LEGAL ETHICS CASES (Case Digest)

#1: Cayetano vs. Monsod201 SCRA 210September 1991

Facts:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There
shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall remembers of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue:

Whether the respondent does not possess the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Held:

In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to theconduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident toactions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them inmatters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,
contemplatingan appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim inbankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estateand guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court,which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practiceof law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, alawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELECchairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of theforegoing, the petition is DISMISSED.*** The Supreme Court held that the
appointment of Monsod is in accordance with the requirement of law as having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Monsod’s past work experiences as
alawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer negotiator of contracts and alawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement that hehas been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Again, in the case of Philippine Lawyer’sAssociation vs. Agrava, the
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases and litigation in court; itembraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings
and othersimilar work which involves the determination by a legal mind the legal effects of facts and conditions.

#2: PHILIPPINE LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION VS. CELEDONIO AGRAVA,in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office

FACTS:

A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against CeledonioAgrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957,
respondentDirector issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination forthe purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before thePhilippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinationsand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in goodstanding, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondentDirector’s holding an examination for the purpose
is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violationof the law. The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or purelythe practice of
law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as amatter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the
examinationcan practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holdingtests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and theprosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves
the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by
the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the
director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should
be taken not to acourt or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

#3: In Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995)

FACTS:

On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan
stemmed from the affliction of severe physical injuries uponhim in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the
accused were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.Eleven (11) days later, Mr.
Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application was granted on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two (2) years,
counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was
allowed and he passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and
be admitted to the practice of law. He averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is noted that his probation period did not last for more than 10 months.

ISSUE:

Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the practice of law

HELD:

Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those who are seeking
admission to the bar. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. In short, he mustshow evidence that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fitfor admission to the profession of law.
He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names of the parents or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.

NOTES:

• The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of goodmoral character, with special education qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
• Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general public and proper administration of justice is concerned.
• All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
• Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who wouldseek admission to the bar must be a necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public.
• Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was possessed of good moral character.
• Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated at the time of the application for permission to take the barexaminations and
more importantly at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

#4: IN RE: ARGOSINO (270 SCRA 26, 03/19/1997)

FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant. Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino was previously involved with hazing which caused
the death of Raul Camaligan a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites but he was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. He was sentenced with 2 years and
4 months of imprisonment where he applied a probation thereafter which was approved and granted by the court. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take
the oath. He filed for a petition to allow him to take the lawyer’s oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law averring that his probation was already terminated. The
court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyer’s oath office and admit him to the practice of law.

HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the STRICT, INTELLECTUAL and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are instruments in the
effective and efficient administration of justice. The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good moral character of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he
has reformed and has become a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually
known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify that he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The petitioner is then allowed to take the lawyer’s oath,
sign the Roll of Attorney’s and thereafter to practice the legal profession.

#5: In Re: JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, 241 SCRA 405

Facts:

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few
substantive legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978
to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the
Supreme Court.

Case 1: Cases involving Traders Royal Bank (TRB).

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he
secured by a real estate mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister)
and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security a mortgage over a parcel
of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed
by their respective owners.

Case 2: Cases involving United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).

Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment
thereof. The mortgage was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7,
1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the
knowledge and consent of UCPB.

Case 3: Cases involving Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC).

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5)
loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a
performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge
his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.

Issue:

Whether the respondent-accused is liable for constructive contempt?

Held:

Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that
he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN
(10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found
guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.

#6: Bongalonta vs. Castillo, 240 SCRA 310

Facts:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
complainant Sally Bongalonta charged PablitoM. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain. The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, aseparate civil action, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary
attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps.
Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed a civil case for collection of a sum of money based on a promissory
note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were
declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading andevidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by defaultrendered in favor
of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was levied upon. It is further alleged that in all the
pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt
number.Thus, complainant concluded that the civil case filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of themoney
judgment which complainant might obtain in the civil case he filed.After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the followingfindings and
recommendations:Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attachedto the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the
respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of
Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the
notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.Consequently, the charge
against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her
husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on. However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their pleadings
the same IBP No., respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty.
Alfonso M. Martija. The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in
placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership
dues of her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see toit that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially
when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of evidence.

Held:

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of theserequirements is the observance of
honesty and candor. Courts are entitled toexpect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the
fundamental duty tosatisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.WHEREFORE, finding respondent
Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

#7: Mauricio Ulep vs The Legal Clinic

223 SCRA 378 – 42 SCAD 287 – Legal Ethics – Advertisement in the Legal Profession – Practice of Law

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the
services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s advertisements which contain the following:

---------------------------------------------

SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041

8:30am – 6:00pm

7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy

Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

-----------------------------------------------------

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is
composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He
said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-
legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.

As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides,
the advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.

ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.

HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services
being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal
Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.

The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself
and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court
also enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement:

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list

2. Use of ordinary simple professional card

3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

#9: In Re: Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978)

Facts: This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2,
Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty
and property and thereby null and void.

Issue: Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the respondent.

Held: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is
voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which
includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not
infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name
of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.

#10: NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, respondent. [A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]

FACTS: Complainant and Respondent are estranged couple with two children ages 5 and 3 who are in the former's custody.

Sometime in December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be
surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody
but he failed to show the original copy of such. Complainant's lawyer did not also receive any motion filed by respondent.
Upon close examination, found out that it bore two dates, sensing something amiss she refused to give custody of the children.

In Jan. 15, 2002, respondent accompanied by armed men supposed to be NBI arrived and demanded for the surrender of custody while the complainant and children are in the
school. Complainant then sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police and at the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he,
assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate courts resolution/order.

In order to difuse the tension complainant allow children to sleep with the respondent within the City. She later on received information that the children were to be taken to
Bacolod City which prompted her to go to the hotel where the children are and transfered to other room.

Respondent filed with RTC Dumaguete a verified petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of
Appeals resolution meanwhile the complainant was able to obtained a Certificaiton from the CA that no such resolution had been issued. Respondent did not appear during the
hearing.

Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorneys oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution
in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country.

The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in his
disbarment.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Ruling: Yes.

Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time
that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display
the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.[8] Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility states:

Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but
dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.[9] The lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be
gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another.[10] By calling complainant, a sly manipulator
of truth as well as a vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.

Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

#11: ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN, Respondents.
Facts: The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation
(Central Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of said corporation, before the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City.

On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and void.

Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as to costs."

The aforesaid decision was affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals and eventually upheld by this Court.

The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents moved for execution which was granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the
decision was issued.

Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by herein petitioner
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely unaware of the suit between private
respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner of the lot having bought the same from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.

On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents motion. Another Order was issued on August 18, 1992 by the trial court holding that the judgment was binding on
petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition.

Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent
Judge.

Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because
the action or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee.

The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals.

On further appeal to this Court, petitioners petition for review on certiorari, was denied.

Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a second writ of execution before the trial court which was granted.

Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioners motion was initially granted by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private
respondents, the said order was reconsidered by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued.

Desperately needing a favorable judgment, Petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court of Appeals, arguing inter alia: that the judgment
cannot be executed against it because it was not a party to Civil Case; that the decision of the trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the
property to the private respondents; that certain facts and circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render the execution highly unjust, illegal and
inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers freedom of religion and worship; and that private respondents title is being questioned in
another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered judgment dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the lower court's decision in Civil Case had long become
final and executory.

Held: The petition must fail.

It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to
any matter related to the controversy litigated come to an end.

Petitioners argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to surrender and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the
ground that they were never parties to the case between private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been resolved by respondent Court of Appeals.

Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because
the action or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee.

A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that
petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall have already been
filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice.

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the
court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of
justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to
the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case such as this, should
not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer
lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

#12: In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 19 JUL

FACTS:

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of Title” to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a tribunal “peopled
by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice…”. He also expressed strong words as against the judiciary like “justice… is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” . The
petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court of Appeals by reason of
jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial move. He
claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice system.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.
HELD:

YES. Indefinite suspension imposed.

RATIO:

It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty. Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his accusations are so
noble, in speaking of the truth and alleged injustices,so as not to condemn the sinners but the sin, it has already caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this
particular case is sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign and local jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as benchmarks and references. Between disbarment and
suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension may only be lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to prove that he is again fit to resume the
practice of law.

#13: WICKER VS ARCANGEL

GR NO 112869, JANUARY 29, 1996

Kelly R. Wicker et. al vs. hon. Paul T. Arcangel G.R. No. 112869. Jan. 29, 1996. 252 SCRA 444 PONENTE: Mendoza

FACTS: It appears that on Nov 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of the respondent Judge Arcangel from the case. Respondent judge
found offense in the allegations on the motion for inhibition filed by complainants, and in an order, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment
for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order of Dec 17, 1993.

HELD: The power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect
without which the administration of justice will fail. Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangel's finding
that petitioners are guilty of contempt. Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client. His
client came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set by his responsibility as a
lawyer which he could not overstep. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in
the motion for inhibition as his client. Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others" and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record
or have materiality to the case."

#14: SOLEDAD NUÑEZ VS. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT A.C. NO. 5054. MAY 29, 2002

Facts: Sometime in October 1982 petitioner authorized respondent attorney to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to give respondent 10
percent of the price as commission. Respondent succeeded in selling the lots, but despite complainant’s repeated demands, he did not turn over to her the proceeds of the sale.
This forced complainant to file against respondent and his wife an action for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Respondent was declared in default and judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner. Respondent appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed for
failure to pay the docket fee within the required period.
A writ of execution was issued, it appeared however that only a partial amount has been paid by the lawyer. Four postdated checks were subsequently issued to cover the balance.
Said checks however, upon presentment were dishonored because the account against which they were drawn was closed. Demands to make good the checks were to no avail so
a case for violation of BP 22 was filed by petitioner.

The lawyer denied the allegations and filed several motions for extension of time to file comment. Complainant filed a motion to cite lawyer for contempt for his alleged delaying
tactics unbecoming of a lawyer and a law dean.

Issue: What is the liability of the lawyer?

Held: Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant. Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that “A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct”.

Respondent had no intention to “honor” the money judgment against him in as can be gleaned from his (1) issuance of postdated checks; (2) closing of the account against which
said checks were drawn; and (3) continued failure to make good the amounts of the checks.

#15: Santiago vs. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252

Facts:

Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology filed for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The petition stated that respondent, in notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a) make
the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and
execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his
client.

The IBP Board of Governors modified the disbarment proposal and instead imposed a penalty of P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a
heavier penalty.

Contention of the petitioner: He did not know that the rule is to be applied strictly in notarizing documents because some of his colleagues are not doing it.

Issue:

Whether the penalty imposed by the IBP is proper

Held:

Yes. Atty. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented
the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. They are also required to
maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to “give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before them a
number corresponding to the one in their register and to state therein the page or pages of their register, on which the same is recorded.” Failure to perform these duties would
result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.

Canon 5 is also violated because the canon states the obligation of lawyers to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments
and jurisprudence which the respondent failed to satisfy by not.

With regard to the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, the Supreme Court held that it was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed
out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in
his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

#16: Cesar Lantoria v. Atty. Irineo Bunyi (1992)

Facts:

An administrative complaint was filed by Lantoria against Bunyi, a member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that Bunyi committed acts of graft and corruption,
dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the IBP, and corruption of the judge and bribery

This is in relation to Bunyi’s handling of a civil case wherein Bunyi was counsel of Mrs. Mascarinas. The latter was the owner of the farm and Lantoria is the supervisor
and manager of the said farm. The 3 civil cases presided by Judge Galicia involved an ejectment suit of squatters in the said farm. The defendants in the said cases were declared
in default.

Correspondences between Lantoria and Bunyi showed that Bunyi initially enclosed a letter in an envelope addressed to Judge Galicia in a confidential and private manner.
Judge Galicia thru the mediation of Lantoria informed Bunyi that he is willing to let Bunyi write the decisions for th 3 civil cases. Lantoria informed the same to Bunyi which later
delivered the 3 decisions thru Lantoria.

Three years later, Lantoria file the present case against Bunyi alleging that they won the said cases because Bunyi wrote the decisions in those cases.

Bunyi contends that Lantoria had knowledge of the request of Judge Galicia to Bunyi as the said judge had two salas before him. Also, Bunyi contends that the drafting of
the decision was not an idea spawned by him. Furthermore, he contends that his participation is merely on revision.

The solicitor general investigated the matters and found that Bunyi prepared the draft of the decisions and that he had previous communications with the judge regarding
drafting the same. Moreover, Bunyi admitted that he prepared the said decisions and that the subject letters do exist.

The Solicitor General found Bunyi guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the
independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is counsel. The Solicitor General
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

Lantoria did not attend hearing of the case and later filed his withdrawal of the same. Bunyi gave an apology but he denied the allegations of offering a gift to judge
Galicia.
Issue: WON Bunyi violated the code of professional responsibility for lawyers?

Held: YES.

The determination of the merits of the instant case should proceed notwithstanding withdrawal of complaint due to the Bunyi having admitted that the letters in question
truly exist, and that he even asked for an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters had on his duty as a lawyer.

Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on attempts to exert personal influence on the court - A lawyer should not communicate or
argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal
consideration or favor.

In the new Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01. CANON 13 — A lawyer
shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not
extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.

Court finds Bunyi guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where he had pending civil case. Suspended for 1 year.

#17: Santiago v Fojas AC 4103

TOPIC: Legal Ethics, Canon 14 CPR

FACTS:

An expulsion case was faced by the complainants contending that they have illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. The lower court resolved
in favor of Salvador and ordered the complainants to pay, jointly and severally, Mr. Salvador. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals. The complainants lost in their
petition at the Court of Appeals due to abandonment, failure to act accordingly, or serious neglect of their counsel, Atty. Fojas to answer the civil complaint on an expulsion case.
Atty. Fojas assured them that everything was in order and he had already answered the complaint. However, the appellants soon discovered that he never answered it after all
because, according to him, he was a very busy man. Atty. Fojas admitted his “mistake” in failing to file an answer for the expulsion case, but he alleges that it was cured by his
filing of a motion for reconsideration. However, such motion for reconsideration was denied. Atty. Fojas defended his negligence with the reason that the case was a losing cause
after all. Atty. Fojas also asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and
unilaterally terminated by complainant. Complainants then filed for a disbarment case.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer
HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. This means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by
the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained his non-
filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to
honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court. Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that
the respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent’s inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a
lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Furthermore, a breach of
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which
provides: “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”

Atty. Fojas’s negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a “losing cause”. The Supreme Court held that he should have seasonably informed
the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides: A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest
opinion on the merits and probable results of the client’s case, neither overstating nor understanding the prospects of the case.

REPRIMANDED AND ADMONISHED