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ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \"',,' .,':il,,,~:.:i"r
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ALFREDO J. NON
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Commissioner CommISsioner
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mpf/gmc-2015.09.005
GMC
Final Revision of
"Annex A"
Of ERC Resolution
No. 21 s. 2014
ANNEXA
The technical criteria for the transmission system planning are used for the technical evaluation of the
candidate projects for transmission network reinforcements.
In system operations, the N-1 criterion is deterministic and it requires that the system be able to
tolerate the outage of anyone Component without disruption and does not concern itself with the
probability of an outage. Even if an outage is highly unlikely, the criterion is still generally applied
because system failure due to a lost Component is unacceptable. i
The cost of meeting this criterion is not questioned; the criterion is generally considered fundamental
as the need to balance generation and loadu
The N-1 Criterion is a system security criterion where the Grid,. following a Credible N-1
Contingency (specified in III-A), is required to be capable to operate within certain minimum
performance (specified in III-B) and tolerate the outage.
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Depicts a Contingency where a sequence of events
N-1-1 consisting of an initial Outage of a Component
followed by a secondary loss.
Other Definitions:
The Outage of a single Component of the Grid that
Contingency cannot be predicted in advance but which excludes
Scheduled Maintenance.
Prolonged
Outage/Long Depicts an Outage of a Component that cannot be put
Lasting back in service as expected.
Contingency
(A1) Loss of a single-circuit transmission line, except those radial circuits' which connect
loads using a single line or cable;
(A2) Loss of one circuit of a double-circuit transmission line including point to point
connection of the Generating Plant to the Grid;
(AA) Loss of a single transformer, except those which connect loads using a single radial
transformer;
(A5) Loss of a Generating Unit, whether directly connected to the Grid or embedded; and
The N-1 criterion is satisfied if, after a single Outage in the system specified under Section III-A
occurs, the following Rules are observed;v:
(B.1) No breach of the limiting values for network operation variables (i.e. operation voltage,
frequency) that may endanger the security of the power system or lead to an
1 Transmission System Operation and Interconnection, Alvarado and Oren: For radial connections, the N-l criterion may be impossible to satisfy; there
is no way to prevent at least some load outage if the link fails. The only way to avoid an outage would be to have instantly available local generation or
not to connect loads radially.
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unacceptable strain on equipment, damage, destruction or an inadmissible reduction in
the life of equipment.
(B.2) No equipment/transmission line loading has exceeded 100% of its operational thermal
limit capacity;
(B.5) There is no need to change or interrupt power transfers and generation dispatch; and
III. Single Outage Contingency (N-1) Criterion Applicability under System Operations
The N-1 criterion is a minimum system security measure that the System Operator should model
the transmission network to address redundancy avoiding potential power interruptions andlor
system failure.
In case an element/s of the existing network lacks N-1 security, a temporary measure such as the
System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) should be made available for the time being that a
permanent network improvement is pending.
Following a Credible N-1 Contingency where the Rules specified under 1II-(B.1-B.6) are
compromised, a temporary security measure such as the SIPS should be employed to avoid
subsistence and spreading of the disturbance.
2 ESBNational Grid Transmission Planning Criteria, page 6: It is acceptable for the voltage to fall within the post contingency (N-l condition) limits for
For the SIPS design, an in-depth study and thorough system security assessment by the
System Operator is required to determine its applicability. The SIPS design shall be approved
by the Grid Management Committee that would form part of the technical requirement prior to
its implementation.
In the absence of SIPS, the System Operator shall initiate any or a combination of manual
corrective interventions, as specified below, following a credible N-k contingency in
anticipation of a probable secondary outage in order to stabilize the system:
In the event of a Credible N-1 Contingency, the system or any part thereof shall be operated
up to its operational thermal limit capacity, beyond which the System Operator shall intercept
to restore system stability.
For the avoidance of doubt, manual corrective interventions shall not be imposed to delimit
the power transfer capabilities of equipment/transmission lines in anticipation of a secondary
outage (N-1-1).
If a significant threat to system security exists following the occurrence of a credible N-1
Contingency, the System Operator may intervene and shall make the necessary manual
corrective actions as required, to protect the integrity of the grid.
As a general principle, for a transmission facility that is not compliant with the 'N-1' criterion, a
System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) should be employed only as a temporary measure
and should not be preferred over an improved reinforcement of the system.
END NOTES
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