Adherence to jurisdiction; Jurisdiction cannot be ousted

Pacific Ace Finance LTD v. Eiji Yanagisawa, G.R. No. 175303, April 11, 2012
. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue
operates as an insurmountable barrier to the subsequent assumption by the Paraaque RTC. [if !supportFootnotes][42][endif] By
insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTCs resolution of the issue
and created the possibility of conflicting decisions. The various branches of the [regional trial courts] of a province or city,
having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot
and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would
obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice. The matter is further explained thus:

It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes
the other courts."

it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its
authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court
of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions,
and to courts-martial.
Barrameda vda de Ballesteros v. Rural bank of Canaman, G.R. No. 176260,
November 24, 2010
the rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One of the exceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction
is curative in character
For sure, Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the liquidation court shall have jurisdiction in the
same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the disputed claims against the Bank.
xxx The requirement that all claims against the bank be pursued in the liquidation proceedings filed by the Central Bank is intended
to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank and designed to establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation
of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness

Union Bank of the Phils. v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 160727, June 26, 2007
The Court is certainly aware of the transfer, effected by R.A. No. 8799, to the RTC of the SECs jurisdiction defined under Section
5(d) of P.D. No. 902-A.[if !supportFootnotes][30][endif] Such transfer, however, did not, as the petitioner and the RTC posit, divest the SEC
of its jurisdiction over SEC Case No. 09-97-5764, given that it had already issued, as early as September 19, 1998, the suspension
order after it found the petition for suspension filed on September 16, 1998 to be sufficient in form and substance. Subsection 5.2
of R.A. No. 8799 prescribing the jurisdiction transfer and the rules on transition provides as follows:

5.2. The [Securities and Exchange] Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of [P.D.] No. 902-A is
hereby transferred to the appropriate [RTC]: Provided that the Supreme Court may designate the [RTC] branches that shall exercise
jurisdiction over these cases. xxx The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation
cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed. (Words in bracket and emphasis added.)

EYCOs petition for suspension for payment was, for all intents and purposes, still pending with the SEC as of June 30, 2000.
Accordingly, the SECs jurisdiction thereon, by the express terms of R.A. No. 8999, still subsists until [the suspension of payment
case and its incidents are] finally disposed. In the words of the CA:

As held by this Court Section 5.2 of RA 8799 specifically provided that the SEC shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension
of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of June 30, 2000 until finally disposed. The records are clear that the suspension of payment
was filed on September 7, 1998. As such, the petition is still pending with the SEC as of the cut-off date set in the rules. xxx[if
!supportFootnotes][31][endif]

When the law speaks of until finally disposed, the reference should include the final disposition of the liquidation and
dissolution processes since it is within the power of the SEC by law,[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] or as incident of or in continuation
of its already acquired jurisdiction over the petition for suspension of payment, [if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] to order the
dissolution/liquidation of a corporation and accordingly appoint a liquidator. In fine, the continuing exercise of jurisdiction
by the SEC over the liquidation and dissolution of the EYCO Group is warranted. Once jurisdiction attaches, the court
cannot be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the
jurisdiction of another body. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no sway in the present case, arise when
the statute expressly so provides or when the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment.[if
!supportFootnotes][34][endif]

Given the above perspective, the Court is at a loss to understand petitioners challenge against the right of the respondent to intervene
in Civil Case No. 97-2184, on the postulate that the latter lacks legal interest in the matter in litigation.

Apo Cement Corp. v. Mingson Mining Industries Corp., G.R. No. 206728, November
12, 2014
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction.1âwphi1
The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at
will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction.38 (Emphases supplied)
Here, it has been established thatthe POA proceeded to resolve the present mining dispute without affording either party any fair
and reasonable opportunity to be heard in violation of the aforementioned provisions of DENR DAO 95-23. Thus, as correctly
ruled by the DENR MAB and later affirmed by the CA, Mingson’s due process rights were violated, thereby rendering the POA’s
Decision null and void.
In this relation, the Court finds it apt to clarify that the DENR MAB did not err in taking cognizance of the due process issue. While
such issue was not assigned as an error in Mingson’s Appeal39 dated July 27, 1996, the same was squarely raised in Mingson’s
August 8, 1996 letter40 to the DENR MAB. Given the lack of any formalprocedure on appeals at that time,41 the DENR MAB
cannot be faulted for considering the letter and the issues raised therein as part of Mingson’s appeal. It must be added that the
DENR MAB is not a court of law but an administrative body; hence, it is not bound by strict rules of procedure and evidence, and
is allowed to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of each case speedily and objectively without resort to technical rules,42
as in this case.
Besides, an apparent lack of due process may be raised by a party at any time since due process is a jurisdictional requisite that all
tribunals, whether administrative or judicial, are duty bound to observe.
"[a]decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a
separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked." The Court sees no defensible reason
as to why this principle should not be herein applied.

Effect of lack of Jurisdiction

Land Bank v. Spouses Placido, G.R. No. 194168, February 13, 2013
held that the SAC validly issued the Order granting execution pending appeal in the exercise of its sound discretion
in issuing the same according to the Rules, still what this Court deemed was justified in that particular case was the
propriety of the issuance of the said Order and not the amount of monetary award that respondents were entitled which,
in turn, corresponds to the valuation of the subject property as determined by the SAC in its Decision. Thus, this Court
stated in the said case that "while this decision does not finally resolve the propriety of the determination of just
compensation by the SAC in view of the separate appeal on the matter, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the SAC Judge in allowing execution pending appeal." A void judgment or order has no legal and binding
effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be
resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or
avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored. As correctly maintained by petitioner, since the
valuation made by the SAC in its Decision dated November 20, 2000 having been annulled by the CA for its lack of
sufficient and legal basis, the void judgment can never be validly executed.

Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the situation contemplated by the CA in the assailed Decision was one
wherein payment has already been made by petitioner to the respondents during the pendency of the appeal. Nowhere
in the disquisition of the CA can it be inferred that it is enjoining the LBP to enforce the writ of execution in accordance
with the valuation made by the SAC. On the contrary, the CA respected the finality of the motion for execution pending
 appeal should the same have already been enforced. Verily, it appears that the writ of execution pending appeal
remains unimplemented as of the time the CA rendered its decision annulling the valuation made by the SAC. The
monetary award having emanated from a void valuation, it follows that the writ of execution pending appeal cannot
be properly implemented. As contemplated by the CA, the situation would have been different if the writ was already
enforced during the pendency of the appeal, for at that time the writ could still be validly enforced since the valuation
made by the SAC still stands. Necessarily, as directed by the CA, any excess amount paid to respondents should be
returned to petitioner.

Nonetheless, the amount of ₱371,154.99 representing the compensation offered by the petitioner for the land taken,
can still be properly awarded to respondents in accordance with Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals. In 32

the said case, the Court allowed the release of the offered compensation to the landowner pending the determination
of the final valuation of their properties. Of course, this is without prejudice to the outcome of the case which was
remanded to the SAC for recomputation of just compensation. Should the SAC find the said valuation too low and
determine a higher valuation for the subject property, petitioner should pay respondents the difference. Conversely,
should the SAC determine that the valuation was too high, respondents should return the excess.

Padre v. Badillo, G.R. No. 165423, January 19, 2011

A void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal
effect.
Whether the case filed by the Badillo family is a real or a personal action is irrelevant. Determining whether an action is real or
personal is for the purpose only of determining venue. In the case at bar, the question raised concerns jurisdiction, not
venue.

Although the Badillo family correctly filed a case for accion publiciana, they pleaded their case before the wrong court. In civil
cases involving realty or interest therein not within Metro Manila, the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction only if the assessed
value of the subject property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] As the assessed value of the
property subject matter of this case is P26,940.00, and since more than one year had expired after the dispossession, jurisdiction
properly belongs to the RTC.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif] Hence, the MTC has no judicial authority at all to try the case in the first place.
A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could never logically become final and executory. Such a
judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif]

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, et al., 23 SCRA 29 (1968)

It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about
a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the
case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present
case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this
plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen
years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first
time.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society,
the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction In the case just cited, by way of
explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the
action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. The Court said that it is not right for a
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason
of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication
on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up
their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

Imperial vs. Armes, G.R. No. 178842, January 30, 2017

Disputes concerning the application of the Civil Code are properly cognizable by courts of general jurisdiction." 96
The development of both the concept and application of the relationship test and controversy test reveals a growing emphasis
on the delineated jurisdiction between the SEC and ordinary courts. The delineation is based on the very purpose for which
the SEC was granted quasi-judicial powers in the first place. Under PD 902-A, the SEC exercised jurisdiction over intra-
corporate controversies precisely because it is a highly-specialized administrative body in specialized corporate matters. It
follows therefore, that where the controversy does not call for the use of any technical expertise, but the application of general
laws, the case is cognizable by the ordinary courts. In Macapalan v. Katalbas-Moscardon,97we said-
It is true that the trend is towards vesting administrative bodies like the SEC with the power to adjudicate matters coming
under their particular specialization, to insure a more knowledgeable solution of the problems submitted to them. This
would also relieve the regular courts of a substantial number of cases that would otherwise swell their already clogged
dockets. But as expedient as this policy may be, it should not deprive the courts of justice of their power to decide ordinary
cases in accordance with the general laws that do not require any particular expertise or training to interpret and apply.
Otherwise, the creeping take-over by the administrative agencies of the judicial power vested in the courts would render the
judiciary virtually impotent in the discharge of the duties assigned to it by the Constitution.98
Applying these principles to this case, we rule that the SEC does not have jurisdiction to order the cancellation of the sale
between Napal and Cruz. It also has no jurisdiction to cancel Cruz's TCT and order its transfer to NIDSLAND.
To assail the validity of the sale, Imperial and NIDSLAND sought to prove that the sale to Cruz was simulated. This involves
the application of the law on sales. As we have already held in Intestate Estate of Alexander T. Ty, the issue of whether a sale
is simulated falls within the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts. It does not concern an adjudication of the rights of Imperial,
NIDSLAND and Napal under the Corporation Code and the internal rules of the corporation. The resolution of these
questions requires the application of an entire gamut of laws that goes well beyond the expertise of the SEC.
Meanwhile, the question of whether Cruz's TCT should be cancelled goes into the proper application of Presidential Decree
No. 152999 and related doctrines. Specifically, there is a need to take into consideration whether the SEC Petition is a
collateral attack on the certificate of title which goes against the well-established rule of indefeasibility. The resolution of
this question demands the application of our laws on land title and deeds, a matter outside the ambit of the SEC's special
competence.
Indeed, our jurisprudence has leaned in favor of recognizing the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies. However, this
jurisdiction must always be viewed within the context of its grant. The law vests quasi-judicial powers to administrative
bodies over matters that require their particular competence and specialized expertise. This grant of jurisdiction is not and
should not be justification to deprive courts of law of their jurisdiction as determined by law and the Constitution. Courts
of law are the instruments for the adjudication of legal disputes. In a system of government where courts of law exist
alongside quasi-judicial bodies, the need to harmonize apparent conflicts in jurisdiction require a determination of whether
the matter to be resolved pertains to a general question of law which belongs to ordinary courts or whether it refers to a
highly specialized question that can be better resolved by a quasi-judicial body in accordance with its power vested by law.
 In overstepping its jurisdiction, the SEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Buenaflor vs. Ramirez, G.R. 201607, Feb. 15, 2017

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction over a case involving the validity of the termination of employment of
an officer or employee of the Civil Service.

The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a particular action is determined by the plaintiffs allegations in the
complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts. 21 Accordingly,
we need to peruse the complaint of Ramirez to determine the issue presented here.
It cannot be disputed that Ramirez's complaint was thereby challenging the validity of his termination from the service,
and that he thereby wanted the RTC to pry into the circumstances of the termination. Such challenge was outside of the
RTC's sphere of authority. Instead, it was the CSC that was vested by law with jurisdiction to do so. Disciplinary cases and
cases involving personnel actions affecting employees in the Civil Service, like appointment or separation from the service,
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.23 Indeed, the Constitution vests in the CSC the jurisdiction over all employees
of the Government, including all its branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, as well as government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters.24
Ramirez was one such employee.
It is clarified that the CSC has jurisdiction over a case involving a civil servant if it can be regarded as equivalent to a labor
dispute resoluble under the Labor Code; conversely, the regular court has jurisdiction if the case can be decided under the
general laws, such as when the case is for the recovery of private debts, or for the recovery of damages due to slanderous
remarks of the employer, or for malicious prosecution of the employees. 27 The mere fact that the parties are members of
the Civil Service should not remove the controversy from the general jurisdiction of the courts of justice and place them
under the special jurisdiction of the CSC.28
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law; it cannot be acquired through a
waiver; it cannot be enlarged by the omission of the parties; it cannot be conferred by the acquiescence of the court. 29
Specifically, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, did not vest jurisdiction in the RTC over matters relating to the Civil
Service. Consequently, the RTC could not arrogate unto itself the hearing and decision of a subject matter outside of its
jurisdiction.
Buenaflor was entirely justified in raising in his answer the special and affirmative defense that the RTC was bereft of jurisdiction
to hear and resolve Ramirez's complaint. When a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to
dismiss the action.30 Upon the filing of the complaint, the RTC could only have dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Any
further actions the RTC took, including rendering the decision on December 28, 2007, were void and ineffectual. Verily,
the decisions or orders rendered by courts without or in excess of their jurisdiction are void,31 and cannot be the source of
any right, or the creator of any obligation.32
The void and ineffectual decision of the RTC did not attain finality despite the supposedly belated appeal by Buenaflor. As
emphasized in Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,33 a void judgment - being non-existent in legal contemplation - does not become
final and executory even with the belated filing of an appeal. Moreover, the Court has pronounced hat because a void judgment
does not attain finality, a petition for certiorari to declare its nullity should not be dismissed for untimeliness. 35 Under the
circumstances, the CA should have heard and granted the petition for certiorari of Buenaflor instead of dismissing it for
the reasons advanced in the assailed resolutions.

Suspended jurisdiction

PAL v. Kurangking, 389 SCRA 588

On 15 December 2000, the Supreme Court, in A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, adopted the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation and directed to be transferred from the SEC to Regional Trial Courts,[2] all petitions for rehabilitation filed
by corporations, partnerships, and associations under P.D. 902-A in accordance with the amendatory provisions of Republic Act
No. 8799. The rules require trial courts to issue, among other things, a stay order in the enforcement of all claims, whether for
money or otherwise, and whether such enforcement is by court action or otherwise, against the corporation under rehabilitation, its
guarantors and sureties not solidarily liable with it.
The stay order is effective from the date of its issuance until the dismissal of the petition or the termination of the rehabilitation
proceedings.[3]
 The interim rules must likewise be read and applied along with Section 6(c) of P.D. 902-A, as so amended, directing that
upon the appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body pursuant to the decree, all actions for
claims against the distressed corporation pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly.
Paragraph (c) of Section 6 of the law reads:
Section 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx.
c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real or personal, which is the subject of the action pending before the
Commission in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order to
preserve the rights of the parties-litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing public and creditors: x x x Provided, finally,
That upon appointment of a management committee, the rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree,
all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships, or associations under management or receivership pending before
any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly.
A claim is said to be a right to payment, whether or not It is reduced to judgment, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or
contingent, matured or unmatured, disputed or undisputed, legal or equitable, and secured or unsecured.[4] In Finasia Investments
and Finance Corporation[5] this Court has defined the word claim, contemplated in Section 6(c) of P.D. 902-A, as referring to debts
or demands of a pecuniary nature and the assertion of a right to have money paid as well.
Verily, the claim of private respondents against petitioner PAL is a money claim for the missing luggages, a financial demand,
that the law requires to be suspended pending the rehabilitation proceedings. [6] In B.F. Homes, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[7] the
Court has ratiocinated:
x x x (T)he reason for suspending actions for claims against the corporation should not be difficult to discover. it is not
really to enable the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to substitute the defendant in any pending action
against it before any court, tribunal, board or body. Obviously, the real justification is to enable the management committee
or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that
might unduly hinder or prevent the rescue of the debtor company. To allow such other action to continue would only add
to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted
in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.[8]

Residual Jurisdiction

DBP vs. Hon. Carpio, G.R. No. 195450, February 1, 2017

Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights
of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal; to approve compromises; to permit appeals by
indigent litigants; to order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow the withdrawal of
the appeal, provided these are done prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, even if the appeal has
already been perfected or despite the approval of the record on appeal 24 or in case of a petition for review under Rule 42, before
the CA gives due course to the petition.25
The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the
appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or
the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective
orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal of the appeal.26
From the foregoing, it is clear that before the trial court can be said to have residual jurisdiction over a case, a trial on the
merits must have been conducted; the court rendered judgment; and the aggrieved party appealed therefrom.
In this case, there was no trial on the merits as the case was dismissed due to improper venue and respondents could not
have appealed the order of dismissal as the same was a dismissal, without prejudice. Section 1 (h), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure states that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. Indeed, there is
no residual jurisdiction to speak of where no appeal has even been filed.27
In Strongworld Construction Corporation, et al. v. Hon. Perello, et al., 28 the Court elucidated on the difference between a
dismissal with prejudice and one without prejudice:
We distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from a dismissal without prejudice. The former disallows and bars the refiling of
the complaint; whereas, the same cannot be said of a dismissal without prejudice. Likewise, where the law permits, a
dismissal with prejudice is subject to the right of appeal.1âwphi1
Briefly stated, dismissals that are based on the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment or by the statute of limitations; (2) that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid,
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (3) that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under
the provisions of the statute of frauds, bar the refiling of the same action or claim. Logically, the nature of the dismissal
founded on any of the preceding grounds is with prejudice because the dismissal prevents the refiling of the same action or claim.
Ergo, dismissals based on the rest of the grounds enumerated are without prejudice because they do not preclude the refiling of the
same action.
xxx
As has been earlier quoted, Section 1(h), Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that no appeal may be
taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. The same section provides that in such an instant where the
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.29
Here, the RTC dismissed the replevin case on the ground of improper venue. Such dismissal is one without prejudice and does not
bar the refiling of the same action; hence, it is not appealable. Clearly, the RTC did not reach, and could not have reached, the
residual jurisdiction stage as the case was dismissed due to improper venue, and such order of dismissal could not be the
subject of an appeal. Without the perfection of an appeal, let alone the unavailability of the remedy of appeal, the RTC did
not acquire residual jurisdiction. Hence, it is erroneous to conclude that the RTC may rule on DBP's application for
damages pursuant to its residual powers.

Hierarchy of courts

Mendoza v. Villas, G.R. No. 187256, FEB. 23, 2011

The instant petition is a direct recourse to this Court from the assailed orders of the RTC. Notably, petitioners did not cite
the rule under the Rules of Court by which the petition was filed. If the petition is to be treated as a petition filed under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, the petition must be dismissed outright for having been filed prematurely.

In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[12]a petition for
certiorari filed under Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court, violating the principle of hierarchy of
courts, to wit:

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the following
pronouncements:

This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should
be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385.
February 20, 2013
We resolve to PARTLY GRANT the petition.
Relaxation of procedural rules for compelling reasons
Second, while the principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed require that recourses should be made to the lower courts
before they are made to the higher courts,15 this principle is not an absolute rule and admits of exceptions under well-
defined circumstances. In several cases, we have allowed direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition;16when dictated by public welfare
and the advancement of public policy; when demanded by the broader interest of justice; when the challenged orders were
patent nullities;17 or when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified our immediate and
direct handling of the case.18
The Republic claims that the respondent judge violated and continues to violate its right to due process by allowing the private
respondents and several others to intervene in the case sans notice to the Republic; by extending to them the benefit of the original
injunction without the requisite injunction bond applicable to them as separate injunction applicants; and by continuing to suspend
the Republic’s right to collect excise taxes from the private respondents and from the lower court petitioners, thus adversely
affecting the government’s revenues. To our mind, the demonstrated extent of the respondent judge’s actions and their effects
constitute special and compelling circumstances calling for our direct and immediate attention.
Lastly, under our rules of procedure,19 service of the petition on a party, when that party is represented by a counsel of record, is a
patent nullity and is not binding upon the party wrongfully served. 20 This rule, however, is a procedural standard that may admit
of exceptions when faced with compelling reasons of substantive justice manifest in the petition and in the surrounding
circumstances of the case.21 Procedural rules can bow to substantive considerations through a liberal construction aimed at
promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 22
The Republic has consistently and repeatedly maintained that it never received a copy of the motions and complaints-in-
intervention, as evidenced by the certification of the Docket Division of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG);

A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Mondejar, G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and
the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution. 25 Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims
cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, 26 does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security
Pacific Assurance Corporation,27 wherein it was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available where there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." the Court ruled:
that the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not
constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an
adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere absence – of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.
Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action29 designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and
not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted
the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not
the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material
to the controversy.30
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the
propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling.
Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the RTC).1âwphi1 To be sure,
the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari.31Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his
action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates
that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court. 32 This procedure is also
in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.33

In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No.
11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition

Maza vs. Turla, G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017

This petition is an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts.
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the
judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from
the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include
the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these
functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial
boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are
physically presented before them. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical
considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by
the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court.
But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a
nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be
novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

the Supreme Court's role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when these become
exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of
such doctrine.

Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power to take cognizance and
assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners,
we have provided exceptions to this doctrine.

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at
the most immediate time.
A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the imminence and
clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence.
Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet
exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court
Fifth, ... Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ...
Seventh, [there is] no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[.]
... The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.
Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by
the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as
clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the past, questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens' right to bear arms, government contracts involving modernization of voters'
registration lists, and the status and existence of a public office.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct resort to this
court.70 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In First United Constructors Corp. v. Poro Point Management Corp. (PPMC), et al.,71 this Court reiterated that it "will not
entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari."72
In this case, the presence of compelling circumstances warrants the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction. At the time the petition
was filed, petitioners were incumbent party-list representatives. The possibility of their arrest and incarceration should the
assailed Orders be affirmed, would affect their representation of their constituents in Congress.

III. RULE 1, Sections 1 to 6, ROC

Redeña v. CA, G.R. No. 146611, February 6, 2007

The Court has often stressed that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They
were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots
of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not
the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation. 12
The Rules itself expressly states in Section 2 of Rule 1 that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
Courts, therefore, not only have the power but the duty to construe and apply technical rules liberally in favor of substantive
law and substantial justice. Furthermore, this Court, unlike courts below, has the power not only to liberally construe the rules,
but also to suspend them, in favor of substantive law or substantial rights. Such power inherently belongs to this Court, which is
expressly vested with rule-making power by no less than the Constitution.13 1awphi1.net
It is equally settled, however, that this Court’s power to liberally construe and even to suspend the rules, presupposes the
existence of substantial rights in favor of which, the strict application of technical rules must concede. The facts are borne
out by the records pertaining to petitioner’s purported undivided share in the property at M. Calim Street, Famy, Laguna,
and the property in Poroza clearly showed that these two properties had been subject of an agreement (Exh. "1") whereby
petitioner recognized respondent’s rights to said properties. This fact binds this Court, there being nothing on record with the trial
court as to the herein alleged fraud against the petitioner. Upon thorough deliberation of the supposed substantial rights claimed by
the petitioner with the court below, the Court finds no cogent basis to favorably rule on the merits of the appeal even if it may
be given due course which is indispensable to justify this Court in considering this case as an exception to the rules.
The present case will have to be decided in accordance with existing rules of procedure. We apply the settled principle that
petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as when
there is no other available or adequate remedy.14 Hence, a petition for relief may not be availed of where a party has another
adequate remedy available to him, which is either a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision of the lower
court, and he is not prevented from filing such motion or taking the appeal. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a
party who seeks to be relieved from the effect of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law is due to his own negligence,
or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which
has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure taken by
counsel.15
Under Section 2 of Rule 38, supra, of the Rules of Court, a party prevented from taking an appeal from a judgment or final
order of a court by reason of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, may file in the same court and in the same
case a petition for relief praying that his appeal be given due course. This presupposes, of course, that no appeal was taken
precisely because of any of the aforestated reasons which prevented him from appealing his case. Hence, a petition for relief under
Rule 38 cannot be availed of in the CA, the latter being a court of appellate jurisdiction. For sure, under the present Rules, petitions
for relief from a judgment, final order or other proceeding rendered or taken should be filed in and resolved by the court in the
same case from which the petition arose. Thus, petition for relief from a judgment, final order or proceeding involved in a
case tried by a municipal trial court shall be filed in and decided by the same court in the same case, just like the procedure
followed in the present Regional Trial Court.16
Here, the record shows that petitioner in fact filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, which the latter granted in its order
of December 11, 1997 and ordered the elevation of the records to the CA. In turn, the CA, in its resolution of September 28,
1998, required the petitioner, thru his former counsel, Atty. Geminiano Almeda, to file his appellant’s brief. But petitioner
failed to comply. Consequently, in its resolution of March 9, 1999, the CA considered the appellant’s appeal as
ABANDONED and DISMISSED the same.
Additionally, after the dismissal of his appeal, petitioner filed with the CA a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal resolution.
Unfortunately, however, the motion was filed very much late on November 8, 1999. Expectedly, in its resolution 17 of November
25, 1999, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, to wit:
The last day to file a motion for reconsideration was on 06 April 1999 and as of 18 October 1999 no such motion was ever filed;
in fact on 19 October 1999 the court resolved that an entry of judgment may now be issued. The motion for reconsideration,
however, pleas for leniency on account of his former lawyer’s inefficiency and negligence in that he failed to appeal the case.
This is not well taken.
Petitioner presents himself as a mere farmer seeking the Court’s leniency to the point of disregarding the rules on reglementary
period for filing pleadings. But he fails to point out any circumstance which might lead the Court to conclude that his station
in life had in any way placed his half-brother in a more advantageous position. As we see it, petitioner failed to show
diligence in pursuing his cause. His condition as a farmer, by itself alone, does not excuse or exempt him from being vigilant
on his right. He cannot lay the blame solely on his former lawyer. It is settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence
and omission of their counsel.18 While, exceptionally, a client may be excused from the failure of his counsel, the circumstances
obtaining in this case do not convince the Court to take exception.
In seeking exemption from the above rule, petitioner claims that he will suffer deprivation of property without due process
of law on account of the gross negligence of his previous counsel. To him, the negligence of his former counsel was so gross
that it practically resulted to fraud because he was allegedly placed under the impression that the counsel had prepared
and filed his appellant’s brief. He thus prays the Court reverse the CA and remand the main case to the court of origin for
new trial.
Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsel’s negligence and allowed a litigant another chance to
present his case (1) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when application
of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require.19 None
of these exceptions obtains here.
For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be shown.
Here, petitioner’s counsel failed to file the appellant’s brief. While this omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence,
it does not amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the proceedings below.
To recapitulate, petitioner is not entitled to relief under Rule 38, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. He was not prevented from
filing his notice of appeal by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, as in fact he filed one. The relief afforded by
Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law
was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise, the petition for relief will be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to
a mistake of procedure by counsel.21 The Rules allow a petition for relief only when there is no other available remedy, and
not when litigants, like the petitioner, lose a remedy by negligence.

Vda de Victoria v. CA, G.R. No. 147550, January 6, 2007

Hernandez v. Rural Bank, 81 SCRA 75

Muñoz v. Atty. Yabut, G.R. No. 142676, June 6, 2011

Go vs. UCPB, G.R. No. 156187. November 11, 2004

IV. RULE 2, Sections 1 to 6

China Banking Corp. v. CA, G.R. No.153267, June 23, 2005

BPI v. Coscolluela, G.R. No. 167724, June 27, 2006

Samson v. Spouses Gabor, G.R. No. 182970, July 23, 2014

The complaint states no cause of action as herein defendant was impleaded without stating any details ofits liabilities nor
any allegation of its violations to the plaintiff’s rights. The only allegation of the rights violated are Articles 19, 20, and 21
of the Civil Code. More importantly, there are no allegations in the complaint that defendant TRB has violated the aforesaid
laws. There is no detailon why the defendant TRB has been impleaded in the instant case.20
A perusal of the complaint would show that aside from the fact that respondent spouses had mortgaged the property subject
herein to respondent bank, there is no other allegation of an act or omission on the part of respondent Bank in violation ofa
right of petitioner. In Spouses Zepeda v. China Banking Corporation, 21 We had occasion to discuss the definition of the term
"cause of action," to wit:
A cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a remedial right. The question of whether the
complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus it
"must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action." Failure to
make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint "warrants its dismissal."
As defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another. Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation
of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain
an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. In determining whether an initiatory pleading states
a cause ofaction, "the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer?" To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts
and circumstances or other matters aliundeare not considered. The court may consider in addition to the complaint the
appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records.22
As already mentioned, there is nothing in the complaint herein which states specific overt acts to show
thatrespondent Bank acted in disregard of the petitioner’s rights. Nowhere in the complaint was it alleged that respondent
Bank had knowledge nor could have known with the exercise of due diligence that respondent spouses had acted illegally,
in order to commit a wrong against the petitioner. Petitioner should have at least specified the details of his cause of action
against respondent Bank.

Agustin v. Bacalan, 135 SCRA 340 (1985)

Plaintiff-appellant raises the issue of whether or not the Court of First Instance may, in an appeal, award the defendant-appellee's
counterclaim in an amount exceeding or beyond the jurisdiction of the court of origin.
It is well-settled that a court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a set-off or counterclaim in excess of its jurisdiction
(Section 5, Rule 5, Revised Rules of Court; Ago v. Buslon, 10 SCRA 202). A counterclaim beyond the court's jurisdiction may
only be pleaded by way of defense, the purpose of which, however, is only to defeat or weaken plaintiff's claim, but not to obtain
affirmative relief.

The rule is that a counterclaim not presented in the inferior court cannot be entertained in the Court of First
Instance on appeal — "Upon an appeal to a court of first instance from the judgment of a justice of the peace, it is not possible,
without changing the purpose of the appeal, to alter the nature of the question raised by the complaint and the answer in the original
action. There can be no doubt, therefore, of the scope of the doctrine laid down in the several decisions of the Court. Consequently,
We hold that, upon an appeal to the Court of First Instance, the plaintiff as well as the defendant cannot file any pleading or
allegation which raises a question essentially distinct from that raised and decided in the justice of the peace court.
Thus, the defendant-appellee's counterclaim beyond P10,000.00, the jurisdictional amount of the city Court of Cebu, should be
treated as having been deemed waived. It is as though it has never been brought before trial court. It may not be entertained on
appeal.
Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount,
the appellate court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by its decisions or otherwise. Appellate jurisdiction being not
only a continuation of the exercise of the same judicial power which has been executed in the court of original jurisdiction, also
presupposes that the original and appellate courts are capable of participating in the exercise of the same judicial power
It is, of course, a well-settled rule that when court transcends the limits prescribed for it by law and assumes to act where
it has no jurisdiction, its adjudications will be utterly void and of no effect either as an estoppel or otherwise ). The Court
of First Instance, in the case at bar, having awarded judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee in excess of its appellate
jurisdiction to the extent of P6,000.00 over the maximum allowable award of P10,000.00, the excess is null and void and of
no effect. Such being the case, an action to declare the nullity of the award as brought by the plaintiff-appellant before the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V is a proper remedy.
The nullity of such portion of the decision in question, however, is not such as to affect the conclusions reached by the
court in the main case for ejectment. Where the amount set up by the defendant was not proper as a defense and it exceeded the
inferior court's jurisdiction, it cannot be entertained therein, but the court's jurisdiction over the main action will remain unaffected.
Consequently, the decision over the main action, in the case at bar, must stand, best remembering that a counter-claim, by
its very nature, is a cause of action separate and independent from the plaintiff's claim against the defendant.

Flores v. Mallare-Philipps, 144 SCRA 377 (1986)

Pantranco v. Buncan, G.R. No. 1406, March 16, 2005

Fausto vs. Multi Agri-Forest, G.R. No. 213939, October 12, 2016

Sps. Decena v. Sps. Piquero, G.R. No. 155736, March 31, 2005

Uniwide Holdings v. Cruz, 529 SCRA 664 (2007)

 Lourdes Suites v. Binaro, G.R. No. 204729, August 6, 2014

Mercene vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 192971, Jan. 10, 2018

labelling-an obligation to have prescribed without specifying the circumstances behind it is a mere conclusion of law. As
would be discussed further, the fact that GSIS had not instituted any action within ten (10) years after the loan had been contracted
is insufficient to hold that prescription had set in. Thus, even if GSIS' denial would not be considered as a specific denial, only the
fact that GSIS had not commenced any action, would be deemed admitted at the most. This is true considering that the
circumstances to establish prescription against GSIS have not been alleged with particularity.
In order for cause of action to arise, the following elements must be present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.17

The running of the prescriptive period of respondent's action on the mortgages did not start when it executed the mortgage
contracts with Saturnino Petalcorin in 1982.1âwphi1
The prescriptive period for filing an action may run either (1) from 1990 when the loan became due, if the obligation was covered
by the exceptions under Article 1169 of the Civil Code; (2) or from 1999 when respondent demanded payment, if the obligation
was not covered by the exceptions under Article 116919 of the Civil Code. [emphasis supplied]
In Maybank Philippines, Inc. v. Spouses Tarrosa, 20 the Court explained that the right to foreclose prescribes after ten (10) years
from the time a demand for payment is made, or when then loan becomes due and demandable in cases where demand is
unnecessary, viz:
An action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should be enforced within ten (10) years from the time the right of action
accrues, i.e., when the mortgagor defaults in the payment of his obligation to the mortgagee; otherwise, it will be barred by
prescription and the mortgagee will lose his rights under the mortgage. However, mere delinquency in payment does not necessarily
mean delay in the legal concept. To be in default is different from mere delay in the grammatical sense, because it involves
the beginning of a special condition or status which has its own peculiar effects or results.
In order that the debtor may be in default, it is necessary that: (a) the obligation be demandable and already liquidated; (b) the
debtor delays performance; and (c) the creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially, unless demand is not
necessary - i.e., when there is an express stipulation to that effect; where the law so provides; when the period is the controlling
motive or the principal inducement for the creation of the obligation; and where demand would be useless. Moreover, it is not
sufficient that the law or obligation fixes a date for performance; it must further state expressly that after the period lapses, default
will commence. Thus, it is only when demand to pay is unnecessary in case of the aforementioned circumstances, or when required,
such demand is made and subsequently refused that the mortgagor can be considered in default and the mortgagee obtains the right
to file an action to collect the debt or foreclose the mortgage.
Thus, applying the pronouncements of the Court regarding prescription on the right to foreclose mortgages, the Court finds that
the CA did not err in concluding that Mercene's complaint failed to state a cause of action. It is undisputed that his
complaint merely stated the dates when the loan was contracted and when the mortgages were annotated on the title of the
lot used as a security. Conspicuously lacking were allegations concerning: the maturity date of the loan contracted and
whether demand was necessary under the terms and conditions of the loan.
As such, the RTC erred in ruling that GSIS' right to foreclose had prescribed because the allegations in Mercene's complaint were
insufficient to establish prescription against GSIS. The only information the trial court had were the dates of the execution of the
loan, and the annotation of the mortgages on the title. As elucidated in the above-mentioned decisions, prescription of the right
to foreclose mortgages is not reckoned from the date of execution of the contract. Rather, prescription commences from the
time the cause of action accrues; in other words, from the time the obligation becomes due and demandable, or upon
demand by the creditor/mortgagor, as the case may be.

V. Rule 3 – Sections 1 to 3: Parties to a Civil Action

Iron and Steel Authority v. CA, 249 SCRA 538 (1995)

Ralla v. Ralla, 199 SCRA SCRA 495 (1991)

 Tampingco v. IAC, 207 SCRA 652

Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006

Pascual v. Pascual, G.R. No. 157830, Nov 17, 2005

Golango v. Jone B. Fung, G.R. No. 157952, September 8, 2009

Equitable PCI Bank, Inc (now known as Banco De Oro-EPCI, Inc.) v. Heirs of Antonio
C. Tiu, et al., G.R. No. 178529, September 4, 2009

Stanley Fine Furniture vs. Gallano, G.R. No. 190486, Nov. 26, 2014

Africa vs. Insurance Saving and Investment Agency, G.R. No. 206540, April 20, 2015

V-Gent, Inc. vs. Morning Star Travel, G.R. No. 186305, July 22, 2015

Saludo vs. PNB,G.R.No. 193138, Aug. 20, 2018

VI. Rule 3, Sections 4 to 6: Parties to a Civil Action

Cameron Granville Asset Mgt. vs. Chua, G.R. 191170, Sept., 2016

Dep’t of Health v. Phil Pharma Wealth, Inc., G.R. No. 182358, February 20, 2013

Air Transportation Office v. Sps.Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011

American Express Co. vs. Santiago, 49 SCRA 75 (1973)