Ong vs Ong G.R. No.
153206 -He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the
Articles 56 & 57
Ong Eng Kiam a.k.a. William Ong vs Lucita Ong
G.R. No. 153206
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when
Lucita filed a complaint for Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the
Family Code.
Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her husband William
subjected her to physical violence like slapping, kicking and pulling her
hair and bang her head against the concrete wall.and been violent towards
their three children. He would scold them using his belt buckle to beat them.
One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several different
parts of her body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house
which she did.
Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior were corroborated by
her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the day after
she left her conjugal home also testified about her injuries.
The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal separation which
the CA affirmed
William then filed this petition for review on certiorari
-On the decision denying all of Lucita’s allegations and that he never inflicted
physical harm on her or their children.
complaint is to deprive him of his control and ownership over his conjugal
properties with Lucita.
-That the CA overlooked some facts of the case which warrant an exception
to the general rule that questions of fact cannot be the subject for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
-The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and their
parents’ doctor Dr. ElinZano since their testimonies are tainted with
relationship and fraud and since Lucita abandoned the family home she has
also given a ground for legal separation and therefore should NOT- be
granted one pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of The family code – Where both
parties have given ground for legal separation
ISSUE: WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation
HELD:
The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to
take control of the conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her
husband’s repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct. That the
physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon
Lucita have been duly established. He can derive no personal gain from
pushing for the financial interests of her family at the expense of her
marriage of 20 years and the companionship of her husband and children
The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses is
given great respect. Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and label a
witness’ testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda
Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward testimonies the court
finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive
conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated in the said
provision
PETITION DENIED: Lucita should be granted a decree of legal separation
 neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give
Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz support to his wife.

G.R. No. L-19565, 30 January 1968
FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant was married in Bacolod
and begotten 6 children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels
of land and were engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action
against her husband for the separation of their properties. She further alleged
that her husband aside from abandoning her also mismanaged their conjugal
properties.
In the case at bar, the Court believed that the defendant did not intend to
leave his wife and children permanently. Thus, the SC held that lower court
erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator
of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business
constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be
a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a
repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.

On the other hand, Severino contended that he had always visited the
conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his frequent
absences when he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their
business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead
stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in the
conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her
husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the
separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander and
dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and
whether or not there has been an abused of his authority as administrator of
the conjugal partnership.

RULING:

No. The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital
obligations and support of the family.

To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must

have willfully and with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation.
The law provides that there must be real abandonment and not mere
separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but
also amount to financial and moral desertion.Therefore, physical separation
alone is not the full meaning of the term “abandonment”, if the husband,
despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither
 cohabitation.
Bugayong v. Ginez Moreover, pursuant to foreign jurisprudence, a divorce suit will not be
granted for adultery where the parties continue to live together after it was
known or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery or sleeping
G.R. No. L-10033, 28 December 1956 together for a single night.

FACTS: Since the parties have stayed together as husband and wife for more than
two nights after the knowledge of wife’s infidelity, condonation is established.
Petitioner, a US Navy serviceman, began receiving letters informing him of
the alleged acts of infidelity of his wife, the respondent. He admitted that
respondent even informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her.

Petitioner, then, sought for his wife and when the two met, they both
proceeded to a certain house where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1
day. Then they repaired to the petitioner’s house and again passed the night
therein as husband and wife. On the following day, petitioner tried to verify
from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed
adultery. But respondent, instead of answering the query, merely packed up
and left, which the petitioner took as confirmation of the acts of infidelity
imputed on his wife. Petitioner went to Ilocos “to soothe his wounded
feelings.”

Petitioner, then, filed for legal separation against his wife, who in turn filed a
motion to dismiss on ground of condonation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is condonation.

RULING:

Yes. Pursuant to previous jurisprudence, there is condonation to the alleged

adultery on the part of the husband.

Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that legal separation may be claimed
only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders,
a legal separation cannot by either of them. Collusion between the parties to
obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

Further, single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties

ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in
the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial
G.R. No. L-48183 November 10, 1941
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Topic: Consent as a defense in an action for legal separation
FACTS:
 May 15, 1926: accused Rodolfo married the complainant Elena Ramirez
Cartagena
 After 7 years (due to incompatibility of characters) they agreed to live
separately from each other
 May 25, 1935: they executed document—agreement, which states that “
That both parties agree to live separated from each other for the rest of
their lives and commit themselves, and reciprocally oblige not to crush or
intervene or mix under any circumstances in their public or private life,
each other, remaining each of the grantors in complete freedom of action
in any act and all concept
 June 15, 1935: accused w/o leaving the Philippines secured a divorce
decree from civil court of Juarez, Bravos District of Chihuahua Mexico
 May 11, 1936: he contracted another marriage with co-accused Julia
Medel before the justice of the peace of Malabon
 Because of the nullity of the divorce decree, complainant herein
instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy and another
for concubinage
 Charge for bigamy culminated in the conviction of accused;
 Meanwhile, before the trial for the charge of concubinage commenced,
accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy and the case was initially
dismissed; upon appeal, the CA held the dismissal before trial to be
premature and without deciding the question of double jeopardy,
remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the merits
TC: accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence
ISSUE:
Whether the accused should be acquitted of concubinage in view of the
agreement executed by Rodolfo and Elena upon their separation
HELD: Yes. The agreement constituted a consent given by Elena to Rodolfo,
hence, Rodolfo should be acquitted. Judgment is reversed.
 No double jeopardy - the defense of bigamy for which he was convicted
and that of concubinage for which he stood trial in the court are two
distinct offenses in the law
 BIGAMY: celebration of second marriage while the first is still existing;
offense against civil status which may be prosecuted at the instance of
the state
 CONCUBINAGE: mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who
is not his wife; offense against chastity and may be prosecuted only at
the instance of the offended party
 Upon the other hand, the accused should have been acquitted of the
crime of concubinage
o the document executed by and between the accused and the
complainant in which they agreed , while illegal for the purpose for
which it was executed , constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to
the act of concubinage within the meaning of Art. 344 of the RPC
o by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the illicit
acts of the other
 Previously, the court held that the consent which bars the offended
party from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness is
that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime has
been committed. However, in this case, the Court sees this to be a
narrow view.
 As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its
commission, "consent" must have been intended agreeably with its
ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No
logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and
subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has
chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy
to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong
 Prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the
offended aprty from prosecuting the offense
 An agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein,
operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar
the offended party from prosecuting the offense
Article 344 of the RPC provides:
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the
guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall
have consented or pardoned the offenders.
Republic of the Philippines faithful wife it he would take care her back. He refused to pardon her to live
SUPREME COURT with her and said she could go where she wished, that he would have
Manila nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned
for the second time, she and her child went back to her coaccused Marcelo
EN BANC Ramos (this was in the year 1924) and they have lived with him ever since.
The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her codefendant in 1924,
G.R. No. L-37720 March 27, 1933 did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as husband.
Shortly thereafter he left for the Territory of Hawaii where she remained for
seven years completely abandoning his said wife and child. On his return to
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, these Islands, he presented the second charge of adultery here involved with
vs. the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce under the
URSULA SENSANO and MARCELO RAMOS, defendants-appellants. provisions of Act No. 2710.

Emilio L. Medina for appellants. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraphs 1 and 2, are as follows:
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
BUTTE, J.: abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery
and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
The appellants were sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte filed by the offended spouse.
for the crime of adultery to three years, six months and twenty-one days
of prision correccional and appealed to this court, assigning the following The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
error: "The court below erred in not holding that the offended husband including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any
contested to the adultery committed by his wife Ursula Sensano in that he case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
refused to live with her after she extinguished her previous sentence for the
same offense, and by telling her then that she could go where she wanted to
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose
and do what she pleased, and by his silence for seven years notwithstanding
when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to
that he was informed of said adultery."
the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the
inference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the
The facts briefly stated as follows: accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal
proceeding.
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They
had one child. Shortly after the birth of his child, the husband left his wife to We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years
go to the Province of Cagayan where he remained for three years without of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is explained by his
writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of herself and their absence from the Philippine Islands during which period it was impossible for
son. Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she could call, she him to take any action against the accused. There is no merit in the argument
struggled for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal day when she that it was impossible for the husband to take any action against the accused
met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to live with him. during the said seven years.
On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and
Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to four months and
The judgment below is reversed with costs de oficio.
one day of arresto mayor. The court, in its decision, stated the following: "In
the opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat
cruel in his treatment of his wife having abandoned her as he did." After Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
completing her sentence, the accused left her paramour. She thereupon
appealed to this municipal president and the justice of the peace to send for
her husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back.
At the house of the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a
 Case Digest: Matubis v. Praxedes (GR No. L -11766)

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Facts:

Plaintiff and defendant were legally married. For failure to agree on how they
should live as husband and wife, the couple agreed to live separately from
each other. They entered into an agreement where it was stipulated that
neither of them can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage.

In January 1955, defendant began cohabiting with another woman. Alleging

abandonment and concubinage, Socorro filed a complaint for legal
separation against Zoilo.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the agreement
between Socorro and Zoilo is a tacit expression of her consent to the
commission of concubinage by her husband.

Issue:

Whether or not there was condonation and consent.

Ruling:

Yes. Condonation and consent on the part of the plaintiff are necessarily part
of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but
expressed.

(b) That both of us is free to get any mate and live with as husband and wife
without any interference by any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the
other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from our
separation. (Exh. B).
G.R. No. 196842 October 9, 2013 that she had known of her husband’s womanizing and believed to have
change his ways.
ALFREDO ROMULO A. BUSUEGO, Petitioner, ISSUE:
vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN MINDANAO and ROSA S. BUSUEGO,
Respondents.,

‘Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
legal separation or, as stated in I Bouver’s Law Dictionary, p. 585, discretion when it found probable cause?- NO
condonation is the ‘conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or RULING:
wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed.’ Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife,
the SC agree with the trial judge that the conduct of the plaintiff-husband
‘In Shackleton vs. Shackleton, 48 N. J. Eq. 364; 21 Atl. 935, it has been held
above narrated despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him,
that ‘condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the
as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the
other infidelity. Such acts necessarily implied forgiveness. It is entirely
offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of
consonant with reason and justice that if the wife freely consents to sexual
Article 100 of the Civil Code.
intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband’s guilt, her consent
should operate as a pardon of his wrong.’ Although the foregoing speaks of condonation of concubinage as a
ground for legal separation, the holding therein applies with equal force in a
FACTS:
prosecution for concubinage as a felony. Indeed, Rosa’s admission was that
Respondent Rosa filed for concubinage, Violence Against Women
she believed her husband had stopped womanizing, not that she had
and Children, and grave threats before the Office of Ombudsman again her
knowledge of Alfredo’s specific acts of concubinage with Sia and de Leon,
husband Alfredo Busuego, the Chief of the Davao Regional Hospital. Rosa
specifically keeping them in the conjugal dwelling. This admission set against
saw evidence of the husband’s infidelity but he denied it. Thereafter, she
the specific acts of concubinage listed in Article 334 of the Revised Penal
went to New York USA to work as a nurse. Her husband was against on her
Code does not amount to condonation. Their continued cohabitation as
decision; before leaving, he took his gun and pointed it at his wife’s temple.
husband and wife construed from Rosa’s annual visits to Davao City is not
Rosa learned that a woman was living at their home. He asked acquiescence to Alfredo’s relations with his concubines.
Alfredo about it, he said she was a nurse at the Regional Hospital and was
The SC held that they find nothing in the record which can be
allegedly raped by his brother that is why he allowed her to sleep at the
construed as pardon or condonation. It is true that the offended party has to
maid’s room.
a considerable extent been patient with her husband’s shortcomings, but that
Rosa together with the help of her children gathered evidences seems to have been due to his promises of improvement; nowhere does it
against her husband. She filed a case against her husband before the appear that she has consented to her husband’s immorality or that she has
Ombudsman, impleading the mistress who did not file the answer. The acquiesced in his relations with his concubine.
Ombudsman finds that there is sufficient case for concubinage against
The Ombudsman’s resolution was affirmed.
the husband and his mistress. The other charges were dismissed for lack
of merit.

Petitioner appeal to the SC saying that it glossed over the wife’s

condonation of the supposed concubinage when she alleged in the complaint
[G.R. No. 96602. November 19, 1991.] In the first place, the case cited does not support petitioner Neri’s position. In
the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband, by
EDUARDO ARROYO, JR., Petitioner, v. entering into an agreement with his wife that each of them were to live
separately and could marry other persons and by filing complaint only about
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, a year after discovering his wife’s infidelity, had "consented to, and
Respondents. acquiesced in, the adulterous relations existing between the accused, and he
FACTS: is, therefore, not authorized by law to institute the criminal proceedings." In
fine, the Guinucud case refers not to the notion of pari delicto but to consent
as a bar to the institution of the criminal proceedings.
"Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the (RTC), of
Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo committed in In the present case, no such acquiescence can be implied: the accused did
the City of Baguio. not enter into any agreement with Dr. Neri allowing each other to marry or
co-habit with other persons; and Dr. Neri promptly filed his complaint after
The RTC convicted petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery as defined discovering the illicit affair.
under Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, the concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code,
Antecedent Facts: but only in Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of
the Civil Code relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. The case
Accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of friends took the morning
at bar does not involve any illegal contract which either of the contracting
plane to Baguio. Accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris’ condominium.
parties is now seeking to enforce.
Arroyo went down where accused Ruby Vera Neri is.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ADULTERY; PARI DELICTO; GUINUCUD CASE,
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — We turn to the contention that pari
Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a new delicto "is a valid defense to a prosecution for adultery and concubinage and
trial, contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband, private that in such a case ‘it would be only a hypocritical pretense for such spouse
complainant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later contracted to appear in court as the offended spouse.’" In the first place, the case cited
marriage with another woman with whom he is presently co-habiting. Both does not support petitioner Neri’s position. In the Guinucud case, the Court
motions were denied by the Court of Appeals. found that the complaining husband, by entering into an agreement with his
wife that each of them were to live separately and could marry other persons
LEGAL ISSUE: and by filing complaint only about a year after discovering his wife’s infidelity,
has "consented to, and acquiesced in, the adulterous relations existing
Whether or not Dr. Neri’s alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing between the accused, and he is, therefore, not authorized by law to institute
the criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto the criminal proceedings." In fine, the Guinucud case refers not to the notion
of pari delicto but to consent as a bar to the institution of the criminal
RULING:
proceedings. In the present case, no such acquiescence can be implied: the
We turn to the contention that pari-delicto "is a valid defense to a prosecution accused did not enter into any agreement with Dr. Neri allowing each other to
for adultery and concubinage and that in such a case ‘it would be only a marry or cohabit with other persons; and Dr. Neri promptly filed his complaint
hypocritical pretense for such spouse to appear in court as the offended after discovering the illicit affair.
spouse.’" 9