People vs Que Po Lay

TITLE: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay

CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954

FACTS:

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders
amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after
the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular
No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and
subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD:

It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central
Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is
based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such
contents including its penalties.

Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.

Case Digest of Tanada vs. Tuvera

TANADA V. TUVERA [136 S 27] - F: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern,
a right recognized in the Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general
orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents contend, among
others that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that
since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC.

HELD: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w/ this Court's construction of said article. In a long
line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the OG is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-- for then the date of publication is material for determining its date
of effectivity, w/c is the 15th day following its publication-- but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect.
Respondent's argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws w/ the fact
of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily
reached that said Art. 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the OG, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.
xxx The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. The clear object of the law is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws w/c are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. W/o such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. It is needless to say that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs Ramos Case Digest

G.R. No 127882

Facts :

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the
DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign
investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent.

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration,
development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral
agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and
withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two
newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942,
however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of
land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-
23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later
repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop
the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act
thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

They pray that the Court issue an order:

(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and
void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as
unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.

Issue :

Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.

Ruling :
The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void:

(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit:
Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of
granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit.

(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section
applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement,

(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance agreement;

(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance agreement;

(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert the same
into a mineral production-sharing agreement;

(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial and
technical assistance agreement;
The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions
and cannot stand on their own:

(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical assistance
agreement.

Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance
 agreement proposals;

Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;

The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share in a financial and
technical assistance agreement; and

Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors;

When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently,
then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected,
must fall with them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Fortune Motors, Inc. v CA (Civil procedure)

Fortune Motors, Inc. v. CA, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company

Facts:
· Private respondent extended various loans to petitioner for a total sum of P32,500,000.00;
· Due to financial difficulties, and economic recession, the petitioner was not able to pay the loan which became
due;
· The respondent bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, the mortgaged property was sold at public
auction where respondent was the highest bidder;
· 3 days before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioner filed a complaint for the annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale at the RTC of Manila, alleging that:
(a) the foreclosure was premature because its obligation to the Bank was not yet due,
(b) the publication of the notice of sale was incomplete, there was no public auction,
(c) thhe price for which was “shockingly low”;
· Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the venue of the action was improperly
laid in Manila for the realty covered by the real estate mortgages is situated in Makati, therefore the action to
annul the foreclosure sale should be filed in the RTC of Makati;
· Petitioner argued that its action is a personal action and that the issue is the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings so that it may have a new one year period to redeem the same.
Lower court rulings:
RTC: reserved the resolution of the Bank’s motion to dismiss until after the trial on the merits

CA: on petition for certiorari and prohibition, granted the petitions and dismissed the case without prejudice to
the filing of the case before the proper courts
*Reconsideration was denied, hence the petition before the SC

Issue: WON petitioner’s action for annulment of the real estate mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure sale of
Fortune Building is personal action or a real action for venue purposes

Ruling: Yes, the action is a real action which should have been filed before the RTC of Makati.

Real actions or actions affecting title to, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of
or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, must be instituted in the CFI of the province where the property or
any part thereof lies.

Personal actions upon the other hand, may be instituted in the CFI where the defendant resides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

An action for the annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives and nature of
action which is to recover real property.

An action for annulment or rescission of sale of real property is a real action; its prime objective is to recover
said real property.

An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real
property.

Hence, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA is affirmed.

Albino Co vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 100776. October 28, 1993)

31MAY

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
Ponente: NARVASA
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against
petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. The case eventuated in petitioner’s conviction of the crime charged on
the basis that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by
B.P. Blg. 22. Pending litigation, Ministry of Justice Circular No. 4 (which excludes guarantee check from
application of B.P. Blg. 22) was subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 which ruled that a check
issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the
Regional Trial Court but the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 declaring the guarantee check will no longer be
considered as a valid defense be retroactively applied.

HELD:
NO. Decision of the Court of Appeals and RTC were set aside. Criminal prosecution against accused-petitioner
was dismissed.

RATIO:
It would seem that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court’s decision of
September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect
to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of
Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be
resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine
of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out
and discussed, negating criminal liability.

Cui vs Arellano University

TITLE: Emetrio Cui v Arellano University
CITATION: GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135

FACTS:

Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from
first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship
grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as
a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of
records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87
scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private
schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that “the amount in tuition and other fees
corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they
decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract
and keep students in a school”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by
Arellano University.

HELD:

The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory
and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the
scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or
tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void.

The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate from
Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.

People Vs. Judge Donato Case Digest

People Vs. Judge Donato

198 SCRA 130
G.R. No.79269

June 5,1991

Facts:

Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed before
and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do
not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not
entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART.
135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos.
1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed
before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed
a condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period
thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and
to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not
comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when
arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a
Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and
address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered
and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held:

Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense, therefore
prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes
discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without
hearing the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of
rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were made
therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will
be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said
petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo,
there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be
waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Iloilo palay and corn Planters assn. vs Feliciano 13 SCRA 377 (Quico's version)

Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose y. Feliciano, chairman and general manager of the Rice and Corn Administration,
wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a
government agency which the president may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the national
economic council as embodied in its resolution no. 70, series of 1964.
On December 28,1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation after the said referral of the president. The
chairman Jose y. Feliciano of the rice and corn administration announced an invitation to bid for said importation
and set the bidding for February 1, 1965. The said facts were all pursuant to a certain provision in republic act
2207.
Considering the said importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice
and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the petitioners together with Ramon A.
Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this court asking for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the respondents.

Issue:
WON RA 2207 was impliedly repealed by RA 3452?

Held:
Republic Act 2207 still stands. RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is
shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207.
These two laws, therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
A repealing clause in an Act which provides that “all laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly” is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the
intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless
an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such
inconsistency.
Wherefore, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this court is hereby dissolved. Cost
against petitioners.

-0-

582 SCRA 694 – Civil Law – Family Code – Article 36; Psychological Incapacity
Personal Examination by Psychologist Not a Condition Sine Qua Non
Note: This reinforced the case of Te vs Te which relaxed the application of the Molina Guidelines.
In 1972, Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez met each other in medical school. In 1975, they married each other.
In 1980, Benjamin became a full-fledged doctor and he practiced at the Velez Hospital (owned by Carmen’s
family).
Benjamin and Carmen had six children during their marriage. But after 18 years of marriage, Carmen went to
court to have their marriage be declared void on the ground that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated.
She alleged that even before she married Benjamin, the latter was already a drunkard; that Benjamin was a
gambler, he was violent, and would rather spend on his expensive hobby; that he rarely stayed home and even
neglected his children and family obligations.
Carmen presented an expert witness (Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate) to prove Benjamin’s psychological incapacity.
However, Oñate merely based her findings on the deposition submitted by Benjamin. Oñate was not able to
personally examine Benjamin because at that time, Benjamin was already working as an anesthesiologist in
South Africa.
On his part, Benjamin opposed the petition. He also presented his own expert witness (Dr. Renato Obra) to
disprove Carmen’s allegations. Obra was not able to personally examine Benjamin but he also evaluated the
same deposition evaluated by Oñate. Also, Benjamin submitted himself for evaluation to a South African doctor
(Dr. A.J.L. Pentz) and the transcript of said evaluation was submitted to Obra and the latter also evaluated the
same. Obra found Benjamin not to be psychologically incapacitated.
The trial court, and eventually the Court of Appeals, ruled in favor of Carmen.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Ting’s psychological incapacity was proven.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the evidence presented to be lacking in order to support a finding of
psychological incapacity on the part of Benjamin. Said the Supreme Court:
we are not condoning Benjamin’s drinking and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife.
There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Benjamin must remember that he owes love, respect, and
fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds Carmen’s
testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by Carmen, to be too inadequate to declare Benjamin
psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
Carmen failed to prove that such attitude by Benjamin is psychologically rooted so as to make Benjamin
unaware of his marital obligations. It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage.
Anent the issue that Benjamin was not personally evaluated by the psychologists which deviates from the Molina
Guidelines, the Supreme Court ruled that as early as the case of Te vs Te, the Molina Guidelines were already
relaxed. Cases involving Article 36 must be tried on a case-to-case basis. Each case involving the application of
Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals. The Supreme Court however emphasized that the Molina case was not abandoned,
its application was merely relaxed.

Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001

FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. She alleged that
he is emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker. Whenever
she tells him to stop or at least minimize his drinking, her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when
she was chased by a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of their children. The children also
suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their children left the home. Two months later, they returned upon the
promise of respondent to change. But he didn’t. She was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for 11 days
for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed RTC’s ruling. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs CA & Molina should be
taken in consideration in deciding in this case.

HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case would fall under the category
of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has force and effect of a law.
These guidelines are mandatory in nature. Petition denied.

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal
maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law.

indispensable.