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Republic of the Philippines . ";')
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ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \"',,' .,':il,,,~:.:i"r
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San Miguel Avenue, Pasig City

RESOLUTION NO. 16 ,Series of 2015



WHEREAS, on 24 November 2014, the Energy' Regulatory

Commission (ERC) issued Resolution No. 21, Series of 2014, entitled
"A Resolution Adopting the Grid Management Committee's
Recommendations on the Interpretation, Imposition, and
Implementation of the Single Outage Contingency (N-1) Operational
Criterion in the Philippine Grid Code': the particulars of which, are
contained in Annex "A" thereof;

WHEREAS, in a letter of 20 April 2015, the National Grid

Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) as the System Operator,
submitted to the Commission, its proposed amendments to ERC
Resolution No. 21, Series of 2014. The proposed amendments
specifically pertain to Annex "A" of the subject Resolution;

WHEREAS, several meetings ensued between NGCP and GMC

as regards NGCP's proposed amendments;

WHEREAS, after a thorough deliberation, the GMC, on 01

September 2015, submitted to the Commission, its recommendation
to amend Annex "A" of ERC Resolution No. 21, Series of 2014;


the Grid Management Committee's proposed amendments to Annex
"A" of ERC Resolution No. 21, Series of 2014, hereto attached as
Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof.

: ,. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the University of

the Philippines Law Center - Office of the National Administrative
Register (UPLC-ONAR), the Department of Energy (DOE), the
National Transmission Corporation (TF.ANSCO), the National Grid
Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP), the Philippine Electricity
Market Corporation (PEMC), and all the other parties concerned.
Resolution No. _, Series of 2015
A Resolution Adopting the Grid Management Committee's Proposed
Amendments to Annex "A" of ERC Resolution No. 21, Series of 2014
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Pasig City, September 21, 2015.

Chairperson lJ

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Commissioner CommISsioner


Commissioner Commissioner

Office oftlie Chairman

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Final Revision of
"Annex A"
Of ERC Resolution
No. 21 s. 2014



I. Technical Criteria for the Transmission Network

The technical criteria for the transmission system planning are used for the technical evaluation of the
candidate projects for transmission network reinforcements.

Technical criteria include:

A) The 'N.1' criterion,
B) Voltage and Reactive Power criterion,
C) Short-circuit criterion, and
D) Stability criterion.

In system operations, the N-1 criterion is deterministic and it requires that the system be able to
tolerate the outage of anyone Component without disruption and does not concern itself with the
probability of an outage. Even if an outage is highly unlikely, the criterion is still generally applied
because system failure due to a lost Component is unacceptable. i

The cost of meeting this criterion is not questioned; the criterion is generally considered fundamental
as the need to balance generation and loadu

II. The Single Outage Contingency (N-1) Criterion Definition

The N-1 Criterion is a system security criterion where the Grid,. following a Credible N-1
Contingency (specified in III-A), is required to be capable to operate within certain minimum
performance (specified in III-B) and tolerate the outage.

The common nomenclature/terms widely used can be expressed as follows:

Depicts a system in base case or in its normal steady-

N-O state operation, with all Components that are expected to
be in service are in fact in service.

Depicts a Contingency where one Component of the

system is on Outage.

For the avoidance of doubt, this means that the current

system shall be able to tolerate the "next worst"
contingency because a Long Lasting
N-1 Contingency/Prolonged Outage in the system is
plausible in real-time operations.

Once a contingency occurs, meeting the N-1 criterion

means considering the altered system, not the original
system, as the new base case to which the criterion must
be applied.

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Depicts a Contingency where a sequence of events
N-1-1 consisting of an initial Outage of a Component
followed by a secondary loss.

Depicts a Contingency of multiple Outages happening at

the same time.

Other Definitions:
The Outage of a single Component of the Grid that
Contingency cannot be predicted in advance but which excludes
Scheduled Maintenance.

Outage/Long Depicts an Outage of a Component that cannot be put
Lasting back in service as expected.

The Outage of a Component or Equipment due to

Scheduled maintenance, which is coordinated by the Transmission
Maintenance Network Provider and the System Operator or User, as
the case mav be.

A Credible N-1 Contingencies;;;

The N-1 Criterion is related to one of the following contingencies:

(A1) Loss of a single-circuit transmission line, except those radial circuits' which connect
loads using a single line or cable;

(A2) Loss of one circuit of a double-circuit transmission line including point to point
connection of the Generating Plant to the Grid;

(A3) Loss of submarine cable;

(AA) Loss of a single transformer, except those which connect loads using a single radial

(A5) Loss of a Generating Unit, whether directly connected to the Grid or embedded; and

(A6) Loss of compensating devices, i.e., Capacitor/Reactor/SVC.

B. Rules for a Minimum Grid Performance following a Credible N-1 Contingency

The N-1 criterion is satisfied if, after a single Outage in the system specified under Section III-A
occurs, the following Rules are observed;v:

(B.1) No breach of the limiting values for network operation variables (i.e. operation voltage,
frequency) that may endanger the security of the power system or lead to an

1 Transmission System Operation and Interconnection, Alvarado and Oren: For radial connections, the N-l criterion may be impossible to satisfy; there
is no way to prevent at least some load outage if the link fails. The only way to avoid an outage would be to have instantly available local generation or
not to connect loads radially.
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unacceptable strain on equipment, damage, destruction or an inadmissible reduction in
the life of equipment.

These variables should be satisfactory for consumers and generating units;

Table 1: Voltaae Scalev

Voltage N-O Condition N-1 Condition2

Vmin (pu) Vmax (pu) Vmin (pu) Vmax (pu)
69 kV 0.95 1.05 0.9 1.1
138 kV 0.95 1.05 0.9 1.1
230 kV 0.95 1.05 0.9 1.1
500 kV 0.95 1.05 0.9 1.1
(Voltages are relative to the Nominal Voltage of the system considered)

Table 2: Fre uencv Scale

N-O Condition N-1 Condition

Low High Low High

59.7 Hz 60.3 Hz 59.4 Hz 60.6 Hz

(B.2) No equipment/transmission line loading has exceeded 100% of its operational thermal
limit capacity;

(B.3) Interruptions of electric power supply to End-Users are avoided;

(B.4) Cascaded Tripping is avoided;

(B.5) There is no need to change or interrupt power transfers and generation dispatch; and

(B.6) The loss of generating unit stability is avoided.

III. Single Outage Contingency (N-1) Criterion Applicability under System Operations

The N-1 criterion is a minimum system security measure that the System Operator should model
the transmission network to address redundancy avoiding potential power interruptions andlor
system failure.

In case an element/s of the existing network lacks N-1 security, a temporary measure such as the
System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) should be made available for the time being that a
permanent network improvement is pending.

A. System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS)

Following a Credible N-1 Contingency where the Rules specified under 1II-(B.1-B.6) are
compromised, a temporary security measure such as the SIPS should be employed to avoid
subsistence and spreading of the disturbance.

2 ESBNational Grid Transmission Planning Criteria, page 6: It is acceptable for the voltage to fall within the post contingency (N-l condition) limits for

the duration of an outage.

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The application of SIPS shall be coordinated by the System Operator with the concerned
Users and shall only be specific to parts of the system determined to be exposed to a high
degree of likelihood for a secondary contingency (N-1-1) or a subsequent multiple
contingency (N-k) such that the risk of cascaded blackout is avoided.

For the SIPS design, an in-depth study and thorough system security assessment by the
System Operator is required to determine its applicability. The SIPS design shall be approved
by the Grid Management Committee that would form part of the technical requirement prior to
its implementation.

B. System Operations Corrective Intervention following a Credible N-k Contingency

In the absence of SIPS, the System Operator shall initiate any or a combination of manual
corrective interventions, as specified below, following a credible N-k contingency in
anticipation of a probable secondary outage in order to stabilize the system:

(B.1) Generating Unit re-dispatching;

(B.2) Usage of voltage and/or power flow control on regulation transformers;

(B.3) Network re-configuration;

(B.4) Manual Load Dropping (MLD); and

(B.5) Generating Unit Tripping

In the event of a Credible N-1 Contingency, the system or any part thereof shall be operated
up to its operational thermal limit capacity, beyond which the System Operator shall intercept
to restore system stability.

For the avoidance of doubt, manual corrective interventions shall not be imposed to delimit
the power transfer capabilities of equipment/transmission lines in anticipation of a secondary
outage (N-1-1).

If a significant threat to system security exists following the occurrence of a credible N-1
Contingency, the System Operator may intervene and shall make the necessary manual
corrective actions as required, to protect the integrity of the grid.

IV. Transmission Facilities non-compliant to Single Outage (N-1) Criterion

As a general principle, for a transmission facility that is not compliant with the 'N-1' criterion, a
System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) should be employed only as a temporary measure
and should not be preferred over an improved reinforcement of the system.


j Transmission System Operation and Interconnection, Alvarado and Oren.

ii -da-
iii EIHP: Transmission Network Investment Criteria, Final Report, March 2007, Page 63.
iv -da-
y California 1$0 Planning Standards, June 23, 2011, Page 4.

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