690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author
n pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime (People v.
People vs. Ritter
G.R. No. 88582. March 5, 1991.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Statutory Rape; Evidence; The evidence on record consisting of the victim’s
baptismal certificate which shows that she was more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged rape,
is more convincing and worthy of belief, than the oral declarations of witnesses establishing the victim’s
age to be less than 12 years old.—All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario
Baluyot was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident are not adequate to establish the
exact date of birth, much less offset a documentary record showing a different date. The defense
presented Rosario Baluyot’s baptismal certificate which the trial court rejected as being hearsay and
of no value. As against the oral declarations made by interested witnesses establishing Rosario’s age
to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on record is more convincing and worthy of belief. (See
Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the victim was not established to have been under 12 years of
age at the time of the alleged sexual violation, the usual elements of rape must be proved.—Since Rosario
was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the time of the alleged sexual violation, it
was necessary to prove that the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that there was force or
intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance with Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code. We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the
contrary, the evidence shows that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant.
In fact, she appears to have consented to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while her
companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The environmental
circumstances coupled with the testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the impression
that Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in
life may have forced her to submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances do not come under
the purview of force or intimidation needed to convict for rape.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; Before conviction can be had upon
circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author
of the crime.—The evidence for the accused may be numerically less as against the number of witnesses
and preponderance of evidence presented by the prosecution but there is no direct and convincing proof
that the accused was responsible for the vibrator left inside the victim’s vagina which caused her death
seven (7) months after its insertion. What the prosecution managed to establish were mere
circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a conviction it is imperative, though, that the
following requisites should concur: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court) For the well-
entrenched rule in evidence is that “before conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Italics supplied). It must fairly exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]). In this case the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the appellant for
the crime charged. (People vs. Tolentino, supra)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence, and therefore should not
be taken against the accused.—The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the
appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario’s vagina. This object may have caused her
death. It is possible that the appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an
affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and
therefore should not be taken against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra) Well-established is the
rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken into account. This rule
applies even to hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour violates the mores of civilized
society. The evidence against the accused must survive the test of reason. The strongest suspicion must
not be allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). As stated in
the case of People v. Ng,
(142 SCRA 615 [1986]): “x x x [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule
that reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning such
proof ‘to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every
reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to
establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the
contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty ___a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it.’ (Moreno,
Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). x x x” In the instant
case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally certain of the guilt of the
appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
Same; Same; Damages; Moral and exemplary damages awarded to the victim’s heirs despite
acquittal of accused on grounds of reasonable doubt.—Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that
the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule
III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly
liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC, supra. “x x x While the guilt of the accused
in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559). x x x
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother’s house. Circumstances forced
her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have
certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death as
reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with
homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there
is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario’s vaginal canal and
that the vibrator may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities
but civil liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of
indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Br. 73.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of about 12 years old who
had been allegedly raped and who later died because of a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide under an information
which reads:
“That on or about the tenth (10th) day of October, 1986 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and with intent to
kill one Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Rosario Baluyot and inserted a foreign object
into the vaginal canal of said Rosario Baluyot which caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage
and prejudice of her relatives.” (66)
When arraigned, the accused pleaded “Not Guilty”. Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the following witnesses, namely: (1)
Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr.
Reino Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga,
(10) Dr. Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14) Patricia
Prollamanta, (15) Mel Santos, (16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez,
(19) Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) 1st Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta,
(22) Corazon Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.
On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits “1” to “24” and the testimonies of (1)
Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong, (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr.
Val Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
are summarized in its decision, as follows:
“The people’s evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter
brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM
Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children were chosen from among a bunch
of street children. Once inside the hotel room accused told them to take a bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias
‘Egan’, was the first to take a bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot went to the bathroom to do
the same. While Rosario Baluyot was inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took out some pictures
depicting dressed up young boys, and put them on top of the table. Other things which were taken out
and placed on top of a table were three (3) other objects which he described as like that of a vicks
inhaler. One of these objects the accused played with his hands and placed it on his palms. The color
of which is grayish blue which turned out later to be the foreign object which was inserted inside the
vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects were later established to be anti-nasal inhalers against
pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok when he went there as a tourist. While Rosario was in
the bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and so did the accused. He then started
masturbating the young boy and also guided the boy’s hand for him to be masturbated, so that they
masturbated each other, while they were both naked, and he gave Jessie Ramirez an erection. When
Rosario Baluyot came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by accused and to join
him in bed. The accused then placed himself between the two (2) children and accused started fingering
Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his attention. He looked,
and he saw accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate
the vagina but it would not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore bother to look because he
was sleepy and fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an ‘American, paid Ramirez
alias ‘Egan’ P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the hotel. After the American left, they
went downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that the American inserted something in her vagina. But they
could not do anything anymore, because the American had already left, and neither did they report the
matter to the police. Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the
object was already removed from her body and Rosario said ‘Yes’. However, Jessie Ramirez claimed
that on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her vagina
and when Egan asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed. Then there was another
occasion wherein Jessie was summoned and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when
he tried to talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks. Thereafter, he did not see Rosario
anymore because he already went home to his aunt’s house who resided at Barrio Barretto and
resumed his studies in the primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near
the gate of the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake Shop near Lot
21, being ogled by people because Rosario’s skirt was bloodied and she was unconscious and foul
smelling. Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her condition and brought her to the Olongapo
City General Hospital in an unconscious condition, via jeepney. He went to the Information desk and
he was the one who gave the personal circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as
Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as ‘guardian’ of Rosario, while Rosario
was already in the emergency room. Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the name
of Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to the hospital, this is belied by the testimony of the
Information clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified that it was Alcantara who
supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario. The Court gives more credence to the testimony of
Miss Limos as against Gaspar Alcantara who became a defense witness, for the reason that through
his own testimony, Gaspar Alcantara claimed that even prior to May 14, 1987, he had already known
Rosario Baluyot for more than one (1) year, because he has seen the said girl go to the house of his twin
brother, Melchor Alcantara, who is his immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by the name of
‘Nora’ who was then in the custody of his brother. His brother Melchor was also living with their
mother, brother and sister-in-law and their two (2) children in his house. Rosario as per Gaspar’s
testimony even stays for one week or a few days at his brother’s house when she visits Nora. So the
Court can safely assume that of all the more than one (1) year that he had regularly seen Rosario at
his brother’s house, he must have already did come to know the name of Rosario Baluyot including her
age. In his testimony in Court he stated that he even asked Rosario for movie and softdrinks money
which can safely be concluded that he knows her very well. It is against normal behavior especially to
a Filipino who have a characteristic of curiosity not to have found out the real name of the girl he
claims to know only as ‘Tomboy’.
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital, nobody was attending
to her since she is a street child, having stowed away from the custody of her grandmother. Three (3)
good samaritans who belong to religious and civic organizations, in the persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe
Israel and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in the hospital chanced upon Rosario Baluyot who
was all alone with no relatives attending to her and after finding out that she was only 12 years old
decided to help her. After a short interview with Rosario, regarding her name and age only because
she clamped up about her residence and her relatives, they decided to help her by providing her the
medicine she needed during her confinement in readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who was
able to get the name and age of Rosario Baluyot from Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her for the
first time. For Fe Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot was an important factor because their program
assisted only indigent patients from infants up to 13 years old.
Rosario’s first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose bowel movement and
vomiting, which was first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which came out later as symptoms of
peritonitis due to a massive infection in the abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, after
she was examined by the physicians at the hospital, it was found out that there was a foreign object
lodged in her vaginal canal and she had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and foul smelling odor
emanating from her body. One of the doctors who attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr.
Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by means of a forceps, but several attempts proved futile
because said object was deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered by tissues. Her abdomen
was enlarged, tender and distended, symptoms of peritonitis. The patient was feverish and incoherent
when she was scheduled for operation on May 19, 1987, after the first attempt for an operation on May
17 was aborted allegedly because the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the hospital director was not
obtained. The surgeon who operated on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified that Rosario had to be
operated even in that condition in order to save her life. Her condition was guarded. This was
corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist during Rosario’s operation. It was in the evening of
May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen by making a 5 inch incision on her
stomach. He found out that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus, and so with the peritonieum,
and the pelvic cavity, and patches of pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared to
have septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and septicemia were traced to have been caused
through infection by the foreign object which has been lodged in the intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The
foreign object which was already agreed upon by both parties that it is a portion of a sexual vibrator
was extracted from the vagina of Rosario while under anesthesia. Said object was coated with tissues,
pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping and gave instructions
to release it to the authorized person. This object was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete
considered the operation successful and the patient was alive when he left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr.
Cruz stayed with said patient in the ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. The following
day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the
afternoon of May 20, 1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz which was indicated
therein that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to septicemia caused by the
foreign object lodged in the intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a transparent small jar and
labelled “Rosario Baluyot”. Jessica Herrera asked the nurse for the foreign object, and it was given to
her under proper receipt. Herrera then showed the same to the persons who helped financially
Rosario’s case, and afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in custody of the
said object until Mr. Salonga came and asked her for the object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask him in
locating the relatives of Rosario. They were able to trace Rosario’s grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos
Turla, and informed her that her granddaughter was already dead and lying in state at St. Martin
Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all the burial expenses for Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her residence at Sta. Rita and
asked her if she was interested in filing a case against the person who caused the death of her
granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence, she was brought to the Fiscal’s (City) Office to file the
same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo Legaspi with his messenger
came to her house and told her that the accused was willing to settle the case, but that accused Ritter
had only P15,000.00. The old woman did not accept it because she knows that the accused is liable to
pay damages anyway. After that, she received a letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a lawyer
for her case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted to have the case settled once and for all giving the
reason that she can no longer bear the situation, sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi.
Her nephew obliged and told her that she will be paid at the office of Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear
in the records, she went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an assistant
barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they were there, she saw Ritter arrive at the law office. Ritter
and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near the bathroom, and thereafter Ritter left. After he left, Atty.
Legaspi told Rosario’s grandmother that they are willing to settle for P20,000.00, but that Ritter left
only P15,000.00, so she received the money with the understanding that there was a balance of
P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign a statement, and she was asked to change the age of her
granddaughter Rosario. With the document prepared, she and the lawyer’s messenger went to the
Fiscal’s office to have it subscribed, and was subscribed before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance
of P5,000.00 was not paid, because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of Olongapo City and he
could no longer attend to it. Atty. Legaspi, during one of the hearings before the Court even apologized
to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of Station “A”, was directed by Col.
Daos, Station Commander of the Olongapo Police Department to make a follow up of the case of Rosario
Baluyot. On the other hand, since the suspect who inserted the foreign object inside Rosario’s vagina
was said to be an American, the NISRA, Subic Naval Base also conducted its investigation headed by
criminal investigator Agent Conrado Salonga. Coordinating with the local police and with Sister Eva
Palencia, since Rosario was a street child at Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about 43 street children
and from some of them they learned that Rosario Baluyot was with Jessie Ramirez with an American
at the MGM Hotel when the foreign object was inserted in her vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez,
they asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They found out that indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot
sometime before Christmas of 1986 with an American, who brought them to the said hotel. Jessie
Ramirez was taken inside the U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his statement. Then he was
brought to Mr. Edward Lee Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of the description supplied by Ramirez,
a composite drawing was photocopied and copies thereof were distributed to the local police and to the
sentries at the gate of the U.S. Naval Base. Some American servicemen who had resemblance to the
composite drawing were photographed and these were shown to Jessie Ramirez, but the result was
negative. Aside from the physical description by Ramirez about the appearance of the suspect, he also
described him as having the mannerisms of a homo-sexual.
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented Ermita, Manila, and thinking
that the so-called American may be
699
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 699
People vs. Ritter
European or Australian national, the team composed of Agent Salonga, Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl Marino
Victoria and P/Cpl Andres Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and Michael Johnson, another juvenile, proceeded
to Manila. They first went to the Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter checked in a hotel. That was on
September 23, 1987. On the first night, they went to Luneta Park where foreign homo-sexuals were
said to be frequenting, but the result was negative. Then on September 25, at about 11:00 p.m., while
they were standing at the corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del Pilar Street, a male caucasian who looked
like a homo-sexual stopped by admiringly infront of the two (2) juveniles, Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie
Ramirez then reported to Mr. Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity with the American suspect,
so the two minors were instructed to follow the foreigner and to strike a conversation. They did, and
when they returned, Jessie Ramirez told them that indeed the said foreigner was the one who brought
him and Rosario Baluyot to the MGM Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this foreigner had no
beard while the one previously described by Ramirez had a beard. Jessie Ramirez told them that maybe
he have just shaved it off. The said caucasian then entered a bar, and after several minutes he came
out, and Jessie Ramirez upon his signal with his thumbs up, as a signal to confirm that the said
foreigner is the suspect, arrested Ritter and brought him to the Manila Western Police District. It could
be mentioned at this stage that in this operation they were accompanied by two (2) policemen from the
Western Police District. The foreigner was hand cuffed and was told that he was a suspect for Rape
with Homicide. After the arrest, they first went to the pension house of the suspect in Ermita, Manila
to get his shoulder bag which contained his personal belongings, and from there they brought him to
the Western Police Department. At the said police headquarters, they were allowed a permissive search
by the foreigner of his clutch bag and his small shoulder bag and confiscated his passport, I.D., 3
inhalers, money in the form of dollars and travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about
P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they learned that the suspect’s name was Heinrich
Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national. During the questioning of Ritter, Salonga and his team already
left the headquarters and went to their hotel, because at this time Jessie Ramirez was already shaking
with fear after he identified the accused.
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was detained at the Olongapo City
Jail. The case for Rape with Homicide was filed against him at the City Fiscal of Olongapo. At the
preliminary investigation, accused was assisted by his own counsel. The private complainant was
Maria Burgos Turla because it was she who
700
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ritter
had custody of Rosario Baluyot after her mother Anita Burgos died on January 12, 1982, and their
father Policarpio Baluyot had left them under her custody. When this case was filed, the father’s
whereabouts was unknown, and he only appeared when the trial of this case before the Court was
already in progress. And upon his (Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only learned about the death
of his daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, long after Rosario was already gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could be no crime of Rape with
Homicide because the suspect was described as an American while Ritter is an Austrian. Also advanced
by the defense is that, it is a case of mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at the time of the
commission of the offense, already more than 13 years old, she having been born on December 26, 1973
as per baptismal certificate, wherein it appears that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25,
1974 and was born on December 26, 1973 as testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of St. James Parish
Church who issued the Baptismal Certificate, having custody and possession of the book of baptism for
the year 1975, but admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the matters or entries entered
therein. Likewise, the defense’s stand is that the accused cannot be liable for Homicide because a
vibrator is not a weapon of death but it is a thing for the purpose of giving sexual pleasure, and that
the death of Rosario Baluyot was due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the surgeon and Director of
the Olongapo City General Hospital, who operated on her.” (Rollo, pp. 109-116)
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads
as follows:
“WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds, that the prosecution has
established the GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape with Homicide as
defined and penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences HEINRICH
STEFAN RITTER to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) Philippine Currency, and TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P10,000.00) by way of attorney’s fees to the private prosecutors and to pay the costs.” (Rollo,
p. 126)
The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors allegedly committed by the court:
701
VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 701
People vs. Ritter
I the admission of hearsay evidence, oral declarations are therefore admissible as proof of birth
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE
ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT WAS ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WHO COMMITTED IT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS LESS THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED
OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO AND NOT REJECTING THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE AND IN NOT
UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt of
the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the most painstaking
effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial
conscience that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act (See People v. Villapaña,161 SCRA
73 [1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide of a young girl
who died after the rape because of a foreign object, believed to be a sexual vibrator, left inside her
vagina.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of the victim—whether or not
Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve (12) years old at the time the alleged incident happened on
October 10, 1986. The age is important in determining whether or not there was statutory rape. Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code defines the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a woman
under 12 years of age, in which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or unconscious state do
not have to be present.
702
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ritter
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she was sexually abused by the accused
and, therefore, rape was committed inspite of the absence of force or intimidation.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies of the victim’s
grandmother and father who testified that she was born on December 22, 1975. These oral declarations
were admitted pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court where, in the absence of a
birth certificate, the act or declaration about pedigree may be received in evidence on any notable fact
in the life of a member of the family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree within the rule which permits
(Decision, p. 54).
The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered Rosario’s birth date because
her brother died in Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosario’s mother) was the only one who failed
to attend the funeral because the latter has just given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13,
1988).
The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario was born on December 22,
1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he was certain that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when
she was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988). The trial court further added that their testimony is
supported by the clinical record and the death certificate indicating that she was 12 years old when
she was admitted at the Olongapo City General Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by
Rosario’s alleged guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the hospital’s clinical record clerk, Lorna Limos. Fe
Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario Baluyot also testified that she was told by Rosario that
she was 12 years old. The trial court accepted this as adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie
Ramirez, the principal witness in this case declared that he was born on September 5, 1973 and that
he was older than Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must have
been less than 12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother and father supported by
other independent evidence such as the clinical record, death certificate and the
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VOL. 194, MARCH 5, 1991 703
People vs. Ritter
testimonies of Fe Israel and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal certificate presented by the
defense without any probative or evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot’s age cannot stand the application of
evidentiary rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules
of Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:
1. (1)That the declarant must be dead or outside of the Philippines or unable to testify;
2. (2)That pedigree is in issue;
3. (3)That the person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the declarant by birth or
marriage;
 4. (4)That the declaration must be made before the controversy occurred or ante litem motam;
and
5. (5)That the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must as a general rule be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.”
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the prosecution nor do the declarations fall
within the purview of the rule.
The victim’s grandmother and father whose declarations regarding Rosario’s age were admitted by
the trial court are both alive, in the Philippines and able to testify as they both did testify in court.
Their declarations were made at the trial which is certainly not before the controversy arose. The other
witnesses who testified on Rosario’s age are not members of the victim’s family. The testimonies of
Rosario’s relatives must be weighed according to their own personal knowledge of what happened and
not as hearsay evidence on matters of family history.
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario’s age of doubtful value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother’s testimony pursuant to the ruling
laid down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court accepted the testimony of the
mother that her daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The mother stated that she knew the age
because
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704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ritter
the child was born about the time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay, but came from
one who had direct knowledge of the child’s birth.
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an
extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness.
(People v. Dasig, 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])
With respect to the grandmother’s testimony, the date of the brother’s death or funeral was never
established, which indicates that the day was rather insignificant to be remembered. The father’s
declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in court does not at all show that he had
direct knowledge of his daughter’s birth. He was certain though that she was more than one (1) year
old at the time she was baptized.
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim’s age, nor was there any basis
shown to establish their competence for the purpose. The clinical records were based on Gaspar
Alcantara’s incompetent information given when he brought the victim to the hospital. Alcantara came
to know her only about a year before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the
circumstances of Rosario’s birth. The death certificate relied upon by the trial court was merely based
on the clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record of birth.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years
old at the time of the alleged incident are not adequate to establish the exact date of birth, much less
offset a documentary record showing a different date.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot’s baptismal certificate which the trial court rejected as
being hearsay and of no value. As against the oral declarations made by interested witnesses
establishing Rosario’s age to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on record is more convincing and
worthy of belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by the lower court to the St.
James Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic priest testified and
stated that he is the head of said parish. He brought with him Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled “Liber
Baptisno-rum”, a latin term for baptismal book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book,
there appears the name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25, 1974, and born on
December 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales.
Edita R. Milan appears as the only sponsor with Olongapo City as her address.
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held that:
xxx xxx xxx
“In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of
baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered
public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates
therein specified—but not the veracity of the status or declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v.
Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof
only of the baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who
baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in
the certificate that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements,
in order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law.”
(At pp. 84-85)
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the
course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms
administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and
recorded in a book of the church during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil. 105 [1914]
Hence, the certificate (Exhibit “22”) presented by the defense that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on
December 25, 1974 may be admitted in evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio Baluyot, the victim’s
father testified that he had in his possession a baptismal certificate different from the one presented
in court. However, no other baptismal record was ever presented to prove a date different from that
brought by the official custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states that Rosario was baptized on
December 25, 1974, it is therefore highly improbable that Rosario could have been born on December
22, 1975. She could not have been baptized before she was born. Exhibit “22” may be proof only of
baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario was born in 1975. With the father’s assertion
that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was baptized, we are then more inclined to agree
that Rosario was born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal Registry. In the case of People v.
Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
“x x x Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth had allegedly not been
registered, her baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother’s testimony, was sufficient to establish that
Mary Rose was below twelve years old when she was violated by Rebancos.” (At. p. 426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more reliable document as
to Rosario’s birth which could serve as sufficient proof that she was born on December 26, 1973.
Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident on October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario’s age. The burden of proof lies on
the prosecution to prove that Rosario was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident in
a charge of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this respect.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the time of the alleged
sexual violation, it was necessary to prove that the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that there
was force of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious in accordance
with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the contrary, the evidence
shows that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant. In fact, she appears to
have consented to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie
Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances coupled
with the testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that Rosario Baluyot,
a poor street child, was a prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced
her to submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances do not come under the purview of force
or intimidation needed to convict for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape was committed. But was
Ritter guilty of homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim was a consequence of the
insertion of the foreign object into the victim’s vagina by the appellant.
We now ask “Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside Rosario’s vagina
which led to her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, the
circumstances are capable of varying interpretations and are not enough to justify conviction.
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object inserted in Rosario’s vagina.
Neither could he identify the object (Exhibit “C-2”) taken from Rosario as the same object which the
appellant was holding at that time of the alleged incident.
In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4, 1987, he answered that:
xxx xxx xxx
“T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang napansin
na inilabas ng kano sa kanyang dala- dalahan kung mayroon man?
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at
napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa kanyang bag na parang vicks
inhaler, na kanyang inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami at pagkatapos
niya ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng
Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may habang
dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay bilog na patulis at may tabang mga
kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng bagay na
may takip dahil natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong
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708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ritter
mabuti ang larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin kung makikilala mo
ang mga bagay na nasa larawang ito, na may kinalaman sa nakita mong
kinuha ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay katulad na
katulad noong takip ng bagay na inilabas ng Amerikano sa kanyang
bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging kulay asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay
kulay puti?(Exhibit“A”, p. 2; Italics Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the appellant does not deny
having possessed at that time. He was certain that the object was white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January 6, 1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was grayish in color with color blue
(Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6, 1988) The inconsistency of
the witness’ testimony casts doubt as to the veracity of the statements made especially when he
answered on additional cross-examination that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit “C-2” was
the same object being held by Ritter was because it was the only one shown to him by the prosecution
(T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator
because he did not actually see it in the possession of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next morning that the foreigner
inserted something inside her vagina. The trial court admitted such statement as part of the res
gestae. In a strained effort to accept such statement as part of res gestae, the trial court focused the test
of admissibility on the lapse of time between the event and the utterance. For the average 13 years old,
the insertion of a mechanical device or anything for that matter into the vagina of a young girl is
undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie, however, there must be more evidence to show that the
statement, given after a night’s sleep had intervened, was given instinctively because the event was so
startling. Res gestaedoes not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something inside Rosario’s vagina, the
evidence is still not adequate to impute the death of Rosario to the appellant’s alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object inserted in her vagina.
We quote:
“Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on Rosario even
categorically admitted to you that she wasalready able to remove the
object allegedly inserted inside her vagina, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words used by
Rosario Baluyot later on when you met her when you asked her and when
she told you that she wasalready able to remove that object from her
vagina?
A “Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, “she told me that. I asked her, “Was it already
removed?” And she answered, ‘Yes, it was removed.’ But the same night,
she again complained of pain of her stomach. She sent one of her friends
to call for me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was uttering defama- tory
words against me as she was groaning in pain.” (TSN, Jan. 6, 1988, pp.
72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after both children were invited by
the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988). Rosario was said to be groaning in pain so
we can just imagine the distress she was undergoing at this point in time. If the device inserted by the
appellant caused the pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain and discomfort
until May, 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA
429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis’ testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness
for the defense is considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a graduate of the State
University in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member of the Bar 1949, and a graduate of the
Institute of Criminology University. He was awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963,
and also a graduate of United
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710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ritter
Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo Japan 1965. He was
appointed Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in 1940 until 1944. He became
Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and became the Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984. He is at
present a Professorial Lecturer on Legal Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima College of
Medicine; a Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH Medical Center, Makati Medical Center, UERM
Medical Center, MCU Medical Center. He has been with the NBI for 43 years. He has attended no less
than 13 conferences abroad. He is the author of the textbooks entitled “Legal Medicine” and “Medical
Jurisprudence”.) With his impressive legal and medical background, his testimony is too authoritative
to ignore. We quote the pertinent portions of his testimony:
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked as Exh. ‘C-2’
which object was described as a part of a sexual vibrator battery operated.
Now, given this kind of object, would you kindly tell us what would be the
proba ble effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is inserted into her
vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed into a human
being and as such be considered a foreign object. As a foreign object, the
tendency of the body may be: No. 1—expel the foreign body—No. 2.—The
tendency of thebody is to react to that foreign body. One of the reactions
that maybe manifested by the person wherein such foreign body is
concerned is to cover the foreign body with human tissue, in a way to avoid
its further injury to the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain manifest
symptoms and changes in the area where theforeign body is located.
In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be localized but
may be felt all over the body, we call it systemic reaction. Now, considering
the fact that this fore ign body as shown to me is already not complete, this
shows exposure of its different parts for the body to react. If there is
mechanism to cause the foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of
power from within and thatpower must be a dry cell battery. [The]
composition of the battery are, manganese dioxide ammonium, salts, water
People vs. Ritter
and any substance that will cause current flow. All of these substances are
irritants including areas of the container and as such, the primary
reaction of the body is to cause irritation on the tissues, thereby
inflammatory changes develop and in all likelihood, aside from those
inflammatory changes would be a supervening infection in a way that the
whole generative organ of the woman will suffer from diseased process
causing her the systemic reaction like fever, swelling of the area, and other
systemic symptoms. x x x. (TSN., pp. 13-15, October 19, 1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before any reaction
such as an infection would set in, how many days after the insertion of this
object in the vagina of a 12 year old girl?
A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends is exposed, in
a way that vaginal secretion has more chance to get in, well, liberation of
this irritant chemicals would be enhanced and therefore in a shorter period
of time, there being this vaginal reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow after the
insertion?
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any foreign body in
the vaginal canal usually developed within a period of two (2) weeks xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
Q x x x [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a sexual vibrator
was inserted in her vagina on October 10, 1986 and she was operated on,
on May 19, 1987 the following year, so it took more than 7 months before
this was extracted, would you say that it will take that long before any
adverse infection could set-in inside the vagina?
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter time. (TSN.,
Oct. 19, 1988, p. 18)
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs and even this
lipstick of women usually, there are only about two (2) weeks time that the
patient suffer some abnormal symptoms.
Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object that you
mentioned, this object has a shorter time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time.” (TSN., Oct. 19, 1988, p. 20)
The trial court, however, ruled that “there is no hard and fast rule as to the time frame wherein
infection sets in upon insertion of a foreign body in the vagina canal. For Dr. Solis, the time frame is
not more than 10 months, and this case is still within the said time frame.”
A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases. But where an accused is
facing a penalty of reclusion perpetua, the evidence against him cannot be based on probabilities which
are less likely than those probabilities which favor him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of foreign body lodged inside the
body. An examination of the object gave the following results:
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a battery as per certification dated 01
June 1988, signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercurio, Shipboard Electrical Systems Mechanics, Foreman II,
SRF Shop 51, Subic (see attached certification).
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and vibrator depicted in the catalog
because no actual physical dimensions and/or mechanical characteristics were shown in the catalog.”
(Exhibit “LL”)
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic examination on the open end portion
which revealed the following:
“Result of Examination
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of specimen #1 shows the following
inscription:
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT” (Exhibit “MM”)
From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered as inert and based on Dr. Solis’
testimony, it is more likely that infection should set in much earlier. Considering also that the object
was inserted inside the vagina which is part of the generative organ of a woman, an organ which is
lined with a very thin layer of membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is more
susceptible to infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)
The truth of Dr. Solis’ testimony is more probable under the circumstances of the case. We see no
reason why his opinions qualified by training and experience should not be controlling and binding
upon the Court in the determination of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA
469 [1988]).
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he examined Rosario Baluyot on
May 17, 1986 as a referral patient from the Department of Surgery to give an OB-GYN clearance to
the patient prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988)
Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario Baluyot on that
day?
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of your findings, if
any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the delivery room. The
patient was brought to the delivery room wheel-chaired then from the wheel
chair, the patient was ambigatory (sic). She was able to walk from the door
to the examining table. On examination, the patient is cons cious, she was
fairly nourished, fairly developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at
that time and examination deals more on the abdomen which shows
slightly distended abdomen with muscle guarding with tenderness all
over, with maximum tenderness over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5,
September 28, 1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about your second examination to the patient, what was your
findings, if any?
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal examin ation wherein I
placed my index finger and middle finger inside the vagina of the patient
and was able to palpate a hard object. After which, I made a speculum
examination wherein I was able to visualize the inner portion of the
vaginal canal, there I saw purulent foul smelling, blood
tints, discharge in the vaginal canal and a foreign body invaded on the
posterior part of the vaginal canal.
xxx xxx xxx
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he asked me to try
to remove the said foreign object by the use of forceps which I tried to do so
also but I failed to extract the same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario Baluyot both in
the first and second instance, Rosario Baluyot was conscious and were you
able to talk to her when you were examining her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge inside her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that “GINAMIT AKO NG NE- GRO AT SIYA
ANG NAGLAGAY NITO.”
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and who inserted and
placed the foreign object on her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3) months ago from the
time I examined her.
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward, what happened
next with your patient?
A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on operation on that
date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo surgery after
that?”
(TSN, Sept. 28, 1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinal’s testimony considering Rosario’s condition at that time. It ruled
that it is inconceivable that she would be striking a normal conversation with the doctors and would
be sitting on the examination table since Gaspar Alcantara stated that when he brought Rosario
Baluyot to the hospital, she was unconscious and writhing in pain.
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and ambulant at that time because
there were several instances testified to by different witnesses that she was still able to talk prior to
her operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of
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People vs. Ritter
the Olongapo Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement testified that as a member of this group she
visits indigent children in the hospital every Saturday and after office hours on working days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosario’s death which was May 17, she was still able to talk to Rosario
Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates helped Rosario go to the comfort room to urinate. (T.S.N., pp.
16-19, May 25, 1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social worker who worked at Pope
John 23rd Community Center under Sister Eva Palencia. In one of her hospital visits, she encountered
Rosario Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child who happened to be Rosario
Baluyot seated on the cement floor and when she asked why she was seated there, she was told that it
was too hot in the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-13,
September 7, 1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital actually testified that she
was conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September 14, 1988) but writhing in pain. He took pity on her so he brought
her to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and could still answer
questions asked of her although she was complaining of stomach pains. Unfortunately, the medical
attention given to her failed to halt the aggravation of her condition. The operation on May 19 was too
late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman’s language is blood poisoning, and peritonitis,
which is massive infection, in the abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual
vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the infection from the uterus to the fallopian
tubes and into the peritoneum and the abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of the RPC.
“He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.”
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
“The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
proof that the accused caused the victim’s death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt.” (Italics supplied)
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we explained that:
xxx xxx xxx
“The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution
fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The
defendant faces the full panoply of state authority with all “The People of the Philippines” arrayed
against him. In a manner of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily
against him. It is important, therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by
presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.” (At. p. 592)
The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the number of witnesses and
preponderance of evidence presented by the prosecution but there is no direct and convincing proof
that the accused was responsible for the vibrator left inside the victim’s vagina which caused her death
seven (7) months after its insertion. What the prosecution managed to establish were mere
circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a conviction it is imperative, though, that the
following requisites should concur:
1. (a)There is more than one circumstance;
2. (b)The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. (c)The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that “before conviction can be had upon circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime
(People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Italics supplied). It must fairly exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]). In this case the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the
appellant for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario Baluyot and how her death
exemplified starkly the daily terrors that most street children encounter as they sell their bodies in
order to survive. At an age when innocence and youthful joys should preponderate in their lives, they
experience life in its most heartless and inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle
disappointments occupying their young minds, they daily cope with tragedies that even adults should
never be made to carry.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the efforts of Government to
dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the nation to care for its street
children. It would have meant a lot to social workers and prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer could
be brought to justice so that his example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the formulation
and implementation of meaningful remedies. However, we cannot convict on anything less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as
much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they are for normal, decent, and law-
abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction
that the accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied.
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing reasonable doubt:
1. 1.The evidence on Rosario Baluyot’s baptism creates reasonable doubt about her being less
than 12 years old when the carnal knowledge took place. If the evidence for the prosecution
is to be believed, she was not yet born on the date she was baptized.
2.Since the proof of Rosario’s being under 12 years of age is not satisfactory, the prosecution has
to prove force, intimidation, or deprivation of reason in order to convict for rape. There is no such
proof. In fact, the evidence shows a willingness to submit to the sexual act for monetary
considerations.
3.The only witness to the fact of Ritter’s placing a vibrator inside the vagina of Rosario was Jessie
Ramirez. This witness did not see Ritter insert the vibrator. The morning after the insertion, he
was only told by Rosario about it. Two days later, he allegedly met Rosario who informed him
that she was able to remove the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the night of that second
encounter, he saw Rosario groaning because of pain in her stomach. She was even hurling
invectives. Ramirez’ testimony is not only hearsay, it is also contradictory.
4.It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign object with active
properties to cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection only after seven months inside a young
girl’s vaginal canal. Infection would have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez recalled that the
incident happened in December of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence,
however shows that the appellant was not here in the Philippines that December. As per the
Commission on Immigration Arrival and Departure Report, Heinrich Ritter arrived in the
Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left on October 12, 1986. He never returned until September
23, 1987 (Exhibits “DD” and “EE”). The incident could have happened only in October, but then
it would have been highly improbable for the sexual vibrator to stay inside the vagina for seven
(7) months with the kind of serious complications it creates.
5.The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital confinement testified that she
told him “Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya ang naglagay nito.” The accused is not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario’s activities after the hotel incident.
Considering Dr. Barcinal’s testimony indicating that she was “used” by a “Negro” three (3) months
prior to admission in the hospital and Rosario’s unfortunate profession, there is always the possibility
that she could have allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where a
vibrator or vibrators were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the alleged crime
renders the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish appellant’s guilty connection with the
requisite moral certainty. (See People v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted
a foreign object inside Rosario’s vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is possible that the
appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon
mere possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken
against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken
into account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour violates
the mores of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must survive the test of reason. The
strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA
593 [1986]). As stated in the case of People v. Ng, (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):
“x x x [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that reasonable doubt in
criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning such proof ‘to the satisfaction
of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis
except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even
though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish the
truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the
reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it.” (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972
Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). x x x”
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally certain of the guilt
of the appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal. This notwithstanding, the Court can not
ignore the acts of the appellant on the children, Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986
at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials, we are convinced that he comes to this country not to
look at historical sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate pleasures but in order to satisfy
the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was the appellant who
picked him and Rosario from among the children and invited them to the hotel; and that in the hotel
he was shown pictures of young boys like him and the two masturbated each other, such actuations
clearly show that the appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up young
children. Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in his book entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:
“Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the compulsive desire to have sexual
intercourse with a child of either sex. Children of various ages participate in sexual activities, like
fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual intercourse. Usually committed by a
homosexual between a man and a boy the latter being a passive partner.”
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia, assuming this is a crime by itself.
Pedophilia is clearly a behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the
state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of our youth. (Article
II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]).
Pedophiles, especially thrill seeking aliens have no place in our country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed acts injurious not
only to Rosario Baluyot but also to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. The state
has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance and special protection from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
(Art. XV, Section 3 [2] x x x (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has abused Filipino children,
enticing them with money. The appellant should be expelled from the country. Furthermore, it does
not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a person while not
criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC, supra.
“x x x While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of
the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code
Commission as follows:
“ ‘The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability
is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances
of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as
to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived
from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and
civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate
and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for the reparation of damages suffered by
the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the
present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: ‘There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from
a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished.’
It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense
should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party,
why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every
private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any
less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It
will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice—a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged.’ ”
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother’s house. Circumstances forced
her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have
certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death as
reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with
homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there
is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario’s vaginal canal and
that the vibrator may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities
but civil liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of
indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public
policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children,
enticing them with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in
the Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed by
the appellant should not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the case, we
are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00. And finally, the
Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children from exploitation
by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young
bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for the
relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten
segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college dissertations, and
other studies deal at length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the appellant will
continue to enter the Philippines and foreign publications catering to them will continue to advertise
the availability of Filipino street children unless the Government acts and acts soon. We have to acquit
the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express the Court’s
concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against them. Something must
be done about it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH
STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the
amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation
proceedings against the appellant and to immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to reentry
into the country.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J., Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ, concur.

Judgment reversed and set aside.

Note.—The force employed by appellant on 12-year old complainant was sufficient to instill fear
in her to submit to his lustful desires. (People vs. Alamo, 130 SCRA 46.)

——o0o——
 VOL. 419, JANUARY 15, 2004 537
People vs. Genosa
G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
Criminal Law; Parricide; Evidence; Witnesses; Appeals; The findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion.—
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution
of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
could affect the outcome of the case.
Same; Same; Same; Relationship; The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender
with the victim.—The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In
the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased
is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact
of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to.
Same; Same; Same; Admission; Exceptions; Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is
conclusive upon the party making it, with exceptions.—Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission
is conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was
made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made.
Same; Same; Justifying Circumstances; Self-defense; In criminal cases, self-defense shifts the burden of
proof from the prosecution to the defense.—When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent
upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Well-settled
is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person)
shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS); The concept has been recognized
in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.—In claiming
self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While new in
Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-
defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense. By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant
is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their “understanding of the justifiably fearful state
of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Battered Woman”, defined; In order to be classified as a
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice.—A battered woman has
been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior
by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore,
in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least
twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second
time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
539
VOL. 419, JANUARY 15, 2004 539
People vs. Genosa
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Battered women exhibit common personality traits.—Battered
women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home,
the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to
accept responsibility for the batterer’s actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Cycle of Violence”; Phases; Tension-Building Phase; During
the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs—it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or
another form of hostile behavior.—During the tension-building phase,minor battering occurs—it could
be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify
the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What
actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor.
All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however,
proves to be double-edged, because her “placatory” and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he
has the right to abuse her in the first place. However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her
effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each
partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the
persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes
emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some
unpredictable point, the violence “spirals out of control” and leads to an acute battering incident.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Acute Battering Incident; The acute battering incident is said
to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death.—The acute battering incidentis
said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman
deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only
the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its
explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot
reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition. At this stage, she has a
sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember
every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer
is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is
futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that
innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Tranquil Period; The final phase of the cycle of
violence begins when the acute battering incident ends—during this tranquil period, the couple
experience profound relief.—The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering
incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the
batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been
viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her
again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never
happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this “good, gentle and caring man”
is the real person whom she loves. A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the
emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-
being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help,
are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek
professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that
she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically. The illusion of absolute inter dependency is well-
entrenched in a battered woman’s psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally
dependent on each other—she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this
miserable cycle of ‘‘tension, violence and forgiveness,” each partner may believe that it is better to die
than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning without the
other.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements; One who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on
one’s life, not merely imaginary.—Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who
resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following
requisites and effect of self-defense: “Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.—The following do not incur
any criminal liability: “1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur; First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlawful aggression; Unlawful aggression is the most essential
element of self-defense.—Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It
presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack—or an imminent danger thereof—on the life or
safety of a person.
541
VOL. 419, JANUARY 15, 2004 541
People vs. Genosa
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-
defense.—Aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such
aggression, there can be no self-defense—complete or incomplete—on the part of the victim.
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Passion and Obfuscation; Requisites; To appreciate this
circumstance, the following requisites should concur.—In addition, we also find in favor of appellant
the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts
or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the
following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.
Same; Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.—There is treachery when one commits
any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. In order to qualify
an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself;
they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation
of evidence. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively
as the killing itself.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Criminal law; Parricide; Justifying Circumstances; Self-defense; Battered Woman
Syndrome; Phases; The Battered Woman Syndrome has three (3) phases.—As exhaustively discussed
in the ponencia, the “Battered Woman Syndrome” has three phases, to wit: (1) the tension-building
phase, where minor batterings in the form of verbal or slight physical abuse occurs. Here, the woman
tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his
way; (2) the acute battering incident phase which is characterized by brutality, destructiveness and
sometimes, death. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him and that
resistance would only exacerbate her condition; and (3) the tranquil period, where the couple
experience a compound relief and the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his
partner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Once BWS and an impending danger based on the conduct of
the deceased in previous battering episodes are established, actual occurrence of an assault is no longer
a condition sine qua non before self-defense may be upheld.—Traditionally, in order that self-defense
may be appreciated, the unlawful aggression or the attack must be imminent and actually in existence.
This interpretation must, however, be re-evaluated vis-à-visthe recognized inherent characteristic of
the psyche of a person afflicted with the “Battered Woman Syndrome.” As previously discussed, women
afflicted by this syndrome live in constant fear for their life and thus respond in self-defense. Once
BWS and an impending danger based on the conduct of the deceased in previous battering episodes
are established, actual occurrence of an assault is no longer a condition sine qua non before self defense
may be upheld. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of
danger. As stated in the ponencia, to require the battered person to await an obvious deadly attack
before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by installment.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc, Leyte, Br. 35.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for appellee.
 Katrina Legarda and Dulce T. Asensi for appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory—the
“battered woman syndrome” (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts,
however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression—no
immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of
cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
“psychological paralysis” she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating
factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she
was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional
and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn
child’s.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody on
parole, because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention
during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic
Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a
generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused
with the penalty of DEATH.
“The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand
pesos (P50.000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages.”2
The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:
“That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel,
Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband,
with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing]
the following wounds, to wit:
‘Cadaveric spasm.
‘Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
‘Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident postmortem
lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly
protrudes out of the mouth.
‘Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital
bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain,
spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior
surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal
vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
‘Blisters at both extremities, anterior chest, posterior chest,
trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.
‘Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.’
which caused his death.”4
With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March 3,
1997.6 In due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution’s version of the facts in this wise:
“Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter,
they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben’s younger brother,
Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from
Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children,
namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre. “On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a
cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo
would pass Ben’s house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that
appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a
store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did not
see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas’ rented house, he heard her
say ‘I won’t hesitate to kill you’ to which Ben replied ‘Why kill me when I am innocent?’ That was the
last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas’ rented house appeared
uninhabited and was always closed.
“On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living
about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a
pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie
Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
“That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc
when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag,
locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50)
meters behind the Genosas’ rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to
Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
“On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating
from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench
but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban
destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen
door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the
unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben
lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back
of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his
son’s misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as
that of [her] son.
“Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police
station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas’ rented house.
Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the
house and went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped
with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found
in one corner
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546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a
wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1
1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not
in disarray.
“About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside
at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the
presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases,
Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing.
The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide
later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben’s death was ‘cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].’
“Appellant admitted killing Ben.She testified that going home after work on November 15, 1995,
she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a
payday. With her cousin Ecel Arano, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at
Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas’
house. Ecel went home despite appellant’s request for her to sleep in their house.
“Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She
allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework.
Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping
knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to appellant,
Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her
around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed
his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben
allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by
the neck, and told her ‘You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.’ Appellant testified that
she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got
a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, ‘smashed’ the arm of Ben with a pipe,
causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then ‘smashed’ Ben at his nape with the pipe
as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
“Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She
supposedly ‘distorted’ the drawer where the gun was
547
VOL. 419, JANUARY 15, 2004 547
People vs. Genosa
and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom.”7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
“1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage,
Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her husband’s death, as a Secretary to the
Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie
Bianca.
“2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in
Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against
their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their
closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
“3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben’s parents, together with Ben’s brother,
Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben ‘lived happily’. But apparently,
soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
“4. Ben’s brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben and
Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home
drunk. Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic
holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic
left the house but after a week, she returned apparently having asked for Ben’s forgiveness. In another
incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben’s aid again and
saw blood from Ben’s forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after
Marivic had apparently again asked for Ben’s forgiveness.
“Mrs. lluminada Genosa, Marivic’s mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic
married in ‘1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.’ She said as the marriage went
along, Marivic became ‘already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of
Marivic’s two sons, there were ‘three (3) misunderstandings.’ The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben
with a table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic
struck Benon the forehead ‘using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was wounded
and also the ear’ and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the
couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben’s hand was plastered as
‘the bone cracked.’
“Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
“5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 ‘After we collected our
salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.’ They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which
they went to ‘Uniloks’ and drank beer—allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought
barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben,
after which he went across the road to wait ‘for the runner and the usher of the masiao game because
during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and
runners so that I can place my bet.’ On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the Genosas
arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one ‘Fredo’ who is used by Ben to feed
his fighting cocks. Basobas’ testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was
Marivic saying ‘I will never hesitate to kill you’, whilst Ben replied ‘Why kill me when I am innocent’
Basobas thought they were joking.
“He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence. Basobas
admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he
once told Ben ‘before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa’ that he should leave her
and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave him ‘so many times’.
“Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had been
quarreling. He said Ben ‘even had a wound’ on the right forehead. He had known the couple for only
one (1) year.
“6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a
habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on
the bed, and sometimes beat her.
“These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben
would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said
after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra.
Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic
said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.
549
VOL. 419, JANUARY 15, 2004 549
People vs. Genosa
“7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and
violence she received at the hands of Ben.
‘7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on November
15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through
the open jalousies, he saw the spouses ‘grappling with each other’. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold.
He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night as that
testified to by Arturo Busabos.8)
‘7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that
he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the
window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw ‘the spouses grappling with each
other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa’. He
said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that,
he went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next
morning. (Again, please note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
‘7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel,
Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them
to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in
him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their
house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified ‘if somebody would come.’ He
testified that while Ben was alive ‘he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our
house and he will say, Teody’ because that was what he used to call me, ‘mokimas ta,’ which means
‘let’s go and look for a whore.’ Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben ‘would box his wife and I would
see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as
according to her a knife was stricken to her.’ Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been
injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
‘7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the
afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben. They
searched in the market place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She
accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house ‘because she
might be battered by her husband.’ When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening,
Miss Arano said that ‘her husband was already there and was drunk.’ Miss Arano knew he was drunk
‘because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face.’ Marivic entered the house and she
heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the
house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when
she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple
‘were very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase.’ She said Marivic ran
into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn’t get in he got a chair and a knife and ‘showed
us the knife through the window grill and he scared us.’ She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no
one came. On cross-examination, she said that when she left Marivic’s house on November 15, 1995,
the couple were still quarreling.
‘7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS,
Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient ‘many times’ and had also received treatment from other doctors.
Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of
physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the
PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an
expert witness.’
xxx xxx xxx
‘Dr. Caing’s clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three
(23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits ‘2’ and ‘2-B.’ The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos
Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical
injuries reported was marked as Exhibit ‘3.’
“On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether the
injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified
to examine the psychological make-up of the patient, ‘whether she is capable of committing a crime or
not.’
7.6. Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified that
about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought
his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing ‘family troubles’. He told Marivic
to return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed ‘that they might have settled
with each other or they might have forgiven with each other.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband
who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she
wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the
Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born
prematurely on December 1, 1995.
“Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5)
times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason
why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because ‘he was crazy about his recent
girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.’
“On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the
bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his
testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in
Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias ‘Marvelous
Isidro’; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of
her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
‘Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did not know
what happened to the pipe she used to ‘smash him once’; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist
with the bob; and that two (2) hours after she was ‘whirled’ by Ben, he kicked her ‘ass’ and dragged her
towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.’
“9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was made of
the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution
witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
“10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the
time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal
cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic
pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police
to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw ‘some police officers and neighbors
around.’ She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the
door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxx xxx xxx
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
“Dra. Cerillo said that ‘there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of the
head’ which she described as a ‘fracture’. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or
3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.
“Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
“11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the
crime of PARRICIDE committed ‘with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with
the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.’
“12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September
1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
“13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding
Marivic guilty ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an
aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.
“14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date of 24
January 2000, Marivic’s trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as
counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant’s Briefs he had
prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her. “The Honorable
Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of appearance of
undersigned counsel.
“15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to
the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of
Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her ‘Brief without counsels’ to the Court.
“This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
“16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable Court
on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death;
allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a
quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
“Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only
qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the death wound (as
culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit ‘A’) is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with
a lead pipe.
“17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted Marivic’s
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case ‘to the trial court for the reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the ‘battered woman syndrome’ plea, within ninety (90)
days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with
the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.’
 “18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
“Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quoasked if she had interviewed Marivic
Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal Institution in 1999,
but that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
“Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own
private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before this, she
was the Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of
Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph’s College; and was the counseling
psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the
Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from
the U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a member
of the American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the International Council of
Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member
of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy,
recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic
violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research about Military
Psychology. She has written a book entitled ‘Energy Global Psychology’ (together with Drs. Allan Tan
and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women
as this is the first case of that nature.
“Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and
psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about
500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that ‘there are lots of variables that cause all
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
of this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.
“Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of ‘a lot of incidents of psychological abuse,
verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, ‘the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of
herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics, x x x they usually think very lowly
of themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that
they were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally
and even sexually abusive to them.’ Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a
dysfunctional family or from ‘broken homes.’
“Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, ‘also has a very low opinion of
himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant, very
hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot
of times they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent.’ The
batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them
feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so ‘there is a lot
of modeling of aggression in the family.’
“Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her
husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which makes her
hope her husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the
sake of the children.
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house, or lock
themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering ‘physical violence on both of
them. She said that in a ‘normal marital relationship,’ abuses also happen, but these are ‘not
consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out.’ In an ‘abnormal marital relationship,’
the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and ‘even would cause hospitalization on the victim
and even death on the victim.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was her
opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because ‘inspite of her feeling of self-confidence
which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she
sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she still has the imprint of all
the abuses that she had experienced in the past.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for
nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then
thought of herself as a victim.
xxx xxx xxx
“19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away, appeared
and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
“Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine
Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of
psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the
Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After
that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna
Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he obtained
the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He
was also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society;
the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
“He authored ‘The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military
Academy from the Period 1954 - 1978’ which was presented twice in international congresses. He also
authored The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000’, which was likewise
published internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on
a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he
published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
 “Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and
neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand,
is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in
psychiatry.
“Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already
encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty
thousand cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his
experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in
Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
“As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, where there
is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an
unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder ‘depends on the vulnerability of the victim.’ Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very
healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and
physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, ‘it will take more repetitive trauma to
precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.’
“In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the ‘anxiety neurosis or
neurologic anxcietism.’ It is produced by ‘overwhelming brutality, trauma.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo explained that with ‘neurotic anxiety’, the victim relives the beating or trauma as if
it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks ‘of nothing but the
suffering.’
xxx xxx xxx
“A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable,
and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher
sensitivity and her ‘self-world’ is damaged.
“Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual’s illness, such as
the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally
‘internalizes what is around him within the environment.’ And it becomes his own personality. He is
very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong facade ‘but in it
there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that ‘even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the one
who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the
individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend themselves,
and ‘primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the immediate
surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the household.’ He said a victim resorts to
weapons when she has ‘reached the lowest rock
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VOL. 419, JANUARY 15, 2004 557
People vs. Genosa
bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted for
two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social case studies
as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx xxx xxx
“On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her
husband Marivic’c mental condition was that she was ‘re-experiencing the trauma.’ He said ‘that we
are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It
will just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-
experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.’ At the time he interviewed Marivic ‘she was more
subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament
she is involved.’
xxx xxx xxx
“20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public prosecutor.
Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-opened
trial a quo were elevated.”9
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution
evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court
appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly
defenseless when he was killed—lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the
back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of
appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower
court to admit the experts’ testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant’s Motion,
remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion
on the “battered woman syndrome” plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this
Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court’s Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two
clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan 10 and Alfredo Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts on domestic
_______________
 10 Qualifying her expertise, Dra. Dayan stated that she had been a practising clinical psychologist
for over twenty (20) years. Currently, she is a professor at the De La Salle University. Prior thereto,
she was the head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of
Psychology of the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph’s College; and the counseling
psychologist of the National Defense College. She obtained her bachelor’s degree in psychology from
the University of the Philippines (UP), her Master of Arts in Clinical Counseling from Ateneo, and her
Ph.D. also from UP. She is the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists, comprised of
members from about 68 countries; and was the past president of the Psychological Association of the
Philippines. She is a member of the Forensic Psychology Association, the American Psychological
Association, and the ASEAN Counseling Association. She authored the book entitled Energy Global
Psychology (together with Drs. Allen Tan and Allan Bernardo). Dra. Dayan also lectures at the
Philippine Judicial Academy, recently on the socio-demographic and psychological profiles of families
involved in domestic violence cases. On the subject, she had conducted, for over a period of ten years,
research on the profiles of about 500 families involved in domestic violence.
11 Dr. Pajarillo obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas and has been in
the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight years. He honed his practice in psychiatry and neurology
during his stint
559
VOL. 419, JANUARY 15, 2004 559
People vs. Genosa
violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then presented to and
admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of
the case.12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court’s consideration:
1. “1.The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting
on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
2. “2.The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally
married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
3. “3.The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
4. “4.The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial
and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-
beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
_______________
with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre. Thereafter, he was called to active duty in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and was assigned at the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty-six years. He was
a diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; and a fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry
and the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was also a member of the World Association of Military
Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine
Association of Military Surgeons. He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the
Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954-1978, which was presented twice in international
congresses. He also authored “The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000,” which
was likewise published internationally and locally. On a Parke-Davis grant, he published a medical
textbook on the use of Prasepam; on an ER Squibb grant, he was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline);
and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86. Prior to his retirement from government
service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. (TSN, February 9, 2001, pp. 6-9; Exhibits “F”-“F-
9”-Appellant (Bio-Data of Dr. Pajarillo).
12 This case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 4, 2003, upon receipt by this Court of
appellee’s Brief. Appellant’s Brief was filed on December 2, 2002.
560
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
1. “5.The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic
Genosa.
2. “6.The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic’s flight to Manila and her
subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her
unborn child.
3. “7.The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of
treachery.
4. “8.The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in
determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby
erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the
ultimate penalty of death.”13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense
and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution
of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
could affect the outcome of the case.14
In appellant’s first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or
misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court’s disposition of the case.
In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
 First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated “an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.” We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge
Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses
and—on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record—made his evaluation, findings
and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of
the accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judge’s conclusions, we cannot
peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an “obviously hasty” manner. The
Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at
least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the conclusion
of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch
should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the
dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in
substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.15
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been
legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,16 this
Court held:
“The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide
of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage
certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may
be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to.”
Two of the prosecution witnesses—namely, the mother and the brother of appellant’s deceased
spouse—attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic. 17 The defense raised no objection to
these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial
admission of her marriage to Ben.18 Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon
the party making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a
palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made.19 Other than merely attacking the non-
presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the admission made by
appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable mistake.
Third,under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben’s death—whether by
a gunshot or by beating with a pipe—has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its
September 29, 2000 Resolution, “[considering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her
husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head,
the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts
actually caused the victim’s death.” Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not
dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk,
gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had
not raised the novel defense of “battered woman syndrome,” for which such evidence may have been
relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed
shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear
inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal
character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellant’s
children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses
and evidence are necessary to present.20 As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor
the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now
fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila
and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the
life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial court’s appreciation of these circumstances
has little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or
defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to
prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. 21 Well-settled is the rule
that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the
burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense. 22
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While new
in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form
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564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Genosa
of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.23 By appreciating evidence that a victim or
defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their “understanding of the justifiably
fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time.” 24
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do
without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with
a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.”25
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs
about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male;
the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer’s actions; and false hopes that the relationship
will improve.26
 More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman’s psyche. In this
violence,”27 which has three phases: phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other—she for his nurturant
People vs. Genosa behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of ‘‘tension, violence and forgiveness,”
(1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel
nonviolent) phase.28 independent, capable of functioning without the other. 31
During the tension-building phase,minor battering occurs—it could be verbal or slight physical History of Abuse in the Present Case
abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses. She
show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:
she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to “ATTY. TABUCANON
prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
double-edged, because her “placatory” and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he
to abuse her in the first place. was cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was
successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty
control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman manifested to you?
soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he
becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence “spirals out pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
of control” and leads to an acute battering incident.29 Q How many times did this happen?
The acute battering incidentis said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, A Several times already.
sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each
be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered other.
woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
her condition. A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she Q What will happen when he follow you?
may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and
rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her after that I go to him and he said ‘sorry’.
past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive
and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.30 behavior by your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this A Yes, sir.
tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender Q Who are these doctors?
and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, xxx xxx xxx
the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
partner will change for the better; and that this “good, gentle and caring man” is the real person whom A Yes, sir.
she loves. Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the A Of course my husband.
batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, Q You mean Ben Genosa?
is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially A Yes, sir.
if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way xxx xxx xxx
of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly [Court] to the witness
tormented psychologically. Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk. A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury left breast. So, [pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your breast
inflicted on your occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.
frequent was the occurrence? Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
A Everytime he got drunk. xxx xxx xxx
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week? Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
A Three times a week. A Yes, sir.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you? Q What did she tell you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these
me.”32 injuries. And she told me that it was done to her by her husband.
Referring to his “Out-Patient Chart”33 on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner: A Yes, sir.
“Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in xxx xxx xxx
the chart of your clinic? ATTY. TABUCANON:
A Yes, sir. Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor? sometime in the month of November, 1995 when this incident
A I did. happened?
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the A As per record, yes.
record. Q What was the date?
A 1. May 12, 1990—physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower A It was on November 6, 1995.
eyelid and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero; Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
2. March 10, 1992—Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain A Yes, sir.
and contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was
3. March 26, 1993—Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla; the patient pregnant?
4. August 1, 1994—Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2° to trauma. Attending A Yes, sir.
physician: Dr. Caing; Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was
5. April 17, 1995—Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending she?
physician: Dr. Canora; and A Eight (8) months pregnant.
6. June 5, 1995—Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora. A Yes, sir.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination
attending physician, is that correct? about her pregnancy or for some other findings?
A Yes, sir. A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused? pregnancy.
A Yes, sir. Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended A Yes, sir.
the patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla? Q For how many days?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with A One day.
something rough substance if force is applied. Q Where?
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla? A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion. xxx xxx xxx
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
 Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you
were able to examine her personally on November 6,1995 and she was 8
months pregnant. What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to
hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the same period from
1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the
patient had hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our
treatment. She does not response when the medication was given to her,
because tension headache is more or less stress related and emotional in
nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in
nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient
is the family history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing
this disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from
the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in
hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the
medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood
pressure of the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is
dangerous level of blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus.”34
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified
that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic would run
to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben. 35
Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the
Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one
occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten o’clock at night, because the couple
“were very noisy . . . and I heard something was broken like a vase.” Then Marivic came running into
Ecel’s room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a
knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help—this time to find Ben—but
they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk. Again
afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of
drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw
or heard the couple quarreling.37 Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful night
when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
“ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in
the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after
office hours, I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I
reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was his father, then
my second child said, ‘he was not home yet’. I was worried because that
was payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for
him, my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o’clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with
me at that time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was
worried that he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep
with me, but she resisted because she had fears that the same thing will
happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her
because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q What’s the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court What was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What
else did he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I
was just worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignored him because I want
to avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was
disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch off
the light and I said to him, ‘why did you switch off the light when the
children were there.’ At that time I was also attending to my children who
were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his
challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna
wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were
scared and he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was
carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to
the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for
packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my
neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How
did he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that ‘you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to
nag me.’
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The
but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his husband had a very meager income, she was the one who was practically
wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that the bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices,
he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in
blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about cockfight and going home very angry and which will trigger a lot of
that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from the
smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity,
everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own.
that very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS So she was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed because
Clinic, I was about to vomit. she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it
COURT INTERPRETER: was happening day in and day out.” 39
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely). In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly
xxx xxx xxx put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
ATTY. TABUCANON: In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room? “Q talked to her about three hours, what was the most relevant information
A Outside. did you gather?
Q In what part of the house? A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened.
A Dining. The most important information were escalating abuses that she had
Q Where were the children during that time? experienced during her marital life.
A My children were already asleep. Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already
Q You mean they were inside the room? knew of the facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of
A Yes, sir. the facts of the case?
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can
this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like? consider them as substantial.
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide. xxx xxx xxx
Q Is it a flexible blade? Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her
A It’s a cutter. husband they were fond of battering their wives?
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges? A I also heard that from her?
A Yes, because he once used it to me. Q You heard that from her?
Q How did he do it? A Yes, sir.
A He wanted to cut my throat. Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband
Q With the same blade? that were fond of battering their wives?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.” 38 A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it in battering their wives.
understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a
totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latter’s ordeal to hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her] several
the court a quo as follows: times in that room?
“Q What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you A She told me about that.
in layman’s term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
you? A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that
A What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that room.
she was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being
battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this
matter. I think that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines,
what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened,
it was really a self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation
and I also believe that she became a disordered person. She had to suffer
anxiety reaction because of all the battering that happened and so she
became an abnormal person who had lost she’s not during the time and
that is why it happened because of all the physical battering, emo-
tional battering, all the psychological abuses that she had experienced
from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
“Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test,
what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory.
The purpose of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the
person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she
someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person
that I can trust. That the data that I’m gathering from her are the
truth.”41
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric
Report,42which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that
during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good—the atmosphere was fine,
normal and happy—until “Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in [to]
gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in
drinking sprees.”
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly
to his wife. The Report continued: “At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he
became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every
time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her
husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more
than eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband
whenever he was drunk.”
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from
the Report, “[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite
of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more
frequent and more severe. x x x. 43
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court’s mind that Appellant
Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind
metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an
ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A
Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on
wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. “How can the mental state of the
appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman
put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she
love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to
pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for
herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called ‘battered wife
syndrome.’ ”44
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one’s viewpoint should not be drawn from that of
an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to
repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with—nay, comprehensible to—those who have not
been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and
misconceptions about battered women.45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence, has
had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and
prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The
psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman
immobilizes the latter’s “ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the
relationship with no means of escape.”46 In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that “the abuse
often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then.” 47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that “the battered woman usually has a
very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics, x x x [W]hen
the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke [d] it, that they were the one[s] who
precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even
sexually abusive to them.”48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave
an abusive partner—poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter’s belief that she provoked the
violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children,
and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change.49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified
in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated “probably ten to twenty thousand” violent
family disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result
of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office
in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which
the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness. 50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that “overwhelming brutality, trauma” could result in posttraumatic stress
disorder, a form of “anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism.” 51 After being repeatedly and severely
abused, battered persons “may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their
situation, x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping
responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim’s ability to muster an active response to try to
escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will
have a predictable positive effect. 52
A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found
that “even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more likely
to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape.” He said that it was
the cognitive aspect—the individual’s thoughts—that proved all-important. He referred to this
phenomenon as “learned helplessness.” “[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important
than the individual’s set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women don’t
attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible,
because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else does will
alter their terrible circumstances.”54
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior
of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no escape. 55 Battered
women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.56 Unless a
shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a means of self-
support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more. 57
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that
appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time,
became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence
that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would
confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing
the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating
to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described
the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical
characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the
syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she
had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How
did Marivic normally respond to Ben’s relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to
prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She
simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother’s or father’s house;58 that Ben would
seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would
return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she
believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional
stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped
in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that
would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed,
they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the
battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted
upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each other’s testimonies, which were culled from
their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual
experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them—if at all—based on which they concluded
that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven
in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the Records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the
essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right
of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense.59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS
defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense 60—she must have actually
feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save
her life. Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must
face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not
merely imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-
defense:62
“Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.—The following do not incur any criminal liability:
“1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.”
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.63 It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack—or an imminent danger thereof—on the life or safety of a person.64 In the present
case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval
between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to
withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he
posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life
or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children’s bedroom—and based on
past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted
graver harm—then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where
the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the
time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To
require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life “would
amount to sentencing her to ‘murder by installment.’ ” 65Still, impending danger (based on the conduct
of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant’s use of deadly force must be shown.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. 66 Considering
such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.67 In
the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense—complete or incomplete—on the part of
the victim.68 Thus, Marivic’s killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances
that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances
that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it
wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties. 69
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological
Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
“This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic experienced
with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological
resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight
of impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her
abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her
part.”70
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of “repetitious pain
taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment” as well as the severity and the prolonged
administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder. 71Expounding thereon, he said:
“Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the
severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering
or the prolonged commission of the battering and the psychological and
constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is the public and
social support available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more
she will go to that disorder . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms
of severity of the posttraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of the head
like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like
holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the individual, suffocating the
individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the
victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is pregnant,
she is very susceptible because the woman will not only protect herself,
she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end
[sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you
classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or
[a]typical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the
individual will manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher
irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute]
cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be thinking of
suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment,
any prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the
first day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months you become chronic. It
is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The
[a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is
abnormal and then become normal. This is how you get neurosis from
neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress disorder.”72
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
“Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x
x affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated.”73
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in
“cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control,”
“psychological paralysis,” and “difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory.”
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an illness
that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of
consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence
or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 974 and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. 76
 In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon
an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that
this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome
reason.77 To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act,
both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might
recover her normal equanimity.78
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his
being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards
a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at
the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus. 79 His abusive and violent acts, an
aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced
passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate
room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she
was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of
indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and
used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of
time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo’s
testimony80 that with “neurotic anxiety”—a psychological effect on a victim of ‘‘overwhelming brutality
[or] trauma”—the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually
being beaten at the time. She cannot control “re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious trauma
that she suffered.” She thinks “of nothing but the suffering.” Such reliving which is beyond the control
of a person under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief
time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should
further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances—psychological paralysis as well as passion and
obfuscation—did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the
battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of
time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise
of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted
on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their
child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn, child.
Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended
party might make.81 In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be
proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures,
which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. 82Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. 83
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death
upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of
Ben had been found lying in bed with an “open, depressed, circular” fracture located at the back of his
head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to
establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his
death:
“Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How
did he drag you?
COURT:
(The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed
forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that ‘you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to
nag me’
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer
but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled
his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware
that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet
and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe
about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the
blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I
had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
 (The witness at this juncture is crying intensely). Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
xxx xxx xxx have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.86 There is no showing,
this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like? though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide. husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it
Q It is a flexible blade? appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she
A It’s a cutter. decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges? deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution,
A Yes, because he once used it to me. this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.87
Q How did he do it? Proper Penalty
A He wanted to cut my throat. The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
Q With the same blade? death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to have
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to
xxx xxx xxx Article 64 of paragraph 588 of the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
ATTY. TABUCANON: is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct? the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the
A Yes, because I smashed him. commission of the offense.90 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall
Q What happened? be within the range of that which is next lower in degree—prision mayor—and the maximum shall be
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
smashed him and I ran to the other room. Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the
Q What else happened? penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum;
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened toreclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that
before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I appellant has already served
know my blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die
because of my blood pressure. _______________
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
witness at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape). People vs. Genosa
ATTY. TABUCANON: the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole. 91
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened? Epilogue
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I’ve been through with him, I Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple
took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood to analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on how
pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him. to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which
COURT decisions are made—on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To
/to Atty. Tabucanon give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted
Q You shot him? here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.”84 the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of the general and appellant’s counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.
victim’s position relative to appellant’s at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits
rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the
a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
anticipated aggression from the assailant. 85
 The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence
must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer
and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third,at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable—not necessarily immediate and actual—grave harm to
the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of
the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED.
However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her
commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCEDto six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed
upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon
due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., I join Mm. Justice Santiago in her dissent.
Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., In the result.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Please see dissenting opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., I am joining Justice Santiago in her dissent.
Austria-Martinez, J., I am joining Justice Santiago in her dissent.
 [No. 43530. August 3, 1935]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. AURELIO LAMAHANG,
defendant and appellant.
1. 1.CRIMINAL LAW; ATTEMPT TO COMMIT AN INDETERMINATE CRIME.—The attempt
which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete
offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution thereof by overt acts of the perpetrator
leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an
indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not
a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.
704
704 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lamahang
1. 2.ID.; ID.—It is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act
objectively performed should constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to
establish its unavoidable relation, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its
effect, to the deed which, upon its consummation, will ripen into one of the crimes defined
and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that such beginning of execution, if carried
to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into a concrete offense.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ATTEMPTED ROBBERY.—In order that a simple act of entering by means of force
or violence another person's dwelling may be considered as attempted robbery, it must be
shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some
personal property belonging to another. In the present case, there is no evidence' in the
record from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.—From the fact established and stated in the decision, that the accused on the
day in question was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of T. Y.'s store,
it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by
means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he
succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to its occupants, or to
commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
1. 5.ID.; ATTEMPTED TRESPASS TO DWELLING.—The fact under consideration does not
constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling (People vs. Tayag and
Morales, 59 Phil., 606, and decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain therein cited). The
accused may be convicted and sentenced for an attempt to commit this crime, in accordance
with the weight of the evidence and the allegations contained in the information.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Paredes, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Honesto K. Bausa for appellant.
Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, finding him guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer two years and
four months of prisión correccional and to an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prisión
mayor f or being an habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs
of the proceeding.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on
Delgado and C. R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an
opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street. At that
time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused had
only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman
showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.
The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo,
the trial judge and the Solicitor-General, as constituting attempted robbery, which we think is
erroneous.
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which
has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of
the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The
attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is
ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is no doubt that in the
case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence, passing
through the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to commit
706
706 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lamahang
an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first
steps of its execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act
objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its
unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed
which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code;
it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following
'its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of
the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in
order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be
considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to
take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In the instant
case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred.
From the fact established and stated in the decision, that the accused on the day in question was
making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a
logical conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will
of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause
physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify
a concrete finding.
 "It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material to dwelling is two degrees lower (art. 51), or, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods.
damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (acción fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but Because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance the penalty
the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (acción medio). Hence, the necessity must be imposed in its maximum period. Pursuant to article 29 of the same Code, the accused is not
that these acts be such that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the entitled to credit for one-half of his preventive imprisonment.
circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and the accused is hereby held guilty of
show without any doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and
interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor, with the
punishable act, must not and can not furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
crimes. The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense which said Avanceña, C. J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ.,concur.
facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and Judgment revoked and defendant found guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling.
therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the mind be able to
directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have
been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender must
commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts performed
must be such that, without the intent to commit an offense, they would be meaningless."
Viada (Vol. I, p. 47) holds the same opinion when he says that "the overt acts leading to the
commission of the offense, are not punishable except when they are aimed directly to its execution, and
therefore they must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense."
"Considering—says the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of March 21, 1892—that in order to
declare that such and such overt acts constitute an attempted offense it is necessary that their objective
be known and established, or that said acts be of such nature that they themselves should obviously
disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground for
the designation of the offense: * * *."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold that the fact under consideration does
not constitute
708
708 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lamahang
attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling (People vs. Tayag and Morales, 59 Phil., 606,
and decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain therein cited). Under article 280 of the Revised Penal
Code, this offense is committed when a private person shall enter the dwelling of another against the
latter's will. The accused may be convicted and sentenced for an attempt to commit this offense in
accordance with the evidence and the following allegation contained in the information: "* * * the
accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall of said store by breaking a board and unf astening
another f or the purpose of entering said store * * * and that the accused did not succeed in entering
the store due to the presence of the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing, who upon hearing the noise
produced by the breaking of the wall, promptly approached the accused * * *." Under the circumstances
of this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is presumed. (U. S. vs. Ostrea, 2 Phil., 93; U.
S. vs. Silvano, 31 Phil., 509; U. S. vs. Ticson, 25 Phil., 67; U. S. vs. Mesina, 21 Phil., 615; U.
S. vs. Villanueva, 18 Phil., 215; U. S. vs. Panes, 25 Phil., 292.) Against the accused must be taken into
consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions,—inasmuch as the
record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered against him—and
in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. The breaking of the wall should not be
taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance inasmuch as this is the very fact which in
this case constitutes the offense of attempted trespass to dwelling.
The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the consummated offense of trespass to
dwelling, if committed with force, is prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a
fine not exceeding P1,000 (art. 280, par. 2); therefore the penalty corresponding to attempted trespass
 G.R. No. 183891. October 19, 2011.*
ROMARICO J. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Social Security Act; Condonation; The clear intent of the law is to grant condonation only to
employers with delinquent contributions or pending cases for their delinquencies and who pay their
delinquencies within the six (6)-month period set by the law. Mere payment of unpaid contributions does
not suffice.—We note that the petitioner does not ask for the reversal of his conviction based on the
authority of RA No. 9903; he avoids making a straightforward claim because this law plainly does not
apply to him or to others in the same situation. The clear intent of the law is to grant condonation only
to employers with delinquent contributions or pending cases for their delinquencies and who pay their
delinquencies within the six (6)-month period set by the law. Mere payment of unpaid contributions
does not suffice; it is payment within, and only within, the six (6)-month availment period that triggers
the applicability of RA No. 9903.
_______________
* SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION.
Same; Same; By paying outside of the availment period, the petitioner effectively placed himself
outside the benevolent sphere of RA No. 9903.—The petitioner’s case was pending with us when RA No.
9903 was passed. Unfortunately for him, he paid his delinquent SSS contributions in 2007. By paying
outside of the availment period, the petitioner effectively placed himself outside the benevolent sphere
of RA No. 9903. This is how the law is written: it condones employers — and only those employers —
with unpaid SSS contributions or with pending cases who pay within the six (6)-month period following
the law’s date of effectivity. Dura lex, sed lex.
Same; Same; Two classifications of employers delinquent in remitting the Social Security System
(SSS) contributions of their employees; Laws granting condonation constitute an act of benevolence on
the government’s part, similar to tax amnesty laws; their terms are strictly construed against the
applicants.—RA No. 9903 creates two classifications of employers delinquent in remitting the SSS
contributions of their employees: (1) those delinquent employers who pay within the six (6)-month
period (the former group), and (2) those delinquent employers who pay outside of this availment period
(the latter group). The creation of these two classes is obvious and unavoidable when Section 2 and the
last proviso of Section 4 of the law are read together. The same provisions show the law’s intent to limit
the benefit of condonation to the former group only; had RA No. 9903 likewise intended to benefit the
latter group, which includes the petitioner, it would have expressly declared so. Laws granting
condonation constitute an act of benevolence on the government’s part, similar to tax amnesty laws;
their terms are strictly construed against the applicants.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Romarico J. Mendoza seeking the
reversal of our Decision dated August 3, 2010. The Decision affirmed the petitioner’s conviction for his
failure to remit the Social Security Service (SSS) contributions of his employees. The petitioner anchors
the present motion on his sup-
683posed inclusion within the coverage of Republic Act (RA) No. 9903 or the Social Security
Condonation Law of 2009, whose passage the petitioner claims to be a supervening event in his case.
He further invokes the equal protection clause in support of his motion.
In our Decision dated August 3, 2010, we AFFIRMED, with modification, the decree of
conviction issued by both the trial and appellate courts for the petitioner’s violation of Section 22(a)
and (d), in relation to Section 28 of RA No. 8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997. To recall its
highlights, our Decision emphasized that the petitioner readily admitted during trial that he did not
remit the SSS premium contributions of his employees at Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc. from
August 1998 to July 1999, in the amount of P239,756.80; inclusive of penalties, this unremitted amount
totaled to P421,151.09. The petitioner’s explanation for his failure to remit, which the trial court
disbelieved, was that during this period, Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc. shut down as a result of
the general decline in the economy. The petitioner pleaded good faith and lack of criminal intent as his
defenses.
We ruled that the decree of conviction was founded on proof beyond reasonable doubt, based on the
following considerations: first, the remittance of employee contributions to the SSS is mandatory under
RA No. 8282; and second, the failure to comply with a special law being malum prohibitum, the
defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent are immaterial.
The petitioner further argued that since he was designated in the Information as a “proprietor,” he
was without criminal liability since “proprietors” are not among the corporate officers specifically
enumerated in Section 28(f) of RA No. 8282 to be criminally liable for the violation of its provisions.
We rejected this argument based on our ruling in Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and
Collection.1 We ruled that to sustain the petitioner’s argument would be to allow the unscrupulous to
conveniently escape liability merely through the creative use of managerial titles.
After taking into account the Indeterminate Penalty Law and Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, we MODIFIED the penalty originally imposed by the trial court 2 and, instead, decreed the
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioner points out that pending his appeal with
the Court of Appeals (CA), he voluntarily paid the SSS the amount of P239,756.80 to settle his
delinquency.3 Note that the petitioner also gave notice of this payment to the CA via a Motion for
Reconsideration and a Motion for New Trial.Although the People did not contest the fact of voluntary
payment, the CA nevertheless denied the said motions.
The present motion for reconsideration rests on the following points:
First. On January 7, 2010, during the pendency of the petitioner’s case before the Court, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed RA No. 9903 into law. RA No. 9903 mandates the effective
withdrawal of all pendingcases against employers who would remit their delinquent contributions to
the SSS within a specified period, viz., within six months after the law’s effectivity.4 The
Petitioner claims that in view of RA No. 9903 and its implementing rules, the settlement of his
delinquent contributions in 2007 entitles him to an acquittal. He invokes the equal protection clause
in support of his plea.
Second. The petitioner alternatively prays that should the Court find his above argument
wanting, he should still be acquitted since the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime
charged.
Third. The petitioner prays that a fine be imposed, not imprisonment, should he be found guilty.
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation In Lieu of Comment and claims that the passage of RA
No. 9903 constituted a supervening event in the petitioner’s case that supports the petitioner’s
acquittal “[a]fter a conscientious review of the case.” 5
 The Court’s Ruling
The petitioner’s arguments supporting his prayer for acquittal fail to convince us. However, we find
basis to allow waiver of the petitioner’s liability for accrued penalties.
The petitioner’s liability for the crime is a settled matter
Upfront, we reject the petitioner’s claim that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the
crime charged. This is a matter that has been resolved in our Decision, and the petitioner did not raise
anything substantial to merit the reversal of our finding of guilt. To reiterate, the petitioner’s
conviction was based on his admission that he failed to remit his employees’ contribution to the SSS.
_______________
withdrawn without prejudice to the refiling of the case in the event the employer fails to remit in
full the required delinquent contributions or defaults in the payment of any installment under the
approved proposal.
5 Rollo, p. 355.
The petitioner cannot benefit from the terms of RA No. 9903, which condone only employers
who pay their delinquencies within six months from the law’s effectivity
We note that the petitioner does not ask for the reversal of his conviction based on the authority of
RA No. 9903; he avoids making a straightforward claim because this law plainly does not apply to him
or to others in the same situation. The clear intent of the law is to grant condonation only to employers
with delinquent contributions or pending cases for their delinquencies and who pay their delinquencies
within the six (6)-month period set by the law. Mere payment of unpaid contributions does not suffice;
it is payment within, and only within, the six (6)-month availment period that triggers the applicability
of RA No. 9903.
True, the petitioner’s case was pending with us when RA No. 9903 was passed. Unfortunately for
him, he paid his delinquent SSS contributions in 2007. By paying outside of the availment period, the
petitioner effectively placed himself outside the benevolent sphere of RA No. 9903. This is how the law
is written: it condones employers — and only those employers — with unpaid SSS contributions or
with pending cases who pay within the six (6)-month period following the law’s date of effectivity. Dura
lex, sed lex.
The petitioner’s awareness that RA No. 9903 operates as discussed above is apparent in his plea
for equal protection. In his motion, he states that
“[he] is entitled under the equal protection clause to the dismissal of the case against him since he had
already paid the subject delinquent contributions due to the SSS which accepted the payment as borne
by the official receipt it issued (please see Annex “A”). The equal protection clause requires that similar
subjects, [sic] should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others. The petitioner is no more no less in the same situation as the employer
who would enjoy freedom from criminal prosecution upon payment in full of the delinquent contribu-
687tions due and payable to the SSS within six months from the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9903.” 6
The Court cannot amplify the scope of RA No. 9903 on the ground of equal protection, and acquit
the petitioner and other delinquent employers like him; it would in essence be an amendment of RA
No. 9903, an act of judicial legislation abjured by the trias politica principle.7
RA No. 9903 creates two classifications of employers delinquent in remitting the SSS contributions
of their employees: (1) those delinquent employers who pay withinthe six (6)-month period (the former
group), and (2) those delinquent employers who pay outside of this availment period (the latter group).
The creation of these two classes is obvious and unavoidable when Section 2 and the last proviso of
Section 48 of the law are read together. The same provisions show the law’s intent to limit the benefit
of condonation to the former group only; had RA No. 9903 likewise intended to benefit the latter group,
which includes the petitioner, it would have expressly declared so. Laws granting condonation
constitute an act of benevolence on the government’s part, similar to tax amnesty laws; their terms are
strictly construed against the applicants. Since the law itself excludes the class of employers to which
the petitioner belongs, no ground
_______________
8 Section 4. Effectivity of Condonation.—The penalty provided under Section 22(a) of Republic Act
No. 8282 shall be condoned by virtue of this Act when and until all the delinquent contributions are
remitted by the employer to the SSS: Provided, That, in case the employer fails to remit in full the
required delinquent contributions, or defaults in the payment of any installment under the approved
proposal, within the availment period provided in this Act, the penalties are deemed reimposed from the
time the contributions first become due, to accrue until the delinquent account is paid in full: Provided,
further, That for reason of equity, employers who settled arrears in contributions before the effectivity of
this Act shall likewise have their accrued penalties waived. [italics ours]
exists to justify his acquittal. An implementing rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent
with the provisions of the enabling statute; it cannot amend the law either by abridging or expanding
its scope.9
For the same reason, we cannot grant the petitioner’s prayer to impose a fine in lieu of
imprisonment; neither RA No. 8282 nor RA No. 9903 authorizes the Court to exercise this option.
On the matter of equal protection, we stated in Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, et al. 10 that the
guarantee simply means “that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the
laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.”
In People v. Cayat,11 we further summarized the jurisprudence on equal protection in this wise:
“It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class.”
The difference in the dates of payment of delinquent contributions provides a substantial
distinction between the two classes of employers. In limiting the benefits of RA No. 9903 to delinquent
employers who pay within the six (6)-month period, the legislature refused to allow a sweeping, non-
discriminatory condonation to all delinquent employers, lest the policy behind RA No. 8282 be
undermined.
The petitioner is entitled to a waiver of his accrued penalties
Despite our discussion above, the petitioner’s move to have our Decision reconsidered is not entirely
futile. The one benefit the petitioner can obtain from RA No. 9903 is the waiver of his accrued penalties,
which remain unpaid in the amount of P181,394.29. This waiver is derived from the last proviso of
Section 4 of RA No. 9903:
Provided, further, That for reason of equity, employers who settled arrears in contributions before the
effectivity of this Act shall likewise have their accrued penalties waived.
This proviso is applicable to the petitioner who settled his contributions long before the passage of the
law. Applied to the petitioner, therefore, RA No. 9903 only works to allow a waiver of his accrued
penalties, but not the reversal of his conviction.
Referral to the Chief Executive for
possible exercise of executive clemency

We realize that with the affirmation of the petitioner’s conviction for violation of RA No. 8282, he
stands to suffer imprisonment for four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, notwithstanding the payment of
his delinquent contribution.
Under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code,12 the courts are bound to apply the law as it is and
impose the proper penalty, no matter how harsh it might be. The same provision, however, gives the
Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appro-
_______________
12 Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are
not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties.—Whenever a court has knowledge of any act
which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which
induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a
strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

690priate but are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. Although the
petitioner was convicted under a special penal law, the Court is not precluded from giving the Revised
Penal Code suppletory application in light of Article 1013 of the same Code and our ruling in People v.
Simon.14
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS petitioner Romarico J. Mendoza’s motion for
reconsideration. The Court AFFIRMS the petitioner’s conviction for violation of Section 22(a) and (d),
in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8282, and the petitioner is thus sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In light of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9903,
the petitioner’s liability for accrued penalties is considered WAIVED. Considering the circumstances
of the case, the Court transmits the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
and RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Bersamin, Abad and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

Motion for Reconsideration partly granted.

 Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001.*
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. 7080); Statutes; Statutory Construction; The whole
gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that
a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.—Preliminarily, the whole
gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that
a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. Courts invariably train
their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it
is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its
bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties
and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial
branch accords to its coordinate branch—the legislature. If there is any reasonable basis upon which
the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the
borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and
for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in
determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should
proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must
be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In
construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation
is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; As it is written, the Plunder Law contains
ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the
nature of his violation; As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained.—As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and
prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. x x x As long as the
law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what
conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently
guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more
importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be
understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in
amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination
of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use.—Petitioner, however, bewails the
failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the
key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts” foundinSec.1,par.(d),andSec.2,and the
word “pattern” in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due
process. The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define
the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so
long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a
statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it
is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.—It is a well-
settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain
and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical
or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers—
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396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers—to use statutory phraseology in
such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following
commonly accepted definition of the words “combination” and “series:” Combination—the result or
product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters. Series—a number of things or events of the same class
coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;“Combination,” Explained.—Thus when the
Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different
categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par.
(d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec.
1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Series,” Explained.—On the other hand, to constitute a
“series” there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public
treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for “combination” and “series,” it would have taken greater pains in
specifically providing for it in the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Pattern,” Explained.—As for “pat-tern,” we agree with the
observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term
issufficientlydefinedinSec.4,inrelationtoSec.1,par.(d),andSec.2.—As for “pattern,” we agree with the
observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1,
par. (d), and Sec. 2—xxxx under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a ‘pattern’ consists of at least a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to
Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal
which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there
must either be an ‘overall unlawful scheme’ or ‘conspiracy’ to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term ‘overall unlawful scheme’ indicates a ‘general plan of action or method’ which the
principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid
common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used
by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common
goal.
397
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Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
Same; Same; Criminal Law; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Words and Phrases; The “void-for-
vagueness” doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that
a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons
of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute—it can only be invoked
against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified
either by a saving clause or by construction.—It cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not
give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances,
petitioner ’s reliance on the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has
been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing
a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against
that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by
a saving clause or by construction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; When a statute lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects—it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid, and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.—A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects—it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and,
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are
merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively
phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities.
The first may be “saved” by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked
where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
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398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
Same; Same; Same; Same; The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice; The“vagueness” doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld—not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude.—The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the “vagueness” doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld—not absolute precision
or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act
will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in
its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all
the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; Facial Challenges; The allegations that the
Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity.—Moreover, we agree
with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of
the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial
review of its validity—The void-forvagueness doctrine states that “a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” The
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that “a governmental purpose may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.” A
facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with narrow specificity.” The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester
399
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 399
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to
penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting
laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to
free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot
be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want
of scientific precision in the law; It will take more than nitpicking to overturn the wellentrenched
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law.—In light of the foregoing disquisition,
it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at
length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by
dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific
precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to
every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its
appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge
of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; Presumption of Innocence;“Reasonable Doubt” Standard; In a
criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal—the use of the “reasonable doubt” standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in the application of criminal law.—The running fault in this reasoning is
obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the
accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The use of the “reasonable doubt” standard is indispensable to
com-
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Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
mand the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical
that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him
guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.
This “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law
as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
Same; Same; Under Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law, what the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.—The thesis that Sec. 4 does
away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the
import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a
number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act
alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that
the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the
public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by
pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at
least P50,000,000.00.
Same; Same; A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law brings the logical
conclusion that “pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy” inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth—such
pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as
defined in Sec. 1, par. (d).—AreadingofSec.2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical
conclusion that “pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy” inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated
otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate
acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense.
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Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash
P50,000,000.00 or more, than “a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth.” The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove
pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Same; Same; All the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition
in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and “pattern” is not one of them; Being a purely procedural
measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only
operates in furtherance of a remedy, it is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law.—We do not
subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and
understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and “pattern” is not one of them.
Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal: SEC. 4. Rule of
Evidence.—For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder xxxxIt purports to do no more than
prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused
but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law.
Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for
the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for
the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may
simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law;
after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough.
Same; Same; Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.—As regards the
third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof
of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion—x x x Precisely because the constitutive
crimes are mala in sethe element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed “willfully,
unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Death Penalty Law (R.A. 7659); It is now too late in the day to
resurrect the issue of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659, the same having been eternally consigned by
People v. Echega-
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402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
ray, 267 SCRA 682 (1997), to the archives of jurisprudential history.—To clinch, petitioner
likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds.
Suffice it to say, however, that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue,
the same having been eternally consigned by People vs. Echegaray to the archives of jurisprudential
history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a
declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an
integral part of it.
Same; Same; Public Officers; Graft and Corruption; The Plunder Law is especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grandscale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a
malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation.—Our nation
has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have
shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the
corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk
the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national
treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-
scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume
the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the
will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice
and other venalities in public office.
MENDOZA, J., Concurring in the Judgment:
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; What footnote 4 of U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152, 82 L. Ed. 1234, 1241 (1938), posits is a double standard of judicial review—strict scrutiny for
laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and deferential or rational
basis standard of review for economic legislation.—What footnote 4oftheCarolene Products case posits
is a double standard of judicial review: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or
restricting the political process, and deferential or rational basis standard of review for economic
legislation. As Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando explained in Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Ass’n v. The City Mayor, this simply means that “if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much
403
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 403
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects what are at the most rights
of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.”
Same; Same; Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation
of speech, gender, or race and facial challenges are allowed for this purpose.—Hence, strict scrutiny is
used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race and facial
challenges are allowed for this purpose. But criminal statutes, like the Anti-Plunder Law, while subject
to strict construction, are not subject to strict scrutiny. The two (i.e., strict construction and strict
scrutiny) are not the same. The rule of strict construction is a rule of legal hermeneutics which deals
with the parsing of statutes to determine the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, strict scrutiny
is a standard of judicial review for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest
brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. It is set opposite such terms as “deferential
review” and “intermediate review.”
Same; Same; Under deferential review, laws are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest, without courts seriously inquiring into the substantiality of such interest and
examining the alternative means by which the objectives could be achieved.—Thus, under deferential
review, laws are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest, without courts
seriously inquiring into the substantiality of such interest and examining the alternative means by
which the objectives could be achieved. Under intermediate review, the substantiality of the
governmental interest is seriously looked into and the availability of less restrictive alternatives are
considered. Under strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Overbreadth Doctrine; Facial Challenges; Words
and Phrases; The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that “a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law”; The overbreadth
doctrine decrees that “a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.—Nor do allegations that the Anti-Plunder
Law is vague and overbroad justify a facial review of its validity. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states
that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
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404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law.” The over-breadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees
that “a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech, the
theory being that “[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could
not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.—
Afacialchallengeisallowedtobemadetoavague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
“chilling effect” upon protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech
and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person
making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with
narrow specificity.” The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free speech cases—they are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.—This
rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting
from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well
be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have
special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, “we have not recognized
an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.” In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, the Court ruled that “claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
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statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words” and, again, that “overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected conduct.” For this reason, it has been held that “a facial challenge to
a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” As for the vagueness
doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. “A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of
the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.”
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases or, as
they are called in American law, First Amendment Cases.—In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny,
overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to
do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established
rule is that “one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional.” As has been pointed out, “vagueness challenges in
the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while
statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] ‘as applied’ to a
particular defendant.” Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim that this Court review the
Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Anti-Plunder Law; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; Resort to the deliberations in
Congress will readily reveal that the word “combination” includes at least two different overt or criminal
acts listed in R.A. No. 7080, such as misappropriation (§1(d)(1)) and taking undue advantage of official
position (§1(d)(6)), while on the other hand, “series” is used when the offender commits the same overt
or criminal act more than once.—Thus, resort to the deliberations in Congress will readily reveal that
the word “combination” includes at least two different overt or criminal acts listed in R.A. No. 7080,
such as misappropriation (§1(d)(1)) and taking undue advantage of official position (§1(d)(6)). On the
other hand, “series” is used when the offender commits the same overt or criminal act more than once.
There is no plunder if only one act is proven, even if the ill-gotten wealth
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acquired thereby amounts to or exceeds the figure fixed by the law for the offense (now
P50,000,000.00). The overt or criminal acts need not be joined or separated in space or time, since the
law does not make such a qualification. It is enough that the prosecution proves that a public officer,
by himself or in connivance with others, amasses wealth amounting to at least P50 million by
committing two or more overt or criminal acts.
Same; Same; Same; A “pattern of overt or criminal acts” is required in §4 to prove “an unlawful
scheme or conspiracy,” and in such a case, it is not necessary to prove each and every criminal act done
in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy so long as those proven show a pattern indicating the scheme
or conspiracy.—A “pattern of overt or criminal acts” is required in §4toprove“an unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.” In such a case, it is not necessary to prove each and every criminal act done in furtherance
of the scheme or conspiracy so long as those proven show a pattern indicating the scheme or conspiracy.
In other words, when conspiracy is charged, there must be more than a combination or series of two or
more acts. There must be several acts showing a pattern which is “indicative of the overall scheme or
conspiracy.” As Senate President Salonga explained, if there are 150 constitutive crimes charged, it is
not necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt all of them. If a pattern can be shown by proving, for
example, 10 criminal acts, then that would be sufficient to secure conviction. The State is thereby
enabled by this device to deal with several acts constituting separate crimes as just one crime of
plunder by allowing their prosecution by means of a single information because there is a common
purpose for committing them, namely, that of “amassing, accumulating or acquiring wealth through
such overt or criminal acts.” The pattern is the organizing principle that defines what otherwise would
be discreet criminal acts into the single crime of plunder.
Same; Same; Same; As applied to petitioner, the Anti-Plunder Law presents only problems of
statutory construction, not vagueness or overbreadth.—As thus applied to petitioner, the Anti-Plunder
Law presents only problems of statutory construction, not vagueness or overbreadth. In Primicias v.
Fugoso, an ordinance of the City of Manila, prohibiting the holding of parades and assemblies in streets
and public places unless a permit was first secured from the city mayor and penalizing its violation,
was construed to mean that it gave the city mayor only the power to specify the streets and public
places which can be used for the purpose but not the power to ban absolutely the use of such places. A
constitutional doubt was thus resolved through a limiting construction given to the ordinance.
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Same; Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Where the ambiguity is not latent and the
legislative intention is discoverable with the aid of the canons of construction, the “void for
vagueness” doctrine has no application.—Where, therefore, the ambiguity is not latent and the
legislative intention is discoverable with the aid of the canons of construction, the “void for vagueness”
doctrine has no application.
Same; Criminal Law; Crimes Mala In Se and Mala Prohibita; Plunder is a malum in se,
requiring proof of mens rea.—Plunder is a malum in se, requiring proof of criminal intent. Precisely
because the constitutive crimes are mala in se, the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution
for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised
Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an
element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent.—The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder
since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that §2
refers to “any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder.” There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as
well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: “We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean.”
Same; Same; Same; Any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be
deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among
the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the legislative declaration in R.A. No.
7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.—Finally, any doubt as to
whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative
by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No.
7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray: x x x The
legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that
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 it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in
the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check
Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of
the acts.
Same; Same; Complex Crimes; Obviously, the legislature views plunder as a crime as serious as
robbery with homicide or rape with homicide by punishing it with the same penalty.—But this is also
the case whenever other special complex crimes are created out of two or more existing crimes. For
example, robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under Art. 294, par. 5 of the Revised
Penal Code is punished with prision correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months, and 1
day) to prision mayor in its medium period (6 years and 1 day to 8 years). Homicide under Art. 249 of
the same Code is punished with reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). But when the two
crimes are committed on the same occasion, the law treats them as a special complex crime of robbery
with homicide and provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for its commission. Again, the
penalty for simple rape under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua, while that
for homicide under Art. 249 it is reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). Yet, when
committed on the same occasion, the two are treated as one special complex crime of rape with homicide
and punished with a heavier penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Obviously, the legislature views
plunder as a crime as serious as robbery with homicide or rape with homicide by punishing it with the
same penalty.
PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; Statutory Construction; Simple statutory
construction, not a declaration of unconstitutionality, is the key to the allegedly vague words of the Anti-
Plunder Law.—Indeed, simple statutory construction, not a declaration of unconstitutionality, is the
key to the allegedly vague words of the Anti-Plunder Law. And the most basic rule in statutory
construction is to ascertain the meaning of a term from the legislative proceedings. Verily, in the
judicial review of a law’s meaning, the legislative intent is paramount.
Pleadings and Practice; Transcripts of Stenographic Notes; Most of us in the legal profession are
all too familiar with the vagaries of stenographic note-taking, especially in courtrooms and legislative
halls—often,
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transcripts of stenographic notes have portrayed lawyers, witnesses, legislators and judges as
blithering idiots, spouting utterly nonsensical jargon and plain inanities in the course of a proceeding.—
Most of us in the legal profession are all too familiar with the vagaries of stenographic note-taking,
especially in courtrooms and legislative halls. Too often, lawyers, parties-litigants and even judges find
themselves at the mercy of stenographers who are unfamiliar with certain legal terms; or who cannot
hear well enough or take notes fast enough; or who simply get confused, particularly when two or more
persons happen to be speaking at the same time. Often, transcripts of stenographic notes have
portrayed lawyers, witnesses, legislators and judges as blithering idiots, spouting utterly nonsensical
jargon and plain inanities in the course of a proceeding. The Record in question is no exception.
Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; It goes without saying that the legislature is well within its
powers to provide higher penalties in view of the grave evils sought to be prevented by R.A. 7080.—Here,
Mr. Justice Mendoza is referring to special complex crimes like rape with homicide or robbery with
homicide. During the Oral Argument, he asked whether petitioner’s counsel was in fact suggesting
that such special complex crimes—a very important part of the Revised Penal Code and well-
entrenched in our penal system—were violative of due process and the constitutional guarantees
against cruel and unusual punishment and should also be struck down. It goes without saying that the
legislature is well within its powers to provide higher penalties in view of the grave evils sought to be
prevented by RA 7080.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Overbreadth Doctrine; A statute may be said to be overbroad
where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the
Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion.—In connection with the foregoing discussion,
petitioner also charges that RA 7080 suffers from “overbreadth.” I believe petitioner misconstrues the
concept. In the very recent case People v. Dela Piedra, this Court held: “A statute may be said to be
overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by
the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed
to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished, is unconstitutionally vague to the extent
that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the
constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.
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Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Judicial Review; The power to construe law is
essentially judicial—to declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law
is or has been is judicial.—At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially
judicial. To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has
been is judicial. Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be expected to spell out with mathematical
precision how the law should be interpreted under any an all given situations. The application of the
law will depend on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence which will then be considered,
weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the constitutionally mandated function of the courts
to interpret, construe and apply the law as would give flesh and blood to the true meaning of legislative
enactments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A law is not a mere composition, but an end to be achieved; and its
general purpose is a more important aid to its meaning than any rule that grammar may lay down.—A
statute should be construed in the light of the objective to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed and should be given such construction as will advance the purpose, suppress the mischief
or evil, and secure the benefits intended. A law is not a mere composition, but an end to be achieved;
and its general purpose is a more important aid to its meaning than any rule that grammar may lay
down. A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that
does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted and that tends to defeat the ends
that are sought to be attained by its enactment.
Same; Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; To this date, the Supreme Court has not
declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity.—Against the foregoing backdrop,
I believe petitioner’s heavy reliance on the void-for-vagueness concept cannot prevail, considering that
such concept, while mentioned in passing in Nazario and other cases, has yet to find direct application
in our jurisdiction. To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the
ground of ambiguity. On the other hand, the constitutionality of certain penal statutes has been upheld
in several cases, notwithstanding allegations of ambiguity in the provisions of law. In Caram Resources
Corp. v. Contreras and People v. Morato, the Court upheld the validity of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
and PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms), respectively, despite constitutional challenges grounded
on alleged ambiguity.
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Same; Same; The prosecution’s burden of proving the crime of plunder is, in actuality, much
greater than in an ordinary criminal case—the prosecution, in establishing a pattern of overt or criminal
acts, must necessarily show a combination or series of acts within the purview of Section I (d) of the law,
and these acts must still be proven beyond reasonable doubt.—Nevertheless, it should be emphasized
that the indicative pattern must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To my mind, this means that the
prosecution’s burden of proving the crime of plunder is, in actuality, much greater than in an ordinary
criminal case. The prosecution, in establishing a pattern of overt or criminal acts, must necessarily
show a combination or series of acts within the purview of Section 1(d) of the law. These acts which
constitute the combination or series must still be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On top of that, the
prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt such pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall scheme or conspiracy, as well as all the other elements thereof.
Same; Same; Regardless of whether plunder is classified as mala prohibita or in se, it is the
prerogative of the legislature—which is undeniably vested with the authority—to determine whether
certain acts are criminal irrespective of the actual intent of the perpetrator.—While I simply cannot
agree that the Anti-Plunder Law eliminated mens rea from the component crimes of plunder, my
bottom-line position still is: regardless of whether plunder is classified as mala prohibita or in se, it is
the prerogative of the legislature—which is undeniably vested with the authority—to determine
whether certain acts are criminal irrespective of the actual intent of the perpetrator.
Same; Same; I join the view that when we speak of plunder, we are referring essentially to two or
more instances of mala in se constituting one malum prohibitum.—Without being facetious, may I say
that, unlike the act of discharging a gun, the acts mentioned in Section 1(d)—bribery, conversion,
fraudulent conveyance, unjust enrichment and the like—cannot be committed sans criminal intent.
And thus, I finally arrive at a point of agreement with petitioner: that the acts enumerated in Section
l(d) are by their nature mala in se, and most of them are in fact defined and penalized as such by the
Revised Penal Code. Having said that, I join the view that when we speak of plunder, we are referring
essentially to two or more instances of mala in seconstituting one malum prohibitum. Thus, there
should be no difficulty if each of the predicate acts be proven beyond reasonable doubt as mala in
se,evenifthedefenseoflackofintentbe taken away as the solicitor general has suggested. In brief, the
matter of classification is not really significant, contrary to what petitioner would
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have us believe. The key, obviously, is whether the same burden of proof—proof beyond
reasonable doubt—would apply.
KAPUNAN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; While every law enacted by Congress enjoys a
presumption of constitutionality, and the presumption prevails in the absence of contrary evidence, when
a constitutionally protected right of an individual is in danger of being trampled upon by a criminal
statute, such law must be struck down for being void.—Every law enacted by Congress enjoys a
presumption of constitutionality, and the presumption prevails in the absence of contrary evidence. A
criminal statute is generally valid if it does not violate constitutional guarantees of individual rights.
Conversely, when a constitutionally protected right of an individual is in danger of being trampled
upon by a criminal statute, such lawmustbestruckdownforbeingvoid.
Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Due Process; The“void-for-vagueness” doctrine is
rooted in the basic concept of fairness as well as the due process clause of the Constitution.—One of the
fundamental requirements imposed by the Constitution upon criminal statutes is that pertaining to
clarity and definiteness. Statutes, particularly penal laws, that fall short of this requirement have been
declared unconstitutional for being vague. This “void-for-vagueness” doctrine is rooted in the basic
concept of fairness as well as the due process clause of the Constitution. The Constitution guarantees
both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. A criminal statute should not be so vague and
uncertain that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to
its application.
Same; Same; Same; Three distinct considerations for the Vagueness Doctrine.—There are three
distinct considerations for the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure that
individuals are properly warned ex ante of the criminal consequences of their conduct. This “fair notice”
rationale was articulated in United States v. Harriss: The constitutional requirement of definiteness is
violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. Second,
and viewed as more important, the doctrine is intended to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory law
enforcement. Vague laws are invariably “standardless”
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Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
and as such, they afford too great an opportunity for criminal enforcement to be left to the
unfettered discretion of police officers and prosecutors. Third, vague laws fail to provide sufficient
guidance to judges who are charged with interpreting statutes. Where a statute is too vague to provide
sufficient guidance, the judiciary is arguably placed in the position of usurping the proper function of
the legislature by “making the law” rather than interpreting it.
Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; The doctrine of over-breadth applies generally to
statutes that infringe upon freedom of speech while the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine applies to criminal
laws, not merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional rights.—A view has
been proffered that “vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are not applicable to penal laws.” These two
concepts, while related, are distinct from each other. On one hand, the doctrine of overbreadth applies
generally to statutes that infringe upon freedom of speech. On the other hand, the “void-for-vagueness”
doctrine applies to criminal laws, not merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental
constitutional rights. The fact that a particular criminal statute does not infringe upon free speech
does not mean that a facial challenge to the statute on vagueness grounds cannot succeed.
Same; Same; Same; Anti-Plunder Law; Words and Phrases; Even men steeped in the knowledge
of the law are in a quandary as to what constitutes plunder.—I respectfully disagree with the majority
that “ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters” are provided in the law to resolve these
basic questions. Even men steeped in the knowledge of the law are in a quandary as to what constitutes
plunder. The Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Justice Francis Garchitorena, admitted that the
justices of said court “have been quarrelling with each other in finding ways to determine what [they]
understand by plunder.” Senator Neptali Gonzales also noted during the deliberations of Senate Bill
No. 733 that the definition of plunder under the law is vague. He bluntly declared: “I am afraid that it
might be faulted for being violative of the due process clause and the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation of an accused. Fr. Bernas, for his part, pointed to several problematical
portions of the law that were left unclarified. He posed the question: “How can you have a ‘series’ of
criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To my mind, resort to the dictionary meaning of the
terms “combination” and “series” as well as recourse to the deliberations of the lawmakers only serve to
prove that R.A. No. 7080
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Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
failed to satisfy the strict requirements of the Constitution on clarity and definiteness.—To my
mind, resort to the dictionary meaning of the terms “combination” and “series” as well as recourse to
the deliberations of the lawmakers only serve to prove that R.A. No. 7080 failed to satisfy the strict
requirements of the Constitution on clarity and definiteness. Note that the key element to the crime of
plunder is that the public officer, by himself or in conspiracy with others, amasses, accumulates, or
acquires “ill-gotten wealth” through a “combination or series of overt or criminal acts” as described in
Section 1(d) of the law. Senator Gonzales, during the deliberations in the Senate, already raised serious
concern over the lack of a statutory definition of what constitutes “combination” or “series,”
consequently, expressing his fears that Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 might be violative of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee and
of the Senate cited by the majority, consisting mostly of unfinished sentences, offer very little help in
clarifying the nebulous concept of plunder.—The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee
and of the Senate cited by the majority, consisting mostly of unfinished sentences, offer very little help
in clarifying the nebulous concept of plunder. All that they indicate is that Congress seemingly
intended to hold liable for plunder a person who: (1) commits at least two counts of any one of the acts
mentioned in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080, in which case, such person commits plunder by a series of
overt criminal acts; or (2) commits at least one count of at least two of the acts mentioned in Section
1(d), in which case, such person commits plunder by a combination of overt criminal acts. Said
discussions hardly provide a window as to the exact nature of this crime.
Anti-Plunder Law; Complex Crimes; The argument that higher penalties may be imposed where
two or more distinct criminal acts are combined and are regarded as special complex crimes, i.e., rape
with homicide, does not justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death in case
plunder is committed.—The argument that higher penalties may be imposed where two or more
distinct criminal acts are combined and are regarded as special complex crimes, i.e., rape with
homicide, does not justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetuatodeathincase plunder is
committed. Taken singly, rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua; and homicide, by reclusion
temporal. Hence, the increase in the penalty imposed when these two are considered together as a
special complex crime is not too far from the penalties imposed for each of the single offenses. In
contrast, as shown by the examples above, there are instances where the component crimes of plunder,
if taken separately,
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Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
would result in the imposition of correctional penalties only; but when considered as forming part
of a series or combination of acts constituting plunder, could be punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. The disproportionate increase in the penalty is certainly violative of substantive due process
and constitute a cruel and inhuman punishment.
Same; Section 1 taken in relation to Section 4 suggests that there is something to plunder beyond
simply the number of acts involved and that a grand scheme to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth is contemplated by R.A. No. 7080.—Granting arguendo that, as asserted by the majority,
“combination” and “series” simplistically mean the commission of two or more of the acts enumerated
in Section 1(d), still, this interpretation does not cure the vagueness of R.A. No. 7080. In construing
the definition of “plunder,” Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 must not be read in isolation but rather, must be
interpreted in relation to the other provisions of said law. It is a basic rule of statutory construction
that to ascertain the meaning of a law, the same must be read in its entirety. Section 1 taken in relation
to Section 4 suggests that there is something to plunder beyond simply the number of acts involved
and that a grand scheme to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth is contemplated by R.A.
No. 7080. Sections 1 and 2 pertain only to the nature and quantitative means or acts by which a public
officer, by himself or in connivance with other persons, “amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth.” Section 4, on the other hand, requires the presence of elements other than those enumerated
in Section 2 to establish that the crime of plunder has been committed because it speaks of the necessity
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a “pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.”
Same; That pattern is an essential element of the crime of plunder is evident from a reading of the
assailed law in its entirety—without the existence of a “pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall scheme or conspiracy” to acquire ill-gotten wealth, a person committing several or even all of the
acts enumerated in Section 1(d) cannot be convicted for plunder, but may be convicted only for the
specific crimes committed under the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code or other laws.—That
pattern is an essential element of the crime of plunder is evident from a reading of the assailed law in
its entirety. It is that which would distinguish plunder from isolated criminal acts punishable under
the Revised Penal Code and other laws, for without the existence a “pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy” to acquire ill-gotten wealth, a person committing several
or even all of the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) cannot be convicted for plunder, but
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may be convicted only for the specific crimes committed under the pertinent provisions of the
Revised Penal Code or other laws.
Same; Section 4 is not merely a rule of evidence or a rule of procedure—it is of substantive
character because it spells out a distinctive element of the crime which has to be established.—For this
reason, I do not agree that Section 4 is merely a rule of evidence or a rule of procedure. It does not
become such simply because its caption states that it is, although its wording indicates otherwise. On
the contrary, it is of substantive character because it spells out a distinctive element of the crime which
has to be established, i.e., an overall unlawful “scheme or conspiracy” indicated by a “pattern of overt
or criminal acts” or means or similar schemes “to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.”
Same; A careful reading of the law would unavoidably compel a conclusion that there should be
a connecting link among the“means or schemes” comprising a “series or combination” for the purpose of
acquiring or amassing “ill-gotten wealth.”—But that obviously is not the definition of the crime of
plunder under R.A. 7080. There is something more. A careful reading of the law would unavoidably
compel a conclusion that there should be a connecting link among the “means or schemes” comprising
a “series or combination” for the purpose of acquiring or amassing “ill-gotten wealth.” The bond or link
is an “overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy mentioned in Section 4. The law contemplates a
combination or series of criminal acts in plunder done by the accused “in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.” It does not postulate acts committed
randomly, separately or independently or sporadically. Otherwise stated, if the legislature intended to
define plunder as the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth in the manner espoused by the majority, the use
in R.A. 7080 of such words and phrases as “combination” and “series of overt or criminal acts” xxx “in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy” is absolutely pointless and meaningless.
Same; Conspiracy; A person who conspires with the accused in the commission of only one of the
component crimes may be prosecuted as co-principal for the component crime, or as co-principal for the
crime of plunder, depending on the interpretation of the prosecutor; The unfettered discretion effectively
bestowed on law enforcers by Section 2 of R.A. 7080 in determining the liability of the participants in
the commission of one or more of the component crimes for plunder undeniably poses the danger of
arbitrary enforcement of the law.—Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 states that “[a]ny person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be
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punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall
be considered by the court.” Both parties share the view that the law as it is worded makes it possible
for a person who participates in the commission of only one of the component crimes constituting
plunder to be liable as co-conspirator for plunder, not merely the component crime in which he
participated. While petitioner concedes that it is easy to ascertain the penalty for an accomplice or
accessory under R.A. No. 7080, such is not the case with respect to a co-principal of the accused. In
other words, a person who conspires with the accused in the commission of only one of the component
crimes may be prosecuted as co-principal for the component crime, or as co-principal for the crime of
plunder, depending on the interpretation of the prosecutor. The unfettered discretion effectively
bestowed on law enforcers by the aforequoted clause in determining the liability of the participants in
the commission of one or more of the component crimes of a charge for plunder undeniably poses the
danger of arbitrary enforcement of the law.
Same; Statutory Construction; Judicial Legislation; It certainly would not be feasible for the
Court to interpret each and every ambiguous provision without falling into the trap of judicial
legislation.—The Solicitor General enjoins the Court to rectify the deficiencies in the law by judicial
construction. However, it certainly would not be feasible for the Court to interpret each and every
ambiguous provision without falling into the trap of judicial legislation. A statute should be construed
to avoid constitutional question only when an alternative interpretation is possible from its language.
Borrowing from the opinion of the court in Northwestern, the law “may be a poorly drafted statute; but
rewriting it is a job for Congress, if it so inclined, and not for this Court.” But where the law as the one
in question is void on its face for its patent ambiguity in that it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, the
Court cannot breathe life to it through the guise of construction.
Same; Criminal Law; The law, in effect, penalizes the accused on the basis of a proven scheme or
conspiracy to commit plunder without the necessity of establishing beyond reasonable doubt each and
every criminal act done by the accused in the crime of plunder.—By its language, Section 4 eliminates
proof of each and every component criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits itself to
establishing just the pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The
law, in effect, penalizes the accused on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy to commit plunder
without the necessity of establishing beyond reasonable
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doubt each and every criminal act done by the accused in the crime of
plunder.ToquoteFr.Bernasagain:“How can you have a ‘series’ of criminal acts if the elements that are
supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?”
Same; Same; Crimes Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita; Since the acts enumerated in Section 1(d)
are mostly defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, and as such, they are by nature mala in se
crime, of which intent is an essential element, accordingly, with more reason that criminal intent must
be established in plunder.—The acts enumerated in Section 1(d) are mostly defined and penalized by
the Revised Penal Code, e.g.malversation, estafa, bribery and other crimes committed by public
officers. As such, they are by nature mala in se crimes. Since intent is an essential element of these
crimes, then, with more reason that criminal intent be established in plunder which, under R.A. No.
7659, is one of the heinous crimes as pronounced in one of its whereas clauses.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Crimes “Mala in Se” and “Mala
Prohibita,” Distinguished; The fact that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 were made
criminal by special law does not necessarily make the same mala prohibita where criminal intent is not
essential, although the term refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws.—The fact that the
acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 were made criminal by special law does not necessarily
make the same mala prohibita where criminal intent is not essential, although the term refers
generally to acts made criminal by special laws. For there is a marked difference between the two.
According to a well-known author on criminal law: There is a distinction between crimes which
are mala in se, or wrongful from their nature, such as theft, rape, homicide, etc., and those that
are mala prohibita,or wrong merely because prohibited by statute, such as illegal possession of
firearms. Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost
unanimous condemnation of its members; while crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of
convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society. (Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary, Rawle’s3rdRevision)(1)Inactsmala in se, the intent governs; but in those mala prohibit the
only inquiry is, has the law been violated? (People vs. Kibler, 106 N.Y., 321, cited in the case of U.S. vs.
Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132) Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of
public policy, as in illegal possession of firearms. (People vs. Conosa, C.A., 45 O.G. 3953)
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Same; Same; Mens rea is a substantive due process requirement under the Constitution, and this
is a limitation on police power.—Mens rea is a substantive due process requirement under the
Constitution, and this is a limitation on police power. Additionally, lack of mens rea or a
clarifying scienter requirement aggravates the vagueness of a statute.
Same; Estoppel; The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law.—The case at bar has
been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that one of
petitioner’scounsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner himself voted for its passage
when he was still a Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The
rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only
as a means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the validity of
R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to him, but
to all others who may be held liable under this statute.
Same; Due Process; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Where the law, such as R.A. 7080, is so
indefinite that the line between innocent and condemned conduct becomes a matter of guesswork, the
indefiniteness runs afoul of due process concepts which require that persons be given full notice of what
to avoid, and that the discretion of law enforcement officials, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement, be limited by explicit legislative standards.—Undoubtedly, the reason
behind the enactment of R.A. 7080 is commendable. It was a response to the felt need at the time that
existing laws were inadequate to penalize the nature and magnitude of corruption that characterized
a “previous regime.” However, where the law, such as R.A. 7080, is so indefinite that the line between
innocent and condemned conduct becomes a matter of guesswork, the indefiniteness runs afoul of due
process concepts which require that persons be given full notice of what to avoid, and that the discretion
of law enforcement officials, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
be limited by explicit legislative standards. It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous
law as R.A. No. 7080 would put on the balance the life and liberty of the accused against whom all the
resources of the State are arrayed. It could be used as a tool against political enemies and a weapon of
hate and revenge by whoever wields the levers of power.
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PARDO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Criminal Procedure; Multiplicity of Offenses; I vote to grant the petition on the second ground
raised therein, that is, multiplicity of offenses charged in the amended information.—With due respect,
I vote to grant the petition on the second ground raised therein, that is, multiplicity of offenses charged
in the amended information. Consequently, the resolution of the Sandiganbayan must be set aside,
and the case remanded to the Ombudsman for the amendment of the information to charge only a
single offense.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Due Process; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Substantive due process requires that a criminal
statute should not be vague and uncertain; The doctrine of constitutional uncertainty is also based on
the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.—Substantive due
process dictates that there should be no arbitrariness, unreasonableness or ambiguity in any law which
deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and other procedures leading to conviction may be fair
and proper. But if the law itself is not reasonable legislation, due process is violated. Thus, an accused
may not be sentenced to suffer the lethal injection or life imprisonment for an offense understood only
after judicial construction takes over where Congress left off, and interpretation supplies its meaning.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Substantive due process
requires that a criminal statute should not be vague and uncertain. More explicitly—That the terms
of a penal statute . . . must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct
on their part will render them liable to penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike
with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process. The doctrine
of constitutional uncertainty is also based on the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. Fundamental fairness dictates that a person cannot be sent to jail for a crime
that he cannot with reasonable certainty know he was committing. Statutes defining crimes run afoul
of the due process clause if they fail to give adequate guidance to those who would be law-abiding, to
advise defendants of the nature of the offense with which they are charged or to guide courts trying
those who are accused. In short, laws which create
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crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penalties may know what acts it is their
duty to avoid.
Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; The doctrines of overbreadth and void-for-vagueness in
Constitutional Law were developed in the context of freedom of speech and of the press but they apply
equally, if not more so, to capital offenses.—The doctrines of overbreadth and void-for-vagueness in
Constitutional Law were developed in the context of freedom of speech and of the press. However, they
apply equally, if not more so, to capital offenses. In the present case, what the law seeks to protect or
regulate involves the deprivation of life itself and not merely the regulation of expression.
Same; Same; Same; A statute is vague or overbroad, in violation of the due process clause, where
its language does not convey sufficiently definite warning to the average person as to the prohibited
conduct.—In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. A statute, especially
one involving criminal prosecution, must be definite to be valid. A statute is vague or overbroad, in
violation of the due process clause, where its language does not convey sufficiently definite warning to
the average person as to the prohibited conduct. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if people of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.
Same; Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; Crimes Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita; In
malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the criminal intent is an important element of
the criminal acts, but under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed, thus, even if the
accused can prove lack of criminal intent with respect to crimes mala in se, this will not exonerate him
under the crime mala prohibita, a violation of substantive due process and the standards of fair play
because mens rea is a constitutional guarantee under the due process clause.—In the crime of plunder,
it is enough that the acts defining malversation or bribery are described. The court then proceeds to
determine whether the acts fall under the prohibitory terms of the law. Criminal intent no longer has
to be proved. The criminal intent to commit the crime is not required to be proved. The desire to benefit
particular persons does not have to spring from criminal intent under the special law creating the
crime of plunder. In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the criminal intent is an
important element of the criminal acts. Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are
committed. Thus, even if the accused
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 can prove lack of criminal intent with respect to crimes mala in se, this will not exonerate him
under the crime mala prohibita.This violates substantive due process and the standards of fair play
because mens rea is a constitutional guarantee under the due process clause.
Same; Same; Same; I agree with petitioner’s concern over the danger that the trial court may allow
the specifications of details in an information to validate a statute inherently void for vagueness—an
information cannot rise higher than the statute upon which it is based; It is the statute, not the
accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression.—I
agree with petitioner’s concern over the danger that the trial court may allow the specifications of
details in an information to validate a statute inherently void for vagueness. An information cannot
rise higher than the statute upon which it is based. Not even the construction by the Sandiganbayan
of a vague or ambiguous provision can supply the missing ingredients of the Plunder Law. The right of
an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is most often
exemplified in the care with which a complaint or information should be drafted. However, the clarity
and particularity required of an information should also be present in the law upon which the charges
are based. If the penal law is vague, any particularity in the information will come from the prosecutor.
The prosecution takes over the role of Congress. The fact that the details of the charges are specified
in the Information will not cure the statute of its constitutional infirmity. If on its face the challenged
provision is repugnant to the due process clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be
charged would not serve to validate it. In other words, it is the statute, not the accusation under it,
that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression. No one may be required
at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to
be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person
accused of a crime possesses inviolable rights founded on the Constitution which even the welfare of the
society as a whole cannot override—the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution are not subject to
political bargaining or to the calculus of social interest.—As a basic premise, we have to accept that
even a person accused of a crime possesses inviolable rights founded on the Constitution which even
the welfare of the society as a whole cannot override. The rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution
are not subject to political bargaining or to the
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calculus of social interest. Thus, no matter how socially-relevant the purpose of a law is, it must
be nullified if it tramples upon the basic rights of the accused. Enshrined in our Constitution is the
ultimate guaranty that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.” This provision in the Bill of Rights serves as a protection of the Filipino people against any form
of arbitrariness on the part of the government, whether committed by the legislature, the executive or
the judiciary. Any government act that militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is
considered an infraction of the due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation
merely of the procedure prescribed by law or affects the very validity of the law itself.
Criminal Law; Anti-Plunder Law; Albeit the legislature did not directly lower the degree of proof
required in the crime of plunder, it nevertheless lessened the burden of the prosecution by dispensing
with proof of the essential elements of plunder.—R.A. No. 7080, as amended, is unconstitutional. Albeit
the legislature did not directly lower the degree of proof required in the crime of plunder from proof
beyond reasonable doubt to mere preponderance of or substantial evidence, it nevertheless lessened
the burden of the prosecution by dispensing with proof of the essential elements of plunder.
Same; Same; When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the
prosecution to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered
the enumerated “criminal acts” under Section 1(d) merely as means and not as essential elements of
plunder.—When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the prosecution
to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered the
enumerated “criminal acts” under Section 1 (d) merely as means and not as essential elements of
plunder. This is constitutionally infirmed and repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair play. As a
matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. The State may not specify a
lesser burden of proof for an element of a crime. With more reason, it should not be allowed to go around
the principle by characterizing an essential element of plunder merely as a “means” of committing the
crime. For the result is the reduction of the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Due Process; Providing a rule of evidence which does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt to establish every fact necessary to constitute the crime is a clear infringement of due
process.—Providing a
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Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
rule of evidence which does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish every fact
necessary to constitute the crime is a clear infringement of due process. While the principles of the law
of evidence are the same whether applied on civil or criminal trials, they are more strictly observed in
criminal cases. Thus, while the legislature of a state has the power to prescribe new or alter existing
rules of evidence, or to prescribe methods of proof, the same must not violate constitutional
requirements or deprive any person of his constitutional rights. Unfortunately, under R.A. No. 7080,
the State did not only specify a lesser burden of proof to sustain an element of the crime; it even
dispensed with proof by not considering the specific “criminal acts” as essential elements. That it was
the clear intention of the legislature is evident from the Senate deliberation.
Same; Same; I believe that R.A. No. 7080 should have provided a cutoff period after which a
succeeding act may no longer be attached to the prior act for the purpose of establishing a pattern.—
Indeed, Congress left much to be desired. I am at a quandary on how many delictual acts are
necessarytogiverisetoa“pattern of overt or criminal acts” in the crime of plunder. If there is no
numerical standard, then, how should the existence of “pattern” be ascertained? Should it be by
proximity of time or of relationship? May an act committed two decades after the prior criminal act be
linked with the latter for the purpose of establishing a pattern? It must be remembered that plunder,
being a continuous offense, the “pattern of overt or criminal acts” can extend indefinitely, i.e., as long
as the succeeding criminal acts may be linked to the initial criminal act. This will expose the person
concerned to criminal prosecution ad infinitum. Surely, it will undermine the purpose of the statute of
limitations, i.e., to discourage prosecution based on facts obscured by the passage of time, and to
encourage law enforcement officials to investigate suspected criminal activity promptly. All these
undesirable consequences arise from the fact that the plunder law fails to provide a period within which
the next criminal act must be committed for the purpose of establishing a pattern. I believe R.A. No.
7080 should have provided a cut-off period after which a succeeding act may no longer be attached to
the prior act for the purpose of establishing a pattern. In reiteration, the RICO law defines “pattern”
as requiring at least two acts of racketeering activity... the last of which occurred within ten years . . .
after the commission of the prior act of racket-eering activity. Such limitation prevents a subsequent
racketeering activity, separated by more than a decade from the prior act of racketeering, from being
appended to the latter for the purpose of coming up with a pattern. We do not have the same safeguard
under our law.
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Same; Same; A statute that does not provide adequate standards for adjudication, by which guilt
or innocence may be determined, should be struck down.—Lastly, the terms “combination” and “series”
are likewise vague. Hence, on the basis of the law, a conviction of an accused cannot be sustained. A
statute that does not provide adequate standards for adjudication, by which guilt or innocence may be
determined, should be struck down. Crimes must be defined in a statute with appropriate certainty
and definiteness. The standards of certainty in a statute prescribing punishment for offenses are higher
than in those depending primarily on civil sanctions for their enforcement. A penal statute should
therefore be clear and unambiguous. It should explicitly establish the elements of the crime which it
creates and provide some reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt. It should not admit of such a
double meaning that a citizen may act on one conception of its requirements and the courts on another.
Same; Same; Considering that without plurality of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime
of plunder, due process of law demands that the terms “combination” and “series” be defined with
exactitude in the law itself—no one may be required, at the peril of life, liberty or property to guess at,
or speculate as to, the meaning of a penal statute.—Considering that without plurality of overt or
criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder, due process of law demands that the terms
“combination” and “series” be defined with exactitude in the law itself. Equating these terms with mere
“plurality” or “two or more,” is inaccurate and speculative. For one, a “series” is a group of usually three
or more things or events standing or succeeding in order and having like relationship to each other.
The Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as “at least three of the acts enumerated under
Section 1(d) thereof.” But it can very well be interpreted as only one act repeated at least three times.
And the Office of the Solicitor General, invoking the deliberations of the House of Representatives,
contends differently. It defines the term series as a “repetition” or pertaining to “two or more.” The
disparity in the Prosecution and OSG’s positions clearly shows how imprecise the term “series” is. This
should not be countenanced. Crimes are not to be created by inference. No one may be required, at the
peril of life, liberty or property to guess at, or speculate as to, the meaning of a penal statute. An
accused, regardless of who he is, is entitled to be tried only under a clear and valid law.
Same; Same; Judicial Legislation; Precision must be the characteristic of penal legislation—for
the Court to define what is a crime is to go beyond the so-called positive role in the protection of civil
liberties or promotion of public interests; A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital
punishment on acts already punished with lesser penal-
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Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
ties by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional.—On the argument that this Court may clarify
the vague terms or explain the limits of the over-broad provisions of R.A. No. 7080, I should emphasize
that this Court has no power to legislate. Precision must be the characteristic of penal legislation. For
the Court to define what is a crime is to go beyond the so-called positive role in the protection of civil
liberties or promotion of public interests. As stated by Justice Frankfurter, the Court should be wary
of judicial attempts to impose justice on the community; to deprive it of the wisdom that comes from
self-inflicted wounds and the strengths that grow with the burden of responsibility. A statute which is
so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment on acts already punished with lesser penalties
by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness cannot be cured by judicial construction.
PETITION to declare Republic Act No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder)
as amended by RA No. 7659 unconstitutional.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Agabin, Verzola, Hermoso & Layaoen Law Officesand Jose B. Flaminiano for petitioner.
Saguisag, Carao & Associates and Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the
rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even
as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot
tread—asserting that “individual spontaneity” must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to
social interference—he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with
a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor
to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says—
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty
of action of any of their number, is
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Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With
the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to
formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment
for non-observance.
The movement from Mill’s individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in
the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to
the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State
impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein
irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the
will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity,
inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial
conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An
Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659,2 wishes to impress upon
us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which
divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to
subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it
suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
______________
1 Approved 12 July 1991 and took effect 8 of October 1991.
2 Approved 13 December 1993 and took effect 31 December 1993.
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Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed
constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d)“Ill-gotten wealth” means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1. (1)Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury;
2. (2)By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
3. (3)By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4. (4)By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
5. (5)By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or
6. (6)By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties.—Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50.000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder
and shall be
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Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participatedwith the said public officer in
the commission of an offense contributing tothe crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In theimposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance ofmitigating and
extenuating circumstances as provided by the RevisedPenal Code shall be considered by the court. The
court shall declare anyand all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assetsincluding the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit orinvestment thereof
forfeited in favor of the State (italics supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence.—For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (italics supplied).
On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659;
(b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e)
and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No.
26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal
Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman
for preliminary investigation with respect to specification “d” of the charges in the Information in Crim.
Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications “a,”“b,”
and “c” to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to
prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary
investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable
cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are
charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motionthus indicating the explicitness and
comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
430
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558
finding that “a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants
for the arrest of the accused.” On 25 June 2001 petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by
the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground
that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged
more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to
Quash,andfive(5)dayslateroron26June2001petitioner submitted his Reply to the
Opposition. On9July2001the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues
for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for
being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder
and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in
RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
 Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act
is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong
predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the
government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the
presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch—the
legislature.
______________
3 Lim v. Pacquing, et al., G.R. No. 115044, 27 January 1995, 240 SCRA 644.
431
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 431
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume
that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed
the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing
the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with
the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a
statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question
of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon 4 we held that as long as there is some basis for
the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case
will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult
a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law
clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on
sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the
validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, “To doubt is to sustain.”5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge
his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently
explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
______________
4 G.R. No. 87001, 4 December 1989, 179 SCRA 828.
5 Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 414 (1925).
432
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and
particularity. Thus—
1. 1.That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;
2. 2.That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series
of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or
indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary
benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project
or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares
of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural,
industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking
advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. 3.That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject
to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must
sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation;
and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can
be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer
in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or
combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
433
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 433
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
“The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, a.k.a. ‘ASIONG SALONGA’ and a.k.a.‘JOSE VELARDE.’ together with Jose ‘Jinggoy’
Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES &
Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12
of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIV-ANCE/CONSPIRACY with his
co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY
TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF. DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT,
SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ AND, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES
434
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less representing a portion of
the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00)tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie
‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS,
MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR
LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION
ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY
REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR
LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME ‘JOSE VELARDE;’
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION
435
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 435
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME ‘JOSE VELARDE’ AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.”
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous—as there is obviously none—that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that
the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent
and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the
accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts”
found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word “pattern” in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to
petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence,
violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void
merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining
them;6 much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional
or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words
employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as
the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed
in the Plunder Law.
______________
6 C.J.S. 68, p. 113; People v. Ring, 70 P.2d 281, 26 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 768.
436
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted
in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,7 unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.8 The intention of the
lawmakers—who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers—to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary contains
the following commonly accepted definition of the words “combination” and “series:”
Combination—the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to
bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series—a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and
temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words “combination” and “se ries” to be understood in their popular REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we
meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became
RA 7080 or the Plunder Law: mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 same act.

May 1991 REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.

REP. I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

ISIDRO: THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR REP. GARCIA: A series.

CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because when we say

HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di

say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number ba?

one and two or number one and something else are included, how REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That

about a series of the same act? For example, through is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is

misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also? only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have

REP. Yeah, because we say a series. here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts.

GARCIA: Soxxxx

REP. Series. REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di . . . .

ISIDRO: SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term “series?”

REP. Yeah, we include series. REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.

GARCIA: REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations . . . .

______________ REP. GARCIA: Its not . . . Two misappropriations will not be combination.
Series.
7 Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104988, 18 June 1996, 257 SCRA 430, 448.
8 PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 943774, 27 August 1992, 213 SCRA 16, REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
26. REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
437
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
VOL. 369, 437
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
NOVEMBER 19,
438
2001
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that—
GARCIA: For example, ha . . .
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition . . .
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
SENATOR In line with our interpellations that sometimes “one” or
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
MACEDA: maybe even “two” acts may already result in such a big
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice—but combination, two acts.
words “a series of overt or,” to read, therefore: “or conspiracy
 COMMITTED by criminal acts such as.” Remove the idea of commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense
with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
necessitating “a series.” Anyway, the criminal acts prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague
areintheplural. on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
SENATOR That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
TANADA: mentioned in this. instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects—it violates due process for
THE failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and,
PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be . . . . it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Govern-
SENATOR ______________
MACEDA: Yes, because “a series” implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR
9 Resolution of 9 July 2001.
TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x. 440
THE If there is only one, then he has to be prosec uted under the 440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PRESIDENT: particular crime. But when we say “acts of plunder” there Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
should be, at least, two or more. ment muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in
SENATOR In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those
that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be
ROMULO: President. “saved” by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under directed against such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed
different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3). conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
On the other hand, to constitute a “serie s”, there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts understanding and practice.12It must be stressed, however, that the “vagueness” doctrine merely
falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld—not absolute precision or
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity,
had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for “combination” and “series,” it would is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be
have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
439 provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 439 details in advance as in all other statutes.
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and over-
As for “pattern,” we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan9 that this term is sufficiently
broad do not justify a facial review of its validity—
defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2—
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
xxxx under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a ‘pattern’ consists of at least a combination or series of overt or
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law,
as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” 13 The over-
the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable
______________
the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be
an ‘overall unlawful scheme’ or ‘conspiracy’ to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the
term ‘overall unlawful scheme’ indicates a ‘general plan of action or method’ which the principal See People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195-196.
10

accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. Ibid.
11
12 State v. Hill, 189 Kan 403, 369 P2d 365, 91 ALR2d 750.
In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple 13 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L.Ed. 328 (1926) cited in Ermita-Malate
accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hotel and Motel Operators Ass’n. v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849, 867 (1967).
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice
of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner’s reliance on the “void-forvagueness” 441
doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 441
 Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
breadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that “a governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.” 14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because
of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with narrow specificity.”15Thepossibleharmto society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases.
They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, “we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment.”16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that “claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only spoken words” and, again, that “overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed
when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.” For
this reason, it has been held that “a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most diffi-
______________
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 12, 2 L.Ed. 325, 338 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
14
479, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960).
15 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 31 L. Ed.2d 408, 413 (1972) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
16 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 95 L.Ed2d 697, 707 (1987); see also People v. De la
Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, 24 January 2001, 350 SCRA 163.
17 413 U.S. 601, 612-613, 37 L.Ed. 2d 830, 840-841 (1973).
442
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
cult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid.” 18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant
may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. “A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others.” 19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that “one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional.”20 As has been pointed out, “vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context,
like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] ‘as applied’ to a particular
defendant.”21Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim that this Court review the Anti-
Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, “on its face” invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground
that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected.22 It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution
and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual set-
______________
18 United States v. Salerno, supra.
19 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 71 L.Ed.2d
362, 369 (1982).
20 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L.Ed.2d 524, 529 (1960). The paradigmatic case is
Yazoo & Mississippi Valley RR. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 57 L.Ed. 193 (1912).
21 G. Gunther & K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1299 (2001).
22 Id. at 1328. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial Challenges, 113 Harv. L. Rev.
1321 (2000) arguing that, in an important sense, as applied challenges are the basic building blocks of
constitutional adjudication and that determinations that statutes are facially invalid properly occur
only as logical outgrowths of ruling on whether statutes may be applied to particular litigants on
particular facts.
443
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 443
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
tings and in sterile abstract contexts.23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v.
Harris 24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of
these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative
process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required lineby-
line analysis of detailed statutes, ...ordinarilyresultsinakind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, “on its face” invalidation of statutes has been described as “manifestly strong
medicine,” to be employed “sparingly and only a last resort,” 25 and is generally disfavored.26In
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been
violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. 27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so
tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where
none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics
who cavil at the
______________
23 Constitution, Art. VIII, §1 and 5. Compare Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158
(1936); “[T]he power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after
full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to be constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.”
24 401 U.S. 37, 52-53, 27 L.Ed.2d 669, 680 (1971). Accord, United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 14
L.Ed.2d 524 (1960); Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989).
25 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 613, 37 L.Ed.2d at 841; National Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998).
26 FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 223, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990); Cruz v. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000, 347 SCRA 128 (Mendoza, J.,
Separate Opinion).
27 United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 656-6 (1963).
444
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and
with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-
entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner
cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for
its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and
its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full
knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan 28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and
emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law
itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that
will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague.
Petitioners posited, among others, that the term “unwarranted” is highly imprecise and elastic with no
common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its
vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice
of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three
(3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of “unwarranted” benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving
of “unwarranted” benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of “unwarranted” benefits through
gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because they were left
to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases “manifest partial-
______________
28 G.R. No. 57841, 30 July 1982, 115 SCRA 793.
445
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 445
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
ity,”“evident bad faith,” and “gross and inexcusable negligence” merely describe the different modes by
which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these
phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word ‘unwarranted’ is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate
reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and
make unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the
act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any
private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term
“unwarranted” in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood
in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners’ objection thereto was
held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law
circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or
criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy—
446
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence.—For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt
a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution
for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence
which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. 29 The
useofthe“reasonable doubt” standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the
community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.
It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a
proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired
such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clausewhich
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 30 The following exchanges between Rep.
Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House
of Representatives are elucidating—
______________
29 People v. Ganguso, G.R. No. 115430, 23 November 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-275.
30 People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 94187, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 349, 360.
447
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 19, 2001 447
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the
information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him
guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the
accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but
the totality of the crime committed is Pl00 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification
of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.Whatisre-quired to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the
crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber
in the informa-tion—three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just
because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved
two.Now,whatisrequiredtobeprovedbeyondreason-able doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the
totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be
taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the
crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the
other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just
one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime,
there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element
of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other
acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there
are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those
transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond
reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (italics supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard
quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove
beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from
a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each
and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To
illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed
fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being
sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that
they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00. 31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that “pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy” inheres in the very acts
of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where
the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par.
(d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predi-
______________
31 Then Senate President Jovito R. Salonga construed in brief the provision, thuswise: “If there are
let’s say 150 crimes all in all, criminal acts, whether bribery, misappropriation, malversation,
extortion, you need not prove all those beyond reasonable doubt. If you can prove by pattern, let’s say
10, but each must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, you do not have to prove 150 crimes. That’s the
meaning of this (Deliberations of Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Laws, 15
November 1988, cited in the Sandiganbayan Resolution of 9 July 2001).
-cate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other
explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than
“a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth.” The prosecution is therefore
not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with
the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that “pattern”
is “a very important element of the crime of plunder;” andthatSec.4is“two pronged, (as) it contains a
rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime,” such that without it the accused cannot be
convicted of plunder—
JUSTICE In other words, cannot an accused be conv icted under the
BELLOSILLO: plunder law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of
Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes
AGABIN: enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved
BELLOSILLO: beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can
you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY.
AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting
BELLOSILLO: an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays
AGABIN: downasubstantiveelementofthelawxxxx
JUSTICE What I said is—do we have to avail of Section 4 when there
BELLOSILLO: is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged
constituting plunder?
ATTY. Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it
AGABIN: contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive
element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by
which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the
BELLOSILLO: predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not
have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very
AGABIN: important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot
be avoided by the prosecution.32
We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled
and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and “pattern” is not one of
them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence.—For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for
plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right
in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an
aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had,
for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude
exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even
granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by
petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the
demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough.
Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause—
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions.—If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person
or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such
provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result
of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the
provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so,
the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in
se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion—
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven
in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of
plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the
part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is
the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made
during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence
for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or
scheme to commit this crime of plunder.33
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript
quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule
of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman’s view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of
attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it
being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that—
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided
by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder
since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that §2
refers to “any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder.” There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as
well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: “We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean.” 35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have
been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a
straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People
v. Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable,
either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized
as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this
light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death
of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the
case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries
______________
35Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339, 73 L.Ed. 722, 728 (1929).
36267 SCRA 682, 721-2 (1997) (emphasis added).were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him
were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive
arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped,
which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the
subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state
finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from
decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the govermment and impoverished the population,
the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of
society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide
even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the
very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and
repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses
involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators mustnot be allowed to cause
further destruction and damage to society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is
a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala
in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case
of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions
for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg.
22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say, however, that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect
this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People vs. Echegaray 38 to the
archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated
in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high
places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more
elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious
ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the
increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the
national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of
grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately
consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament
to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the
avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men’s souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national
importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner’s ignominious fall
from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing
saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by
responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge
triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law,
as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 G.R. No. 157171. March 14, 2006.*
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Law; Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita Distinguished.—Generally, mala in se felonies
are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently
immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal
intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently
immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the
sole
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
618
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals
issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are
prohibited for reasons of public policy.
Same; Mala in Se; Election Law; Acts prohibited in Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 are
mala in se. Intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is
inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another. Criminal intent is
presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the
contrary shall appear.—The acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors
and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes
to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to
happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors.
However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is
inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another. Criminal intent is
presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the
contrary shall appear. Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its
existence.
Same; Same; Same; The mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is
already punishable under Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.—The fact that the number of votes
deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not
added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act
No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is already punishable
under the said provision.
Election Law; Board of Canvassers; Extraordinary Diligence;Public policy dictates that
extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the
results of the elections.—Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the
members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part
would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial
candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are
sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.
619
VOL. 484, MARCH 14, 2006 619
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Vicente D. Millora for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 245471 that
affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court2 of Alaminos City, Pangasinan,
Branch 54, for violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial
elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner,
with violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:
_______________
Rollo, pp. 101-115. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, with Associate Justices
1
Teodoro P. Regino, and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 60-99.
3 SEC. 27. Election Offenses.—In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated
in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases,
or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses,
after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
xxx
620
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals
“That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995
elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia,
Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray,
Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with,
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully
decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine
hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred
fifty-nine (159) precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos.
008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-
one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and
Certificate of Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077)
votes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”4
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence,
except petitioner who was convicted as follows:
xxx
5. And finally, on the person of ARSENIA B. GARCIA, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes
of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that this finding is
a violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as
maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next
degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused ARSENIA B. GARCIA is not entitled to
probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualifica-
_______________
4 Records, pp. 1-2.
621
tion to hold public office and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered to
commit her person to the Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further
orders from the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.”5
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision,
thus,
“WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to
one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.”6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal assigning the
following as errors of the appellate court:
I committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT COURT,
NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE
VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE
PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO BEEN THE TABULATORS
BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.
II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE TAPES
DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.
III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED
THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. “7”, WHEN
THE DUTY WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.
IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT
WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL.7
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous, based on speculations,
surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to
reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an
election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in
se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a
special law.8 Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the
crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the
criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are
forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. 9Criminal intent is
not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy. 10
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611 provides:
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.—In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in
Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases,
or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses,
after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
xxx
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12 For otherwise, even errors and mistakes
and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And
it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However,
intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently
immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law
punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. 13 Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence.
Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of Canvassers of the
Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows:
1. 1.After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the results
thereof were sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing;
 2. 2.The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was then recorded in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its
Statement of Votes with appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election
appearing in the results from the precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized. 22
of the Board, entering the number in the Statements of Votes as read by the appellant. Six In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998. 23
Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes received by each candidate in the 159
precincts of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan. As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921 votes
3. 3.After the number of votes received by each candidate for each precincts were entered by and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be
accused Viray in the Statements of Votes, these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in
de Vera with the use of electrical adding machines. the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on
4. 4.After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding machine tapes were record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of totals from one
handed to appellant who reads the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the document to another.
precincts listed in each Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
proper column in the Statement of Votes. sustaining petitioner’s conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year
5. 5.After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and de instead of six months is AFFIRMED.
Vera added all the subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes. SO ORDERED.
6. 6.After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the grand total was Carpio, Carpio-Morales and Tinga, JJ., concur.
reflected was handed to appellant who reads the same and accused Viray enters the figure
read by appellant in the column for grand total in the Statement of Votes.” 14 Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.
Notes.—Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. (Alberto vs.
Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV) for each
Commission on Elections, 311 SCRA 215 [1999])
precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in SOV
_______________
Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to arrive
Statement of Votes Votes Based on SOV Subtotals Votes per SOV
at the grand total of votes received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423. 15 The
grand total of the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 008417 1,131 1,174
6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the number of votes private complainant actually received. This error is 008418 1,068 1,068
also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero. 16
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure 008419 1,139 1,139
of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the 008420 864 864
board.17 Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit “A-7”),
008421 1,137 1,171
though it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an
intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.18 008422 1,090 1,090
Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea 008423 492 492
how the SOV (Exhibit “6”) and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead
of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner’s concern was to assure TOTAL 6,921 6,998
accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and 628
fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant
sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law. 19 628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant, Uy vs. Bueno
Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of The existence of the right of suffrage is a threshold for the preservation and enjoyment of all other
liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a rights. (Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, 420 SCRA 438 [2004])
candidate in an election is already punishable under the said provision. 20
At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate court. The ——o0o——
Court has consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court of Appeals
are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly where the findings of both
the trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide. 21
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board
of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the
 G.R. No. 161106. January 13, 2014.*
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, respondents.
G.R. No. 161266. January 13, 2014.*
PLANET INTERNET CORP., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, respondent.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecutors; The public prosecutor has direction and control
of the prosecution of “(a)ll criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information.”—Petitioners
contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal of the search warrants without the
conformity of the public prosecutor. They argue that it violated Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit: SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions.—All criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
prosecutor. The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and
control of the prosecution of “(a)ll criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information.”
However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the
filing of an application therefor.
Same; Same; Search Warrants; An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action.—An
application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. Meanwhile, we have consistently recognized
the right of parties to question orders quashing those warrants. Accordingly, we sustain the CA’s ruling
that the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for
reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants.
Same; Same; Same; An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as
an incident in a main criminal already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed.—An
application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main criminal
case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal case (of which
the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the
purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in Marcelo, the
quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still “something more to be done in the
said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein.”
Same; Same; Same; Where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal
case yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the
grant) ends the judicial process.—Where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of
a criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for
reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the applications for search
warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions.
When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be
done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory,
and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.
Same; Same; Same; In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires “such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.”—In the issuance
of a search warrant, probable cause requires “such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in
connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.” There is no exact test for the
determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent
on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. They determine
probable cause
20based on “evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that
it was committed” by the offender.
Same; Same; Same; When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made
by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts.—When a finding of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by
reviewing courts: x x x. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a
showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such
facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place
sought to be searched.
Criminal Law; Theft; The use of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT’s)
communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and business.—
For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown to exist: (1) the taking by
petitioners (2) of PLDT’s personal property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the consent of PLDT (5)
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or the use of force upon
things. Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue with categorizing the earnings and business
as personal properties of PLDT. However, in Laurel v. Abrogar, 576 SCRA 41 (2009), we have already
held that the use of PLDT’s communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its
telephone services and business.
Same; Same; Personal property includes ownership of telephone services, which are protected by
the penal provisions on theft.—In Laurel, we reviewed the existing laws and jurisprudence on the
generally accepted concept of personal property in civil law as “anything susceptible of appropriation.”
It includes ownership of telephone services, which are protected by the penal provisions on theft. We
therein upheld the Amended Information charging the petitioner with the crime of theft against PLDT
inasmuch as the allegation was that the former was engaged in international simple resale (ISR) or
21“the unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines,
cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic
exchange facilities of the country where destined.” We reasoned that since PLDT encodes, augments,
enhances, decodes and transmits telephone calls using its complex communications infrastructure and
facilities, the use of these communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft, which is the
unlawful taking of telephone services and business. We then concluded that the business of providing
telecommunications and telephone services is personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, and that the act of engaging in ISR is an act of “subtraction” penalized under said article.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Search Warrants; A trial judge’s finding of probable cause
may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed if the
person against whom the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence that when the police
officers and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth
on matters that are essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause.—A trial judge’s finding of
probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be
quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence that
when the police officers and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless
disregard for the truth on matters that are essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause. In
that case, the finding of probable cause is a nullity, because the trial judge was intentionally misled by
the witnesses. On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses
will not cause the quashal of a search warrant. In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali that
the test calls they conducted did not pass through PLDT’s IGF are true. They neglected, however, to
look into the possibility that the test calls may have passed through other IGFs in the Philippines,
which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood.
Even Planet Internet stated that the conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in the country
was made “carelessly and haphazardly.”22
Same; Same; Same; General Warrants; Words and Phrases; A general warrant is defined as “(a)
search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized.”
It is one that allows the “seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another” and gives the officer
executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.—A general warrant is defined as “(a)
search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be
seized.” It is one that allows the “seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another” and gives
the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take. Such discretion is abhorrent,
as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution
guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in
place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful
reasons.
Same; Same; Same; Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer
making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.—In furtherance
of this constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, amplify the rules
regarding the following places and items to be searched under a search warrant: SEC. 3. Personal
property to be seized.—A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
a) Subject of the offense; b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or c) Used
or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search
warrant.—A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. Within the context of the above
legal requirements for valid search warrants, the Court has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law
enforcement officers in describing the items to be searched, especially when these items are technical
in nature, and when the extent of the illegal operation is largely unknown to them. Vallejo v. Court of
Appeals, 427 SCRA 658 (2004), ruled as follows: The things to be seized must be described with
particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that
23there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched
for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not
require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room
for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible
for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look
for. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making
the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.
Same; Same; Same; A search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise and
minute detail. The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the properties
to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized.—The Court also had
occasion to rule that the particularity of the description of the place to be searched and the things to
be seized is required “wherever and whenever it is feasible.” A search warrant need not describe the
items to be seized in precise and minute detail. The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers
to readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles
to be seized. In this case, considering that items that looked like “innocuous goods” were being used to
pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard put to secure
a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent precision. In People
v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 (1925), we pronounced that “[t]he police should not be hindered in the
performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by
superficial adherence to technicality or far-fetched judicial interference.”
Same; Same; Same; A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description
of the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued.—A search warrant fulfills the requirement of
particularity in the description of the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those
that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. To our mind, PLDT was
able to establish the connec-
24tion between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of
its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted
ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners and was then able to confirm that they had “utilized
various telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or
routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, and support equipment such as software,
diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations.”
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Madrid and Associates for petitioners in G.R. No. 161106.
Oscar F. Martinez for petitioner in G.R. No. 161266.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for respondent PLDT in both cases.
SERENO, CJ.:
Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the
Decision[1] dated 20 August 2003 and the Resolution[2] dated 27 November 2003 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversing the quashal of the search warrants previously issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC).
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office
(RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for warrants[3]before the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation
(WWC)[4] located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as
well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet)[5] located at UN
2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The
applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to
theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water,
Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts),
to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).[6]
On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants.
The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the Alternative Calling
Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.
According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should pass through the local
exchange or public switch telephone network (PSTN) on to the toll center of one
_______________
 [4] WWC is a domestic corporation that ceased business operations on 30 June 2002. It was an
Internet service provider and a subscriber to the telephone services of respondent PLDT. Petitioner
Cheryll L. Yu is a former director of WWC.
[5] Planet Internet is registered with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) as a
Value-Added Service (VAS) provider. Section 3(h), Article I of Republic Act No. 7925 (Public
Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines) defines a VAS provider as “an entity which, relying
on the transmission, switching and local distribution facilities of the local exchange and inter-exchange
operators, and overseas carriers, offers enhanced services beyond those ordinarily provided for by such
carriers.”
26of the international gateway facilities (IGFs)[7] in the Philippines.[8] The call is then transmitted to
the other country through voice circuits, either via fiber optic submarine cable or microwave radio
using satellite facilities, and passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the destination country. The
toll center would then meter the call, which will pass through the PSTN of the called number to
complete the circuit. In contrast, petitioners were able to provide international long distance call
services to any part of the world by using PLDT’s telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF. This scheme
constitutes toll bypass, a “method of routing and completing international long distance calls using
lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency which connects directly to the local or domestic
exchange facilities of the originating country or the country where the call is originated.”[9]
On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and registered to WWC
was used to provide a service called GlobalTalk, “an internet-based international call service, which
can be availed of viaprepaid or billed/post-paid accounts.”[10] During a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali
dialed the local PLDT telephone number 6891135, the given access line. After a voice prompt required
him to enter the user code and personal identification number (PIN) provided under a GlobalTalk
prepaid account, he was then requested to
_______________
[7] An IGF “comprises equipment which makes possible the interfacing or interconnection between
(1) a domestic telecommunication system, like that of PLDT, and (2) the cables or other equipment for
transmitting electronically messages from points within the Philippines to points outside the
Philippines, as well as messages originating from points outside to points inside the Philippines.”
(Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Telecommunications Commission, 311 Phil.
548, 558; 241 SCRA 486, 492 [1995]).
27enter the destination number, which included the country code, phone number and a pound (#) sign.
The call was completed to a phone number in Taiwan. However, when he checked the records, it showed
that the call was only directed to the local number 6891135. This indicated that the international test
call using GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF.
Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to WWC with address at
UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. However,
upon an ocular inspection conducted by Rivera at this address, it was found that the occupant of the
unit is Planet Internet, which also uses the telephone lines registered to WWC. These telephone lines
are interconnected to a server and used as dial-up access lines/numbers of WWC.
Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally connected by
petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed the international calls and bypassed PLDT’s IGF, they
violated Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401 as amended,[13] on unauthorized installation of telephone
connections. Petitioners also committed theft, because through
_______________
[13] P.D. 401, Sec. 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped
gas connection without previous authority from the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System,
the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, or the Manila Gas
Corporation, as the case may be, tampers and/or usestampered water, electrical or gas meters, jumpers
or other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas is stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or
piped gas meters, or water, electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits; knowingly
possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical or gas meters as well as stolen or pilfered water, electrical
and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon conviction, be punished
with prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand
pesos, or both. (Underscoring supplied.)
28their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and equipment and with clear intent to gain, they
illegally stole business and revenues that rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to the
letter and intent of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded
the payment of access and bypass charges in its favor while “piggy-backing” on its multi-million dollar
facilities and infrastructure, thus stealing its business revenues from international long distance calls.
Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment (CPE)
without first securing type approval license from the latter.
Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of petitioners, PLDT computed a monthly revenue
loss of P764,718.09. PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange revenues,
and evaded the payment of taxes, license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government.
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to be
searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of particular computers and servers that
would be taken.
On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for search warrants. Accordingly, the
following warrants were issued against the office premises of petitioners, authorizing police officers to
seize various items:
1. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3856, issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft)
in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code against WWC, Adriel S. Mirto, Kevin L. Tan,
Cherryll L. Yu, Carmelo J. Canto, III, Ferdinand B. Masi, Message One International Corporation,
Adriel s. Mirto, Nova Christine L. Dela Cruz, Robertson S. Chiang, and Nolan B. Sison with business
address at 11/F IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Cyberpark Libis, Quezon City:
a) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information, applying the
process of the information and supplying the results of this process;
b) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information;
and
c) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statements, receipts, contracts,
communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment.
2. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3857, issued for violation of P.D. 401 against Planet Internet
Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C.
Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald
Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such
as computers to communicate with other data terminal equipment via a telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the
prescribed process of the information and supplying the results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or
frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and equipment;
 d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from different
sources to pass through a common cable or transmission line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of connecting
telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information;
and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks,
orders, communications and documents, lease and/or subscription agreements or contracts,
communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment.
3. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3858, issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft)
in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code against Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One,
Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with
business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio,
Pasig City:
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such
as computers to communicate with other data terminal equipment via a telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the
prescribed process of the information and supplying the results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or
frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and equipment;
d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from different
sources to pass through a common cable or transmission line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of connecting
telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information;
and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks,
orders, communications and documents, lease and/or subscription agreements or contracts,
communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment.
The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the National Capital
Region Police Office.
Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors,
numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop computer. Planet Internet notes that even
personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of
international calls, such as the President’s Office and the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage
regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, and Planet Internet filed their respective motions to quash the
search warrants, citing basically the same grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without
probable cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained
of, was not a crime; (3) the search warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant
thereto were “fruits of the poisonous tree.”
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions to quash.
In the hearing of the motions to quash on 19 October 2001, the test calls alluded to by Gali in his
Affidavit were shown to have passed the IGF of Eastern Telecommunications (Philippines) Inc.
(Eastern) and of Capital Wireless (Capwire).[24] Planet Internet explained that Eastern and Capwire
both provided international direct dialing services, which Planet Internet marketed by virtue of a
“Reseller Agreement.” Planet Internet used PLDT lines for the first phase of the call; but for the second
phase, it used the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire. Planet Internet religiously paid PLDT for its
domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its IGF usage. None of these contentions were
refuted by PLDT.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature
of general warrants. Thus, the properties seized under the said warrants were ordered released to
petitioners.
While it may be true that during the application for search warrant on September 25, 2001,
in view of the technical nature of the crime alleged to be committed, the Court ordered for these
things to be seized, the Court now admits it was precipitate in doing so.
A perusal of the items that were ordered seized by the Court reveals that they partake of a
general warrant so much so that they can likewise be used by the respondents in their legitimate
business. Thus, the effect of such issuance would literally place the herein respondents out of
business.
PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on the ground that it had failed to get
the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The CA Ruling
PLDT appealed to the CA, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 26190. The CA reversed
and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid and effective.
In concluding that the assailed warrants were not general warrants, the CA reasoned:
Unlike in the cases cited by the appellees, the search warrants did not sanction
indiscriminately the taking of things regardless of whether the transactions for which these were
used were legal or illegal. The articles targeted have a direct relation to the criminal offense
imputed and of which the applicant had adduced evidence, other than the articles themselves,
sufficient to prove the charge.
The description of the objects to be searched and seized need not be of tight specificity and
unerring accuracy. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized
when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs.
Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 [1932]), or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. (Bache & Co. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823
[1971]).
Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. (Uy vs.
Unfish Paking [sic] Corp. vs. BIR, G.R. No. 129651, Oct. 20, 2000, 344 SCRA 36). Taking into considera-
34Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling. Among the points raised was
that PLDT should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than an appeal when it questioned the RTC
Resolution before the CA. The appellate court denied the Motions for Reconsideration.
Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, and Planet
Internet to assail the CA Decision and Resolution. The Court consolidated the two Petitions.
Issues
I. Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal despite the following procedural
infirmities:
 1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no personality to question
the quashal of the search warrants;
2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
II. Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause, considering that the
acts complained of allegedly do not constitute theft.
III. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search warrants were not general
warrants.
Our Ruling
I.
1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; conformity of the
public prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to question an
order quashing search warrants.
Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal of the search warrants
without the conformity of the public prosecutor. They argue that it violated Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions.—All criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.
The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of
the prosecution of “(a)ll criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information.” However, a search
warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application
therefor.
Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, an application for a search warrant is a
“special criminal process,” rather than a criminal action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the
obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial
court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which
is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed
in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and
purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the
institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant
is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar
remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and
provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a
process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and
not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion,
with the catalogue of authorities herein. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. Meanwhile, we have
consistently recognized the right of parties to question orders quashing those warrants. Accordingly,
we sustain the CA’s ruling that the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an
aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants.
2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior to the
filing of a criminal action, partakes of a final order that can be the proper subject of an
appeal.
Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling on the motions to quash was interlocutory, it
cannot be appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. PLDT should have filed a Rule 65 petition
instead. Petitioners cite, as authority for their position, Marcelo v. de Guzman. The Court held therein
as follows:
But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying the motion to quash the search warrant and
to return the properties seized thereunder final in character, or is it merely interlocutory?
In Cruz vs. Dinglasan, this Court, citing American jurisprudence, resolved this issue thus:
Where accused in criminal proceeding has petitioned for the return of goods seized,
the order of restoration by an inferior court is interlocutory and hence, not appealable;
likewise, a denial, by the US District Court, of defendant’s petition for the return of the
articles seized under a warrant is such an interlocutory order. (56 C.J. 1253).
A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined; on the other hand an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits. Tested against this criterion,
the search warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is indisputably of interlocutory character
because it leaves something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of
the guilt of the accused therein.
Petitioners’ reliance upon Marcelo is misplaced.
An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main
criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal case
(of which the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant
for the purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search
warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in Marcelo,
the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still “something more to be done in
the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein.”[41]
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet
to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant)
ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the applications for
search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal
actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing
left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not
interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.
II.
Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their judicial functions. A trial
judge’s finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by
reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.
Petitioners claim that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrants.
The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution:
 Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires “such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects
sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.”
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants.
It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial
function. They determine probable cause based on “evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed” by the offender.
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the
finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts:
x x x. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing
to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for
that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought
out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense
sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
The transcript of stenographic notes during the hearing for the application for search warrants on
25 September 2001 shows that Judge Percival Mandap Lopez asked searching questions to the
witnesses and particularly sought clarification on the alleged illegal toll bypass operations of
petitioners, as well as the pieces of evidence presented. Thus, the Court will no longer disturb the
finding of probable cause by the trial judge during the hearing for the application for the search
warrants. However, petitioners insist that the determination of the existence of probable cause
necessitates the prior determination of whether a crime or an offense was committed in the first place.
In support of their contention that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants,
petitioners put forward the adage nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege — there is no crime when there
is no law punishing it. Petitioners argue that there is no law punishing toll bypass, the act complained
of by PLDT. Thus, no offense was committed that would justify the issuance of the search warrants.
According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local calls and not overseas
calls, thus effectively evading payment to the PLDT of access, termination or bypass charges, and
accounting rates; payment to the government of taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory
requirements. PLDT concludes that toll bypass is prohibited, because it deprives “legitimate telephone
operators, like PLDT … of the compensation which it is entitled to had the call been properly routed
through its network.” As such, toll bypass operations constitute theft, because all of the elements of
the crime are present therein.
On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu argue that there is no theft to speak of,
because the properties allegedly taken from PLDT partake of the nature of “future earnings and lost
business opportunities” and, as such, are uncertain, anticipative, speculative, contingent, and
conditional. PLDT cannot be deprived of such unrealized earnings and opportunities because these do
not belong to it in the first place.
Upon a review of the records of the case, we understand that the Affidavits of Rivera and Gali that
accompanied the applications for the search warrants charge petitioners with the crime, not of toll
bypass per se, but of theft of PLDT’s international long distance call business committed by means
of the alleged toll bypass operations.
For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown to exist: (1) the taking
by petitioners (2) of PLDT’s personal property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the consent of PLDT
(5) accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or the use of force upon
things.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue with categorizing the earnings and business as
personal properties of PLDT. However, in Laurel v. Abrogar, we have already held that the use of
PLDT’s communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and
business:
x x x “[I]nternational long distance calls,” the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case,
take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls
were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership
over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls
using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of
said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without
its consent. It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of
PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the
telephone services and business.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone
service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the
act of engaging in ISR is an act of “subtraction” penalized under said article. However,
the Amended Information describes the thing taken as, “international long distance calls,” and
only later mentions “stealing the business from PLDT” as the manner by which the gain was
derived by the accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be
remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the Amended Information,
to clearly state that the property subject of the theft are the services and business of
respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in
charging the proper offense, which would have called for the dismissal of the information under
Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To
be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The purpose of the amendment
is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of
the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Laurel, we reviewed the existing laws and jurisprudence on the generally accepted concept of
personal property in civil law as “anything susceptible of appropriation.” It includes ownership of
telephone services, which are protected by the penal provisions on theft. We therein upheld the
Amended Information charging the petitioner with the crime of theft against PLDT inasmuch as the
allegation was that the former was engaged in international simple resale (ISR) or “the unauthorized
routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air
wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the
country where destined.”
We reasoned that since PLDT encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits telephone calls
using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities, the use of these communications
facilities without its consent constitutes theft, which is the unlawful taking of telephone services and
business. We then concluded that the business of providing telecommunications and telephone services
is personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and that the act of engaging in ISR
is an act of “subtraction” penalized under said article.
 Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished without the installation of
telecommunications equipment to the PLDT telephone lines. Thus, petitioners may also be held liable
for violation of P.D. 401, to wit:
Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped
gas connection without previous authority from the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System, the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, or the Manila Gas Corporation, as the case may be, tampers and/or uses tampered
water, electrical or gas meters, jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas
is stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or piped gas meters, or water, electric and/or telephone
wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical or
gas meters as well as stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone wires, or piped gas
pipes and conduits, shall, upon conviction, be punished with prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both.
(Emphasis supplied)
The peculiar circumstances attending the situation compel us to rule further on the matter of
probable cause. During the hearing of the motions to quash the search warrants, the test calls
conducted by witnesses for PLDT were shown to have connected to the IGF of either Eastern or
Capwire to complete the international calls.
A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him
based on his finding may be quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued presents clear
and convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses testified, they committed a
deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are essential or necessary to a
showing of probable cause. In that case, the finding of probable cause is a nullity, because the trial
judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses.
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not
cause the quashal of a search warrant. In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test
calls they conducted did not pass through PLDT’s IGF are true. They neglected, however, to look into
the possibility that the test calls may have passed through other IGFs in the Philippines, which was
exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood. Even
Planet Internet stated that the conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in the country was
made “carelessly and haphazardly.”
On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must be noted that the trial
judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack of probable cause. Instead, the issue before
us is whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC, which ruled that the search warrants are general
warrants.
III.
The requirement of particularity in the description of things to be seized is fulfilled
when the items described in the search warrant bear a direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is sought.
Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants were in the nature of general warrants because
the descriptions therein of the objects to be seized are so broad and all-encompassing as to give the
implementing officers wide discretion over which articles to seize. In fact, the CA observed that the
targets of the search warrants were not illegal per se, and that they were “innocuous goods.” Thus, the
police officers were given blanket authority to determine whether the objects were legal or not, as in
fact even pieces of computer equipment not involved in telecommunications or Internet service were
confiscated.
On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search warrant already fulfills the requirement of
particularity of description when it is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow. Furthermore, it cites Kho v. Makalintal, in which the Court allowed leeway in the description of
things to be seized, taking into consideration the effort and the time element involved in the
prosecution of criminal cases.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment filed with the CA, likewise prayed for
the reversal of the quashal of the search warrants in view of the OSG’s position that the scheme was a
case of electronic theft, and that the items sought to be seized could not be described with calibrated
precision. According to the OSG, assuming that the seized items could also be used for other legitimate
businesses, the fact remains that the items were used in the commission of an offense.
A general warrant is defined as “(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person
to be arrested or the property to be seized.” It is one that allows the “seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another” and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items
to take.
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued,
vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched
only for the most compelling and lawful reasons.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no such search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In furtherance of this constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
amplify the rules regarding the following places and items to be searched under a search warrant:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized.—A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:
a) Subject of the offense;
b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which
may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search warrants, the Court has been
mindful of the difficulty faced by law enforcement officers in describing the items to be searched,
especially when these items are technical in nature, and when the extent of the illegal operation is
largely unknown to them. Vallejo v. Court of Appeals[61] ruled as follows:
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of
description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and
certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant
shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part
of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the
 applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
for. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer
making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is Petitions denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
sufficient. (Emphasis supplied)
Notes.—It is the use of these telecommunications facilities without the consent of Philippine Long
Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule that the particularity of the description of the
Distance Telephone (PLDT), that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the
place to be searched and the things to be seized is required “wherever and whenever it is feasible.” A
telephone services and business. (Laurel vs. Abrogar, 576 SCRA 41 [2009])
search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail. The warrant is
A judicially ordered search that fails to yield the described illicit article does not of itself render the
valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them
court’s order unlawful; Statements of mere conclusions of law expose the complaint to a motion to
with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized.
dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action. (Del Rosario vs. Donato, Jr., 614 SCRA 332
In this case, considering that items that looked like “innocuous goods” were being used to pursue
[2010])
an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a
search warrant if they were required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent precision. In People
v. Veloso, we pronounced that “[t]he police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties,
which are difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to
technicality or far-fetched judicial interference.”
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be
seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which
the warrant is being issued.
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as
identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the
application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners
and was then able to confirm that they had “utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting
of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment,
and support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to
support the illegal toll bypass operations.”
In HPS Software and Communication Corp. v. PLDT, we upheld a similarly worded[69] description
of items to be seized
_______________
[69] The description in the search warrants reads:
a) LINES, CABLES AND ANTENNAS or equipment or device capable of transmitting air
waves or frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and equipment;
b) COMPUTERS or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the
prescribed process of the information and supplying the result of this processes;
c) MODEMS or any equipment or device that enaliles data terminal equipment such as
computers to communicate with each other data-terminal equipment via a telephone line;
d) MULTIPLEXERS or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from
different sources to pass through a common cable or transmission line;
e) SWITCHING EQUIPMENT or equipment or device capable of connecting telephone lines;
f) SOFTWARE, DISKETTES, TAPES, OR EQUIPMENT, or device used for recording or storing
information; and
g) Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications, and documents, lease and/or subscription agreements or contracts,

51by virtue of the search warrants, because these items had been sufficiently identified physically and
shown to bear a relation to the offenses charged.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 20 August 2003
and Resolution dated 27 November 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26190 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 170217. December 10, 2012.*
HPS SOFTWARE AND COMMUNICATION CORPORATION and HYMAN YAP, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT), JOSE JORGE E. CORPUZ, in
his capacity as the Chief of the PNP-Special Task Force Group-Visayas, PHILIP YAP, FATIMA
CIMAFRANCA, and EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 170694. December 10, 2012.*
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HPS SOFTWARE AND
COMMUNICATION CORPORATION, including its Incorporators, Directors, Officers: PHILIP YAP,
STANLEY T. YAP, ELAINE JOY T. YAP, JULIE Y. SY, HYMAN A. YAP and OTHER PERSONS
UNDER THEIR EMPLOY, JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, IN THE PREMISES LOCATED AT HPS
BUILDING, PLARIDEL ST., BRGY. ALANG-ALANG, MANDAUE CITY, CEBU, respondents.
Criminal Law; Theft; The Supreme Court had categorically stated and still maintains that an
International Simple Resale (ISR) activity is an act of subtraction covered by the provisions on Theft,
and that the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is personal property, which
can be the object of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.―Interest in business was not
specifically enumerated as personal property in the Civil Code in force at the time the above decision
was rendered. Yet, interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is capable of
appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code
provides that all things which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real
property or personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal property under the
Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be appropriated. Following the ruling in
Strochecker v. Ramirez, business should also be classified as personal property. Since it is not included
in the exclusive enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it is therefore personal property. As
can be clearly gleaned from the above disquisitions, petitioner’s acts constitute theft of respondent
PLDT’s business and service, committed by means of the unlawful use of the latter’s facilities. x x x.
(Citations omitted.) Plainly, from the aforementioned doctrinal pronouncement, this Court had
categorically stated and still maintains that an ISR activity is an act of subtraction covered by the
provisions on Theft, and that the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is
personal property, which can be the object of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Search Warrants; A search warrant proceeding is not a
criminal action, much less a civil action, but a special criminal process.―What is involved here is a
search warrant proceeding which is not a criminal action, much less a civil action, but a special criminal
process. Since a search warrant proceeding is not a criminal action, it necessarily follows that the
requirement set forth in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that “all
criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of a public prosecutor” does not apply.
Same; Civil Procedure; Motion for Reconsideration; The general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to
grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case; Exceptions.―The general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to
grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case. However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has
laid down the following exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper notwithstanding
the failure to file a motion for reconsideration: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in
the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
petition is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and, (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Requisites of Forum Shopping.―There is forum shopping when,
between an action pending before this Court and another one, there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites also constitutive
of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a
search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man
to believe that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper.―This Court
has consistently held that the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following
factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause,
the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter
may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons and things to be seized. Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is
such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his
action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.
Same; Evidence; Probable Cause; In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., 438 SCRA 224
(2004), the Supreme Court held that the quantum of evidence required to prove probable cause is not
the same quantum of evidence needed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt which is required in a
criminal case that may be subsequently filed.―In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., 438 SCRA
224 (2004), this Court held that the quantum of evidence required to prove probable cause is not the
same quantum of evidence needed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt which is required in a
criminal case that may be subsequently filed. We ruled in this case that: The determination of probable
cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, “probable cause” is concerned
with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not
the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Search Warrants; A search warrant issued must particularly describe
the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is
considered as a general warrant which is proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987
Constitution.―A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which
is proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution. In Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, we explained
the purpose of the aforementioned requirement for a valid search warrant, to wit: [A] search warrant
should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose
and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly
described in the search warrant―x x x what articles they shall seize, to the end that “unreasonable
searches and seizures” may not be made,–that abuses may not be committed. x x x
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions and resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Senining, Belciña, Atup, Entise, Limalima, Jumao-as & Bantilan Law Offices for Fatima
Cimafranca.
Roque E. Paloma, Jr. collaborating counsel for HPS Software & Communications Corp., H. Yap,
S. Yap, E.J. Yap and J. Sy.
Teodoro C. Villarmia, Jr. for Philip Yap.
Muntuerto, Miel, Duyongco Law Offices for respondents HPS, Hyman Yap, Stanley Yap, Elaine
Joy Yap and Julie Sy.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for PLDT.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court each seeking to annul and set aside a ruling of the Court of Appeals concerning the May 23,
2001 Joint Order1 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 55. In G.R. No. 170217,
petitioners HPS Software and Communication Corporation and Hyman Yap (HPS Corporation, et al.)
seek to nullify the March 26, 2004 Decision 2 as well as the September 27, 2005 Resolution3 of the
former Fourth (4th) Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65682, entitled “Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company v. Hon. Judge Ulric Cañete, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Mandaue City, HPS Software and Communication Corporation;
its Officers and/or Directors: Philip Yap, Hyman Yap, Fatima Cimafranca; Eastern
Telecommunications Phils., Inc., and Jose Jorge E. Corpuz, in his capacity as the Chief of the PNP-
Special Task Force Group-Visayas.” The March 26, 2004 Decision modified the May 23, 2001 Joint
Order of the trial court by setting aside the portion directing the immediate return of the seized items
to HPS Corporation and, as a consequence, directing the Philippine National Police (PNP)-Special Task
Force Group-Visayas to retrieve possession and take custody of all the seized items pending the final
disposition of the appeal filed by Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) on the said
May 23, 2001 Joint Order. The September 27, 2005 Resolution denied for lack of merit HPS
Corporation, et al.’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. On the other hand, in G.R. No. 170694,
petitioner PLDT seeks to set aside the April 8, 2005 Decision4 as well as the December 7, 2005
Resolution5 of the former Eighteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75838,
entitled “People of the Philippines, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. HPS Software and
Communication Corporation, its Incorporators, Directors, Officers:
Philip Yap, Stanley T. Yap, Elaine Joy T. Yap, Julie Y. Sy, Hyman A. Yap and Other Persons Under
Their Employ, John Doe and Jane Doe, in the premises located at HPS Building, Plaridel St., Brgy.
Alang-Alang, Mandaue City, Cebu.” The April 8, 2005 Decision affirmed the May 23, 2001 Joint Order
of the trial court while the December 7, 2005 Resolution denied for lack of merit PLDT’s subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration.
The undisputed thread of facts binding these consolidated cases, as summarized in the assailed
May 23, 2001 Joint Order, follows:
[O]n October 20, 2000, the complainant PAOCTF filed with this Honorable Court two applications for
the issuance of search warrant for Violation of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code for Theft of
Telephone Services and for Violation of P.D. 401 for unauthorized installation of telephone
communication equipments following the complaint of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company or PLDT that they were able to monitor the use of the respondents in their premises of
Mabuhay card and equipments capable of receiving and transmitting calls from the USA to the
Philippines without these calls passing through the facilities of PLDT.
Complainant’s witnesses Richard Dira and Reuben Hinagdanan testified under oath that
Respondents are engaged in the business of International [S]imple Resale or unauthorized sale of
international long distance calls. They explained that International Simple Resale (ISR) is an
alternative call pattern employed by communication provider outside of the country. This is a method
of routing and completing international long distance call using pre-paid card which respondents are
selling in the States. These calls are made through access number and by passes the PLDT
International Gate Way Facilities and by passes the monitoring system, thus making the international
long distance calls appear as local calls, to the damage and prejudice of PLDT which is deprived of
revenues as a result thereof.
Complainant’s witnesses Richard Dira and Reuben Hinagdanan testified that they found out that
respondents are engaged in the business of International Simple Resale on September 13, 2000 when
they conducted a test call using Mabuhay Card. They followed the dialing instructions found at the
back of the card and dialed “00” and the access code number 18008595845 of the said Mabuhay Card.
They were then prompted by a voice to enter the PIN code to validate and after entering the PIN code
number 332 1479224, they were again prompted to dial the country code of the Philippines 011-6332
and then dialed telephone number 2563066. Although the test calls were incoming international calls
from the United States, they discovered in the course of their test calls that PLDT telephone
lines/numbers were identified as the calling party, specifically 032-3449294 and 032-3449280. They
testified that the test calls passing through the Mabuhay Card were being reflected as local calls only
and not overseas calls. Upon verification, they discovered that the lines were subscribed by Philip Yap
whose address is HPS Software Communication Corporation at Plaridel St., Alang-alang, Mandaue
City. They also testified that the lines subscribed by Philip Yap were transferred to HPS Software and
Communications Corporation of the same address. They further testified that the respondents
committed these crimes by installing telecommunication equipments like multiplexers, lines, cables,
computers and other switching equipments in the HPS Building and connected these equipments with
PLDT telephone lines which coursed the calls through international privatized lines where the call is
unmonitored and coursed through the switch equipments in Cebu particularly in Philip Yap’s line and
distributed to the subscribers in Cebu.
Satisfied with the affidavits and sworn testimony of the complainant’s witnesses that they were
able to trace the long distance calls that they made on September 13, 2000 from the record of these
calls in the PLDT telephone numbers 032 3449280 and 032 3449294 of Philip Yap and/or later on
transferred to HPS Software and Communication Corporation using the said Mabuhay Card in
conducting said test calls, and that they saw the telephone equipments like lines, cables, antennas,
computers, modems, multiplexers and other switching equipments, Cisco 2600/3600, Nokia BB256K
(with Bayantel marking) inside the compound of the respondents being used for this purpose, this court
issued the questioned search warrants to seize the instruments of the crime. 6
On October 20, 2000, the trial court issued two search warrants denominated as S.W. No. 2000-10-
4677 for Violation of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (Theft of Telephone Services) and S.W. No.
2000-10-4688 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Unauthorized Installation of Telephone
Connections) which both contained identical orders directing that several items are to be seized from
the premises of HPS Corporation and from the persons of Hyman Yap, et al.
The search warrants were immediately implemented on the same day by a PAOCTF-Visayas team
led by Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Danilo Villanueva. The police team searched the premises of HPS
Corporation located at HPS Building, Plaridel St., Brgy. Alang-Alang, Mandaue City, Cebu and seized
the articles specified in the search warrants.9
 Subsequently, a preliminary investigation was conducted by Assistant City Prosecutor Yope M.
Cotecson (Pros. Cotecson) of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaue City who thereafter issued a
Resolution dated April 2, 200110 which found probable cause that all the crimes charged were
committed and that Philip Yap, Hyman Yap, Stanley Yap, Elaine Joy Yap, Julie Y. Sy, as well as Gene
Frederick Boniel, Michael Vincent Pozon, John Doe and Jane Doe were probably guilty thereof. The
dispositive portion of the said April 2, 2001 Resolution reads as follows:
Wherefore, all the foregoing considered, the undersigned finds the existence of probable cause for
the crimes of Theft and Violation of PD 401 against all the respondents herein, excluding Fatima
Cimafranca, hence, filing in court of corresponding Informations is hereby duly recommended. 11
On November 23, 2000, Philip Yap and Hyman Yap filed a Motion to Quash and/or Suppress
Illegally Seized Evidence.12 Then on December 11, 2000, HPS Corporation filed a Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and Return of the Things Seized.13 Both pleadings sought to quash the search
warrants at issue on the grounds that the same did not refer to a specific offense; that there was no
probable cause; and that the search warrants were general warrants and were wrongly implemented.
In response, PLDT formally opposed the aforementioned pleadings through the filing of a Consolidated
Opposition.14
The trial court then conducted hearings on whether or not to quash the subject search warrants
and, in the course thereof, the parties produced their respective evidence. HPS Corporation, et
al. presented, as testimonial evidence, the testimonies of Mr. Jesus M. Laureano, the Chief
Enforcement and Operation Officer of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)-Region
VII and Ms. Marie Audrey Balbuena Aller, HPS Corporation’s administrative officer, while PLDT
presented Engr. Policarpio Tolentino, who held the position of Engineer II, Common Carrier
Authorization Division of the NTC. 15
In the course of Engr. Tolentino’s testimony, he identified certain pieces of evidence which PLDT
caused to be marked as its own exhibits but was objected to by HPS Corporation, et al. on the grounds
of immateriality. The trial court sustained the objection and accordingly disallowed the production of
said exhibits. Thus, PLDT filed a Manifestation with Tender of Excluded Evidence16on April 18, 2001
which tendered the excluded evidence of (a) Mabuhay card with Personal Identification Number (PIN)
code number 349 4374802 (Exhibit “E”), and (b) Investigation Report dated October 2, 2000 prepared
by Engr. Tolentino in connection with the validation he made on the complaints of PLDT against ISR
activities in Cebu City and Davao City (Exhibit “G”).
Subsequently, on April 19, 2001, PLDT formally offered in evidence, as part of Engr. Tolentino’s
testimony and in support of PLDT’s opposition to HPS Corporation, et al.’s motion to quash, the
following: (a) Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum issued by the trial court to Engr.
Tolentino, commanding him to appear and testify before it on March 26, 27 and 28, 2001 (Exhibit “A”);
(b) Identification Card No. 180 of Engr. Tolentino (Exhibit “B”); (c) PLDT’s letter dated September 22,
2000, addressed to then NTC Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago (Exhibit “C”); (d) Travel Order No. 52-
9-2000 issued to Engr. Tolentino and signed by then NTC Commissioner Joseph Santiago (Exhibit “D”);
and (e) Travel Order No. 07-03-2001 dated March 23, 2001 issued to Engr. Tolentino by then NTC
Commissioner Eliseo M. Rio, Jr., authorizing Engr. Tolentino to appear and testify before the trial
court (Exhibit “F”).17
PLDT then filed a Motion for Time to File Memorandum18 asking the trial court that it be allowed
to submit a Memorandum in support of its opposition to the motion to quash search warrants filed by
HPS Corporation, et al. within a period of twenty (20) days from receipt of the trial court’s ruling.
Consequently, in an Order19 dated May 3, 2001, the trial court admitted Exhibits “A,” “B,” “C,” “D,”
and “F” as part of the testimony of Engr. Tolentino. The trial court also directed PLDT to file its
Memorandum within twenty (20) days from receipt of said Order. As PLDT’s counsel received said
Order on May 16, 2001, it reckoned that it had until June 5, 2001 to file the aforementioned
Memorandum.
However, the trial court issued the assailed Joint Order on May 23, 2001, before the period for the
filing of PLDT’s Memorandum had lapsed. The dispositive portion of said Order states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to quash the search warrants and return the
things seized is hereby granted. Search Warrant Nos. 2000-10-467 and 2000-10-468 are ordered
quashed. The things seized under the said search warrants are hereby ordered to be immediately
returned to respondent HPS Software and Communication Corporation. 20
When PLDT discovered this development, it filed a Notice of Appeal21 on June 7, 2001 which the
trial court gave due course via an Order22 dated June 13, 2001. This case would be later docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 75838.
PLDT likewise asserted that, without its knowledge, the trial court caused the release to HPS
Corporation, et al. of all the seized items that were in custody and possession of the PNP Task Force
Group-Visayas. According to PLDT, it would not have been able to learn about the precipitate discharge
of said items were it not for a Memorandum23dated June 13, 2001 issued by Police Superintendent Jose
Jorge E. Corpuz which PLDT claimed to have received only on June 27, 2001. Said document indicated
that the items seized under the search warrants at issue were released from the custody of the police
and returned to HPS Corporation, et al. through its counsel, Atty. Roque Paloma, Jr.
Thus, on July 18, 2001, PLDT filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 6524 with the Court of
Appeals assailing the trial court’s release of the seized equipment despite the fact that the Joint Order
dated May 23, 2001 had not yet attained finality. This petition became the subject matter of CA-G.R.
SP No. 65682.
The former Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals issued a Decision dated March 26, 2004 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 65682 which granted PLDT’s petition for certiorari and set aside the trial court’s May 23,
2001 Joint Order insofar as it released the seized equipment at issue. The dispositive portion of the
March 26, 2004 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
respondent judge’s May 23, 2001 Joint Order is MODIFIED by SETTING ASIDE that portion
directing the immediate return of the seized items to respondent HPS. Consequently, the respondent
PNP Special Task Force is directed to retrieve possession and take custody of all the seized items, as
enumerated in the inventory a quo, pending the final disposition of the appeal filed by the petitioner
on respondent judge’s May 23, 2001 Joint Order.25
HPS Corporation, et al. moved for reconsideration of said Court of Appeals ruling but this motion
was denied for lack of merit via a Resolution dated September 27, 2005. Subsequently, HPS
Corporation, et al. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 4526 with this Court on
November 16, 2005. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 170217.
On the other hand, PLDT’s appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75838 was resolved by the former
Eighteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated April 8, 2005. The dispositive portion
of the April 8, 2005 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Joint Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Mandaue City, dated May
23, 2001, is hereby AFFIRMED.27
PLDT moved for reconsideration but this was rebuffed by the Court of Appeals through a
Resolution dated December 7, 2005. Unperturbed, PLDT filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 4528 with this Court on January 26, 2006. The petition was, in turn, docketed as G.R. No. 170694.
In a Resolution29 dated August 28, 2006, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 170217 and
G.R. No. 170694 in the interest of speedy and orderly administration of justice.
 HPS Corporation, et al.’s Joint Memorandum (for respondents HPS Software and Communication
Corporation, Hyman Yap, Stanley Yap, Elaine Joy Yap and Julie Sy) 30 dated June 23, 2008 to the
consolidated cases of G.R. No. 170217 and G.R. No. 170694 raised the following issues for consideration:
IV.1. Whether or not the above-entitled two (2) petitions are already moot and
academic with this Honorable Supreme Court’s promulgation of the doctrinal decision for
the case of Luis Marcos P. Laurel vs. Hon. Zeus C. Abrogar, People of the Philippines and
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, G.R. No. 155076, February 27, 2006, declaring
that: “x x x the telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing
said services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
x x x In the Philippines, Congress has not amended the Revised Penal Code to include
theft of services or theft of business as felonies. Instead, it approved a law, Republic Act No.
8484, otherwise known as the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, on February 11, 1998.
x x x.”?
In the most unlikely event that the above-entitled two (2) petitions have not yet been rendered
moot by the doctrinal decision in the said Laurel case, HPS respectfully submit that the following are
the other issues:
IV.2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when
it declared that the subject warrants are general warrants?
IV.3. Whether or not the factual findings of the trial court in its May 23, 2001 Order
that there was no probable cause in issuing the subject warrants is already conclusive,
when the said factual findings are duly supported with evidence; were confirmed by the
Court of Appeals; and, PLDT did not refute the damning evidence against it when it still
had all the opportunity to do so?
IV.4. Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it stated in its May 23, 2001 Joint Order that:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to quash the search warrants
and return the things seized is hereby granted. Search Warrant Nos. 2000-10-467 and
2000-10-468 are ordered quashed. The things seized under the said search warrants
are hereby ordered to be immediately returned to respondent HPS Software and
Communications Corporation.”
IV.5. Whether or not PLDT’s memorandum was necessary before a decision can be
rendered by the trial court?
IV.6. Whether or not there was a need for PLDT to first file a Motion for
Reconsideration before filing its petition for certiorari in the subject case?
IV.7. Whether or not a Petition for Certiorari was the appropriate remedy for PLDT
when it had recourse to other plain remedy other than the Petition for Certiorari?
IV.8. Whether or not PLDT has the legal interest and personality to file the present
petition when the complainant PAOCTF has already voluntarily complied with or satisfied
the Joint Order.
IV.9. Whether or not the Court of Appeals can, in a petition for certiorari, nullify a
litigant’s or the Search Warrants Applicant’s exercise of its prerogative of accepting and
complying with the said May 23, 2001 Joint Order of the trial court?
IV.10. Whether or not there was forum shopping when PLDT filed an appeal and a
petition for certiorari on the same May 23, 2001 Joint Order issued by the trial court?
IV.11. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it
upheld the trial court’s decision to disallow the testimony of Engr. Policarpio Tolentino
during the hearings of the motion to quash the subject search warrants when the said Engr.
Tolentino was not even presented as witness during the hearing for the application of the
subject search warrants; and, as the Court of Appeals had declared: “. . . We cannot but
entertain serious doubts as to the regularity of the performance of his official function”?
IV.12. Whether or not PLDT’s counsel can sue its own client, the applicant of the
subject search warrant?31
On the other hand, PLDT raised the following arguments in its Memorandum 32 dated June 16,
2008 to the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 170217 and G.R. No. 170694:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS WHEN IT SUSTAINED
THE QUASHAL OF THE SEARCH WARRANTS DESPITE THE CLEAR AND SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE ON RECORD ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE THEREOF.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN INDISCRIMINATELY RELYING UPON
RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT THAT ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
A. THE RULING IN LAGON V. HOOVEN COMALCO INDUSTRIES, INC. THAT
LITIGATIONS SHOULD NOT BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF SUPPOSITIONS,
DEDUCTIONS IS NOT PROPER IN THIS CASE CONSIDERING THAT:
1. The Search Warrant Case is merely a step preparatory to the filing of criminal cases
against the Respondents. Thus, the applicant needed only to establish probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrants and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Even assuming arguendo that there is some controversy as to the value remaining in
the Mabuhay card, the totality of evidence submitted during the applications for the Search
Warrant is more than sufficient to establish probable cause.
B. THE RULING IN DAYONOT V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION THAT AN
ADVERSE INFERENCE ARISES FROM A PARTY’S FAILURE TO REBUT AN ASSERTION
THAT WOULD HAVE NATURALLY INVITED AN IMMEDIATE AND PERVASIVE
OPPOSITION IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE CONSIDERING THAT:
1. PLDT sufficiently rebutted Respondents’ claim that PLDT has no cause to complain
because of its prior knowledge of HPS’s internet services.
2. Assuming arguendo that PLDT had knowledge of HPS’s internet services, such fact is
immaterial in the determination of the propriety of the Search Warrants issued in this case.
The Search Warrants were issued because the evidence presented by PAOCTF overwhelmingly
established the existence of probable cause that Respondents were probably committing a crime
and the objects used for the crime are in the premises to be searched.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE DISALLOWANCE OF A
PORTION OF ENGR. TOLENTINO’S TESTIMONY AND OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THE
MABUHAY CARD AND HIS INVESTIGATION REPORT IN VIOLATION OF THE PRESUMPTION
THAT OFFICIAL DUTY HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT’S JOINT
ORDER WHICH WAS ISSUED WITH UNDUE HASTE. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED
FACTS WHICH CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THE TRIAL COURT’S PREJUDGMENT OF THE
CASE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS, IN VIOLATION OF PLDT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CONTESTED SEARCH
WARRANTS ARE IN THE NATURE OF GENERAL WARRANTS CONSIDERING THAT:
 A. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE GENERAL WARRANTS WAS
NEVER RAISED IN THE APPEAL BEFORE IT.
B. IN ANY CASE, THE SEARCH WARRANTS STATED WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY
THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE OBJECTS TO BE SEIZED, IN CONFORMITY
WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL REQUIREMENTS IN THE
ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANTS.
VI
RESPONDENTS’ ALLEGATION THAT PLDT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
OF SECTION 3, RULE 45 AND SECTION 4, RULE 7 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS COMPLETELY
BASELESS CONSIDERING THAT:
A. PLDT COMPLIED WITH THE RULES ON PROOF OF SERVICE.
B. THE PETITION WAS PROPERLY VERIFIED. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
ORIGINAL VERIFICATION SUBMITTED WAS DEFICIENT, THE SAME WAS PROMPTLY
CORRECTED BY PLDT, IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE DIRECTIVE OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT.
C. PLDT DID NOT ENGAGE IN FORUM-SHOPPING.
1. The issues, subject matter and reliefs prayed for in the Appeal Case and
the Certiorari Case are distinct and separate from one another.444
2. Assuming arguendo that the Appeal Case involves the same parties, subject matter and
reliefs in the Certiorari Case, then Respondents are equally guilty of forum-shopping when they
elevated the Decision of the Court of Appeals in the CertiorariCase to this Honorable Court.
VII
RESPONDENTS’ RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF LAUREL V. ABROGAR IS ERRONEOUS AND
MISLEADING. LAUREL V. ABROGAR IS NOT YET FINAL AND EXECUTORY, HENCE, CANNOT
BIND EVEN THE PARTIES THERETO, MUCH LESS RESPONDENTS HEREIN. 33 (Citations
omitted.)
A year later, on June 1, 2009, PLDT submitted a Supplemental Memorandum 34 to its June 16, 2008
Memorandum. In the said pleading, PLDT pointed out the reversal by the Supreme Court En Banc of
the February 27, 2006 Decision in Laurel v. Abrogar35 and raised it as a crucial issue in the present
consolidated case:
IN A RESOLUTION DATED 13 JANUARY 2009, THIS HONORABLE COURT EN BANC SET ASIDE
THE 27 FEBRUARY 2006 DECISION IN LAUREL V. ABROGAR. THEREFORE, THE PREVAILING
DOCTRINE WITH RESPECT TO THE ACT OF CONDUCTING ISR OPERATIONS IS THAT IT IS
AN ACT OF SUBTRACTION COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS ON THEFT, AND THAT THE
BUSINESS OF PROVIDING TELECOMMUNICATION OR TELEPHONE SERVICE IS
CONSIDERED PERSONAL PROPERTY WHICH CAN BE THE OBJECT OF THEFT UNDER
ARTICLE 308 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. THUS, RESPONDENTS CAN NO LONGER RELY
ON THE 27 FEBRUARY 2006 DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN LAUREL V.
ABROGAR.36
After evaluating the aforementioned submissions, the Court has identified the following questions
as the only relevant issues that need to be resolved in this consolidated case:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PLDT HAS LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THE PETITION FOR SPECIAL
CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI IN CA-G.R. SP No. 65682 AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW IN G.R. NO. 170694 WITHOUT THE CONSENT OR APPROVAL OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PLDT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED
OUTRIGHT BY THE COURT OF APPEALS SINCE NO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS
FILED BY PLDT FROM THE ASSAILED MAY 23, 2001 JOINT ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PLDT COMMITTED FORUM-SHOPPING.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE TWO (2) SEARCH WARRANTS WERE IMPROPERLY QUASHED.
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT SEARCH WARRANTS ARE IN THE NATURE OF GENERAL
WARRANTS.
VI
WHETHER OR NOT THE RELEASE OF THE ITEMS SEIZED BY VIRTUE OF THE SUBJECT
SEARCH WARRANTS WAS PROPER.
Before resolving the aforementioned issues, we will first discuss the state of jurisprudence on the
issue of whether or not the activity referred to as “international simple resale” (ISR) is considered a
criminal act of Theft in this jurisdiction.
To recall, HPS Corporation, et al. contends that PLDT’s petition in G.R. No. 170694 has already
become moot and academic because the alleged criminal activity which PLDT asserts as having been
committed by HPS Corporation, et al. has been declared by this Court as not constituting the crime of
Theft or any other crime for that matter. HPS Corporation, et al. draws support for their claim from
the February 27, 2006 Decision of this Court in Laurel v. Abrogar.37
In that case, PLDT sued Baynet Co., Ltd. (Baynet) and its corporate officers for the crime of Theft
through stealing the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting ISR which is a
method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or
air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country
where the call is destined. One of those impleaded in the Amended Information, Luis Marcos P. Laurel
(Laurel), moved for the quashal of the Amended Information arguing that an ISR activity does not
constitute the felony of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals did not find merit in his motion. However, this Court speaking through its
First Division upheld Laurel’s contention by ruling that the Amended Information does not contain
material allegations charging petitioner with theft of personal property since international long
distance calls and the business of providing telecommunication or telephone services are not personal
properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court then explained the basis for this
previous ruling in this wise:
In defining theft, under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, as the taking of personal property
without the consent of the owner thereof, the Philippine Legislature could not have contemplated the
human voice which is converted into electronic impulses or electrical current which are transmitted to
the party called through the PSTN of respondent PLDT and the ISR of Baynet Card Ltd. within its
coverage. When the Revised Penal Code was approved, on December 8, 1930, international telephone
calls and the transmission and routing of electronic voice signals or impulses emanating from said
calls, through the PSTN, IPL and ISR, were still non-existent. Case law is that, where a legislative
history fails to evidence congressional awareness of the scope of the statute claimed by the respondents,
a narrow interpretation of the law is more consistent with the usual approach to the construction of
the statute. Penal responsibility cannot be extended beyond the fair scope of the statutory mandate. 38
Undaunted, PLDT filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme
Court En Banc. This motion was acted upon favorably by the Court En Banc in a Resolution 39 dated
January 13, 2009 thereby reconsidering and setting aside the February 27, 2006 Decision. In resolving
PLDT’s motion, the Court En Banc held that:
The acts of “subtraction” include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed
or used for generating, containing, conducting, or measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service;
(b) tapping or otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or
other apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of which one may
fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone service.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment
or apparatus to private respondent PLDT’s telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell
or re-route international long distance calls using respondent PLDT’s facilities constitutes all three
acts of subtraction mentioned above.
The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property
which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Business may be
appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be the object of theft:
“Section 2. Any sale, transfer, mortgage, or assignment of a stock of goods, wares,
merchandise, provisions, or materials otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and the
regular prosecution of the business of the vendor, mortgagor, transferor, or assignor, or any
sale, transfer, mortgage, or assignment of all, or substantially all, of the business or trade
theretofore conducted by the vendor, mortgagor, transferor or assignor, or all, or substantially
all, of the fixtures and equipment used in and about the business of the vendor, mortgagor,
transferor, or assignor, shall be deemed to be a sale and transfer in bulk, in contemplation of
the Act. x x x.”
In Strocheker v. Ramirez, this Court stated:
“With regard to the nature of the property thus mortgaged, which is one-half interest in the
business above described, such interest is a personal property capable of appropriation and not
included in the enumeration of real properties in Article 335 of the Civil Code, and may be the
subject of mortgage.”
Interest in business was not specifically enumerated as personal property in the Civil Code in force
at the time the above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was declared to be personal
property since it is capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties.
Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things which are or may be the object of appropriation
are considered either real property or personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as
personal property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be appropriated.
Following the ruling in Strochecker v. Ramirez, business should also be classified as personal property.
Since it is not included in the exclusive enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it is therefore
personal property.
As can be clearly gleaned from the above disquisitions, petitioner’s acts constitute theft of
respondent PLDT’s business and service, committed by means of the unlawful use of the latter’s
facilities. x x x.40 (Citations omitted.)
Plainly, from the aforementioned doctrinal pronouncement, this Court had categorically stated and
still maintains that an ISR activity is an act of subtraction covered by the provisions on Theft, and that
the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is personal property, which can be
the object of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Having established that an ISR activity is considered as Theft according to the prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter, this Court will now proceed to discuss the central issues involved in this
consolidated case.
Anent the first issue of whether PLDT possesses the legal personality to file the petition in G.R.
No. 170694 in light of respondents’ claim that, in criminal appeals, it is the Solicitor General which
has the exclusive and sole power to file such appeals in behalf of the People of the Philippines, this
Court rules in the affirmative.
The petition filed by PLDT before this Court does not involve an ordinary criminal action which
requires the participation and conformity of the City Prosecutor or the Solicitor General when raised
before appellate courts.
On the contrary, what is involved here is a search warrant proceeding which is not a criminal
action, much less a civil action, but a special criminal process. In the seminal case of Malaloan v. Court
of Appeals,41 we expounded on this doctrine in this wise:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of
a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would
thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent
in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specificcourts of
indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of
a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.
A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for
personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process
akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary
because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search
warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in
the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant
to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this
opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued
by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all
writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to
include a writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or
his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other
process issuing from a court of justice. 42 (Citations omitted.)
Since a search warrant proceeding is not a criminal action, it necessarily follows that the
requirement set forth in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that “all
criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of a public prosecutor” does not apply.
In Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,43 we sustained the legal personality
of a private complainant to file an action or an appeal without the imprimatur of government
prosecutors on the basis of the foregoing ratiocination:
The threshold issue that must first be determined is whether or not petitioners have the legal
personality and standing to file the appeal.
Private respondent asserts that the proceedings for the issuance and/or quashal of a search warrant
are criminal in nature. Thus, the parties in such a case are the “People” as offended party and the
accused. A private complainant is relegated to the role of a witness who does not have the right to
appeal except where the civil aspect is deemed instituted with the criminal case.
Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that as the offended parties in the criminal case, they have
the right to institute an appeal from the questioned order.
From the records it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings
which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while
the general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the
Court of Appeals, if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process,
the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor
General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners to
argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General. (Citation omitted.)
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Bright Future
Technologies, Inc.,44we upheld the right of a private complainant, at whose initiative a search warrant
was issued, to participate in any incident arising from or in connection with search warrant
proceedings independently from the State. We quote the relevant discussion in that case here:
The issue of whether a private complainant, like SCEI, has the right to participate in search
warrant proceedings was addressed in the affirmative in United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip:
. . . [A] private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government
agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear,
participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the
validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of the properties
seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in collaboration
with the NBI or such government agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to
quash the search warrant issued by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of the court
order granting such motion to quash.45
With regard to the second issue of whether or not PLDT’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should have been dismissed outright by the Court of Appeals since
no motion for reconsideration was filed by PLDT from the assailed May 23, 2001 Joint Order of the
trial court, this Court declares that, due to the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, the
petition for certiorari was properly given due course by the Court of Appeals despite the non-fulfillment
of the requirement of the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition
for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error
attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.46
However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down the following exceptions when
the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for
reconsideration:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition
is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and,
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.47
In the case at bar, it is apparent that PLDT was deprived of due process when the trial court
expeditiously released the items seized by virtue of the subject search warrants without waiting for
PLDT to file its memorandum and despite the fact that no motion for execution was filed by
respondents which is required in this case because, as stated in the assailed March 26, 2004 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65682, the May 23, 2001 Joint Order of the trial court is a
final order which disposes of the action or proceeding and which may be the subject of an appeal. Thus,
it is not immediately executory. Moreover, the items seized by virtue of the subject search warrants
had already been released by the trial court to the custody of respondents thereby creating a situation
wherein a motion for reconsideration would be useless. For these foregoing reasons, the relaxation of
the settled rule by the former Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals is justified.
Moving on to the third issue of whether PLDT was engaged in forum shopping when it filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals despite the fact that it had previously
filed an appeal from the assailed May 23, 2001 Joint Order, this Court rules in the negative.
In Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. International Exchange Bank,48 we reiterated the
jurisprudential definition of forum shopping in this wise:
Forum shopping has been defined as an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another
forum, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari, or the institution of two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, there is forum shopping when, between an action pending before this Court and another one,
there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration; said requisites also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendantor lis
pendens.49
In the case at bar, forum shopping cannot be considered to be present because the appeal that
PLDT elevated to the Court of Appeals is an examination of the validity of the trial court’s action of
quashing the search warrants that it initially issued while, on the other hand, the petition
for certiorari is an inquiry on whether or not the trial court judge committed grave abuse of discretion
when he ordered the release of the seized items subject of the search warrants despite the fact that its
May 23, 2001 Joint Order had not yet become final and executory, nor had any motion for execution
pending appeal been filed by the HPS Corporation, et al. Therefore, it is readily apparent that both
cases posed different causes of action.
As to the fourth issue of whether or not the two search warrants at issue were improperly quashed,
PLDT argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously appreciated the facts of the case and the
significance of the evidence on record when it sustained the quashal of the subject search warrants by
the trial court mainly on the basis of test calls using a Mabuhay card with PIN code number 332
147922450 which was the same Mabuhay card that was presented by PLDT to support its application
for a search warrant against HPS Corporation, et al. These test calls were conducted in NTC-Region
VII Office on November 3, 2000 and in open court on January 10, 2001. PLDT insists that these test
calls, which were made after the issuance of the subject search warrants, are immaterial to the issue
of whether or not HPS Corporation, et al. were engaged in ISR activities using the equipment seized
at the time the subject search warrants were issued and implemented. PLDT further argues that a
search warrant is merely a preparatory step to the filing of a criminal case; thus, an applicant needs
only to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant and not proof beyond reasonable
doubt. In this case, PLDT believes that it had established probable cause that is sufficient enough to
defeat the motion to quash filed by HPS Corporation, et al.
We find that the contention is impressed with merit.
This Court has consistently held that the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon
the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination
of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place
to be searched and persons and things to be seized. 51
Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by
facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken
in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.52
In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,53 this Court held that the quantum of evidence required
to prove probable cause is not the same quantum of evidence needed to establish proof beyond
reasonable doubt which is required in a criminal case that may be subsequently filed. We ruled in this
case that:
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof
that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves,
“probable cause” is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution
need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of
a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.54(Citation
omitted.)
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the former Eighteenth Division of the Court of Appeals
agree that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the subject search warrants. In
sustaining the findings of the trial court, the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision dated April 8,
2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75838 ratiocinated in this manner:
As a giant in the telecommunications industry, PLDT’s declaration in page 21 of its appellant’s
brief that it would “take sometime, or after a certain number of minutes is consumed, before the true
value of the card is correspondingly reflected”, by way of further explaining the nature of the subject
Mabuhay Card as not being a “smart” card, is conceded with much alacrity.
We are not, however, prepared to subscribe to the theory that the twenty (20) minutes deducted
from the balance of the subject Mabuhay Card after a couple of test calls were completed in open court
on January 10, 2001 already included the time earlier consumed by the PLDT personnel in conducting
their test calls prior to the application for the questioned warrants but belatedly deducted only during
the test calls conducted by the court a quo. It is beyond cavil that litigations cannot be properly resolved
by suppositions, deductions, or even presumptions, with no basis in evidence, for the truth must have
to be determined by the hard rules of admissibility and proof. This Court cannot quite fathom why
PLDT, with all the resources available to it, failed to substantiate this particular supposition before
the court a quo, when it could have helped their case immensely. We note that at the hearing held on
January 10, 2001, the trial judge allowed the conduct of test calls in open court in order to determine
if the subject Mabuhay Card had in fact been used, as alleged by PLDT. However, it was proven that
the Card retained its original value of $10 despite several test calls already conducted in the past using
the same. PLDT should have refuted this damning evidence while it still had all the opportunity to do
so, but it did not.
Moreover, if we go by the gauge set by PLDT itself that it would take a certain number of minutes
before the true value of the card is reflected accordingly, then we fail to see how the test calls conducted
by its personnel on September 13, 2000 could only be deducted on January 10, 2001, after almost four
(4) months.
PLDT cannot likewise capitalize on the fact that, despite the series of test calls made by Engr.
Jesus Laureno at the NTC, Region VII office on November 3, 2000, the subject Mabuhay Card still had
$10 worth of calls. Had PLDT closely examined the testimony of Engr. Laureno in open court, it would
have realized that not one of said calls ever got connected to a destination number. Thus:
“Q You said that after you heard that female voice which says that you still have ten (10)
dollars and you entered your call at the country of destination, you did not proceed that
call. Will you please tell the Court of the six test calls that were conducted, how many
calls were up to that particular portion?
A Five (5).
Q Will you please tell the Court who… since that were five (5) test calls, how many calls did
you personally make up to that particular portion?
A Only one (1).
Q In whose presence?
A In the presence of Director Butaslac, Engr. Miguel, Engr. Yeban, Engr. Hinaut and three
(3) PNP personnel, Atty. Muntuerto and Atty. Paloma.
Q What about the other four (4)? You mentioned of five (5) test calls and you made only one,
who did the other four (4) test calls which give the said results?
A The third call was done by Engr. Yeban using the same procedure and then followed by the
PNP personnel. Actually, the first one who dial or demonstrate is Atty. Muntuerto, me is
the second; third is Engr. Yeban; the fourth is the PNP personnel and also the fifth; and
the sixth test calls was Engr. Yeban and with that call, we already proceeded to the dialing
the destination number which we call one of the numbers of our office.
Q What number of the office was called following the instruction that you have ten (10) dollars
and that you enter your destination number now?
A 346-06-87.
Q What happened? You said that, that was done on the sixth test calls, what happened after
that destination number was entered?
A The call is not completed and the female voice said to retry again.” (TSN, January 10, 2001,
pp. 45-48)
In fine, PLDT cannot argue that the court a quo should not have relied heavily upon the result of
the test calls made by the NTC- Regional Office as well as those done in open court on January 10,
2001, as there are other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of its personnel showing that, in
fact, test calls and ocular inspections had been conducted yielding positive results. Precisely, the trial
court anchored its determination of probable cause for the issuance of the questioned warrants on the
sworn statements of the PLDT personnel that test calls had been made using the subject Mabuhay
Card. However, said statements were later proven to be wanting in factual basis.55
Essentially, the reasoning of the Court of Appeals relies solely on the fact that the Mabuhay card
with PIN code number 332 1479224 with a card value of $10.00 did not lose any of its $10.00 value
before it was used in the test calls conducted at the NTC-Region VII office and in open court. Thus, the
Court of Appeals concluded that, contrary to PLDT’s claims, no test calls using the same Mabuhaycard
were actually made by PLDT’s witnesses when it applied for a search warrant against HPS
Corporation, et al.; otherwise, the Mabuhay card should have had less than $10.00 value left in it.
This Court cannot subscribe to such a hasty conclusion because the determination of whether or
not test calls were indeed made by PLDT on Mabuhay card with PIN code number 332 1479224 cannot
be ascertained solely by checking the value reflected on the aforementioned Mabuhay card. In fact,
reliance on this method of verification is fraught with questions that strike deep into the capability of
the said Mabuhay card to automatically and accurately reflect the fact that it had indeed been used by
PLDT’s witnesses to make test calls.
We find that indeed PLDT never represented that the Mabuhay card had an accurate recording
system that would automatically deduct the value of a call from the value of the card at the time the
call was made. Certainly, PLDT was not in a position to make such an assertion as it did not have a
hand in the production and programming of said Mabuhay card.
Furthermore, several plausible reasons could be entertained for the non-deduction of the value of
the Mabuhay card other than the trial court’s assertion that the said phone card could not have been
utilized in test calls made by PLDT’s witnesses.
One explanation that PLDT offered is that the said Mabuhay card might not be a “smart” card
which, in telecommunications industry parlance, is a card that automatically debits the value of a call
as it is made as opposed to a non-“smart” card which takes a considerable amount of time before the
true value of the card is correspondingly reflected in the balance.
Another explanation that PLDT suggests is that the test calls that were conducted in NTC-Region
VII on November 3, 2000 and in open court on January 10, 2001 were made long after the subject
search warrants were issued which was on October 20, 2000. During the time in between said events,
the identity of the Mabuhay card was already a matter of judicial record and, thus, easily ascertainable
by any interested party. PLDT asserts this circumstance could have provided HPS Corporation, et
al. the opportunity to examine the prosecution’s evidence, identify the specific Mabuhay card that
PLDT’s witnesses used and manipulate the remaining value reflected on the said phone card. This idea
is not farfetched considering that if HPS Corporation, et al. did indeed engage in illegal ISR activities
using Mabuhay cards then it would not be impossible for HPS Corporation, et al. to possess the
technical knowledge to reconfigure the Mabuhay card that was used in evidence by PLDT. In support
of this tampering theory, PLDT points to HPS Corporation, et al.’s vehement opposition to the
introduction of a different Mabuhay card during the testimony of Engr. Tolentino, which PLDT
attributes to HPS Corporation, et al.’s lack of opportunity to identify and manipulate this particular
phone card.
Since the value of the subject Mabuhay card may be susceptible to tampering, it would have been
more prudent for the trial court and the Court of Appeals to weigh the other evidence on record. As
summarized in its memorandum, PLDT submitted the following to the trial court, during the
application for the subject search warrants and during the hearing on HPS Corporation, et al.’s motion
to suppress the evidence:
a. The affidavit56 and testimony57 of PLDT employee Engr. Reuben C. Hinagdanan (Engr.
Hinagdanan) which was given during the application for the issuance of the subject search
warrants. In his affidavit and testimony, Engr. Hinagdanan averred that PLDT conducted
surveillance on the ISR activities of HPS Corporation, et al. and that the said surveillance
operation yielded positive results that PLDT telephone lines subscribed by Philip Yap and/or
HPS Corporation were being utilized for illegal ISR operations.
b. The call detail records58 which are attached as Annex “C” to Engr. Hinagdanan’s affidavit which
indicated that test calls were made by Engr. Hinagdanan using the Mabuhay card with PIN
code number 332 1479224. The said document also indicated that even if the calls originated
from the United States of America, the calling party reflected therein are local numbers of
telephone lines which PLDT had verified as the same as those subscribed by Philip Yap and/or
HPS Corporation.
c. The affidavit59 and testimony60 of PLDT employee Engr. Richard L. Dira (Engr. Dira) which
was given during the application for the issuance of the subject search warrants. In his affidavit
and testimony, Engr. Dira averred that he personally conducted an ocular inspection in the
premises of HPS Corporation and that the said inspection revealed that all PLDT lines
subscribed by Philip Yap and/or HPS Corporation were illegally connected to various
telecommunications and switching equipment which were used in illegal ISR activities
conducted by HPS Corporation, et al.
d. The testimony61 and investigation report62 of Engr. Tolentino which details the test calls he
made using Mabuhay card with PIN code number 349 4374802. This is a
different Mabuhay card than what was used by PLDT in its application for the subject search
warrants. According to his investigation report, the telephone lines subscribed by Philip Yap
and/or HPS Corporation were indeed utilized for illegal ISR operations.
e. The testimony63 of Police Officer Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Officer Ouano) of the Legal and
Investigation Division of the PAOCTF given during the hearing on the application for the
issuance of the subject search warrants wherein Officer Ouano averred that, upon complaint of
PLDT, the PAOCTF conducted surveillance operations which yielded positive results that HPS
Corporation, et al. were engaged in illegal ISR activities.
f. The results of a traffic study64 conducted by PLDT on the twenty (20) direct telephone lines
subscribed by Philip Yap and/or HPS Corporation which detailed the extent of the losses
suffered by PLDT as a result of the illegal ISR activities conducted by HPS Corporation, et al.
Taken together, the aforementioned pieces of evidence are more than sufficient to support a finding
that test calls were indeed made by PLDT’s witnesses using Mabuhay card with PIN code number 332
1479224 and, more importantly, that probable cause necessary to engender a belief that HPS
Corporation, et al. had probably committed the crime of Theft through illegal ISR activities exists. To
reiterate, evidence to show probable cause to issue a search warrant must be distinguished from proof
beyond reasonable doubt which, at this juncture of the criminal case, is not required.
With regard to the issue of whether or not the subject search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants, PLDT argues that, contrary to the ruling of the former Eighteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals in its assailed Decision dated April 8, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75838, the subject search
warrants cannot be considered as such because the contents of both stated, with sufficient
particularity, the place to be searched and the objects to be seized, in conformity with the constitutional
and jurisprudential requirements in the issuance of search warrants. On the other hand, HPS
Corporation, et al. echoes the declaration of the Court of Appeals that the language used in the subject
search warrants are so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records and equipment of HPS
Corporation regardless of whether they are legal or illegal.
We rule that PLDT’s argument on this point is well taken.
A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized in order for it to be valid, 65 otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is
proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution.
In Uy Kheytin v. Villareal,66 we explained the purpose of the aforementioned requirement for a
valid search warrant, to wit:
[A] search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only
those, particularly described in the search warrant―x x x what articles they shall seize, to the end that
“unreasonable searches and seizures” may not be made,–that abuses may not be committed. x x x
In Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz,67 we held that, among other things, it is only required that a
search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow, such that:
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a
conclusion of fact―not of law–by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and
seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
The disputed text of the subject search warrants reads as follows:
a. LINES, CABLES AND ANTENNAS or equipment or device capable of transmitting air
waves or frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and equipment;
b. COMPUTERS or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the
described process of the information and supplying the result of this processes;
c. MODEMS or any equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such as
computers to communicate with each other data-terminal equipment via a telephone line;
d. MULTIPLEXERS or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from
different sources to pass through a common cable or transmission line;
e. SWITCHING EQUIPMENT or equipment or device capable of connecting telephone lines;
f. SOFTWARE, DISKETTES, TAPES, OR EQUIPMENT, or device used for recording and
storing information; and
g. Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing statements, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications, and documents, lease and/or subscription agreements or contracts,
communications and documents pertaining to securing and using telephone lines and or
equipment in relation to Mr. Yap/HPS’ ISR Operations.
Utilizing the benchmark that was previously discussed, this Court finds that the subject search
warrants are not general warrants because the items to be seized were sufficiently identified physically
and were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the offenses charged which are Theft
and Violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 through the conduct of illegal ISR activities. Lastly, on
the issue of whether or not the release of the items seized by virtue of the subject search warrants was
proper, this Court rules in the negative.
We quote with approval the disquisition of the Court of Appeals on this particular issue in its
assailed Decision dated March 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65682, to wit:
Although there was no separate order from the respondent judge directing the immediate release
of the seized items, such directive was already contained in the Joint Order dated May 23, 2001. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Joint Order reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to quash the search warrants and return
the things seized is hereby granted. Search Warrant Nos. 2000-10-467 and 2000-10-468 are
ordered quashed. The things seized under the said search warrants are hereby ordered to be
immediately returned to the respondent HPS Software and Communication Corporation.
SO ORDERED.”
As properly pointed out by the petitioner PLDT, the May 23, 2001 Joint Order of the respondent
judge is not “immediately executory”. It is a final order which disposes of the action or proceeding and
which may be the subject of an appeal. Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders―Execution shall issue as a matter
of right, on motion, upon judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom, if no appeal has been duly perfected.
xxxx
From the foregoing, it is clear that execution may issue only upon motion by a party and only upon the
expiration of the period to appeal, if no appeal has been perfected. Otherwise, if an appeal has been
duly perfected, the parties would have to wait for the final resolution of the appeal before it may execute
the judgment or final order―except for instances where an execution pending appeal is granted by the
proper court of law.467
VOL. 687, DECEMBER 10, 2012 467
HPS Software and Communication vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT)
It would appear that despite the absence of any motion for execution, the respondent judge enforced
his Joint Order by directing the release of the seized items from the physical custody of the PNP Special
Task Force on June 5, 2001―less than the fifteen-day prescribed period within which an aggrieved
party may file an appeal or for such Joint Order to become final and executory in the absence of an
appeal. Clearly the release of the seized items was enforced prematurely and without any previous
motion for execution on record.
We cannot give weight to the argument that the seized items were voluntarily released by the PNP
Special Task Force, and thus, with such voluntary implementation of the May 23, 2001 Joint Order,
the latter is already final and executed.
We take note that the PNP Special Task Force only retained physical custody of the seized items.
However, it was clearly the respondent judge who ordered and released said seized items with his
directive in the May 23, 2001 Joint Order. The PNP Special Task Force could not release the said items
without the directive and authority of the court a quo. Hence, such compliance cannot be deemed
voluntary at all.
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the respondent judge’s directive in the May 23,
2001 Joint Order for the immediate return of the seized items to the respondent HPS was enforced
prematurely and in grave abuse of discretion. Clearly, the Joint Order dated May 23, 2001 was not yet
final and executory when it was implemented on June 5, 2001. Moreover, a motion for execution filed
by the interested party is obviously lacking. Thus, this Court concludes that there is no legal basis for
the implementation of the May 23, 2001 Joint Order when the seized items were released on June 5,
2001.68
In all, we agree with the former Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals that there was indeed
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in the premature haste attending the release of
the items seized.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of HPS Corporation, et al. in G.R. No. 170217 is
DENIED for lack of merit. The petition of PLDT in G.R. No. 170694 is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision dated April 8, 2005 as well as the Resolution dated December 7, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75838 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (C.J., Chairperson), Del Castillo,** Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition in G.R. No. 170217 denied; while petition in G.R. No. 170694 granted, judgment and
resolution dated December 7, 2005 reversed and set aside.
Notes.―The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while
in estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. (Matrido vs. People,
592 SCRA 534 [2009])
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. (Del Castillo vs.
People, 664 SCRA 430 [2012])
――o0o――
 VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 21, 2007 643
Malto vs. People
G.R. No. 164733. September 21, 2007.*
MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Sufficiency of Complaint or Information; A complaint
or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the
statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the offended party,
the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed.—
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
644
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malto vs. People
Pursuant thereto, the complaint or information against him should be sufficient in form and
substance. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the
offense was committed.
Same; Same; Same; The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances.—The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Same; Same; Same; The failure however to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated does not vitiate the
information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged.—The designation
in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the failure to designate the
offense by statute, or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification
of the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged. What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of
the offense but the actual facts recited in the information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the
commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged
in the information.
645
VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 21, 2007 645
Malto vs. People
Criminal Law; Republic Act 7610; Elements of Paragraph (a) and (b) of RA 7610.—The elements
of paragraph (a) are: 1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution; 2.
the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means: a. acting as a procurer of a child
prostitute; b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means; c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a
child as a prostitute; d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute or,
e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such
child in prostitution; 3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and, 4. the
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. On the other hand, the elements of paragraph
(b) are: 1. the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; 2. the act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse and, 3. the child,
whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Same; Same; Under paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit.—Paragraph (a)
essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It contemplates sexual
abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a), the child is abused
primarily for profit.
Same; Same; Paragraph (b) covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also
one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct.—Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a
child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only
a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion,
intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
Same; Same; Petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610
despite a finding that he did not commit rape.—Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, not rape. The offense for which he was convicted is punished by a
special law while rape is a felony under the Revised Penal Code. They have different elements. The
two are separate and distinct crimes. Thus, petitioner can be held
646
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malto vs. People
liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a finding that he did not commit
rape.
Same; Same; Sweetheart Theory; For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in
child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable.—The sweetheart theory
applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or without the consent of the
victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that the accused
and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual relations. For purposes of sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is
unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give
consent to sexual intercourse with another person.
Same; Same; Same; Unlike rape, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610.—Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious
conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the
offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
Same; Same; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special
law, petitioner may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.—The penalty prescribed for
violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed
by the law. Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special law, petitioner may enjoy the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Since the penalty provided in RA 7610 is taken from the range of
penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. Thus, he is entitled to a maximum term which should be within the range of the proper
imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and
1 day to 20 years) and a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the law: prision mayor in its
647
VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 21, 2007 647
Malto vs. People
medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period (ranging from 8 years and 1 day to
14 years and 8 months).
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ruby Ruiz-Bruno for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
CORONA, J.:
Whereas, mankind owes to the child the best it has to give.(Final preambular clause of the
Declaration of the Rights of the Child)
This is a petition for review1 of the decision2 dated July 30, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 25925affirming with modification the decision3 of Branch 109 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 000691 which found petitioner Michael John Z. Malto guilty for
violation of paragraph 3, Section 5(a), Article III of RA 7610, 4 as amended.
Petitioner was originally charged in an information which read:
“The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5(b), AR
_______________
1Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon and concurred in by Associate Justices
Edgardo P. Cruz and Mariano C. Del Castillo of the Special Tenth Division of the Court of
Appeals. Rollo, pp. 33-45.
Dated March 7, 2001. Penned by Judge Lilia C. Lopez. Id., pp. 57-89.
3
Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. It is
4
also known as the “Anti-Child Abuse Law.”
648
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malto vs. People
TICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as follows: That on or about and
sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Michael John. Z. Malto,
a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce and/or seduce his student
at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse for
several times with him as in fact said accused had carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law.”5
This was subsequently amended as follows:
“The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5(a), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS AMENDED, committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Michael John Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take advantage and exert influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his
student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal
knowledge.
Contrary to law.”6
Petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned; hence, the trial court entered for him a plea of “not
guilty.” After the mandatory pre-trial, trial on the merits proceeded.
The prosecution established the following:
At the time of the incident, private complainant AAA was 17 years old. 7 She was a college student
at the Assumption
_______________
5 Trial court records, vol. I, p. 2.
6 Id., p. 96.
7 Her birth certificate (Exhibit “H”) showed that she was born on December 3, 1979. Id., p. 229.
649
VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 21, 2007 649
Malto vs. People
College in San Lorenzo Village, Makati City. Petitioner, then 28, was her professor in her Philosophy
II class in the first semester of the school year 1997 to 1998.
On July 18, 1997, AAA was having lunch with her friends when petitioner joined their group. He
told them to address him simply as “Mike.” He handed them his organizer and asked them to list down
their names and contact numbers.
On October 3, 1997, while AAA and her friends were discussing the movie Kama Sutra, petitioner
butted in and bragged that it was nothing compared to his collection of xxxrated films. To the shock of
AAA’s group, he lectured on and demonstrated sexual acts he had already experienced. He then invited
the group to view his collection.
On October 10, 1997, petitioner reiterated his invitation to AAA and her friends to watch his
collection of pornographic films. Afraid of offending petitioner, AAA and two of her friends went with
him. They rode in his car and he brought them to the Anito Lodge on Harrison St. in Pasay City. They
checked in at a “calesa room.” Petitioner was disappointed when he found out there was neither a video
cassette player (on which he could play his video tapes) nor an x-rated show on the closed-circuit
television. He suggested that they just cuddle up together. AAA and her friends ignored him but he
pulled each of them towards him to lie with him in bed. They resisted until he relented.
AAA and her friends regretted having accepted petitioner’s invitation. For fear of embarrassment
in case their classmates got wind of what happened, they agreed to keep things a secret. Meanwhile,
petitioner apologized for his actuations.
Thereafter, petitioner started to show AAA amorous attention. He called her on the phone and
paged8 her romantic messages at least thrice a day. When semestral break came,
_______________
8 Before cellular phones and text messaging came in vogue, the status symbol were pagers/beepers
used for paging/beeping messages.
650
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malto vs. People
his calls and messages became more frequent. Their conversation always started innocently but he had
a way of veering the subject to sex. Young, naive and coming from a broken family, AAA was soon
overwhelmed by petitioner’s persistence and slowly got attracted to him. He was the first person to
court her. Soon, they had a “mutual understanding” and became sweethearts.
When AAA secured her class card in Philosophy II at the start of the second semester, petitioner
told her that he gave her a final grade of “3.” She protested, stating that her midterm grade was “1.2.”
He gave her a grade of “1.5” when she promised not to disclose his intimate messages to her to anyone.
He also cautioned her not to tell anyone about their affair as it could jeopardize his job.
On November 19, 1997, at around 11:00 a.m., AAA agreed to have lunch with petitioner outside
the premises of the college. Since she was not feeling well at that time, he asked her to lie down in the
backseat of his car. She was surprised when he brought her to Queensland Lodge 9 on Harrison St. in
Pasay City. Once inside the motel room, he kissed her at the back and neck, touched her breasts and
placed his hand inside her blouse. She resisted his advances but he was too strong for her. He stopped
only when she got angry at him.
On November 26, 1997, petitioner asked AAA to come with him so that they could talk in private.
He again brought her to Queensland Lodge. As soon as they were inside the room, he took off his shirt,
lay down in bed and told her, “halika na, dito na tayo mag-usap.” She refused but he dragged her
towards the bed, kissed her lips, neck and breasts and unsnapped her brassiere. She struggled to stop
him but he overpowered her. He went on top of her, lowered her pants and touched her private part.
He tried to penetrate her but she pushed him away forcefully and she sat up in bed. He hugged her
tightly saying, “Sige na, AAA, pumayag ka na, I won’t
_______________
9Queensland Motel in some parts of the records.
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hurt you.” She refused and said, “Mike, ayoko.” He angrily stood up saying, “Fine, hindi na tayo mag-
uusap. Don’t come to the faculty room anymore. You know I need this and if you will not give in or give
it to me, let us end this.” She replied, “Mike, hindi pa ako ready and it was you who said it will be after
my debut” on December 3, 1997. He insisted that there was no difference between having sex then and
after her debut. He told her, “kung hindi ko makukuha ngayon, tapusin na natin ngayon.” Pressured
and afraid of his threat to end their relationship, she hesitantly replied “Fine.” On hearing this, he
quickly undressed while commenting “ibibigay mo rin pala, pinahirapan mo pa ako” and laughed. They
had sexual intercourse.
In July 1999, AAA ended her relationship with petitioner. She learned that he was either
intimately involved with or was sexually harassing his students in Assumption College and in other
colleges where he taught. In particular, he was dismissed from the De La Salle University-Aguinaldo
for having sexual relations with a student and sexually harassing three other students. His
employment was also terminated by Assumption College for sexually harassing two of his students. It
was then that AAA realized that she was actually abused by petitioner. Depressed and distressed, she
confided all that happened between her and petitioner to her mother, BBB.
On learning what her daughter underwent in the hands of petitioner, BBB filed an administrative
complaint in Assumption College against him. She also lodged a complaint in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City which led to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-0691.
In his defense, petitioner proffered denial and alibi. He claimed that the alleged incidents on
October 3, 1997 and October 10, 1997 did not happen. He spent October 3, 1997 with his colleagues
Joseph Hipolito and AJ Lagaso while he was busy checking papers and computing grades on October
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10, 1997. The last time he saw AAA during the first semester was when she submitted her final paper
on October 18, 1997.
On November 19, 1997, between 10:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., he sorted out conflicts of class schedules
for the second semester at the Assumption College. On November 26, 1997, he was at St. Scholastica’s
College (where he was also teaching) preparing a faculty concert slated on December 12, 1997. At lunch
time, he attended the birthday treat of a colleague, Evelyn Bancoro.
On November 29, 1997, he attended AAA’s 18th birthday party. That was the last time he saw her.
According to petitioner, AAA became his sweetheart when she was already 19 years old and after
he was dismissed from Assumption College. On December 27 and 28, 1998, they spent time together,
shared their worries, problems and dreams and kissed each other. On January 3, 1999, he brought her
to Queensland Lodge where they had sexual intercourse for the first time. It was repeated for at least
20 times from January 1999 until they broke up in July 1999, some of which were done at either his or
her house when no one was around.
 The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction.
On March 7, 2001, it rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty. 10 The dispositive portion read:
“In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Michael John Malto y Zarsadias guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section 5(a)[,] paragraph 3 of RA 7610[,] as amended and
hereby sentences him to reclusion temporal in its medium period or an imprisonment of seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay civil indemnity in the amount of
Php 75,000.00 and moral and exemplary damages of Php
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10Supra note 3.
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50,000.00 to minor complainant with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.” 11
Petitioner questioned the trial court’s decision in the CA. In a decision dated July 30, 2004, 12 the
appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his acts were not covered by paragraph (a)
but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. It further observed that the trial court failed
to fix the minimum term of indeterminate sentence imposed on him. It also ruled that the trial court
erred in awarding P75,000 civil indemnity in favor of AAA as it was proper only in a conviction for rape
committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty was authorized by law. 13 Hence,
the CA modified the decision of the trial court as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of conviction is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
(1) appellant MICHAEL JOHN MALTO y ZARSADIAS is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years,
Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and (2) the sum of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity is DELETED.”14
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in sustaining his conviction although it found that he did not
rape AAA. For him, he should have been acquitted since there was no rape. He also claims that he and
AAA were sweethearts and their sexual intercourse was consensual.
Petitioner is wrong.
_______________
Id.
11
Supra note 2.
12
13 RA 9346 (“An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty” enacted on June 24, 2006)
subsequently repealed the death penalty.
14 Supra note 2.
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THE OFFENSE STATED IN THE INFORMATION WAS WRONGLY DESIGNATED
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.15 Pursuant thereto, the complaint or information against him should be
sufficient in form and substance. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense and the place where the offense was committed. 16
The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver
the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.17 If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it. 18 The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. 19
The designation of the offense in the information against petitioner was changed from “violation of
Section 5(b), Article III” of RA 7610 to “violation of Section 5(a), Article III”
_______________
15 Section 1(b), Rule 115, Rules of Court.
16 Section 6, Rule 110, Id.
17 Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 465.
18 Section 8, Rule 110, Rules of Court.
19 Section 9, Id.
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thereof. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provide:
“Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.—Children, whether male or female, who, for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to
be children exploited inprostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are
not limited to, the following:
1. 1.Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
2. 2.Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
3. 3.Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
4. 4.Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
5. 5.Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to
engage such child in prostitution.
 (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3,
for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
xxx xxx x x x (emphasis supplied)
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. 1.the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
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1. 2.the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
1. a.acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
2. b.inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
3. c.taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
4. d.threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute or
5. e.giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to
engage such child in prostitution;
1. 3.the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
2. 4.the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
On the other hand, the elements of paragraph (b) are:
1. 1.the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. 2.the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
and
3. 3.the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It
contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a), the
child is abused primarily for profit.
On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with
a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only
a situation where a child is abused
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for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct.20
The information against petitioner did not allege anything pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution. It did not aver that AAA was abused for profit. What it charged was that petitioner had
carnal knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was induced
and/or seduced by petitioner who was her professor to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct and AAA was a 17-year old minor. These allegations support a charge for violation of
paragraph (b), not paragraph (a), of Section 5, Article III, RA 7610.
THE REAL NATURE OF THE OFFENSE IS DETERMINED BY FACTS ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION,NOT BY THE DESIGNATION
The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on
the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the failure
to designate the offense by statute, 21 or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act,22 or an
erroneous specification of the law violated23does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly
recite the facts constituting the crime charged.24 What controls is not the title of the information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information. 25 In other words, it is
_______________
People v. Larin, 357 Phil. 987; 297 SCRA 309 (1998).
20
U.S. v. de Dao, 2 Phil. 458 (1903).
21
22 People v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664 (1958).
23 People v. Arnault, 92 Phil. 252 (1952).
24 Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law, volume IV: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rex Bookstore, 1992
edition, p. 59.
25 People v. Resayaga, G.R. No. L-49536, 30 March 1988, 159 SCRA 426; Santos v. People, G.R. No.
77429, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 487.
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658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines
the crime being charged in the information. 26
The facts stated in the amended information against petitioner correctly made out a charge for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and appellate courts followed the
wrong designation of the offense, petitioner could be convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts
recited in the information and duly proven during trial.
PETITIONER VIOLATED SECTION 5(B), ARTICLE III OF RA 7610, AS AMENDED
The first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts committed by the
accused. The second element refers to the state or condition of the offended party. The third element
corresponds to the minority or age of the offended party.
The first element was present in this case. Petitioner committed lascivious conduct against and
had sexual intercourse with AAA in the following instances: (1) on November 19, 1997, when he kissed
her at the back and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her blouse to gratify his lust;
(2) on November 26, 1997, when, with lewd designs, he dragged her towards the bed of the motel room
and forcibly kissed her on the lips, neck and breasts and (3) when he exerted moral influence on her
and pressured her until she surrendered herself to him on November 26, 1997. His acts were covered
by the definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct under Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and
Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to implement the
provisions of RA 7610, particularly on child abuse:
_______________
26People v. Elesterio, G.R. No. 63971, 9 May 1989, 173 SCRA 243.
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(g) “Sexual abuse” includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;
(h) “Lascivious conduct” means the intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any
object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex,
with an intent toabuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or public area of a person.
(emphasis supplied)
The second element was likewise present here. The following pronouncement in People v. Larin 27 is
significant:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. (emphasis
supplied)
On November 19, 1997, due to the influence of petitioner, AAA indulged in lascivious acts with or
allowed him to commit lascivious acts on her. This was repeated on November 26, 1997 on which date
AAA also indulged in sexual intercourse with petitioner as a result of the latter’s influence and moral
ascendancy. Thus, she was deemed to be a “child subjected to other sexual abuse” as the concept is
defined in the opening paragraph of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 and in Larin.
The third element of the offense was also satisfied. Section 3 (a), Article I of RA 7610 provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.—
_______________
27Supra note 20.
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660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malto vs. People
(a) “Children” refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable
to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition; (emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 2007 and November 26, 2007, AAA was a child as she was below 18 years of age. She
was therefore within the protective mantle of the law.
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of petitioner was proper.
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(B), ARTICLE III OF RA 7610 AND RAPE ARE SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT CRIMES
Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, not rape. The
offense for which he was convicted is punished by a special law while rape is a felony under the Revised
Penal Code.28 They have different elements.29 The two are separate and distinct crimes. Thus,
petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a finding that
he did not commit rape.
_______________
28 At the time of the commission of the offense, rape was still classified as a crime against chastity
punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. It is now a crime against persons defined and
penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
29 In contrast to the offense punished under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, the crime of rape
has the following elements: (1) the offender is a man who had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2)
such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or when
the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. (People v. Padilla, G.R. No. 142899, 31 March
2004, 426 SCRA 648)
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CONSENT OF THE CHILD IS IMMATERIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES INVOLVING VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5, ARTICLE III OF RA 7610
Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and consented to have sexual intercourse
with him. They engaged in these acts out of mutual love and affection. But may the “sweetheart theory”
be invoked in cases of child prostitution and other sexual abuse prosecuted under Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610? No.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or
without the consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It
requires proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual
relations.30
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA
7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is
exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum,
an evil that is proscribed.
_______________
30People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 140278, 03 June 2004, 430 SCRA 469.
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Malto vs. People
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws.31 This is on the rationale that she can
easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or
import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm
to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.32 Those of
tender years deserve its protection.33
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more
damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her
_______________
31 Article 1327, Civil Code. A contract between a child and another person who is of legal age is
voidable at the instance of the child. The rule is, however, subject to the following exceptions: (a) upon
reaching the age of majority, the contract is ratified by the party who was a child when he entered into
it, (b) the contract was entered into thru a guardian and approved by a CA competent jurisdiction, (c)
it is a contract for necessities, such as food, but the person legally bound to give them support should
pay therefor and (d) the child misrepresented his age and pretended to be of majority age and is thus
in estoppel.
It should also be noted that under our present criminal laws, the age of exemption from criminal
liability was raised from 9 years old to 15 years old. (RA 9344) Thus, a child 15 years of age or under
at the time of the commission of the offense is exempt from criminal liability. A child above 15 but
below 18 years of age is presumed not to have acted with discernment and will be criminally liable only
upon rebuttal of that presumption by proof that he acted with discernment. Thus, there is a
presumption of lack of discernment on the part of a child (which presumption is conclusive if she is 15
years of age and below and disputable if she is over 15 but below 18 years of age).
32 People v. Baylon, G.R. No. L-35785, 29 May 1974, 57 SCRA 114.
33 Id.
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Malto vs. People
from the harmful consequences34 of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. 35 For this reason, a child
should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the
act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against
abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or
even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a
child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse.36
This must be so if we are to be true to the constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the youth.37 This is consistent with the
declared policy of the State
_______________
34 These harmful consequences include teenage pregnancy, mothering or fathering an illegitimate
child and contracting sexually transmitted disease(s).
35 The recognition that copulation is an adult activity is reflected in the way films or shows are
classified as rated “R” or “R-18.” Under the Guidelines of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB), a movie or show classified as “Restricted– 18” (“R-18”) may be viewed
only by those who are 18 years old and above. As to its sexual content, the movie may portray sexual
activity. (Section 1(D), Chapter IV, 2004 Guidelines of the MTRCB) Moreover, Section 9 of PD 1986
(Creating the MTRCB) makes it unlawful for (a) any person below 18 years of age to enter, to
misrepresent or make use of any false evidence about his or her age in order to gain admission into a
movie house or theater showing a motion picture classified as “Restricted” or “For Adults Only” by the
MTRCB and (b) for any employee of a movie house or theater to sell to, or receive from, another person
known to the former to be below 18 years of age any admission ticket to the exhibition of motion
pictures classified as “Restricted” or “For Adults Only.”
36 People v. Delantar, G.R. No. 169143, 02 February 2007, 514 SCRA 115.
37 Section 13, Article II, Constitution. The Constitution also provides that the State shall defend
“the right of children to assis
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Malto vs. People
“[T]o provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention
and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination.”38 (emphasis supplied)
as well as to
“intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian, teacher or person having care or
custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation, and discrimination
or when such acts against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or
person having care and custody of the same.”39 (emphasis supplied)
This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration of the child’s best interests in all actions
concerning him or her.
“The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions
concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principles of First Call for
Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort
shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a
useful and happy life.”40 (emphasis supplied)
PETITIONER MAY ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
 G.R. No. 155647. November 23, 2007.*
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. JIMMY GO and BEMJAMIN GO
BAUTISTA alias BEN-JAMIN GO, respondents.
Mercantile Law; Trust Receipts Law; A trust receipt is considered a security transaction designed
to provide financial assistance to importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or
resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire
credit except through utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise imported or purchased.—A trust
receipt is considered a security transaction designed to provide financial assistance to importers and
retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of
merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral, of the
merchandise imported or purchased. It is a document in which is expressed a security transaction
where the lender, having no prior title to the goods on which the lien is to be constituted, and not
having possession over the same since possession thereof remains in the borrower, lends his money to
the borrower on security of the goods which the borrower is privileged to sell, clear of the lien, with an
agreement to pay all or part of the proceeds of the sale to the lender. It is a security agreement pursuant
to which a bank acquires a “security interest” in the goods. It secures a debt, and there can be no such
thing as security interest that secures no obligation.
Same; Same; The subject trust receipts, being contracts of adhesion, are not per se invalid and
inefficacious.—The subject trust receipts, being contracts of adhesion, are not per se invalid and
inefficacious. But should there be ambiguities therein, such ambiguities are to be strictly construed
against Metrobank, the party that prepared them.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Perez, Calima Law Offices for petitioner.
Arturo S. Santos for respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metro-bank) urges this Court to review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure the Decision dated August 15, 2002
and the Resolution dated October 15, 2002, both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61544.1
The Facts of the Case
On September 30, 1988, Metrobank, through its Assistant Vice-President Leonardo B. Lejano, executed
a Credit Line Agreement2 in favor of its client, BGB Industrial Textile Mills, Inc. (BGB) in the total
amount of P10,000,000.00. As security for the obligation, private respondent Benjamin Go (now
deceased), being an officer of BGB, executed a Continuing Surety Agreement 3 in favor of Metrobank,
binding himself solidarily with BGB to pay Metrobank the said amount of P10,000,000.00.
In November 1988, private respondent Jimmy Go, as gen-eral manager of BGB, applied for eleven
(11) commercial letters of credit to cover the shipment of raw materials and spare parts. Accordingly,
Metrobank issued the 11 irrevocable letters of credit to BGB. The merchandise/shipments were
delivered to and accepted by BGB on different dates. Consequently, 11 trust receipts were executed by
BGB thru Jimmy Go and Benjamin Go, as entrustees, in favor of Metrobank as entruster. The letters
of credit and their corresponding trust receipts are listed below:
By the terms of the trust receipts, BGB agreed to hold the goods in trust for Metrobank and, in case of
sale of the goods, to hand the proceeds to the bank to be applied against the total obligation object of
the trust receipts.
On maturity dates of the trust receipts, because the goods remained unsold, BGB and Jimmy and
Benjamin Go failed to satisfy their obligation. Metrobank filed three (3) separate complaints against
BGB, for collection of sum of money equivalent to the value of the goods subject of the trust receipts.
The cases were filed with the Makati Regional Trial Court and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 93-496, 93-
509, and 93-910.
Later, Metrobank instituted 11 criminal charges against Jimmy and Benjamin Go for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 115 (Trust Receipts Law) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
After preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila issued a Resolution 26 in
I.S. Nos. 94D-09945-55 dated May 31, 1995 recommending the dismissal of the case, viz.:
“The liability of respondents is only civil in nature in the absence of commission and misappropriation.
Respondents are liable ex-contractu for breach of the Letters of Credit—Trust Receipt.
In the instant case, the goods subject of the trust receipts have not been sold, so there is (sic) no
proceeds to deliver to the bank.
Granting for the sake of argument that respondents failed to account for said goods, the failure is
only a mere disputable presumption which has been overturned by the submission of an inventory
showing that the goods are intact and in the warehouse in Bataan.
Considering that the goods are still intact in the [respondents’] warehouse at the Bataan Export
Processing Zone, considering further the fact that the goods were never processed, and considering
finally that the goods have not been sold, ergo, there is no violation of [the] Presidential Decree. As
already stated, respondents’ liability is only civil in nature.”
On June 22, 1995, Metrobank filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied for lack of
merit in the Review Resolution27 dated October 25, 1999. Metrobank appealed to the Department of
Justice. On September 5, 2000, then Acting Secretary of Justice, Ramon J. Liwag, rendered a
Resolution28 dismissing the appeal on two grounds: (1) the resolution issued by the City Fiscal is in
accord with law and evidence; and (2) Metrobank failed to submit proof of service of a copy of the appeal
to the prosecutor either by personal service or registered mail as required by Section 3 of Department
Order No. 223.
Metrobank went to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Metrobank moved to reconsider the dismissal, but the motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The reasons given by Metrobank for the allowance of its petition are as follows:
First Reason
BOTH THE RESOLUTION AND THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DELIBERATELY
IGNORED THE GLARING VIOLATION COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENTS OF BOTH THE
PROVISIONS OF THE SUBJECT TRUST RECEIPTS AND OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 115.
Second Reason
BOTH THE RESOLUTION AND THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DELIBERATELY
IGNORED THE FACT THAT THE OFFER MADE BY THE RESPONDENTS TO ALLEGEDLY
RETURN THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE IS A MERE AFTERTHOUGHT.
Third Reason
BOTH THE RESOLUTION AND THE DECISION DELIBERATELY IGNORED THE FACT THAT A
VIOLATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 115, AS SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE HOLD, IS
AN OFFENSE AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER AND NOT MERELY AGAINST PROPERTY. 29
Petitioner Metrobank ascribed error to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila when it found that
the liability of respondents Jimmy and Benjamin Go was only civil in nature, i.e., to return the
 merchandise subject of the 11 trust receipts, considering that they were never sold, and to pay their
obligation under the letters of credit. Citing jurisprudence, 30 it contends that Section 13,31 the penal
provision of the Trust Receipts Law, encompasses any act violative of an obligation covered by the
trust receipt and is not limited to transactions in goods which are to be sold (retailed), re-shipped,
stored, and processed as a component of a product ultimately sold. It posits that a violation of the
Trust Receipts Law can be committed by mere failure of the entrustee to discharge any of the
obligations imposed upon him under Section 932 of the said law.
_______________
31 SECTION 13. Penalty clause.—The failure of an entrus-tee to turn over the proceeds of
the sale of the goods, documents, or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of
the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods,
documents, or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms
of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the provisions of
Article Three hundred and fifteen, paragraph one (b) of Act Numbered Three thousand
eight hundred and fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. If the
violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or other juridical entities,
the penalty provided for in this Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other
officials or persons therein responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising
from the criminal offense. (Emphasis supplied)
32 SECTION 9. Obligations of the entrustee.—The entrustee shall (1) hold the goods, documents, or
instruments in trust for the entruster and shall dispose of them strictly in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the trust receipt; (2) receive the proceeds in trust for the entruster and turn over the
same to the entruster to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears on the trust
receipt; (3) insure the goods for their total value against loss from fire, theft, pilferage, or other
casualties; (4) keep said goods or proceeds thereof whether in money or whatever form, separate and
capable of identification as property of the entruster; (5) return the goods, documents, or instruments
in the event of non-sale or upon demand of the entruster; and (6) observe all other terms and conditions
of the trust receipt not contrary to the provisions of this Decree.
According to Metrobank, Jimmy and Benjamin Go’s offer to deliver the merchandise subject of the trust
receipts cannot exculpate them from criminal liability because they failed to offer to surrender and to
actually surrender the goods upon maturity of the trust receipts and even when several demands were
made upon them. Stated differently, it was Metrobank’s position that there was already a violation of
the Trust Receipts Law committed by Jimmy and Benjamin Go even before they made their offer to
return the merchandise to Metrobank in their pleadings before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila. Metrobank claimed that the belated offer of Jimmy and Benjamin Go to return the goods was
a mere afterthought in order to evade indictment and prosecution.
Metrobank further argues that the dismissal by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila of the
11 criminal charges for violation of the Trust Receipts Law against Jimmy and Ben-jamin Go for want
of probable cause, grounded on the absence of conversion or misappropriation, is tantamount to holding
that a violation of the Trust Receipts Law is merely a crime against property and not against public
order, contrary to prevailing jurisprudence.
The Ruling of the Court
After a judicious study of the records of this case, this Court does not find any cogent reason to reverse
the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, and the Resolutions of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila and of the Secretary of Justice.
First. The issues raised in this petition are substantially factual. Essentially, Metrobank urges this
Court to determine whether or not Jimmy and Benjamin Go failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale
of the goods or to return them, if un-sold, in accordance with the terms of the 11 trust receipts. This
failure, Metrobank adds, amounts to a violation of Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law and warrants
the prosecution of respondents for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) 33 of the Revised Penal Code.
In an appeal via certiorari, only questions of law may be raised because this Court is not a trier of
facts.34 Metrobank wants to make this case an exception to the rule, as it attributes to the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila, the Secretary of Justice, and the Court of Appeals a misapprehension of the
facts. Unfortunately, there is no adequate support for this imputation.
In order that respondents Jimmy and Benjamin Go may be validly prosecuted for estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 13 of the Trust Receipts
Law, the following elements must be established: (a) they received the subject goods in trust or under
the obligation to sell the same and to remit the proceeds thereof to Metrobank, or to return the goods
if not sold; (b) they misappropriated or converted the goods and/or the proceeds of the sale; (c) they
performed such acts with abuse of
confidence to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank; and (d) demand was made on them by
Metrobank for the remittance of the proceeds or the return of the unsold goods. 35
The Office of the City Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice had identical findings that the
element of misappropriation or conversion is absent, and that Jimmy and Benjamin Go could not
deliver the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise to Metrobank because the goods remained unsold.
Both offices similarly found that the failure of the respondents to account for the proceeds of the sale
or of the goods only created a disputable presumption that either the proceeds or the goods themselves
were converted or misappropriated, but the presumption was overturned when the goods were offered
to be inventoried and returned as they remained intact in the warehouse at the Bataan Export
Processing Zone. Accordingly, they both ruled that the liability of Jimmy and Benjamin Go was merely
civil in nature, and the criminal complaints were dismissed for lack of probable cause.
Declaring that the Office of the City Prosecutor did not commit grave abuse of discretion, the Court
of Appeals likewise made a factual finding that Jimmy and Benjamin Go offered to return the goods
even prior to the filing of the civil cases against them, although the offer was not accepted because
Metrobank appeared more interested in collecting the amount it advanced under the letters of credit.
It also found that Metrobank failed to prove its demand for the return of the goods.
Thus, even if we accommodate the petitioner’s plea to review the case’s factual milieu, we still have
to agree with the findings of fact of the Office of the City Prosecutor and of the Court of Appeals. These
findings appear to be supported by the evidence on record. The prosecution for estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, cannot prosper because the second
(misappropriation/conversion) and the fourth (demand) elements of the offense are not present.
Under the pro-forma trust receipts subject of this case, Jimmy and Benjamin Go, as entrustees,
agreed to hold the goods (whether in their original, processed or manufactured state, and irrespective
of the fact that a different merchandise is used in completing such manufacture) in trust for Metro-
bank, as its exclusive property, with liberty to sell them for cash only for the latter’s account, but
without authority to make any other disposition whatsoever of the said goods or any part (or the
proceeds) thereof by way of conditional sale, pledge, or otherwise. They further agreed that in case of
sale of the goods, or if the goods are used for the manufacture of finished products and are sold, they
will turn over the proceeds to Metrobank to be applied against their total obligation under the trust
receipts and for the payment of other debts to Metrobank.
It is noteworthy that Jimmy and Benjamin Go processed the goods into textiles, to be sold for cash
only, and that not all of the merchandise were sold such that they were able to remit only enough
proceeds to fully settle their accounts under Letters of Credit-Trust Receipt Nos. 1922 and 1939, which
were not subject of the 11 criminal complaints filed by Metro-bank. Metrobank wants us to interpret
this as confirmation that Jimmy and Benjamin Go had sold all the other merchandise but deliberately
failed to turn over their corresponding proceeds. However, the Court sees this circumstance for what
it simply and truly is, i.e., that Jimmy and Benjamin Go exerted efforts to comply with their obligation
to sell the merchandise and remit the proceeds thereof. Unfortunately, the rest of the merchandise
remained unsold in the warehouse at the Bataan Export Processing Zone, such that no proceeds thereof
could be remitted to Metrobank.
This Court also observes that the same trust receipts provide that Metrobank has the option to
take possession of the goods upon default of Jimmy and Benjamin Go on any of their obligations and
to sell them, with the proceeds thereof to be applied to the principal obligation and also to the expenses
to be incurred by Metrobank in selling the same.36 But Metro-bank did not exercise this option. Instead,
it filed three (3) complaints to collect the value of the merchandise. Jimmy and Benjamin Go offered to
return the merchandise to Metro-bank even before these civil cases were filed. Then, Jimmy and
Benjamin Go reiterated the offer to return the goods in their answer to the civil complaints. Again,
Metrobank did not accept the offer, and instead filed the 11 criminal complaints for alleged violation
of the Trust Receipts Law to be prosecuted as estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code. This chain of events validates the finding of the Court of Appeals that Metrobank is not
interested in the return of the goods but only in collecting the money it extended to the respondents.
Furthermore, the trust receipts uniformly contain the following provision:
“Failure on the part of the ENTRUSTEE to account to the BANK/ENTRUSTER for the
goods/documents/instruments received in trust and/or for the proceeds of the sale thereof within thirty
(30) days from demand made by the BANK/ENTRUSTER shall constitute an admission that the
ENTRUSTEE has converted or misappropriated said goods/documents/instruments for the personal
benefit of the ENTRUSTEE and to the detriment and prejudice of the BANK/ENTRUSTER, and the
BANK/ENTRUSTER is forthwith authorized to file and prosecute the corresponding and appropriate
action, civil or criminal, against the ENTRUSTEE.”37
Yet, not one of the 11 criminal complaints was accompanied by a demand letter to show that Metrobank
demanded the remittance of the proceeds of the sale of the goods or the return of goods, if unsold. We
find this deficiency exceptionally revealing, especially considering that the said trust receipts had
different maturity dates.
Second. The trust receipts subject of this case partake of the nature of contracts of adhesion. A
contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one party imposes a ready-made form of contract which
the other party may accept or reject, but which the latter cannot modify; one party prepares the
stipulations in the contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature or his “adhesion” thereto,
giving no room for negotiation, and resulting in deprivation of the latter of the opportunity to bargain
on equal footing.38
In this case, the trust receipts were prepared solely by Metrobank with Jimmy and Benjamin Go
having no choice but to adhere entirely to their provisions. In fact, the trust receipts stipulated that
the goods subject thereof were the exclusive property of Metrobank, contrary to the essence of a trust
receipt.
A trust receipt is considered a security transaction designed to provide financial assistance to
importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation
or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as
collateral, of the merchandise imported or purchased. It is a document in which is expressed a security
transaction where the lender, having no prior title to the goods on which the lien is to be constituted,
and not having possession over the same since possession thereof remains in the borrower, lends his
money to the borrower on security of the goods which the borrower is privileged to sell, clear of the lien,
with an agreement to pay all or part of the proceeds of the sale to the lender. It is a security agreement
pursuant to which a bank acquires a “security interest” in the goods. It secures a debt, and there can
be no such thing as security interest that secures no obligation. 39
The subject trust receipts, being contracts of adhesion, are not per se invalid and inefficacious. But
should there be ambiguities therein, such ambiguities are to be strictly construed against Metrobank,
the party that prepared them.40
There is no doubt as to the obligation of Jimmy and Ben-jamin Go to turn over the proceeds of the
sale of the goods or to return the unsold goods. However, an ambiguity exists as to when this obligation
arises, whether upon maturity of the trust receipts or upon demand by Metrobank. A strict construction
of the provisions of the contracts of adhesion dictates that the reckoning point should be the demand
made by Metrobank.
As already discussed above, Jimmy and Benjamin Go turned over the proceeds of the goods sold
under the two letters of credit/trust receipts which were not subject of the criminal cases. They also
made the offer to return the unsold goods covered by the eleven trust receipts even before the three
civil cases were filed against them. The offer was reiterated in their answer. More importantly, the
unsold goods remained intact, contrary to the claim of Metrobank that they had misappropriated or
converted the same. While there was a stipulation of a presumptive admission on the part of Jimmy
and Benjamin Go of misappropriation or conversion upon failure to account for the goods or for the
proceeds of the sale thereof within 30 days from demand, which will authorize Metrobank to pursue
legal remedies in court, the fact of demand made by Metrobank was not established by competent
evidence. Except for the bare allegation that it did so in the 11 criminal complaints, no letter of demand
accompanied all of the criminal complaints.
As to the other obligations under the trust receipts adapted from Section 9 of the Trust Receipts
Law, there is no sufficient evidence proffered by Metrobank that Jimmy and Ben-jamin Go had actually
violated them. What the law punishes is the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of
money or goods to the prejudice of another, whether the latter is the owner.41 The malum
prohibitumnature of the offense notwithstanding, the intent to misuse or misappropriate the goods or
their proceeds on the part of Jimmy and Benjamin Go should have been proved. Unfortunately, no such
proof appears on record.42
In the prosecution of criminal cases, it is the complainant who has the burden to prove the elements
of the crime which the respondents are probably guilty of. 43Obviously, Metro-bank failed to discharge
this burden.
Indeed, there is neither error nor grave abuse of discretion which can be attributed to the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila when it dismissed the criminal complaints for lack of probable cause. In
the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, this
Court must not interfere in its findings, considering that full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the latter in determining whether or not a criminal charge should be instituted. 44 With
greater reason should we respect this finding, as it had been uniformly affirmed not only by the
reviewing prosecutor but also by the Secretary of Justice and by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated
August 15, 2002 and the Resolution dated October 15, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
61544 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, assailed decision and resolution affirmed.
Note.—In a trust receipt transaction, the goods are released by the entruster (who owns or holds
absolute title or security interests over the said goods) to the entrustee on the latter’s execution and
delivery to the entruster of the trust receipt. (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Prudential
Bank, 475 SCRA 623 [2005])
 G.R. No. 152644. February 10, 2006.*
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Duplicity of Charges; Words and Phrases; There is
duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information carries more than one offense; The Rules
of Criminal Procedure prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in
preparing his defense.—Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges
more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly
states: Duplicity of offense.—A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. In short, there
is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense. Under
Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single
information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to
avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each
petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners
erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the
petition deserves outright denial.
Same; Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; A single act or incident might offend against two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than
one offense.—As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident
might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the
prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for “the same offense.” In People
v. Doriquez, we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not “the same”—x x x if
one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x x x.
Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from
the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element
of the other. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Mala in Se; Mala Prohibita; Words and Phrases; Mala
in se cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes; What makes the former a felony is the criminal intent (dolo)
or negligence (culpa) while what make the latter crime are special laws enacting them.—On petitioners’
claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC “absorbs” the charges for violation of PD
1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibitacrimes (such as those violating PD
1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence
(culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no double jeopardy when the accused are being
prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a
national statute.—Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claim against multiple prosecutions based on
a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as
the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four
national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall
under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same
offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14
March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional
Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations filed against petitioners
John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez (“petitioners”). The 14 March 2002
Resolution denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and Chief
Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of
Marcopper Mining Corporation (“Marcopper”), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of
Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings3 from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At
the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makulapnit rivers. It appears that
Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or
near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into
the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial
Court of Boac, Marinduque (“MTC”) with violation of Article 91(B), 4 sub-
_______________
3 Mine tailings or mine waste refer to “soil and/or rock materials from surface or underground
mining operations with no present economic value to the generator of the same” (Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order No. 96-40 (1996) (“DENR DAO No. 96-40”),
Section 5[be]). Waste from milling operations or mill tailings is defined as “materials whether solid,
liquid or both[,] segregated from the ores during concentration/milling operations which have no
present economic value to the generator of the same” (DENR DAO No. 96-40, Section 5 [au]).
4 This provision states: “A fine exceeding Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) but not more than Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) or imprisonment exceeding three (3) years but not more than six (6) years,
or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court, shall be imposed on any person who
commits any of the following acts:
xxxx
5. Constructing, without prior permission of the government agency concerned, works that produce
dangerous or noxious substances, or performing acts that result in the introduction of sewage,
industrial waste, or any substance that pollutes a source of water supply.
6. Dumping mine tailings and sediments into rivers or waterways without permission.”
5 The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-44, 96-45, and
96-46. Except for the names of the accused and their respective designations at Marcopper, the
Informations uniformly alleged (Rollo, pp. 54-62):
That on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the municipality
of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, x x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously dispose, discharge
or introduce industrial waste, particularly mine tailings, without permission into the Makulapnit River
and the entire Boac River system which is a source of water supply and/or dump or cause, permit,
suffer to be dumped, without permission, mine tailings or other waste matters discharged due to breach
caused on its Tapian drainage pit/tunnel, thus causing pollution and siltation in the Makulapnit River
and the entire Boac River system which became a dead river, resulting to damage and/or destruction
of living organisms, like fish or other aquatic life in the vicinity, and to health and property in the same
vicinity.
6 This provision states: “Prohibitions.—No person shall throw, run, drain, or otherwise dispose into
any of the water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines, or cause, permit, suffer to be thrown,
run, drain, allow to seep or otherwise dispose thereto any organic or inorganic matter or any substance
in gaseous or liquid form that shall cause pollution thereof.
No person shall perform any of the following activities without first securing a permit from the
[National Pollution Control] Commission for the discharge of all industrial wastes and other wastes
which could cause pollution:
1. (1)the construction, installation, modification or operation of any sewage works or any
extension or addition thereto;
2. (2)the increase in volume or strength of any wastes in excess of the permissive discharge
specified under any existing permit;
(3) the construction, installation or operation of any industrial or commercial establishments
or any extension or modification thereof or addition thereto, the operation of which would cause an
increase in the discharge of waste directly into the water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines
or would otherwise alter their physical, chemical or biological properties in any manner not already
lawfully authorized.”
7 The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-47, 96-48, and
96-49. Except for the names of the accused and their respective designations at Marcopper, the
Informations uniformly alleged (Rollo, pp. 63-71):
That on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the municipality
of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, x x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise
dispose/discharge into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River system and/or cause, permit,
suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such river/waterway, mine tailings or other waste matters
discharged due to breach caused on its Tapian drainage pit/tunnel for his failure to institute adequate
measures as a managing head thereof, thus causing pollution of such rivers/waterways due to
exceedances [sic] in the criterion level for cadmium, copper, and lead, as found by the Pollution
Adjudication Board, which rendered such water resources harmful, detrimental or injurious to public
health, safety or welfare or which adversely affected their utilization for domestic, agricultural, and/or
recreational purposes.
8 This provision states: “Violation of the Terms and Conditions of the[E]nvironmental Compliance
Certificate.—Any person who willfully violates or grossly neglects to abide by the terms and conditions
of the environmental compliance certificate issued to said person and which causes environmental
damage through pollution shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months to six (6) years or
a fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), or both at
the discretion of the court.”
9 The Informations charging this offense were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-50, 96-51, and
96-52. Except for the names of the accused and their respective designations at Marcopper, the
Informations uniformly alleged (Rollo, pp. 72-80):
That on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the municipality
of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, x x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise
dispose/discharge into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River system and/or cause, permit,
suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such river system, mine tailings or other waste matters
discharged due to breach caused on its Tapian drainage tunnel for his failure to institute adequate
measures, thus causing pollution and siltation in the entire Boac River System thus, willfully violating
or grossly neglecting to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) issued to [Marcopper Mining C]orporation x x x, particularly that the Marcopper Mining
Corporation should ensure the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Magpog and
Boac Rivers, resulting to damage and/or destruction of living organisms, like fish and other aquatic life
in the vicinity, and to health and property in the same vicinity.
10 This provision states, in part: “Imprudence and negligence.—Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period;
if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
xxxx
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value
of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.”
11 The Informations under this charge were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 96-53, 96-54, and 96-
55. Except for the names of the accused and their respective designations at Marcopper, the
Informations uniformly alleged (Rollo, pp. 81-91):
That on or about March 24, 1996, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the municipality
of Boac, province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, x x x, did then and there negligently, imprudently, unlawfully and feloniously
drain or otherwise dispose/discharge into the Makulapnit River or Boac River system and/or cause,
permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such river system/waterway, its mine tailings due to
breach caused on the Tapian drainage pit/tunnel of the [Marcopper Mining C]orporation so managed
and operated by said accused, in a negligent, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regard and
in gross violation of the conditions set forth in the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the
Environmental Management Bureau to the said corporation on April 6, 1996, and the accused, x x x,
did not take the necessary or adequate precaution to prevent damage to property thus causing by such
carelessness and imprudence said corporation operated by him to discharge mine tailings into the
Makulapnit River at the rate of 5 to 10 cubic meters per second then resulting to damage and/or
destruction of living organisms, like fish or other aquatic life in the said river system and which also
affected agricultural products, the rehabilitation and restoration of which will cost the government the
approximate sum of not less than P50,000,000.00.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations
were “duplicitous” as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2)
petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident
subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute
legal excuse or justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 (“Joint Order”), the MTC12 initially deferred ruling on petitioners’
motion for lack of “indubitable ground for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x.” The MTC scheduled
petitioners’ arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners’ motion, the MTC issued a
Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 (“Consolidated Order”), granting partial reconsideration to its
Joint Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained
the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
“[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to “mine tailings” which were
precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian
drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to prevent pollution and
siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and condition required to be
undertaken under the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to prove the single
fact of pollution constituting violation of the Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set
of evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving the elements constituting
violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the
terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In other
words, the same set of evidence is required in proving violations of the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and after taking into
consideration the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3)
aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act should be
maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the
Water Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the aforesaid
violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act
(RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the Water Code; and
Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby
DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the
Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be maintained
and heard in a full blown trial because the common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting
to [sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law punishes not the negligent act
of polluting the water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar
to the prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property.”13
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners’ arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29 May 1997. In
the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing to be arraigned on the charge
for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for violation of RA 7942 as they intended
to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it maintained the Informations for that offense. After
making of record petitioners’ manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the
entry of “not guilty” pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac,
Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for
violation of RA 7942. Petitioners’ petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public respondent filed
an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the
Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondent’s appeal was raffled to Branch
38. On public respondent’s motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondent’s appeal consolidated with
petitioners’ petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its Resolution14 of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondent’s appeal but denied
petitioners’ petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the
Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. Branch 94
affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there can be no
absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate
and distinct from each other. The elements of proving each violation are not the same with each other.
Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit
and Boac rivers was the basis for the information[s] filed against the accused each charging a distinct
offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that—
“A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if
one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x.”
xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different
from one another. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other
does not although they stemmed from a single act. 15
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94 acted with
grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and
the Article 365 of the RPC “proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac
and Makulapnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings” and (2) the duplicitous nature of the
Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.16Petitioners further contended that since the
acts complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are “the very same
acts complained of” in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former.
Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC. 17
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94’s ruling. The appellate
court held:
“The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the aforementioned
Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
specifically provides the grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x x
xxxx
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].
xxxx
We now go to petitioners’ claim that the resolution of the public respondent contravened the
doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for being violative of their right against multiple prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the People’s argument with respect to the variances in
the mens rea of the two offenses being charged to be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in
the context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under Section 21 of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same section. x x x
xxxx
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at Bench since the
Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four separate and distinct laws which are
national in character.
xxxx
 This Court firmly agrees in the public respondent’s understanding that the laws by which the
petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly absorb one another as the elements of each crime
are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other
does not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would give rise to
any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Court’s quashal of the Informations against the
petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial court’s
denial of the petitioner’s motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.” 18
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its Resolution of 14
March 2002.
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. I.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN MAINTAINING
THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND
REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067)
AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:
1. A.THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942)
AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE
BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND
MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.
2. B.THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE
CHARGES CONTRA-VENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE VS. RE-LOVA,
148 SCRA 292 [1986] THAT “AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM
ONE ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR
OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS.”
1. II.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE PRECAUTION,
NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST
PETITIONERS[.]19
The Issues
The petition raises these issues:
1. (1)Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity
of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
should stand; and
2. (2)Whether Branch 94’s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v.
Relova.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as
Section 13 of Rule 11020 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense.—A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one
offense.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 11722 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single
information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to
avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. 23 Here, however, the prosecution charged each
petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense.Thus, petitioners
erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the
petition deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only—Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Damage to Property—because (1) all the charges filed against them “proceed from and are based on
a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makulapnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings” and
(2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC “absorbs” the other charges since the element of
“lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence” is common among
them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might
offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the
prosecution of the accused for more than one
( This provisions states: “Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information
on any of the following grounds: x x x x
(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses[.]” This is substantially reiterated in Section 3(f), Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules.)
offense.24 The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for “the same offense.”25 In People v. Doriquez,26we held that two (or more)
offenses arising from the same act are not “the same”—
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not,
x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from
the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element
of the other.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present. 28 However, for the
limited purpose of controverting petitioners’ claim that they should be charged with one offense only,
we quote with approval Branch 94’s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article
365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one
essential element not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping of mine
tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the
authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper permit to dump
said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-
Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One can be
validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it
has complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did
take the necessary precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of actual
pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused must be
exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of
precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful
violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the
containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no
violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done
everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not
follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the
Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential
element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the
part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under the previous
laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution
to the Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law
are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.29
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same
incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC “absorbs” the charges
for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibitacrimes (such as
those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent
(dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution contravenes this
Court’s ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Court’s statement in Relova that
the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by “multiple prosecutions for offenses which though
different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of
technical elements.”
This contention is also without merit.
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one Manuel
Opulencia (“Opulencia”) with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted
of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated
Opulencia’s right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by
those two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an
ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for
the same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section
21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
“The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same
as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to
commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information.”
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear both from
the express terms of the constitutional provision involved—which reads as follows:
“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.” x x x and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with
the petitioner’s position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first
sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of
the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that
is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second
offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22)
embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against
double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be
different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the
Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x
x30 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claim against multiple prosecutions based on a single act
not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of
Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes
and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first
sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not,
as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November 2001 and the
Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
Notes.—If the accused feels that there has been such an infringement of the rule against duplicity
of offenses, it is too late in the day for him to still challenge the duplicitous character of the Information
on appeal—this kind of an objection should be raised in a motion to quash before a plea to the
Information is made, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. (People vs. Nogar, 341 SCRA 206 [2000])
An accused charged with murder may be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
(People vs. Carmen, 355 SCRA 267 [2001])
 G.R. No. 176229. October 19, 2011.*
HO WAI PANG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Right to Counsel; The infractions of the so-called “Miranda rights” render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation; The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and are not otherwise excluded
by law or rules, are not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.—While
there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the
customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12 of Article III
of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision
prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself. Thus,
in Aquino v. Paiste, 555 SCRA 255 (2008), the Court categorically ruled that “the infractions of the so-
called Miranda rights render inadmissible ‘only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during
custodial investigation.’ The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue
and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation.”
Same; Same; Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused
becomes the basis of their conviction.—In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or
admission during his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial
confession extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from
petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence against him. Verily, in determining
the guilt of the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v.
Buluran, 325 SCRA 476 (2000), “[a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from
the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.” Hence, petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred
in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant consideration.
Same; Right to Confrontation; The right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a
defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution.—As borne out by the records, petitioner
did not register any objection to the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence particularly on the
testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack
of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the important thing is that petitioner, through
counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The
right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of
the prosecution.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Conspiracy; Conspiracy which determines criminal
culpability need not entail a close personal association or at least an acquaintance between or among
the participants to a crime; It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in
express terms to enter into and pursue a common design.—“Conspiracy is [the] common design to
commit a felony.” “[C]onspiracy which determines criminal culpability need not entail a close personal
association or at least an acquaintance between or among the participants to a crime.” “It need not be
shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a
common design.”
“The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof
of facts and
626circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole” as
we ruled in People v. Mateo, Jr., 179 SCRA 303 (1989). Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his
co-accused’s collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a common design, concerted action
and concurrence of sentiments in bringing about the crime committed.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness,
his testimony must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts.—Jurisprudence teaches
that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety instead
of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts
and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. “In ascertaining the facts established by a witness,
everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and
considered.”
Same; Same; The act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is
punished as an offense under a special law; As such, the mere commission of the act is what constitutes
the offense punished and same suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing
the act so punished regardless of criminal intent.—Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of
the shabu inside his luggage considering that his bag was provided by the travel agency. However, it
bears stressing that the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is
punished as an offense under a special law. As such, the mere commission of the act is what constitutes
the offense punished and same suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing
the act so punished regardless of criminal intent.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Virna Emeline Z. Caringal for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights
render inadmissible only the extraju-
627dicial confession or admission made during such investigation. 1 “The admissibility of other
evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not
affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.”2
Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse assails the June 16, 2006 Decision3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 affirming the April 6, 1995 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 118 of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 91-1592, finding him and
his co-accused, namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue,5 Wu Hing Sum, Tin San Mao6 and Kin San
Ho7 guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article III 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed is the January 16, 2007 CA
Resolution9 denying the motion for reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No.
068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Among the passengers
were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, the group
leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner
Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express Lane. Cinco examined the
baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came up. From the first traveling bag, she saw few
personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the
second bag was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size as those in
the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of them.
Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was white crystalline substance contained in a white
transparent plastic. Cinco thus immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty
Collector Alalo and Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU)
while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes earlier discovered.
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger manifest and further
examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain three chocolate boxes. Next
was petitioner’s bag which contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco, however, recalled that
two of the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane belong to him. Wu Hing Sum’s bag
followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and
Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were
recovered from the baggages of the six accused.
NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the relevant testimony of Cinco pertaining to
the presence of the chocolate boxes. According to him, he conducted a test on the white crystalline
substance contained in said chocolate boxes at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test.10 The
result of his examination11 of the white crystalline substance yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate boxes were bundled together with tape, placed inside
a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists
were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The confiscated
stuff were turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined them. Findings show that
its total weight is 31.1126 kilograms and that the representative samples were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.12 Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A.
No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his five co-accused.
Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed against petitioner
and his co-accused. These Informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-1591 to 97.
Subsequently, however, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation 13 which the trial court granted.
The reinvestigation conducted gave way to a finding of conspiracy among the accused and this resulted
to the filing of a single Amended Information 14 under Criminal Case No. 91-1592 and to the withdrawal
of the other Informations.15 The Amended Information reads:
“That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the country
without lawful authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or less, of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also
popularly known as “SHABU,” a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”16
After pleading not guilty to the crime charged, 17 all the accused testified almost identically,
invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge about the transportation
of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision 18 finding all the accused guilty of violating Section
15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the decretal portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused LAW KA WANG, CHAN
CHIT yue, ho wai pang, wu hing sum, tin sun mao, and kin san ho (ho kin san) guilty of Conspiracy in
violating Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having conspired to transport
into the Philippines 31.112 kilograms of methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu,
and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6)
[sic] RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30)
THOUSAND PESOS (p30,000.00) each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is being imposed
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659 considering its applicability to the accused though retroactively for
having a less stricter penalty than that of life imprisonment provided in Republic Act No. 6425. The
fine of P30,000.00 for each accused is imposed pursuant to R.A. No. 6425 it being more favorable to the
accused [than] that provided in R.A. No. 7659 WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION AFTER SERVICE
OF SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be imposed since the offense was committed prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused WONG KOK WAH @ SONNY WONG,
CHAN TAK PIU, HO WAI LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.
SO ORDERED.”19
From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the case records were forwarded
to per Order of the RTC dated May 10, 1995.20 Later, all the accused except for petitioner, filed on
separate dates their respective withdrawal of appeal. 21 This Court, after being satisfied that the
withdrawing appellants were fully aware of the consequences of their action, granted the withdrawal
of their respective appeals through a Resolution dated June 18, 1997. 22 Per Entry of Judgment, 23 said
Resolution became final and executory on July 7, 1997. Consequently, petitioner was the only one left
to pursue his appeal.
Petitioner filed his Brief24 on April 6, 1998 while the brief25 for the respondent People of the
Philippines was filed on August 27, 1998 through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Per
Resolution26 dated August 30, 2004, this Court referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition and
determination pursuant to this Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo.27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC. While conceding
that petitioner’s constitutional right to counsel during the custodial investigation was indeed violated,
it nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction. The
CA also rebuked petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to
confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and quoted with favor the trial court’s ratiocination regarding the existence of conspiracy
among the accused.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 28 which the CA denied in its
Resolution29dated January 16, 2007.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
I violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE CUSTOMS
OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI INVESTIGATORS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER
WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST
HIM.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION’S
EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PRESENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO OVERTURN THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO PETITIONER BY THE CONSTITUTION.30
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as evidence only confessions and admissions
of the accused as against himself.
Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a
competent and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he was not
duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence,
petitioner faults the CA in not excluding evidence taken during such investigation.
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning
by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 1231 of
Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional
provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.
Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,32 the Court categorically ruled that “the infractions of the so-called Miranda
rights render inadmissible ‘only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation.’ The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and [are] not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation.”
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial
investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as
evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and
subsequently used in evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his
co-accused, the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on
the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v. Buluran,33 “[a]ny allegation of
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.”
Hence, petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial
investigation deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Court’s ruling in People v. Wong Chuen Ming34 to exculpate
himself from the crime charged. Though there are semblance in the facts, the case of Ming is not exactly
on all fours with the present case. The disparity is clear from the evidence adduced upon which the
trial courts in each case relied on in rendering their respective decisions. Apparently in Ming, the trial
court, in convicting the accused, relied heavily on the signatures which they affixed on the boxes of
Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags. The Court construed the accused’s act of affixing their signatures
thereon as a tacit admission of the crime charged. And, since the accused were not informed of their
Miranda rights when they affixed their signatures, the admission was declared inadmissible evidence
for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. In ruling against the accused, the
trial court also gave credence to the sole testimony of the customs examiner whom it presumed to have
performed his duties in regular manner. However, in reversing the judgment of conviction, the Court
noted that said examiner’s testimony was not corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.
On the other hand, petitioner’s conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having
been caught inflagrante delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any
confession or admission. Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and credible
by the trial court, hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire incident thus providing
direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. As the Court held in People
v. Dela Cruz,35 “[n]o rule exists which requires a testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged credible.
x x x Thus, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a
single witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such testimony is found positive and credible
by the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction.”
Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to another case when there
are stark differences between the two cases. Cases must be decided based on their own unique facts
and applicable law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner was not denied of his right
to confrontation.
Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent provision of Section
14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the right to confrontation, viz.:
“Section 14. x x x
 (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production
of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.”
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses
testified to. According to him, only a full understanding of what the witnesses would testify to would
enable an accused to comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to refute it by cross-
examination or by his own countervailing evidence.
In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers
and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is petitioner’s call to
hire an interpreter to understand the proceedings before him and if
637he could not do so, he should have manifested it before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends
that petitioner was nevertheless able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such
examination suffices as compliance with petitioner’s right to confront the witnesses against him.
We agree with the OSG.
As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the
prosecution’s evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter.
Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all,
the important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the
other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a
defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution. In People v. Libo-on,36 the Court held:
“The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the
person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be
given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of confrontation
is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if the opportunity for cross-examination has
been secured, the function and test of confrontation has also been accomplished, the confrontation
being merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-examination.”
Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioner’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him was not impaired.
Conspiracy among the accused was
duly established.
Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial court’s finding of conspiracy which was
quoted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision, and which we once again herein reproduce with
approval:
“On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence to conclude conspiracy.
However, just like in other cases where conspiracy is not usually established by direct evidence but by
circumstantial evidence, the Court finds that there are enough circumstantial evidence which if taken
together sufficiently prove conspiracy. First, it cannot be denied that the accused somehow have known
each other prior to their [departure] in Hong Kong for Manila. Although Law Ka Wang denied having
known any of the accused prior to the incident in NAIA, accused Ho Wai Pang identified him as the
one who assisted him in the supposed tour in the Philippines to the extent of directly dealing with the
travel agency and [that] Law Ka Wang was the one who received the personal things of Ho Wai Pang
allegedly to be place[d] in a bag provided for by the travel agency. Accused Wu Hing Sum has been
known to accused Ho Kin San for about two to three years as they used to work as cooks in a restaurant
in Hong Kong. Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at large, is know[n] to accused Chan Chit Yue, Wu
Hing Sum and Ho Kin San. These relationships in a way can lead to the presumption that they have
the capability to enter into a conspiracy. Second, all the illegal substances confiscated from the six
accused were contained in chocolate boxes of similar sizes and almost the same weight all contained in
their luggages. The Court agrees with the finding of the trial prosecutor that under the given
circumstances, the offense charged [c]ould have been perpetrated only through an elaborate and
methodically planned conspiracy with all the accused assiduously cooperating and mutually helping
each other in order to ensure its success.”37
We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.
“Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony.” 38 “[C]onspiracy which determines criminal
culpability need not entail a close personal association or at least an acquaintance between or among
the participants to a crime.”39 “It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed
in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design.” 40 “The assent of the minds may be and,
from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole” as we ruled in People v. Mateo,
Jr.41 Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his co-accused’s collective conduct, viewed in its
totality, that there was a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in bringing
about the crime committed.
Petitioner’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
He makes capital on the contention that no chocolate boxes were found in his traveling bag when it
was examined at the ICU. He claimed that it was his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge in
ascribing upon him the possession of the two chocolate boxes.
Petitioner’s contentions fail to persuade.
True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3, 1992, she declared that
she did not see any chocolate boxes but only personal effects in petitioner’s bag. 42 Nonetheless, she
clarified in her succeeding testimony that she recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from petitioner’s
bag when they were still at the counter. This sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate
boxes from petitioner’s bag when they were at the ICU.43 To us, this slight clash in Cinco’s statements
neither dilute her credibility nor the veracity of her testimony.
The trial court’s words on this matter when it resolved petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence in its
Order44 of February 16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus—
“In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the prosecution is insufficient to command
conviction, the Demurrer went on to say that the testimony of Hilda Cinco is either conjectural or
hearsay and definitely missed its mark in incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she even
testified that she found nothing inside the hand-carried luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June
3, 1992). But that was when investigation was going on at the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU). However,
the same Hilda Cinco later on testified that from the express lane in going to the ICU, after the
discovery of shabu, she was already carrying with her four (4) chocolate boxes, two of [which] taken
from the bag of Tin Sun Mau and the other two retrieved from the luggage of herein movant, Ho Wai
Pang. Categorically, Cinco admitted it was the reason that at the ICU, Ho Wai Pang’s bag was already
empty (pp. 53-54, TSN, June 3, 1992), but she nonetheless recognized the bag and could recall the
owner thereof, pointing to Ho Wai Pang. Such testimony is not hearsay evidence. They are facts from
the personal perception of the witness and out of her personal knowledge. Neither is it conjectural.” 45
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be
considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is
not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. “In ascertaining
the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations
must be calibrated and considered.” 46 Also, where there is nothing in the records which would show a
motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification should be
given full weight. Here, petitioner presented no evidence or anything to indicate that the principal
witness for the prosecution, Cinco, was moved by any improper motive, hence her testimony is entitled
to full faith and credit.
Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court is convinced
that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing else can speak so eloquently of
his culpability than the unassailable fact that he was caught red-handed in the very act of transporting,
along with his co-accused, shabu into the country. In stark contrast, the evidence for the defense
consists mainly of denials.
Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his luggage considering that his
bag was provided by the travel agency. However, it bears stressing that the act of transporting a
prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As
such, the mere commission of the act is what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to
validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished regardless of criminal
intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials, petitioner has not presented any plausible proof to
successfully rebut the evidence for the prosecution. “It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons
who are eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony.” 47
All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in adjudging petitioner guilty
of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabuinto the country in violation of Section 15,
Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Penalty
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we find the
same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of the commission of
the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1683.48 The decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall be imposed.
Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 765949 further introduced new amendments to Section 15, Article III
and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty
prescribed in Section 15 was changed from “life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
P20,000.00 to P30,000.00” to “reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10
million.” On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No.
6425 in that the new penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the
quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No.
7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive
application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.
We agree. In People v. Doroja,50 we held:
“In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the amendatory
law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive application, x x x.”
And, since “reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and considering the rule
that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive effect,” 51 the
penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the
penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the
trial court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.
WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed June 16, 2006
Decision and January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 are
AFFIRMED.
_______________
SPECIAL LAWS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”; The Act was approved on December 13, 1993 and took
effect on December 31, 1993.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Note.—The right to counsel is not an absolute right and may be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. (Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532
[2008])
 [No. 34665. August 28, 1931]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. DONATO BINDOY,
defendant and appellant.
CRIMINAL LAW; ACCIDENTAL HOMICIDE.—In struggling with another who sought to
wrench away his bolo, the defendant accidentally wounded a bystander, who died in consequence. Had
the defendant tried to wound his adversary and instead had hit the bystander, he would, of course,
have had to answer for his criminal act (art. 1, par. 3, Penal Code); but in view of the
evidence, Held: That the injury was accidental and the defendant should be acquitted.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis. Rich, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Florentino Saguin for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VlLLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of
twelve years and one day of reclusión temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime charged against the accused is
homicide, according to the following inf ormation:
"That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province
of Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and
with his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in the chest
which caused his instant death, in violation of article 404 of the Penal Code."
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in this instance contends
that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime
of homicide.
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in
the barrio market of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by
some of the tuba drinkers. There were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One
Donato Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having
already done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an interchange of
words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away
from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which attracted the attention of
Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what
was happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were
struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from
Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such
violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy.
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. Neither is
there any indication that the accused was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the place, for,
according to the testimony of the witnesses, the latter passed behind the combatants when he left his
house to satisfy his curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill f eeling between Bindoy and Omamdam,
on the contrary, it appears they were nephew and uncle, respectively, and were on good terms with
each other. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was
only defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him, and his
conduct was perfectly lawful.
The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the description given by the sanitary
inspector who attended him as he lay dying, tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo.
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio Omamdam's death,
but the defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent.
Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having seen the accused stab
Omamdam with his bolo. Such testimony is not incompatible with that of the accused, to the effect that
he wounded Omamdam by accident. The widow testified that she knew of her husband's wound being
caused by Bindoy from his statement to her before his death.
The testimony of the witnesses f or the prosecution tends to show that the accused stabbed
Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free
himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but,
as we have stated, there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of
committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent,
and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his act, since
whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this
is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas
and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the
former had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio
Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio
had passed behind him. The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later, and
asked him about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die of this wound." And then continued:
"Please Iook after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't starve," adding further: "This wound was
an accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this witness
was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it existed, would have
greatly facilitated the solution of this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in United
States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:
"The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of
definitely ascertaining and proving, when possible, the motives which actuated the "In many criminal
cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the
accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty
person to indulge the criminal act."
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the appellant is entitled to
acquittal according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed,
and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Romualdez, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and defendant acquitted.
 G.R. Nos. 141154-56. January 15, 2002.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO “Ando” COSTALES and
FERNANDO RAMIREZ (atlarge), accused. FERNANDO “Ando” COSTALES, accused-appellant.
Witnesses; Consistency and uniformity in the testimonies of witnesses may be irregular at first
blush, if there is failure to take into account some factors which account for the “near flawless”
statements of the prosecution witnesses.—Concededly, the prosecution witnesses gave almost uniform
observations on how the malefactors carried out their detestable crimes, i.e., the identity of the
assailants, that Miguel was strangled by both intruders and almost simultaneously shot on the head,
that one of them sprayed a chemical on the other occupants of the house and after a split second fired
at Crispina. Such consistency and uniformity may be irregular at first blush, but accused-appellant
failed to take into account the following factors which account for the “near flawless” statements of the
prosecution witnesses: (a) the one-room shanty was very small with no substantial obstruction to
impede the vision of the occupants; (b) the room was lighted by a kerosene lamp sufficient enough for
the occupants to recognize accused-appellant and his cohort, especially so since the assailants were
prominent and venerated leaders of their church; and, (c) at the time of the incident the Marcelo
spouses and their children were lying very near each other because of the very limited space of their
shanty such that every perceived action could be seen, felt, or at least sensed, by all of them.
Same; Television sets powered by Motolite battery is a common practice in unenergized
“barrios.”—Neither should we ascribe importance, as the accused-appellant seems to suggest, to an
apparent “inconsistency” by witness Jessie Molina when she mentioned that the unwanted intrusion
occurred shortly after she turned off the television set, contrary to her earlier claim that barangay
Capas was without electricity. Jessie Molina dispelled this obscurity when she clarified that the
television set was powered by Motolite battery which is in fact a common practice in unenergized
“barrios,” as the trial court would put it, and Sitio Raniag, Barangay Capas did not still have electricity
at that time.
Same; The straightforward and consistent narration of facts by three (3) prosecution witnesses,
especially by one who is a victim herself, immensely fortifies the conclusion that accused is guilty as
charged.—Clearly, the straightforward and consistent narration of facts, as the trial court observed,
by the three (3) prosecution witnesses, especially Crispina Marcelo, a victim herself, immensely
fortifies the conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty as charged. Moreover, no impure motive on
their part has been established by the defense to sully their truthfulness and erode their credibility.
Criminal Law; Murder; Illegal Possession of Firearms; Aggravating Circumstances; RA 8294,
which took effect 7 July 1997, amended the PD 1866 and now considers the use of unlicensed firearm
as a special aggravating circumstance in murder and homicide, and not as a separate offense.—
Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under PD
1866 was committed, RA 8294, which took effect 7 July 1997, amended the decree and now considers
the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance in murder and homicide, and not
as a separate offense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of any allegation in the Information that the accused
committed murder with the use of unlicensed firearm, the same cannot be appreciated in imposing the
proper penalty.—As it should be, possession and use of firearm without license should aggravate the
crimes of murder and frustrated murder as herein charged but, fortunately for accused-appellant, Secs.
8 and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect 1 December 2000, now require
the qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances to be expressly and specifically alleged in the
complaint or information, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court even if proved during
the trial. Withal, in the absence of any allegation in the Information in Crim. Case No. T-2057 that
accused-appellant committed murder with the use of unlicensed firearm, the same cannot be
appreciated in imposing the proper penalty.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Treachery has been established where the
evidence showed that the accused and his confederate swiftly and unexpectedly barged into the victim’s
residence in the middle of the night, shot the victim to death as well as his wife who almost lost her life,
and sprayed a substance which temporarily blinded the other occupants of the house.—While we yield
to the trial court’s finding of treachery, we take exception to its view that evident premeditation and
nighttime also aggravated the offenses. Without doubt, treachery has been established by the
prosecution evidence which showed that accused-appellant Fernando Costales and his confederate
Fernando Ramirez swiftly and unexpectedly barged into the Marcelo residence in the middle of the
night, shot Miguel Marcelo to death as well as his wife Crispina who almost lost her life, and sprayed
a substance which temporarily blinded the other occupants of the house. The suddenness of the attack
gave the victims no opportunity whatsoever to resist or parry the assault thereby ensuring the
accomplishment of their dastardly deed without risk to themselves. Since the attack on the victims
was synchronal, sudden and unexpected, treachery must be properly appreciated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Nighttime; Evident Premeditation; The aggravating circumstance of
nighttime is absorbed by treachery, while evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in the absence of
proof of the planning and preparation to kill or when the plan was conceived.—We cannot however give
our assent to the view that nighttime and evident premeditation accompanied the commission of the
crimes. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime is absorbed by treachery, while evident pre-
meditation cannot be appreciated in the absence of proof of the planning and preparation to kill or
when the plan was conceived.
Same; Same; Damages; Award of damages is dictated, not by the agreement of the parties, worse,
“in a manner that suits them best,” but by the mandate of law and jurisprudence.—We observe that the
trial court awarded P250,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased on the justification that the same had
been stipulated upon by the parties. This is patently wrong. Award of damages is dictated, not by the
agreement of the parties; worse, “in a manner that suits them best,” but by the mandate of law and
jurisprudence. Accordingly in conformity with established law and jurisprudence, the award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages should be awarded to the
heirs of the victim.
Same; Attempted Murder; Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would
be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful, hence, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not
frustrated murder.—We call to mind People v. De La Cruz where this Court ruled that the crime
committed for the shooting of the victim was attempted murder and not frustrated murder for the
reason that “his injuries, though no doubt serious, were not proved fatal such that without timely
medical intervention, they would have caused his death.” In fact, as early as People v. Zaragosa, we
enunciated the doctrine that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be
fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not
frustrated murder.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Br. 51.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Traditionally, religious fervor nourishes love, respect and concern for one another among brethren; it
was not so however in the case of one whose adherence to his faith became the harbinger of his tragic
end, sending his wife hanging by the thread of death, and worse, the crimes were perpetrated
apparently by their brethren professing to be “denizens of the temple.”
Accused Fernando “Ando” Costales and Fernando Ramirez, the latter being still at large, stood
charged with the murder of Miguel Marcelo and the frustrated murder of Crispina Marcelo. As the
perpetrators were found to be in unlawful possession of firearms they were also charged with violation
of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294.
Since accused Fernando Ramirez remained at large, only accused Fernando “Ando” Costales was
arraigned and tried.
For violation of Sec. 1, PD 1866, as amended (Crim. Case No. T-2054), accused Fernando “Ando”
Costales was found guilty and sentenced 1 to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.
For the murder of Miguel Marcelo (Crim. Case No. T-2057), accused Fernando “Ando” Costales was
found guilty and meted the ultimate penalty of death.
For the frustrated murder of Crispina Marcelo (Crim. Case No. T-2056) he was found guilty only
of attempted murder and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. Additionally, he was
ordered “to pay the heirs of the two (2) victims P250,000.00 in damages to be shared by and among
them in a manner that suits them best.”
Sitio Raniag, Barangay Capas, was a placid but forlorn barrio in Pangasinan where the spouses
Miguel and Crispina Marcelo resided in a small one-room shanty with concrete flooring and cogon
roofing. Although their married daughters Donabel, Jessie and Erlinda already had their own houses
they would spend the night with them every once in a while. And so it was on the night of 27 November
1997.
Jessie Molina recalled that at around 11:30 o’clock in the evening of 27 November 1997, she and
her sisters Donabel and Erlinda together with their parents Miguel and Crispina had taken their own
corners of their small house to prepare for the night. Miguel laid in a folding bed beside the door while
the others occupied a bamboo bed with the exception of Jessie who for want of available space settled
instead on the concrete floor. Jessie and Erlinda had just watched tv when two (2) persons suddenly
barged into their house passing through the door kept ajar by sacks of palay and strangled her father
Miguel. Jessie readily recognized the two (2) intruders because the entire room was illuminated by a
nightlamp which the family kept burning overnight.
Jessie narrated that Fernando “Ando” Costales, one of the assailants, poked a gun at the head of
her father and shot him once in cold blood. Thereafter the other assailant Fernando Ramirez sprayed
on their faces what she described as “something hot and pungent,” and with his firearm pumped a
bullet on her mother’s chest.
Erlinda Marcelo was also awakened when the two (2) accused suddenly entered their house and
strangled their father after which Fernando Costales shot him point blank in the head. According to
Erlinda, when tear gas was sprayed by Ramirez, she ducked and almost simultaneously she heard a
gunshot towards the direction of her mother. When she opened her eyes, she saw her mother Crispina
clutching her breast, reeling from the blow and collapsing on the floor in a heap. In her testimony
Crispina herself confirmed that Ramirez shot her once on the right chest which caused her to bleed
and lose consciousness.
Both Jessie and Erlinda affirmed that they were familiar with the two (2) accused because, like the
rest of the family, they were members of the “Baro a Cristiano” also known as Lamplighter, of which
Fernando “Ando” Costales and Fernando Ramirez were the high priests in their respective areas.
According to Jessie, her parents decided to quit the brotherhood because Ramirez warned them not to
sever their ties with the sect if they did not want any harm to befall them. In fact, according to her, a
month earlier Ramirez even threatened her sister Erlinda with bodily harm.
Like her sister, Erlinda stated that their family distanced themselves from the congregation when
Ramirez threatened her father. According to her, on 16 November 1997, Miguel tried to fetch her from
the house of Ramirez but Miguel relented only after Ramirez threatened her with a bolo. Her father
tried to get her when he learned that Ramirez was molesting her every time his wife was away. She
however did not report this matter immediately to the authorities because she feared for her life.
Dr. Alex E. Trinidad, Rural Health Physician of Umingan, Pangasinan, after conducting an autopsy
on the body of Miguel Marcelo reported: (a) The gunshot wound penetrating the left lobe of the liver of
deceased Miguel Marcelo was fatal; (b) Considering the trajectory of the gunshot wound, the assailant
was probably pointing slightly downward; (c) The cause of death of the deceased was internal
hemorrhage arising from the gunshot wound; and, (d) Considering the wound of the victim, he could
have survived for a few minutes after he was shot.
To show that he could not have been a party to the crimes charged, accused Fernando Costales
gave a detailed account of his activities by retracing his steps from late afternoon of 27 November 1997
until dawn of the following day. He narrated that at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 27 November he
was irrigating his land in Barangay Libeg, then proceeded to a nearby chapel to pray. At past 7:00
o’clock in the evening, he went to see a certain Isidro who was irrigating his own land with the use of
his (Fernando’s) water pump. That being done he went back home.
A couple of hours later, in the company of his wife and children, he returned to the mission house
to attend another religious service. At past 9:00 o’clock that same evening he dropped by Isidro’s
farmland to verify if the latter had finished irrigating. He went back home at around 11:00 o’clock to
sleep and was awakened by Isidro at about 11:45 o’clock only to inform him that he (Isidro) was
through. When Isidro left, Fernando went back to sleep only to be roused again by Gregorio Baguio
who also wanted to borrow his water pump. With his sleep disrupted, he decided around midnight to
visit as he did the nearby mission house to pray. Shortly after, he resumed his sleep but woke up again
at 4:00 o’clock in the morning to see if Baguio had already finished watering his farm.
Defense witnesses Isidro Costales and Gregorio Baguio corroborated the claim of Fernando
Costales that he could not have perpetrated the crimes as he was with them all the time they were
irrigating their farms. Likewise, Elvie Costales, wife of accused Fernando Costales, presented an
“attendance notebook,” purportedly prepared by her, showing that her husband, who was the chapter’s
religious leader, was worshipping in the Barangay Libeg chapel from 4:45 to 4:47 o’clock and from 5:30
to 5:37 o’clock at daybreak,2 from 7:22 to 8:00 o’clock after sunset, 3 and from 12:10 to 12:15 o’clock
midnight4 of 27 November 1997, although he would periodically leave the prayer meeting to check if
Isidro had already finished watering his farm so that Baguio could also use the pump.
But the trial court viewed the alibi of the defense with askance and assigned full credit to the
declarations of the prosecution witnesses.
In disbelieving the veracity of the “attendance notebook,” the court a quo opined that Exh. “2” could
have been more impressive had it borne the confirming signatures or thumbmarks of the “Baro a
Cristiano” faithful, including their leader Fernando Costales, or had Exhs. “2-B” and “2-C” been
corroborated on the witness stand by a less interested member, or had the church secretary who
allegedly kept record of attendance been some member other than Mrs. Costales or the nearest of kin. 5
The court below also virtually jettisoned the testimonies of Isidro Costales and Gregorio Baguio
when it said that “they had every reason to come to the rescue of the accused Costales, their admittedly
common nephew.” Further, it pointed out that the accused and his witnesses issued contradictory and
irreconcilable statements when, on one hand Isidro testified that before midnight of 27 November 1997
he went to the house of his nephew Fernando Costales to inform him that the irrigation of his farm
was already through; on the other hand, Baguio claimed that at around 11:00 o’clock that night he
roused the accused who thereafter went to operate the pump and stayed put beside it until Baguio’s
farm was completely irrigated at 4:00 o’clock the next morning.
The above statements, the court a quo observed, did not jibe with those made by the accused that
his uncle Isidro woke him up at around 11:45 o’clock in the evening and told him that the irrigation of
his farm was finished, after which he returned to bed and when he awakened at past 4:00 o’clock the
following morning, he met Baguio who told him that he too was through irrigating.
In contrast, the trial court saw no dark motives behind the respective testimonies of Crispina
Marcelo and her two (2) daughters. The Costaleses and the Marcelos used to be members of the same
religious sect and accused “Ando” Costales even stood as a sponsor at the wedding of Jessie Marcelo,
and again when Crispina’s brother got married. In short, the Marcelos could not have mistaken “Ando”
Costales and Fernando Ramirez for other felons.
In this automatic review, accused Fernando Costales takes exception to the findings of the trial
court and thus seeks reversal of his convictions on the ground that it erred: (a) in according credence
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses although the same are perforated with material
inconsistencies and bias; (b) in not giving weight to the defense of alibi despite the weakness of the
prosecution evidence; (c) in convicting him of violation of Sec. 1, PD 1866, as amended, since the same
was absorbed in the crime of murder; (d) in finding that the crime was attended by conspiracy despite
the fact that no aggravating circumstance was established beyond reasonable doubt; and, (e) in not
appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor.
The first and second assigned errors will be discussed jointly since they are interrelated.
Accused-appellant argues that the seemingly flawless and unwavering testimonies of the three (3)
key prosecution witnesses on the assault of the Marcelo household are obviously biased that they invite
suspicion and disbelief.
Concededly, the prosecution witnesses gave almost uniform observations on how the malefactors
carried out their detestable crimes, i.e., the identity of the assailants, that Miguel was strangled by
both intruders and almost simultaneously shot on the head, that one of them sprayed a chemical on
the other occupants of the house and after a split second fired at Crispina. Such consistency and
uniformity may be irregular at first blush, but accused-appellant failed to take into account the
following factors which account for the “near flawless” statements of the prosecution witnesses: (a) the
one-room shanty was very small with no substantial obstruction to impede the vision of the occupants;
(b) the room was lighted by a kerosene lamp sufficient enough for the occupants to recognize accused-
appellant and his cohort, especially so since the assailants were prominent and venerated leaders of
their church; and, (c) at the time of the incident the Marcelo spouses and their children were lying very
near each other because of the very limited space of their shanty such that every perceived action could
be seen, felt, or at least sensed, by all of them.
Accused-appellant is seeing ghosts where there is none. Contrary to his submission, it would be
highly irregular indeed if the prosecution witnesses failed to observe the events that transpired on that
fateful night of 27 November 1997 and their statements did not dovetail, at least on material points,
despite very favorable conditions for a fairly accurate observation.
Neither should we ascribe importance, as the accused-appellant seems to suggest, to an apparent
“inconsistency” by witness Jessie Molina when she mentioned that the unwanted intrusion occurred
shortly after she turned off the television set, contrary to her earlier claim that barangay Capas was
without electricity. Jessie Molina dispelled this obscurity when she clarified that the television set was
powered by Motolite battery which is in fact a common practice in unenergized “barrios,” as the trial
court would put it,6 and Sitio Raniag, Barangay Capas did not still have electricity at that time.
Clearly, the straightforward and consistent narration of facts, as the trial court observed, by the three
(3) prosecution witnesses, especially Crispina Marcelo, a victim herself, immensely fortifies the
conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty as charged. Moreover, no impure motive on their part has
been established by the defense to sully their truthfulness and erode their credibility.
Accused-appellant cannot insist on his alibi, especially so since he and his co-accused were
positively identified by the prosecution witnesses. More so when it is undisputed that the proximity of
their place to the scene of the crimes did not preclude the possibility that they were in fact present at
the time of their commission.
On the third issue, accused-appellant decries the Decision of the court a quo in qualifying the
crimes of murder and attempted murder with illegal possession of firearm and at the same time
convicting him for violation of PD 1866, as amended.
We agree. Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm
under PD 1866 was committed, RA 8294, which took effect 7 July 1997, amended the decree and now
considers the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance in murder and homicide,
and not as a separate offense.7
As it should be, possession and use of firearm without license should aggravate the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder as herein charged but, fortunately for accused-appellant, Secs. 8 and 9
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect 1 December 2000, now require the
qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances to be expressly and specifically alleged in the
complaint or information, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court even if proved during
the trial. Withal, in the absence of any allegation in the Information in Crim. Case No. T-2057 that
accused-appellant committed murder with the use of unlicensed firearm, the same cannot be
appreciated in imposing the proper penalty. Moving now to the modifying circumstances raised under
the fourth assigned error, accused-appellant points out that the trial court grievously erred in
appreciating unlicensed firearm, evident premeditation and nighttime which were alleged in the
Informations in Crim. Case No. T-2056 for frustrated murder and Crim. Case No. T-2057 for murder.
While we yield to the trial court’s finding of treachery, we take exception to its view that evident
premeditation and nighttime also aggravated the offenses. Without doubt, treachery has been
established by the prosecution evidence which showed that accused-appellant Fernando Costales and
his confederate Fernando Ramirez swiftly and unexpectedly barged into the Marcelo residence in the
middle of the night, shot Miguel Marcelo to death as well as his wife Crispina who almost lost her life,
and sprayed a substance which temporarily blinded the other occupants of the house. The suddenness
of the attack gave the victims no opportunity whatsoever to resist or parry the assault thereby ensuring
the accomplishment of their dastardly deed without risk to themselves. Since the attack on the victims
was synchronal, sudden and unexpected, treachery must be properly appreciated.
We cannot however give our assent to the view that nighttime and evident premeditation
accompanied the commission of the crimes. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime is absorbed by
treachery,8 while evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in the absence of proof of the planning
and preparation to kill or when the plan was conceived.9
The convergence of the wills of the two (2) executioners amply justifies the imputation that they
acted in concert and in unity in their unlawful objective when in the stillness of the night they both
crashed into the Marcelo residence, strangulated the victim Miguel, then one of them shot him in the
head while the other sprayed tear gas on the other members of the family obviously to disable them,
and thereafter pumped a bullet at the horrified Crispina. This series of actions betrays a concerted
design and concurrence of sentiments to cause mayhem and murder. Accordingly, conspiracy was
properly appreciated by the trial court.
Neither can we sympathize with accused-appellant’s misplaced sentiment that he had been denied
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. As found by the trial court, his alleged surrender
was made too late, and in a place too distant from the crime site as well as his place of residence. 10
We observe that the trial court awarded P250,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased on the justification
that the same had been stipulated upon by the parties. This is patently wrong. Award of damages is
dictated, not by the agreement of the parties; worse, “in a manner that suits them best,” 11but by the
mandate of law and jurisprudence. Accordingly in conformity with established law and jurisprudence,
the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages should be
awarded to the heirs of the victim.
Pursuant to Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659, the penalty for murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances found in Crim. Case No. T-
2057, and applying par. 2 of Art. 63 of the Code, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetuashall be
imposed.
In Crim. Case No. T-2056, accused-appellant was charged by the trial court with frustrated murder
but was convicted only for attempted murder. In its Decision, the trial court explained that the failure
of the prosecution to present a medical certificate or competent testimonial evidence showing that
Crispina would have died from her wound without medical intervention, justified the accused’s
conviction for attempted murder only.
We call to mind People v. De La Cruz12 where this Court ruled that the crime committed for the
shooting of the victim was attempted murder and not frustrated murder for the reason that “his
injuries, though no doubt serious, were not proved fatal such that without timely medical intervention,
they would have caused his death.” In fact, as early as People v. Zaragosa,13 we enunciated the doctrine
that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically
attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the
accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated murder.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding accused-appellant Fernando “Ando” Costales guilty
of murder and attempted murder is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION: In Crim. Case
No. T-2057, the crime of murder not being considered to have been attended by any generic mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, accused-appellant Fernando “Ando” Costales is sentenced to suffer only
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In Crim. Case No. T-2056, the crime of attempted murder not
likewise considered to have been attended by any generic mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
accused-appellant Fernando “Ando” Costales is accordingly sentenced in addition to his penalty
imposed in Crim. Case No. T-2057 herein before mentioned, to suffer an indeterminate prison term of
two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccionalmedium as minimum, to eight (8) years and
six (6) months of prision mayor minimum as maximum;
Accused-appellant Fernando “Ando” Costales is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
Miguel Marcelo P50,000.00 as death indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

Judgment affirmed with modification.

Notes.—In treachery, the mode of attack must be planned and must not spring from the
unexpected turn of events. (People vs. Marquita, 327 SCRA 41 [2000])
Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as conclusively as the killing itself.
(People vs. Albao, 327 SCRA 123 [2000])

[No. 12155. February 2, 1917.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs.PROTASIO EDUAVE, defendant and appellant.
1. 1.CRIMINAL LAW; FRUSTRATED CRIMES.—A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
1. 2.ID.; ATTEMPTED CRIMES.—There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of the
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which constitute the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own voluntary desistance.
1. 3.ID.; ID.—In case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense. He is
interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes before the subjective phase is
passed.
1. 4.ID.; FRUSTRATED CRIMES.—In case of frustrated crimes the subjective phase is completely passed.
Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing through the
subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime
did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond his control.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; SUBJECTIVE PHASE.—The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime
included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the
offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time f orward
the phase is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over
which, he has control—that period between the point where he begins and the point where
he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by any cause outside of his own
voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is attempt. If he is not so stopped
but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Misamis. Johnston, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Manuel Roxas for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
We believe that the accused is guilty of frustrated murder.
We are satisfied that there was an intent to kill in this case. A deadly weapon was used. The blow was directed
toward a vital part of the body. The aggressor stated his purpose to kill, thought he had killed, and threw the body
into the bushes. When he gave himself up he declared that he had killed the complainant.
There was alevosía to qualify the crime as murder if death had resulted. The accused rushed upon the girl
suddenly and struck her from behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo, producing a frightful gash in the lumbar
region and slightly to the side eight and one-half inches long and two inches deep, severing all of the muscles and
tissues of that part.
The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for the reason that she had theretofore
charged him criminally before the local officials with having raped her and with being the cause of her pregnancy.
He was her mother's querido and was living with her as such at the time the crime here charged was committed.
That the accused is guilty of some crime is not denied. The only question is the precise crime of which he should
be convicted. It is contended, in the first place, that, if death had resulted, the crime would not have been murder
but homicide, and in the second place, that it is attempted and not frustrated homicide.
As to the first contention, we are of the opinion that the crime committed would have been murder if the girl
had been killed. It is qualified by the circumstance of alevosía,the accused making a sudden attack upon his victim
from the rear, or partly from the rear, and dealing her a terrible blow in the back and side with his bolo. Such an
attack necessitates the finding that it was made treacherously; and that being so the crime would have been
qualified as murder if death had resulted.
As to the second contention, we are of the opinion that the crime was frustrated and not attempted murder.
Article 3 of the Penal Code defines a frustrated felony as follows:
"A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a
consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator."
An attempted felony is defined thus:
"There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which constitute the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
voluntarily desistance."
The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is clear from the fact that the defendant performed all of the acts
which should have resulted in the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts. A crime cannot
be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginningthe commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented,
against his will, by some outside cause from performing allof the acts which should produce the crime. In other
words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which
intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce
the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which should
result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no
intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and
the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the
former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which
should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart f rom his voluntary desistance.
To put it in another way, in case of an' attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense.
He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes before the subjective phase is passed.
On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes the subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the crime
is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime,
however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. He did
all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to something
beyond his control.
The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the
commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime. From that time forward the phase is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied
by the acts of the offender over which he has control—that period between the point where he begins and the point
where he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of
his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped
but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated.
That the case before us is frustrated is clear.
The penalty should have been thirteen years of cadena temporal there being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed with costs. So ordered.
Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur. Carson and Trent, JJ.,concur in the result.
Judgment affirmed; penalty modified.
 VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 533
Palaganas vs. People
G.R. No. 165483. September 12, 2006.*
RUJJERIC Z. PALAGANAS,1 petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Homicide; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; As an element of self-defense,
unlawful aggression refers to an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate
manner, which places the defendant’s life in actual peril.—As an element of self-defense, unlawful
aggression refers to an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner,
which places the defendant’s life in actual peril. It is an act positively strong showing the wrongful
intent of the aggressor and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. It is also described as a
sudden and unprovoked attack of immediate and imminent kind to the life, safety or rights of the
person attacked. There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or
imminent peril the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical
force or actual use of weapon. In order to constitute unlawful aggression, the person attacked must be
confronted by a real threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and
actual, not merely imaginary.
Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; It is an oft-repeated rule that the nature and number of
wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia to
disprove a plea of self-defense.—It is significant to note that the shooting resulted in the death of
Melton, and wounding of Servillano and Michael. With regard to Melton, a bullet hit his right thigh,
and another bullet hit his head which caused his instant death. As regards Servillano, a bullet
penetrated two of his vital organs, namely, the large intestine and urinary bladder. He underwent two
(2) surgeries in order to survive and fully recover. Michael, on the other hand, sustained a gunshot
wound on the right shoulder. It must also be noted that the Ferrer brothers were shot near the videoke
bar, which contradict petitioner’s claim he was chased by the Ferrer
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
1Also referred to as Rojeric Palaganas y Zarate in the Informations, and Decisions of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.
534
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaganas vs. People
brothers. Given the foregoing circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the Ferrer brothers
were the unlawful aggressors. As correctly observed by the prosecution, if the petitioner shot the Ferrer
brothers just to defend himself, it defies reason why he had to shoot the victims at the vital portions of
their body, which even led to the death of Melton who was shot at his head. It is an oft-repeated rule
that the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly
considered important indicia to disprove a plea of self-defense.
Same; Same; The reasonableness of the means employed by the person defending himself may take
into account the weapons, the physical condition of the parties and other circumstances showing that
there is a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense.—The second element of
self-defense requires that the means employed by the person defending himself must be reasonably
necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of the victim. The reasonableness of the means
employed may take into account the weapons, the physical condition of the parties and other
circumstances showing that there is a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the
defense. In the case at bar, the petitioner’s act of shooting the Ferrer brothers was not a reasonable
and necessary means of repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the Ferrer brothers. As aptly
stated by the trial court, petitioner’s gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer
brothers. Moreover, we stated earlier that when the Ferrer brothers allegedly threw stones at the
petitioner, the latter had other less harmful options than to shoot the Ferrer brothers. Such act failed
to pass the test of reasonableness of the means employed in preventing or repelling an unlawful
aggression.
Homicide; Self-Defense; Where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense.— In
resolving criminal cases where the accused invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, this Court
consistently held that where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense.
As the burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove all the elements of self-defense, he must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.
535
VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 535
Palaganas vs. People
Criminal Law; Words and Phrases; “Frustrated Felony” and “Attempted Felony,”
Distinguished.—The distinctions between frustrated and attempted felony are summarized as follows:
1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution. 2.) In frustrated felony,
the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the
perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is
a cause or accident other than the offender’s own spontaneous desistance.
Physical Injuries; If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s
sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical
injury.—In addition to these distinctions, we have ruled in several cases that when the accused
intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim
sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime
committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the
qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. However, if the
wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is
only attempted murder or attempted homicide. If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused
and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less
serious or slight physical injury.
Criminal Law; Aggravating Circumstances; Generic aggravating circumstances are those that
generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14, pars. No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14,
18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code, and have the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to
its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree; Special aggravating
circumstances are those which arise under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to
its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to the next higher degree; The meaning
and effect of generic and special aggravating circumstances are exactly the same except that in case of
generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the
536
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaganas vs. People
case of special aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.—Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as
those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised
Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it
cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and charged in the
information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. Moreover, it can be offset
by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are
those which arise under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum
period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to the next higher degree. Examples are quasi-
recidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does
not change the character of the offense charged. It must always be alleged and charged in the
information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. Moreover, it cannot be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect
of generic and special aggravating circumstances are exactly the same except that in case of generic
aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the case of
special aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
Same; Illegal Possession of Firearms; With the passage of R.A. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use
of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating
circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.—Aside from the aggravating circumstances
abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance provided for under Presidential Decree No.
1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, which is a special law. Its pertinent provision states: If
homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. In interpreting the same provision, the
trial court reasoned that such provision is “silent as to whether it is generic or qualifying.” Thus, it
ruled that “when the law is silent, the same must be interpreted in favor of the accused.” Since a generic
aggravating circumstance is more favorable to petitioner compared to a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, as the latter changes the nature of the crime and
537
VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 537
Palaganas vs. People
increase the penalty thereof by degrees, the trial court proceeded to declare that the use of an
unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only as a generic aggravating circumstance.
This interpretation is erroneous since we already held in several cases that with the passage of
Republic Act No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now
considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.
Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the commission of the crimes
in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should
be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a generic
aggravating circumstance.
Damages; Documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning
capacity; Exceptions.—The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a
claim for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages therefore may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence if there is testimony that the victim was either (1) self-employed,
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice is taken of the fact
that in the victim’s line of work, no documentary evidence is available; of (2) employed as a daily-wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Demetria, Demetria, Magno-Concepcion Law Officesfor petitioner.
Nuelito B. Ranches for respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For what is a man, what has he got?
If not himself, then he has naught.
To say the things he truly feels;
And not the words of one who kneels.
538
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaganas vs. People
The record shows I took the blows—
And did it my way!
The song evokes the bitterest passions. This is not the first time the song “My Way”2 has triggered
violent behavior resulting in people coming to blows. In the case at bar, the few lines of the song
depicted what came to pass when the victims and the aggressors tried to outdo each other in their
rendition of the song.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner
Rujjeric Z. Palaganas prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
22689 dated 30 September 2004,4 affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 46, of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, in Criminal Cases No. U-9608, U-9609, and U-9610 and
U-9634, dated 28 October 1998,5 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and two (2) counts of Frustrated Homicide
under Article 249 in relation to Articles 6 and 50 of the same Code.
On 21 April 1998, petitioner and his older brother, Ferdinand Z. Palaganas (Ferdinand), were
charged under four (4) separate Informations 6 for two (2) counts of Frustrated Murder, one (1) count
of Murder, and one (1) count for Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 7relative to Article 22,
Sec-
_______________
2Music
by Paul Anka; Sung and popularized by Frank Sinatra.
3Rollo,
pp. 9-23.
4 Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and
Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Rollo, pp. 24-43.
5Penned by Judge Modesto C. Juanson; Id., at pp. 44-75.
 Records, Volume I, pp. 1-2 and 10, Volume II, pp. 1-2 and Volume III, p. 1.
6 with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring together, did then and there
RULES AND REGULATIONS ON: (A) BEARING, CARRYING OR TRANSPORTING
7 willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot MICHAEL FERRER alias “Boying Ferrer,” inflicting upon
FIREARMS OR OTHER DEADLY him gunshot wound on the right shoulder, the accused having thus performed all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but which nevertheless, did not
539 produce it by reason of the causes independent of the will of the accused and that is due to the medical
VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 539 assistance rendered to said Michael “Boying” Ferrer which prevented his death, to his damage and
prejudice.
Palaganas vs. People
CONTRARY to Art. 248 in relation with Arts. 6 and 50, all of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.”
tion 261, of the Omnibus Election Code, 8 allegedly committed as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9608
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9610
“That on or about January 16, 1998, in the evening at Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan and within the
“That on or about January 16, 1998, in the evening at Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan and within
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with an unlicensed firearm, with
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with an unlicensed firearm,
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring together, did then and there willfully,
with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring together, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously shoot SERVILLANO FERRER, JR. y Juanatas, inflicting upon him
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot MELTON FERRER alias “TONY FERRER,” inflicting upon
“gunshot wound penetrating perforating abdomen, urinary bladder, rectum bullet sacral region,” the
him mortal gunshot wounds in the head and right thigh which caused the instantaneous death of
accused having thus performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
said Melton “Tony” Ferrer, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Murder as a consequence, but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the causes
CONTRARY to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659.”
independent of the will of the accused and that is due to the timely medical assistance rendered to said
Servillano J. Ferrer, Jr. which prevented his death, to his damage and prejudice.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9634
_______________
“That on or about January 16, 1998 which is within the election period at Poblacion, Manaoag,
WEAPONS; (B) SECURITY PERSONNEL OR BODYGUARDS; (C) BEARING ARMS BY ANY Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then
MEMBER OF SECURITY OR POLICE ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS; (D) and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously bear and carry
ORGANIZATION OR MAINTENANCE OF REACTION FORCES DURING THE ELECTION
PERIOD IN CONNECTION WITH THE MAY 11, 1998 ELECTIONS. (Promulgated on December 23, 541
1997). VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 541
8 Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (December 3, 1985), Article XXII—ELECTION
Palaganas vs. People
OFFENSES, Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts.—par. (p): Deadly weapons.—Any person who carries any
one (1) caliber .38 without first securing the necessary permit/license to do the same.
deadly weapon in the polling place and within a radius of one hundred meters thereof during the days
CONTRARY to COMELEC RES. 2958 in relation with SEC. 261 of the OMNIBUS ELECTION
and hours fixed by law for the registration of voters in the polling place, voting, counting of votes, or
CODE, as amended.”9 (Italics supplied.)
preparation of the election returns. However, in cases of affray, turmoil, or disorder, any peace officer
or public officer authorized by the Commission to supervise the election is entitled to carry firearms or When arraigned on separate dates,10 petitioner and Ferdinand entered separate pleas of “Not Guilty.”
any other weapon for the purpose of preserving order and enforcing the law x x x. Par. (q) Carrying Upon motion of Ferdinand,11 the four cases were consolidated and were assigned to Branch 46 of the
firearms outside residence or place of business.—Any person who, although possessing a permit to RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. 12
carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of business during the election The factual antecedents as viewed by the prosecution, are summarized in the Comment dated 18
period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission x x x. April 2005 of the Office of the Solicitor General,13 to wit:
“On January 16, 1998, around 8:00 in the evening, brothers Servillano, [Melton] and Michael, all
540
surnamed Ferrer were having a drinking spree in their house because [Melton], who was already living
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED in San Fernando, La Union, visited his three brothers and mother at their house in Sitio Baloking,
Palaganas vs. People Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan. At 9:45 in the evening, the three brothers decided to proceed to
CONTRARY to Art. 248 in relation with Arts. 6 and 50, all of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.” Tidbits Videoke bar located at the corner of Malvar and Rizal Streets, Poblacion, Manaoag to continue
their drinking spree and to sing. Inside the karaoke bar, they were having a good time, singing and
drinking beer.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9609
Thereafter, at 10:30 in the evening, Jaime Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas
and Virgilio Bautista. At that time, only the Ferrer brothers were the customers in the bar. The two
“That on or about January 16, 1998, in the evening at Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan and within
groups occupied separate tables. Later, when Jaime Palaganas was singing, [Melton] Ferrer sang along
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with an unlicensed firearm,
with him as he was familiar with the song [My Way]. Jaime however, resented this and went near the
table of the Ferrer brothers and said in Pangasinan dialect “As if you are tough guys.” Jaime further
said “You are already in
_______________
9Rollo, pp. 45-47.
10 Records, Volume I, p. 43; Volume II, p. 39, and Volume III, p. 41.
11Id., at pp. 35-36; Id., at pp. 43-44; and Id., at p. 52.
12Id., at p. 37 and Id., at p. 45.
13Rollo, pp. 101-119.
542
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaganas vs. People
sulting me in that way.” Then, Jaime struck Servillano Ferrer with the microphone, hitting the back
of his head. A rumble ensued between the Ferrer brothers on the one hand, and the Palaganases, on
the other hand. Virgilio Bautista did not join the fray as he left the place. During the rumble, Ferdinand
went out of the bar. He was however pursued by Michael. When Servillano saw Michael, he also went
out and told the latter not to follow Ferdinand. Servillano and Michael then went back inside the bar
and continued their fight with Jaime.
Meantime, Edith Palaganas, sister of Jaime and the owner of the bar, arrived and pacified them.
Servillano noticed that his wristwatch was missing. Unable to locate the watch inside the bar, the
Ferrer brothers went outside. They saw Ferdinand about eight (8) meters away standing at Rizal
Street. Ferdinand was pointing at them and said to his companion, later identified as petitioner
[Rujjeric] Palaganas, “Oraratan paltog mo lara,” meaning “They are the ones, shoot them.” Petitioner
then shot them hitting Servillano first at the left side of the abdomen, causing him to fall on the ground,
and followed by [Melton] who also fell to the ground. When Servillano noticed that [Melton] was no
longer moving, he told Michael “Bato, bato.” Michael picked up some stones and threw them at
petitioner and Ferdinand. The latter then left the place. Afterwards, the police officers came and the
Ferrer brothers were brought to the Manaoag Hospital and later to Villaflor Hospital in Dagupan.
Servillano later discovered that [Melton] was fatally hit in the head while Michael was hit in the right
shoulder.”
On the other hand, the defense, in its Appellant’s Brief dated 3 December 1999, 14 asserted the following
set of facts:
“On January 16, 1998, at around 11:00 in the evening, after a drinking session at their house, the
brothers Melton (Tony), Servillano (Junior) and Michael (Boying), all surnamed Ferrer, occupied a
table inside the Tidbits Café and Videoke Bar and started drinking and singing. About thirty minutes
later, Jaime Palaganas along with his nephew Ferdinand (Apo) and friend Virgilio Bautista arrived at
the bar and occupied a table near that of the Ferrers.’
_______________
14CA
Rollo, pp. 123-148.
543
VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 543
Palaganas vs. People
After the Ferrers’ turn in singing, the microphone was handed over to Jaime Palaganas, who then
started to sing. On his third song [My Way], Jaime was joined in his singing by Tony Ferrer, who sang
loudly and in an obviously mocking manner. This infuriated Jaime, who then accosted Tony, saying,
“You are already insulting us.” The statement resulted in a free for all fight between the Ferrers,’ on
one hand, and the Palaganases on the other. Jaime was mauled and Ferdinand, was hit on the face
and was chased outside of the bar by Junior and Boying Ferrer.
Ferdinand then ran towards the house of the appellant Rujjeric Palaganas, his brother, and sought
the help of the latter. Rujjeric, stirred from his sleep by his brother’s shouts, went out of his house and,
noticing that the van of his uncle was in front of the Tidbits Videoke Bar, proceeded to that place.
Before reaching the bar, however, he was suddenly stoned by the Ferrer brothers and was hit on
different parts of his body, so he turned around and struggled to run towards his house. He then met
his brother, Ferdinand, going towards the bar, so he tugged him and urged him to run towards the
opposite direction as the Ferrer brothers continued pelting them with large stones. Rujjeric then
noticed that Ferdinand was carrying a gun, and, on instinct, grabbed the gun from the latter, faced the
Ferrer brothers and fired one shot in the air to force the brothers to retreat. Much to his surprise,
however, the Ferrer brothers continued throwing stones and when (sic) the appellant was again hit
several times. Unable to bear the pain, he closed his eyes and pulled the trigger.”
On 28 October 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty only of the crime of
Homicide and two (2) counts of Frustrated Homicide.15 He was, however, acquitted of the charge of
Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 in relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code.16 On the other hand, Ferdinand was acquitted of all the charges against him.17
_______________
15Rollo, pp. 44-75.
16Id.
17Id.
544
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaganas vs. People
In holding that petitioner is liable for the crimes of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide but not for
Murder and Frustrated Murder, the trial court explained that there was no conspiracy between
petitioner and Ferdinand in killing Melton and wounding Servillano and Michael.18According to the
trial court, the mere fact that Ferdinand “pointed” to where the Ferrer brothers were and uttered to
petitioner “Araratan, paltog mo lara!” (They are the ones, shoot them!), does not in itself connote
common design or unity of purpose to kill. It also took note of the fact that petitioner was never a
participant in the rumble inside the Tidbits Cafe Videoke Bar (videoke bar) on the night of 16 January
1998. He was merely called by Ferdinand to rescue their uncle, Jaime, who was being assaulted by the
Ferrer brothers. It further stated that the shooting was instantaneous and without any prior plan or
agreement with Ferdinand to execute the same. It found that petitioner is solely liable for killing
Melton and for wounding Servillano and Michael, and that Ferdinand is not criminally responsible for
the act of petitioner.
Further, it declared that there was no treachery that will qualify the crimes as murder and
frustrated murder since the Ferrer brothers were given the chance to defend themselves during the
shooting incident by stoning the petitioner and Ferdinand. 19 It reasoned that the sudden and
unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims, was absent. In addition,
it ratiocinated that there was no evident premeditation as there was no sufficient period of time that
lapsed from the point where Ferdinand called the petitioner for help up to the point of the shooting of
the Ferrer brothers.20 Petitioner was sleeping at his house at the time he heard Ferdinand calling him
for help. Immediately, petitioner, still clad in pajama and sleeveless shirt, went out of his room to meet
Ferdinand. Thereafter, both
_______________
18Id., at pp. 68-69.
19Id., at p. 69.
20Id., at pp. 69-70.
545
VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 545
Palaganas vs. People
petitioner and Ferdinand went to the videoke bar where they met the Ferrer brothers and, shortly
afterwards, the shooting ensued. In other words, according to the trial court, the sequence of the events
are so fast that it is improbable for the petitioner to have ample time and opportunity to then plan and
organize the shooting.
Corollarily, it also stated that petitioner cannot successfully invoke self-defense since there was no
actual or imminent danger to his life at the time he and Ferdinand saw the Ferrer brothers outside the
videoke bar.21 It noted that when petitioner and Ferdinand saw the Ferrer brothers outside the videoke
bar, the latter were not carrying any weapon. Petitioner then was free to run or take cover when the
Ferrer brothers started pelting them with stones. Petitioner, however, opted to shoot the Ferrer
brothers. It also stated that the use by petitioner of a gun was not a reasonable means to prevent the
attack of the Ferrer brothers since the latter were only equipped with stones, and that the gun was
deadlier compared to stones. Moreover, it also found that petitioner used an unlicensed firearm in
shooting the Ferrer brothers.22
As regards the Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958, in relation to Section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the trial court acquitted the petitioner of the offense as his use and possession
of a gun was not for the purpose of disrupting election activities. 23 In conclusion, the trial court held:
“WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9610, [Rujjeric] PALAGANAS is hereby CONVICTED beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE (Not Murder) with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The
penalty imposable is in its maximum period which is 20 years. The Court sentences [Rujjeric]
Palaganas to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period or 20 years of
imprisonment;
_______________
21 Id., at pp. 70-71.
22Id., at pp. 71-72.
23Id., at p. 72.
546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaganas vs. People
and to pay the heirs of [MELTON] Ferrer the sum of P7,791.50 as actual medical expenses of
[MELTON] Ferrer; P500,000.00 as moral damages representing unearned income of [MELTON];
P50,000.00 for the death of [MELTON]; P50,000.00 for exemplary damages and P100,000.00 for burial
and funeral expenses.
Ferdinand Palaganas is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and
likewise, for failure to prove the guilt of Ferdinand Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9608, [Rujjeric] PALAGANAS is hereby CONVICTED beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE (Not Frustrated Murder), with the use of
an unlicensed firearm, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of Prision Mayor in its maximum
period or 12 years of imprisonment and to pay Servillano Ferrer the sum of P163,569.90 for his medical
expenses and P50,000.00 for exemplary damages;
Ferdinand Palaganas is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and
likewise, for failure to prove the guilt of Ferdinand Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9609, [Rujjeric] PALAGANAS is hereby CONVICTED beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE (Not Frustrated Murder), with the use of
an unlicensed firearm, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of Prision Mayor in its maximum
period or 12 years of imprisonment; and to pay Michael Ferrer the sum of P2,259.35 for his medical
expenses and P50,000.00 for exemplary damages;
Ferdinand Palaganas is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and
likewise, for failure to prove the guilt of Ferdinand Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt.
Ordering accused [Rujjeric] Palaganas to pay Mrs. Elena Ferrer, the mother of the Ferrer brothers,
the amount of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees in CRIM. CASES NOS. U-9608, U-9609, U-9610.
4. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9634, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of [Rujjeric]
Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 in
relation with Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Court ACQUITS [RUJJERIC]
PALAGANAS.”24
_______________
24Id., at pp. 73-75.
547
VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 547
Palaganas vs. People
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the foregoing Decision of the RTC dated 28 October 1998, before the
Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 30 September 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
modifications the assailed RTC Decision. In modifying the Decision of the trial court, the appellate
court held that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender under Article 13, No. 7, of the
Revised Penal Code should be appreciated in favor of petitioner since the latter, accompanied by his
counsel, voluntarily appeared before the trial court, even prior to its issuance of a warrant of arrest
against him.25 It also stated that the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied in imposing the
penalty upon the petitioner.26 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION
that the penalty to be imposed for the crimes which the appellant committed are as follows:
1. (1)For Homicide (under Criminal Case No. U-9610), the appellant is ordered to suffer
imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs
of Melton Ferrer civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 without need of proof and actual damages in the amount of P43,556.00.
 2. (2)For Frustrated Homicide (under Criminal Case No. U-9609), the appellant is hereby 27 Id., at pp. 41-42.
ordered to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as 28 Id., at p. 17.
minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Appellant is also ordered to pay
Michael Ferrer actual damages in the amount of P2,259.35 and moral damages in the 549
amount of P30,000.00. VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 549
3. (3)For Frustrated Homicide (under Criminal Case No. U-9608), the appellant is hereby
Palaganas vs. People
penalized with imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as
ing shot” fired by the petitioner; and, that if this exhibit was properly appreciated by the trial court,
minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Appellant is also or
petitioner would be acquitted of all the charges. 29
Moreover, petitioner contended that the warning shot proved that the Ferrer brothers were the
_______________ unlawful aggressors since there would have been no occasion for the petitioner to fire a warning shot
if the Ferrer brothers did not stone him; that the testimony of Michael in the trial court proved that it
25 Id., at p. 39. was the Ferrer brothers who provoked petitioner to shoot them; and that the Ferrer brothers pelted
26 Id., at pp. 39-41. them with stones even after the “warning shot.” 30
Petitioner’s contention must fail.
548 Article 11, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code provides for the elements and/or requisites in
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 548 order that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a person from criminal
Palaganas vs. People liability, viz.:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances.—The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
1. dered to pay Servillano Ferrer actual damages in the amount of P163,569.90 and moral concur;
damages in the amount of P30,000.00.”27 First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
On 16 November 2004, petitioner lodged the instant Petition for Review before this Court on the basis Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. x x x.
of the following arguments:
I. As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression refers to an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in
an imminent and immediate manner, which places the defendant’s life in actual peril. 31 It is an act
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF positively strong showing the wrongful intent of the aggressor and not merely a threatening or in-
CONVICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT. _______________

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF LAWFUL SELF-DEFENSE.28
Anent the first issue, petitioner argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are present in the
instant case and, thus, his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that when he fired his gun on that
fateful night, he was then a victim of an unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that
he, in fact, sustained an injury in his left leg and left shoulder caused by the stones thrown by the
Ferrer brothers; that the appellate court failed to consider a material evidence described as “Exhibit
O”; that “Exhibit O” should have been given due weight since it shows that there was slug embedded
on the sawali wall near the sign “Tidbits Café and Videoke Bar”; that the height from which the slug
was taken was about seven feet from the ground; that if it was true that petitioner and Ferdinand were
waiting for the Ferrer brothers outside the videoke bar in order to shoot them, then the trajectory of
the bullets would have been either straight or downward and not upward considering that the
petitioner and the Ferrer brothers were about the same height (5’6”-5’8”); that the slug found on the
wall was, in fact, the “warn-
_______________
29Id.,
at pp. 17-18.
30Id.,
at pp. 18-19.
31People v. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366, 374 (1947).
550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaganas vs. People
timidating attitude.32 It is also described as a sudden and unprovoked attack of immediate and
imminent kind to the life, safety or rights of the person attacked. 33
There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or imminent peril
the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical force or actual
use of weapon.34 In order to constitute unlawful aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by
a real threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary.35
In the case at bar, it is clear that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer
brothers that justified the act of petitioner in shooting them. There were no actual or imminent danger
to the lives of petitioner and Ferdinand when they proceeded and arrived at the videoke bar and saw
thereat the Ferrer brothers. It appears that the Ferrer brothers then were merely standing outside the
videoke bar and were not carrying any weapon when the petitioner arrived with his brother Ferdinand
and started firing his gun.36
Assuming, arguendo, that the Ferrer brothers had provoked the petitioner to shoot them by pelting
the latter with stones, the shooting of the Ferrer brothers is still unjustified. When the Ferrer brothers
started throwing stones, petitioner was not in a state of actual or imminent danger considering the
wide distance (4-5 meters) of the latter from the location
_______________
32 People v. Arizala, 375 Phil. 666, 675; 317 SCRA 244, 253 (1999).
33 People v. Bausing, G.R. No. 64965, 8 July 1991, 199 SCRA 355, 361.
34 People v. Crisostomo, 195 Phil. 162, 172; 108 SCRA 288, 298 (1981).
35 Senoja v. People, G.R. No. 160341, 19 October 2004, 440 SCRA 695, 703.
36Records, TSN, 2 July 1998, pp. 7-10.
551
VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 551
Palaganas vs. People
of the former.37 Petitioner was not cornered nor trapped in a specific area such that he had no way out,
nor was his back against the wall. He was still capable of avoiding the stones by running away or by
taking cover. He could have also called or proceeded to the proper authorities for help. Indeed,
petitioner had several options in avoiding dangers to his life other than confronting the Ferrer brothers
with a gun.
The fact that petitioner sustained injuries in his left leg and left shoulder, allegedly caused by the
stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers, does not signify that he was a victim of unlawful aggression or
that he acted in self-defense.38There is no evidence to show that his wounds were so serious and severe.
The superficiality of the injuries sustained by the petitioner is no indication that his life and limb were
in actual peril.39
Petitioner’s assertion that, despite the fact that he fired a warning shot, the Ferrer brothers
continued to pelt him with stones, 40 will not matter to exonerate him from criminal liability. Firing a
warning shot was not the last and only option he had in order to avoid the stones thrown by the Ferrer
brothers. As stated earlier, he could have run away, or taken cover, or proceeded to the proper
authorities for help. Petitioner, however, opted to shoot the Ferrer brothers.
It is significant to note that the shooting resulted in the death of Melton, and wounding of
Servillano and Michael. With regard to Melton, a bullet hit his right thigh, and another bullet hit his
head which caused his instant death. 41 As regards Servillano, a bullet penetrated two of his vital
organs, namely, the large intestine and urinary bladder. 42 He under-
_______________
37CA Rollo, p. 132.
38 Roca v. People, G.R. No. 114917, 29 January 2001, 350 SCRA 414, 423.
39Id.
40 Rollo, pp. 18-19.
41CA Rollo, p. 40, Records, TSN, 6 July 1998, pp. 8-12.
42Id., at pp. 41-42, Records, TSN, 27 July 1998, pp. 2-8.
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaganas vs. People
went two (2) surgeries in order to survive and fully recover.43 Michael, on the other hand, sustained a
gunshot wound on the right shoulder. 44 It must also be noted that the Ferrer brothers were shot near
the videoke bar, which contradict petitioner’s claim he was chased by the Ferrer brothers. Given the
foregoing circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the Ferrer brothers were the unlawful aggressors.
As correctly observed by the prosecution, if the petitioner shot the Ferrer brothers just to defend
himself, it defies reason why he had to shoot the victims at the vital portions of their body, which even
led to the death of Melton who was shot at his head. 45 It is an oft-repeated rule that the nature and
number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered
important indicia to disprove a plea of self-defense.46
Let it not be forgotten that unlawful aggression is a primordial element in self-defense.47 It is an
essential and indispensable requisite, for without unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, there
can be, in a jural sense, no complete or incomplete self-defense.48 Without unlawful aggression, self-
defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be
appreciated, even if the other elements are present.49 To our mind, unlawful aggression, as an element
of self-defense, is wanting in the instant case.
The second element of self-defense requires that the means employed by the person defending
himself must be reasonably
_______________
43Id.
44 Id., at pp. 42-43; Records, TSN, 27 July 1998, pp. 2-8.
45Rollo, p. 117.
46 Id.
47 People v. Cario, G.R. No. 123325, 31 March 1998, 288 SCRA 404, 417.
48People v. Gallego, 453 Phil. 825, 839; 406 SCRA 6, 16 (2003).
49 People v. Caratao, 451 Phil. 588, 602; 403 SCRA 482, 492 (2003).
553
VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 553
Palaganas vs. People
necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of the victim. The reasonableness of the means
employed may take into account the weapons, the physical condition of the parties and other
circumstances showing that there is a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the
defense.50 In the case at bar, the petitioner’s act of shooting the Ferrer brothers was not a reasonable
and necessary means of repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the Ferrer brothers. As aptly
stated by the trial court, petitioner’s gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer
brothers.51
Moreover, we stated earlier that when the Ferrer brothers allegedly threw stones at the petitioner,
the latter had other less harmful options than to shoot the Ferrer brothers. Such act failed to pass the
test of reasonableness of the means employed in preventing or repelling an unlawful aggression.
With regard to the second issue, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting
him on the ground of lawful self-defense.
Petitioner’s argument is bereft of merit.
In resolving criminal cases where the accused invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, this
Court consistently held that where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-
defense.52 As the burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove all the elements of self-defense,
he must rely on the
_______________
50 People v. Encomienda, 150-B Phil. 419, 433-434; 46 SCRA 522, 534 (1972).
51Rollo, p. 70.
52 Rendon v. People, G.R. No. 127089, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA 142, 146.
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaganas vs. People
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. 53
As we have already found, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers
which justified the act of petitioner in shooting them. We also ruled that even if the Ferrer brothers
provoked the petitioner to shoot them, the latter’s use of a gun was not a reasonable means of repelling
the act of the Ferrer brothers in throwing stones. It must also be emphasized at this point that both
the trial court and the appellate court found that petitioner failed to established by clear and
convincing evidence his plea of self-defense. In this regard, it is settled that when the trial court’s
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding
upon this Court.54 In the present case, we find no compelling reason to deviate from their findings.
Verily, petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to an acquittal on
the ground of lawful self-defense.
On another point, while we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is
guilty of the crime of Homicide for the death of Melton in Criminal Case No. U-9610, and Frustrated
Homicide for the serious injuries sustained by Servillano in Criminal Case No. U-9608, we do not,
however, concur in their ruling that petitioner is guilty of the crime of Frustrated Homicide as regards
to Michael in Criminal Case No. U-9609. We hold that petitioner therein is guilty only of the crime of
Attempted Homicide.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states and defines the stages of a felony in the following manner:
_______________
53 People v. Castillano, Sr., 448 Phil. 482, 499-500; 400 SCRA 401, 411-412 (2003).
54 People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 118912, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 40, 50.
555
VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 555
Palaganas vs. People
“ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.—Consummated felonies, as well as
those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for the for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason
or causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance (italics supplied).”
Based on the foregoing provision, the distinctions between frustrated and attempted felony are
summarized as follows:
1. 1.)In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution.
2. 2.)In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason
for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own
spontaneous desistance.
In addition to these distinctions, we have ruled in several cases that when the accused intended to kill
his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal
or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is
frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the qualifying
circumstances under
556
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaganas vs. People
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. 55However, if the wound/s sustained by the victim in
such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted
homicide.56 If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by the
victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury. 57
Based on the medical certificate of Michael, as well as the testimony of the physician who diagnosed
and treated Michael, the latter was admitted and treated at the Dagupan Doctors-Villaflor Memorial
Hospital for a single gunshot wound in his right shoulder caused by the shooting of petitioner. 58 It was
also stated in his medical certificate that he was discharged on the same day he was admitted and that
the treatment duration for such wound would be for six to eight days only. 59 Given these set of
undisputed facts, it is clear that the gunshot wound sustained by Michael in his right shoulder was not
fatal or mortal since the treatment period for his wound was short and he was discharged from the
hospital on the same day he was admitted therein. Therefore, petitioner is liable only for the crime of
attempted homicide as regards Michael in Criminal Case No. U-9609.
With regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm,
we agree with the trial court and the appellate court that the same must be applied against petitioner
in the instant case since the same was alleged in the informations filed against him before the RTC
and proven during the trial. However, such must be consid-
_______________
55 People v. Costales, 424 Phil. 321, 334; 373 SCRA 269, 281 (2002).
56 People v. Castillo, 426 Phil. 752, 768; 376 SCRA 360, 374-375 (2002).
57People v. Asuela, 426 Phil. 428, 452; 376 SCRA 51, 72 (2002).
58Supra note 43.
59Id.
557
VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 557
 Palaganas vs. People
ered as a special aggravating circumstance, and not a generic aggravating circumstance.
Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those
mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal
Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot
increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and charged in the information,
and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. 60 Moreover, it can be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance.
On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under special
conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase
the penalty to the next higher degree. Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and complex
crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does not change the character of the offense
charged.61 It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the
trial in order to be appreciated.62 Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special aggravating
circumstances are exactly the same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset
by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the case of special aggravating circumstance, it
CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating
circumstance provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866,63 as amended by Republic Act No.
8294,64 which is a special law. Its pertinent provision states:
“If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.”
In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such provision is “silent as to whether
it is generic or qualifying.”65 Thus, it ruled that “when the law is silent, the same must be interpreted
in favor of the accused.”66 Since a generic aggravating circumstance is more favorable to petitioner
compared to a qualifying aggravating circumstance, as the latter changes the nature of the crime and
increase the penalty thereof by degrees, the trial court proceeded to declare that the use of an
unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only as a generic aggravating
circumstance.67 This interpretation is erroneous since we already held in several cases that with the
passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or
homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating cir-
_______________
63 CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE,
DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR
EXPLOSIVES; AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF
AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.
64 AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS
AMENDED, ENTITLED: CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION,
MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS,
AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES; AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN
VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES (6 June 1997).
65Rollo, pp. 71-72.
66Id., at p. 72.
67Id.
559
VOL. 501, SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 559
Palaganas vs. People
cumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance. 68Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant
case since it took effect before the commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an
unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should be designated and appreciated as a
SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a generic aggravating circumstance.
As was previously established, a special aggravating circumstance cannot be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance. Voluntary surrender of petitioner in this case is merely an ordinary
mitigating circumstance. Thus, it cannot offset the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm. In accordance with Article 64, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
imposable on petitioner should be in its maximum period. 69
As regards the civil liability of petitioner, we deem it necessary to modify the award of damages
given by both courts. In Criminal Case No. U-9610 for Homicide, we agree with both courts that the
proper amount of civil indemnity is P50,000.00, and that the proper amount for moral damages is
_______________
68 People v. Lumilan, 380 Phil. 130, 145; 323 SCRA 170, 182 (2000); People v. Castillo, 382 Phil.
503; 325 SCRA 613, 619 (2000); People v. Malinao, G.R. No. 128148, 16 February 2004, 423 SCRA 34,
51.
69 ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.—In cases in which
the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or
composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the
provisions of articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following
rules, according to whether there are or are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
xxx
3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose
the penalty in its maximum period.
560
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaganas vs. People
P50,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 70However, based on the receipts for hospital,
medicine, funeral and burial expenses on record, and upon computation of the same, the proper amount
of actual damages should be P42,374.18, instead of P43,556.00. Actual damages for loss of earning
capacity cannot be awarded in this case since there was no documentary evidence to substantiate the
same.71 Although there may be exceptions to this rule,72 none is availing in the present case.
Nevertheless, since loss was actually established in this case, temperate damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 may be awarded to the heirs of Melton Ferrer. Under Article 2224 of the New Civil Code,
temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was
suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. Moreover, exemplary damages should be
awarded in this case since the presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm
was already established.73 Based on prevailing jurisprudence, the award of exemplary damages for
homicide is P25,000.00.74
_______________
70 People v. Bangcado, G.R. No. 132330, 28 November 2000, 346 SCRA 189, 213; People v.
Panado, G.R. No. 133439, 26 December 2000, 348 SCRA 679, 691.
 71 Nueva España v. People, G.R. No. 163351, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 547, 556.
72 The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of
earning capacity. By way of exception, damages therefore may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence if there is testimony that the victim was either (1) self-employed, earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice is taken of the fact that in the
victim’s line of work, no documentary evidence is available; of (2) employed as a daily-wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. Id., at p. 556.
73 People v. Manambay, G.R. No. 130684, 5 February 2004, 422 SCRA 73, 90.
74 Lamis v. Ong, G.R. No. 148923, 11 August 2005, 466 SCRA 510, 519-520.
In Criminal Cases No. U-9608 and U-9609, we agree with both courts as to the award of actual damages
and its corresponding amount since the same is supported by documentary proof therein. The award
of moral damages is also consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. However, exemplary damages
should be awarded in this case since the presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm was already established. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, the award of
exemplary damages for both the attempted and frustrated homicide shall be P25,000.00 for each.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004
is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now is twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum period to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum period. As regards
the civil liability of petitioner, the latter is hereby ordered to pay Melton Ferrer exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and moral damages
awarded by the Court of Appeals. The actual damages likewise awarded by the Court of
Appeals is hereby reduced to P42,374.18.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
Judgment affirmed with modifications.
_______________
scribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated
felony.
77 ART. 249. Homicide.—Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill

1. (1)In Criminal Case No. U-9609, the petitioner is found guilty of the crime of attempted
homicide. The penalty imposable on the petitioner is prision correccional under Article 51 of
the Revised Penal Code.75 There being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an
unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence of Law, the penalty now
becomes four (4) years and two (2) months of arresto mayor as minimum period to six (6)
years of prision correccional as maximum period. As regards the civil liability of petitioner,
the latter is hereby ordered to pay Michael Ferrer exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and moral damages awarded by the Court of
Appeals.
2. (2)In Criminal Case No. U-9608, the penalty imposable on the petitioner for the frustrated
homicide is prision mayor under Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code. 76 There being a
another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article,
shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
Notes.—The justifying circumstance of self-defense may not survive in the face of the accused’s
flight from the crime scene, his concealment of the weapon and his failure to inform the authorities of
the incident. (People vs. Gerolaga, 263 SCRA 143 [1996])
It is an oft-repeated rule that the presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim
negates self-defense—instead, it indicates a determined effort to kill the victim. (People vs.
Deopante, 263 SCRA 691 [1996])

_______________

75 ART. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crime.—The penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals
in an attempt to commit a felony.
76 ART. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime.—The penalty next lower in

degree than that pre-

special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now becomes six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum period to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum period.
As regards the civil liability of petitioner, the latter is hereby ordered to pay Servillano
Ferrer exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages
and moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals.

(3)In Criminal Case No. U-9610, the penalty imposable on petitioner for homicide
is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 77 There being a special
 [No. 26298. January 20, 1927] There being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended
THE-PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, paintiff and appellee, vs. JULIAN ERIÑIA party, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and can only be found guilty of
Y VINOLLA, defendant and appellant. frustrated rape, but in view of the fact that he was living in the house of the parents of the
CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE OF A CHILD.—The crime of rape may be committed upon child as their guest, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence existed and the
a child of the age of 3 years and 11 months. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of penalty must therefore be imposed in its maximum degree.
First Instance of Manila. Diaz, J. The judgment appealed from is modified and the defendant-appellant is hereby found
999 guilty of the crime of frustrated rape and is sentenced to suffer twelve years of prisión
mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and with the costs in both instances.
VOL. 50, JANUARY 20, 1927 999
So ordered.
People vs. Eriñia Johnson, Street, Villamor, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Hermogenes Caluag for appellant. MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
In my opinion, the accused is guilty of raping a child 3 years and 11 months of age. It is
OSTRAND, J.: consummated rape according to the evidence of record, the findings of the trial judge, and
our decisions. (People vs. Hernandez [1925], 49 Phil., 980; People vs. Oscar [1925], 48 Phil.,
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the def 527.) The instant case is on all fours with the case of Kenney vs.State (65 L. R. A., 316), cited
endant guilty of the crime of consummated rape and sentencing him to suffer seventeen in the majority decision. In the Kenney case, the penalty was death, and here for this horrible
years, four months and one day of reclusión temporal, with the accessory penalties provided crime, should be placed in the maximum degree, or seventeen years, four months, and one
by law and to pay the costs. day imprisonment, as imposed by the trial court. Accordingly, my vote is for affirmance of
The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11 months old and the evidence is the judgment.
conclusive that the defendant endeavored to have carnal intercourse with her, but there may Judgment modified.
be some doubt whether he succeeded in penetrating the vagina before being disturbed by the
timely intervention of the mother and the sister of the child. The physician who examined
the genital organ of the child a few hours after the .commission of the crime found a slight
inflammation of the exterior parts of the organ, indicating that an effort had been made to
enter the vagina, but in testifying before the court he expressed doubts as to whether the
entry had been effected. The mother of the child testified that she found its genital organ
covered with a sticky substance, but that cannot be considered conclusive evidence of
penetration.
It has been suggested that the child was of such tender age that penetration was
impossible; that the crime of rape consequently was impossible of consummation; and that,
therefore, the offense committed should be treated only as abusos deshonestos. We do not
think so. It is probably true that a complete penetration was impossible, but such penetration
is not essential to the commission of the crime; it is sufficient if there is a penetration of the
labia. In the case of Kenney vs. State ([Tex. Crim. App ]
1000
1000 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Eriñia
79 S. W., 817; 65 L. R. A., 316) where the offended party was a child of the age of 3 years and
8 months, the testimony of several physicians was to the effect that the labia of the privates
of a child of that age can be entered by a man's male organ to the hymen and the defendant
was found guilty of the consummated crime of rape.
 VOL. 184, APRIL 3, 1990 105
People vs. Orita
G.R. No. 88724. April 3, 1990.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CEILITO ORITA alias “Lito,” defendant-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape; Court; Findings of fact of the trial court on credibility of witnesses should
be accorded the highest respect.—We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the
findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect
because it has the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is
telling the truth (People v. Samson, G.R. No. 55520, August 25, 1989).
Same; Same; Perfect penetration is not essential for the consummation of rape.—Clearly, in the
crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains
his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act
necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line of cases (People v.
Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29,
1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set
the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
106
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Orita
organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People v.
Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559; People v. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434)
because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the
crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape
can ever be committed.
Same; Same; The accused may be convicted of rape on the basis of the credible testimony of the
victim.—The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis
of the victim’s testimony if credible (People v. Tabago, G.R. No. 69778, November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA
65; People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569; People v. Taduyo, G.R.
Nos. L-37928-29, September 29, 1987, 154 SCRA 349). Moreover, Dr. Zamora’s testimony is merely
corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of this case (People v. Alfonso,
supra).
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Br. 2.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
C. Manalo for defendant-appellant.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 83-031-
B before the Regional Trial Court, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar. The information filed in the
said case reads as follows (p. 47, Rollo):
“The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal upon prior complaint under oath by the offended
party, accuses CEILITO ORITA alias LITO of the crime of Rape committed as follows:
“That on March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o’clock in the morning inside a boarding house at Victoria
St., Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above named accused with lewd designs and by the use of a Batangas knife he conveniently
provided himself for the purpose and with threats and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully
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VOL. 184, APRIL 3, 1990 107
People vs. Orita
and feloniously lay with and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Cristina S. Abayan against
her will and without her consent.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged. After the
witnesses for the People testified and the exhibits were formally offered and admitted, the prosecution
rested its case. Thereafter, the defense opted not to present any exculpatory evidence and instead filed
a Motion to Dismiss. On August 5, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads (pp. 59-60, Rollo):
“WHEREFORE, the Court being morally certain of the guilt of accused CEILITO ORITA @ LITO, of
the crime of Frustrated Rape (Art. 335, RPC), beyond reasonable doubt, with the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and
considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imposes on accused an imprisonment
of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS
PRISION MAYOR, maximum; to indemnify CRISTINA S. ABAYAN, the amount of Four Thousand
(P4,000.00) pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay costs.
“SO ORDERED.”
Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On December 29, 1988,
the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 102, Rollo):
“WHEREFORE, the trial court’s judgment is hereby MODIFIED, and the appellant found guilty of the
crime of rape, and consequently, sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
“SO ORDERED.”
On January 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its December 29, 1988
decision and forwarded the case to this Court, considering the provision of Section 9, paragraph 3 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in conjunction with Section 17, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948.
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108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Orita
The antecedent facts as summarized in the People’s brief are as follows (pp. 71-75, Rollo):
“Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph’s College at
Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier.
 “In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her
classmates had just brought her home from a party (p. 44, tsn, May 23, 1984). Shortly after her
classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house (p. 5, ibid). All of a sudden, somebody
held her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of
another boarder (pp. 8-9, ibid).
“She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door
which led to the first floor was locked from the inside, appellant forced complainant to use the back
door leading to the second floor (p. 77, ibid). With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right
hand poking a ‘balisong’ to her neck, appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p. 14, ibid). When
they reached the second floor, he commanded her to look for a room. With the Batangas knife still
poked to her neck, they entered complainant’s room.
“Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall. With one
hand holding the knife, appellant undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her
clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off her bra, pants and panty (p. 20, ibid).
“He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and
insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position,
however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept
on moving (p. 23, ibid).
“Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a
small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his hands
flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping (p. 20, ibid).
“She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant pursued her and climbed the
partition. When she saw him inside the room, she ran to another room. Appellant again chased her.
She fled to another room and jumped out through a window (p. 27, ibid).
“Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about eighteen meters in front of the
boarding house, and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building and
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VOL. 184, APRIL 3, 1990 109
People vs. Orita
knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door, they
found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her,
took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. When they discovered what happened, Pat. Donceras
and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house. They heard a sound at the second floor and saw
somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant.
“Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where
she was physically examined.
“Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined complainant, issued a Medical
Certificate (Exhibit ‘A’) which states:
‘Physical Examination—Patient is fairly built, came in with loose clothing with no under-clothes;
appears in state of shock, per unambulatory.
‘PE Findings—Pertinent Findings only.
‘Neck—Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck.
‘Breast—Well developed, conical in shape with prominent nipples; linear abrasions below (L)
breast.
‘Back—Multiple pinpoint marks.
‘Extremities—Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.
‘Vulva—No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the vulva, errythematous (sic)
areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice, tender; hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted;
examining finger can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.’ ”
As aforementioned, the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.
In this appeal, the accused assigns the following errors:
1. 1)The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the witnesses; and
2. 2)The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the
accused.
The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. Donceras because they “show remarkable
and vital inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and therefore casted doubt to
its candor, truth and validity.” (p. 33, Rollo)
A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they refer to trivial inconsistencies
which are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on the witnesses’ straightforward attestations. Far from
being badges of fabrication, the inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be justifiably
considered as
110
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Orita
manifestations of truthfulness on material points. These little deviations also confirm that the
witnesses had not been rehearsed. The most candid witnesses may make mistakes sometimes but such
honest lapses do not necessarily impair their intrinsic credibility (People v. Cabato, G.R. No. L-37400,
April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 98). Rather than discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
discrepancies on minor details must be viewed as adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous
testimonies (Aportadera, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-41358, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA
695). As a matter of fact, complete uniformity in details would be a strong indication of untruthfulness
and lack of spontaneity (People v. Bazar, G.R. No. L-41829, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 609). However,
one of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a little discussion which is, the testimony of the victim that
the accused asked her to hold and guide his penis in order to have carnal knowledge of her. According
to the accused, this is strange because “this is the only case where an aggressor’s advances is being
helped-out by the victim in order that there will be a consumation of the act.” (p. 34, Rollo). The
allegation would have been meritorious had the testimony of the victim ended there. The victim
testified further that the accused was holding a Batangas knife during the aggression. This is a
material part of the victim’s testimony which the accused conveniently deleted.
We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it has the
advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the truth
(People v. Samson, G.R. No. 55520, August 25, 1989). We quote with favor the trial court’s finding
regarding the testimony of the victim (p. 56, Rollo):
“As correctly pointed out in the memorandum for the People, there is not much to be desired as to the
sincerity of the offended party in her testimony before the court. Her answer to every question
profounded (sic), under all circumstances, are plain and straightforward. To the Court she was a
picture of supplication hungry and thirsty for the immediate vindication of the affront to her honor. It
is inculcated into the mind of the Court that the accused had wronged her; had traversed illegally her
honor.”
 111
VOL. 184, APRIL 3, 1990 111
People vs. Orita
When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape was committed provided her testimony is clear and free from contradiction and her sincerity and
candor, free from suspicion (People v Alfonso, G.R. No. 72573, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 487; People
v. Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-88, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 280; People v. Soterol, G.R. No. 53498,
December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA 400). The victim in this case did not only state that she was raped but
she testified convincingly on how the rape was committed. The victim’s testimony from the time she
knocked on the door of the municipal building up to the time she was brought to the hospital was
corroborated by Pat. Donceras. Interpreting the findings as indicated in the medical certificate, Dr.
Reinerio Zamora (who was presented in view of the unavailability of Dr. Abude) declared that the
abrasions in the left and right knees, linear abrasions below the left breast, multiple pinpoint marks,
circumscribed hematoma at the anterior neck, erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and
tender vulva, are conclusive proof of struggle against force and violence exerted on the victim (pp. 52-
53, Rollo). The trial court even inspected the boarding house and was fully satisfied that the narration
of the scene of the incident and the conditions therein is true (p. 54, Rollo):
“x x x. The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition safe enough to carry the weight of
both accused and offended party without the slightest difficulty, even in the manner as narrated. The
partitions of every room were of strong materials, securedly nailed, and would not give way even by
hastily scaling the same.”
A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging rape complaints (People v. Torio, et
al., G.R. No. L-48731, December 21, 1983, 126 SCRA 265). Thus, the trial court added (p. 55, Rollo):
“x x x And the jump executed by the offended party from that balcony (opening) to the ground which
was correctly estimated to be less than eight (8) meters, will perhaps occasion no injury to a frightened
individual being pursued. Common experience will tell us that in occasion of conflagration, especially
occuring (sic) in high buildings, many have been saved by jumping from some considerable heights
112
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Orita
without being injured. How much more for a frightened barrio girl, like the offended party to whom
honor appears to be more valuable than her life or limbs? Besides, the exposure of her private parts
when she sought assistance from authorities, as corroborated, is enough indication that something not
ordinary happened to her unless she is mentally deranged. Sadly, nothing was adduced to show that
she was out of her mind.”
In a similar case (People v. Sambili, G.R. No. L-44408, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 312), We ruled
that:
“What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her having been rendered entirely naked
by appellant and that even in her nudity, she had to run away from the latter and managed to gain
sanctuary in a house owned by spouses hardly known to her. All these acts she would not have done
nor would these facts have occurred unless she was sexually assaulted in the manner she narrated.”
The accused questions also the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses to corroborate the
allegations in the complaint and the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually
examined the victim. Suffice it to say that it is up to the prosecution to determine who should be
presented as witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity (Tugbang v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56679, June 29, 1989; People v. Somera, G.R. No. 65589, May 31, 1989). As
for the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually examined the victim, the trial court
stated that it was by agreement of the parties that another physician testified inasmuch as the medico-
legal officer was no longer available. The accused did not bother to contradict this statement.
Summing up, the arguments raised by the accused as regards the first assignment of error fall flat
on its face. Some were not even substantiated and do not, therefore, merit consideration. We are
convinced that the accused is guilty of rape. However, We believe the subject matter that really calls
for discussion, is whether or not the accused’s conviction for frustrated rape is proper. The trial court
was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim
and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.
The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated
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VOL. 184, APRIL 3, 1990 113
People vs. Orita
rape. The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of rape:
“ART. 335. When and how rape is committed.—Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. “1.By using force or intimidation;
2. “2.When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. “3.When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
“x x x .”
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman
(Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 193).
On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:
“ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.—Consummated felonies as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
“A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment
are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
“There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.”
Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply
to the crime of rape. Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of
rape.
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of
the perpetrator’s will. In the leading case of United States v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209, 212, Justice
Moreland set a distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies which is readily understood even
by law students:
“x x x A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of
the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the
acts which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the
offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior
to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence,
which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the
consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there
is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission
of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the
consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at
the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point
by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.”
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he
actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have
been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last
act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line of cases (People v.
Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29,
1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set
the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil.
559; People v. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts
of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape
and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be
committed.
Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Eriñia, 50 Phil.
998 [1927] where We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive evidence of
penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it appears that this is a “stray” decision
inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. Likewise, We are aware of Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 (dated September 12, 1960) and
Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the
penalty of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or
on the occasion thereof. We are of the opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead
provision. The Eriñia case, supra, might have prompted the law-making body to include the crime of
frustrated rape in the amendments introduced by said laws.
In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim,
the trial court relied on the testimony of Dr. Zamora when he “categorically declared that the findings
in the vulva does not give a concrete disclosure of penetration. As a matter of fact, he tossed back to
the offended party the answer as to whether or not there actually was penetration.” (p. 53, Rollo)
Furthermore, the trial court stated (p. 57, Rollo):
“x x x It cannot be insensible to the findings in the medical certificate (Exhibit ‘A’) as interpreted by
Dr. Reinerio Zamora and the equivocal declaration of the latter of uncertainty whether there was
penetration or not. It is true, and the Court is not oblivious, that conviction for rape could proceed from
the uncorroborated testimony of the offended party and that a medical certificate is not necessary
(People v. Royeras, People v. Orteza, 6 SCRA 109, 113). But the citations the people relied upon cannot
be applicable to the instant case. The testimony of the offended party is at variance with the medical
certificate. As such, a very disturbing doubt has surfaced in the mind of the court. It should be stressed
that in cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all
respect, compliment each other, for otherwise to rely on the testimony alone in utter disregard of the
manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of mischievous results.”
The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not exist. On
the contrary, it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous (which means
marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in inflammation) and tender.
It bears emphasis that Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the victim. He
merely testified that there was uncertainty whether or not there was penetration. Anent this
testimony, the victim positively testified that there was penetration, even if only partially (pp. 302,
304, t.s.n., May 23, 1984):
“Q Was the penis inserted on your vagina?
“A It entered but only a portion of it.”
xxx
“Q What do you mean when you said comply, or what act do you referred (sic) to, when
you said comply?
“A I inserted his penis into my vagina.
“Q And was it inserted?
“A Yes only a little.”
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the
victim’s testimony if credible (People v. Tabago, G.R. No. 69778, November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA
65; People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569; People v. Taduyo, G.R.
Nos. L-37928-29, September 29, 1987, 154 SCRA 349). Moreover, Dr. Zamora’s testimony is merely
corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of this case (People v. Alfonso,
supra).
Although the second assignment of error is meritorious, it will not tilt the scale in favor of the
accused because after a thorough review of the records, We find the evidence sufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape.
Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty is death. In view, however, of Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution and
Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989, that the cited
Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty but merely prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty
whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but instead reduced the same to reclusion
perpetua (People v. Solis, et al., G.R. Nos. 78732-33, February 14, 1990). Reclusion perpetua, being a
single indivisible penalty under Article 335, paragraph 3, is imposed regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code; see People v.
Arizala, G.R. No. 59713, March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 615; People v. Manzano, G.R. No. L-38449,
November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 705; People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 70744, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 702).
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused
Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Decision modified.
Note .—Fact that no spermatozoa was found in complainant’s private part does not disprove
consummation of rape. The slightest penetration even without emission is sufficient to constitute the
crime of rape. (People vs. Budol, 143 SCRA 241.)
 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Quiñanola
G.R. No. 126148. May 5, 1999.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.AGAPITO QUIÑANOLA y ESCUADRO and
EDUARDO ES-CUADRO y FLORO, accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Rape; Guiding Principles in Review of Rape Cases; Expectedly, courts would
scrupulously examine the testimony of the complainant with the thought always in mind that the
conviction of the accused would have to depend heavily on the credibility of the offended woman.—In
reviewing rape cases, this Court must again say that it has been continually guided by the principles
(a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime which
usually involves only two persons, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. Expectedly, courts would
scrupulously examine the testimony of the complainant with the thought always in mind that the
conviction of the accused would have to depend heavily on the credibility of the offended woman. It is
not much different in this instance for, at bottom, appellants assail the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, particularly that of the complainant, in seeking a reversal of the judgment of conviction.
Same; Same; Witnesses; Findings of the trial court on credibility are entitled to highest respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court has “over-
looked, misunderstood or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance” that could have
consequential effects.—The doctrine, then again, is that the findings of the trial court on credibility are
entitled to highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that
the trial court has “overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and
substance” that could have consequential effects. The stringency with which appellate tribunals have
observed this rule is predicated on the undisputed vantage of the trial court in the evaluation and
appreciation of testimonial evidence.
_________________
*THIRD DIVISION.
711
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People vs. Quiñanola
Same; Same; Same; Affidavits; Discrepancies between the statement of an affiant in an affidavit
and those made on the witness stand do not necessarily downgrade testimonial evidence.—The reliance
being made by appellants on the affidavit of Catalina in order to discredit her is likewise futile. The
Court has consistently ruled that discrepancies between the statement of an affiant in an affidavit and
those made on the witness stand do not necessarily downgrade testimonial evidence. Ex
parte affidavits are usually incomplete and frequently prepared by an administering officer and cast
in the latter’s language and understanding of what the affiant has said. Quite frequently, the affiant
would simply sign the affidavit after it has been read to him or to her.
Same; Same; Same; It is unbelievable that a young barrio lass would concoct a tale of defloration,
publicly admit having been ravished and her honor tainted, allow the examination of her private parts,
and undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial,
had she not in fact been raped and truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, as well as to obtain
justice, for the wicked acts committed against her.—Catalina’s candid and straightforward narration of
the two sexual assaults perpetrated on her on the night of the incident unmistakably deserves
credence. It is unbelievable that a young barrio lass would concoct a tale of defloration, publicly admit
having been ravished and her honor tainted, allow the examination of her private parts, and undergo
all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not
in fact been raped and truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, as well as to obtain justice, for
the wicked acts committed against her. There is no plausible reason why Catalina should testify
against appellants, imputing upon them so grave a crime as rape if it did not happen. This Court has
consistently held that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why
a prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a serious offense,
the testimony deserves faith and credit. So, also, the Court has repeatedly said that the lone testimony
of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction.
Same; Same; Same; Denial; The rule is that affirmative testimony is far weightier than a mere
denial, especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness.—The positive identification of
appellants as being the perpetrators of the crime effectively effaces
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712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Quiñanola
their alibi. The rule is that affirmative testimony is far weightier than a mere denial, especially
when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Moreover, alibi might be aptly considered only
when an accused has been shown to be in some other place at the crucial time and that it would have
been physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of
the commission of the crime.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, “carnal
knowledge,” unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the
vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.—In the context it is used in the Revised Penal
Code, “carnal knowledge,” unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily
require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. The crime of rape is deemed
consummated even when the man’s penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female organ or, as once
so said in a case, by the “mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating
the sexual act.”
Same; Same; Same; “Frustrated Rape”; As the Revised Penal Code presently so stands, there is no
such crime as frustrated rape.—Let it be said once again that, as the Revised Penal Code presently so
stands, there is no such crime as frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita, the Court has explicitly
pronounced. Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line
of cases (People vs. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People vs. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People vs. Royeras, G.R.
No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People vs. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58
SCRA 505), We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips
of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People vs.
Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559; People vs. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States vs. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434)
because not all acts of execution was performed. The
713
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 People vs. Quiñanola
offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account
the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it
is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Until Congress sees it fit to define the term frustrated rape and thereby
penalize it, the Court will see its continued usage in the statute book as being merely a persistent lapse
in language.—The Court is not unaware that Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, has retained the provision penalizing with reclusion perpetua to death an accused
who commits homicide by reason or on the occasion of an attempted or frustrated rape. Until Congress
sees it fit to define the term frustrated rape and thereby penalize it, the Court will see its continued
usage in the statute book as being merely a persistent lapse in language.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; Each co-conspirator is responsible not only for the rape committed
personally by him but also for the rape committed by the other as well.—Each appellant is liable for two
counts of consummated rape on account of a clear conspiracy between them shown by their obvious
concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. Each of them, therefore, is responsible
not only for the rape committed personally by him but also for the rape committed by the other as well.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Aid of Armed Men;The fact alone that a malefactor has
sported a firearm does not, by itself, militate to aggravate the crime.—Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code, includes among its enumeration of generic aggravating circumstances the fact that the crime is
committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. The fact alone, then,
that a malefactor has sported a firearm does not, by itself, militate to aggravate the crime.
Same; Same; Same; Abuse of Superior Strength; Republic Act No. 7659 should be deemed to have
already considered the circumstance of abuse of superior strength in qualifying the crime of rape to its
“heinous” character, rendering in that context, abuse of superior strength as an inherent element
thereof.—As regards appellant Quiñanola, the aggravating circumstance of his being a member of the
714
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Quiñanola
Philippine National Police would have exposed him to the penalty of death under the amendatory
provisions of Article 335 by Republic Act No. 7659, had this circumstance been properly alleged in the
information. The description by the trial court of appellants as being “powerfully, built, brawny and
mean-looking” as against the “short, slender, easily cowed” 15-year-old victim would not here warrant
a finding that abuse of superior strength has aggravated the commission of the crime. The law should
be deemed to have already considered this circumstance in qualifying the crime to its “heinous”
character, rendering in that context, abuse of superior strength as an inherent element thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Craft; Words and Phrases; “Craft, Fraud or Disguise,” Explained; The
fact that one of the accused has pretended to be a member of the New People’s Army does not necessarily
imply the use of craft, fraud or disguise, in the commission of the crime.—Craft, fraud or disguise is a
species of aggravating circumstance that denotes intellectual trickery or cunning resorted to by an
accused to aid in the execution of his criminal design or to lure the victim into a trap and to conceal
the identity of the accused. The fact that one of the appellants has pretended to be a member of the
New People’s Army does not necessarily imply the use of craft, fraud or disguise, in the commission of
the crime.
Same; Same; Same; Ignominy; Ignominy cannot be appreciated where there is nothing on record
that even remotely suggests that the accused so deliberately sought to leave the victim with bottoms bare
that she might be left alone in shame with only her T-shirt and brassieres on.—The Court does not
subscribe to the view of the trial court that accused-appellants have employed means which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the crime, particularly in “stripp(ing) the victim of her denim pants
and panties and then sending her home in this humiliating and distressing condition.” There is nothing
on record that even remotely suggests that accused-appellants so deliberately sought to leave Catalina
with bottoms bare that she might be left alone in shame with only her T-shirt and brassieres on.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Br. 14.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
715
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People vs. Quiñanola
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Glenn R. Canete for accused-appellants.
VITUG, J.:
In People vs. Orita,1 this Court has declared that the crime of frustrated rape is non-existent. The
pronouncement, notwithstanding, on 01 March 1996, more than six years after the promulgation of the
decision in Orita, the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of Cebu City, Branch 14, has convicted accused
Agapito Quiñanola y Escuadro and Eduardo Escuadro y Floro, herein appellants, of the crime of
frustrated rape, principally on the strength of People vs. Eriñia2 which this Court, in
the Orita decision, has considered to be a “stray” decision. The 1st March 1996 decision of the RTC of
Cebu City imposing upon each of the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua “of Forty (40) Years,”
has been brought up by them to this Court. The appeal opens up the whole case for review.
The information, dated 06 April 1994, charging the two accused with the crime of rape reads:
“That on or about the 5th day of March, 1994, at about 11:30 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at
Barangay Tangil, Municipality of Dumanjug, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed in having carnal knowledge of the offended party Catalina
Carciller, fifteen (15) years of age, against her will and consent.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”3
Already in force and effect at the time of the averred commission of the crime are the provisions of
Republic Act No.
_______________
1 184 SCRA 105.
2 50 Phil. 998.
3 Records, p. 1.
716
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Quiñanola
7659, amending the Revised Penal Code, which define and penalize rape, as follows:
“ART. 335. When and how rape is committed.—Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
 1. “1.By using force or intimidation;
2. “2.When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. “3.When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
“The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
“Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
“When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
death.
“When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
“When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
“The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. “1.when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. “2.when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. “3.when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. “4.when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. “5.when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) disease.
717
VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 717
People vs. Quiñanola
1. “6.when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine
National Police or any law enforcement agency.
2. “7.when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation.”
Duly assisted by counsel, the two accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During the trial that
ensued, the prosecution and the defense presented their respective versions of the case.
The story of prosecution was the first to be told. Catalina Carciller, her cousin 15-year-old Rufo
Ginto and another male companion named Richard Diaz, went to attend a dance at around ten o’clock
in the evening of 05 March 1994 in Sitio Bangag, Tangil, Dumanjug, Cebu. Catalina, born on 09
November 1978,4 was just then fifteen (15) years and four (4) months old. She was a student at the
Bito-on National Vocational School at Dumanjug, Cebu. About an hour later, they left the party and
were soon on their way home. The three unsuspecting youngsters stopped momentarily to rest at a
waiting shed beside the Tangil Elementary School. Accused Agapito Quiñanola a.k.a. “Petoy,” and
accused Eduardo Escuadro a.k.a. “Botiquil” who were both armed with guns suddenly turned up.
Quiñanola beaming his flashlight at the trio while Escuadro stood by focused his attention on Catalina.
Quiñanola announced that he and Escuadro were members of the New People’s Army (NPA).
Quiñanola instructed Escuadro to take care of the male companions of Catalina while he (Quiñanola)
held the latter at gunpoint.
Escuadro brought Diaz and Ginto outside the waiting shed area. He ordered the duo to lie face
down on the ground and then urinated at them. While Escuadro was fixing the zipper of his pants,
Diaz and Ginto were able to escape and ran away. Meanwhile, Quiñanola, with his gun pointed at
Catalina, forcibly brought her towards the nearby school. Catalina heard a gunfire but Quiñanola
assured her that it was only an
_________________
4Exh. B, Records, p. 39.
718
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Quiñanola
exploding firecracker. When Escuadro again showed up, Catalina asked about her two friends.
Quiñanola replied that he had ordered them to go home. Catalina begged that she herself be allowed
to leave. Pretending to agree, they walked the path towards the road behind the school. Then,
unsuspectingly, Quiñanola forced Catalina to sit on the ground. She resisted but Quiñanola, pointing
his gun at her, warned her that if she would not accede to what he wanted, he would kill her. Catalina
started to cry. Quiñanola told Escuadro to remove her denim pants. Catalina struggled to free herself
from Escuadro’s hold but to no avail. Escuadro ultimately succeeded in undressing her. Quiñanola
unzipped his pants and laid on top of her while Escuadro held her legs. Quiñanola “started to pump,
to push and pull”5 even as Catalina still tried desperately to free herself from him. She felt his organ
“on the lips of (her) genitalia.”6 When Quiñanola had satisfied his lust, Escuadro took his turn by
placing himself on top of Catalina. Catalina could feel the sex organ of Escuadro “on the lips of (her)
vulva”7 while he made a push and pull movement. Quiñanola, who stood by, kept on smoking a
cigarette.
Escuadro and Quiñanola scampered immediately after Catalina’s ordeal. Failing to find her pair of
pants and panty, Catalina was left wearing only her T-shirt and brassieres. Catalina just then sat
down, not knowing what to do, until she finally started to run home fearing that she might be followed.
Upon reaching home, Catalina went upstairs and, afraid that the culprits would still come after her,
hid herself behind the door. Baffled by Catalina’s strange behavior, her mother and her elder sister
took turns in interrogating her. Catalina finally said that she was raped but she would not reveal the
names of the persons who had committed the dastardly act because of their threat.
Guillermo Zozobrado learned from his wife, Catalina’s sister, that Catalina had been raped. He
promptly repaired to
__________________
5 TSN, Catalina Carciller, 29 July 1994, p. 10.
6 Ibid., p. 11.
7 Ibid.
719
VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 719
People vs. Quiñanola
the municipal hall of Dumanjug to report the crime. Policemen were immediately dispatched to the
Carcillers’ residence. Still in a state of shock, Catalina initially kept mum about it; later, when the
police officers returned at daytime, she was able to respond to questions and to disclose that “Petoy,”
referring to Agapito Quiñanola, and “Botiquil,” the other accused Eduardo Escuadro, were the persons
who ravished her. The officers later invited her to the police station to identify a suspect whom she
positively identified to be “Botiquil” or Eduardo Escuadro.
Living Case Report No. 94-MI-7,8 prepared by Dr. Tomas P. Refe, medico-legal officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation (“NBI”) of Region 7, Central Visayas, who conducted the physical
examination of Catalina on 07 March 1994, showed that there was “no evidence of extragenital physical
injury noted on the body of the Subject.” 9 The genital examination yielded the following findings on the
victim:
“Pubic hairs, fully grown, moderately dense. Labiae mejora and minora, both coaptated. Fourchette,
tense. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, moderately thick, wide, intact. Hymenal orifice, annular,
admits a tube 1.8 cms. in diameter with moderate resistance. Vaginal walls, tight and rogusities,
prominent.”10(Italics supplied.)
The report concluded that the hymenal orifice, about 1.8 cms. in diameter, was “so small as to preclude
complete penetration of an average-size adult penis in erection without producing laceration.”11
Against the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the accused, in their defense,
interposed alibi, ill motive on the part of an “uncle” of the complainant, and insufficient identification.
_________________
8 Exh. A or 1, Records, p. 13.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
720
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Quiñanola
Accused Agapito Quiñanola, a member of the Philippine National Police stationed at Naga, Cebu,
testified that it was his day-off on 05 March 1994. At about 8:30 a.m., he and his wife, Leticia, who had
just arrived in Naga from Cebu City, proceeded to the house of his parents in Panla-an, Dumanjug, to
attend to the construction of their unfinished house. Quiñanola helped Vidal Lañojan and Nicasio
Arnaiz in cementing the kitchen floor of their house. The work was finished at around 11:00 o’clock in
the evening. After Vidal and Nicasio had gone home, Quiñanola went to bed with his wife around
midnight until the following morning of 06 March 1994. He denied having been in the company of his
co-accused, Escuadro a.k.a. “Botiquil,” at any time during the whole day and night of 05 March 1994.
According to him, Guillermo Zozobrado, Catalina’s brother-in-law, concocted the rape charge to get
even with him because of an incident in August 1993 at a fiesta dance in upper Tangil, Panla-an, when
George Camaso, the husband of his sister Jinga, got into trouble with Samuel Escuadro. Quiñanola
tried to pacify George Camaso who was then drunk but Camaso suddenly hit him. He parried the blow
and slapped Camaso on the face. Zozobrado joined the fray and tried to hit Quiñanola but because
Zozobrado was drunk, he stumbled when Quiñanola had pushed him. 12 He admitted that he had no
misunderstanding of any kind with the complainant and her parents themselves.
Leticia Quiñanola, the wife of accused Agapito Quiñanola, testified to attest to her husband’s “good
moral character” and to corroborate his testimony. Leticia said that after the workers had left their
house at around midnight, she and appellant talked for a while and then made love. Vidal Lañojan,
the carpenter was presented to state that Quiñanola was at home helping the carpenters until “past
11:00 o’clock” on the night of the incident. Nicasio Arnaiz, a farmer and stone cutter added that work
in the Quiñanola house had started late in the morning of 05 March 1994 since they still waited for
Qui-
__________________
12TSN, Agapito Quiñanola, November 13, 1995, p. 16.
721
VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 721
People vs. Quiñanola
ñanola and his wife Pritsy to arrive. Work in the house, he said had stopped at about past 11:00 o’clock
that night.
Accused Eduardo Escuadro a.k.a. “Botiquil” declared that at about seven o’clock in the evening of
05 March 1994, he and Pablito Cuizon, Jr., went fishing in Tangil, Dumanjug, Cebu until about ten
o’clock that evening. After partaking of supper at around 11:30 p.m., they had a drinking spree and
went to bed at 12:00 midnight waking up at 6:30 a.m. the following day. He denied having been in the
company of Quiñanola and insisted that the rape charge had been the result of a mere mistaken
identity. Pablito Cuizon, Jr., corroborated Escuadro’s story about their being together up until they
parted company after a drinking spree.
The defense also presented the two police officers, PO2 William Beltran and SPO2 Liberato
Mascarinas, Jr., who took part in the investigation of the crime, and Margarito Villaluna, a suspect at
the early stages of the police investigation who was in the frequent company of the accused. According
to PO2 Beltran, barangay tanods Gilly and George Zozobrado reported the rape incident to him at
midnight of 05 March 1994. He entered the report in the “temporary blotter because the suspect was
unknown then.”13 Accompanied by the two tanods, he went to the residence of the victim and when he
asked Catalina if she was able to recognize the malefactors, she kept silent and continued crying. SPO2
Liberato Mascarinas, Jr., asserted that, in the early morning of 06 March 1994, Gilly and George
Zozobrado went to the police station and named “Pitoy Quiñanola, Margarito Villaluna and Batiquil or
Escuadro” as being the suspects in the rape incident. While on their way to the latter’s respective
residences, the team met Catalina Carciller and party who were themselves about to repair to the
police headquarters. Mascarinas asked Catalina about the identities of the rapists. She named “Pitoy
Quiñanola” but said she did not know the names of “the other persons” although she could recognize
them by face. Botiquil was later brought to the police station. Pitoy Quiñanola by
__________________
13TSN, PO2 William Beltran, 14 December 1994, p. 3.
722
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Quiñanola
that time had already gone to Naga. Margarito Villaluna declared that he had been in Panla-an, Negros
Oriental, from 05 March 1994 until 09 March 1994, harvesting corn. His sister, Mercy Villaluna,
testified that, in the morning of 06 March 1994, policemen in the company of barangay tanods,
including Gilly Zozobrado and his son Marcelo, came to their house looking for her brother Margarito.
Shortly after the group had left, another policeman, in the company of one Erwin Quirante also came
looking for her brother. The arrival of the policemen prompted her to verify from the Coast Guard
whether her brother had indeed left for Negros Oriental. She was told that her brother was in the boat
that departed for Negros in early dawn of 02 March 1994. Still unsatisfied with the result of her
queries, Mercy went to Guinholngan where she met Margarito.
Following the trial and submission of the case for decision, the court a quo,14 on 01 March 1996,
found the two accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of “frustrated rape” and sentenced
them accordingly; thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds guilty beyond reasonable doubt the two
accused Agapito ‘Petoy’ Quiñanola and Eduardo Escuadro, alias ‘Batiquil,’ as principals by direct
participation and indispensable cooperation of the frustrated rape of the complaining witness Catalina
‘Cathy’ Carciller, and considering the attendance in the commission of the crime of the six (6)
aggravating circumstances aforementioned, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, hereby
sentences these two accused individually to Reclusion Perpetua of Forty (40) Years, plus all the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the offended party civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00 each.
“The Court also hereby recommends that under no circumstance should the two accused be granted
parole or conditional or absolute pardon, in view of the extreme moral turpitude and perversity which
they exhibited in the commission of the crime—not until they shall have served at least thirty (30)
years of the full range of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua meted out against them in this
__________________
14Presided by Judge Renato C. Dacudao.
723
VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 723
People vs. Quiñanola
case. They should be interdicted for that length of time from the usual and normal liasons (sic) and
dealings with their fellowmen and their community so as to protect the latter from their pernicious
and insidious examples. This is the most generous and charitable recommendation that the Court can
make for these two malefactors, short of imposing upon them the supreme penalty of death, which the
Court in other times and conditions might have been compelled, as a matter of inexorable duty, to mete
out against them, in obedience to the implacable and peremptory demands and dictates of retributive
justice.
“Costs shall also be taxed against the two accused.
“SO ORDERED.”15
The trial court ruled that the accused were liable for the crime of frustrated rape “with an eye to
extending to the two accused the benefit of the principle that in case of doubt criminal justice naturally
leans in favor of the milder form of penalty”16 but that, because of the existence of “at least six (6)
aggravating circumstances,17 not offset by any mitigating circumstance,”18 the accused should each be
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It explained:
“Now, the crime of rape had it been consummated and had it been committed with the attendance of
the above-mentioned aggra-
_______________
15 Records, p. 121.
16 Ibid., p. 120.
17
1. (1)Use of deadly weapons to terrorize and intimidate the victim;
2. (2)Two persons committed the crime;
3. (3)One of the offenders was a member of the Philippine National Police;
4. (4)Fraud or disguise because appellant Quiñanola pretended that he was a member of the
New People’s Army to instill fear in the victim;
5. (5)Commission of the crime at nighttime; and
6. (6)Resort to ignominy in the commission of the crime by stripping the victim of her pants and
panty and sending her home in that “humiliating and distressing condition.”
18Ibid.
724
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Quiñanola
vating circumstances, with absolutely no offsetting mitigating circumstances, ought to be punished
with the mandatory penalty of death under the pertinent provisions of Sections 11 and 23 of Republic
Act No. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and further amplified the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the same code. But because the crime
committed here is ‘merely’ frustrated rape for the reasons heretofore discussed, attended by the
aforementioned six aggravating circumstances, not offset by even one mitigating circumstance, the
proper penalty to be imposed upon the two principals, the two accused herein, both co-conspirators, by
direct participation and indispensable cooperation, of the frustrated rape, should be one degree lower
than the indivisible afflictive penalty of death, which is also the indivisible afflictive penalty of
reclusion perpetua which, under Section 21 of the amendatory statute, shall range from twenty years
and one day to forty years.”19
In their appeal to this court, the two convicted accused interposed the following assignment of errors:
1. “I.THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE INCONSISTENCIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHICH IF THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED COULD HAVE
ALTERED THE DECISION IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
2. “II.THE COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS
CARCILLER EVEN IF THE SAME WERE CLOUDED WITH GRAVE
INCONSISTENCIES.
3. “III.THE COURT ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF ACCUSED AND
BY DISMISSING IT AS WEAK ALIBIS.
4. “IV.THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER THE REBUTTAL EVIDENCE OF
DEFENSE WITNESSES EVEN IF THE SAME WERE NOT CONTROVERTED.
5. “V.THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
POLICEMEN WHICH WERE UNCONTROVERTED AND WITH PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES.
_________________
19Records, p. 121.
725
VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 725
People vs. Quiñanola
 1. “VI.THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF FRUSTRATED RAPE “Q How did you resist?
AND OF SENTENCING THEM TO 40 YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA.” 20
“A I said I will not sit down.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court must again say that it has been continually guided by the principles “TRIAL PROS. NAZARENO:
(a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the “Q What did Agapito Quiñanola do, if any, when you resisted?
person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime which “A He pointed his gun to me.
usually involves only two persons, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot “Q When he pointed a gun at you, referring to Agapito Quiñanola, what did he say?
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. 21 Expectedly, courts “A He said that if I will not accede to what he wanted me to do and if I will shout, he
would scrupulously examine the testimony of the complainant with the thought always in mind that will kill me.
the conviction of the accused would have to depend heavily on the credibility of the offended woman. It
is not much different in this instance for, at bottom, appellants assail the credibility of the prosecution “Q What did you do when you heard those words coming from Agapito Quiñanola?
witnesses, particularly that of the complainant, in seeking a reversal of the judgment of conviction. “A I cried.
The doctrine, then again, is that the findings of the trial court on credibility are entitled to highest “Q When you cried what did Agapito Quiñanola do, if any?
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court has
“overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance” that could “A He ordered Eduardo Escuadro to remove my pants and panty.
have consequential effects. The stringency with which appellate tribunals have observed this rule is
predicated on the undisputed vantage of the trial court in the evaluation and appreciation of ________________
testimonial evidence.22
In assailing Catalina’s credibility, as against the assessment made by the trial court which has 23Appellants’ Brief, pp. 20-24.
described the victim’s testimony to be impressed with “candor, spontaneity and 727
VOL. 306, 727
___________________
MAY 5, 1999
20 Rollo, p. 188. People vs. Quiñanola
21 People vs. Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687. “COURT:
22 People vs. Sta. Ana, G.R. Nos. 115657-59, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 188.
“Q Why what were you wearing at that time?
726
“A Pants.
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“Q What kind of pants?
People vs. Quiñanola
naturalness,” appellants theorize that the sexual intercourse, if indeed true, could have only been “A Denim.
committed against Catalina in a sitting position, contrary to her declaration of having been made to “TRIAL PROS. NAZARENO:
lie on the ground because her T-shirt, marked Exhibit E, is “not tainted with mud at all especially the “Q Now, after Agapito Quiñanola ordered Eduardo Escuadro to remove your
back if she were made to lie down.” 23 The Court finds this so-called incongruity committed by the
complainant to be a feeble attempt to discredit her testimony. The Court is convinced of the sexual pants and panty what did Eduardo Escuadro do, if any?
assault made against her. Here follows the testimony of Catalina on this score: “A He did what Agapito Quiñanola commanded him.
“Q You said that you were forced by Agapito Quiñanola to sit down, where were you “COURT:
forced to sit down, in what particular place or area? “Q How about you, what what (sic) were you doing at that time?
“A Just behind the back of the school. “A I cried and tried to free myself.
“Q You were forced to sit down on the ground? “TRIAL PROS. NAZARENO:
“A Yes. “Q Now, when Eduardo Escuadro removed your pants and panty where was
“Q In effect did you sit down as ordered by him? Agapito Quiñanola and what did Agapito Quiñanola do?
“A I resisted. “A He unzipped his pants.
“COURT: “Q After that what happened?
 In effect, were your pants and panty removed by Eduardo Escuadro? “Q What did you feel when Eduardo Escuadro was already on top of you and made a
“A Yes. push and pull on you?
“Q Now, you said Agapito Quiñanola opened his fly or unzipped his pants, “A I held my breath.
when Agapito Quiñanola already unzipped his pants, what did he do? “Q Did you see the penis of Eduardo Escuadro?
“A He approached me and lay on top of me. “A No.
“Q When Agapito Quiñanola approached you and laid on top of you, what “Q Now, did you feel that the penis of Escuadro was inserted into your vagina?
did Eduardo Escuadro do? “A I felt it on the lips of my vulva.”24
“A He was holding on to my legs. The fact that she must have been lying down when violated has even more been made clear by the
defense on cross-examination. Thus:
“Q Then what happened after that?
“A Agapito Quiñanola started to pump, to push and pull. __________________
“Q What did you do when Agapito Quiñanola was already on top of you and
24TSN, July 29, 1994, pp. 8-11.
made a push and pull on you?
729
“A I struggled to free myself.
VOL. 306, 729
“Q After that what happened when Agapito Quiñanola was already on top of
MAY 5, 1999
you and kept on making a push and pull?
728 People vs. Quiñanola

728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED “Q Did you say any testimony in the direct that you were made to lie on the

People vs. Quiñanola ground at the time when you were raped by these two accused?
“A They pointed a gun at me and ordered me to lie down.
“A Eduardo Escuadro took his turn.
“Q Lie on the ground?
“Q What do you mean by took his turn, please specify what did Escuadro do? He did
“A Yes.”25
what Agapito had just done to you?
And on why her T-shirt was no longer soiled with mud when presented in court, Catalina creditably
“COURT: explained that when it was offered in evidence, she had already dusted and rid it of grass particles. At
“Q What did Agapito Quiñanola do to you actually? all events, whether appellants spent their lust on Catalina in a sitting position or lying down would
not be of any real moment for what remained clear, established rather convincingly by the prosecution,
“A He lay on top of me and did a push and pull movement.
was that appellants had forced carnal knowledge of the victim.
“TRIAL PROS. NAZARENO: The reliance being made by appellants on the affidavit of Catalina in order to discredit her is
“Q When Agapito Quiñanola lay on top of you and made a push and pull movement, do likewise futile. The Court has consistently ruled that discrepancies between the statement of an affiant
in an affidavit and those made on the witness stand do not necessarily downgrade testimonial
you mean to say that he inserted his penis into your vagina?
evidence. Ex parte affidavits are usually incomplete and frequently prepared by an administering
“A I felt something hard on the lips of my genitals. officer and cast in the latter’s language and understanding of what the affiant has said. Quite
“Q What is this something hard that you felt that touched the lips of your vagina or frequently, the affiant would simply sign the affidavit after it has been read to him or to her. 26
vulva? Not much differently could be said of Catalina’s identification of appellants as being her ravishers.
On the witness stand, Catalina explained that while she gave appellant Escuadro’s nickname
“A His organ or penis. “Botiquil” to the investigating police officer, the latter did not mention that name in the affidavit
“Q When Agapito Quiñanola unzipped his pants, did you see his penis? because, according to the officer, the affidavit was merely a “shortcut.” 27 In her testimony, she was
“A Yes. categorical that she had known appellants even before the rape incident. She

“Q You also said that Eduardo Escuadro took his turn and laid on top of you and made a ________________
push and pull on you, specifically what did Eduardo Escuadro do?
“A The same as Agapito did, he was doing the push and pull movement.
25 TSN, August 1, 1994, p. 5.
26 People vs. Banguis, G.R. No. 121626, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 279.
 27TSN, August 1, 1994, pp. 8-9.
730
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Quiñanola
knew that appellant Quiñanola was a policeman and a “popular maldito” (nasty) in the
locality.28 Catalina knew that appellant Escuadro, a resident of Punla-an not far from her own abode,
was commonly known as “Batiquil” (Botiquil). She could not have been mistaken in the identification
of the culprits since appellants themselves held a flashlight which they used that added to the
illumination shed by a fluorescent lamp and two bulbs on the side of a house only some meters away.
As regards the allegation of appellants that the testimony of Catalina contradicted in certain
respects that of prosecution witness Rufo Ginto, suffice it to say that the testimony of Rufo Ginto (who
was noted by the trial court not to be “an intelligent witness”29) was merely corroborative in nature
and neither dealt with the actual commission of the crime nor delved on material points.
Catalina’s candid and straightforward narration of the two sexual assaults perpetrated on her on
the night of the incident unmistakably deserves credence. It is unbelievable that a young barrio lass
would concoct a tale of defloration, publicly admit having been ravished and her honor tainted, allow
the examination of her private parts, and undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention
the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been raped and truly moved to protect and
preserve her honor, as well as to obtain justice, for the wicked acts committed against her. 30 There is
no plausible reason why Catalina should testify against appellants, imputing upon them so grave a
crime as rape if it did not happen. This Court has consistently held that where there is no evidence to
show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify falsely against
the accused or implicate him in a serious offense, the testimony deserves faith and credit. 31 So, also,
the
__________________
28 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
29 TSN, November 15, 1994, pp. 9-10.
30 People vs. Auxtero, 289 SCRA 75.
31 People vs. Banguis, supra.
731
VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 731
People vs. Quiñanola
Court has repeatedly said that the lone testimony of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to
sustain a conviction.32
The positive identification of appellants as being the perpetrators of the crime effectively effaces
their alibi.33The rule is that affirmative testimony is far weightier than a mere denial, especially when
it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. 34 Moreover, alibi might be aptly considered only when
an accused has been shown to be in some other place at the crucial time and that it would have been
physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the
commission of the crime.35
In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code, “carnal knowledge,” unlike its ordinary
connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that
the hymen be ruptured.36 The crime of rape is deemed consummated even when the man’s penis merely
enters the labia or lips of the female organ37or, as once so said in a case, by the “mere touching of the
external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act.” 38 In People vs. Escober,39 in
convicting a father of having raped twice his 11-year-old daughter, the Court has said:
“While the evidence may not show full penetration on both occasions of rape, the slightest penetration
is enough to consummate the offense. In fact, there was vulva penetration in both cases. The
__________________
32 People vs. Fuensalida, 281 SCRA 452.
33 People vs. Bajar, 281 SCRA 262.
34 People vs. Ramirez, 334 Phil. 305.
35 People vs. Timon, 281 SCRA 577.
36 6 WORDS AND PHRASES 273 citing Walker vs. State, 273 S.W. 2d 707, 711, 197 Tenn. 452.
37 People vs. Cabebe, G.R. No. 125910, May 21, 1998, 290 SCRA 543.
38 People vs. De la Peña, 233 SCRA 573 cited in People vs. Castromero, 280 SCRA 421.
39 281 SCRA 498.
732
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Quiñanola
fact that the hymen was intact upon examination does not belie rape for a broken hymen is not an
essential element of rape nor does the fact that the victim has remained a virgin negate the crime. What
is fundamental is that the entrance or at least the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum is proved. As in the case at bar, it can be said that there was penetration although
incomplete, and it was sufficient to prove carnal knowledge of a child under twelve years of age. A
medical examination is not an indispensable element in a prosecution for rape. The accused may be
convicted on the sole basis of complainant’s testimony if credible and the findings of the medico-legal
officer do not disprove the commission of rape.
There are no half measures or even quarter measures nor is their gravity graduated by the inches
of entry. Partial penile penetration is as serious as full penetration. The rape is deemed consummated
in either case in a manner of speaking, bombardment of the drawbridge is invasion enough even if the
troops do not succeed in entering the castle.”40 (Italics supplied.)
In another case People vs. Gabayron41 where the accused has been found guilty of raping his daughter,
then less than twelve years old, the Court has observed:
“Accused-appellant draws attention to the fact that based on the medico-legal findings, there is no
showing that his daughter’s hymen was penetrated, nor was there any evidence of injuries inflicted.
However, jurisprudence is well-settled to the effect that for rape to be consummated, rupture of the
hymen is not necessary, nor is it necessary that the vagina sustained a laceration especially if the
complainant is a young girl. The medical examination merely stated that the smallness of the vaginal
orifice only precludes COMPLETE penetration. This does not mean that rape has not been
committed. The fact that there was no deep penetration of the victim’s vagina and that her hymen was
intact does not negate rape, since this crime is committed even with the slightest penetration of a
woman’s sex organ. Presence of a laceration in the vagina is not an essential prerequisite to prove that
a victim has been raped. Research in medicine even points out that negative findings are of no
__________________
40 At pp. 506-507.
41 278 SCRA 78.
 733 “Q Since you did not spread your legs and Quiñanola was on top of you, did you not
VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 733 bother to pull your legs, kick the one holding it and pushed Quiñanola or do any
People vs. Quiñanola harm to him?
significance, since the hymen may not be torn despite repeated coitus. In fact, many cases of pregnancy
“A No, because I was already frightened considering that there were two of them and
have been reported in women with unruptured hymen. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ
merely, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, is sufficient to warrant they were armed.”45
conviction. What must be proven in the crime of rape is merely the introduction of the male organ into This testimony would indicate that Catalina, considering her struggle to free herself, understandably
the labia of the pudendum and not the full penetration of the complainant’s private part. As we held failed to notice whether her legs were spread apart or close together during her ordeal. What she did
in Baculi: ‘there could still be a finding of rape even if despite the repeated intercourse over a period of distinctly recall, however, was that Escuadro had kept holding both her legs when Quiñanola took her.
four years the complainant still retained an intact hymen without signs of injury.’ In the case at bench, Thus—
Summer’s testimony has established without a doubt that accused-appellant’s organ managed to come “Q At that time when he unzipped and your hands were free, did you not attempt to hold
into contact with her vagina, enough to cause her pain.”42 (Italics supplied.)
his penis forcibly so that he will refrain from raping you?
In its recent holding in People vs. Echegaray,43 the Court has declared that “a mere knocking at the
doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused’s penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full “A I was not able to think of that because of my fear, and besides that Eduardo Escuadro
entry into the victim’s vagina is not required to sustain a conviction.” was holding on to both my legs.
The trial court, in convicting appellants only of frustrated rape, ruled that there was no “conclusive
“Q Now, if Eduardo Escuadro was holding on both your two legs how was Quiñanola
evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party”44 in that (a) Catalina had admitted
that she did not spread her legs and (b) the medico-legal officer’s findings showed she did not sustain able to place himself on top of you?
any extragenital injuries and her hymenal orifice was so small that an erect average-size penis would
not have completely penetrated it without causing laceration. It would seem that the trial court failed ________________
to consider Catalina’s testimony in its entirety, she testified:
“Q And when he mounted on top of you Escuadro was holding on to your two feet and
45TSN, August 29, 1994, p. 10.
735
all the time that he (Quiñanola) was making a push and pull on you, Escuadro was
VOL. 306, 735
holding on to your two feet?
MAY 5,
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 1999

People vs. Quiñanola People vs. Quiñanola

“A Yes. “A It was because Eduardo Escuadro had already released my hands and
“COURT: Quiñanola was the one holding on to it already, afterwards Eduardo
“Q Your two feet? Escuadro transferred to hold both my legs.46
Let it be said once again that, as the Revised Penal Code presently so stands, there is no such crime as
“A Yes. frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita,47 the Court has explicitly pronounced:
“ATTY. CREER: “Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he
“Q Now, in other words since your two feet were held and Eduardo Escuadro was actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have
been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last
waving (sic [moving]) slightly to your left as you demonstrated your two feet act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line of cases (People vs.
became closer to each other, it could not be spread? Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People vs. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People vs. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April
“A I was still struggling at that time to free myself and I do not know whether my legs 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People vs. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have
set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
were spread out or not. penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
“Q Did you spread your legs? organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
“A No. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People vs. Tayaba, 62
Phil. 559; People vs. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States vs. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434) because not
all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape
and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be even remotely suggests that accused-appellants so deliberately sought to leave Catalina with bottoms
committed. bare that she might be left alone in shame with only her T-shirt and brassieres on.
“Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People vs. Eriñia, 50 Phil. The absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime punishable by two (2)
998 [1927] where We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive evidence of indivisible penalties, such as reclusion perpetua to death would justify even without any mitigating
penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it appears that this is a ‘stray’ decision circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. Likewise, We are aware of Article The trial court has ordered appellants to each pay the offended party civil indemnity in the amount
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 (dated September 12, 1960) and of P50,000.00. Prevailing jurisprudence55 likewise allows the victim to have an award of moral
Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the damages for having evidently undergone mental, physical and psychological sufferings. The civil
penalty of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or liability of appellants being predicated on delict, is solidary.56
on the occasion thereof. We are of the opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead WHEREFORE, appellants Agapito Quiñanola y Escuadro and Eduardo Escuadro y Floro are each
provision. The Eriñia case, supra, might have prompted the law-making body to include the crime of found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of consummated rape and accordingly,
frustrated rape in the amendments introduced by said laws.” 48 sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case. Said appellants are ordered to pay jointly
The Court is not unaware that Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and severally Catalina Carciller the sum of P100,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delictu for the two
has retained the provision penalizing with reclusion perpetua to death an accused who commits counts of consummated rape plus P60,000.00 moral damages. Costs against appellants.
homicide by reason or on the occasion of an attempted or frustrated rape. Until Congress sees it fit to SO ORDERED.
define the term frustrated rape and thereby penalize it, the Court will see its continued usage in the Romero (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
statute book as being merely a persistent lapse in language. Each of the two accused-appellants guilty of two (2) consummated rapes.
Each appellant is liable for two counts of consummated rape on account of a clear conspiracy
between them shown by their obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. Notes.—When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect
Each of them, therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him but also for all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. (People vs. Vitor, 245 SCRA 392 [1995])
the rape committed by the other as well.49 Considering the inbred and the consequent revulsion of a Filipina against airing in public things
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, when rape is that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that the victim would reveal and admit the ignominy she
committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two persons, the crime is punishable by reclusion had undergone if it was a mere fabrication. (People vs. Roncal, 272 SCRA 242 [1997])
perpetua to death. Even while the information has failed to allege the use of a deadly weapon in the
commission of the rape, appellants can, nonetheless, be held accountable under that provision since
the information has likewise averred that the “above-named accused,” referring to the two appellants,
have conspiratorially committed the crime.
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, 50 includes among its enumeration of generic aggravating
circumstances the fact that the crime is committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure
or afford impunity. The fact alone, then, that a malefactor has sported a firearm does not, by itself,
militate to aggravate the crime. As regards appellant Quiñanola, the aggravating circumstance of his
being a member of the Philippine National Police would have exposed him to the penalty of
death51 under the amendatory provisions of Article 335 by Republic Act No. 7659, had this
circumstance been properly alleged in the information. The description by the trial court of appellants
as being “powerfully, built, brawny and mean-looking” as against the “short, slender easily cowed” 15-
year-old victim would not here warrant a finding that abuse of superior strength has aggravated the
commission of the crime. The law should be deemed to have already considered this circumstance in
qualifying the crime to its “heinous” character rendering in that context, abuse of superior strength as
an inherent element thereof. Neither may nighttime be considered an aggravating circumstance in the
absence of proof of its having been deliberately sought out by appellants to facilitate the commission of
the offense.52 Craft, fraud or disguise53 is a species of aggravating circumstance that denotes
intellectual trickery or cunning resorted to by an accused to aid in the execution of his criminal design
or to lure the victim into a trap and to conceal the identity of the accused. The fact that one of the
appellants has pretended to be a member of the New People’s Army does not necessarily imply the use
of craft, fraud or disguise, in the commission of the crime. Finally, the Court does not subscribe to the
view of the trial court that accused-appellants have employed means which added ignominy to the
natural effects of the crime, particularly in “stripp(ing) the victim of her denim pants and panties and
then sending her home in this humiliating and distressing condition.” 54 There is nothing on record that
 VOL. 541, DECEMBER 19, 2007 265 Same; Same; Same; Qualifying circumstances must be proven beyond reasonable doubt as the
crime itself—it cannot be considered on the strength of evidence which merely tends to show that the
People vs. Aviles victim was probably surprised to see the assailant trying to get inside the jeepney.—Qualifying
G.R. No. 172967. December 19, 2007.* circumstances must be proven beyond reasonable doubt as the crime itself. It cannot be considered on
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.CHRISTOPHER AVILES, accused-appellant. the strength of evidence which merely tends to show that the victim was probably surprised to see the
Criminal Law; Witnesses; Witnessing a crime is one novel experience which elicits different assailant trying to get inside the jeep-
reactions from witnesses for which no clear-cut standard of behavior can be drawn, and this especially 267
true if the assailant is physically near the witness.—Neither are we persuaded by Aviles’ argument that VOL. 541, DECEMBER 19, 2007 267
it is more consistent with human nature that a person’s attention would be caught up in the ongoing
struggle, rather than in trying to recognize the attacker. Different people react differently to a given People vs. Aviles
situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, ney. As discussed above, Arenas’ shout can be interpreted in different ways. In fact, prosecution
startling or frightful experience. Witnessing a crime is one novel experience which elicits different witness Dr. Ramon Gonzales even testified that it was possible that Aviles and Arenas were having a
reactions from witnesses for which no clear-cut standard of behavior can be drawn. This is especially fight.
true if the assailant is physically near the witness. In People v. Aquino, 329 SCRA 247 (2000), we even APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
held that: There is no standard rule by which witnesses to a crime may react. Often, the face and body The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from the memory of The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
witnesses x x x. Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
Same; Slight Physical Injuries; Where the prosecution proved the act of stabbing but failed to
prove intent to kill, which is an element of both frustrated and attempted homicide, and neither was CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
there proof either as to the extent of the injury or the period of inca-
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the
_______________ Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Branch 46, convicting accused-appellant
Christopher Aviles y Molina Alias “Topeng” (Aviles) of the crimes of murder and slight physical
*THIRD DIVISION. injuries.
266 Aviles was charged with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder in two separate Informations,
allegedly committed as follows:
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Aviles Criminal Case No. U-12011
pacity for labor or of the required medical attendance, the accused can only be convicted of slight
physical injuries.—We also agree with the trial court that the crime proven to have been committed by xxxx
Aviles in stabbing Contapay is only slight physical injuries. While the prosecution sufficiently “That on or about 7:30 o’clock in the evening of June 19, 2002 at Alexander St., Poblacion, Urdaneta
established that Aviles stabbed Contapay, it failed to prove intent to kill, which is an element of both City, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
frustrated and attempted homicide. On the contrary, the evidence appears to show that Aviles stabbed with a sharp bladed and pointed knife, with intent to kill, and treachery, did then and there willfully,
Contapay on the knee only for the purpose of preventing the latter from further helping Arenas. Since unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab Danilo Arenas, inflicting upon him the following:
there was no proof either as to the extent of the injury or the period of incapacity for labor or of the
required medical attendance, Aviles can only be convicted of slight physical injuries. _______________
Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Elements.—There is treachery when the
following requisites are present: (1) the employment of means, methods, or manner of execution to Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Danilo B. Pine and
1
ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory action on the part of the victim and Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok, concurring. Rollo, pp. 3-16.
(2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method or manner of execution. 2 Penned by Presiding Judge Tita Rodriguez-Villarin. CA Rollo, pp. 23-44.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present at the inception of 268
the attack—if the attack is continuous and treachery was present only at a subsequent stage and not at
the inception of the attack, it cannot be considered.—For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present 268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
at the inception of the attack. If the attack is continuous and treachery was present only at a People vs. Aviles
subsequent stage and not at the inception of the attack, it cannot be considered. Rather than being an
—Wound, hook-shaped 26.5 x 4cms., left thigh middle 3rd antero-
expression of surprise at the presence of Aviles as held by the Court of Appeals, the shout “Apaya” or
“Apay aya,” when translated as “Bakit ba,” connotes confusion as to why the person to whom it is spoken medial aspect.
is acting the way he is acting. This implies the lapse of several moments between the commencement —Chopping wound 15 x 2.5 cm., left leg upper 3rd below knee.
of the attack and Arenas’ shouting.
—Chopping wound 4 x 1 cm., right leg middle 3rd anterior aspect. Meanwhile, Contapay, realizing the lack of doctors in Sacred Heart Hospital, proceeded to the
Villasis Polymedic Hospital and Trauma Center to have his left knee treated. Contapay stayed in the
—Wound semilunar 3 x 0.5 cm., right foot dorum. hospital until the following day, incurring
—Hacking wound 3 cm. x 0.5 cm. left hand dorsum, near wrist.
resulting to “Irreversible shock due to arterial hemorrhage due to severe branch of fermoral artery,” _______________
which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY To Art. 249, Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659.” 4According to the Court of Appeals, apaya means why.
270
Criminal Case No. U-12385
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“That on or about 7:30 o’clock in the evening of June 19, 2002 along Alexander Street, Poblacion, People vs. Aviles
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named medical and hospital expenses.5 Arenas, however, died at 2:00 in the morning of 20 June 2002. The
accused, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there, willfully, Certificate of Death stated that the immediate cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest and the
unlawfully and feloniously stab and hit NOVELITO CONTAPAY y CALICA, inflicting upon him a stab antecedent cause was hemorrhagic shock due to stab wound on the medial side of the thigh.
wound in the left knee, the accused having thus commenced by overt act the commission of the crime Also on 20 June 2002, SPO2 Dismaya and other policemen went to the residence of Aviles in Jungle
of Murder but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the felony by reason Town, San Vicente, Urdaneta City, but did not find him there. Aviles’ mother accompanied the
of some cause or accident other than accused[‘s] spontaneous desistance, to the damage and prejudice policemen to the house of Aviles’ father-inlaw, where they finally saw Christopher Aviles. They invited
of said Novelito Contapay y Calica. Aviles to the police station in connection with the stabbing incident. Aviles denied participation in the
CONTRARY to Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.”3 stabbing incident and claimed that it was his half-brother, Cresencia, who stabbed Arenas.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on 19 June 2002 at around 7:30 p.m., Novelito Contapay Upon the request of Police Superintendent Jessie Lorenzo Cardona, Chief of Police of the Urdaneta
(Contapay) was driving his passenger jeep along Alexander Street, Poblacion, Urdaneta City, at less City Police Station, City Health Physician of Urdaneta City, Dr. Ramon B. Gonzales, Jr. conducted an
than ten kilometers per hour due to heavy traffic in front of Magic Mall. His lone passenger, the autopsy on the body of Arenas. The Autopsy Report 6 reads:
SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
_______________ —Plaster cast on left lower extremity.
Upon removing cast:
3Id., at pp. 23-24. —Sutured wound left thigh middle 3rd antero-medial aspect.
Upon opening sutured wound:
269
Wound hook-shaped 26.5 x 4 cm.
VOL. 541, DECEMBER 19, 2007 269 —Sutured wound left leg upper 3rd below knee
People vs. Aviles Upon opening sutured wound:
deceased Danilo Arenas, was seated beside him. Arenas suddenly shouted apaya.4 Contapay turned Chopping wound 15 x 2.5 cm.
his head and saw Christopher Aviles stabbing Arenas. Aviles’ upper body was already inside the jeep —Sutured wound right leg middle 3rd anterior aspect.
with one foot on the running board. Contapay halted the jeep and tried to help Arenas by holding the Upon opening sutured wound:
hand of Aviles, but the latter stabbed Contapay on his left knee. Contapay pushed Aviles who ran —Chopping wound 4 x 1 cm.
away. Contapay alighted from the jeepney, but he was not able to chase Aviles because of his bleeding
left knee. Contapay noticed that Arenas was already unconscious, and he brought the latter to the _______________
Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital.
SPO2 Asterio Dismaya, SPO2 Ernesto Contaoi, SPO1 Rodolfo Febreo, PO3 Dennis Torres and a 5Evidenced by Official receipts; Exhibits “K-10” to “K-12”; Records, pp. 130-132.
certain SPO2 Cachuela investigated the stabbing incident. SPO2 Dismaya and his companions went 6Exhibit “B,” Records, p. 7.
to the Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital but they were not able to interview Danilo Arenas. A nurse 271
informed SPO2 Dismaya that it was Novelito Contapay who brought Arenas to the hospital. SPO2 VOL. 541, DECEMBER 19, 2007 271
Dismaya interviewed Contapay who was still in the premises.
Thereafter, the policemen went to the scene of the incident. SPO2 Dismaya was able to talk to People vs. Aviles
Rufina Calvero, a balut vendor, who told him that she noticed Aviles and the latter’s half-brother, —Sutured wound right foot, dorsum.
George Cresencia (Cresencia), pass by her going southwards. Rufina Calvero also told SPO2 Dismaya Upon opening sutured wound
that her husband had a drinking spree with Aviles and Cresencia. —Sutured wound semilunar 3 x 0.5 cm.
SPO2 Dismaya was also able to talk to Patricio Oliveros who informed him that Aviles created —Sutured wound left hand dorsum, near wrist.
trouble at the parking lot for tricycles by chasing other tricycle drivers, but was pacified by Cresencia. Upon opening sutured wound:
—Hacking wound 3 cm. x 0.5 cm.
 SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
Severed branch of femoral artery.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Irreversible shock due to arterial hemorrhage due to severed branch of femoral artery.
During the trial, the father of Danilo Arenas, Victorio, testified that he and his wife, Lagremas, spent
P52,524.00 for the treatment of Danilo Arenas at the Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital, P50,000.00
during the wake, and another P38,000.00 paid to the Enriquez Funeral Home. These amounts were
supported by official receipts.
The widow of Danilo Arenas, Sophia, testified that her late husband was a businessman who used
to earn around P9,000.00 a month. Besides Sophia, Danilo Arenas is survived by his three children:
Mark Joseph (10 years old), Mary Jane (9 years old), and Jeremias (6 years old).
Accused-appellant Christopher Aviles, who testified that he was a shoe repairer and fish vendor,
claimed that at around 5:00 p.m. on 19 June 2002, he, George Cresencia, Romeo Aquino, Maria Aquino
and several other persons were drinking in front of the Magic Mall in Urdaneta City. He allegedly left
the group to accompany someone to the municipal hall, after which, he returned to the place where the
group was drinking. He then told Cresencia that he was going home, but the latter asked him to stay
and continue drinking with them. After 30 minutes, he finally left in order to go home. While he was
walking towards the public market near Rocca Theater, he saw Cresencia running towards him.
Cresencia, who had blood stains on his t-shirt, told him that he (Cresencia)
272
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Aviles
stabbed someone. Aviles revealed that he did not ask Cresencia who the victim was and proceeded on
his way home. He did not tell his mother or his wife that Cresencia stabbed someone. The following
day, on 20 June 2002, at 6:00 a.m., he was arrested and brought to the municipal hall.
Renton and Criselda Aviles, who are Christopher Aviles’ brother and sister-in-law, testified that
on 19 June 2002, Cresencia arrived drunk in their house at around 9 p.m., with blood stains on his
shirt. Cresencia allegedly told them that he was involved in a fight and that he might have stabbed
someone. Cresencia spent the night at their house and left the following morning.
On 21 July 2003, the trial court rendered a Joint Decision convicting Christopher Aviles of the
crimes of murder and slight physical injuries, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused CHRISTOPHER AVILES Y MOLINA
ALIAS “TOPENG”—
1. CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-12011:
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
and is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim of Danilo Arenas in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), to pay funeral expenses of Thirty Eight Thousand Pesos
(P38,000.00), to pay medical expenses of Fifty Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty Four Pesos
(P52,524.00), to pay P50,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages, all without subsidiary
imprisonment;
2. CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-12385:
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES and is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) days of Arresto Menor, and is hereby ordered to pay
medical expenses of Six Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Eight Pesos (P6,898.00);
and to pay the costs.
273
VOL. 541, DECEMBER 19, 2007 273
People vs. Aviles
The accused shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment in the service of
his sentence.”7
Aviles appealed to this Court. Conformably with this Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,8 we resolved9 to
transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeals.
On 23 December 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with modification the
trial court’s Decision, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision dated July 21, 2003 is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant Christopher Aviles y Molina is ordered to pay the heirs of Danilo Arenas the
amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.” 10
Aviles now comes before us, assigning the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED.11
Christopher Aviles argues that the identification made by the lone eyewitness, Contapay, is doubtful.
Contapay testified that when he heard the deceased Arenas shout “Apaya,” he
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 43-44.
8 G.R. No. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
9 CA Rollo, p. 100.
10 Rollo, p. 15.
11 CA Rollo, p. 59.
274
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Aviles
turned his head and saw Aviles stabbing the deceased several times. He tried to hold Aviles but was,
however, stabbed on the knee, prompting him to kick Aviles out of the jeepney. According to Aviles,
when confronted with a situation like this, it is more consistent with human nature that a person’s
attention would be caught up in the on-going struggle and confusion, rather than in trying to recognize
the attacker. Aviles points out that he and Contapay did not know each other prior to the stabbing
incident and, thus, the only basis of Contapay’s memory of Aviles’ appearance was the span of time
when the incident transpired.
Aviles further calls our attention to the investigation conducted by prosecution witness SPO2
Dismaya, who had interviewed balut vendor Rufina Calvero, tricycle driver Romeo Aquino, and Aviles’
half-brother Cresencia. Aviles asserts that these three people were never presented in court to affirm
their statements.
We do not find Aviles’ assertions to be sufficient to reverse the outcome of the case.
Aviles may be correct that when the prosecution has at its disposal disinterested witnesses to the
alleged crime but fails to produce them at the trial, such failure, although not fatal, seriously weakens
the case against the accused.12However, that is not the case here. The statements of Rufina Calvero,
Romeo Aquino and George Cresencia, while instrumental in the identification of Christopher Aviles
for the purpose of his arrest, were neither necessary nor beneficial for the identification of Aviles in
trial.
SPO2 Dismaya’s testimony centered on his investigation of the crime which led to the arrest of
Aviles. This investigation started with SPO2 Dismaya’s interview of Contapay who knew neither the
name nor the residence of Aviles. SPO2 Dismaya and his companions thus proceeded to the scene of
the crime, which led to their discovery of witnesses who indi-
_______________
12United States v. Tacubanza, 18 Phil. 436, 438 (1911).
275
VOL. 541, DECEMBER 19, 2007 275
People vs. Aviles
cated Aviles’ presence therein and possible participation in the stabbing incident. This eventually led
to the arrest of Aviles who was identified by Contapay as the person who stabbed him and Arenas.
During the trial, when Aviles was already in custody, testimonies merely pointing to a “possibility”
that Aviles participated in the stabbing incident was supplanted by the eyewitness account of Contapay
that Aviles himself had performed the stabbing. The trial court found Contapay’s testimony to be
credible. It is settled that the appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court
considering that the latter is in a better position to determine the same, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain
facts of value have been plainly overlooked, which if considered, might affect the result of the case.
It must also be considered that, as elucidated by the statements of Aviles himself, he and Contapay
had never met before the stabbing incident. Contapay cannot therefore, could not have been impelled
by ill will or evil intent in testifying against Aviles whom he did not know prior to the incident.
Neither are we persuaded by Aviles’ argument that it is more consistent with human nature that
a person’s attention would be caught up in the ongoing struggle, rather than in trying to recognize the
attacker. Different people react differently to a given situation, and there is no standard form of
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.
Witnessing a crime is one novel experience which elicits different reactions from witnesses for which
no clear-cut standard of behavior can be drawn. This is especially true if the assailant is physically
near the witness.13 In People v. Aquino,14 we even held that:
_______________
13 People v. Avedaño, 444 Phil. 338, 356; 396 SCRA 309, 323 (2003).
14 385 Phil. 887, 906; 329 SCRA 247, 264 (2000).
276
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Aviles
“There is no standard rule by which witnesses to a crime may react. Often, the face and body
movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from the
memory of witnesses x x x.”
This finding of credibility on the part of Contapay likewise obliges us to affirm the ruling of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals finding Aviles guilty of slight physical injuries. Contapay’s testimony
was the evidence presented to prove not only the killing of Arenas, but likewise the stabbing of
Contapay himself who had tried to help Arenas.
We also agree with the trial court that the crime proven to have been committed by Aviles in
stabbing Contapay is only slight physical injuries. While the prosecution sufficiently established that
Aviles stabbed Contapay, it failed to prove intent to kill, which is an element of both frustrated and
attempted homicide. On the contrary, the evidence appears to show that Aviles stabbed Contapay on
the knee only for the purpose of preventing the latter from further helping Arenas. Since there was no
proof either as to the extent of the injury or the period of incapacity for labor or of the required medical
attendance, Aviles can only be convicted of slight physical injuries.
Anent the second assigned error, Aviles claims that the trial court erred in its finding that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime, as Contapay did not testify
as to how the attack on Arenas was initiated.
There is treachery when the following requisites are present: (1) the employment of means,
methods, or manner of execution to ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory
action on the part of the victim and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method or
manner of execution.15
The Court of Appeals ruled that the fact that Arenas shouted “Apaya” (perhaps a shortened form
of apay aya, which is more accurately translated in Filipino as bakit ba) showed that he
was probably surprised to see Aviles trying to get inside the jeepney which was moving slowly because
of heavy traffic. The testimony of Contapay that after hearing Arenas shout “Apaya,” he saw Aviles
already stabbing Arenas, showed that the attack was sudden and unexpected.
We agree with Aviles on this score. Although Contapay testified that he turned around immediately
when the deceased shouted “Apaya,” he did not testify as to how the attack was initiated. Also,
considering that he was driving the jeepney when Arenas was attacked, he could not even have known
how the attack was initiated.
For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present at the inception of the attack. If the attack is
continuous and treachery was present only at a subsequent stage and not at the inception of the attack,
it cannot be considered.16Rather than being an expression of surprise at the presence of Aviles as held
by the Court of Appeals, the shout “Apaya” or “Apay aya,” when translated as “Bakit ba,” connotes
confusion as to why the person to whom it is spoken is acting the way he is acting. This implies the lapse
of several moments between the commencement of the attack and Arenas’ shouting.
Qualifying circumstances must be proven beyond reasonable doubt as the crime itself.17 It cannot
be considered on the strength of evidence which merely tends to show that the victim
was probably surprised to see the assailant trying to get inside the jeepney. As discussed above,
Arenas’ shout can be interpreted in different ways. In fact, prosecution witness Dr. Ramon Gonzales
even testified that it was possible that Aviles and Arenas were having a fight:
Atty. Florendo: You also found a wound on the left wrist of the cadaver, Doctor?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Would you consider it as a defensive wound, Doctor?
A: Yes sir.
Q: When you said it was a defensive wound, it is possible that the victim and the
assailant was having a fight?
A: Yes sir.18
Neither does the fact that Arenas was in between Contapay and Aviles conclusively prove the presence
of treachery. While this situation proved fatal to Arenas who had nowhere to run, there was no evidence
that this situation was deliberately and consciously adopted to ensure safety of the malefactor from
defensive or retaliatory action on the part of the victim. As we have similarly held in People v. Latag,19
“Furthermore, no other circumstance attendant to the shooting supports the allegation that
appellant carefully and deliberately planned the killing in a manner that would ensure his
safety and success. There were no indications that he had deliberately chosen the place, the time or
the method of killing. In addition, there was no showing that the meeting between him and the victim
had been planned. The fact that the former was seen by Atienza behind some shrubs after a gunshot
had rung out does not, by itself, compel a finding of treachery. Such a finding must be based on
some positive proof, not merely on an inference drawn more or less logically from a
hypothetical fact. Apparent from the assailed Decision of the trial court is that it simply surmised
that treachery had attended the killing.”
As no qualifying circumstance attended the killing, Christopher Aviles can only be convicted of
homicide. Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal.20 There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances proven in the case at bar, the penalty should be applied in its medium period of 14 years,
8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty will be selected from the above range, with the minimum penalty being selected
from the range of the penalty one degree lower than reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor (six
years and one day to 12 years). We find the indeterminate sentence of 10 years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum to 14 years and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum to be sufficient.
Finally, the absence of qualifying circumstances also warrants the deletion of the exemplary
damages.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. The Court finds accused-
appellant Christopher Aviles y Molina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE, and
is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and one day of prision
temporal as minimum to 14 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The penalty imposed
by the courts a quo for the crime of slight physical injuries as well as all civil indemnities imposed by
the courts a quo are AFFIRMED, with the exception of the P25,000.00 imposed on accused-appellant
Aviles by way of exemplary damages, which is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinezand Reyes, JJ., concur.
Nachura, J., On Leave.
Judgment modified.
Notes.—Moral damages, which include physical suffering and mental anguish, may be recovered
in criminal offenses resulting in physical injuries or the victim’s death. (People vs. Salcedo, 273 SCRA
473 [1997])
If there was an intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wounds sustained by the victim
were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injuries. (Palaganas
vs. People, 501 SCRA 533[2006])
G.R. No. 173479. July 12, 2007.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN CABBAB, JR., accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Witnesses; Finding no facts and circumstances of weight and substance that would
otherwise warrant a different conclusion, the Supreme Court accords the highest respect to the trial court’s
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses.—To be sure, the trial court which had the unique opportunity to
observe at first hand the demeanor of witnesses Belmes and Agbulos and asses whether they are telling the
truth or not, gave full faith and credence to their testimonies. Finding no facts and circumstances of weight
and substance that would otherwise warrant a different conclusion, the Court accords the highest respect to
the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of these witnesses.
Same; Same; Paraffin Tests; The negative findings of a paraffin test do not conclusively show that a
person did not discharge a firearm at the time the crime was committed.—Appellant likewise capitalizes on
the results of the paraffin test showing that both his hands yielded no trace of gunpowder residue.
Unfortunately for appellant, the results of the paraffin test would not exculpate him. The negative findings
of said test do not conclusively show that a person did not discharge a firearm at the time the crime was
committed. This Court has observed that it is quite possible for a person to discharge a firearm and yet
exhibit no trace of nitrates: when, e.g., the assailant fired the weapon while wearing gloves or where the
assailant thoroughly washes his hands thereafter. As George de Lara of the NBI stated in his testimony
before the trial court, if a person applies cosmetics on his hands before the cast is taken, gunpowder residue
would not be found in that person’s hands. He also testified that certain factors could contribute to the
negative result of a paraffin test such as perspiration, humidity or the type of firearm used. In fine, a finding
that the paraffin test on the person of the appellant yielded negative results is not conclusive evidence to
show that he indeed had not fired a gun.
Same; Same; Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an
oath deserve full faith and credence.—Appellant has not shown any evidence of improper motive on the part
of prosecution witnesses Belmes and Agbulos that would have driven them to falsely testify against him. In
fact, appellant himself declared that he did not know of any reason why Belmes and Agbulos would implicate
him in the crime. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an
oath deserve full faith and credence.
Denials and Alibis; Where there is even the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene,
the defense of alibi will not hold water.—Interjected as a defense is alibi, appellant claiming that he went to
Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his friends in the morning of April 22, 1988 and returned home only
at around 5:30 p.m. For alibi to prosper, however, the hornbook rule requires a showing that the accused was
at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Where there is even the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of
alibi will not hold water.
Robbery with Homicide; Elements; In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to
rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery—it is immaterial that death would supervene by
mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons
are killed.—To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution is burdened to
prove the confluence of the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence
or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by
intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is
committed. In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or that
the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the special complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Same; Penalties; In the application of a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, like that for
Robbery with Homicide, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that “when in the commission of
the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.”—The
prescribed penalty for Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659
(Death Penalty Law), is reclusion perpetua to death. In the application of a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, like that for Robbery with Homicide, Article 63 of the RPC provides that “when in the
commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied.” In this case, the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime, as
appellant’s attack on the victims who were then unsuspectingly walking on their way home was sudden and
done without any provocation, thus giving them no real chance to defend themselves.
Same; Same; Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the
robbery is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains
fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the
robbery.—The Court feels, however, that the two courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate
crime of attempted murder for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted homicide or attempted murder
committed during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in this case, is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with
Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number
of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery.
Same; Same; Damages; In People v. Abrazaldo, 397 SCRA 137 (2003), the Court laid down the doctrine
that where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined because of the absence of
receipts to prove them, temperate damages may be awarded in the amount of P25,000.00.—With respect to
actual damages, Winner’s father, Vidal Agbulos, testified that he spent a total of P50,000.00 as burial
expenses but he failed to present receipts therefor. In People vs. Abrazaldo, 397 SCRA 137 (2003), we laid
down the doctrine that where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined
because of the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate damages may be awarded in the amount of
P25,000.00. Thus, in lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 must be
awarded to the heirs of Winner because although the exact amount was not proved with certainty, it was
reasonable to expect that they incurred expenses for the coffin and burial of the victim. We, however, cannot
grant the same to the heirs of Eddie Quindasan for their failure to testify on the matter. Finally, appellant
is obliged to return to the heirs of Winner Agbulos the amount of P20,000.00 he had taken from Winner.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the decision1 dated February 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968 which affirmed, with modification, an earlier decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 687, finding appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr.,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Attempted Murder and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo 2which modified the provisions of the Rules of Court
insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed by
the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was earlier3 referred to the CA,
whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 01978, for appropriate action and disposition.
The Case
In the court of origin, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr., along with his cousin-in-law Segundino Calpito, was
charged with the crimes of Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery in an Information4 alleging,
as follows:
“That on or about April 22, 1988, in Sitio Kayawkaw, Barangay Kimmalasag, Municipality of San Isidro,
Province of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused
with the intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, while armed with a firearm (not-recover),
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shot from ambush WINNER AGBULOS and EDDIE QUINDASAN,
consequently inflicting thereby multiple gunshot wounds on the different parts of their bodies, killing Winner
Agbulos on the spot and causing the death of Eddie Quindasan shortly thereafter, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, shot William Belmes, said accused having commenced the
execution of Murder by overt acts but were unable to perform all the acts of execution, which would have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence thereof, due to alertness of victim William Belmes to roll and
poor marksmanship of the accused thus prevented his death, then and there willfully and unlawfully and
feloniously, with the intent of gain, take, steal and carry away the money of Winner Agbulos in the amount
of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00), Philippine currency.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstance of: (1) uninhabited place.”
On arraignment, appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and accused Segundino Calpito separately entered their pleas
of “Not Guilty” to the crimes charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, in the course of which the
prosecution presented the oral testimonies of M/Sgt. Godofredo Tubadeza, a police investigator at Camp
Villamor, Bangued, Abra; PO William Belmes, a member of the Integrated National Police at the Villaviciosa
Police Station; Vidal Agbulos, father of the victim Winner Agbulos; Dra. Leona Garcia-Beroña, medico-legal
officer who conducted an autopsy on the body of Winner Agbulos; and Dr. Godofreco Gasa, a physician at the
Abra Provincial Hospital.
For its part, the defense presented the appellant himself; accused Segundino Calpito; and George de
Lara, a Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The Evidence
The People’s version of the incident is succinctly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in
its Appellee’s Brief,5 to wit:
“In the morning of 22 April 1988, father and son Vidal Agbulos and Winner Agbulos, together with Eddie
Quindasan, Felipe Abad and Police Officer (PO) William Belmes, went to Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro,
Abra to attend a “fiesta” celebration. Upon arrival in the area, they found out that the fiesta celebration was
already over, thus, they decided to go home in Villaviciosa, Abra. Since it was already lunchtime, the group
took their lunch at Sitio Turod, located in the same area of Barangay Kimmalasag. After taking their lunch
and on their way home, they were met by accused-appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Segundino Calpito who
invited them to play “pepito,” a local version of the game of “russian poker.”
Only Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan played “pepito” with the group of accused-appellant. Winner
Agbulos played the dealer/banker in the game while accused-appellant and Segundino Calpito acted as
players therein. Around 3:00 o’clock p.m., PO William Belmes told Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan
that they should be going home after three (3) more deals. About 3:30 p.m., Winner Agbulos’s group wrapped-
up the game and were set for home together with his group. Winner Agbulos won the game.
While walking on their way home from Sitio Turod, PO William Belmes, who was behind Winner Agbulos
and Eddie Quindasan picking-up guava fruits from a tree, saw accused-appellant, accused Segundino Calpito
and a companion running up a hill. Suddenly, he heard gunshots and saw Winner Agbulos and Eddie
Quindasan, who were then walking ahead of the group, hit by the gunfire.
By instant, PO William Belmes dove into a canal to save himself from the continuous gunfire of accused-
appellant. PO William Belmes ran towards Vidal Agbulos and Felipe Abad, who were walking behind the
group, and informed the two that Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan were ambushed by accused-
appellant and Segundino Calpito. The three (3) proceeded to the crime scene where they saw the dead body
of Winner Agbulos together with Eddie Quindasan whom they mistook for dead. The three sought help from
the police authorities of Pilar, Abra and returned to the scene of the crime where they found Eddie Quindasan
who was still alive and who narrated that it was Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Segundino Calpito who ambused them
and took the money, estimated at P12,000.00, of Winner Agbulos which he won in the card game. Eddie
Quindasan was brought to the Abra Provincial Hospital but died the following day. Postmortem examination
of Winner Agbulos showed that the cause of his death was “cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hemorrhage
due to multiple gunshot wounds.” On the other hand, Eddie Quindasan’s cause of death was “cardio Appellant, on the other hand, filed on December 18, 2006 his supplemental brief on the lone assigned
respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock due to multiple gunshot wounds.” error, that:
For the defense, appellant himself took the witness stand claiming that in the morning of April 22, 1988, he “THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI
went to Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his friends Romeo, Demetrio and Restituto, all surnamed INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE VERSION IS MORE
Borreta. He stayed there almost the entire day and left only at around 5:00 p.m. He arrived home in CREDIBLE AND SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.”
Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra at around 5:30 p.m. He declared that his co-accused Calpito was not with him Insisting that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant pleads for
that day. He likewise averred that he did not know prosecution witnesses PO William Belmes and Vidal acquittal. He avers that the witnesses for the prosecution failed to positively identify him as the perpetrator
Agbulos nor did he know of any motive for them to testify against him. of the crime as they did not actually see him shoot the victims. Appellant also relies on the results of the
Appellant’s co-accused Calpito denied having committed the crimes charged. He testified that at around paraffin test showing that he was negative of gunpowder nitrates.
8:30 a.m. of April 22, 1988, he went fishing at Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra until 4:00 a.m. of the following The appeal must fail.
day. Appellant’s contention that the witnesses for the prosecution failed to identify him as the perpetrator of
George de Lara, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, testified that he conducted an examination on the paraffin the crime is belied by the testimony of PO William Belmes, who was with the victims when the incident
cast taken from appellant to determine the presence of gunpowder residue or nitrates on appellant’s hands. happened. We quote from the transcripts of the stenographic notes:
The results of the said examination showed that appellant was negative of nitrates. He opined that certain William Belmes on Re-direct Examination
factors may affect the result of the test such as perspiration, wind velocity, humidity or the type of gun used.
He also theorized that a paraffin test would yield a negative result if fertilizers or cosmetics are applied to FISCAL FLORES:
the hands before the cast is taken. Q. Mr. Witness, when you gave your statement on April 30, 1988, exactly eight (8) days after
The Trial Court’s Decision the incident when the incident wherein you were investigated upon still very very fresh in
In a decision6 dated August 26, 1997, the trial court acquitted Segundino Calpito but found appellant Juan
Cabbab, Jr. guilty of two crimes, i.e. (1) robbery with double homicide and (2) attempted murder. your mind (sic). Now, in your statement which you gave to the investigator, Pat. Tubadeza,
Dispositively, the decision reads: you stated that you saw the persons shot at Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan and after
“WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder
the two (2) had fell down then you also likewise saw them shot at you at the time you were
with robbery or better put, robbery with double homicide and attempted murder as defined in Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 294 of the same Code or robbery with double homicide defined and rolling to the ground. Do you affirm and confirm this statement of yours which you
penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Same Code with aggravating circumstance of uninhabited subscribed before Fiscal Ricarte Valera?
place with no mitigating circumstances and sentences him with the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of
the killing of Winner Agbulos and for robbing the said victim after killing him and for the killing of Eddie ATTY. YANURIA:
Quindasan. The court likewise finds the accused Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Your Honor, it is misleading, we object, in so far as the shooting of Eddie Quindasan and
attempted murder defined and penalized in Art. 48 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. These
Winner Agbulos was not seen. He only saw the persons who were firing at him namely:
offenses attended by the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place with no mitigating circumstances
and sentence him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto Juan Cabbab and Segundino Calpito.
mayoras minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as maximum. COURT:
He is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims P50,000.00 for each of them plus P20,000.00 also for
each of them as actual expenses and finally, the amount of P100,000.00 also for each of them as moral and In his testimony before the court he testified before the court that he saw Juan Cabbab and
exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this suit. Segundino Calpito shot at Eddie Quindasan and Winner Agbulos. Reform the question.
Accused Segundino Calpito is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
FISCAL FLORES:
SO ORDERED.”
The records of the case were then transmitted to this Court on automatic review. As stated at the onset Q. However, you saw these two (2) accused, Juan Cabbab and Segundino Calpito shoot at
hereof, the Court, in its Resolution7 of January 17, 2006 and pursuant to its ruling in People v. you?
Mateo,8 referred the case and its records to the CA for appropriate action and disposition, whereat it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968. A. Yes, sir.
In a decision dated February 22, 2006, the CA modified the trial court’s decision and found appellant guilty Q. Will you tell the court if how far were these two (2) accused when they were firing at you?
of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The CA also affirmed appellant’s conviction, as well as the penalty imposed, for the separate crime A. Eight (8) meters, sir.
of attempted murder. Q. And therefore what time is it when they were firing at you?
From the CA, the case was then elevated to this Court for automatic review. In its Resolution 9 of A. If I’m not mistaken it was 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon.10
September 20, 2006, the Court resolved to require the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs.
In a Manifestation dated November 16, 2006, the OSG, in behalf of appellee People, informed the Court xxx xxx xxx
that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief and was merely adopting its appellee’s brief before the CA as William Belmes on cross-examination
its supplemental brief.
ATTY. YANURIA:
Q. In other words, it was you being shot out by Segundino Calpito and Juan Cabbab but you
did not see them shoot at Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan?
A. I saw Juan Cabbab and Segundino fire at Winner Agbu-los and Eddie Quindasan (the
witness using the word “banat”) and when they already fell down, they continued firing
attempt and in my case I rolled and they also fired at me.11
The above testimony adequately showed that Belmes was able to look at and see appellant at the time he
perpetrated the crime. To our mind, Belmes could not have made a mistake with respect to appellant’s
identity, what with the fact that just a few hours before the incident, it was even appellant himself who
invited Belmes and his group to play poker. For sure, Belmes had a face-to-face encounter with appellant
before the assault and thus would be able to unmistakably recognize him especially because at the time of
the attack, Belmes was just eight (8) meters away from appellant and conditions of visibility were very good
at the time of the incident as it was only around 4:00 in the afternoon. Jurisprudence recognizes that it is
the most natural reaction of victims of violence to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime
and to observe the manner in which the crime was committed.12
Belmes’ testimony was corroborated by that of Vidal Agbulos who was also with the group when the
robbery and shooting took place. Again, we quote from the transcripts of stenographic notes:
Vidal Agbulos on direct examination
FISCAL FLORES:
Q. What did you do next when Felipe Abad informed you again that your son was already
killed and Eddie Quindasan was injured?
A. Even if he told me about that I just went ahead.
Q. What happened next when he told you that?
A. When I went ahead I saw Juan Cabbab took the wallet from my son.
COURT:
Q. At that time, Winner Agbulos was already prostrate on the ground?
A. Yes, sir, my son was lying on the ground facing down.13
Clearly, then, Vidal Agbulos positively identified appellant as the person who robbed his son, Winner, of his
winnings. Just like Belmes, Agbulos could also not have been mistaken as to appellant’s identity considering
that it was appellant who personally approached Agbulos’ group and invited them to play poker just a few
hours prior to the commission of the crime. Further, Agbulos testified that he was familiar with appellant as
he would often see him in a cockpit in San Isidro, Abra.
To be sure, the trial court which had the unique opportunity to observe at first hand the demeanor of
witnesses Belmes and Agbulos and asses whether they are telling the truth or not, gave full faith and
credence to their testimonies. Finding no facts and circumstances of weight and substance that would
otherwise warrant a different conclusion, the Court accords the highest respect to the trial court’s evaluation
of the credibility of these witnesses.
Appellant likewise capitalizes on the results of the paraffin test showing that both his hands yielded no
trace of gunpowder residue. Unfortunately for appellant, the results of the paraffin test would not exculpate
him. The negative findings of said test do not conclusively show that a person did not discharge a firearm at
the time the crime was committed. This Court has observed that it is quite possible for a person to discharge
a firearm and yet exhibit no trace of nitrates: when, e.g., the assailant fired the weapon while wearing gloves
or where the assailant thoroughly washes his hands thereafter.14 As George de Lara of the NBI stated in his
testimony before the trial court, if a person applies cosmetics on his hands before the cast is taken, gunpowder
residue would not be found in that person’s hands. He also testified that certain factors could contribute to
the negative result of a paraffin test such as perspiration, humidity or the type of firearm used. In fine, a
finding that the paraffin test on the person of the appellant yielded negative results is not conclusive evidence
to show that he indeed had not fired a gun.
Too, appellant has not shown any evidence of improper motive on the part of prosecution witnesses
Belmes and Agbulos that would have driven them to falsely testify against him. In fact, appellant himself
declared that he did not know of any reason why Belmes and Agbulos would implicate him in the crime.
Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive,
their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve full
faith and credence.15
Interjected as a defense is alibi, appellant claiming that he went to Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra to
visit his friends in the morning of April 22, 1988 and returned home only at around 5:30 p.m. For alibi to
prosper, however, the hornbook rule requires a showing that the accused was at another place at the time of
the perpetration of the offense and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission.16 Where there is even the least chance for the accused to be present at the
crime scene, the defense of alibi will not hold water.17
Here, the evidence shows that Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra where appellant allegedly visited his
friends was only 30 minutes drive from Barangay Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra where the crime was
committed. In short, appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the physical impossibility
of his presence at the scene of the crime on the date and time of its commission.
The weakness of appellant’s alibi is heavily underscored by the fact that appellant was positively
identified by witnesses Belmes and Agbulos who were with the victims at the time of the incident. For sure,
appellant’s positive identification as the perpetrator of the crime renders his defense of alibi unworthy of
credit.18
The crime committed by appellant was correctly characterized by the appellate court as Robbery with
Homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) which reads:
“Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons—Penalties.—Any person guilty of robbery
with the use of violence against any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.”
To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
confluence of the following elements:
1. “(1)the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
2. (2)the property taken belongs to another;
3. (3)the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and
4. (4)by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.”19
In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during
or after the robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide.20
Here, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant, having lost to Winner
Agbulos in the game of poker, intended to divest Agbulos of his winnings amounting to P20,000.00. In pursuit
of his plan to rob Agbulos of his winnings, appellant shot and killed him as well as his companion, Eddie
Quindasan.
The prescribed penalty for Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
7659 (Death Penalty Law), is reclusion perpetua to death. In the application of a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, like that for Robbery with Homicide, Article 63 of the RPC provides that “when in the
commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied.” In this case, the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime, as
appellant’s attack on the victims who were then unsuspectingly walking on their way home was sudden and
done without any provocation, thus giving them no real chance to defend themselves.
However, considering that the crime was committed in 1988 or prior to the effectivity of R.A. No.
7659,21 the trial court and the CA correctly imposed upon appellant the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Court feels, however, that the two courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate crime
of attempted murder for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted homicide or attempted murder
committed during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in this case, is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with
Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number
of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery.22
We now come to the award of damages.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence, the heirs of Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan are each
entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, 23 to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00,24 and to exemplary damages in the sum of P25,000.00.25
With respect to actual damages, Winner’s father, Vidal Agbulos, testified that he spent a total of P50,000.00
as burial expenses but he failed to present receipts therefor. In People vs. Abrazaldo,26 we laid down the
doctrine that where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined because of the
absence of receipts to prove them, temperate damages may be awarded in the amount of P25,000.00. Thus,
in lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 must be awarded to the heirs of
Winner because although the exact amount was not proved with certainty, it was reasonable to expect that
they incurred expenses for the coffin and burial of the victim. We, however, cannot grant the same to the
heirs of Eddie Quindasan for their failure to testify on the matter. Finally, appellant is obliged to return to
the heirs of Winner Agbulos the amount of P20,000.00 he had taken from Winner.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 22, 2006 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00968 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. 1.Appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. 2.Appellant is hereby ordered to return to the heirs of Winner Agbulos the amount of P20,000.00
representing the amount stolen from him. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Winner
Agbulos the following: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages, (c)
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c) P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
3. 3.Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Eddie Quindasan P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
another P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

1. 4.For reasons herein stated, appellant is ACQUITTED of the separate crime of attempted murder
against the person of PO William Belmes.

Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Corona and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On Leave.
Judgment affirmed with modifications.
Notes.—In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, it is not necessary to identify who among
the conspirators inflicted the stab wound on the victim. (People vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494 [2003])
In robbery with homicide, while the intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life, the
homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery; There is no such felony of robbery with homicide
through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. (People vs. De Jesus, 429 SCRA 384 [2004])
 VOL. 362, AUGUST 9, 2001 473
People vs. Padilla
G.R. Nos. 138472-73. August 9, 2001.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.PO3 NOEL PADILLA, accused-appellant.
Witnesses; The testimony of a witness would only need to be congruent on important and relevant
points concerning the principal occurrence.—The testimony of a witness would only need to be
congruent on important and relevant points concerning the principal occurrence; slight inconsistencies
might even serve to strengthen the sincerity of the witness and would tend to prove that his testimony
has not been rehearsed.
_______________
*THIRD DIVISION.
474
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Padilla
Same; Names; The weight of the eyewitness account should be on the fact that the witness saw the
accused commit the crime and was positive on the latter’s physical identification, rather than in being
able to identify him by his appellation or name.—Appellant would make an issue over an entry in the
medical record of Casaul from the Jose Reyes Medical Hospital which stated “unknown assailant” to
the question of whether the victim knew the identity of his attacker. The matter was easily explained,
however, by Casaul himself who said that he had known appellant only by face until the case was filed.
The weight of the eyewitness account should be on the fact that the witness saw the accused commit
the crime and was positive on the latter’s physical identification, rather than in being able to identify
him by his appellation or name.
Judgments; The efficacy of a decision should not necessarily be impaired by the fact that its writer
only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial.—Appellant would impugn the
credibility of Judge Silva in rendering the assailed decision on the ground that it was not he, but Judge
Baclig, who heard the testimony of Casaul. This kind of argument had been dismissed a good number
of times by the Court. The efficacy of a decision should not necessarily be impaired by the fact that its
writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial. The fact that the judge
who penned the decision did not hear the case in its entirety would hardly be a compelling reason to
thereby jettison his findings and conclusions as long as the entire record was made available to him
for his perusal.
Criminal Law; Murder; Witnesses; Motive; When an accused is positively identified by the victim
himself, lack of motive on the part of the transgressor becomes close to being inconsequential.—Appellant
contends he has had a clean record and no strong motive to commit the crimes imputed against him.
The absence of motive for committing the crime does not preclude a conviction, for it is not unknown
for persons to be killed or assaulted even for no reason at all. More importantly, when an accused is
positively identified by the victim himself, lack of motive on the part of the transgressor becomes close
to being inconsequential.
Same; Same; Same; The failure of the prosecution to present a particular witness does not give
rise to the presumption that “evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced” where that
evidence is at the disposal of both parties or where the only object of presenting the witness would be to
provide corroborative or cumulative evidence.—Appellant alleges that the failure of the prosecution to
present three of the witnesses listed in the informations, as well as two others mentioned by Casaul,
475
VOL. 362, AUGUST 9, 2001 475
People vs. Padilla
gives rise to the presumption that if the testimony of these witnesses were given before the court,
their declaration would have been adverse to the prosecution. The settled rule is that the prosecution
determines who among its witnesses are to testify in court, and it is neither for the accused nor the
court to override that prerogative. Corollarily, the failure of the prosecution to present a particular
witness does not give rise to the presumption that “evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced” where that evidence is at the disposal of both parties or where the only object of presenting
the witness would be to provide corroborative or cumulative evidence.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Treachery is evident when the accused
suddenly positioned himself at the back of the unsuspecting victim, pointed his gun at him and, without
any warning, promptly delivered the fatal shots.—Murder is the unlawful killing of any person when
qualified by any of the circumstances listed under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Treachery,
aptly alleged in the information, is one of such qualifying circumstances. Its elements are: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. Here, treachery is
evident when the accused suddenly positioned himself at the back of the unsuspecting victim, pointed
his gun at him and, without any warning, promptly delivered the fatal shots. There was no way the
victim could have defended himself, taken flight, or avoided the assault.
Same; Frustrated Murder; Words and Phrases; A felony is frustrated when the offender performs
all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator; For the crime of murder,
the frustrated stage is reached only if the wound inflicted would have been mortal.—There is, however,
reason to modify the lower court’s ruling on the second crime of frustrated murder. A felony is
frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator. For the crime of murder, the frustrated stage is reached only if the wound inflicted
would have been mortal. The examining physician has declared that the wounds suffered by the victim
damaged no vital tissues and, without complications, would not have killed him.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Br. 2.
476
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Padilla
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edmundo S. Cari-an for accused-appellant.
VITUG, J.:
PO3 Noel Padilla has appealed from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 2, in
Criminal Cases No. 5095 and No. 5096, convicting him of murder and frustrated murder.
The twin indictments against appellant for murder and frustrated murder, respectively, read:
“That on or about November 19, 1991, in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal
violence upon Apolinario Belmonte by then and there shooting him with a firearm on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Apolinario Belmonte.” 2
“That on or about November 19, 1991, in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon
Jesus Casaul, Jr., by shooting him with a firearm on the right cheek, thereby inflicting upon the said
Jesus Casaul, Jr., physical injury which could have caused his death, thus the said accused performing
all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason or cause independent of his will, that is, the timely and able
medical attendance rendered upon Jesus Casaul, Jr., which prevented his death, to the damage and
prejudice nevertheless of the said offended party.” 3
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 70.
2 Rollo, p. 70.
3 Rollo, p. 70.
477
VOL. 362, AUGUST 9, 2001 477
People vs. Padilla
Noel Padilla, a member of the Philippine National Police since 1985, pleaded not guilty to both charges.
The cases were jointly tried and heard, initially, by Judge Vivencio S. Baclig and, later, by Judge
Lorenzo R. Silva, Jr.
The facts found by the trial court that led to the conviction of the accused were largely sourced from
the eyewitness account of Jesus Casaul, Jr., the victim in the frustrated murder charge.
On 18 November 1991, around 11:30 p.m., Jesus Casaul, Jr., and his cousin Apolinario Belmonte,
the victim in the murder charge, were partaking of beer and watching a video cassette recording on
television inside the Mango Grove restaurant at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center (PRPC) in
Morong, Bataan, when PO3 Noel Padilla together with several companions, among them Nonong
Navarette, arrived at the scene.
Navarette approached Casaul and Belmonte. An ensuing conversation turned into a heated
argument. Navarette went back to his group while Padilla, at first appearing to aim his gun at the
television set, suddenly went behind Belmonte and shot him twice at the back of his head. Padilla next
pointed his gun at Casaul who raised his hands pleading for dear life. The accused, unmindful of the
plea, shot Casaul twice, hitting him on the cheek and at the back of his ear.
Belmonte and Casaul were rushed by the owner of the restaurant to the PRPC Hospital. Belmonte
did not make it. Dr. Roberto Luneta who conducted the post mortem examination attributed the death
of Belmonte to the gunshot wound that had penetrated his skull. Casaul survived. Dr. Benjamin
Dacula, the medical officer who attended to Casaul at the PRPC Hospital said that the gunshot wounds
sustained by Casaul did not pose any threat to his life. While he had to undergo an operation for the
removal of the slugs embedded on his cheek and the right side of his vertebrae, Dr. Antonio Rafael, the
surgeon, stated there was, however, no vital tissue damaged and the wounds suffered by the victim,
without complications, would not have been enough to kill him.
The defense placed the accused and nine others to the witness stand but, except for the accused,
no one attested to the events that
478
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Padilla
had transpired on the night of the shooting. Padilla’s own account was synthesized by the trial
court, viz:
“On November 18, 1991, he was with Lt. Nieves conducting a mobile patrol. On their way to the
municipal station, they received a radio call from the station. When they reached the station they were
informed that there was a stabbing incident at the PRPC. He was ordered by Lt. Nieves to look into
the incident. He had then the handgun which he kept in his possession even if he was not on duty. He
changed to civilian clothes and together with members of the family of the victims of the stabbing
incident proceeded to the PRPC hospital. At the hospital, Noel saw SPO4 Lagundino, the investigator,
who told him that he saw PO3 Tongia at the Shakey’s party at the mess hall of the PRPC. When he
went to the party, he saw PO3 Tongia who was with some youngster whom he has not met before.
Tongia offered him a mug of beer. He left Shakey’s at 10:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less. PO3
Tongia invited him together with the young boys to the picnic grove.
“Upon arriving at the picnic grove, they went directly to the long table. Tongia ordered softdrinks
for the young boys and for Tongia and him two (2) bottles of beer. There were two tables near the store
occupied by different groups.
“A betamax was playing very loud, but he was not interested in the show.
“When they ran out of cigarette’s, he went to the store to buy. He was joking with the saleslady.
Afterwards he introduced himself to a person who must have noticed his gun. This man introduced
himself as Pines Simon. After he returned to the long table, a group of four (4) males arrived, a group
which he saw at Shakey’s. One of them occupied the seat near Tongia and two (2) occupied the seats
near him. He was introduced to the three who were homosexuals. After exchanging jokes, he left the
picnic grove for the hospital after telling Tongia about it. Nothing unusual happened before he left for
the hospital.
xxx xxx xxx
“When he was at the hospital at the lobby when he saw Casaul and his cousin at around 1:00 or
2:00 o’clock being transferred in an ambulance he heard their names from SP02 Lagundino. He has
not met the victims before.
“On cross-examination, Noel Padilla declared that he was assigned at the Regional Special Action
Force in Camp Olivas in December 1985 up to March 1987. He was the platoon sergeant of the
company. They were
479
VOL. 362, AUGUST 9, 2001 479
People vs. Padilla
assigned at civil disturbance control and went to infiltrated areas. This is an elite force of the police.
xxx xxx xxx
“He confirmed that he arrived at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening at the PRPC and after ten (10)
or fifteen (15) minutes, he proceeded to Shakey’s. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
“It was only after he had a few drinks of beer with Navarette and his companions and with Tongia
that he decided to proceed to the picnic grove and Shakey’s was about to close. Only he, Tongia and
three youngsters who were not homosexuals proceeded to the picnic grove. A few minutes later Nonong
Navarette and his three companions arrived. The three (3) went to their table while Nonong Navarette
went to the store. This was the second time he met Navarette; the first time was at the police station.
“He was not irritated by the loud volume of the betamax; he did not draw his firearm and aimed it
at the betamax. He did not notice if Navarette went to the table occupied by Apolinario Belmonte and
Jesus Casaul. He denied that Navarette complained to him about Apolinario Belmonte. From 10:00 7Rollo, p. 100.
p.m. to 12:00 midnight he was at the picnic grove drinking beer and conversing with Tongia. He does 481
not know of any reason why Jesus Casaul should point to him as the one who fired and killed Apolinario VOL. 362, AUGUST 9, 2001 481
Belmonte. He does not know of any reason why Jesus Casaul pointed to him as having fired a gun at
him except that he was the policeman present. He decided to transfer his gun to the front of his pants People vs. Padilla
because according to Navarette someone quarreled with them the night before. “A careful examination of the record will show that Casaul’s testimony is not inconsistent with the
“On re-direct, Noel Padilla declared that he never met Jesus Casaul, Jr., and Apolinario Belmonte testimony of Dr. Rafael. Casaul was telling the truth when he said that he saw the appellant shoot
before the incident.”4 him. It must be noted that Casaul and his cousin Apolinario Belmonte were occupying a square table
The trial court gave scant value to the testimony of the accused which it described to be which were just beside the table being occupied then by appellant and his friends (pp. 14-15, TSN May
“uncorroborated, negative and evasive in character.” 5 The court held the shooting of Belmonte and 19, 1994). For this reason, Casaul could clearly observe and see the table where appellant was when
Casaul to have been attended by treachery. The trial court concluded thusly: the crimes were committed (p. 15, ibid.):
“WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for the murder of Apolinario Belmonte and the frustrated “Q How about your cousin Apolinario Belmonte, what was his position when Noel
murder of Jesus Casaul, Jr., having been
Padilla was already behind Apolinario Belmonte?
_______________ “A His back is on Noel Padilla.
“Q And then what happened please demonstrate.
4 Rollo, pp. 73-75. “A He fired two shots. (The witness is slightly in bending position with his two hands
5 Rollo, p. 77.
clutched).
480
“ATTY. CARIAN:
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
And the hand is less than one foot from the head of Apolinario Belmonte.
People vs. Padilla
proved beyond reasonable doubt, the accused Noel Padilla is hereby sentenced as follows: “ATTY. BANZON:
“In Crim. Case No. 5095 for the offense of frustrated murder against Jesus Casaul, Jr., the accused Showing the position of Noel Padilla holding a gun.
Noel Padilla is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years, one (1) month and eleven
“Q And then what happened?
(11) days prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days reclusion
temporal as maximum with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the offended party “A He fired two shots, ‘Bang, Bang’ (in a split second).
in the amount of P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus the costs of suit. “Q What was the position of your cousin Apolinario Belmonte when hit?
“In Crim. Case Nc. 5096 for the murder of Apolinario Belmonte, the accused Noel Padilla is “A He fell on his right.
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Apolinario Belmonte the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs of “ATTY. BANZON:
suit.” The alleged position of accused in line with the witness is around 45°.
In this appeal, Appellant raises the following issues: “COURT:
“WHETHER THE TESTIMONY OF JESUS CASAUL, JR. IS TRUSTWORTHY AND RELIABLE, and
“WHETHER THE NON-PRESENTATION OF WITNESSES LISTED IN THE INFORMATIONS Make of record that when the witness demonstrated the position of the accused he
(SHOULD) BE CONSTRUED AGAINST THE PROSECUTION.”7 was not directly behind Apolinario Belmonte.
In its attempt to support the first argument, the defense pointed to what it considered to be “ATTY. CARIAN:
contradictions in the testimony of Casaul. Thus, Casaul declared on direct examination that he was
facing the accused when the latter shot him; however, Dr. Rafael said that based on the location of the Around 40°.
wounds, the triggerman must have been at Casaul’s right side. Casaul stated that he was still conscious “ATTY. BANZON:
when he was shot on the right cheek, a claim which was not in accord with the opinion of Dr. Rafael “Q Was there any conversation that transpired before the shot was fired between
that while the wound on Casaul’s cheek did not render the victim unconscious, the wound, however,
on his ear must have did. Apolinario Belmonte and the accused?
The defense argument has been convincingly refuted by the Solicitor General; he states: “A There was none.
482
_______________ 482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6 Rollo, p. 80. People vs. Padilla
“Q How about you granting that I am you, what was my position then?
“A After he fired his gun to my cousin, he pointed his gun at me and I raised my hands
to stop him, and I said: ‘Huwag.’ (Witness demonstrating by turning his head
towards his right towards the direction of the accused who went near him and then
fired at him on his face. He slumped down on the table). (emphasis supplied) (pp.
15-16, TSN May 19, 1994)
“Clearly then, Casaul was not lying when he said that he saw the appellant shoot him and
Apolinario Belmonte. He testified that when appellant approached the back of Apolinario and shot the
latter, he turned his head to his right where he saw appellant. Hence, Dr. Rafael corroborates the
testimony of Casaul that appellant was on the right side of Casaul when Casaul was shot and hit on
the right cheek.
“Significantly, Dr. Rafael likewise confirms that Casaul could still identify appellant when he was
shot by appellant. As stressed by Dr. Rafael, the first gunshot wound on Casaul’s cheek could not
render him unconscious. Therefore, Casaul could still see appellant shooting him (p. 10, TSN December
7, 1994). With this on record, it is immaterial whether or not the second gunshot wound inflicted by
appellant at the back of the ear of Casaul could knock-out the latter. The trial court found no
inconsistencies between the findings of Dr. Rafael and the testimony of Casaul. Both are consistent on
material points. There is thus, no reason to disturb the conclusions reached by the trial court insofar
as the prosecution witness credibility and appellant’s guilt are concerned.” 8
The testimony of a witness would only need to be congruent on important and relevant points
concerning the principal occurrence;9 slight inconsistencies might even serve to strengthen the
sincerity of the witness and would tend to prove that his testimony has not been rehearsed. 10
Appellant would make an issue over an entry in the medical record of Casaul from the Jose Reyes
Medical Hospital which stated “unknown assailant” to the question of whether the victim knew the
identity of his attacker. The matter was easily explained, however, by Casaul himself who said that he
had known appellant only by face until the case was filed. The weight of the eyewitness account should
be on the fact that the witness saw the accused commit the crime and was positive on the latter’s
physical identification,11 rather than in being able to identify him by his appellation or name. 12
Appellant would impugn the credibility of Judge Silva in rendering the assailed decision on the
ground that it was not he, but Judge Baclig, who heard the testimqny of Casaul. This kind of argument
had been dismissed a good number of times by the Court. The efficacy of a decision should not
necessarily be impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier
presided at the trial.13 The fact that the judge who penned the decision did not hear the case in its
entirety would hardly be a compelling reason to thereby jettison his findings and conclusions as long
as the entire record was made available to him for his perusal14
Appellant contends he has had a clean record and no strong motive to commit the crimes imputed
against him. The absence of motive for committing the crime does not preclude a conviction for it is not
unknown for persons to be killed or assaulted even for no reason at all. 15 More importantly, when an
accused is positively identified by the victim himself, lack of motive on the part of the transgressor
becomes close to being inconsequential.16 Appellant alleges that the failure of the prosecution to present
three of the witnesses listed in the informations, as well as two others mentioned by Casaul, gives rise
to the presumption that if the testimony of these witnesses were given before the court, their
declaration would have been adverse to the prosecution. The settled rule is that the prosecution
determines who among its witnesses are to testify in court,17 and it is neither for the accused nor the
court to override that prerogative. Corollarily, the failure of the prosecution to present a particular
witness does not give rise to the presumption that “evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced” where that evidence is at the disposal of both parties or where the only object of presenting
the witness would be to provide corroborative or cumulative evidence.18
This Court finds no cogent reasons to reverse the decision of the trial court in finding the accused
guilty of murder.
Murder is the unlawful killing of any person when qualified by any of the circumstances listed
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.19 Treachery, aptly alleged in the information, is one of
such qualifying circumstances. Its elements are: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate and conscious
adoption of the means of execution.20 Here, treachery is evident when the accused suddenly positioned
himself at the back of the unsuspecting victim, pointed his gun at him and, without any warning,
promptly delivered the fatal shots. There was no way the victim could have defended himself, taken
flight, or avoided the assault.
There is, however, reason to modify the lower court’s ruling on the second crime of frustrated
murder. A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator.21 For the crime of murder, the frustrated stage is reached only if the
wound inflicted would have been mortal. 22 The examining physician has declared that the wounds
suffered by the victim damaged no vital tissues and, without complications, would not have killed him.
The penalty imposed upon appellant should correspondingly be lowered to prision mayor in its medium
period, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance established. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum term can be anywhere within the range of prision correccional or from six
(6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years and the maximum within the range of prision mayorin its
medium period, or from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
The civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded to the heirs of the deceased victim Apolinario Belmonte
conforms with prevailing jurisprudence. The grant of P20,000.00 moral damages to Jesus Casaul, Jr.,
found by the trial court has not been disputed by the defense; the award will not be disturbed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No.
5096, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and imposing
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as well as sentencing him to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased victim, Apolinario Belmonte, a civil indemnity of P50,000.00, is AFFIRMED. In Criminal
Case No. 5095, the appealed judgment is MODIFIED and appellant is hereby found guilty only of the
crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and nine
(9) months of prision correccional as minimum to nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum; the imposition on him by the trial court of P20,000.00 moral damages is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On leave.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.—A witness who has two names and adopts the name of his wife is not credible. (People vs.
Buendia, 210 SCRA 531 [1992])
The shooting of a peace officer who was fully aware of the risks in pursuing the malefactors, when
done in a spur of the moment, is an act which can hardly be characterized as treacherous where it was
nowhere proved that the same was deliberately adopted to deny the victim the opportunity to defend
himself. (People vs. Porras, 255 SCRA 514 [1996])