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court in view of the facts and circumstances obtaining, finds the petition with merit
and hereby grants its imprimatur to the petition. Judgment is hereby rendered declaring the presumptive
death/absence of Francisco Lorino, Jr. pursuant to Art. 41 of the New Family Code but subject to all
restrictions and conditions provided therein.
SO ORDERED.7
Despite the judgment being immediately final and executory under the provisions of Article 247 of the
Family Code, thus:
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory,
the Office of the Solicitor General, for the Republic of the Philippines, nevertheless filed a Notice of
Appeal.8 Acting thereon, the RTC had the records elevated to the Court of Appeals which docketed the
case as CA-G.R. CV No. 73884.
In a decision dated September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed
case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, denied the Republic’s appeal and
accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC decision:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the
appealed November 7, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal in Spec. Proc. No.
325-00 SM is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.9
Without filing any motion for reconsideration, petitioner Republic directly went to this Court via the instant
recourse under Rule 45, maintaining that the petition raises a pure question of law that does not require
prior filing of a motion for reconsideration.
The foregoing factual antecedents present to this Court the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS DULY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL
ON A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; and
WHETHER OR NOT THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES FOR A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF
PRESUMPTIVE DEATH UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE WERE DULY ESTABLISHED IN
THIS CASE.
The Court rules against petitioner Republic.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY
LAW, sets the tenor for cases covered by these rules, to wit:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases
provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
Judge Elizabeth Balquin-Reyes of RTC, Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal duly complied with the above-cited
provision by expeditiously rendering judgment within ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence by
therein petitioner, Gloria Bermudez-Lorino.
The problem came about when the judge gave due course to the Republic’s appeal upon the filing of a
Notice of Appeal, and had the entire records of the case elevated to the Court of Appeals, stating in her
order of December 18, 2001, as follows:
Notice of Appeal having been filed through registered mail on November 22, 2001 by the Office of the
Solicitor General who received a copy of the Decision in this case on November 14, 2001, within the
reglementary period fixed by the Rules, let the entire records of this case be transmitted to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.10
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to
perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section
247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part
of the RTC to give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of
the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is
immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec,11 "the right to appeal is not a
natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express
mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in
Family Law are "immediately final and executory", the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties
therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death,
should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001.
It was fortunate, though, that the Court of Appeals, acting through its Special Fourth Division, with Justice
Elvi John S. Asuncion as Acting Chairman and ponente, denied the Republic’s appeal and affirmed
without modification the final and executory judgment of the lower court. For, as we have held in Nacuray
vs. NLRC :12
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory it becomes
immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and whether made by
the highest court of the land (citing Nunal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94005, 6 April 1993, 221 SCRA
26).
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated
that the RTC’s decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course
thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the
appeal outright on that ground.
This judgment of denial was elevated to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Although the result of the Court of Appeals’ denial of the appeal would apparently be the same, there is a
big difference between having the supposed appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact
that the RTC decision sought to be appealed is immediately final and executory, and the denial of the
appeal for lack of merit. In the former, the supposed appellee can immediately ask for the issuance of an
Entry of Judgment in the RTC, whereas, in the latter, the appellant can still raise the matter to this Court
on petition for review and the RTC judgment cannot be executed until this Court makes the final
pronouncement.
The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of jurisdiction, and
reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was immediately final and executory. As it
were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous
appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of law, the
judgment was not appealable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.1a\^/phi1.net No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, (Chairman), J., in the result.
Footnotes
1 Records, p. 9.
2 Records, pp. 10-11.
5 Records, p. 42.
6 Records, p. 41.
7 RTC Decision, p. 2; Records, pp. 51-52.
8 Records, p. 53.
9 Rollo, pp. 22-26.
10 Records, p. 56.
11 211 SCRA 907 [1992].
12 270 SCRA 9 [1997].

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163604 May 6, 2005

vs. 
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L.
MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria
Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29,
1999,1 granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioner’s Report2 and accordingly declared the
absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family
Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years,
the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial court’s order by filing a
Notice of Appeal.3
By Order of November 22, 1999s,4 the trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served "as
required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case
being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s order of disapproval having been denied
by Order of January 13, 2000,5 it filed a Petition for Certiorari6 before the Court of Appeals, it contending
that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special
proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
By Decision of May 5, 2004,7 the Court of Appeals denied the Republic’s petition on procedural and
substantive grounds in this wise:
At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form. It failed to attach to its petition a
certified true copy of the assailed Order dated January 13, 2000 [denying its Motion for Reconsideration
of the November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of Appeal]. Moreover, the petition questioned the
[trial court’s] Order dated August 15, 1999, which declared Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead, likewise
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet, not even a
copy could be found in the records. On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright
in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the substantive issue of
the validity/nullity of the assailed order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a
person is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30 days and the party
appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal to perfect its
appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15 days from notice or
decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal (Section 3,
Rule 41, Rules of Court).
As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil action is one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong" while a
special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as "a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No.
124320, March 2, 1999).
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a
special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial
court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right or a
cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying OSG’s
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal was
correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special proceeding, OSG should have
filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court . .
. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall
be filed and served in like manner.
Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected. The petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the enumeration, petitioner
contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.
By Resolution of December 15, 2004,8 this Court, noting that copy of the September 27, 2004
Resolution9 requiring respondent to file her comment on the petition was returned unserved with
postmaster’s notation "Party refused," Resolved to consider that copy deemed served upon her.
The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special Proceedings, Part II of the Revised
Rules of Court entitled SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, read:
RULE 72 
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY 
OF GENERAL RULES
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. – Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the
following:
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(b) Escheat;
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
(d) Trustees;
(e) Adoption;
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
(h) Habeas corpus;
(i) Change of name;
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;
(l) Constitution of family home;

(m) Declaration of absence and death;
(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. – In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for
in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. (Underscoring
supplied)
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant of the
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouses was
in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in
disapproving petitioner’s Notice of Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple
or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal
shall be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxx
By the trial court’s citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria
Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract
a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following
above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW,
contains the following provision, inter alia:
xxx
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
casesprovided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided
in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x,
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding
under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls
for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of
Appeal from the trial court’s order sufficed.
That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as
the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and
42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended,
and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
seals the case in petitioner’s favor.
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioner’s petition before the appellate court. Petitioner’s failure
to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial court’s order denying its motion for
reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what
the appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.
As for petitioner’s failure to submit copy of the trial court’s order granting the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, contrary to the appellate court’s observation that petitioner was also assailing it,
petitioner’s 8-page petition10filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having assailed the order
disapproving the Notice of Appeal.
WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing discussion.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Annex "F" to Petition, Rollo at 47-50.
2 Annex "E" to Petition, Id. at 44-45.
3 Annex "A" to Petition for Certiorari, CA Rollo at 11.
4 Annex "B" to Petition, Rollo at 41.
5 Annex "C" to Petition, Id. at 42.
6 CA Rollo at 1-8.
7 Id. at 51-54.
8 Rollo at 100.
9 Id. at 97.
10 Vide note 6.

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner,  
vs. 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 26877, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting
Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and
legally married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-
MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO
P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before
Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.4 He met the
private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in
Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer
Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her.
Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo
succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her
that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was
assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on
April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch
61.5 It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
 
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they
were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel
started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and
whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took
all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-
certified copy of the marriage contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that
Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.8
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest
Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous
marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in
order until this one time when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck. He then abandoned her.
Eduardo further testified that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to
seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit
suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited
her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his
first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina
Gandalera the amount of ₱200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.9
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that his first
marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate
him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled
that even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter
would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because
when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He
maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his
first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code,
there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in
marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful
marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code.
To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v.
Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo’s defense of good faith and reliance on
the Court’s ruling in United States v. Enriquez13 were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the
Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a
judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry.
Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of the marriage;  
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the
private complainant’s knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an
offense against the State and not just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous
and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the
penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel
could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s
presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v.
Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of Appeals16 to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is
hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.17
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER’S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE
CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS
PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña
had been "absent" for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead
as a matter of law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who
has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all
purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of
death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon
the satisfaction of two requirements: the  
specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he
was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of
her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the
Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code,
the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil
Code does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive
death would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the
requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a
requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of
the private complainant. The private complainant was a "GRO" before he married her, and even knew that
he was already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also
pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioner’s
conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the
OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.19
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legítimamente disuelto el anterior, será
castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.20 The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
because the drafters of the law were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which
provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of
presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy."21
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she
has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage
having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage.22 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
23 Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage must be entered into with
fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony by dolo.24 On the other
hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a
marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not
matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until
lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.25 As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that
there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3)
fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act.28 He explained that:
… This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle
antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no
willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject 
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong
evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who
contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because
of the many years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his
endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent
intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime.29
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony
by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the
act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony
by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice" do
not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary."31
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury.32 When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is
proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.
33 Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of
his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a
reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.34
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an
evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.36 The
prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the
effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of
the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in
1996, he was of the well-grounded belief  
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He
should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his
first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate
criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not
be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty
or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for
the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good
faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution." Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the
interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its
severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.37 The laws regulating civil
marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage
anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the
welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving
State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on
every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties
and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of
the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent
spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the requirement of
the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the
present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first
spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true," is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a
second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would
make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of
forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals.39 Only with such proof
can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of
parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance,41 namely, a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is
misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence
of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate
among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not
been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether
or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration.
42 However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death,
reads:
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.43
With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390
of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger
of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b)
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is,
unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the
spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition
is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as
so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present
to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision
was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the
confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for purposes of the marriage law,
it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.48 In In Re Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that proof of
actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in
another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree
declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard from in seven years
cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an
appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then
a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.
The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and
meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of
an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words "proper proceedings" in
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,52 the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that,
under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a
person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of Article 349 or "before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper
proceedings" is erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision
presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not
been declared presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous.
He maintains that the supposition is not true.53 A second marriage is bigamous only when the
circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present.54 Former Senator
Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution
or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not
constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give
rise to bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of an
absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present
cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.56
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is
absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after
securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead.57 Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present
spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with
bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former
Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
… Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the present
spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty
of bigamy in case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse
contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s reappearance. This
provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349
of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively
dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.58
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that
things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes
of  
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will
suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of
the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause "before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x" should be disregarded because of Article 83,
paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.59
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law,
in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of
presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
60 Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in
good faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and
the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by
Article 41 of the Family Code, "which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry."
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages
in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in
any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner
asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,63 where an award of moral
damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed
to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she adduced
evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases
enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against
the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió indedublamente porque el articulo 2219
del Código Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto,
violación, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeración el delito de
bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aquí los daños de ₱5,000.00 arriba
mencionados.64
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG,
likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s
wrongful act or omission.65 An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following
conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by
the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act
or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth,
the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil
Code.66
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in
Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may
also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9
of this article in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved
party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise,
there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 221967 and analogous
cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or
resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.)68
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the
offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless,
the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." This provision contains what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The
standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.69
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for
its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth
in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible.70 If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that
"every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the
latter for the same." On the other hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for damages." The latter provision  
is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove
for specifically in the statutes." Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting
in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends
upon the circumstances of each case.71
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured
her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and
his parents made the same assurance – that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to
marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the
petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful
husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had
no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless
deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he
maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who  
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support
of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to
a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband.72
The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his
marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed,
in Morris v. Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser,
supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the
wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate
consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27
N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendant’s
conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff
became entitled not only to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages
in the Law of Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendant’s
bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and "ashamed to go
out" but "couldn’t sleep" but "couldn’t eat," had terrific headaches" and "lost quite a lot of weight." No just
basis appears for judicial interference with the jury’s reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on
the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.74 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert
the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from
claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from
recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:75
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in

consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact
a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by
him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v.
Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the
defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave
her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally
violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but
rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her
being led by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband
and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for
such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106
Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of
the law by herself but upon the defendant’s misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed,
innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the defendant’s fraud for which damages
may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been
maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819;
Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v.
Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery
where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal
action was induced solely by the defendant’s misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of
action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations  
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a
contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act
upon which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A.
L. R. 958.76
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of ₱200,000.00 for moral
damages to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals isAFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
On leave
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice 
Chairman, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and
Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, concurring; rollo, pp. 28-41.
2 Penned by Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.
3 Records, p. 1.
4 Exhibit "B," records, p. 7.
5 Exhibit "A," id. at 6.
6 TSN, April 23, 2002, p. 15.
7 Exhibit "B," records, p. 7.
8 TSN, April 23, 2002, p. 15.
9 Records, pp. 111-116.
10 58 Phil. 817 (1933).
11 1 Phil. 109 (1902).
12 G.R. No. 111656, March 20, 1996, 255 SCRA 202.
13 32 Phil 202 (1915).
14 G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.
15 G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 122.
16 G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993, 226 SCRA 572.
17 Rollo, p. 41.
18 Rollo, pp. 14-15.
19 Supra, at note 14.
20 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal Reformado, Vol. V, 627.
21 aquino, the Revised Penal Code, vol. iii, 497 (1988 ed.) (emphasis supplied).
22 Id. at 634.
23 People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 247 (1935).

24 … "Tres son los elementos esenciales del mismo; el vinculo matrimonial anterior, la celebración de
nuevo matrimonio antes de la disolución de ese vinculo anterior, y por ultimo, la intención fraudulenta,
que constituye la criminalidad misma del acto. Este ultimo elemento no lo consigna el articulo, por
hallarse indudablemente embebido en ese principio anterior a todos los Codigos, e inscrito en el
frontispicio del nuestro (Art. I.), que donde no hay voluntad, no hay delito. xxx" (Codigo Penal Reformado,
tomo 5, 560) Groizard is of the view that bigamy may be committed by culpa. (id. at 558).
25 Derecho Penal Reformado, Vol. 1, 629-630.
28 Albert, The revised Penal Code, 819 (1932 ed.).
29 Id.
30 l.b. reyes, the Revised Penal Code, book one, 37 (13th ed. 1993).
31 United States v. Peñalosa, 1 Phil. 109.
32 Wharton, Criminal Law, Volume 1, 302.
33 People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d. 798; 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
34 Wharton, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 203.
35 Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111656, March 20, 1996, 255 SCRA 202.
36 Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 747.
37 People v. Bitdu, supra, at note 10.
38 Geisselman v. Geisselman, 134 Md. 453, 107 A. 185 (1919).
39 Wharton criminal law, vol. 2, 2377 (12th ed., 1932).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Tolentino, The New Civil Code, Vol. I, 690.

43 Emphasis supplied.
44 The Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) took effect on August 4, 1988.
45 Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996, 259 SCRA 129.
46 G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 201.
47 64 Phil. 179 (1937).
48 Id. at 83.
49 81 Phil. 461 (1948).
50 Id. at 463.
51 98 Phil. 574 (1956).
52 107 Phil. 381 (1960).
53 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. III, 490.
54 Id. at 497.
55 Padilla, Comments on the Revised Penal Code, Vol. IV, 717-718.
56 The Revised Penal Code, 1981 ed., Vol. II, 906.
57 Republic v. Nolasco, supra, at note 19.
58 Handbook on The Family Code, 48-49.
59 The Family Code of the Philippines annotated, 62-63 (1992 ed.).
60 regalado, criminal law conspectus, 633 (1st ed., 2000), citing Lukban v. Republic, supra.
61 Id. citing People v. Reyes, CA-G.R. No. 12107-R, June 30, 1955, and People v. Malana, CA-G.R. No.
5347, January 30, 1940.
62 Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 358.
63 CA-G.R. No. 22573-R, April 23, 1959.

64 Article 2217, Civil Code.
65 Francisco v. Ferrer, Jr., G.R. No. 142029, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 261.
66 Id. at 266.
67 tolentino, new civil code, vol. ii, 658, citing People v. Plaza, 52 O.G. 6609.
68 Id.
69 Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16.
70 Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989,
176 SCRA 778.
71 Id.
72 Leventhal v. Liberman, 186 N.E. 675 (1933).
73 135 A.2d 657 (1957).
74 Id. at 662.
75 Id. at 611-612.
76 164 N.E. 609 (1929).

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  

vs. 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION), and ALAN B. ALEGRO, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan,
Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton.
In an Order1 dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for hearing on May 30, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. and
directed that a copy of the said order be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in
the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Samar, and  
that a copy be posted in the court’s bulletin board for at least three weeks before the next scheduled
hearing. The court also directed that copies of the order be served on the Solicitor General, the Provincial
Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan, through counsel, and that copies be sent to Lea by registered mail. Alan
complied with all the foregoing jurisdictional requirements.2
On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a Motion to Dismiss3 the petition, which was, however, denied by the court for failure to comply with Rule
15 of the Rules of Court.4
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan,
Samar.5He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her
for being always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be
better for her to go back to her parents.6 Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work
the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere
to be found.7 Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan,
Samar.8 However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the house of Lea’s parents to
see if she was there, but he was told that she was not there. He also went to the house of Lea’s friend,
Janeth Bautista, at Barangay Canlapwas, but he was informed by Janette’s brother-in-law, Nelson
Abaenza, that Janeth had left for Manila.9 When Alan went back to the house of his parents-in-law, he
learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their house but that she left without notice.10 Alan
sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him locate his wife. He also
inquired from his friends of Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail.11
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave
after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed.
12 However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in
Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him that she
had not seen her.13 He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan
decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to
no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.14
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station.15 The police authorities
issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001.16 Alan also reported Lea’s disappearance to the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001.17
Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared that on February 14,
1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by his house and he told Alan that she did not.
Alan also told him that Lea had disappeared. He had not seen Lea in the barangay ever since.18 Lea’s
father, who was his compadre and the owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not know where Lea
was.19
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General
adduced evidence in opposition to the petition.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioner’s absent spouse ROSALIA JULATON is hereby
declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of the petitioner’s subsequent marriage under Article
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said
absent spouse.
SO ORDERED.20
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered judgment on August 4,
2003, affirming the decision of the RTC.21 The CA cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.22
The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CA’s decision alleging that respondent Alan B.
Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead.23 It averred that the
respondent failed to exercise reasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even
admitted that Lea’s father told him on February 14, 1995 that Lea had been to their house but left without
notice. The OSG pointed out that the respondent reported his wife’s disappearance to the local police and
also to the NBI only after the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The petitioner avers that, as
gleaned from the evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and locate Lea. Finally, the
petitioner averred:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-
mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There
have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry
knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who
cannot have their marriages x x x declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to
Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary nature of its proceedings.
It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the
foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks
to protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-
founded belief that his wife is already  
dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the petition
for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court
of Appeals.24
The petition is meritorious.
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.25
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon
writes that "es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."26
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or
assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character,
habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men,
and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance
or throw light on their intentions,27 competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts
to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and
after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present
spouse.28
Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the present spouse that the
absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco,29 the Court warned against collusion between the
parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also
the maxim that "men readily believe what they wish to be true."
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The
respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he
allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent
admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law on February 14, 1995, his father-in-law
told him that Lea had just been there but that she left without notice.
The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he chided her for coming
home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be better for her to go home
to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never
returned. Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of
her resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month after their marriage. What is so
worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s
whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent
had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea’s whereabouts considering that Lea’s father was
the owner of Radio DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but
it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief,
before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondent’s petition.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.  

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, DANTE O. TINGA 

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
REYNATO S. PUNO 
Chairman, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Records, p. 1.
2 Exhibits "C" to "H" and "H-1," folder of exhibits, pp. 10-21.
3 Records, pp. 3-6.
4 Id. at 9.
5 Exhibit "A," folder of exhibits, p. 5.
6 TSN, 20 September 2001, p. 6.
7 Id. at 9.
8 Id. at 7.
9 TSN, 20 September 2001, p. 12.
10 Id. at 16.
11 Id. at 13-15.
12 Id. at 16.
13 Id. at 17-19.
14 Id. at 20-21.
15 Exhibits "I" and "I-1," folder of exhibits, p. 22.
16 Exhibit "J," Id. at 23.
17 Exhibit "K," Id. at 24.
18 TSN, November 5, 2001, pp. 4-6.
19 Id. at 8.
21 Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and
Noel G. Tijam, concurring; rollo, pp. 33-40.
22 G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.
23 Rollo, p. 17.
24 Id. at 26-28.
25 Emphases supplied.
26 Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 633.
27 Tyrrell v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 115 A.L.R., 392 (1937), citing In re: Hurlburt’s
Estate,35 L.R.A. 794 68 Vt.366, 35 A.77.
28 Gall v. Gall, 69 Sickels 109, 21 NE 106 (1889).
29 Supra, note 19.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,  

vs. 
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution dated September 28,
20043 reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social Security
Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for review on
certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona,
Sorsogon.6
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Sorsogon a petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication of the
Notice of Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby declared to
[sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.10
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a
retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.11
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,00012 by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits13 which was also granted by
the SSS on April 6, 1998.14
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa)
contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that
Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and
the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailon’s
medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of
her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated
February 13, 199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as
husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the necessary court action
to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally know that Alice is "still very
much alive."16
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of
"Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s death,17 he further
attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries
before the SSS.20
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the
cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the
refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the denial
of the claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during his lifetime;
and the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailon’s beneficiaries according to
the order of preference provided under the law, after the amount erroneously paid to respondent has
been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by misrepresentation in declaring
the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.
xxxx
x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead," did not become
final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
xxxx
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and is the
deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.
xxxx
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his
marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of
reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic]
Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of.21 (Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000,22 advised respondent that as
Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses, she should return the P12,000
paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,23 the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her
monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her
marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latter’s marriage with Alice was still
subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become
final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the validity of the order. It thus requested respondent
to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly pension she had received from
the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS
dated October 12, 1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she reiterated
her request for the release of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not
declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for
all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000,26 maintained the denial of her claim
for and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she was not
deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her
entitlement to monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount
of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings
"forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any amount during Bailon’s wake."28
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondent’s petition, and the parties filed their respective Position
Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting
that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to
declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily located
her, she having stayed at her parents’ residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon
was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and,
therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the
legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00 representing
the death benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999 as well
as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising from
the demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as Section
13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this Commission of
its compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable
conclusion that the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of
Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member represented
in bad faith. This Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in its Memorandum
dated August 9, 1999,32revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her
separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and by
exerting fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the deceased
member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is void, considering
that the first marriage on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled, invalidated or otherwise
dissolved during the lifetime of the parties thereto. x x x as determined through the investigation
conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not Alice Diaz Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law wife of the
deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary, to the latter’s
death benefit. x x x
xxxx
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary
beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she
received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle
of solutio indebiti x x x
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of
Clemente Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her by the SSS as
funeral benefit.33(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration34 having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a
petition for review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4,
2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due her.
Held the CA:
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of the then
CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more
importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings of
the RTC, and on its own, declare the latter’s decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar import, can
respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the first marriage subsisting and the second marriage
null and void?
xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as the
finding that "the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the second
marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent
court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the
reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere does the law
contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare the second marriage null and
void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the decision of the RTC declaring one to
be presumptively dead is without basis.
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular
courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due credence
to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the decision
of the RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of fair play and
thus its findings are of doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample
opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.
xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry
is no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore as the marital
bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the latter’s death. Neither is
there a second marriage to terminate because the second marriage was likewise dissolved by the death
of Clemente Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance with
the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the respondent SSS
has now the authority to review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare the second marriage
null and void.36(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration37 which were both denied for
lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on certiorari38 anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OF JURISDICTION.39
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on the prior
and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to determine
to whom, between Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 540 of
the Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due process or ample
opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.
The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no moment to
the present controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of the SSC’s finding
of the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice has a
better right to the death benefits."41
The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and
contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less
reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the
December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same,
making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alice’s marriage on the one hand and the
invalidity of Bailon and respondent’s marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court. The law
does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of its
authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of
the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration.42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
unless:
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of
the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or
contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any
of these exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows
that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage.44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years45 when Bailon
sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a requirement
then for purposes of remarriage.46
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity
of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to
prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must
also be shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was contracted. The presumption in
favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of the legality of his second marriage,
will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life of the first spouse or of the continuance of the
marital relation with such first spouse.47 (Underscoring supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article
42 thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with
due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of
reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of the
Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee
and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or
by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the
subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the
spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an
absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial

declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of
dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised,
because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct
action for annulment.52(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead,
still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died,
as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be
brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any
conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse," as expressly provided in Section 2 of the
Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.54 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.
Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
56
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s
marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of
Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered
unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES  

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE) 

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING 
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO 
Acting Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA 
Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
ANTONIO T. CARPIO  
Acting Chairperson
C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN 
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On Official Leave.
1 Penned by Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Justices Mariano C. del Castillo
and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
2 CA rollo, pp. 147-157.
3 Id. at 195.
4 Id. at 47-55.
5 Id. at 56.
6 SSC records, p. 112.
7 Id. at 65-67.
8 CA rollo, pp. 6-9.
9 Id. at 8-9.
11 CA rollo, p. 11.
13 Ibid.
14 Id. at 96-97.
15 Id. at 55.
16 Ibid.
17 Id. at 109.
18 Id. at 110.
19 Herminia Bailon-Argente, Cecilia Bailon-Yap, Norma Bailon-Chavez, Roselyn Bailon-Ladesma, Susan

J. Bailon, Charito Bailon-Soriano, and Clemente J. Bailon, Jr.
20 SSC records, pp. 113-120.
21 Id. at 135-136.
22 Id. at 137.
23 Id. at 124.
24 Id. at 125.
25 Id. at 129-130.
26 Id. at 134.
27 CA rollo, pp. 12-14.
29 CA rollo, pp. 15-19.
30 Id. at 144.
31 Rollo, pp. 56-57.
32 Pertinent portions of the Memorandum provide:
xxxx
1. Based on the interview conducted by our Account Officer, Mr. Rolando G. Gomez to [sic] the relatives
of Alice (not Aliz) Diaz namely: Rogelio Del Prado and Emelita Diaz at Poblacion Sur, Barcelona,
Sorsogon they alleged that subject deceased member and Alice live [sic] as husband and wife for only a
year. Alice never left Barcelona, Sorsogon since their separation and is not dependent for support nor
received support from the deceased member. x x x
33 Rollo, pp. 53-56.
34 SSC records, pp. 172-174.
36 Rollo, pp. 41-44.
37 CA rollo, pp. 161-170.
38 Rollo, pp. 10-34.
39 Id. at 22.
40 SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. – (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage,
benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by
the Commission, and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any of its
members, or by hearing officers duly authorized by the Commission and decided within the mandatory
period of twenty (20) days after the submission of the evidence. The filing, determination and settlement
of disputes shall be governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission.
xxxx
41 Rollo, p. 28.
42 Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby
would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
43 Article 41 of the Family Code now provides:
44 Armas v. Calisterio, 386 Phil. 402, 409 (2000).
45 CA rollo, p. 8.
46 Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179, 183 (1937).
47 I A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 282 (1999 ed.).
(Citations omitted)
48 Art. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to be
dead was in fact living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force;
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Art. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and within the periods
as follows:
xxxx
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent, during his or
her lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other;
xxxx
49 Supra note 47, at 284.
50 Ibid.
51 Id. at 285-286.
53 150 Phil. 204 (1972).
54 Id. at 213.
55 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 673 (2000). (Citations omitted)
56 Id. at 674.
SUPREME COURT 
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 180863 September 8, 2009
ANGELITA VALDEZ, Petitioner,  

vs. 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12, 2007 dismissing
petitioner Angelita Valdez’s petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Sofio
Polborosa (Sofio).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971, petitioner gave
birth to the spouses’ only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because
the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal
dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to return but, finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to
go back to her parents’ home in Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from
Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and
they agreed to separate. They executed a document to that effect.1 That was the last time petitioner saw
him. After that, petitioner didn’t hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.2
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985.3 Subsequently,
however, Virgilio’s application for naturalization filed with the United States Department of Homeland
Security was denied because petitioner’s marriage to Sofio was subsisting.4 Hence, on March 29, 2007,
petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death
of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision5 on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The RTC
held that Angelita "was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was
already dead." It said that under Article 41 of the Family Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove
that her spouse has been absent and that she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said, must be
the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the
absent spouse.
The RTC found that, by petitioner’s own admission, she did not try to find her husband anymore in light of
their mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioner’s daughter testified that her mother
prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still
alive, considering that he would have been only 61 years old by then, and people who have reached their
60s have not become increasingly low in health and spirits, and, even assuming as true petitioner’s
testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is no evidence that he continues to drink
and smoke until now.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.6 She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in this case
and not the Family Code since petitioner’s marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11, 1971, long
before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a vested right under
the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the Family Code should not be applied
against her because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on declaration of absence
and presumption of death, respectively, can be found, was not expressly repealed by the Family Code. To
apply the stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had acquired under the
Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10, 2007.7
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and Motion for
Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion,8 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended that the Court
set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead. The OSG
argues that the requirement of "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case. It said that petitioner could not be expected to comply with this requirement because it
was not yet in existence during her marriage to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The OSG further argues that
before the effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner already acquired a vested right as to the validity of her
marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio under the Civil Code. This vested right
and the presumption of Sofio’s death, the OSG posits, could not be affected by the obligations created
under the Family Code.9
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by Article 41 of the Family
Code.10 Title XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly repealed by the Family
Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code provides that its provisions shall not be retroactively
applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.11
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must state that we are
denying the Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court
from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question
of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here,
the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or
jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.12
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to prove
a "well-founded belief" that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family Code, to
wit:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971
and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
unless:
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence
of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of
the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the
former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.13
Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings
independent of the settlement of the absentee’s estate.
In re Szatraw14 is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish national in 1937.
They lived together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the husband, on the pretext
of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with their child and never returned. After inquiring from
friends, petitioner found that her husband went to Shanghai, China. However, friends who came from
Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen there. In 1948, petitioner filed a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband arguing that since the latter had been absent for more
than seven years and she had not heard any news from him and about her child, she believes that he is
dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he
possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his married
life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to
presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had
been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or
in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court.
Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor
can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced
nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer
for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v.
Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is
dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in
seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such
a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the
petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not
improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial
pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It
is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or
declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to
pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or
status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or
may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status determined,
or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the judgment on the subject of the controversy,
or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res
judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is,
therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot
reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because
he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined.1avvphi1 If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead,
because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the
lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.15
In Lukban v. Republic,16 petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on
December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel. She
did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent search, inquiries from his parents and friends, and
search in his last known address, proved futile. Believing her husband was already dead since he had
been absent for more than twenty years, petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration that she is a
widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a
subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the antecedents in Gue v. Republic17 are similar to Szatraw. On
January 5, 1946, Angelina Gue’s husband left Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai,
China. From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not written to her, nor in anyway communicated
with her as to his whereabouts. Despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11 years,
she asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the
provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial declaration that
petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law.18
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established
by law19and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have
taken place by the seventh year of absence,20 Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s
capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is not required.
Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not
yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not
change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief"
will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was
celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family
Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death
can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However,
we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in
1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA 

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO 
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA 
Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
Chairperson, Third Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
REYNATO S. PUNO 
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 33.
2 Id. at 5-6.
3 Id. at 10.
4 Id. at 11.
5 Penned by Judge Jose S. Vallo, id. at 35-39.
6 Rollo, pp. 40-55.
7 Id. at 56-61.
8 Id. at 86-98.
9 Id. at 92-93.
10 Id. at 94.
11 Id. at 96.
12 Philippine Veterans Bank v. Monillas, G.R. No. 167098, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 251. (Citations
omitted.)
13 Jones v. Hortigüela, 64 Phil. 179, 183 (1937).
14 In re Szatraw, 81 Phil. 461 (1948).
15 Id. at 462-463. (Emphasis supplied.)
16 98 Phil. 574 (1956).

17 107 Phil. 381 (1960).
18 Id. at 386.
19 In re Szatraw, supra note 14.
20 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 5th ed., p. 738.

SUPREME COURT 
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,  

vs. 
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T.
ALMELOR, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise
involves a true intertwining of personalities.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition
for annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Piñas,
Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on
January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne,
born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on
July 4, 1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician,
respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their
marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they
worked as medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got
along well with other people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was
the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida
described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's
unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a
couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for
his mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making were
incomprehensible to Leonida.8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first
aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught
him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller.9 She also found
several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession.10 Her worse fears were confirmed when
she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she
confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal
abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children.12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del
Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on
Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina
Corrinne (the eldest child).13 She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.14 Such
incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He,
however, maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment
filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry. It
began when he refused to heed the memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The
memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary
hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as
Manuel's clinic and residence.17 In other words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in the
same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them. At
most, he only imposed the necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to return
the love and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially
apt now that his mother is in her twilight years.18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this
otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and possessive nature.19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends. He
wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories
about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his
possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.20
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually
stayed at Manuel's house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the
generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had
some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to what Leonida
described in her testimony.21
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed
another man. He denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date,22 he and Manuel went
straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except their driver.23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert
witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following
disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects under the
law null and void from the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of defendant's
share thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with
visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of
Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila City to cause the registration of the
said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It
ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the allegations in the
complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is
more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero sexual
marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special
contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has
trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in
relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the biological
fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a
normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual
shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.25
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for
annulment of judgment with the CA.26
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it
had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of
his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court
AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in
Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.27
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for
annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower Court.
But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an
ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an
ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise thereof.
"Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule
refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID ON THE
GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF
THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice
and in the Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode
shall be dismissed.30This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and
mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all
rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies
are available or no longer available through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v. Court of
Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they
should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that while the Rules are
liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for
perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have
sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has
given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have
denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of
equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing
appeals.35 It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to consider
his petition before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court for
annulling his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is
faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated
to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled
Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during
the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without back wages. On appeal,
Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of the
Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner
is filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court.38 (Underscoring
supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of
appeal.39 The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x
appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review."40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the Administrative
Circular. The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a
minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals
should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the parties
concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application of the rules
would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified
in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.41(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy
by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the
interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of
discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The
Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the
strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.
43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present
petition and treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at
stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court
reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a
statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every
party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a
review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice.46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to
appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the
denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She
also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked to the
detriment of Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has
recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of
due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty and
property; or (3) where the interest of justice so require.47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross
negligence of petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to
suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be allowed
to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act
performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his
client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which
resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in
court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice
and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not
be made to suffer for the lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to
parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers,
which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in court.49(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the
demands of justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the
sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of one's action.50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance System v.
Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to
prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a particular case from
the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per
se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest,
he fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the supporting
grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went further
by citing Republic v. Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or
beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in
the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in
Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt
acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove that the perceived
homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and Leonida
on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned
out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is fire.
Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with
certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from the totality of
the marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own close
friends doubtedhis true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December
2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard but
defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all his denials.
Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after that. There may have been more
important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be effected by these
people and so, putting more premiums on defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him.
Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of
initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain - even during his
marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got thicker,
reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and
their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even small details
in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing what
clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these admissions of
defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had extra fondness of his
male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was
allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes
likewise allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex
identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the name of the
game in this case; but the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not
enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward
infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and family as a whole.57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual
and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public
perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance
of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as
a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud,58 such as concealment of homosexuality.59 Nowhere in the
said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of
his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife.60 It is the concealment of homosexuality,
and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment
presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties.
An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has
enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among
those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations62 of the Committees on the
Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds for legal
separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of "concealment,"
while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the
ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the marriage.
Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage" at the
end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.63
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves
as a valid ground to annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one
that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that
questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the
exclusive sexual bond between the spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which would make
the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to discharge the duties of
a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things, they would
cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health.67
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are
significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged
incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in
our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven (11)
years, which produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on
Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found
in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant
resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the
instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or
violence compelled him to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely
consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable
and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as
to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he
was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of
self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter
was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an
outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee.
xxx
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or
undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of
these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account
petitioner's homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its
existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.70 The State and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by fabricated evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or
conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing
such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal
partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property
regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and
Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children. Considering
that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the
property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES 
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ  MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO 

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA  

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO 
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1See Separate Opinion of Justice Romero in Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, February
13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
2Rollo, pp. 22-42. Dated July 31, 2007. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, with Associate
Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring.
3 Id. at 46.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 26.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 47.
14Id. x x x defendant x x x suffer(s) from Narcissistic Personality Disorder of lack of empathy or

unresponsiveness to the needs and feelings of his spouse and children, sense of entitlements or
expectations of automatic compliance, manipulative and deceit stance, grandiose sense of self-
importance, the strong need to seek approval and recognition and to prove his self-worth with Anti-social
Features of irritability, verbal and physical aggression and lack of genuine remorse. Rigidly pervasive and
egosyntonic in nature and hence no effective psychiatric therapeutic modality could satisfactorily remedy
his unremitting psychology, defendant's psychological incapacity has its antecedence as early as before
his marriage. x x x
15 Id. at 48. Dated October 27, 1998.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 47. Dated November 1, 2002.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 51-52.
25 Id. at 49.
26Id. at 22. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93817. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, with
Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring.
27 Id. at 41.
28 Id. at 36-37.
29 Id. at 10.
30 Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 (1994).
31 Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112547, July 18, 1994, 234 SCRA 192.
32 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 47, Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. Coverage. - This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
petitioner.
33 G.R. No. 142021, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 563.

34 Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, id. at 568.
35 Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44050, July 16, 1985, 137 SCRA 570.
36Gerales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85909, February 9, 1993, 218 SCRA 638; Teodoro v. Carague,
G.R. No. 96004, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 429; Cabutin v. Amacio, G.R. No. 55228, February 28,
1989, 170 SCRA 750; American Express International, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
L-70766, November 9, 1988, 167 SCRA 209; Fonseca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-36035, August 30,
1988, 165 SCRA 40; Calasiao Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 50633, August 17, 1981, 106 SCRA 630; A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35560,
October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 590; Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43511, July 28, 1976, 72
SCRA 120; Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 (1910).
37 G.R. No. 123561, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 610.
38 Nerves v. Civil Service Commission, id. at 613.
39 Id. at 613-614.
40 Id. at 614.
41 Id. at 615.
42 G.R. No. 138777, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 659.
43 Tan v. Dumarpa, id. at 665.
44 G.R. 142920, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 459.
45 Salazar v. Court of Appeals, id. at 471.
Sarraga, Sr. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 143783, December 9, 2002, 393
46
SCRA 566.
47 Id. at 574.
48 G.R. No. 133750, November 29, 1999, 319 SCRA 456.
49 Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id. at 465.
50 Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114282, November 28, 1995, 250 SCRA 371.
51 G.R. No. 137448, January 31, 2002, 375 SCRA 431.
52 G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 140.

53 Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc., supra note 51, at 445.
54 Supra note 1.
55 Rollo, p. 49.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 49-50.
58 Family Code, Art. 45(3).
59 Id., Art. 46(4).
60 Rollo, pp. 49-51.
61Article 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the
preceding Article:
1) Non-disclosure of previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other
than her husband;
3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time
of the marriage.
62Minutes of the 154th Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees held on September 6, 1986,
9:00 a.m. at the Conference Room, First Floor, Bacobo Hall, U.P. Law Complex, Diliman, Quezon City.
63 Id. at 12.
64 Id.
65 78 ALR 2d 807.
66 38 So. 337 (1905).
67 Crutcher v. Crutcher, id. at 337.
68 G.R. No. 132955, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 565.

69 Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, id. at 569-570.
70 Philippine Constitution (1987), Art. II, Sec. 12 provides:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. x x x
Art. XV, Secs. 1-2 provides:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.
71 Tolentino v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-23264, March 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 1.
72Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,  

vs. 
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision2 dated January 12,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a)
dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering
him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998
Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13,
1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for
annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who
was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with
her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on
August 29, 1988.4
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month
after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private
respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which
ended in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees
and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant
petition for review based on the following assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT

GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN
OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE
PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER
AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE
ALLOWED BY LAW.7
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent; and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the
instant case, are generally binding on this Court.8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or
violence compelled him to do so, thus –
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced consent
which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17,
1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step
to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s
allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment
thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for
bigamy which was then already pending against him. Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the
criminal case was admittedly decided ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the
very outcome of the present case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy
case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of
annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in
this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely
consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable
and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone
calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the
University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a
supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee
and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as
to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he
was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at
that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very
least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed
made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security
personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And
neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter
was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an
outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee.
His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the
appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel
where "the sexual act was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to undermining
the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on August 29, 1989, a
year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as there is no
controversy regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of the
cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988,
matching the date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve
the appellee and throw overboard her entire testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact
date of the death of the fetus, especially when she herself had presented documentary evidence that put
August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.
Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence continues in his
argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in December 1987,
then she could not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial,
because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether the appellee’s impression
that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus
on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellant’s admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in
January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot
complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him to the
appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant identified the
seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted
by the appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man
under duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied
authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit them because he was
threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the admission,
where did he find the temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation
can only be motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters
against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to
the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to
annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can
terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it
arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of
parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify
his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be
upheld.9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code
provides that attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the
circumstances, as in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis. There
is nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral damages. In
justifying the award, the Court of Appeals merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by the appellant
as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x10
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of private
respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to
moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering,
mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial.
Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness stand and should have testified on the mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to
sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear
and convincing proof. No other person could have proven such damages except the respondent himself
as they were extremely personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary
damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that
he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question
of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed
upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered,
nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the
liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary
damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages.12 In the
instant case, private respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is
not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing
petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However,
the award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 31-37. Penned by then Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now Associate Justice of this
Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Conchita Carpio Morales (now also an Associate Justice of
this Court) and Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos.
2 Id. at 58-61. Penned by Judge Floro P. Alejo.
3 Id. at 39.
4 RTC records, pp. 1-3.
5 Id. at 8-10.
6 Rollo, p. 61.
7 Id. at 10.
8 Valdez v. Reyes, G.R. No. 152251, August 17, 2006.
9 Rollo, pp. 33-36.
10 Id. at 36.
11 G.R. No. 152753, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 118, 121.
12 Id. at 122.
SUPREME COURT 
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  

vs. 
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29,
2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25,
2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee
Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo
of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with
any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore,
null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a
motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007,
the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of
both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right
over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the
testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after
the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never
again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never
processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for
want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give
their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further
explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is,
for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE

CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST,
HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to
be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly
entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to
the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of
marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The
parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage
was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of
lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the
purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of
their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.
14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the principal
test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a
sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This
standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA),
which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining
the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must
be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not
purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages
in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country,
the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The
Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent
permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they
do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception
to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without
subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of
representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as
soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They
must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as
merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid
marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham
marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC
went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their
consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a
marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American
citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under
Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation,
and undue influence.24Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable
of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their
act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that
the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to
enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void
ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There
is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for
any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There
was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for
a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with
law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on
the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm
of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy
allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live
apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered
into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and
title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,31are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes,
It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham
or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and
subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the
wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall
constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole
purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore,
under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham
marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare
such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have
availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be
allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial
institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get
herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be
entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA 

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. 

Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION**
CASTRO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
PRESBITER J. VELASCO, JR. 

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO 

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen per Special Order
No. 1570 dated October 14. 2013.
** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad. Per Special Order No.
1554dated September 19, 2013.
1 Rollo. pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez. Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justice Ramon M. Bato. Jr. and Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino of the Fifth Division. Manila.
2 Id. at 38-39.
3 Id. at 37.
4 Id. at 33-35.
5 Id. at 38-39.
6 Id. at 39.
7 Id. at 48-49.
8 Id. at 13.
9 Id. at 61-71.
10 Id. at 89-95.
11 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?

abstract_id=2000956. Lutwak v. United States , 344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S. 1953).

abstract_id=2000956; citing Schibi v. Schibi , 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where
parties married only to give a name to a prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop , 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct.
1970); Erickson v. Erickson , 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding similarly to Schibi ); Delfino
v.Delfino , 35 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (denying annulment where purpose of marriage was to protect
the girl’s name and there was an understanding that the parties would not live together as man and wife);
Bove v. Pinciotti , 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942); Campbell v. Moore , 189 S.E.2d 497 (S.C.1939) (refusing an
annulment where parties entered marriage for the purpose of legitimizing a child); Chander v. Chander ,
No.2937-98-4, 1999 WL 1129721 (Va. Ct. App. June 22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife married
husband to get his pension with no intention to consummate marriage because husband knew that was
the purpose of the marriage).
13 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625 (2007);http://
www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), § 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G) (2000).
14 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage ; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625 (2007);http://
www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing 132 CONG.REC.
27,012, 27,015 (1986) (statement of Rep Mc Collum) (promoting the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986).
15 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.
17 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
18 United States v. Rubenstein , 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
19 Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff’d , 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).
abstract_id=2000956; citing Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff’d, 440F.
2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).
21 Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).
22 Lynn D. Wardle and Laurence C. Nolan, Family Law in the USA, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law
International, 2011) p. 86.
23 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?

abstract_id=2000956.
24 Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, (Quezon City, Philippines: Joer
Printing Services, 2005), p. 4.
25 Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, (Quezon City, Philippines: Rex Printing
Company, Inc., 2010), Fifth Edition, p. 121.
26 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, (Manila,
Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231.
27 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, (Manila,
Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231; citing McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J. 225.
28 Article 4, Family Code.
29 Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing McGuire v. McGuire ,
59 N.W.2d 336, 337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
31 Article 4, Family Code.
32 Const. ( 1987), Article XV, Section 2.

SUPREME COURT 
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner,  

vs. 
REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated 24 May 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica
Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,2 docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by petitioner before the RTC on 22
August 2002. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000
by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latter’s residence. After their wedding, petitioner and
respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents.
Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s
abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for
Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working
in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call
respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for
Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines.
Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did
not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent
proceeded to his parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila,
who claimed that he was not aware of respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his
arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus,
petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her,
providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between
petitioner and respondent.
Per the Sheriff’s Return3 dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a copy of petitioner’s
Complaint, was served upon respondent on 30 September 2002.4
On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion5 to direct the public prosecutor to
conduct an investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.
As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November 2002 an Order6 directing the
public prosecutor to conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to
submit a report thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that evidence was not
fabricated or suppressed.
On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her Report
manifesting that she had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in January
2003, but respondent never participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that no
collusion took place between the parties, and measures were taken to prevent suppression of evidence
between them. She then recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine whether
petitioner’s Complaint was meritorious or not.
Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.
On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical
psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.
Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in her Complaint. Cabacungan
corroborated petitioner’s testimony.
Petitioner’s third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of petitioner and
respondent:
After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner is found to be free from any
underlying personality aberration neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits, which may
possibly impede her normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned arrived to
(sic) a firm opinion that the sudden breakdown of marital life between petitioner and respondent was
clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder that the respondent is harboring, making him
psychologically incapacitated to properly assume and comply [with] essential roles (sic) of obligations as
a married man.
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a disorder
clinically classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long
lasting in proportion and incurable by any treatment.
People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive pattern of
grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early
adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:
1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and talents, expect to be

recognized as superior without commensurate achievements)
2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love
3. believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or should associate
with, other special or high status people (institutions)
4. requires excessive admiration
5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or

automatic compliance with his or her expectations
6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends
7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others
8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her
9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.
The root cause of respondent’s personality disorder can be attributed to his early childhood years with
predisposing psychosocial factors that influence[d] his development. It was recounted that respondent is
the first child of his mother’s second family. Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation composed his
immediate environment in his growing up years. Respondent had undergone a severe longing for
attention from his father who had been unfaithful to them and had died early in life, that he was left alone
to fend for the family needs. More so that they were coping against poverty, his caregivers failed to
validate his needs, wishes or responses and overlooked the love and attention he yearned which led to
develop a pathological need for self-object to help him maintain a cohesive sense of self-such so great
that everything other people offer is "consumed." Hence, he is unable to develop relationship with other
(sic) beyond this need. There is no capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence as it already

existed long before he entered into marriage. Since it already started early in life, it is deeply engrained
within his system and becomes a[n] integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such to be
permanent and incurable.7
Tayag concluded in the end that:
As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the fact that it has long been (sic) ceased to
exist and have their different life priorities. Reconciliation between them is regarded to be (sic). The
essential obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual
help and support, and commitment, did not and will no lon[g]er exist between them. With due
consideration of the above-mentioned findings, the undersigned recommends, the declaration of nullity of
marriage between petitioner and respondent.8
On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa
(Lagrosa), who replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to the admission of
petitioner’s evidence and manifested that she would no longer present evidence for the State.
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioner’s Complaint for annulment of her
marriage to respondent, holding in substance that:
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not communicating with petitioner and
not living with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic)
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
"defects" were already present at the inception of their marriage or that these are incurable.
That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED.9
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 but it was denied by the RTC in an Order11 dated 19 August
2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a
Decision12dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove respondent’s
psychological incapacity. Other than petitioner’s bare allegations, no other evidence was presented to
prove respondent’s personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,13 the appellate court ruled that the
evidence should be able to establish that at least one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that said person could not have known the marital obligations to be assumed; or knowing the
marital obligations, could not have validly assumed the same. At most, respondent’s abandonment of
petitioner could be a ground for legal separation under Article 5 of the Family Code.1avvphi1
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution14 dated 28
August 2008.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.15
At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the RTC was for
annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.16 Incapacity to consummate denotes
the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.
17 Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused
by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness
and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by
psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result of making the spouse
physically incapable of performing the marriage act.18
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically
incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-
examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent
left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondent’s part, then, there is no
ground for annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Petitioner’s Complaint was, therefore, rightfully
dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence presented
by petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was
actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latter’s
psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsel’s mistake
or gross ignorance.19 But even said reason cannot save petitioner’s Complaint from dismissal. It is settled
in this jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of
procedural technique.20 Although this rule is not a hard and fast one and admits of exceptions, such as
where the mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the violation of his
client’s substantive rights,21 petitioner failed to convince us that such exceptional circumstances exist
herein.
Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based
on Article 36 of the Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the
evidence presented by petitioner during the trial.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.23
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,24 to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged
in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we

scrutinized the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was not enough to
sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s testimonies, merely established that respondent
left petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the
Philippines a year and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all
since leaving for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into respondent’s
psychological state.
Tayag’s psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioner’s cause. It must be
noted that Tayag was not able to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear for
examination despite Tayag’s invitation.25 Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to
rely on information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and
thorough in her evaluation of respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of information,
namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.
Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
traceable to the latter’s experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for
the said conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" that showed that
respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain how such a
personality disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a
husband. We emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent suffers
from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders him "truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage."26 Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations.
In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into petitioner’s marital
life and, as a result, we perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming
strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much
as possible from his wife.
To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological
illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut
the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not
available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation – a
relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties; or where one of
them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was
celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a
marriage.271avvphi1
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos28]:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. x x x.
Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
in no wise constitute psychological incapacity.29
As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads abandonment by
and sexual infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion30 dated 21 August 2007 filed before us,
petitioner claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the same barangay
as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-in with another woman named "Sally."
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
the Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.31
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition
of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.32 Presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.33 In the case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that
respondent’s failure to communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with
petitioner after returning to the country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from
knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
We are not downplaying petitioner’s frustration and misery in finding herself shackled, so to speak, to a
marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.34
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint in Civil
Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO 
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING 
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal de Leon with Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Mariano C.
del Castillo (now a member of this Court) concurring; rollo, pp. 18-24.
2 Records, pp. 3-5.
3 Id. at 10.
4 Id. at 75
5 Id. at 12.
6 Id. at 13.
7 Rollo, pp. 67-68.
8 Records, p. 69.
9 Id. at 80.
10 Id. at 91-95.
11 Id. at 96.
12 Rollo, p. 24.
13 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
14 Rollo, p. 27.
15 Id. at 6.
16 Alicia V. Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 58.
17 Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law (2004 Edition,) p. 278.
18 Id. at 279.
19 Rollo, p. 8.
20 Tan Hang v. Paredes, 241 Phil. 740 (1988).
21 Heirs of Pael and Destura v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 222, 244-245 (2000).
22 310 Phil. 21, 30 (1995).
23 Id.; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).
24 Supra note 13 at 676-678.
25 TSN, 21 January 2004, p. 6
26 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22.
27 Renato Reyes So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, 5 June 2009.
28 Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 23 at 851.
29 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13.
30 Rollo, pp. 41-43.
31 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919, 931-932
(1999); Dedel v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 226, 233-232 (2004).
32 Carating-Siayngco v Siayngco, 484 Phil. 396, 412 (2004).
33 Id.
34 Dedel v. Court of Appeals, supra note 31.

SUPREME COURT 
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996
EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner,  

vs. 
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondents.
PUNO, J.:p
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioner's appeal from an order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
This case arose from the following facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149,
Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In
her complaint, private respondent alleged that she and petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and from
this union, begot two children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was already psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward and
resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that in one of their fights, petitioner inflicted physical
injuries on private respondent which impelled her to file a criminal case for physical injuries against him;
that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a one-year
suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer, and in 1984, he left
the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in succession, one of whom he presented to the
public as his wife; that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to the family and
even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children compelling private respondent to accept donations
and dole-outs from her family and friends; that petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and abused his
administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets and incurring large
obligations with banks, credit card companies and other financial institutions, without private respondent's
consent; that attempts at reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioner's refusal to
reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent prayed for powers of
administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.1
Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As affirmative defense, he claimed that he and
private respondent were a normal married couple during the first ten years of their marriage and actually
begot two children during this period; that it was only in 1982 that they began to have serious personal
differences when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity due him as a husband but treated him
like a persona non grata; that due to the "extreme animosities " between them, he temporarily left the
conjugal home for a "cooling-off period" in 1984; that it is private respondent who had been taking
prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another man; that petitioner's work as owner and operator
of a radio and television station exposed him to malicious gossip linking him to various women in media
and the entertainment world; and that since 1984, he experienced financial reverses in his business and
was compelled, with the knowledge of his wife, to dispose of some of the conjugal shares in exclusive golf
and country clubs. Petitioner petitioned the court to allow him to return to the conjugal home and continue
his administration of the conjugal partnership.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private respondent presented four
witnesses, namely, herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a Canon Law expert and marriage counselor of both private
respondent and petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close friend of the spouses, and Atty. Jose F. Racela IV,
private respondent's counsel. Private respondent likewise submitted documentary evidence consisting of
newspaper articles of her husband's relationship with other women, his apprehension by the authorities
for illegal possession of drugs; and copies of a prior a church annulment decree.2 The parties' marriage
was clerically annulled by the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimonial which was affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986.3
During presentation of private respondent's evidence, petitioner, on April 18, 1990, filed his Opposition to
private respondent's petition for appointment as administratrix of the conjugal partnership of gains.
After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception of petitioner's evidence
on May 11, 1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing , a counsel for petitioner moved for a
postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to return on the
first week of June.4 The court granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990.5
On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court declared
petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on
the basis of the evidence presented.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private respondent's marriage
to petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private respondent. The court ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage contracted by Ma. Victoria L. Tuason and Emilio R.
Tuason on June 3, 1972 is declared null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on
the part of the defendant under Sec. 36 of the Family Code. Let herein judgment of annulment be
recorded in the registry of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where the marriage was contracted and in the
registry of Makati, Metro Manila where the marriage is annulled.
The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and the defendant is hereby awarded to the
plaintiff.
The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of the other effects of annulment as
provided for under Arts . 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the Philippines.6
Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal was taken from the
decision.
On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a "Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of
Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties."7 Petitioner opposed the motion on October
17, 1990.8
Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed with the trial court a
petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision.
The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991.9
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court denying his petition for relief
from judgment. On July 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the
trial court. 10
Hence this petition.
The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstances of
the case.
We rule in the negative.
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides:
Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding thereof. — When a
judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a Court of First Instance
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on
the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert
facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. 11 If the petition
is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had
been granted therein. 12
In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private respondent had already become
final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Petitioner however
claims that the decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of his right to due process. He
contends he was denied due process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial
court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of
the evidence for private respondent. Petitioner justifies his absence at the hearings on the ground that he
was then "confined for medical and/or rehabilitation reason." 13 In his affidavit of merit before the trial
court, he attached a certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of the Narcotics Command, Drug
Rehabilitation Center which states that on March 27, 1990 petitioner was admitted for treatment of drug
dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila of
the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police. 14 The records, however, show that the former
counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of this confinement. And when the court rendered its
decision, the same counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became final and
executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. 15
The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal
therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client
and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right
to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. 16
Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of petitioner's
confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings.
Petitioner has not given any reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform
the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case deemed submitted for decision on the basis
of the evidence presented by the private respondent alone. To compound the negligence of petitioner's
counsel, the order of the trial court was never assailed via a motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may have lost his right to
present evidence but he was not denied his day in court. As the record show, petitioner, through counsel,
actively participated in the proceedings below. He filed his answer to the petition, cross-examined private
respondent's witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private respondent's motion for dissolution
of the conjugal partnership of gains. 17
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exception cases where
there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available or adequate
remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or
appeal from an adverse decision of the trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he
was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking
such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. 18 Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who
seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost
thru inexcusable negligence. 19
Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code which
provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should
intervene for the state because the law "looks with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of annulment
of marriages by default." He contends that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial
court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason
for his non-appearance. 20
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. 21
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of
collusion. 22 Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any
collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the
defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead,
should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties.23 The
prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.24 Our
Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. 25Our family
law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is
vitally interested. The state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break
up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone
of the family members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code.
For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his
answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively
participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of
private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds
barred contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings
is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are
convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the
contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses, particularly Dr. Samuel Wiley
and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biased, incredible and hearsay. Petitioner alleges that if he were able to present
his evidence, he could have testified that he was not psychologically incapacitated at the time of the
marriage as indicated by the fact that during their first ten years, he and private respondent lived together
with their children as one normal and happy family, that he continued supporting his family even after he
left the conjugal dwelling and that his work as owner and operator of a radio and television corporation
places him in the public eye and makes him a good subject for malicious gossip linking him with various
women. These facts, according to petitioner, should disprove the ground for annulment of his marriage to
petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioner's
psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us. 26 Petitioner has not
sufficiently shown that the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private
respondent's witnesses vis-a-vis petitioner's defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous. 27
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirmed.
Regalado, Romero and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Amended Complaint, Records, pp. 22-30.

3 Exhibits "O," and "P;" Records, pp. 113-118.
4 Records, pp. 126-127.
5 Id., p. 128.
6 Id., pp. 132-133.
7 Id., pp. 136-139.
8 Id., pp. 143-145. Despite petitioner's opposition, the court, on September 9, 1991, granted said motion
and declared the establishment between husband and wife of the regime of complete separation of
property and adjudicated to private respondent the conjugal home and lot on which the conjugal home
stands.
9 Id., pp. 215-216.
10 CA-G.R. CV No. 37925, Rollo, pp. 33-40.
11 Mateo v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 280 [1991]; Torno v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 742 [1988].
12 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 7.
13 Petitioner's Reply to Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p.110.
14 Records, pp. 151-152.
15 Petitioner's Reply to Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 110.
16 Palanca v. American Food Mfg. Co., 24 SCRA 819 [1968]; Duran v. Pagarigan, 106 Phil. 907 [1960].
17 Court of Appeals Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 38.
18 Somoso v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 654, 660 [1989]; Ibabao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150
SCRA 76 [1987]; Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Lood, 110 SCRA 205 [1981].
19 Ibabao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra., at 86; Manila Electric Co. v. Court of Appeals, 187
SCRA 201 [1990].
20 Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 15.

21 Taken from Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which were also taken from Article
85 of the Old Civil Code.
22 Dean Francisco Capistrano, member of the Civil Code Commission, cited in I Francisco, Revised
Rules of Court in the Philippines 1026 [1973].
23 Rule 18, Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. — If the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
24 San Gabriel v. San Gabriel, (CA) 56 O.G. 3555, Nov. 27, 1959.
25 Sec. 12, Article II.
26 cf. Periquet, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 238 SCRA 697, 710 [1994].
27 Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Aruego, 102 SCRA 530 [1981]; Bank of the Philippine Islands v. de
Coster, 47 Phil. 594 [1925].
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,  

vs. 
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
59550 which dismissed the petitioner’s petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to
annul the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No.
NC-662 nullifying the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the
resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.
This case arose from the following facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. They had eight children during their coverture, whose names and dates of births are as follows:
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA – born October 6, 1959
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. – born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA – born May 18, 1962
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA – born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA – born October 29, 1965
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA – born March 6, 1967
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA – born November 19, 19703
On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their
children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 40, against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial
separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. The case was docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, the petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM
Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila.4
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement5 where some of the conjugal properties
were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite)
located at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation
under TCT No. 310882, together with the resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building,
pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements. All of the shares of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods
Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3) to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12)
each.6
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, the
respondent vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and improvements
thereon. The petitioner, with the knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662.
Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at No.
72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, "where she may
be served with summons."7 The clerk of court issued summons to the petitioner at the address stated in
the petition.8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service on June 6,
1995 on the petitioner’s son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite.9
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to the court stating that
the summons and a copy of the petition were served on the petitioner through her son Venancio Mariano
B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:
RETURN OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and its annexes was received
by the herein defendant thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the signature appearing
on the summons. Service was made on June 6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.

(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR. 
Sheriff10
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte
Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. During the
hearing on the said date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for
the State and offered no objection to the motion of the respondent who appeared with counsel. The trial
court granted the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce
evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7,
1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab
initio.11 The clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996.12
On February 14, 1998, Valentine’s Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights
before the municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite.13
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of Appeals
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite in
Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner
alleged, inter alia, that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear in his
petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF
Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, when in truth and in fact, the respondent knew very well that
she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the petitioner, the
respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a
favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the respondent caused
the service of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her married son, Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the respondent was a resident.
Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons.
Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void
(1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the
respondent. She further contended that there was no factual basis for the trial court’s finding that she was
suffering from psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that she learned of the Order of the
RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of the petitioner
and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.
The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render Judgment granting the
Petition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic,
Cavite).
2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner
a. ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b. ₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. ₱200,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for every hearing;
d. ₱100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
e. Costs of suit.14
On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the following ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of any clear and specific
averment by petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Neither is there any averment
or allegation that the present petition is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it was
not availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion for new trial, or petition for relief.15
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution, appending thereto an amended
petition in which she alleged, inter alia, that:
4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period after discovery of the extrinsic
fraud.
6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have been availed of in a motion for
new trial or petition for relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies were no
longer available through no fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said remedies. This
petition is the only available remedy to her.16
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the respondent’s
marriage was null and void for the court a quo’s failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to
appear for the State.
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that the CA erred as follows:
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought to be annulled.
2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.
3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioner’s Motion to Admit the Amended Petition; and in not
admitting the Amended Petition.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality.17
An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to annul a
judgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic
fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent,
namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.18 The petitioner must allege in the petition that the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court are no longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the
petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from judgment through her own fault or
negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she cannot resort to the remedy under Rule
47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.19
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available through no fault of
her own. The petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The safeguard
was incorporated in the rule precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy.20 Access to the courts is guaranteed.
But there must be limits thereto. Once a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of
a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to sue anew. The prevailing party
should not be vexed by subsequent suits.21
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, and petition for relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own. She merely alleged
therein that she received the assailed order of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioner’s
amended petition did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition, because although she admitted
therein that she did not avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment, she
did not explain why she failed to do so.
We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and denying
admission of the amended petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take note
from the material allegations of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also
on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the copy of the
complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not served on her. While the original petition and amended
petition did not state a cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner, notwithstanding the
absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or appeal are
no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over
the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of
new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available
through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC
without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or
by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless
barred by laches.23
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the material
averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court
over the person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a
copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint were served on her son, Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give her the said summons and complaint.
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its annexes will show that it
is, prima facie meritorious; hence, it should have been given due course by the Court of Appeals.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over
the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority
or by service of summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him
that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard
as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a valid waiver
renders the judgment of the court null and void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the
person of the defendant even if he knows of the case against him unless he is validly served with
summons.26
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy thereof to him in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her.27 However, if there is impossibility
of prompt service of the summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service
of the summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the said
Rules:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.— If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies of defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.28
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of service should be strictly followed in order
that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is only when a defendant
cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating the
efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that such
effort failed.30 This statement should be made in the proof of service to be accomplished and filed in court
by the sheriff. This is necessary because substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of
service. It has been held that substituted service of summons is a method extraordinary in character;
hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances categorized by statutes.31
As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes thereof, the summons
in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the same day, the summons was served on
and received by Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III,33 the petitioner’s son. When the return of summons was
submitted to the court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no statement was made on the impossibility of
locating the defendant therein within a reasonable time, or that any effort was made by the sheriff to
locate the defendant. There was no mention therein that Venancio Mariano Ancheta III was residing at
No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, where the petitioner (defendant
therein) was allegedly residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III had been residing at
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed him the summons and the complaint and
was made to affix his signature on the face of the summons; he was not furnished with a copy of the said
summons and complaint.
4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I have been
residing on the adjoining land consisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as his share of the
conjugal partnership. Since then, I have been residing therein up to the present.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated on my father’s lot), my father
came to see me and then asked me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my father) and the Sheriff did
not allow me to read. Apparently, these papers are for the Summons to my mother in the case for
annulment of marriage filed by my father against her. I was not given any copy of the Summons and/or
copy of the complaint/petition.34
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition of the petitioner
and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final order of the trial court.
However, we cannot but express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown by the records.
The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted
the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutor condoned the acts of
the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith
received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a
whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor
are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment.35
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now
Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.— If the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.38
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,40regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State.41 The trial court, abetted by the ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public
prosecutor, waylaid the Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of this Court.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.42
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion.
Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion
between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-
spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting
attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation
of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the
State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern
of the family members alone.43Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay
together must not depend on the whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers
psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated July 13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby SET ASIDE and
REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur. 

Puno, J., (Chairman), on leave.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (Chairman)
and B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz, concurring.
2 Penned by Judge Enrique M. Almario.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 26-27.
4 Id. at 26.
5 Rollo, pp. 95-102.
6 CA Rollo, pp. 4-5.
7 Id. at 49.
8 Id. at 53.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 54.
11 Id. at 57-59.
12 Id. at 212.
13 Id. at 213.
14 Id. at 21.
15 Id. at 101.
16 Id. at 109.
17 Rollo, p. 36.
18 Rule 47, Section 1.
19 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 352 SCRA 235 (2001).
20 Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. III, 1997 ed., p. 549.
21 Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, 115 SCRA 117 (1982).

22 Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 635 (1989).
23 SEC. 3. Period for filing action.—If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four (4)
years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
24 211 SCRA 879 (1992).
25 Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 339 SCRA 243 (2000).
26 United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, 368 SCRA 464 (2001).
27 Rule 14, Section 6, Rules of Court.
28 Supra.
29 326 SCRA 278 (2000).
30 Keister v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209 (1977).
31 Ibid.
32 CA Rollo, p. 53.
33 Ibid.
34 Id. at 55-56.
35 Supra.
36 Supra.
37 268 SCRA 198 (1997).
38 Id. at 213.
39 355 SCRA 285 (2001).
40 Supra.
41 The procedure has been modified by the Supreme Court in Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC
which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Sec. 8. Answer.—(1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from service of summons, or
within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by publication. The
answer must be verified by the respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.
(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in default.
(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court shall order the public
prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.—(1) Within one month after receipt of the court order
mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court
stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The
parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a
copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and, if convinced that the parties are in
collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall
be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
42 See note 39.
43 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).

SUPREME COURT 
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 172198 June 16, 2009
MA. LOURDES C. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,  

vs. 
CRISPINO DE CASTRO, JR., OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR FOR MANILA, and THE OFFICE
OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
81856, dated April 4, 2006, which found no grave abuse of discretion in the Orders dated August 20, 2003
and December 12, 2003, issued by Acting Judge Marvic Balisi-Umali of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila in Civil Case No. 96-79135 for the declaration of nullity of marriage.
First, the facts:
Petitioner Ma. Lourdes C. De Castro and private respondent Crispino De Castro, Jr. were married on
January 1, 1971. In 1996, private respondent filed a petition2 for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
before the RTC of Manila.
In his petition, private respondent alleged that he was impulsive and reckless in his youth; that while still
in school, he impregnated petitioner, and they got married so as not to expose both their families to
further embarrassment; that their quarrels intensified during the marriage; that due to immaturity and
inability to cope with their problems, he abandoned his family many times and became involved in affairs
with different women. He further alleged that they tried to save their marriage through counseling, but to
no avail. In 1992, he left the family home for good, and lived with another woman with whom he had three
illegitimate children.
For failure of petitioner to file her Answer to the petition and upon motion of private respondent, the case
was set for hearing and private respondent testified. Further, he presented psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia
Albaran, as an expert witness. He then rested his case, with no opposition from the public prosecutor.
On June 22, 1998, the RTC annulled the marriage between petitioner and private respondent, viz.:
After a thorough review of the evidence adduced and the testimonies of petitioner [herein private
respondent] and Dra. Cecilia Albaran, the Court finds and so holds that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated to enter into marriage. The Court, therefore, is convinced that from the evidence presented,
there appears sufficient basis to declare that herein parties are psychologically incapacitated to enter into
marriage, which, under the provisions of the Family Code, is a valid ground for the annulment of
marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Decision is hereby rendered declaring the marriage entered into by
the parties herein on January 1, 1971 at Santuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City null and
void and of no legal effect.
The Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City is hereby directed to cancel from the Registry of Marriages
the marriage contract entered into by the parties herein on January 1, 1971 at Mandaluyong City.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City for proper
annotation and recording, as required by law; the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the National Census
and Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.3
On August 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave4 to file an Omnibus Motion5 seeking a new trial or
reconsideration of the June 22, 1998 Decision. She alleged that she was misled and prevented from
participating in the annulment case by private respondent, because of his promise of continuous
adequate support for the children, and the transfer of title to their three children of their family home,
including its lot, located in Blue Ridge Subdivision, Libis, Quezon City and another piece of real property
in Tagaytay.
The trial court granted the omnibus motion in an Order dated December 11, 1998. In the Order, petitioner
was required to submit a question-and-answer form affidavit which would constitute her direct testimony.
Further, the cross-examination of petitioner and her witnesses was scheduled on February 4, 1999.
On December 27, 1999, petitioner filed her Answer. She controverted the allegations of private
respondent. She alleged that they were both psychologically and emotionally prepared for marriage; that,
except for a few slightly turbulent months in 1981, their life as a married couple was smooth and blissful
and remained so for twenty years, or until 1990; that they were well adapted to each other, and their
quarrels were few and far between; that the communication lines between them were always open and
they were able to settle their differences through discussion; that private respondent was a devoted and
faithful husband, and did not abandon them repeatedly; and that petitioner knew of only one extramarital
affair of private respondent.
The trial court conducted hearings on petitioner's (1) application for support pendente lite and (2) urgent
motion for judicial deposit of petitioner's [herein private respondent's] separation benefits,6 in light of his
retirement/separation from employment at Petron Corporation, effective August 31, 2000; and private
respondent's (3) motion for judicial approval of the alleged voluntary agreement on the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains and partition of the conjugal properties.7 The first has been resolved,8 but
the second and third remain pending.
On July 17, 2002, petitioner was to present her first witness. The trial court reset the hearing to August 21,
2002 as there was no return of the notice sent to private respondent and his counsel.9
On August 21, 2002, petitioner started her direct testimony. However, considering the length of her
testimony, the continuance of her direct examination was set on October 2, 2002.
On September 30, 2002, private respondent moved to reset the October 2, 2002 hearing to November
13, 2002, due to his trip to Europe.10
On November 8, 2002, private respondent again moved to reset the November 13, 2002 hearing to
December 11, 2002 or at the earliest possible date as the calendar of the trial court would allow, for the
reason that his counsel was "out of the country for important personal reasons and cannot attend the
hearing."11
During the hearing on December 11, 2002, petitioner's counsel moved for its cancellation because of the
absence of petitioner who was at that time attending a very urgent business meeting in connection with
her volunteer work for Bantay Bata. The hearing was reset to February 6, 2003.12 However, the records
reveal that no hearing was conducted on said date.
On the next hearing of February 20, 2003, petitioner's counsel again moved for the resetting of the
hearing to March 27, 2003.13
On March 27, 2003, the hearing was reset to April 10, 2003 because the Presiding Judge was on official
leave.14
On April 10, 2003, the hearing was again reset to May 8, 2003, by agreement of the parties.15
On May 8, 2003, the hearing was likewise reset to July 25, 2003 because of the absence of counsel of
both petitioner and private respondent.16
During the hearing on July 25, 2003, petitioner's counsel moved to reset the hearing because of the
absence of petitioner who was then in the U.S. helping her daughter in taking care of her newborn baby.
The trial court then ordered the resetting of the hearing to August 20, 2003 for the last time, viz.:
As prayed for by respondent's counsel for the cancellation of today's hearing as according to her the
respondent is out of the country, over the vehement objection of petitioner's counsel, the hearing today is
cancelled and reset for the last time to August 20, 2003 at 9:30 o'clock (sic) in the morning.
In the event the respondent cannot present any evidence on the next scheduled hearing, on proper
motion the case shall be submitted for decision.
It appears that the presentation of respondent's evidence had been reset twice at the instance of
defendant's counsel, the respondent is hereby directed to pay a postponement fee of Php100.00 and to
show proof of compliance.
Both counsels are notified in open Court.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open Court this 25th day of July 2003 in the City of Manila, Philippines.17
In the hearing on August 20, 2003, counsel for petitioner again requested that it be cancelled and reset
due to the unavailability of witnesses. Petitioner was still in the U.S. taking care of her newborn
grandchild, while Dr. Maria Cynthia Ramos-Leynes, who conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner,
was likewise out of the country, attending a convention. The motion was denied by the trial court, viz.:
In its Order of July 25, 2003, respondent was given today her last chance to present her evidence, with
the warning that if no evidence is presented today, then the case shall be submitted for decision.
In today's hearing, respondent failed to present any evidence. As ordered and on motion of petitioner's
counsel, the Court deems the respondent to have waived her right to present further evidence. In view
thereof, she is hereby given fifteen (15) days from today within which to make an offer of her exhibits,
copy of which she shall furnish the petitioner's counsel, who is hereby given the same period of time from
receipt thereof within which to make his comments thereon. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
Court's resolution on respondent's offer of exhibits, parties are directed to file their respective
Memorandum of Authorities.
Thereafter, this case which is of 1996 vintage shall be submitted for the decision once again.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open Court, this 20th day of August, 2003 in Manila.18
Petitioner moved to reconsider the August 20, 2003 Order. She claimed that her reasons for her absence
during the hearings were justifiable and she had no intention to delay the proceedings of this case.
Further, she argued that there were pending incidents yet to be resolved by the trial court, referring to her
motion for judicial deposit of private respondent's separation benefits and private respondent’s motion for
judicial approval of the alleged voluntary agreement on the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
and partition of the conjugal properties.19
This motion was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2003, which states:
This resolves respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration on the August 20, 2003 Order directing her to
submit her formal offer of exhibits after the Court deemed her to have waived her right to present further
evidence for her failure to appear on the hearing which was previously set on said date by her counsel.
The record of the case reveals that respondent commenced the presentation of her evidence on August
21, 2002. The subsequent settings were all cancelled on motion of respondent’s counsel for one reason
or another.
On July 25, 2003, the hearing was again cancelled on motion of respondent’s counsel and was reset for
the last time to August 20, 2003 with the warning that if the respondent still fails to present evidence, the
case shall be submitted for decision. On August 20, 2003, respondent failed to adduce her evidence.
The respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration deserves a DENIAL.
It is more than apparent that the respondent was given all opportunity to adduce her evidence but she
failed to do so. The Court had stretched its leniency to the limit but it is apparent the respondent is merely
trifling with the Court’s precious time.
Wherefore, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. Respondent is given ten (10)
days from notice to file her offer of exhibits.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, December 12, 2003.20
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals,
seeking to annul the Orders dated August 20, 2003 and December 12, 2003, for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion. Upon motion of petitioner, the trial court held in abeyance its Order to file the
formal offer of exhibits, pending resolution by the Court of Appeals of the petition for certiorari.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled:
. . . A reading of the assailed Orders reveals that public respondent’s denial of petitioner’s motion for
cancellation and resetting of the hearing for continuance of her testimony was for cause. We take notice
of the several postponements of the hearings on the continuation of petitioner’s testimony, mostly on
account of petitioner’s own urgings. Particularly, we find remarkably militating against petitioner’s cause
the Order dated 25 July 2003 where public respondent, maybe exasperated at petitioner’s seemingly
shallow interest to proceed with the case as manifested in the prior motions to cancel the hearing,
dutifully warned that another postponement of the scheduled presentation of testimony would compel the
court to consider the case submitted for decision. We see this as a reasonable exercise of discretion on
the part of public respondent. Petitioner was properly apprised and warned of the consequence of
another non-appearance in the hearing. Petitioner insists that her inability to be present on the scheduled
hearing on August 20, 2003 was due to physical impossibility to appear as she was out of the country on
that day. We find the excuse flimsy. Aware in advance that she could not make it on the 20 August 2003
hearing, the least that she could have done was to instruct her counsel to make a timely representation
with the court by filing an early motion-manifestation for the resetting of the hearing. Between July 25,
2003 and August 20, 2003 she had sufficient time to file one. Had the counsel not waited for the August
20, 2003 hearing to make the motion, petitioner may have elicited a kinder action from public respondent.
xxx
The Orders being assailed are interlocutory that will lead to a rendering of a judgment in the case by
public respondent. Should such judgment be adverse to petitioner as she assumes it would be, she is not
completely rendered helpless and without remedy as there will always be the remedy of appeal where
facts and issues raised in the instant petition such as errors of law and errors of facts will still be
ventilated and passed upon.
Certiorari is not available as a remedy against an interlocutory order except when such interlocutory order
is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford an adequate and expeditious relief. We
do not find the assailed Orders patently erroneous and in case of an eventual unfavorable judgment, the
remedy of appeal is an adequate relief always available to petitioner. Hence, certiorari, in the case at bar,
will not lie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.21
Hence, this petition where petitioner invokes the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT JUDGE UMALI DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING HIS ORDERS DATED 20 AUGUST 2003 AND 12 DECEMBER
2003.22
Petitioner argues that the lower courts erred in ruling that she waived her right to present further evidence
when she failed to appear at the August 20, 2003 hearing. She contends that in effect, she was declared
in default, which is violative of the state policy on marriage as a social institution and the due process
clause of the Constitution.
We disagree.
The instant case was set for hearing twelve times, or on the following dates:
1. July 17, 2002
2. August 21, 2002
3. October 2, 2002
4. November 13, 2002
5. December 11, 2002
6. February 6, 2003
7. February 20, 2003
8. March 27, 2003
9. April 10, 2003
10. May 8, 2003
11. July 25, 2003

12. August 20, 2003
The hearing of March 27, 2003 was cancelled because the presiding judge was on official leave, while the
April 10, 2003 hearing was reset by agreement of the parties. Likewise, the hearing of May 8, 2003 was
reset because the counsels of both parties were absent.
On the other hand, the following postponements were made at the instance of private respondent: (1)
October 2, 2002 hearing, where private respondent, on September 30, 2002, moved to reset the hearing
because of his trip to Europe; and (2) November 13, 2002 hearing, where private respondent, on
November 8, 2002, moved to reset the hearing because his counsel was out of the country for important
personal reasons.
In contrast, the following postponements were made at the instance of petitioner: (1) December 11, 2002
hearing, where petitioner's counsel, on the day itself, moved for the cancellation of the hearing because of
the absence of his client who was at that time attending a very urgent business meeting in connection
with her volunteer work for Bantay Bata; (2) February 20, 2003 hearing, where petitioner's counsel, on the
day itself, moved for the resetting of the hearing; (3) July 25, 2003 hearing, where petitioner's counsel, on
the day itself, moved to reset the hearing because his client was in the U.S. taking care of her newborn
grandchild; and (4) August 20, 2003 hearing, where petitioner's counsel, again only on the day itself,
moved to cancel the hearing because his client was still in the U.S. Further, Dr. Ramos-Leynes,
petitioner's witness who conducted a psychiatric evaluation on her, was likewise out of the country.
We take note of the fact that all motions for postponement by petitioner were made on the scheduled
hearing dates themselves. On the August 20, 2003 hearing, despite previous warning that no further
postponement would be allowed, petitioner still failed to appear. We agree with the Court of Appeals when
it pointed out that petitioner obviously knew in advance that she could not make it to the August 20, 2003
hearing. As of the last scheduled hearing of July 25, 2003, she was still out of the country. The least that
petitioner could have done was to instruct her counsel to make a timely representation with the trial court
by filing an early motion-manifestation for the resetting of the hearing. Between July 25, 2003 and August
20, 2003 she had sufficient time to file one. Obviously, the warning by the court of the consequence of
another non-appearance in the hearing fell on deaf ears. After having been granted numerous motions for
postponement, petitioner cannot now claim that she was denied due process. In Ortigas, Jr. v.
Lufthansa German Airlines,23 we ruled that:
Where a party seeks postponement of the hearing of this case for reasons caused by his own
inofficiousness, lack of resourcefulness and diligence if not total indifference to his own interests or to the
interests of those he represents, thereby resulting in his failure to present his own evidence, the court
would not extend to him its mantle of protection. If it was he who created the situation that brought about
the resulting adverse consequences, he cannot plead for his day in court nor claim that he was so denied
of it.
Further in Hap Hong Hardware Co. v. Philippine Company,24 we sustained the trial court's denial of a
motion for postponement on the ground that the defendant's witnesses, officers of the company, could not
come because it was the beginning of the milling season in the municipality of San Jose, Mindoro
Occidental and their presence in the Central was necessary. We held that the reason adduced was "not
unavoidable and one that could not have been foreseen." We ratiocinated:
The reason adduced in support of the motion for postponement is not unavoidable and one that could not
have been foreseen. Defendant ought to have known long before the date of trial that the milling season
would start when the trial of the case would be held. The motion should have been presented long in
advance of the hearing, so that the court could have taken steps to postpone the trial without
inconvenience to the adverse party. As it is, however, the motion was presented on the day of the trial.
Knowing as it should have known that postponements lie in the court's discretion and there being no
apparent reason why the defendant could not have presented the motion earlier, thus avoiding
inconvenience to the adverse party, the appellant can not claim that the trial court erred in denying
postponement. Under all the circumstances we hold that the court was perfectly justified in denying the
motion for postponement.
In the case at bar, petitioner's excuse — that she was still in the U.S. taking care of her newborn
grandchild, while her witness, Dr. Maria Cynthia Ramos-Leynes, who conducted a psychiatric evaluation
on her, was likewise out of the country, attending a convention — was unjustified. These reasons were
"not unavoidable and one that could not have been foreseen." The date of the trial was set one month
prior, and as of July 25, 2003, petitioner was in the U.S. Certainly, petitioner would know in advance if she
could make it to the August 20, 2003 hearing. Likewise, attending a convention is a scheduled event, also
something known in advance. It is the basic duty of a litigant to move for postponement before the day of
the hearing, so that the court could order its resetting and timely inform the adverse party of the new date.
This was not the case at bar for the subject motion was presented only on the day of the trial without any
justification. We thus hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for
postponement.
Consequently, we cannot strike down the trial court’s following orders: (1) dated August 20, 2003, which
denied petitioner’s motion for postponement, and, instead, directed petitioner to submit her formal offer of
exhibits after the trial court considered her to have waived her right to present further evidence; and (2)
dated December 12, 2003, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. These orders are not
violative of the state policy on marriage as a social institution, for the trial judge has the duty to resolve
judicial disputes without unreasonable delay.
Petitioner contends that because her direct examination has not been completed and as she has not
been cross-examined, her testimony has become useless. Apparently, petitioner is alluding to the rule that
oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly
cross-examined by the adverse party; until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of
the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the
evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case.25 The rule will not apply to the instant case.
Private respondent, who was present in court during the August 20, 2003 hearing and did not register any
objection to the trial court's order nor move to strike out petitioner's testimony from the records, is deemed
to have waived his right to cross-examine petitioner. Thus, petitioner's testimony is not rendered
worthless. The waiver will not expunge the testimony of petitioner off the records. The trial court will still
weigh the evidence presented by petitioner vis-à-vis that of private respondent's. The situation is not akin
to default at all, where, for failure of defendant to file his responsive pleading and after evidence for the
plaintiff has been received ex parte, the court renders a judgment by default on the basis of such
evidence.1avvphi1
Lastly, the appellate court correctly pointed out that the assailed Orders are interlocutory and there is yet
no judgment in the case by the court a quo. If the trial court renders a judgment that is adverse to
petitioner, she can always avail of the remedy of appeal to protect her legal rights.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
81856, dated April 4, 2006, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO 
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN 
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO 
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 36-47.
2 Annex "B," rollo, pp. 48-52.
3 Rollo, p. 57.
4 Annex "D," rollo, pp. 58-59.
5 Rollo, pp. 60-69.
6 Annex "H," rollo, pp. 89-96.
7 Annex "I," rollo, pp. 97-103.
8 Annex "G," rollo, p. 88.
9 Annex "L," rollo, p. 119.
10 Annex "M," rollo, p. 120.
11 Annex "N," rollo, pp. 122-123.
12 Annex "O," rollo, p. 124.
13 Annex "P," rollo, p. 125.
14 Annex "Q," rollo, p. 126.
15 Annex "R," rollo, p. 127.
16 Annex "S," rollo, p. 128.
17 Annex "T," rollo, p. 129.
18 Annex "U," rollo, p. 130.
19 Annex "V," rollo, pp. 131-137.

20 Annex "W," rollo, pp. 138-139.
21 CA rollo, pp. 223-226.
22 Rollo, p. 24.
23 G.R. No. L-28773, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 610.
24 G.R. No. L-16773, May 23, 1961, 2 SCRA 68, cited in id.
25 Bachrach Motor Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-26136, October 30, 1978, 86 SCRA 27,
citing Ortigas, Jr. v Lufthansa German Airlines, supra note 23 at 636-637.
SUPREME COURT 
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-49542 September 12, 1980
ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner,  

vs. 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH MEJIAS, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 54618-R
which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX dismissing the action for
recognition and support filed by respondent Elizabeth Mejias against petitioner Antonio Macadangdang,
and which found minor Rolando to be the illegitimate son of petitioner who was ordered to give a monthly
support of P350.00 until his alleged son reaches the age of majority (p. 47, rec.; p. 10, ROA).
The records show that respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin
Anahaw (pp. 61-62, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972; pp. 10-11, Brief for Respondent [P. 198, rec.]) She allegedly
had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967 (p. 38, t.s.n., June 7,
1972 in CC No. 109). She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967 (p.
63, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she
gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December
24,1967 (Annex "A", List of Exhibits).
The records also disclose that on April 25, 1972, respondent (then plaintiff) filed a complaint for
recognition and support against petitioner (then defendant) with the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch IX. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 263 (p. 1, ROA).
Defendant (now petitioner) Macadangdang filed his answer on June 30, 1972, opposing plaintiff's claim
and praying for its dismissal (p. 3, ROA).
On August 9, 1972, the lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing certain
stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed (pp. 4, 5, and 6, ROA).
Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff on October
17, 1972 (pp. 7,8 and 9, ROA).
In its decision rendered on February 27, 1973, the lower court dismissed the complaint,. The decision
invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities (pp. 10-18, ROA).
On April 18, 1973, plaintiff appealed the CFI decision to the Court of Appeals (p. 59, In her appeal,
appellant assigned these errors:
1. The Honorable Trial Court erred in applying in the instant case the provisions of Arts. 255 and 256 of
the Civil Code and Secs. 4[a], 4[b] and 4[c], Rule 131, of the Revised Rules of Court (p. 18, rec.);
2. The Honorable Trial Court erred in holding that plaintiff-appellant cannot validly question the legitimacy
of her son, Rolando Macadangdang, by a collateral attack without joining her legal husband as a party in
the instant case (p. 18, rec.).
In its decision handed down on June 2, 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision (p.
47, and thus declared minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang (p. 52, rec.).
On November 6, 1978, the Court of Appeals denied appellant's motions for reconsideration for lack of
merit. (p. 56, rec.).
Hence, petitioner filed this petition on January 12, 1979.
The issues boil down to:
1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses
Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; and
2. Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her
husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.
The crucial point that should be emphasized and should be straightened out from the very beginning is
the fact that respondent's initial illicit affair with petitioner occurred sometime in March, 1967 and that by
reason thereof, she and her husband separated. This fact surfaced from the testimony of respondent
herself in the hearing of September 21, 1972 when this case was still in the lower court. The pertinent
portions of her testimony are thus quoted:
By Atty. Fernandez:
Q — What did you feel as a result of the incident where Antonio Macadangdang used pill and took
advantage of your womanhood?
A — I felt worried, mentally shocked and humiliated.

Q — If these feelings: worries, mental shock and humiliation, if estimated in monetary figures, how much
win be the amount?
A — Ten thousand pesos, sir.
Q — And because of the incidental what happened to your with Crispin Anahaw.
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A — We separate, sir. (pp. 61-63, T.s.n., Civil Case No. 263, Sept. 21, 1972; emphasis supplied).
From the foregoing line of questions and answers, it can be gleaned that respondent's answers were
given with spontaneity and with a clear understanding of the questions posed. There cannot be any other
meaning or interpretation of the word "incident" other than that of the initial contact between petitioner and
respondent. Even a layman would understand the clear sense of the question posed before respondent
and her categorical and spontaneous answer which does not leave any room for interpretation. It must be
noted that the very question of her counsel conveys the assumption of an existing between respondent
and her husband.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that respondent and her husband were separated in 1965 cannot
therefore be considered conclusive and binding on this Court. It is based solely on the testimony of
respondent which is self-serving. Nothing in the records shows that her statement was confirmed or
corroborated by another witness and the same cannot be treated as borne out by the record or that which
is based on substantial evidence. It is not even confirmed by her own husband, who was not impleaded.
In the case of Tolentino vs. De Jesus (L-32797, 56 SCRA 167 [1974], this Court restated that the findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings
are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on
record [Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation vs. Yap, L-36232, December 19, 1974; Roque vs.
Buan, L-22459, 21 SCRA 642 (1967); Ramos vs. Pepsi-cola Bottling Company of the Philippines,
L-225533, 19 SCRA 289 (1967); emphasis supplied].
Again, in Roque vs. Buan, supra, this Court reiterated the aforestated doctrine adding four more
exceptions to the general rule. This case invoked the same ruling in the previous case of Ramos vs.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company, etc., supra.
In the recent case of Francisca Alsua-Betts, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-46430-31, July 30, 1979),
which petitioner aptly invokes, this Court thus emphasized:
... But what should not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike is the more basic principle that the
"findings of fact" described as "final" or "conclusive" are those borne out by the record or those which are
based upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid down by the Supreme Court does not declare the
absolute correctness of all the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. There are exceptions to the
general rule, where we have reviewed the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals ... (emphasis supplied).
The following provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court should be borne in mind:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to
be legitimate.
Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in such a way that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was
no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in article 255, the child
is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child
is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal
case.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy —
(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before
three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed
legitimate.
Against presumption no evidence be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
[1] By the impotence of the husband
[2] By the fact that the husband and the wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not
possible;
[3] By the serious illness of the husband;
(b) The child shall be presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy
or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
(c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no
physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth above, the child is presumed
legitimate, unless it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband.
For the purpose of the rule, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case. ... (Rule 131, Rules
of Court).
Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be immaterial to the resolution of the
status of the child Rolando. What should really matter is the fact that during the initial one hundred twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the renamed child, no concrete or even substantial
proof was presented to establish physical impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse.
From her very revealing testimony, respondent declared that she was bringing two sacks of rice to Samal
for her children; that her four children by her husband in her mother's house in the said town; that her
alleged estranged husband also lived in her mother's place (p. 73, pp. 21 & 22, 64 & 65, t.s.n., Sept. 21,
1972). It should also be noted that even during her affair with petitioner and right after her delivery,
respondent went to her mother's house in Samal for treatment. Thus, in the direct examination of
Patrocinia Avila (the boy's yaya), the following came out:
Q — Why were you taking care of the child Rolando, where was Elizabeth Mejias?
A — Because Elizabeth went to her parents in Same Davao del Norte for treatment because she had a
relapse (p. 13, t.s.n., of Sept. 21, 1972).
From the foregoing and since respondent and her husband continued to live in the same province, the
fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other. As has already been pointed
out, respondent's self-serving statements were never corroborated nor confirmed by any other evidence,
more particularly that of her husband.
The baby boy subject of this controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7) months after
March, 1967 when the "incident" or first illicit intercourse between respondent and petitioner took place,
and also, seven months from their separation (if there really was a separation). It must be noted that as of
March, 1967, respondent and Crispin Anahaw had already four children; hence, they had been married
years before such date (t.s.n., pp. 21-22, Sept. 21, 1972). The birth of Rolando came more than one
hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the
alleged separation between aforenamed spouses.
Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the
legitimate son of respondent and her husband.
The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial sexual contact between
petitioner and respondent is another proof that the said child was not of petitioner since, from indications,
he came out as a normal full-term baby.
It must be stressed that the child under question has no birth certificate of Baptism (attached in the List of
Exhibits) which was prepared in the absence of the alleged father [petitioner]. Note again that he was
born on October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967, the time difference is clearly 7
months. The baby Rolando could have been born prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent
underwent a normal nine-month pregnancy. Respondent herself and the yaya, Patrocinia Avila, declared
that the baby was born in the rented house at Carpenter Street, which birth was obvisouly normal; that he
was such a healthy baby that barely 5 days after his birth, he was already cared for by said yaya when
respondent became sick (pp. 28, 29 & 43, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972); and that when he was between 15 days
and 2 months of age, respondent left him to the care of the yaya when the former left for Samal for
treatment and returned only in February, 1968 (pp. 30-32, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). From the aforestated
facts, it can be indubitably said that the child was a full-term baby at birth, normally delivered, and raised
normally by the yaya. If it were otherwise or if he were born prematurely, he would have needed special
care like being placed in an incubator in a clinic or hospital and attended to by a physician, not just a
mere yaya. These all point to the fact that the baby who was born on October 30, 1967 or 7 months from
the first sexual encounter between petitioner and respondent was conceived as early as January, 1967.
How then could he be the child of petitioner?
In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal
certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified — but not the veracity of the states or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/
or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus vs. Novero (L-22378,
23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal administered, in conformity with the rites of the
Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations
and statements contained in the certificate that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such
declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by
proof recognized by law.
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This presumption
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the
spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is actually
quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence — the physical impossibility of
access between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the
child. This physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these:
1. Impotence of the husband;
2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and
3. Serious illness of the husband.
This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage,
particularly during the period of conception. Hence, proof of the physical impossibility of such sexual
union prevents the application of the presumption (Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code, Vol. 1, p. 513 citing Bevilaqua, Familia p. 311).
The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of the
child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such
presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the
husband must be taken to be the father of the child (Tolentino, citing Madden, Persons and Domestic
Relations, pp. 340-341).
To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must be physical impossibility of access by the
husband to the wife during the period of conception. The law expressly refers to physical impossibility.
Hence, a circumstance which makes sexual relations improbable, cannot defeat the presumption of
legitimacy; but it may be proved as a circumstance to corroborate proof of physical impossibility of access
(Tolentino, citing Bonet 352; 4 Valverde 408).
Impotence refers to the inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function (Bouvier's
Law Dictionary 514). As defined in the celebrated case of Menciano vs. San Jose (89 Phil. 63), impotency
is the physical inability to have sexual intercourse. It is not synonymous with sterility. Sterility refers to the
inability to procreate, whereas, impotence refers to the physical inability to perform the act of sexual
intercourse. In respect of the impotency of the husband of the mother of a child, to overcome the
presumption of legitimacy on conception or birth in wedlock or to show illegitimacy, it has been held or
recognized that the evidence or proof must be clear or satisfactory: clear, satisfactory and convincing,
irresistible or positive (S.C. — Tarleton vs. Thompson, 118 S.E. 421, 125 SC 182, cited in 10 C.J.S. 50).
The separation between the spouses must be such as to make sexual access impossible. This may take
place when they reside in different countries or provinces, and they have never been together during the
period of conception (Estate of Benito Marcelo, 60 Phil. 442). Or, the husband may be in prison during the
period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through corrupt violation of or allowed
by prison regulations (1 Manresa 492-500).
The illness of the husband must be of such a nature as to exclude the possibility of his having sexual
intercourse with his wife; such as, when because of a injury, he was placed in a plaster cast, and it was
inconceivable to have sexual intercourse without the most severe pain (Tolentino, citing Commissioner vs.
Hotel 256 App. Div. 352, 9 N.Y. Supp. p. 515); or the illness produced temporary or permanent impotence,
making copulation impossible (Tolentino, citing Q. Bonet 352).
Thus, in the case of Andal vs. Macaraig (89 Phil. 165), this Court ruled that just because tuberculosis is
advanced in a man does not necessarily mean that he is incapable of sexual intercourse. There are cases
where persons suffering from tuberculosis can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage of health
because then they seemed to be more inclined to sexual intercourse. The fact that the wife had illicit
intercourse with a man other than her husband during the initial period, does not preclude cohabitation
between said husband and wife.
Significantly American courts have made definite pronouncements or rulings on the issues under
consideration. The policy of the law is to confer legitimacy upon children born in wedlock when access of
the husband at the time of conception was not impossible (N.Y. Milone vs. Milone, 290 N.Y. S. 863, 160
Misc. 830) and there is the presumption that a child so born is the child of the husband and is legitimate
even though the wife was guilty of infidelity during the possible period of conception (N.Y. Dieterich vs.
Dieterich, 278 N.Y. S. 645, Misc. 714; both cited in 10 C.J.S., pp. 18,19 & 20).
So firm was this presumption originally that it cannot be rebutted unless the husband was incapable of
procreation or was absent beyond the four seas, that is, absent from the realm, during the whole period of
the wife's pregnancy (10 C.J.S. p. 20).
The presumption of legitimacy of children born during wedlock obtains, notwithstanding the husband and
wife voluntarily separate and live apart, unless the contrary is shown (Ala. Franks vs. State, 161 So. 549,
26 . App. 430) and this includes children born after the separation [10 C.J.S. pp. 23 & 24; emphasis
supplied].
It must be stressed that Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child is presumed legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress has been adopted for two solid reasons. First, in a fit of anger, or to arouse jealousy in the
husband, the wife may have made this declaration (Power vs. State, 95 N.E., 660). Second, the article is
established as a guaranty in favor of the children whose condition should not be under the mercy of the
passions of their parents. The husband whose honor if offended, that is, being aware of his wife's
adultery, may obtain from the guilty spouse by means of coercion, a confession against the legitimacy of
the child which may really be only a confession of her guilt. Or the wife, out of vengeance and spite, may
declare the as not her husband's although the statement be false. But there is another reason which is
more powerful, demanding the exclusion of proof of confession or adultery, and it is, that at the moment of
conception, it cannot be determined when a woman cohabits during the same period with two men, by
whom the child was begotten, it being possible that it be the husband himself (Manresa, Vol. I, pp.
503-504).
Hence, in general, good morals and public policy require that a mother should not be permitted to assert
the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in order to obtain some benefit for herself (N.Y. — Flint vs.
Pierce, 136 N.Y. S. 1056, cited in 10 C.J.S. 77).
The law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to suit the whims and purposes of either
parent, nor Merely upon evidence that no actual act of sexual intercourse occurred between husband and
wife at or about the time the wife became pregnant. Thus, where the husband denies having any
intercourse with his wife, the child was still presumed legitimate (Lynn vs. State, 47 Ohio App. 158,191
N.E. 100).
With respect to Article 257 aforequoted, it must be emphasized that adultery on the part of the wife, in
itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child is
that of the husband (Tolentino, citing 1 Vera 170; 4 Borja 23-24).
It has, therefore, been held that the admission of the wife's testimony on the point would be unseemly and
scandalous, not only because it reveals immoral conduct on her part, but also because of the effect it may
have on the child, who is in no fault, but who nevertheless must be the chief sufferer thereby (7 Am. Jur.
Sec. 21, pp. 641-642).
In the case of a child born or conceived in wedlock, evidence of the infidelity or adultery of the wife and
mother is not admissible to show illegitimacy, if there is no proof of the husband's impotency or non-
access to his wife (Iowa — Craven vs. Selway, 246 N.W. 821, cited in 10 C.J.S. 36).
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or
economic interest involved (Tolentino, citing Bevilaqua, Familia, p. 314).
The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock belongs only to the alleged
father, who is the husband of the mother and can be exercised only by him or his heirs, within a fixed
time, and in certain cases, and only in a direct suit brought for the purpose (La — Ducasse vs. Ducasse,
45 So. 565, 120 La. 731; Saloy's Succ. 10 So. 872, 44 La. Ann., cited in 10 C.J.S. 77; emphasis
supplied).
Thus the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain; she can only
contest the Identity of the child (La — Eloi vs. Mader, 1 Rollo. 581, 38 Am. D. 192).
Formerly, declarations of a wife that her husband was not the father of a child in wedlock were held to be
admissible in evidence; but the general rule now is that they are inadmissible to bastardize the child,
regardless of statutory provisions obviating incompetency on the ground of interest, or the fact that the
conception was antenuptial. The rule is said to be founded in decency, morality and public policy (Wallace
vs. Wallace 137 Iowa 37,114 N.W. 527,14 L.R.A. [N.S.] 544,126 Am. St. Rep. 253,15 Ann. Cas. 761, Am.
Jur. 26).
From the foregoing, particularly the testimony of respondent and her witnesses, this Court has every
reason to believe that Crispin Anahaw was not actually separated from Elizabeth Mejias; that he was a
very potent man, having had four children with his wife; that even if he and were even separately (which
the latter failed to prove anyway) and assuming, for argument's sake, that they were really separated,
there was the possibility of physical access to each other considering their proximity to each other and
considering further that respondent still visited and recuperated in her mother's house in Samal where her
spouse resided with her children. Moreover, Crispin Anahaw did not have any serious illness or any
illness whatsoever which would have rendered him incapable of having sexual act with his wife. No
substantial evidence whatsoever was brought out to negate the aforestated facts.
Crispin Anahaw served as a refuge after respondent's reckless and immoral pursuits or a "buffer" after her
flings. And she deliberately did not include nor present her husband in this case because she could not
risk her scheme. She had to be certain that such scheme to bastardize her own son for her selfish
motives would not be thwarted.
This Court finds no other recourse except to deny respondent's claim to declare her son Rolando the
illegitimate child of petitioner. From all indications, respondent has paraded herself as a woman of highly
questionable character. A married woman who, on first meeting, rides with a total stranger who is married
towards nightfall, sleeps in his house in the presence of his children, then lives with him after their initial
sexual contact — the atmosphere for which she herself provided — is patently immoral and hedonistic.
Although her husband was a very potent man, she readily indulged in an instant illicit relationship with a
married man she had never known before.
Respondent had shown total lack of or genuine concern for her child (Rolando) for, even after birth, she
left him in the care of a yaya for several months. This is not the normal instinct and behavior of a mother
who has the safety and welfare of her child foremost in her mind. The filing of this case itself shows how
she is capable of sacrificing the psycho-social future (reputation) of the child in exchange for some
monetary consideration. This is blatant shamelessness.
It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and
consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all — her
own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization of respondent's son would give
rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married
women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during such
immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of
wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.
And as between the paternity by the husband and the paternity by the paramour, all the circumstances
being equal, the law is inclined to follow the former; hence, the child is thus given the benefit of legitimacy.
Finally, Article 220 of the Civil Code reinforces the aforesaid principle when it provides thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, an presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every of law or facts
leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED JUNE 2, 1978, AND ITS
RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 6, 1978 ARE HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. COSTS
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 102126 March 12, 1993
ANGELICA LEDESMA, Petitioner, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF CIPRIANO PEDROSA

represented by Nelson Jimena, Honorable Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon in her
capacity as Presiding Judge-Designate, Branch 51, RTC, Bacolod City, Respondents.
Hector P. Teodosio of Defensor and Teodocio Law Office for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law
library
Edmundo G. Manlapao for private respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing an order dated 24 January
1991 issued by herein respondent presiding judge-designate Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon of
the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 51 which considered the supplemental
action for partition (after annulment of the marriage) as terminated due to the death of one
of the spouses (husband) and the pendency of intestate proceedings over his
estate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner Angelica Ledesma's marriage to Cipriano Pedrosa was declared a nullity by the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 51 on 8 February 1984 in Civil Case No.
1446. 1 The dispositive portion of the order annulling the marriage also provided thus:
. . . that the properties acquired by plaintiff Cipriano Pedrosa and defendant Angelica
Ledesma at the time they were living together as common-law husband and wife is (sic)
owned by them as co-owners to be governed by the provisions on co-ownership of the civil
code; that the properties acquired by plaintiff and defendant after their marriage was
solemnized on March 25, 1965, which was annulled by this Court in the above-entitled
proceeding, forms (sic) part of the conjugal partnership and upon dissolution of the
marriage, to be liquidated in accordance with the provision of the civil code. 2chanrobles
virtual law library
Surprisingly it took some time before the next order implementing the above disposition
was issued on 4 May 1989, the pertinent part of which reads:
. . . . It appearing from the records that the court has to verify and determine the correct
inventory of the properties of Cipriano Pedrosa and Angelica Ledesma, the parties, including
the receiver, through their respective attorneys, are ordered to submit their respective
inventory, if one has not been submitted yet, before June 1, 1989. . . . . 3chanrobles virtual
law library
Pending receipt by the court of the ordered inventory, Cipriano Pedrosa died. A separate
petition for the probate of his last will and testament was 
filed. 4 Nelson Jimena was named executor and substituted Pedrosa in the partition
proceedings (Civil Case No. 1446).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Due to disagreement of the parties on the characterization of the properties, the court in the
partition proceedings ordered (30 March 1990) the submission of comments, objections and
manifestations on the project of partition submitted by the parties. During a lull in the
proceedings, the presiding judge also passed away. On 24 January 1991 the following now-
questioned order was issued by the herein respondent presiding-judge designate who took
over:
It is informed by Atty. Pio Villoso that insofar as the status of this case is concerned, the
plaintiff who has long been dead, was substituted by the administrator, now the plaintiff
Nelson Jimena, and Atty. Vicente Sabornay, as the receiver. Furthermore, the judgment as
to the annulment of the marriage had already been rendered partially by then Presiding
Judge Quirino Abad Santos, Jr., on February 8, 1984. What is being litigated here by the
parties affects the property division to dissolve the partnership. However, the plaintiff died
and an intestate proceeding is now pending before Branch 43 whereby the said Nelson
Jimena was actually the appointed administrator, and who was substituted as plaintiff in this
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
With all these informations, and considering the nature of the action, the Court finds the
substitution of the original plaintiff improper, as the defendant herein can pursue her claim
over the properties before the intestate proceedings being instituted. Action for intervention
in order that the judgment in this particular proceeding can be implemented, can be raised
in the intestate Court. Likewise, the appointment of the receiver conflicts with that of the
judicial administrator considering that with the filing of the intestate case, the properties of
the deceased plaintiff are in custodia legis and this Court losses jurisdiction in determining
further the distribution of the properties.
In view of the above, without prejudice to the defendant's right to file as intervenor in the
intestate proceedings with the judgment annulling the marriage, the proceedings becomes
moot and academic with the pendency of the intestate proceeding before Branch 43. This
case is therefore deemed TERMINATED. 5chanrobles virtual law library
With the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration by the respondent court, this
special civil action was initiated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner argues that respondent judge reneged in the performance of a lawful duty when
she refrained from rendering a decision in the partition case (Civil Case No. 1446) and
considered the same closed and terminated, due to the pendency of intestate proceedings
over the deceased husband's estate (Sp. Proc. No. 4159). 6 It is likewise erroneous,
petitioner contends, to rule that petitioner's remedy is a motion for intervention in said
intestate proceedings to implement judgment in the marriage-annulment case, since
petitioner has already presented all her evidence in the annulment case to prove which
properties acquired during the marriage pertain to her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The case of Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, 7 where a similar issue was involved - the
husband having died after the legal separation of the spouses had been finally decreed but
before the actual liquidation of their community of properties - is on point. The Court therein
said:
WE do not find merit in petitioner's submission that the questioned decision had not become
final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute community of property as
among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. Article 106 of the Civil Code thus
reads:
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:chanrobles virtual
law library
1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds
shall not be severed;chanrobles virtual law library
2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall
be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the
profits earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of
Article 176;
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
The aforequoted provision mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the property regime
of the spouses upon finality of the decree of legal separation. Such dissolution and
liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. This legal effect of the decree of
legal separation ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of, the
judgment decreeing legal separation for the purpose of determining the share of each
spouse in the conjugal assets.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
. . . the decision of the trial court dated January 4, 1973 decreeing the legal separation
between then spouses Antonio Macadangdang and Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang had
long become final and executory and the division of the conjugal property in a
"supplemental decision" is a mere incident of the decree of legal
separation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Since We have ruled on the finality of the judgment decreeing the spouses' legal separation
as of January 4, 1973, the remaining issue for Our resolution is the final disposition of their
conjugal partnership of gains which partnership, by reason of the final decree, had been
automatically dissolved. The law (Article 106, 107 of the Civil Code) clearly spells out the
effects of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The death on November 30, 1979 of herein petitioner who was declared the guilty spouse
by the trial court, before the liquidation of the conjugal property is effected, poses a new
problem which can be resolved simply by the application of the rules on intestate succession
with respect to the properties of the deceased
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains under the
aforecited provisions of the Civil Code would be applied effective January 4, 1973 when the
decree of legal separation became final. Upon the liquidation and distribution conformably
with the law governing the effects of the final decree of legal separation, the law on
intestate succession should take over in the disposition of whatever remaining properties
heave been allocated to petitioner. This procedure involves details which properly pertain to
the lower court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The properties that may be allocated to the deceased petitioner by virtue of the liquidation
of the conjugal assets, shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of intestate
succession in Special Proceedings No. 134.
The Macadangdang decision involved legal separation but, with equal reason, the doctrine
enunciated therein should be applied to a marriage annulment which is the situation at bar.
The respondent presiding judge is directed to decide the partition (liquidation) case (Civil
Case No. 1446) within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of this decision to determine
which of the properties of the conjugal partnership should be adjudicated to the husband
and the wife. This is but a consequence or incident of its decision rendered in the same case
annulling the marriage. Petitioner's letters to the Court indicate that she is seventy (70)
years of age and the prolonged action for partition (liquidation) has taken a toll on her
resources. Justice and equity demand the disposition of her case with dispatch. Any
properties that may be adjudicated to the deceased husband Pedrosa can then be
distributed in accordance with his last will and testament in the special proceedings
involving his estate (Sp. Proc. No. 4159).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Judge's order dated 24 January 1991 considering Civil Case
No. 1446 closed and terminated for being moot and academic is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Judge or whoever may have succeeded her is ordered to decide said action for
partition (liquidation) within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur. 
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, p. 40.chanrobles virtual law library
2 Annex E of petition, Rollo, pp. 40-44.chanrobles virtual law library
3 Annex F, Rollo, pp. 45-46.chanrobles virtual law library
4 Sp. Proc. No. 4159, RTC of Negros Occidental, Branch 43.chanrobles virtual law library
5 Annex I, Rollo, pp. 49-50
6 It would appear that the other case Sp. Proc. No. 4159 is not an intestate but a testate
proceeding.chanrobles virtual law library
7 G.R. No. L-38287, October 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 314.

SUPREME COURT 
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,  

vs. 
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS
II, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the
effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which reversed and set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money,
and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory
heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land
Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One
(13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project),
being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5;
on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the
subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate,
L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the
NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata
River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE
THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la
parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde
el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina
E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la
parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts.
Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de
CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.3
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in
order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the
share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These
three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No.
139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo
Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent
Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877
and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as
Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial
compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the
proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-
meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land
of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land
were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided
between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994,
with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement,
which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the
parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of
marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and
damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent
Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained
that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with
respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued
in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including
the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of
petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage
license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the
illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents
prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment.
Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late
Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of
the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary
judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan,
certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent
Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v.
Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-
respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and
manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and
summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang,
Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab
initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted
child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with
the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City,
and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void,
and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo
Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and
void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor
Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive
name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor
Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30
o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial
court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of
Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof,
a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and
public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought
summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an
action "to recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply
(sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire
to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of
Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage
upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for
summary judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been
applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of
Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact,
however, that appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and
wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is
sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more
thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which
the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in
the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at
bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be
warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites
of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation
to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the
marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval,
although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the
contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is
corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the
Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962
as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number
of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason that it was
the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the
same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the veracity
and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same should be
properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not proof that a
marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license
be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular
party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo
Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's
statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of
appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's brother,
to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right
to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare allegation that
appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights
arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant
Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible
when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed
said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could
have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve
the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in
denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the
nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a
grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the
circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise
decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a
manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that
the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1,
Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing
Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that
the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings
on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws
and misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a
judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other
procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of
marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on
the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment,
instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment
on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on
summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at
bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be
warranted. x x x11
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings
and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in
annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary judgments
or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with
clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 200312 is found
in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of
evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the
spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment
on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring
supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We

excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or
for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to
intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public
prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity
to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to
appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no
suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public
prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not
fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State
during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.16
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside
of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the
other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.
17 (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving,
peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of
marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors
and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a
cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the
end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the
surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their
successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without
any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of
the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15,
2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new
Rule which became effective on March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held
in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in
controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage
took place.23
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who
may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for
the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a
license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.26
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a
mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action.27
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or
even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held
that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the
case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent
Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or
restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow
respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondent's marriage as bigamous
and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant
petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.29 (Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to
seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving
compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession,
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs
are called to succeed by operation of law.30
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo
II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children
and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.31
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative,
such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the
estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall
be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives
from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or
children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son
of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire
successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct
line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner.
Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow
pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the
subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is
contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of
Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has
no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad.
This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does not have
proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning,
still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,34 or even an
adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of
the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage
case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate,
or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in
order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action before
it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case
concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter
hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.36
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare
allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total
forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its
pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent
Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of
the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by
the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived
within a valid marriage.37
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab
initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and filiation of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval
and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo
Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of
action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case
priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES 
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA- MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO 

MARTINEZ  Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA  

Associate Justice
 
ATTESTATION
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO 
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 47-63. Dated October 15, 2002. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador,
with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurring.
2 Civil Case No. 95-135.
3 Rollo, pp. 49-51.
4 Docketed as Civil Case No. 11975, CA decision, p. 6.
5 Rollo, p. 55.
7 Id. at 63.
8 Id. at 60-63.
9 Rollo, pp. 24-25.
10 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 34, Sec. 1.
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for
legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
11 CA rollo, p. 61.
12 Sec. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
13 G.R. No. 152154, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 133, citing Family Code, Arts. 48 & 60, and Roque v.
Encarnacion, 96 Phil. 643 (1954).
14 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 143.
15 Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177, citing Malcampo-Sin v.
Sin, G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 285, 289, and Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975,
February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425, 435.
16 Id. at 187-188, citing Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508, 529,
and Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740.
17 Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 418, 429, citing
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders.
18 Id. at 427-428, citing Modequillo v. Brava, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990, 185 SCRA 766, 772. (Note in
the citation omitted.)
19 Id. at 429-430.
20 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC - Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages.
SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a
21 Supra note 17.
22 Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, id. at 428.
23 Malang v. Moson, G.R. No. 119064, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 393.
24 See Republic v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, and Tecson-Dayot v. Dayot, G.R. No. 179474, March 28,
2008; Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446.
25 Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., G.R. No. 155394, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 735, 746.
26 Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348.
27 Id. at 358, citing Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004, 442
SCRA 507, 521; Pascual v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115925, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 105, 117;
and Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals, 448 Phil. 181, 194-195 (2003); Borlongan v.
Madrideo, 380 Phil. 215, 224 (2000); Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 466, 482 (1999); Ralla v.
Ralla, G.R. No. 78646, July 23, 1991, 199 SCRA 495, 499; Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81123,
February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 800, 806; Chua v. Torres, G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005, 468 SCRA
358, citing Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127210, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 470, 475-76; citing in
turn University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No. 110280, October 21, 1993,
227 SCRA 342, 355; Ralla v. Ralla, supra; Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, supra; Shipside, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA 334, 346, in turn citing Pioneer Insurance &
Surety Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 84197 & 84157, July 18, 1989, 175 SCRA 668.
28 G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 607, citing Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 2, Rule 2, Sec.
1; Niñal v. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 122.
29 Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, id. at 614-615.
30 Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 522.
31 Paragraphs 4 & 5 are no longer controlling. The distinctions among different classes of illegitimate
children under the Civil Code have been removed. All of them fall in the category of illegitimate children,
as provided under Article 165 of the Family Code:
Article 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise
provided in this Code.
32 See Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117740, October 30, 1998, 298 SCRA 322; see
also Reyes v. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 520; Pedrosa v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 118680, March 5, 2001, 353 SCRA 620; Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998, 300 SCRA 345.
33 Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, supra.
34 Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.
35 Reyes v. Sotero, supra note 32; Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.
36 Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion, G.R. Nos. 157696-97, February 9, 2006, 482 SCRA 87, citing
Sociedad Europea de Financiacion, S.A. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75787, January 21, 1991, 193
SCRA 105, 114, citing in turn Saura Import & Export Co., Inc. v. Philippine International Co., Inc., 118 Phil.
150, 156 (1963); and Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 140 Phil. 304, 312 (1969).
37 Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 438
SUPREME COURT 
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner,  

vs. 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be determined in
this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that purpose has been dismissed by the lower
courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the action.
Antecedents
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.1 The case was docketed as Special
Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza
and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the
marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being
the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real
properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that
any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila
at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.2
Ruling of the RTC
On October 18, 2000, 3 the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to DISMISS the
petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2)
petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on
December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration on November 14, 2000.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is not a
party to the marriage.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003,4 however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not
prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party, which in
this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition was filed by
Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the marriage contracted by
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a
real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage
will not prosper if persons other than those specified in the law file the case.
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject petition.
More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said
case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV.
NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49
AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV NO.
69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek
the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
Ruling
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the
mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid
marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage
is contracted.6 As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a
subsequent amendment of the governing law.7 To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a
stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the
intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between a
stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage
remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the
marriage ceremony.8
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative
Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation
demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
under the regime of the Civil Code.9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages
covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is
prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.10
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are
excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated
under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949,
the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for
declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the
petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog,12 the children were allowed to file after the death of
their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s marriage to their stepmother
contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished
between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned,
thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns
the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the
fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of
the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is
not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted
during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is
made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground
for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.13
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a
marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited
by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.15 Thus, only the party who can
demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action.16Interest within the meaning of the rule means material
interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the
real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.17
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that
the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of
Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the
petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the
estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil
Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the
deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased’s estate.
18 Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of
whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of
whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made
by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We
reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s
surviving wife,19stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant
to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required
a marriage license for their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is made all the more
necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license
and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein:
xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.
1avvphi1 It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the action should be
dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.21
We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 entitled Heirs of
Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda
Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the property involved
therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26, 2009, and the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is
reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and
daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose
substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead
Leila.
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action, however,
considering that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in
order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be
made "on motion of any party or on (the trial court’s) own initiative at any stage of the action and on such
terms as are just."
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are returned to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with instructions to first
require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter
Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any
ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as
whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to
succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly.
No costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN 
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES  

Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION ROBERTO A. ABAD*

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. 

Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES 
Associate Justice Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
RENATO C. CORONA 
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Additional member per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
1 Rollo, pp. 24-26.
2 Id., p. 14.
3 Id., p. 22.
4 Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a Member of this Court), with Associate
Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrerro (retired) and Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino (retired)
concurring; rollo, pp. 18-21.
5 Rollo, pp. 20-21.
6 Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family Relations, 2004 ed., p. 105; citing Stewart v. Vandervort, 34 W. VA.
524, 12 SE 736, 12 LRA 50.
7 Id. p. 106.
8 Id, pp. 106-107.
9 Id.
10 Enrico vs. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614,
September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 418.
11 G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 116.

12 G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 122.
13 At pp. 135-136 (highlighting provided for emphasis).
14 Supra, note 12.
15 Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348.
16 Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 607.
17 Carlos v. Sandoval, supra, note 15; citing Abella Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574,
November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 507.
18 See Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998, 300 SCRA 345.
19 This action is entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza
and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.
20 Under the old Civil Code, not all marriages solemnized without a marriage license were void from the
beginning. Exempt from the requirement of a marriage license were marriages of exceptional character,
as provided for from Article 72 to Article 79, old Civil Code, to wit:
Article 72. In case either of the contracting parties is on the point of death or the female has her habitual
residence at a place more than fifteen kilometers distant from the municipal building and there is no
communication by railroad or by provincial or local highways between the former and the latter, the
marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license; but in such cases the official, priest,
or minister solemnizing it shall state in an affidavit made before the local civil registrar or any person
authorized by law to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or at a place
more than fifteen kilometers distant from the municipal building concerned, in which latter case he shall
give the name of the barrio where the marriage was solemnized. The person who solemnized the
marriage shall also state, in either case, that he took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and
relationship of the contracting parties and that there was in his opinion no legal impediment to the
marriage at the time that it was solemnized.
Article 73. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with a copy of the
marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the
municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days, after the performance of the marriage.
The local civil registrar shall, however, before filing the papers, require the payment into the municipal
treasury of the legal fees required in Article 65.
Article 74. A marriage in articulo mortis may also be solemnized by the captain of a ship or chief of an
airplane during a voyage, or by the commanding officer of a military unit, in the absence of a chaplain,
during war. The duties mentioned in the two preceding articles shall be complied with by the ship captain,
airplane chief or commanding officer.
Article 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of
the Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace
or mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.
Article 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age
of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Article 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity
with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion it shall no longer be necessary to
comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be
considered as a purely religious ceremony.
Article 78. Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be
performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites
shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with Article
92.
However, twenty years after approval of this Code, all marriages performed between Mohammedans or
pagans shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of this Code. But the President of the
Philippines, upon recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior, may at any time before the expiration
of said period, by proclamation, make any of said provisions applicable to the Mohammedan and non-
Christian inhabitants of any of the non-Christian provinces.
Article 79. Mixed marriages between a Christian male and a Mohammedan or pagan female shall be
governed by the general provision of this Title and not by those of the last preceding article, but mixed
marriages between a Mohammedan or pagan male and a Christian female may be performed under the
provisions of the last preceding article if so desired by the contracting parties, subject, however, in the
latter case to the provisions of the second paragraph of said article.
21 Regner v. Logarta, G.R. No. 168747, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 277, 289; citing Borlasa v. Polistico,
47 Phil. 345, 347 (1925) and People v. Hon. Rodriguez, 106 Phil. 325, 327 (1959).
22 Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is
ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a
misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. (11a)
SUPREME COURT 
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,  

vs. 
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the
December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under Rule
65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R.
SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent
final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No.
6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006,
with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S.
BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of
the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this
decision.
SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal
on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file
the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and executory
and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilo’s appeal; 2) the
November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3)
the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo
also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to
Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC.
The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only
to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time
to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court’s
Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11, 2009 Resolution,4 denied the
motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following
ISSUES
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED
DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN
ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IS

APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY
ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC
PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD "MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION OF

ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS
APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE.
HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN
RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A PRECONDITION

FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED
FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND
THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF
THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS
MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or not A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter
dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision
on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of
the Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to be declared null were
solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of both the Family Code
in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and decided after the
effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with
Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further stresses the
meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null and void
due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of the parties who were
supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as required under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1
of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only
to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the Family
Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.9 As the statute is
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba
legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and
importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her
favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with
and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules
prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely
indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By
their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.12
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is
non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The
Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court
has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not
suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under
the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course
to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of
the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to
appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the
right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system
and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather,
ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This
constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and
inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and
an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.16
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which
the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the
concern alone of the family members.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA 

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE

NACHURA CASTRO*
Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
Chairperson, Second Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
RENATO C. CORONA 
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order No. 905 dated
October 5, 2010.
1 Rollo, pp. 43-48. Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices
Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Romeo F. Barza, concurring.
2 See Rollo, p. 8; see also Annex A of petition, rollo, p. 44.
3 G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 418, 427-428.
4 Annex B of petition; rollo p. 49.
5 Rollo, pp. 12-14.
6 Id. at 329.
7 Supra note 3, citing Modequillo v. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990, 185 SCRA 766,722.
8 Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 116, 132.
9 Amores v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189600, June 29,2010, citing Twin Ace
Holdings Corporation v. Rufina and Company, G.R. No. 160191, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 368, 376.
10 Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 519, 531, citing R. Agpalo, Statutory
Construction 124 (5st ed., 2003).
11 Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009, 594 SCRA 139, 143,
citing Yutingco v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 83 (2002).
12 Id., citing Gonzales v. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1653, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA 490.
13 510 Phil. 268, 274 (2005).
14 Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil 456, 460 (1995).
15 G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 447, 460-461, citing Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 426
Phil 864, 877 (2002), citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, 414 Phil 815, 826 (2001).
16 Almelor v. Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, Br. 253, G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008, 563
SCRA 447 citing 1987 Philippine Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 12 which provides:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. x x x
Art. XV, Secs. 1-2 which provides:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.
17 Azcueta v. Republic, G.R. No. 180668, May 26, 2009, 588 SCRA 196, 205, citing Ancheta v. Ancheta,
G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740; Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil 169, 180-181
(1996).
SUPREME COURT 
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2316 October 9, 2012 

(Formerly A.M. No. 09-7-280-RTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,  

vs. 
HON. LIBERTY 0. CASTANEDA, Presiding Judge, ATTY. PAULINO I. SAGUYOD, Clerk of Court,
LOURDES E. COLLADO, Sheriff, MARYLINDA C, DOCTOR, EVELYN B. ANTONIO, ROSALIE P.
SARSAGAT and CHERYL B. ESTEBAN, Court Stenographers, GEORGE P. CLEMENTE, Clerk,
MARITONI FLORIAN C. CERVANTES, Court Interpreter, and RUBEN A. GIGANTE, Utility Worker, all
of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative matter is a consequence of the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases
conducted from September 29, 2008 to October 8, 2008 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui,
Tarlac, Branch 67, presided over by Judge Liberty O. Castañeda (Judge Castañeda). A follow-up audit
was subsequently conducted on February 1 to 4, 2011.
The Facts
The team from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reported1 that as of audit date, Branch 67 had
a caseload of 1,123, consisting of 406 criminal cases and 717 civil cases. Of the 70 cases submitted for
decision, 18 have not been decided notwithstanding the lapse of the 90-day period within which to resolve
them. Likewise, of the seven (7) criminal and three (3) civil cases with pending incidents submitted for
resolution, seven (7) have been awaiting resolution beyond the reglementary period.
However, notwithstanding her failure to decide the 18 cases and resolve the incidents in the seven (7)
cases mentioned above, Judge Castañeda certified in her Certificates of Service from January to
December 2008 that she has decided and resolved all cases and incidents within three (3) months from
the date of submission.
The audit team also reported that 164 cases have not been acted upon for a considerable length of time;
there are 14 cases with pending incidents; and no initial action has been taken in 27 cases. Apart from
these figures, the audit team likewise noted that Branch 67 had a poor case and records management,
particularly citing the absence of minutes of the court proceedings, lack of stamp receipts on the
pleadings filed before it, official receipts reflecting that filing fees were paid days after the cases had been
filed, registry receipts containing no registry numbers, and lack of proofs of receipts of court processes or
issuances. Case records were not even properly stitched together.
The audit also revealed that there were criminal cases that were ordered archived even before the
expiration of the 6-month period reckoned from the delivery of the warrant of arrest to the police
authorities, in violation of OCA Circular No. 89-20042 dated August 12, 2004. In one case, Judge
Castañeda arbitrarily reduced the bail bond of an accused from P120,000.00 to P10,000.00, and released
another on recognizance on charges of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
9165.3 Similarly, another accused, who was charged with violation of R.A. 7610,4 was released on
recognizance despite the fact that the penalty therefor is reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua.
It was also found that Atty. Paulino I. Saguyod (Atty. Saguyod), the Branch Clerk of Court, issued
commitment orders in two (2) criminal cases without written authority from Judge Castañeda, and that no
certificates of arraignment were issued in some cases.
Prompted by reports that Branch 67 is fast becoming a haven for couples who want their marriages to be
judicially declared null and void or annulled, or those who merely want to be legally separated, the audit
team gave special attention to cases for declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of marriage and
legal separation, and found that of the 717 civil cases, 522 or 72.80% involved nullity of marriage,
annulment and legal separation.
Further investigation of these cases revealed various irregularities in the proceedings, consisting of
blatant violations of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,5 or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as well as A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC,6 or the Rule on Legal
Separation.
First. Judge Castañeda allowed the petitions for nullity of marriage or annulment to prosper despite the
impropriety of venue. The audit showed that most of the parties in these petitions are not actual residents
of the places under the territorial jurisdiction of Branch 67, i.e., Paniqui, Anao, Moncada and San Miguel,
all in Tarlac. A number of the addresses reflected on the pleadings are incomplete or vague, some are
handwritten, typewritten or super-imposed on blanks, or even left completely blank. Many of the
respondents raised the issue of improper venue, which Judge Castañeda ignored. One of the
respondents, Lea Benaid, the respondent in Civil Case No. 254-P’07 (Dodgie Benaid v. Lea Borreo-
Benaid) claimed, in a letter7 dated October 8, 2008 addressed to the Chief Justice, that she and her
petitioner-husband are not residents of Tarlac but of Infanta, Quezon, and that she never received any
summons nor has she been notified of a collusion investigation by the public prosecutor. She also averred
that she never met the clinical psychologist, whose report reflected that she was purportedly suffering
from psychological incapacity. Neither was she subjected to any psychological test.
Second. In some cases, there are no proofs of payment of docket fees, while in others, summons and
other initial court processes were issued even before the docket fees were fully paid.
Third. There are cases where the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Office of the Public
Prosecutor (OPP) were not furnished copies of the petition, which under the rules must be done within
five (5) days from the date of its filing, and proof of such service must be submitted to the court within the
same period, otherwise, the petition may be outrightly dismissed. However, in those cases where it has
been established that the OSG and OPP were not served copies of the petition, Judge Castañeda did not
order the petitioners to comply.
Fourth. In several cases, the process server or sheriff merely resorted to substituted service of summons,
without strict compliance with the rule8 thereon as well as the Court's ruling in Manotoc v. Court of
Appeals 9elucidating on the requirements for effecting a valid substituted service. Nonetheless, Judge
Castañeda acted on these petitions.
Fifth. Judge Castañeda likewise granted motions for depositions and allowed the advance taking of
testimonies even without the respondent or public prosecutor being furnished copies of the motion. In
several cases, she granted the motion on the very same day, or merely a day after it was filed.
Sixth. After having been served with summons, respondents were usually no longer notified of
subsequent court orders or processes.
Seventh. In other cases, Judge Castañeda permitted the public prosecutor to conduct a collusion
investigation even before the respondent has filed an answer, or the lapse of the prescribed period of 15
days. She would proceed with the pre-trial even without proof that respondent had been duly notified, or
terminate the pre-trial for failure of respondent to file an answer and even without the prosecutor's
collusion report. Worse, eight (8) petitions were granted despite the absence of an investigation report
from the public prosecutor.
Eighth. Judge Castañeda allowed the pre-trial to proceed in several cases, notwithstanding the absence
of the petitioner, or the fact that the latter failed to authorize his/her counsel, through a duly-executed
special power of attorney (SPA), to represent him/her thereat. She also condoned the late filing of pre-trial
briefs, as in fact, there were instances when the petitioner's pre-trial brief was filed on the day of the pre-
trial conference itself.
Ninth. There are cases where the documentary evidence had been allegedly marked and formally offered,
and which Judge Castañeda admitted, but which cannot be found in the records. In several cases, the
petitioner would be allegedly cross-examined by the public prosecutor, but records are bereft of showing
to establish such proceeding.
Tenth. Most of the pyschologists' reports are pro forma and mere photocopies, and the psychologists did
not even testify in court. On the other hand, the respondent's failure to appear in court for purposes of
presenting his/her evidence is considered a waiver thereof, despite lack of due notice.
Eleventh. At the time of the audit, Judge Castañeda had granted 175 cases involving nullity or annulment
of marriage and legal separation. More particularly, the audit team observed the extraordinary speed and
overzealousness with which Judge Castañeda acted in granting some 11 cases, which were decided
between a period of a mere 16 days to four (4) months from the date of their filing.
Finally, Judge Castañeda issued certificates of finality of decisions notwithstanding the lack of proof that
the parties, counsels, the OSG and the OPP had been duly furnished with copies of the decisions.
Acting upon the report of the audit team, the Court, in its Resolution10 dated November 23, 2009,
resolved, inter alia, to:
(a) preventively suspend Judge Castañeda from office immediately upon receipt of notice, and direct her
to explain, within 60 days from notice, why she should not be administratively dealt with for her numerous
infractions above-enumerated, and to comment on the letter of Lea Benaid dated October 8, 2008, the
respondent in Civil Case No. 254-P’07 (Dodgie Benaid v. Lea Benaid);
(b) direct Atty. Saguyod, the Clerk of Court of Branch 67, to:
(1) explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for issuing commitment orders without Judge
Castañeda's written authority in two (2) criminal cases; failing to issue certificates of arraignment in
several cases; failing to furnish respondents copies of notice of pre-trial in some cases; allowing the
issuance of notice of pre-trial in two (2) civil cases only two (2) days prior to the pre-trial conference;
allowing the delay in the issuance of notice of pre-trial in Civil Case No. 228-07, which respondent
received 16 days after the scheduled pre-trial; failing to furnish the respondent the court's order setting
the presentation of respondent's evidence in several cases; and issuing the certificates of finality in many
cases without the OSG having been furnished with copies of the court's decisions;
(2) explain why no initial action has been taken on several cases, to take appropriate action and to submit
a report to the Court, through the OCA, on the status of these cases;
(c) direct Process Server Angel C. Vingua (Process Server Vingua) and Sheriff Lourdes E. Collado
(Sheriff Collado), both of Branch 67, to explain within 15 days from notice why they failed to comply with
the rules on personal service of summons and the requirements to effect a valid substituted service, in
several cases;
(d) order Court Stenographers Marylinda C. Doctor (Doctor), Evelyn B. Antonio (Antonio), Rosalie P.
Sarsagat (Sarsagat) and Cheryl B. Esteban (Esteban) to attach their stenographic notes and transcripts
thereof to the case records;
(e) advise Clerk George P. Clemente (Clerk Clemente) and Court Interpreter Maritoni Florian C.
Cervantes (Court Interpreter Cervantes), personnel in charge of the criminal and civil dockets, to attach
the registry receipts and registry returns to the case records, arrange the pleadings and court orders
chronologically according to the dates of receipt or issue, cause the pagination of records and update
their respective dockets; and
(f) order Utility Worker Ruben A. Gigante (Utility Worker Gigante) to stitch all court records.
In her defense, Judge Castañeda claimed11 that when she assumed her judicial functions on March 16,
2007, the court was actually housed in a dilapidated old school building, with leaky ceilings and faulty
wiring, and that the records were in bundles and complete disarray. When her predecessor retired, she
inherited quite a number of cases, and she was taken to task with rickety typewriters, limited office
supplies, and lack of personnel. In July 2008, when the construction of a new judiciary building
commenced, the court was transferred to a 6x10 square-meter session hall in the barangay. Judge
Castañeda declared that this was the situation in which the OCA team found Branch 67 when they
conducted the audit.
More specifically, Judge Castañeda asseverated that her preventive suspension was a violation of her
human rights, as well as her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. She maintained
that the undecided and unresolved cases which Judge Alipio C. Yumul, who took over her duties during
her preventive suspension, was directed to decide included 2008 cases, which were either newly-filed,
pending trial, or submitted for decision. Defending Atty. Saguyod's issuance of commitment orders, she
insisted that it was sanctioned by the 2002 Manual for Clerks of Court, especially when the judge's
signature could not be secured.
Judge Castañeda cited inadvertence with respect to the archiving of cases without the warrants of arrest
having been returned, and claimed that the two (2) accused who allegedly have not yet been arraigned
had, in fact, already been arraigned when she was appointed as judge. She averred that she reduced the
bail bond of an accused charged with violation of RA No. 9165 from P120,000.00 to P10,000.00 because
it was recommended by Provincial Prosecutor Aladin Bermudez, and that she released on recognizance
two (2) other accused charged with violation of RA No. 7610 because they were minors, both of whom
she referred to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
With regard to her alleged failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, Judge Castañeda
insisted that she had already resolved them, thereby prompting her to declare such fact, in good faith, in
her Certificates of Service.
Finally, Judge Castañeda denied that she failed to observe the provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and
02-11-11-SC. Instead, she asseverated that, since the petitions filed before her were all verified, it was no
longer incumbent upon her to confirm the veracity of the contents thereof, including the parties'
addresses. She contended that she merely allowed the issuance of summons even before the filing fees
had been paid when no receipts were readily available to be issued. She likewise explained that it was
not the duty of the court to order the petitioner to furnish the OSG or the OPP with copies of the petition,
and that it was only upon the petitioner's failure to do so that the court arrogates unto itself the duty to
furnish the OSG a copy of the petition.
With respect to the granting of motions to take depositions without the respondent and the OPP being
furnished copies thereof, she asserted that only the OSG is required to be given a copy, not the
respondent, who only learns of the case when summons is served upon him/her. On the other hand, she
adopted the explanation offered by Sheriff Collado on the matter of resorting to substituted service and
the failure to strictly observe the requirements on validly effecting it, as mandated by the rules.
Meanwhile, Judge Castañeda blamed the clerk in-charge for allegedly forgetting to attach the court orders
requiring the public prosecutor to conduct a collusion investigation in declaration of nullity and annulment
of marriage, and legal separation cases. She defended her stance to proceed with pre-trial conferences
notwithstanding the absence of the public prosecutor's investigation report, maintaining that resetting the
pre-trial for this reason alone would unduly delay the proceedings. She also proceeded with pre-trial
despite lack of showing that respondent was duly notified thereof as the court merely presumes that he/
she received it via registered mail within a period of 30 days. With regard to the absence of the petitioners
themselves during pre-trial, or an SPA authorizing their counsels to act on their behalf, Judge Castañeda
averred that the parties may have simply forgotten to sign the minutes, or the staff failed to make them
sign for some reason. As for those cases where there were no SPAs presented, or where the petitioner
has yet to submit a pre-trial brief, she imputed the blame upon the clerk in charge, who she claimed had
forgotten to attach them to the records or who may have even misplaced or misfiled them.
Judge Castañeda likewise avowed that she always checks all documents when she renders her
decisions. Thus, even if there has been no proof that respondent was furnished with a copy of the notice
of hearing for the presentation of respondent's evidence, she nonetheless issues Orders submitting them
for decision, as to wait for the returns would unnecessarily delay case disposition. She also insisted that
the public prosecutor's investigation reports were always in the case records, and if they were not, they
might have been misplaced or accidentally removed. She also postulated that the OSG is always
furnished with copies of the decisions in all cases.
With respect to the letter12 sent by Lea Benaid, Judge Castañeda reiterated her earlier ratiocination that
the petition filed by Lea's petitionerhusband was verified, thus, the court had no duty to investigate on the
veracity of its contents. Judge Castañeda likewise pointed out that, despite having received summons,
Lea did not file any responsive pleading, nor did her counsel appear before the court to participate in the
proceedings.
For his part, Atty. Saguyod explained13 that he issued the commitment orders without Judge Castañeda's
written authority as he was empowered, under the 2002 Manual of Clerks of Court to issue
a mittimus whenever the signature of the judge could not be secured, and there was an immediate
necessity to detain an accused. He charged to mere inadvertence or oversight instances when the branch
staff failed to have the accused or counsel affix their signatures on the certificates of arraignment. With
regard to his alleged failure to furnish respondents copies of notice of pre-trial, Atty. Saguyod explained
that these notices were actually sent on time but the proofs of mailing were not immediately attached to
the records, and unfortunately, these proofs were misplaced.
Further, Atty. Saguyod averred that there was a mere typographical error on the date of one notice of pre-
trial, supposedly issued two (2) days before the pre-trial conference, which should have reflected
―February 8, 2008ǁ and not ―February 18, 2008.ǁ In a civil case where the respondent received the
notice of pre-trial only on February 22, 2008, 16 days after the scheduled pre-trial, Atty. Saguyod claimed
that the notice of pre-trial was promptly mailed to respondent on February 1, 2008. Similarly, the order
setting the hearing for the presentation of respondent's evidence was actually mailed, only that the proof
of mailing was not attached to the case records.
Finally, Atty. Saguyod echoed the defense of Judge Castañeda that the OSG had always been furnished
with copies of the court's decisions before the corresponding certificates of finality were issued.
In compliance with the Court's directive, Atty. Saguyod submitted a report14 of the initial action taken on
the cases mentioned in the Court's November 23, 2009 Resolution.
For her part, Sheriff Collado claimed15 that she served summons only in 10 cases enumerated in the
Court's November 23, 2009 Resolution, but admitted that she failed to observe the requirements to validly
effect substituted service of summons set forth in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,16 as she was allegedly not
aware thereof and because she was used to a pro forma return of service. However, she posited that it
was an honest mistake and made assurances to strictly observe the rules in future services of summons.
On the other hand, records show that Process Server Vingua died on January 1, 2009.17
On March 12, 2010, Judge Castañeda manifested18 that she will resume her duties as Presiding Judge of
Branch 67 on March 22, 2010, asseverating that since she had already acted upon the cases cited in the
Court's November 23, 2009 Resolution, and that any lapses thereon were not attributable to her but to her
staff, she has the right to be reinstated to her position. Thus, Judge Castañeda reported back to her court
on March 22, 2010 notwithstanding the lack of any action from the Court regarding her manifestation.
On February 1 to 4, 2011, a second audit was conducted in Branch 67, the results of which essentially
mirrored those of the first audit.19
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum20 dated March 22, 2011, the OCA recommended the following, inter alia:
(a) that Judge Castañeda be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations, for dishonesty, gross ignorance of
the law and procedure, gross misconduct and incompetency;
(b) that Atty. Saguyod be suspended for six (6) months and one (1) day, without salaries and other
benefits, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely,
for inefficiency and incompetency;
(c) that Sheriff Collado, Court Stenographers Doctor, Antonio, Sarsagat and Esteban, Clerk Clemente,
Court Interpreter Cervantes, and Utility Worker Gigante be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 each,
for simple neglect of duties, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely; and,
(d) that Atty. Saguyod and Clerk Clemente be ordered to explain, within fifteen (15) days from notice, why
they failed to present to the audit team, in the conduct of the second audit, the records of 241 nullity of
marriage cases decided in 2010, and why 30 decided cases involving nullity of marriage were not
reported in 2010.
In arriving at its recommendation insofar as Judge Castañeda is concerned, the OCA found that she
failed to decide cases within the reglementary period, and that her inaction or procrastination was
inexcusable. The OCA touted Judge Castañeda's explanation as unsatisfactory, especially since she
attempted to use her staff as scapegoats to evade administrative liability.
Because she failed to conduct a semi-annual inventory of her case docket, Judge Castañeda failed to see
that there were two (2) accused who were yet to be arraigned. With respect to the accused charged with
an offense involving drugs whose bailbonds she drastically reduced from P120,000.00 to P10,000.00
purportedly upon the recommendation of the public prosecutor, records are bereft of such
recommendation.
Moreover, the OCA also considered the irregularities and procedural lapses in the manner in which Judge
Castañeda handled cases for nullity, annulment of marriage and legal separation, as she completely
disregarded the basic provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and 02-11-11-SC. For these infractions, the
OCA found her guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and held her unjustifiable zeal and
readiness in granting petitions for nullity, annulment and legal separation to be so gross, patent and
deliberate that it reeks of utter bad faith. In fact, the OCA aptly took note of Judge Castañeda's alarming
and indiscriminate granting of petitions for nullity and annulment of marriage, as evidenced by the fact
that these cases would be usually submitted for decision within a month from the filing of the petition and
decided in a mere 2 months' time. In 2010 alone, Judge Castañeda granted the extremely high total
of 410 petitions of this nature. From this observation, the OCA explained that Judge Castañeda
demonstrated an utter lack of competence and integrity in performing her duties as a judge, which
amounted to grave abuse of authority.
Finally, by submitting her Certificates of Service for February and March 2010 and falsely asserting
therein that she rendered work for that period when, in fact, she served her preventive suspension from
January 13, 2010 to March 21, 2010, Judge Castañeda deliberately committed acts of dishonesty.
In fine, Judge Castañeda violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, which enjoins judges to uphold the
integrity of the judiciary, avoid impropriety or the appearance of impropriety in all activities and to perform
their duties honestly and diligently. Thus, considering the number and severity of Judge Castañeda's
infractions, the OCA indicated that the extreme penalty of dismissal may be imposed upon her.
On the other hand, the OCA found Atty. Saguyod administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of his duties, which is classified as a grave offense under the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. The judicial audits showed that Atty. Saguyod went beyond the
ministerial duties of a branch clerk of court and arrogated unto himself functions that belong to a judge by
issuing commitment orders in two criminal cases. On the other hand, he was remiss in his mandated
duties as a branch clerk of court when he accepted nonverified petitions for nullity, annulment and legal
separation as well as petitions which were not within the territorial jurisdiction of Branch 67. He
demonstrated inefficiency when he failed to: (1) issue certificates of arraignment in several criminal cases;
(2) furnish respondents copies of notice of pre-trial; and (3) furnish the respondent the Order setting the
case for presentation of the latter's evidence, as well as when he issued certificates of finality without
furnishing the respondent and/or the public prosecutor with copies of the decision.
Moreover, Atty. Saguyod miserably failed in performing his mandated duty under the Rules of Court to
oversee and exercise control and supervision over the orderly keeping of court records, papers and files.
Worse, he passed the blame to his subordinates and attributed the miserable state of their records to the
condition of their office during the first audit.
However, when the second audit was eventually conducted, the team observed no substantial
improvement in case and records management despite the fact that Branch 67 had already transferred to
a new building.
As for Sheriff Collado, the OCA held that she should endeavor to learn the rules on service of summons,
and her claim that their office uses a pro forma return of service is no excuse to absolve her from liability.
On the other hand, despite having been ordered in the Court's November 23, 2009 Resolution to attach
the stenographic notes and transcripts of stenographic notes to the case records, Court Stenographers
Doctor, Antonio, Sarsagat and Esteban still failed to do so. Similarly, Clerk Clemente failed to attach the
registry receipts and registry returns to the case records, arrange the pleadings and court issuances
chronologically, cause the pagination of records and update the court docket book. For her part, former
Clerk and currently Court Interpreter Cervantes was found to have failed to prepare the minutes of the
court proceedings and mark exhibits properly. Finally, Utility Worker Gigante still failed to stitch all court
records accordingly.
For their respective infractions, the OCA found Sheriff Collado, Court Stenographers Doctor, Antonio,
Sarsagat and Esteban, Clerk Clemente, Court Interpreter Cervantes, and Utility Worker Gigante liable for
simple neglect of duties, which is classified as a less grave offense under the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, punishable by suspension for 1 month and 1 day to 6 months
for the first offense. Instead of suspending them, however, the OCA recommended that a fine of
P5,000.00 each be imposed upon them. The OCA refused to give credence to their defense that they
cannot cope with their work because of the court's heavy caseload.
The Issue Before The Court
The sole issue before the Court is whether Judge Castañeda, Atty. Saguyod, Sheriff Collado, Court
Stenographers Doctor, Antonio, Sarsagat and Esteban, Clerk Clemente, Court Interpreter Cervantes, and
Utility Worker Gigante should be imposed the penalties as recommended by the OCA, for their various
and respective infractions in the performance of their official duties.
The Court's Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court wholly concurs with the findings and recommendations
of the OCA as enumerated above.
Judge Liberty O. Castañeda, Presiding Judge
A. On the Delay in the Disposition of Cases
"Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that judges
shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with
reasonable promptness."21 Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates trial court judges to
decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days, to wit:
(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates:
Rule 3.05 — A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods.
Thus, ―rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent
needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases, making the 90-day period within which to
decide cases mandatory."22 Corollarily, judges have always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to
the rule on speedy disposition of cases.23 Delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion
of public faith and confidence in the judicial system, as judges have the sworn duty to administer justice
without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied.24
In Judge Castañeda's case, both judicial audits conducted in the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67
revealed that there were many cases that were undecided notwithstanding the lapse of the 90-day
reglementary period within which they should be disposed, apart from those that have remained dormant
or unacted upon for a considerable amount of time. Judge Castañeda failed to decide, within the
prescribed period, 4025 cases from the first audit and 22 cases from the second audit, or a total
of 62 cases. In the absence of an extension of time within which to decide these cases, which Judge
Castañeda could have sought from the Court, her failure to assiduously perform her judicial duties is
simply inexcusable. An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period
constitutes gross inefficiency26 warranting a disciplinary sanction.27
B. On the Falsification of the Certificates of Service
A certificate of service is an instrument essential to the fulfillment by the judges of their duty to dispose of
their cases speedily as mandated by the Constitution.28 A judge who fails to decide cases within the
reglementary period but continues to collect his salaries upon his certification that he has no pending
matters to resolve transgresses the constitutional right of the people to the speedy disposition of their
cases.29
Notwithstanding her failure to dispose of cases within the prescribed period, Judge Castañeda made it
appear in her monthly Certificates of Service that she had decided or resolved cases within 90 days from
their submission. When she was preventively suspended in the Court's November 23, 2009 Resolution,
which suspension she served from January 13, 2010 to March 21, 2010, she nonetheless misrepresented
on her Certificates of Service in February and March 2010 that she rendered work for those months.
Because of such dishonest conduct, she was able to receive her salaries for the months when she was
supposedly under preventive suspension. A judge who falsifies her Certificate of Service is
administratively liable for serious misconduct and inefficiency.30
C. On Disregarding the Provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and 02-11-11-SC
"A judge should observe the usual and traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he should hear both
sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a
minimum."31 Thus, ―he must neither sacrifice for expediency’s sake the fundamental requirements of due
process nor forget that he must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek the truth, to know and aptly
apply the law, and to dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially."32
The serious infractions committed by Judge Castañeda were in cases involving petitions for nullity and
annulment of marriage and legal separation, the most disturbing and scandalous of which was the haste
with which she disposed of such cases. For the year 2010 alone, Judge Castañeda granted a total
of 410 petitions of this nature. The audits likewise showed that she acted on these petitions despite the
fact that it was not verified; that the OSG or the OPP were not furnished a copy of the petition within 5
days from its filing; that the petition did not recite the true residence of the parties, which should be within
the territorial jurisdiction of Branch 67 for at least 6 months prior to the filing of the petition; or that the
docket fees have not been fully paid and jurisdiction over the person of the respondents have not been
acquired.
The Court takes special exception to Civil Case No. 254-P’07 (Dodgie Benaid v. Lea Benaid), which
Judge Castañeda granted notwithstanding the following irregularities: (1) petitioner-husband Dodgie
Benaid appeared to be a resident of Infanta, Quezon, contrary to the information reflected on the petition
that he was a resident of Apulid, Paniqui, Tarlac; (2) respondent-wife Lea Benaid is not a resident, either,
of Goldenland Subdivision, Mabalacat, Pampanga, but of Infanta, Quezon; and (3) Lea was neither
interviewed nor investigated by the public prosecutor in arriving at the conclusion that no collusion exists
between her and her husband. In fact, records show that Dodgie Benaid, the Chief of Police of Real,
Quezon, was eventually found guilty of misconduct and dishonesty for falsely claiming in his petition for
nullity of marriage that he was a resident of Apulid, Tarlac and that his wife, Lea, was a resident of
Mabalacat, Pampanga.
The OCA has extensively elucidated on the transgressions committed by Judge Castañeda, which the
Court adopts in its entirety. For her blatant disregard of the provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and
02-11-11-SC, Judge Castañeda is thus found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Thus,
in Pesayco v. Layague, the Court held:
No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain
professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge must be acquainted
with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross
ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the
duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules
of procedure must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.33 Moreover, the reprehensible haste with which she
granted petitions for nullity and annulment of marriage and legal separation, despite noncompliance with
the appropriate rules and evident irregularities in the proceedings, displayed her utter lack of competence
and probity, and can only be considered as grave abuse of authority.
Atty. Paulino I. Saguyod, Branch Clerk of Court
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Trocino, the Court explained the functions and
responsibilities of a clerk of court, to wit:
Clerks of court perform vital functions in the prompt and sound administration of justice. Their office is the
hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes, and concerns. Clerks of court are charged not
only with the efficient recording, filing, and management of court records but also with administrative
supervision over court personnel. A clerk of court is the personnel officer of the court who exercises
general supervision over all court personnel, enforces regulations, initiates investigations of erring
employees, and recommends appropriate action to the judge. They play a vital role in the complement of
the court. 34
In the extensive results of the judicial audits conducted by the OCA, Atty. Saguyod miserably failed to
meet the standards required of an effective and competent clerk of court. He arrogated unto himself
functions which were not his, and at the same time, failed to perform duties which were incumbent upon
him to do.
Records further show that Branch 67 has been remiss in the submission of the reportorial requirements,
as evidenced by the fact that as of March 21, 2011, the latest Docket Inventory of Cases submitted by
Branch 67 is for January to June 2010, and the latest Monthly Report of Cases is for November
2010.35 Clearly, Atty. Saguyod violated Administrative Circular No. 4-2004 dated February 4, 2004, which
requires the Monthly Report of Cases to be filed with the Court on or before the 10th day of the
succeeding month, as well as Administrative Circular No. 76-2007 dated August 31, 2007 which in turn
requires all trial judges and their clerks of court to submit the docket inventory of cases not later than the
first week of February and the first week of August each year.
As aptly pointed out by the OCA, when he assumed the position of Clerk of Court of Branch 67, Atty.
Saguyod is presumed to be ready, willing, and able to perform his tasks with utmost devotion and
efficiency, failing which, he becomes administratively liable. Thus, Atty. Saguyod is administratively liable
for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties.
Sheriff Lourdes E. Collado

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court expounded on the duty of the sheriff with respect to effecting a
valid service of summons, thus:
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence,
and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice.
Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other
hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be
resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For substituted
service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally
serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure
to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were
unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or
accepted. 36(Emphasis supplied)
With Sheriff Collado's admission that she indeed failed to observe the requirements to effect a valid
substituted service of summons set forth in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals37 in the 10 cases assigned to her,
and upon her assurances to strictly observe these rules in the future, the Court therefore reminds Sheriff
Collado to endeavor to commit to memory the rules on proper service of summons.
Court Stenographers Marylinda C. Doctor, Evelyn B. Antonio, Rosalie P. Sarsagat and Cheryl B.
Esteban; Clerk George P. Clemente; Court Interpreter Maritoni Florian C. Cervantes; Utility Worker
Ruben A. Gigante
Section 17 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court provides for the functions and duties of a court stenographer,
which states in part:
SEC. 17. Stenographer. – It shall be the duty of the stenographer who has attended a session of a court
either in the morning or in the afternoon, to deliver to the clerk of court, immediately at the close of such
morning or afternoon session, all the notes he has taken, to be attached to the record of the case; and it
shall likewise be the duty of the clerk to demand that the stenographer comply with said duty. The clerk of
court shall stamp the date on which such notes are received by him. When such notes are transcribed,
the transcript shall be delivered to the clerk, duly initialed on each page thereof, to be attached to the
record of the case.1ªvvph!1
Further, Administrative Circular No. 24-9038 requires all stenographers to transcribe all stenographic notes
and to attach the transcripts to the records of the case not later than 20 days from the time the notes were
taken. Stenographers are also required to accomplish a verified monthly certification to monitor their
compliance with this directive. In the absence of such certification or for failure or refusal to submit the
certification, the stenographer’s salary shall be withheld.1âwphi1
In the Court's November 23, 2009 Resolution, issued pursuant to the results of the first audit conducted
by the OCA, Stenographers Doctor, Antonio, Sarsagat and Esteban were already directed by the Court to
attach their stenographic notes and transcripts of stenographic notes to the case records. Likewise, Clerk
Clemente, who was in charge of civil cases, was advised to attach registry receipts and registry returns to
their respective records, arrange papers chronologically, complete records pagination and update his
docket book. Similarly, Court Interpreter Cervantes was ordered to prepare the Minutes of proceedings
and mark exhibits properly, and Utility Worker Gigante was tasked to stitch all court records properly.
Unfortunately, by the time the second audit had been concluded on February 4, 2011, all of them
miserably failed to complete the respective tasks assigned to them, for which they must be held
administratively liable.
On this note, the Court takes the opportunity to remind judges, clerks of court, and other court employees
that all of them share in the same duty and obligation to ascertain that justice is dispensed promptly. In
order to realize this end, they must be able to work together and mutually assist one another. However, it
bears to stress that it is the judge who has, at the end of the day, the ultimate responsibility to ensure that
the professional competence of her staff is constantly displayed, and to take the necessary steps when
she feels that the same is not observed or begins to take a downward path. Thus, judges should
supervise their court personnel to guarantee the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at
all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.39
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds:
(a) JUDGE LIBERTY. 0. CASTANEDA guilty of dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law and procedure,
gross misconduct and incompetency and hereby DISMISSES her fro·m the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations;
(b) ATTY. PAULINO I. SAGUYOD guilty of inefficiency and incompetency and hereby SUSPENDS him for
six (6) months and one (1) day, without salaries and other benefits, with warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely;
(c) SHERIFF LOURDES E. COLLADO; COURT STENOGRAPHERS MARYLINDA C. DOCTOR,

EVELYN B. ANTONIO, ROSALIE P. SARSAGAT AND CHERYL B. ESTEBAN; CLERK GEORGE P.
CLEMENTE; COURT INTERPRETER MARITONI FLORIAN C. CERVANTES and UTILITY WORKER
RUBEN A. GIGANTE guilty .of simple neglect of duties and hereby imposes upon them a FINE in the
amount of P5,000.00 each, with wan1ing that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the records of Judge Castaneda, Atty. Saguyod, Sheriff
Collado, Stenographers Doctor, Antonio, Sarsagat and Esteban,· Clerk Clemente, Court Interpreter
Cervantes and Utility Worker Gigante on file with the Court.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO 

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE 
Associate Justice
Footnotes
* No part due to prior participation as then Court Administrator.
1 Rollo, Volume I, pp. 1-41.

2 Item I(a) of OCA Circular No. 89-2004 states that ―A criminal case may be archived only if after the
issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused remained at large for six (6) months from the delivery of the
warrant to the proper peace officer.ǁ x x x
3 Otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 effective June 7, 2002.
4 Otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act effective June 17, 1992.
5 Dated March 4, 2003.
6 Dated March 4, 2003.
8 Rules of Court, Rule 14, Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
9 G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006, 499 SCRA 21, 33.
11 Comment dated February 26, 2010, id. at 572-583; Comment dated July 13, 2010, id. at 1459-1465.
12 Supra note 7.
14 Id. at 307-311.
15 Id. at 302-303.
16 Supra note 9.
17 Rollo, Volume II, p. 1535.

20 Id. at 1490-1538.
21 OCA v. Judge Trocino, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1936, May 29, 2007, 523 SCRA 262, 271.
22 OCA v. Judge Garcia-Blanco and Atty. Mercado, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1941, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 109,
120.
23 Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City, A.M. No. 05-2-113-RTC, December
7, 2005, 476 SCRA 598, 599.
24 Re: Request of Judge Roberto S. Javellana, RTC,Br. 59, San Carlos City (Negros Occidental) for
Extension of Time to Decide Civil Cases Nos. X-98 and RTC 363, A.M. No. 01-6-314-RTC, June 19,
2003, 404 SCRA 373, 376.
26 Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 29 and 59, Toledo City, A.M. No. 97-9-
278-RTC, July 8, 1998, 292 SCRA 8, 23.
27 Tam v. Judge Regencia, MCTC, Asturias-Balamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1604, June 27, 2006, 493
SCRA 26, 42.
28 Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor, A.M. No. RTJ-90-474, October 4, 1991, 202 SCRA 435.
29 Request of Peter Ristig for Assistance Regarding the Delay in the Proceedings of Criminal Case No.
95227-R, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Henry Uy" Pending at MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City,
A.M. No. 02-5-107-MTCC, December 9, 2004, 445 SCRA 538.
30 Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 61, 134 and 147, Makati, Metro
Manila, A.M. Nos. 93-2-1001-RTC and A.M. No. P-93-944, September 5, 1995, 248 SCRA, 5, 31.
31 Dayawon v. Garfin, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1367, September 5, 2002, 388 SCRA 341, 349, citing Castillo v.
Juan, 62 SCRA 124, 127 (1975).
32 Id., citing Young v. De Guzman, 303 SCRA 254, 258 (1999).
33 A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889, December 22, 2004, 447 SCRA 450, 459, citations omitted.

37 Supra note 9.
38 Revised Rules on Transcription of Stenographic Notes and their Transmission to Appellate Courts,
dated July 12, 1990.

SUPREME COURT 
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC March 4, 2003
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND

ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
RESOLUTION
Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting
for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation not later than March 7, 2003
March 4, 2003
Davide, C.J. Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna 
Ynares-Santiago, on leave 
Corona, on official leave
RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF

VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of te Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. (n)
(b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed in the Family Court.
(c) Imprecriptibility ofaction or defense. - An Action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage shall not prescribe.
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall specially allege te complete facts
showing the either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.
Section 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriage based on
any of the grounds under article 45 of the Family Code and within the period herein indicated:
(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising substitute parental authority did
not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one unless, after attaining
the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabitated with the other as husband or wife; or the parent,
guardian or person having legal charge of the contracting party , at any time before such party has
reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative, guardian, or person
having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party; or by the insane spouse
during the a lucid interval or after regaining sanity, provided that the petitioner , after coming to reason,
has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within five years after the discovery of the
fraud, provided that said party, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, has not freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation, or undue influence, within five
years from the time the force intimidation, or undue influence disappeared or ceased, provided that the
force, intimidation, or undue influence having disappeared or ceased, said party has not thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of consummating the marriage with
the other and such incapability continues and appears to be incurable, within five years after the
celebration of marriage; and
(6) Te injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be
serious and appears to be incurable, within five years after the celebration of marriage.
(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing. Or in the
case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner.
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the
cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the regime
governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may
apply for a provisional order for spousal support, the custody and support of common children, visitation
rights, administration of community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiringurgent
action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied celebration of marriage. (b) Where to file.-The petition shall be
filed in the Family Court.
Section 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the
case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines at the election of the
petitioner.
Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts constituting the
cause of action.
(2) it shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the regime
governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may
apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of common children, visitation
rights, administration of community or conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent
action.
(3) it must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and
certification must be signed personally by me petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or
through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall
be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general,
consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
(4) it shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its
filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal
of the petition.
Section 6. Summons. - The service of summons shall be governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and
by the following rules:
(1) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given address or his whereabouts are unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected upon
him by publication once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines and in such places as the court may order In addition, a copy of the summons shall be served
on the respondent at his last known address by registered mail or any other means the court may deem
sufficient.
(2) The summons to be published shall be contained in an order of the court with the following data: (a)
title of the case; (b) docket number; (c) nature of the petition; (d) principal grounds of the petition and the
reliefs prayed for; and (e) a directive for the respondent to answer within thirty days from the last issue of
publication.
Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground
that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.
Section 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from service of
summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by
publication. The answer must be verified by the respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.
(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in default.
(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court shall order the public
prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.
Section 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. - (1) Within one month after receipt of the court order
mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court
stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the on the finding of collusion within
ten days from receipt of a copy of a report The court shall set the report for hearing and If convinced that
the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall
be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Section 10. Social worker. - The court may require a social worker to conduct a case study and submit
the corresponding report at least three days before the pre-trial. The court may also require a case study
at any stage of the case whenever necessary.
Section 11. Pre-trial. -
(1) Pre-trial mandatory. - A pre-trial is mandatory. On motion or motu proprio, the court shall set the pre-
trial after the last pleading has been served and filed, or upon receipt of the report of the public prosecutor
that no collusion exists between the parties.
(2) Notice of pre-trial. - (a) The notice of pre-trial shall contain:
(1) the date of pre-trial conference; and
(2) an order directing the parties to file and serve their respective pre-trial briefs in such manner as shall
ensure the receipt thereof by the adverse party at least three days before the date of pre-trial.
(b) The notice shall be served separately on the parties and their respective counsels as well as on the
public prosecutor. It shall be their duty to appear personally at the pre-trial.
(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent even if he fails to file an answer. In case of summons
by publication and the respondent failed to file his answer, notice of pre-trial shall be sent to respondent at
his last known address.
Section 12. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief shall contain the following:
(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements as may be allowed by law,
indicating the desired terms thereof;
(b) A concise statement of their respective claims together with the applicable laws and authorities;
(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as well as the disputed factual and legal issues;
(d) All the evidence to be presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the
nature and purpose thereof;
(e) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits; and
(f) Such other matters as the court may require.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required contents shall have the same effect as
failure to appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding paragraphs.
Section 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - {a) If the petitioner fails to appear personally, the
case shall be dismissed unless his counsel or a duly authorized representative appears in court and
proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.
(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial and
require the public prosecutor to investigate the non-appearance of the respondent and submit within
fifteen days thereafter a report to the court stating whether his non-appearance is due to any collusion
between the parties. If there Is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for
the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.
Section 14. Pre-trial conference. -At the pre-trial conference, the court:
(a) May refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist the parties in reaching an agreement on matters
not prohibited by law.
The mediator shall render a report within one month from referral which, for good reasons, the court
may extend for a period not exceeding one month.
(b) In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial
conference, on which occasion it shall consider the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such
other makers as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.
Section 15. Pre-trial order. - {a) The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon termination of
the pre-trial, the court shall Issue a pre-trial order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up In the
conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed on the pleadings, and except as to the
ground of declaration of nullity or annulment, the agreements or admissions made by the parties on any
of the matters considered, including any provisional order that may be necessary or agreed upon by the
parties.
(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall contain a recital of the following;
(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need not be proved subject to Section 16 of this Rule;
(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;
(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that have been marked and will be presented;
(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.
(c) The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the public prosecutor to appear for the State and
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties at any stage of the proceedings and fabrication or
suppression of evidence during the trial on the merits.
(d) The parlies shall not be allowed to raise issues or present witnesses and evidence other than those
stated in the pre-trial order.
The order shall control the trial of the case, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
(e) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the pre-trial order to propose corrections or
modifications.
Section 16. Prohibited compromise. - The court-shall not allow compromise on prohibited matters, such
as the following:
(a) The civil status of persons;
(b) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;
(c) Any ground for legal separation;
(d) Future support;
(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and
(f) Future legitime.
Section 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of
the reception of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property
relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment
on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
(3) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons, including members of the press,
who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made if the court determines on the
record that requiring a party to testify in open court would not enhance the ascertainment of truth; would
cause to the party psychological harm or inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear,
or timidity; would violate the right of a party to privacy; or would be offensive to decency or public morals.
(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of the records of the case or parts thereof be
made by any person other than a party or counsel of a party, except by order of the court.
Section 18. Memoranda. - The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation
with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of their claims within
fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its
own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be
submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered
submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that
the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance
with Article 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of
the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear
in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general
circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of
judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal Is filed by any of the
parties the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
(4) Upon the finality of the decision, the court shall forthwith issue the corresponding decree if the parties
have no properties.
If the parties have properties, the court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of this
Rule.
The entry of judgment shall be registered in the Civil Registry where the marriage was recorded
and In the Civil Registry where the Family Court'granting the petition for declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage is located.
Section 20. Appeal. -
(1) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion
for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.
(2) Notice of appeal. - An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a
Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial.
The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive iegltimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon
receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of
either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
Section 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment of Marriage." (a) The
court shall issue the Decree after;
(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage in the Civil Registry where the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry of the place
where the Family Court is located;
(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, in the proper
Register of Deeds where the real properties are located; and
(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound securities.
(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and attach to the
Decree the approved deed of partition.
Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the court shall order the
Local Civil Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate indicating the new civil status of the children
affected.
Section 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree as best evidence. - (a) The prevailing
party shall cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where the marriage was registered,
the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is situated, and in the National Census and
Statistics Office. He shall report td the court compliance with this requirement within thirty days from
receipt of the copy of the Decree.
(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause the publication of the
Decree once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage and shall serve as notice to third persons concerning the properties of petitioner
and respondent as well as the properties or presumptive legitimes delivered to their common children.
Section 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. - (a) In case a party
dies at any stage of the proceedings before the entry of judgment, the court shall order the case closed
and terminated, without prejudice to the settlement of the estate in proper proceedings in the regular
courts.
(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall be binding upon
the parties and their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular courts.
Section 25. Effectlvity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a

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Supreme Court Rules Search for Missing Wife Insufficient to Declare Presumptive Death

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

How did you do that?

In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:

Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.

4 Trial Court Decision, p. 4; Records, p. 39.

5 Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 13.

7 Pertinent portions of Article 83 of the Civil Code reads:

xxx xxx xxx

9 See generally Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937).

10 Petition, p. 11; Rollo; p. 15.

11 Memorandum for Respondent, p. 4.

14 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 16.

16 Court of Appeal's Decision, p. 6.

17 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 14.

18 See generally Ramos v. Sandiganbayan, 191 SCRA 671 (1990).

19 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 10.

20 35 Phil. 252 (1919).

22 81 Phil. 461 (1948).

23 203 SCRA 750 (1991).

24 203 SCRA at 761.

G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000

ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,

(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

2 Rollo, pp. 29-30.

3 Rollo, pp. 35-36.

7 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 557.

8 Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.

G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

The facts may be summarized, as follows:

The Court rules against petitioner Republic.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, (Chairman), J., in the result.

3 Records, pp. 12-15.

4 Records, pp. 37-40.

7 RTC Decision, p. 2; Records, pp. 51-52.

9 Rollo, pp. 22-26.

11 211 SCRA 907 [1992].

12 270 SCRA 9 [1997].

G.R. No. 163604 May 6, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;

(c) Guardianship and custody of children;

(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;

(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;

(h) Habeas corpus;

(i) Change of name;

(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;

(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;

(l) Constitution of family home;

(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:

x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -

Republic of the Philippines 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  

ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,  

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  

Republic of the Philippines 