SUBJECT: PALIAL
G.R. No. L-34361 November 5, 1930
1. CANDIDO B. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JOSE DE LOS REYES, in his capacity as Peace Officer and Assistant
Chief of the Constabulary, respondent-appellee.
MALCOM, J.:
FACTS:
On October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez attacked and assaulted,
without any justification, the Honorable Jose D. Dimayuga, who was then
and is now a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippine
Islands, while said Representative was going to the hall of the House of
Representative to attend to the sessions which were then about to begin, as a
result of which attack and assault said Representative was unable to attend
the sessions on that day and those of the two days next following. Thereafter,
Candido Lopez appeared before the Committee on Privileges of the House of
Representatives where he was notified that he was charged with contempt for
having violated the privileges of one of the members of this house.
However, it will be observed that the alleged assault by Lopez on
Representatives Dimayuga occurred on October 23, 1929. The House of
Representatives adopted its original resolution, requiring the Speaker to order
the arrest of Lopez, to be confined in Bilibid Prison for twenty four hours on
November 6, 1929. That session, as well as following session after that, was
adjourned at midnight on November 8, 1929, without the order of arrest
having been served on Lopez. The confirmatory resolution hereinbefore
quoted was approved on September 16, 1930, during the third session of
the Philippine Legislature. Following the day of the resolution’s approval,
a new warrant of arrest was issued by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives on September 17, 1930. Lopez was taken into custody by
Colonel De los Reyes, Assistant Chief of the Constabulary, on September 19,
1930. Immediately a writ of habeas corpus was obtained from Honorable
Mariano Albert, Auxiliary Judge of First Instance sitting in the City of
Manila.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the House of Representatives has the
right to order the commitment of a person guilty of
contempt against it.
2. Whether or not the House of Representatives had lost
jurisdiction over Lopez following the adjournment of the
session in which the contempt occurred
RULING:
1. YES. The Court turn to consider the power of a legislative body
in the Philippines to punish for contempt. It is a question of first
impression. General legislative powers with certain exceptions,
are vested in the Philippine Legislative, consisting of the Senate
and the House of Representatives. A power essential to permit
the Houses of the Philippine Legislature to perform their duties
without impediment, as contemplated by the Organic Act, must
be assumed. There is as much necessity for the House in a
territorial legislature to possess the power to punish for contempt
as there is for the Houses in the Congress of the United States
and the Houses in the State Legislatures to possess this power.
Accordingly, we rule that a limited power to punish persons not
members for contempt resides in the House of Representatives of
the Philippine Legislature.
2. YES. Giving application now to the exact words of the United
States Supreme Court, which it is our bounden duty to do, "the
session of the body in which the contempt occurred" was the
second session of the Philippine Legislature. That session was
adjourned as provided by law, without the resolution affecting
Lopez having been enforced. It was this session beyond which
the imprisonment could not be extended. When at the next
session, the third, the order of arrest was attempted to be
resuscitated, the House was without legal right so to proceed.
The fact that the House at this third session, without a new
hearing and adjudication, passed a confirmatory resolution of the
resolution approved at the second session, added nothing to the
legal position of the House. The legislative function to act
having ceased with the cessation of the legislative power in a
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
previous session, a resolution could not be revived by mere
reapproval.
The legislative power to punish for contempt arises by
implication, is justified only by the right of self-preservation, and is the
least possible power adequate to the end proposed. We point out again
that where imprisonment is imposed for contempt of a legislative body in the
United States, it terminates with the adjournment of the session of the
body in which the contempt occurred. We emphasize again the absolute
absence of any judicial precedent which acknowledges the right of a
legislative body to extend punishment for contempt beyond the adjournment
of the session, and that to go against the unanimous authority to the contrary,
would be to sanction a power for the Houses of the Philippine Legislature
greater than that which any legislative body in the United States, including
the Houses of the Congress of the United States, is permitted to exercise. No
legal cause for the restraint of the petitioner is shown.
G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950
2. JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,
vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of Prisons, respondents.
OZAETA, J.:
FACTS:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government,
through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as
Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000,
respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a
nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the
Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest
of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of P500,000 was
all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-in-fact, the
North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for
the alleged interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong Estate.
The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de
Dios Hospital. The Philippine Government held a 25-year lease contract on
said estate, with an option to purchase it for P3,000,000 within the same
period of 25 years counted from January 1, 1939. The occupation Republic
of the Philippines purported to exercise that option by tendering to the owner
the sum of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing it in court on
June 21, 1944, together with the accrued rentals amounting to P3224,000.
Since 1939 the Government has remained in possession of the estate.
On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista
Estate for P5,000,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who made a down payment of
P10,000 only and agreed to pay P5000,000 within one year and the
remainder in annual installments of P500,000 each, with the stipulation that
failure on his part to make any of said payments would cause the forfeiture of
his down payment of P10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind to
sale to him. Aside from the down payment of P10,000, Burt has made no
other payment on account of the purchase price of said estate.
The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine
Trust Company. On May 14, 1946, the Philippine Trust Company sold estate
for the sum of P1,200,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000 down and
promise to pay P90,000 within nine months and the balance of P1,100,000 in
ten successive installments of P110,000 each. The nine-month period within
which to pay the first installment of P90,000 expired on February 14, 1947,
without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount then or afterwards.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and
delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an
absolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February
5, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration made, under article 1504 of the
Civil Code, a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation
of his contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust Company due to his
failure to pay the installment of P90,000 within the period of nine months.
Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered the cancellation of
Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the
Rural Progress Administration, from which order he appealed to the Supreme
Court.
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two
parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing
question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the
government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen,
of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates
that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible
for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the
subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its
hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused
to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds
pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was
committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment
until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas
corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his
detention.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Senate have the power to punish the
petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person
to whom he gave the Php440,000.00
2. Whether or not the Senate have the authority to commit
petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session?
RULING:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the
investigating committee has the power to require a witness to
answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course
to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry,
to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must
be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by
the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and
every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a
witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of
the inquiry or investigation.
The Court finds that the question for the refusal to answer which the
petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under
inquiry. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject
of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed
legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the
legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is
material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is
that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry. If the subject of
investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to
that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by
imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative
body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the
end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very
reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the
legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or
obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed
during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed
legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is
recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-
preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted
by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist
upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to
punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case.
G.R. No. L-6749 July 30, 1955
3. JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as Director of Prisons, respondent-appellant.
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
Jean Arnault was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the
negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by
the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected on October
21, 1949 and the price paid for both estates was P5,000,000. On February 27,
1950, the Senate of the Philippines adopted Resolution No. 8, whereby it
created a Special Committee to determine "whether the said purchase was
honest, valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the deal was fair
and just, the parties responsible therefor, any other facts the Committee may
deem proper in the premises."
In the investigation conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said
Resolution, petitioner-appellee was asked to whom a part of the purchase
price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner-appellee refused to answer this
question, whereupon the Committee resolved on May 15, 1950, to order his
commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate
and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time when he
shall reveal to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person
who received the P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto.
In the month of December, 1951, while still in confinement in
Bilibid, petitioner-appellee executed an affidavit, Exhibit A, wherein he
gives in detail the history of his life, the events surrounding acquisition of the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by Gen. Burt, the supposed
circumstances under which he met one by the name of Jess D. Santos. When
presented, the Senate Special Committee, not being satisfied, ordered the
director of prison to continue holding Arnault in confinement until
saidArnault shall have purged himself of contempt of the senate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt or
incarcerate him as a punitive rather than as a coercive measure.
RULING:
YES. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate
him as a punitive measure. Although the resolution studiously avoids saying
that the confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the
petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the continuation
of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly punitive. This may be inferred
from the confining made in the resolution that petitioner's acts were arrogant
and contumacious and constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and
authority.
The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This
power is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered
implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to
effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge
and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and
compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to
punish a defiance of its power and authority? The legislative department
should not be constrained to look to the courts whenever for every act of
refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy with which it is faced.
The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and
contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to judicial
interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute disregard of
discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of
constitutional limitations.
G.R. No. 89914
4. JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS,
represented by and through the Chairman, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA,
respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil case against Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez, and the petitioners in this case. PCGG alleges, among
others, that the petitioners Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Romualdez are
cronies of former President Marcos and First Lady Imelda Marcos. PCGG
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
claims that the petitioners engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly
enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino people.
This enabled them to: (a) obtain control of some big business
enterprises such as MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (b)
manipulate the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and
borrow more capital, reaching a total of more than P2 billion, (c) collaborate
with lawyers of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties,
maneuvering the purported sale of interests in certain corporations, and
misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25 million.
On 13 September 1988, then-Senate Minority Floor Leader, Juan
Ponce Enrile, delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before
the Senate on the alleged take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of
the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC), by Ricardo Lopa,
Marcos’ brother-in-law. Enrile called upon the Senate to look into the
possible violations of R.A. 3019.
Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its
investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed
by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know"
regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin
Romualdez. However, Lopa refused to testify on the ground that his
testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants the civil case before the
Sandiganbayan. Bengzon also refused to testify, invoking his constitutional
right to due process.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to
subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings
before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in
clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave
and irreparable damage, the petitioners filed the present petition for
prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive
relief.
ISSUES:
(1) WoN the Court may inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in
conducting legislative investigations;
(2) WoN the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has a valid
legislative purpose;
(3) WoN it would be an encroachment into the domain of judicial
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan if the SBRC would continue with the
inquiry.
RULING:
(1) YES. In the case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Court
held that when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly
is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over
the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent
of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into
private affairs in purported aid of legislation.
(2) NO. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is
specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.Such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any
proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress
and/or in the Senate alone.
After examination of the speech of Senator Enrile, it would
appear that it contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he
merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of
RA No. 3019. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted
by respondent Blue Ribbon Commitee was to find out whether or not the
relatives of President Aquino, particularly Ricardo Lopa, had violated
the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations
belonging to Benjamin Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears to be,
therefore, no intended legislation involved.
(3) YES. It cannot be overlooked that when respondent Committee
decided to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, a complaint had
already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint
shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners is
the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin
Romualdez. Then, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent
Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. The issue had already been pre-empted by that court.
To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation
of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the
possibility of conflicting judgments between a legislative committee and a
judicial tribunal, but also if the Committee's judgment were to be reached
before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made
to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted.
In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into
the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan,
would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial
jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.
The petition is granted. The respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee is enjoined from compelling the petitioners to testify before it and
produce evidence at the said inquiry.
G.R. No. 136760
5. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, represented by its
Chairman, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE B. MAJADUCON, Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Regional
Trial Court of General Santos City, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
G.R. No. 136760
On August 28, 1998, Senator Blas F. Ople filed Senate Resolution
No. 157 directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of then Defense
Secretary Orlando Mercado that a group of active and retired military
officers were organizing a coup d’état to prevent the administration of then
President Joseph Estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.
On the same date, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III also filed Resolution
No. 160, directing the appropriate senate committee to conduct an inquiry, in
aid of legislation, into the alleged mismanagement of the funds of the Armed
Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). The Senate
President referred the two resolutions to the Blue Ribbon Committee and the
Committee on National Defense and Security.
During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot in General
Santos City for P10,500.00 per square meter from private respondent Atty.
Nilo J. Flaviano. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds
indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000.00 per square
meter.
The Committee caused the service of a subpoena to respondent Atty.
Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused.
Instead, he filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with
prayer for TRO with the RTC.
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
The trial court granted the petition. The Committee filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state
a cause of action. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
G.R. No. 138738
The Philippine Star published a news report on the filing by the
Committee with this Court of the petition for certiorari. The news report
quoted portions of the petition filed by the Committee, alleging that RTC
Judge Majaducon was guilty of gross ignorance of the rules and procedures
when he issued the TRO, because, under the principle of separation of
powers, courts cannot interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its
authority to conduct investigations in aid of legislation.
Judge Majaducon initiated a charge for indirect contempt of court. A
decision was against Senator Pimentel. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WoN Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when
he dismissed petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
RULING:
YES. There is grave abuse of discretion when the respondent acts in
a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his
judgment, as when the assailed order is bereft of any factual and legal
justification. The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was
issued without legal basis.
The principle of separation of powers essentially means that
legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive, and
settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from
invading the domain of the others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and
testify before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse
and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its
authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Hence, the RTC, or any court for that matter, had no authority to
prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent to appear and testify
before it.
Likewise, the ruling in Bengzon, cited by respondent,does not apply
in this case. In Bengzon, no intended legislation was involved. On the other
hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose, as stated in Senate
Resolution No. 160, and the appropriate Senate Committee was directed to
look into the reported misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds,
with the intention of enacting appropriate legislation to protect the rights and
interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Further, in Bengzon, the validity of the sale of Romualdez corporations was
pending with the Sandiganbayan when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
decided to conduct its investigation. In short, the issue had already been pre-
empted by the court.
The petitions are granted.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: (on the case of indirect contempt) Pimentel is not
guilty of improper conduct which obstructs or degrades the administration of
justice. It does not appear that Pimentel caused the publication in the
Philippine Star of the fact of filing of the petition for certiorari by the
Committee and the reproduction of excerpts thereof.The statement that
respondent Judge was grossly ignorant of the rules of law and procedure does
not constitute improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice. the phrase gross ignorance of the law is a necessary
description to support a petition which seeks the annulment of an order of a
judge wherein basic legal principles are disregarded.
G.R. No. 169777
6. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, et al., petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-
ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
FACTS:
The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers
in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group. The
Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued
invitations to several officials of the AFP.
Sometime thereafter, the President issued E.O. 464, which requires
all heads of departments of the Executive Branch to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.
Consequently, Senate President Drilon received from Executive
Secretary Ermita a letter informing him that officials of the Executive
Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the
same without the consent of the President. Gen. Senga of the AFP also
informed the Committee that no officer of the AFP is authorized to appear
before them without the approval of the President.
[Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary
Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation pushed through, with only Col.
Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani attending. For defying President Arroyo’s
order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from
their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.]
Three petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed before this
Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
ISSUE:
WoN E.O. 464 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
It is partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21
of Article VI of the Constitution. As discussed in Arnault, the power of
inquiry is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process.
If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their
offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of
reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to
compel the disclosure thereof.
However, law and jurisprudence provide for safeguards to this power
of inquiry. In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, if the inquiry itself
is not properly be in aid of legislation, it is beyond the constitutional power
of Congress. In Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, it isrequired that
the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published
rules of procedure; it also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries be respected.
Moreover, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." This
privilege exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to
the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the
discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in
maintaining governmental operations.
Nevertheless, the extraordinary character of the exemption indicates
that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor
of disclosure.
VALIDITY OF SECTION 1
The required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on
Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as
the question hour.
A distinction must be made between inquiries in aid of legislation
and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Sections 21 and 22 of the Constitution, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that
may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct
a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress’ oversight function. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry,
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a
valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads.
Section 1 of E.O. 464, in the absence of any reference to inquiries
in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to
appearances of department heads in the question hour. The reading is
dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted,
as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
VALIDITY OF SECTIONS 2 AND 3
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress. The enumeration also includes such other officers
as may be determined by the President.
Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the
President that an official is "covered by the executive privilege," such official
is subjected to the requirement that he first secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before Congress. This requirement effectively
bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by
the President.
Hence, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure
to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to
Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the
President, has determined that the requested information is privileged.
The implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not
accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof.
[As illustrated in this case, the letter of Eduardo Ermita does not
explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these
officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized
grounds of the privilege.]
While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are
covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to
speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive.
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers
the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely
declare that the President has determined that it is so.
A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation
to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely
provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section
2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege.
The petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are
declared void. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, valid.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: (on how executive privilege is invoked) Congress
must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is
meant to protect. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a
responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.
G.R. No. 174340
7. CAMILO L. SABIO petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
On February 28, 1986, former President Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). She entrusted upon this Commission the task of
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
recovering the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1
provides that: "No member or staff of the Commission shall be required
to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance." Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG's unhampered
performance of its task.
The constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the
ground that it tramples upon the Senate's power to conduct legislative
inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago
introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),
"directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC)
due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective
Board of Directors."
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the
authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L.
Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one
of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to
deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because
of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O.
No. 1 earlier quoted.
On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners to
appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on
what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455.
Similar subpoenas were issued against the directors and officers of
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation.
Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to
Senator Gordon, he reiterated his earlier position, invoking Section 4(b)
of E.O. No. 1. Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O. Coscolluela,
sent another notice to Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and
testify on the same subject matter. Once more, Chairman Sabio did not
comply with the notice. He sent a letter to Senator Gordon reiterating
his reason for declining to appear in the public hearing.
This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order requiring
Chairman Sabio and Commissioners to show cause why they should not
be cited in contempt of the Senate. On September 11, 2006, they
submitted to the Senate their Compliance and Explanation, explaining
that Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 and that it constitutes a limitation on the
power of legislative inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to
provide protection to the PCGG in order to ensure the unhampered
performance of its duties under its charter. E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section
4(b) of which had not been amended, repealed or revised in any way.
Chairman Sabio's letter to Sen. Gordon pointed out that the
anomalous transactions referred to in the P.S. Resolution No. 455 are subject
of pending cases before the regular courts, the Sandiganbayan and the
Supreme Court for which reason they may not be able to testify thereon
under the principle of sub judice. The laudable objectives of the PCGG's
functions, recognized in several cases decided by the Supreme Court, of the
PCGG will be put to naught if its recovery efforts will be unduly impeded by
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
a legislative investigation of cases that are already pending before the
Sandiganbayan and trial courts.
Unconvinced with the Explanation, the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee
on Public Services issued an Order to place Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate where he was
detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for
habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services,
their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and
Members, and likewise filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the same respondents.
Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting
respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Meanwhile Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of
legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from
testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
ISSUE:
WoN Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987
Constitution.
RULING:
YES. Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the
1987 Constitution. Respondent Senate Committees' power of inquiry
relative to Senate Resolution 455 is upheld. PCGG Chairman Camilo L.
Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti
and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's
nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors
and officers, petitioners in G.R. No. 174177, are ordered to comply with
the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate
Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings
relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not
just of Congress, but also of "any of its committee." This is significant
because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the
committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take
in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also
available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid
existence and expansive construal. The Court's high regard to such
power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it
categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation"
and that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to
legislate."
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, the court found Section
4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts
the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This
cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision
granting such exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad,
encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing
laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions
are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG
belongs to this class.

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad

power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.

In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo

Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti, and Tereso Javier; and Manuel
Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation, as well as its directors and officers, must comply with the
Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees
directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate
Resolution No. 455.

G.R. No. 167173

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch),et al.,

petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS,et al., respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Standard Chartered Bank (SCB)-Philippines is an
institution incorporated in England with limited liability and is licensed to
engage in banking, trust, and other related operations in the Philippines.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of the Senate
Committee on Banks, delivered a privilege speech entitled "Arrogance of
Wealth" before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in
violation of the Securities Regulation Code and urging the Senate to
immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of
Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent.
Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile had introduced
Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution No. 166, directing the Committee on
Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, to conduct an inquiry in aid of
legislation, into the illegal sale of unregistered by SCB.
Respondent then commenced the investigation. The first hearing was
adjourned without the setting of the next hearing, until a few months after,
when the petitioners were served by respondent with
subpoenaeadtestificandumand ducestecum to compel them to attend and
testify at the second hearing.
Hence, this petition for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin respondent
from (1) proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.)
Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling petitioners who are officers of petitioner
SCB-Philippines to attend and testify before any further hearing to be
conducted by respondent; and (3) enforcing any hold-departure order (HDO)
and/or putting the petitioners on the Watch List.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
Petitioners argue that respondent has no jurisdiction to conduct the
inquiry because its subject matter is the very same subject matter of several
cases before ordinary civil courts. Citing Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, the petitioners claim that since the issue of whether or not SCB-
Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already preempted
by the courts that took cognizance of the cases, the respondent, by this
investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in these
courts.
ISSUE:
WoN the investigation in aid of legislation would encroach upon the
judicial powers of the civil courts.
RULING:
NO. The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint
before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the
conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy
to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of
instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of
sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an
essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation.
Furthermore, the Bengzon case is not on all fours with this case. In
that case, the Court found that the intended inquiry was not in aid of
legislation. The speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such investigation,
contained no suggestion of any contemplated legislation; it merely called
upon the Senate to look into possible violations of Section 5, Republic Act
No. 3019. Thus, the Court held that the requested probe failed to comply
with the fundamental requirements of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution.
P.S. Resolution No. 166, on the other hand, is explicit on the
subject and nature of the inquiry to be conducted by the respondent
Committee, as found in the last three Whereas clauses thereof. The
unmistakable objective of the investigation, as what was stated at the
conclusion of Senator Enrile’s speech, was to prevent the occurrence of a
similar fraudulent activity in the future.
Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the
respondent Committee. The Court notes that among those invited as resource
persons were officials of the SEC and BSP. These officials were subjected to
the same critical scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings
on the illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. It is
obvious that the objective of the investigation was the quest for
remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the
allegedly fraudulent activity.
The petition is denied.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: (on the issue of contempt) Petitioners insist that the
inquiry conducted by respondent was, in fact, "in aid of collection." They
claim that Atty. Bocobo and Manuel Baviera were only seeking a friendly
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
forum so that they could recover their investments from SCB-Philippines; (on the possibility that the investigation before respondent may result
and that the respondent has allowed itself to be used as the conveniently in a recommendation for their prosecution) The prosecution of offenders by
available vehicle to effect this purpose. the prosecutorial agencies and the trial before the courts is for the
punishment of persons who transgress the law. The intent of legislative
Outraged by petitioners' imputation that it was conducting the
inquiries, on the other hand, is to arrive at a policy determination, which may
investigation "in aid of collection," respondent held petitioners, together with
or may not be enacted into law.
their counsel, in contempt and ordered their detention for six
hours.Petitioners, in their MR, claimed that the phrase "in aid of collection" Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt,
partakes of an absolutely privileged allegation in the petition. the respondent cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming
evidence of criminal culpability, although it may include in its report a
The petitioners are incorrect. The principle that Congress or any of
recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may appear
its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon
liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in
reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to
such a report would be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial
the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the
agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot
require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is
impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? And how could this
authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of
defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort
to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent
by itself to punish or deal therewith, with affronts committed against its
authority or dignity?
Petitioners' imputation that the investigation was "in aid of
collection" is a direct challenge against the authority of the Senate
Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter. In this light, the contempt
citation against the petitioners is reasonable and justified.
(on the power to compel the attendance of witnesses) Additionally, it
is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power
to compel the attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel
the attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses would
be available to testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at bench,
considering that most of the officers of SCB-Philippines are not Filipino
nationals who may easily evade the compulsive character of respondent's
summons by leaving the country, it was reasonable for the respondent to
request the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to
prevent said witnesses from evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose.

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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
G.R. No. 180643
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount
of U.S. approximately P16 Billion Pesos. The Project was to be financed by
the People's Republic of China.
Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of NEDA, was invited
by the respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint investigation on
the alleged anomalies in the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project.
When he testified before the Senate Committees, he disclosed that then
Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE,
offered him P200 million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project.
He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege.”
In particular, he refused to answer the questions on
1.) Whether or not the President followed up the NBN Project;
2.) Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and ;
3.) Whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on 20
November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter
dated 15 November to the Committees requesting them to dispense with
Neri’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Ermita invoked the
privilege on the ground that “the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China,” and given the confidential nature in which these
information were conveyed to the President, Neri “cannot provide the
Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the
very thing the privilege is designed to protect.” Thus, on 20 November, Neri
did not appear before the respondent Committees.
On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri
requiring him to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for his
failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29 November,
Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did not intend to
snub the Senate hearing, and requested that if there be new matters that were
not yet taken up during his first appearance, he be informed in advance so he
can prepare himself. He added that his non-appearance was upon the order of
the President, and that his conversation with her dealt with delicate and
sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of
the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss
of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.
Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued an
Order citing Neri in contempt and consequently ordering his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he appears and
gives his testimony.
Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show
Cause Letter and the Contempt Order for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and stressed
that his refusal to answer the three questions was anchored on a valid claim
to executive privilege in accordance with the ruling in the landmark case of
Senate vs. Ermita . For its part, the Senate Committees argued that they did
not exceed their authority in issuing the assailed orders because there is no
valid justification for Neri’s claim to executive privilege. In addition, they
15
 SUBJECT: PALIAL
claimed that the refusal of petitioner to answer the three questions violates
the people’s right to public information, and that the executive is using the
concept of executive privilege as a means to conceal the criminal act of
bribery in the highest levels of government.
ISSUE:
WoN the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were
covered by executive privilege, making the arrest order issued by the
respondent Senate Committees void.
DISCUSSION:
Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court
laid out the three elements needed to be complied with in order for the claim
to executive privilege to be valid. These are: 1.) the protected
communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power; 2.) it must be authored, solicited, and received by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test
is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President;
and, 3.) it may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important evidence,” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive
privilege on the argument that the communications elicited by the three
questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President
and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making
process,” and that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of
China.” It is clear then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to
the quintessential and non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or
foreign relations.
As to the second element, the communications were received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test,
petitioner Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a member of the
President’s Cabinet.
And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. Presidential communications are presumptive
privilege and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of
public need by the branch seeking access to such conversations. In the
present case, respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical
need for the answers to the three questions in the enactment of any law under
Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the
legislative oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As ruled in Senate vs.
Ermita, “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation.”
Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege
does not violate the people’s right to information on matters of public
concern simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution itself provides that
this right is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
RULING:
The divided Supreme Court (voting 9-6) was convinced that the
three questions are covered by presidential communications privilege, and
that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive department,
enough to shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue
against him for not answering such questions.
The petition was granted. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008,
citing petitioner in contempt of the Senate Committee and directing his arrest
and detention was nullified.
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
10. VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, et al. respondents.
FACTS:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between
the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured
unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that
placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted
in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously
referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner VirgilioGarcillano to manipulate
in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were
to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by
committees of both Houses of Congress.
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority
Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two
Tapes," and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted.
During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged.
But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director
Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy
Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven
alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped
conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee
members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes
were eventually played in the chambers of the House.
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend
the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee
reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource
persons.
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano
(Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction,
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent
House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the
"illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and
for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the
respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the
recordings in any of the House proceedings.
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and OswaldoAgcaoili,
retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275,
seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry.
They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A.
No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its
public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7, 12 13 and
October 1, 14 2007.
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci"
recordings, they have different objectives–the first is poised at preventing the
playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the
committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of
the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource
persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved
to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.
IntervenorSagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that
he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not
only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended
legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on
oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only
in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they
first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.
ISSUE No. 1
1. WON Petitioners have legal standing
RULING: YES
In Tolentino v. COMELEC, we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus
standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged
governmental act x xx," THUS, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate
only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the
Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed,
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to
prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even
permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the
Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The
majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that
"this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural
barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal
questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court’s
duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches
of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them."
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the
petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes.
Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent
committees as one of the voices in the recordings. Obviously, therefore,
petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees’
actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to
institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by
alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP.
They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci"
tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper
use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public
hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and
individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes
through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution
of the laws and that intervenorSagge asserts his constitutional right to due
process, they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
ISSUE NO. 2
2.Won there is an actual case or controversy
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
RULING:
None against the House of Representatives
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and
academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the
exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and
resolution of actual cases and controversies. By actual cases, we mean
existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will
amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend
to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in
which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its
purpose has become stale. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot
have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.
The court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and
heard by its members. There is also the widely publicised fact that the
Committee reports on the “Hello Garci’’inquiry were completed and
submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. Having
been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed
for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to
restraint he doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a
remedy for an act already accomplished.
Yes against the Senate.
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate
cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
ISSUE NO. 3
3. Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the Senate’s website, satisfies the due
process requirement of law
RULING:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.
Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end
of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may
deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in
aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally
infirm.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the
inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules
for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published
rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses
or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative
inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily
adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot
justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without
more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and
does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules
prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is
illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that
the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due
process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at
risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their
claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A.
8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In
other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for
their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules
and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could
not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the
legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008
issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this
fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought
to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be
undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules
governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the
petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be
issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of
its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on
the "Hello Garci" tapes.
G.R. No. 174105: April 2, 2009
11. SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (Ret.) and
MARIA FE C. DELA PAZ, Petitioners, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS and the SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS
JOSE BALAJADIA, JR., Respondents.
FACTS: On October 6, 2008, a Philippine delegation of eight (8) senior
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers arrived in Moscow, Russia to
attend the 77th General Assembly Session of the International Criminal
Police Organization (ICPO)-INTERPOL in St. Petersburg from October 6-
10, 2008. With the delegation was Gen. Dela Paz, then comptroller and
special disbursing officer of the PNP. Gen. Dela Paz, however, was to retire
from the PNP on October 9, 2008. Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the
local authorities at the Moscow airport departure area for failure to declare in
written form the 105,000 euros [approximately ₱6,930,000.00] found in his
luggage. In addition, he was also found to have in his possession 45,000
euros (roughly equivalent to ₱2,970,000.00). Petitioners were detained in
Moscow for questioning. After a few days, Gen. Dela Paz and the PNP
delegation were allowed to return to the Philippines, but the Russian
government confiscated the euros. Gen. Dela Paz arrived in Manila, a few
days after Mrs. Dela Paz. Awaiting them were subpoena earlier issued by
respondent Committee for the investigation it was to conduct on the Moscow
incident on October 23, 2008.
On October 23, 2008, respondent Committee held its first hearing. Instead of
attending the hearing, petitioners filed with respondent Committee a pleading
denominated Challenge to Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash
Subpoena. Senator Santiago emphatically defended respondent Committee’s
jurisdiction and commanded Balajadia to arrest petitioners. Hence, this
Petition. Petitioners argue that respondent Committee is devoid of any
jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve
state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the
Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim that respondent
Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of
arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of
respondent Committee.
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not
published as required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the
basis of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident.
ISSUE: Whether the rules of proceedings in the Senate may be a subject of
judicial supervision and interference.
RULING: No. First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution
states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary
authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and
promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is
generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will
constitute a denial of due process.
The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire
into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue
partakes of the nature of a political question that was characterized as a
question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. The
Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit,
subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. Thus, it is
not for this Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of policy, an issue
dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senate’s action.
Second. Even if it is within our power to inquire into the validity of the
exercise of jurisdiction over the petitioners by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, we are convinced that respondent Committee has acted within
the proper sphere of its authority. Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the
Senate Rules provides:
12) Committee on Foreign Relations. – Fifteen (15) members. All matters
relating to the relations of the Philippines with other nations generally;
diplomatic and consular services; the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations; the United Nations Organization and its agencies; multi-lateral
organizations, all international agreements, obligations and contracts; and
overseas Filipinos.
A reading of the above provision unmistakably shows that the investigation
of the Moscow incident involving petitioners is well within the respondent
Committee’s jurisdiction.The Moscow incident could create ripples in the
relations between the Philippines and Russia. Gen. Dela Paz went to Moscow
in an official capacity, as a member of the Philippine delegation to the
INTERPOL Conference in St. Petersburg, carrying a huge amount of
"public" money ostensibly to cover the expenses to be incurred by the
delegation. For his failure to comply with immigration and currency laws, the
Russian government confiscated the money in his possession and detained
him and other members of the delegation in Moscow. Furthermore, the
matter affects Philippine international obligations. We take judicial notice of
the fact that the Philippines is a state-party to the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime. The two conventions contain provisions
dealing with the movement of considerable foreign currency across borders.
The Moscow incident would reflect on our country’s compliance with the
obligations required of state-parties under these conventions. Thus, the
respondent Committee can properly inquire into this matter, particularly as to
the source and purpose of the funds discovered in Moscow as this would
involve the Philippines’ commitments under these conventions.
Third. The Philippine Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be
jointly conducted by the respondent Committee and the Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon
Committee).
Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue
Ribbon Committee may conduct investigations on all matters relating to
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in office by officers and
employees of the government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions and
instrumentalities, and on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or
brought to its attention by any of its members. It is, thus, beyond cavil that
the Blue Ribbon Committee can investigate Gen. Dela Paz, a retired PNP
general and member of the official PNP delegation to the INTERPOL
Conference in Russia, who had with him millions which may have been
sourced from public funds.
Fourth. Subsequent to Senator Santiago’s verbal command to Balajadia to
arrest petitioners, the Philippine Senate issued a formal written Order of
arrest, signed by ten (10) senators, with the Senate President himself
approving it, in accordance with the Senate Rules.
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
Fifth. The Philippine Senate has already published its Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in two newspapers of general
circulation.
Sixth. The arrest order issued against the petitioners has been rendered
ineffectual. In the legislative inquiry held on November 15, 2008, jointly by
the respondent Committee and the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Gen.
Dela Paz voluntarily appeared and answered the questions propounded by the
Committee members. Having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
Senate Committees, there was no longer any necessity to implement the
order of arrest. Furthermore, in the same hearing, Senator Santiago granted
the motion of Gen. Dela Paz to dispense with the presence of Mrs. Dela Paz
for humanitarian considerations. Consequently, the order for her arrest was
effectively withdrawn.
12. REGHIS M. ROMERO II, et al., petitioners, vs. SENATOR
JINGGOY E. ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR,
EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT,
respondents.
FACTS:
On August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders,
Inc., received from the Committee an invitation, signed by the Legislative
Committee Secretary, which states that pursuant to Resolution No. 537 and
543, Petitioner Reghis Romero II as owner of R-II Builders Inc. was invited
by the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources
Development to attend a public hearing at the Senate on August 23,2006
regarding the investment of OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The investigation is
intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to the
pertinent provisions of RA 8042,The Migrant Workers Act.
Petitioner Romero in his letter-reply requested to be excused from appearing
and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject
matter and purpose of Philippine Senate Resolution Nos. 537 and 543.
The Committee denied his request. On the same date, invitations were sent to
the other six petitioners, then members of the Board of Directors of R-II
Builders Inc. requesting them to attend the September 4,2006 Committee
hearing.
The next day, Senator Jinggoy Estrada as Chairman of the Committee issued
subpoena ad testificandum to petitioner Romero II directing him to appear
and testify before the Committee relative to the aforesaid Senate resolutions.
The Committee later issued subpoenas to the Board of Directors of R-II
Builders Inc.
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction under Rule 65, assailing
the constitutionality of the invitations and compulsory processes issued by
the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources
Development in connection with its investigation on the investment of
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration(OWWA) funds in the Smokey
Mountain project
Failing to secure the desired TRO sought in the petition, petitioner Romero II
appeared at the September 4, 2006 Committee investigation.
Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea
for a TRO6 alleging, among others, that: (1) he answered questions
concerning the investments of OWWA funds in the Smokey Mountain
project and how much of OWWA's original investment had already been
paid; (2) when Senator Estrada called on Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as
resource person, the latter spoke of the facts and issues he raised with the
Court in Chavez v. National Housing Authority,7 none of which were related
to the subject of the inquiry; and (3) when Senator Estrada adjourned the
investigation, he asked petitioners Romero II and Canlas to return at the
resumption of the investigation.
The manifestation was followed by the filing on September 19, 2006 of
another urgent motion for a TRO in which petitioners imputed to the
Committee the intention to harass them as, except for petitioner Romero II,
none of them had even been mentioned in relation to the subject of the
investigation.
Meanwhile, respondents, in compliance with our September 5, 2006
Resolution that ordered them to submit a comment on the original plea for a
TRO, interposed an opposition,8 observing that the Senate's motives in
calling for an investigation in aid of legislation were a political question.
22
 SUBJECT: PALIAL
They also averred that the pendency of Chavez "is not sufficient ground to
divest the respondents of their jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry into the
matters alleged in the petition."
In this petition, petitioners in gist claim that: (1) the subject matter of the
investigation is sub judice owing to the pendency of the Chavez petition; (2)
since the investigation has been intended to ascertain petitioners' criminal
liability for plunder, it is not in aid of legislation; (3) the inquiry compelled
them to appear and testify in violation of their rights against self-
incrimination; and (4) unless the Court immediately issues a TRO, some or
all of petitioners would be in danger of being arrested, detained, and forced
to give testimony against their will, before the Court could resolve the issues
raised in G.R. No. 164527.
In their Comment dated October 17, 2006,9 respondents made a distinction
between the issues raised in Chavez and the subject matter of the Senate
resolutions, nixing the notion of sub judice that petitioners raised at every
possible turn. Respondents averred that the subject matter of the investigation
focused on the alleged dissipation of OWWA funds and the purpose of the
probe was to aid the Senate determine the propriety of amending Republic
Act No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 and enacting laws to
protect OWWA funds in the future.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter of the Committee's inquiry is sub
judice.
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held that the sub judice issue has been
rendered moot and academic by the supervening issuance of the en banc
resolution of July 1, 2008 in GR No. 164527.
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial
proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of the sub judice rule
may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court.
For by an en banc Resolution dated July 1, 2008, the Court, in G.R. No.
164527, denied with finality the motion of Chavez, as the petitioner in
Chavez, for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated August 15,
2007. In fine, it will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice effect
of Chavez and resist, on that ground, the assailed congressional invitations
and subpoenas. The sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic
by the supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1, 2008 in
G.R. No. 164527.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without
practical use and value.
Thus, there is no more legal obstacle on the ground of sub judice, assuming it
is invocable to the continuation of the Committee's investigation challenged
in this proceeding.
At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is still pending final
adjudication by the Court, still, such circumstance would not bar the
continuance of the committee investigation.
The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or administrative
action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has
different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative
procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the
other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to
enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely
and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing
laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in
any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude
congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or
quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation.
The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to
respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully
with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
13. PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ENRIQUE L.
LOCSIN AND MANUEL D. ANDAL, Petitioners, vs. SENATE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, HON. SEN.
RICHARD GORDON AND HON. SEN. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, Respondents. G.R. No. 180308 June 19, 2012
FACTS: The Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a government-sequestered
organization in which the Republic of the Philippines holds a 35% interest in
shares of stocks. Petitioner PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC),
meanwhile, is a private corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws and a holding company whose main operation is collecting
the money market interest income of PHILCOMSAT. Petitioners Enrique L.
Locsin and Manuel D. Andal are both directors and corporate officers of
PHC, as well as nominees of the government to the board of directors of both
POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
By virtue of its interests in both PHILCOMSAT and POTC, the
government has, likewise, substantial interest in PHC. For the period from
1986 to 1996, the government, through the PCGG, regularly received cash
dividends from POTC. In 1998, however, POTC suffered its first loss.
Similarly, in 2004, PHC sustained a ₱7-million loss attributable to its huge
operating expenses. By 2005, PHC's operating expenses had ballooned
tremendously. Likewise, several PHC board members established
Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), a wholly-owned PHC subsidiary to
which PHC funds had been allegedly advanced without the appropriate
accountability reports given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT.
In view of the losses that the government continued to incur and in
order to protect its interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago, introduced Proposed Senate Resolution No.
455 directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the
anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the
mismanagement committed by their respective board of directors. PSR No.
455 was referred to respondent Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises, which conducted eleven (11) public hearings on various
dates. Petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to attend these hearings as
"resource persons." Respondents Senate Committees submitted the assailed
Committee Report No. 312, where it noted the need to examine the role of
the PCGG in the management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC.
After due proceedings, the respondents Senate Committees found
overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG and its nominees over POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in performing its
mandate to preserve the government's interests in the said corporations. In
sum, Committee Report No. 312 recommended, inter alia, the privatization
and transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC
and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO) under
the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government
nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT. Petitioners filed the
instant petition before the Court, questioning, in particular, the haste with
which the respondent Senate approved the challenged Committee Report No.
312.
ISSUES: Whether the Committee Resolution No. 312 should be nullified,
having proposed no piece of legislation and having been hastily approved by
the respondent Senate.
RULING: The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to
PSR No. 455 has been upheld in Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution.
The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of
inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate
Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its
effective discharge. On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot
be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312,
given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the
respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on the very same day that the
assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with
respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article
VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless. Corollarily, petitioners Locsin
and Andal's allegation that their constitutionally-guaranteed right to counsel
was violated during the hearings held in furtherance of PSR No. 455 is
specious.
The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person
under custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and
therefore attaches only during such custodial investigation.16 Since petitioners
24
 SUBJECT: PALIAL
Locsin and Andal were invited to the public hearings as resource persons, Allegedly due to Hazing-Related Activities” filed by Sen. Paolo Benigno
they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to counsel. Aquino IV.

When the petitioner attended the hearing dated on October 18, 2017,
14. ARVIN R. BALAG v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. Sen.Grace Poe asked the petitioner if he was the president of Aegis Juris
G.R. No. 234608,3 July 2018, EN BANC (Gesmundo, J.) Fraternity however, the petitioner refused to answer and invoked his right to
self-incrimination. Sen. Panfilo Lacson reminded that it was just a “simple
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: The interests of the Senate and the witnesses
question” to invoke self-incrimination and warned the petitioner that he may
appearing in its legislative inquiry are balanced. The Senate can continuously
be cited in contempt, but the petitioner still refused to answer. According to
and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry
Sen. Grace Poe, the petitioner’s signature appeared on the document for the
against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be
application of the Aegis Juris Fraternity in the organizational sheet submitted
exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a
in the school administration and it was indicated therein that the petitioner
contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the
was the President, yet he still refuses to answer the simple question asked.
said witness. However, the Senate will be prevented from effectively
The petitioner was then cited in contempt and was ordered to place in
conducting legislative hearings during recess -shall be duly addressed
detention under the Senate Sergeant at Arms’ supervision after the senate
because it is expressly provided herein that the Senate may still exercise its
hearing. Sen. Panfilo Lacson gave the petitioner a chance to purge out of
power of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that
contempt, however, the petitioner still refused to answer and invoked his
the period of imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the
right to self-incrimination. When the petitioner was asked of the question of
legislative inquiry, specifically, upon the approval or disapproval of the
whose decision it was to bring the victim to the hospital, the petitioner
Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still
submitted a plea to lift his contempt and stated that he was a member of the
potent and compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of
Aegis Juris Fraternity, however, he does not know who the president was
the persons appearing are respected because their detention shall not be
because he was enrolled at another university at the time of the incident. The
indefinite.
question asked before his plea was again repeated and the petitioner invoked
FACTS: This is a case of petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer again his right to self-incrimination.
of an issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
ISSUE: Did the Senate Committee acted with grave abuse of discretion in
injunction seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin implementation of the
conducting the legislative inquiry and citing petitioner in contempt?
Senate P.S. Resolution No. 504 and October 18, 2017 Order of Complaint by
the Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs filed by Arvin
R. Balag (petitioner) against the Senate of the Philippines, et. al.
(respondent). On September 17, 2017, a first-year law student from the RULING: YES. However, the court denied the petition for being moot and
University of Santo Tomas named Horacio Castillo III, allegedly died due to academic. In the present case, the Court finds that there is no more justiciable
hazing-related activities conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity. On controversy to be decided up since in its resolution dated December 12,
September 20, 2017, the senate released Senate Resolution No. 504 entitled 2017, the Court ordered in the interim the immediate release of petitioner
“a Resolution Directing the Appropriate Senate Committees to Conduct an pending resolution of the instant petition. Thus, petitioner was no longer
Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into the Recent Death of Horacio Castillo III detained under the Senate's authority.

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 SUBJECT: PALIAL
However, the court still resolved the case despite being moot and academic. The phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight
The court ruled that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of Committee" in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the
contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for
the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, "only upon review and approval of
until the termination of the legislative inquiry. The court stated that the
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee" found in the second paragraph
interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval
should be balanced. The Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not
power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries
witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC
immediately when the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to its pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189.48
own rules and the constitutional rights of the said witness. However, during Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate
and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.
recess, the Senate will be prevented from effectively conducting legislative
hearings. But the Senate may still exercise its power of contempt during
legislative hearings while on recess provided that the period of imprisonment
shall only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry upon the
approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent
power of contempt is still potent and compelling even during its recess. At
the same time, the rights of the persons appearing are respected because their
detention shall not be indefinite.

15. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity
as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary
of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.

Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003)1 suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and
material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed
the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES: Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1,

Article IX-A of the Constitution?

RULING: Such provision is unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article

IX-A mandating the independence of constitutional commissions.

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