THE NEXUS BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OF PARSI WOMEN

ABSTRACT

Every individual withholds the right to autonomy by virtue of the ‘personal liberty’ guaranteed by
Indian Constitution. This right to autonomy includes non-interference with one’s own concept of
existence and one’s own self. Autonomy is an important tool for carving and preserving the
identity. However, in Indian patriarchal society, women are not autonomous and therefore, their
identity is bound to that of others’ recognition. Women autonomy remained hostage to community
norms. A Parsi woman marrying outside their community may want to exercise her autonomy to
remain in the Parsi community in conflict with what society identifies. This creates discord
between individual and community. Can she, after exercising her right to autonomy, choose not to
secede to all the rights guaranteed to her by Zoroastrian religion? Can she create an identity
independent of societal rules or would the marriage which is considered to be as a sacred institution
be allowed to rob the identity of the women? This paper aims at answering these questions, which
gained prominence after the Parsi Woman Goolrokh Gupta married a non Parsi files Special Leave
Petition in Supreme Court for the Zoroastrian rites. It, thereby, projects a nexus between the
autonomy and the identity of the Parsi Women on constitutional touchstone and jurisprudential
basis in view of the Goolrokh Gupta v. Burjor Pardiwala1 case. The hallmark of democracy and
free society necessitate Parsis women to define their own identity in conflict between cultures and
individuals.

1
Goolrokh M. Gupta v. Burjor Pardiwala, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1275.
 INTRODUCTION

Women have perpetually been deprived of their rights. It is always the society that comes into the
picture to impose the rules, whether justified or unjustified by offering their explanation for its
justification. The explanation is more or less inclined towards divinity. However, the Indian
Constitution provides for various provision for the equal rights of women. Supreme Court has
always tested the justification on the touchstone of constitutional morality and protects the right
of the women and the same is evident from the recent judgement of Indian Young Lawyers
Association v. State of Kerala2.

In ancient times, women were never allowed to identify and define their self. But in the recent
past, with the women empowerment, they have started identifying themselves as an individual,
coming out of the shackles of the society’s definition. However, due to the long-established
practice of the rule of robbing their identities, one has to go to Supreme Court in order to legally
recognize their right of self.

Parsi women marrying outside the religion, lose their religious identity, meaning thereby that their
identity and rights are binary with the religious and community norms ignoring their autonomy.
They either can exercise their right to interfaith marriage or right to freedom of religion. A Parsi
woman marrying outside their community may want to exercise her autonomy to remain in the
Parsi community in conflict with what society identifies. She may want to choose not to secede to
all the rights guaranteed by Zoroastrian religion creating an identity independent of societal rules.
This autonomy is demanded by a Parsi Woman Goolrokh Gupta marrying a non Parsi, thereby,
projecting a nexus between the autonomy and identity of the Parsi women.

The paper consists of 5 sections. Firstly, it discusses the autonomy and identity that is guaranteed
to every person projecting the node between two. As the paper sees the nexus of religious identity
of Parsi women, the second section describes the status quo of right of autonomy and religious
identity of Parsi’s women. Thirdly, the paper focusses on the move initiated by Goolrukh Gupta
demanding for the change in the status quo. Further section of the paper put the autonomy and
religious identity of the Parsi women on the anvil of constitution and jurisprudence.

2
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1690.
 AUTONOMY AND IDENTITY

Article 21, guaranteeing Right to Life and Personal Liberty, encompasses host of rights by way of
its extended meaning by Hon’ble Supreme Court which are essentially fundamental to an
individual. Autonomy is essential and important aspect to live an independent and dignified life.
Autonomy nourishes dignity by allowing each individual to make critical choices for the exercise
of liberty.3 Particularly, the phrase “personal liberty” includes within it the aspects of autonomy,
self-determination and personhood. 4 At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.5 Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct.6 The notion of the personal autonomy of every individual marches with the presumption
of liberty enjoyed in a free polity: a presumption which consists in the principle that every
interference with the freedom of the individual stands in need of objective justification.7

Autonomy must mean far more than the right to occupy an envelope of space in which a socially
detached individual can act freely from interference and what is crucial is the nature of the activity,
not its site.8 Autonomy provides choice to an individual as regards to one’s own self in every facet.
Autonomy is a process; being autonomous gives human life value by allowing us to act on our
own choices and motivations.9 Without autonomy, a human life cannot live a dignified life. Human
Dignity, in modern time, is a value which is not just limited as social, philosophical or religious
value but as a constitutional value. Human Dignity as a constitutional value is the freedom of
choice of human being, the autonomy of their will and their human identity.10

Human dignity and human freedom imply that a man should be free to shape himself and his fate
in a way that he deems best fits.11 A sense of one's own personal identity is crucial to human beings
and without a sense of identity, the self can disintegrate, be lost, obscured and vulnerable. 12 A

3
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1690.
4
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
5
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
6
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
7
R. (on the application of Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, (2009) EWCA Civ 414.
8
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, 1998 SCC OnLine ZACC 15.
9
ROS HAGUE, AUTONOMY AND IDENTITY: THE POLITICS OF WHO WE ARE (Routledge 2011).
10
Aharon Barak, Human Dignity: A Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right, 192 PROC. BR. ACAD. 361,
363 (2013).
11
Cossey v. UK, (1990) 13 EHRR 622.
12
ANTHONY ELLIOTT, CONCEPTS OF THE SELF (Cambridge: Polity Press 2001).
person is commonly identified by the identity he or she creates. Identities have been defined as
“the fundamental bases upon which society, independent of the special and unique features of each
individual, orders and arranges its members.”13 Furthermore, identity is seen as “an individual’s
sense of self, group affiliations, structural positions, and ascribed and achieved statuses.”14 Wendy
Cadge and Lynn Davidman have observed that religious identity ... is a matter of both ascription
and achievement, meaning that it is often viewed as a combination of something that is determined
by birth and also the result of conscious choices made over the course of one’s life.15

By recognizing our liberty as autonomous persons, the Constitution recognizes our ability to
preserve and shape our identities in interactions with others.16 Autonomy is important to identity
because it offers the prospect of taking control of identity and the means for self-definition. 17
Autonomy is just a tool to carve and preserve our identity, and the relevant question is not: “How
do you want to exercise your autonomy”, but: “How do you define yourself”.18 But sometime our
identity is bound to that of others’ recognition and remain hostage to the community norms. This
view allows for the common conflict between individual and society: while we feel autonomous
standing for what we feel ourselves to be, society can only understand our autonomy as the
preservation of our social identity. 19 Individual is thus forced to choose either their self-identity
or social identity.

We think of ourselves as authors of our own lives, but in many respects, we have little authority
over our identity because our identities are contingent and malleable, created and documented by
others.20 We have a pen and a blank notebook to write, however, the writing is subject to the
dictation of society. In Indian patriarchal society, women’s identity is not even dictated but written
itself by the society. They are always identified in relation to father before marriage and husband
after marriage. Even the name of the woman gets converted and submerged with that of husband.
Thus, women’s autonomous persona is traditionally challenged and tries to confine it within their

13
Morris Rosenberg, The Self-Concept: Social Product and Social Force, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 593, 601 (Morris Rosenberg & Ralph H. Turner eds., 1981).
14
Lori Peek, Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity, 66 SOC. RELIGION 215, 216–17 (2005).
15
Wendy Cadge & Lynn Davidman, Ascription, Choice, and the Construction of Religious Identities in the
Contemporary United States, 45 J. SCI. STUD. RELIGION 23, 24 (2006).
16
K S Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1642.
17
ROS HAGUE, AUTONOMY AND IDENTITY: THE POLITICS OF WHO WE ARE (Routledge 2011).
18
JC Correia, Autonomy and Identity, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 141, 141 (2000).
19
Id.
20
Annette R. Appell, Certifying Identity, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361 365 (2014).
families, kin and communities. Questions of women’s autonomy were historically to be subsumed
within questions of religion, community and personal law and hardly ever treated as a matter of
either individual right or justice. 21

PARSI’S RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

Parsis in India are the descendent of the migrant from the Persia, leaving their fatherland, in order
to escape from the religious persecution from the Arabs. Since then, they have lived in India,
keeping a separate identity, despite adapting many local customs and practices.22 They continue to
follow their own religion of forefather and erected Agiaries and Dokhma for the performance of
religious worship. It is the Zoroastrian religion to which the Parsis have remained faithful that have
moulded the admittedly high civilisation and culture of the Parsis, and have made them
conspicuous among the teeming millions of the Indian population.23

According to concept of purity in Parsi, only Parsis are allowed to enter the fire temple (Agiaries)
and towers of silence (Dakhma). Agiaries are the places where ‘holy fire’ is kept lighted. A woman
marrying outside community is deemed to have denounced her Parsi religion and is identified
herself by the husband’s religion. As a result, women engaging in interfaith marriages are not
permitted to enter the fire temple and towers of silence because as per their faith, among various
symbols, fire is symbol of purity. However, a male engaging in interfaith marriage is allowed to
enter the fire temple and towers of silence. Bombay High Court asserted that Plaintiff (male),
marrying non Parsis, born of Parsi Parents are undoubtedly entitled to enter the Agiary and make
as much use of it as any other Parsi is entitled to make, to participate in every fund that exists for
the benefit of all Zoroastrians and as a matter of right to have their bodies disposed of in the Tower
of Silence.24

The Parsi rule is similar to patrilineality within caste society which formally enjoins endogamy,
but accepts hypergamy whereby a male from an upper caste is permitted to marry a woman from

21
Paula Banerjee, Debates on Women Autonomy in India, MAHANIRBAN CALCUTTA RESEARCH GROUP (2005).
22
Kamala Ganesh, Intra-community Dissent and Dialogue: The Bombay Parsis and the Zoroastrian Diaspora, 57
SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN 315, (2008).
23
J. M. Unvala, Political and Cultural Relations between Iran and India, 28 ANNALS OF THE BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 165 (1947).
24
Dinsha Manekji Petit v. Jamsetji Jijibhai, (1909) 11 Bom LR 85.
a lower caste but not the other way around: the well-known dichotomy between anuloma and
pratiloma norms.25

It implies that a woman is autonomous to marry a Parsi or a non Parsi. However, her identity is
submerged with the identity of her husband in case she marries a non Parsi. She is not autonomous
to choose her identity if she marries a non Parsi. A women identity is defined by the Parsis’
orthodox norms. These norms closely supervise and control marriages, especially of women and
act as gateways to the system. Women have to remain within the gateways in order to define her
religious identity of her choice.

The judgment laid down by judges Dinshaw Davar and Frank Beaman26 stated that a Parsi can
only be so termed if he or she is born of a Parsi father. Then why the identity of a woman born of
Parsi parents ceased to remain Parsi after interfaith marriage? There exists no legal justification
for the same. Jehangir Patel, editor of community magazine Parsiana says, “It’s been over 100
years now. Unfortunately, no woman has taken up the issue in a big way.” However, Goolrokh
Gupta undertook the issue and makes a move against the orthodox mindset.

MOVE AGAINST STATUS QUO OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

Goolrokh Gupta, from Valsad, Gujarat, was born in Parsi community who engaged in interfaith
marriage. She had seen her Parsi friend who was denied to attend her parent’s funeral rites. She,
therefore, wrote to Valsad Anjuman insisting to enter doongerwadi (place where funeral rites took
place) when her parents would die. The response was in negative. Thus, she petitioned Gujarat
High Court seeking issuance of a writ against the trust to allow the petitioner or any other Parsi
Zoroastrian woman married to a non-Parsi to enter and worship at the fire temple and performs
funeral ceremonies at the tower of silence.27 However, Gujarat High Court ruled against her.
Therefore, the matter was appealed to Supreme Court and the case comes up for final hearing in
the month of August. Amidst hearing, parties have agreed and declared that the Respondents will,
on compassionate grounds, permit the Petitioner to attend the funeral prayers (Paidust ceremony)

25
GANESH, supra note 23.
26
Dinsha Manekji Petit v. Jamsetji Jijibhai, (1909) 11 Bom LR 85.
27
Goolrokh M. Gupta v. Burjor Pardiwala, 2012 SCC OnLine Guj 2058.
of her parents performed inside the Prayer Hall of the Bungli (Bungalow) of the Towers of Silence
Complex (Doongerwadi) at Valsad through memorandum filed.28

High Court while ruling gave a Doctrine of Merger which states that the personality including
identity gets merged with the identity of the husband. High Court had relied on the common law
for this doctrine. However, common law has itself abandoned this doctrine. The ruling that a
woman marrying under the Special Marriage Act automatically undertakes the religion of her
husband seems unfair. Supreme Court observed, “The purpose of the Act of 1954 is for the parties
to the marriage to retain their individual religious identity post marriage. If either party had to
convert to the religion of the other, then they would have solemnised the marriage under the Hindu
Marriage Act of 1956. Unless the wife expressly denounces her religion and converts to the
religion of her husband, logically there is a presumption that she is continuing to practice her own
religion. Prima facie there is no case for accepting the application of the doctrine of merger.”29

ON THE ANVIL OF CONSTITUTION

Autonomy is integral part of Right to personal liberty. The norms of a particular community seem
reducing the autonomy, especially for the women. Autonomy could be coloured because
sometimes people have to make decisions on matters around which there tends to be fairly intense
pressure to do and think as most other people are doing and thinking, especially within a
community.30 Individual decision may be influenced by friends, community etc. Primae Facie, the
decision of an individual appears autonomous but viewing it from broad framework will bring to
notice the coloured autonomous decision of an individual.

Humans, being a social being have to live in society and follow the societal norms which are
mostly based on the community they belong to. Thus, the community norms reflect inadequate
respect for autonomy thereby, individual liberty. The magnitude of interference with autonomy
rises when these community norms is prima facie discriminatory on the gender basis. These kind
of discrimination because of the community norms, could undermine autonomy by attacking the
self-respect of those discriminated against.31 Therefore, it shows inadequate concern for the

28
Goolrokh M. Gupta v. Burjor Pardiwala, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1275.
29
Id.
30
Farrah Ahmed, Personal Autonomy and the Option of Religious Law, 24 INT J LAW POLICY FAMILY, 222 (2010).
31
J Gardner, Discrimination as Injustice, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353 (1996).
welfare and identity of the one discriminated against, leaving them with inadequate resources for
an autonomous life.32

Women are always subjected to this gender discrimination. Parsis’ norm, not being an exception,
is inclined towards the man. It is discriminatory to the extent that religious identity of the woman
is completely bereft when they try to exercise their right to choose life partner outside their religion
which is fundamental to their autonomy. Community norms pressurize the woman. Women are
able to be autonomous because of the Fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution.
However, sometimes this autonomy is overpowered by the community norms in disguise of the
personal laws.

The question of professing, practicing and propagating one’s faith is a right which the human being
had from the very beginning of time and that has been recognised as an inalienable right of every
human being.33 How can then, under a secular Constitution, Parsi women could not be autonomous
on account of their religious identity?

Article 25 gave the autonomy to profess the religion one wishes. It thereby implies that one has
the autonomy to choose religion whichever she wants to practice or profess because religion is a
matter of choice. This autonomous choice will define the religious identity. Linking the
fundamental freedom with the liberty of belief, faith and worship indicates that the religion cannot
be dictated.

However, the Parsi woman doesn’t have the autonomy to define their identity after engaging
interfaith marriage. Her autonomy to marry a Parsi or non Parsi does not allow her to define the
identity. The identity is defined according to the community norms. It is ironical that on one side
constitution allows the right to freedom of religion and on the other side imposes deemed
conversion on the Parsi Woman after marriage. How can the identity of the Parsi Woman
guaranteed by the Constitution be inferior to the identity defined by the norms? This constitutional
identity permitting the autonomy cannot be allowed to suppress by the community norms
describing Parsi women religious identity.

32
Hasan, Two recent reports Voice of the Voiceless and Muslim Women Speak detail innumerable instances of distress,
which reveal that in most situations personal law undermines the rights of women, especially poor women caught in
the intersection of class and community 362 (2005)
33
Constituent Assembly Debates, 6 Dec 1948, Vol. VII.
Special Marriage Act 1954 seems strengthening the freedom of religion by providing a special
form of marriage irrespective of the faith which either party to the marriage may profess.34 The
purpose of the Special Marriage Act which allows the interfaith marriages is to retain the religious
identity of the person engaging interfaith marriages. If the religion has to be automatically deemed
to be converted on marrying outside community, then what’s the use of other personal laws like
Hindu Marriage act? The act prima facie is in conflict with the Doctrine of Merger. It implies that
Gujarat High Court had neglected the purpose of the Special marriage act and the autonomy that
a woman has in order to define his identity while giving the doctrine of merger. The court has
interpreted a secular and progressive law in an archaic and patriarchal way which is based on the
ancient feudal idea that women are ‘chattel’ – with their identity either belonging to their father or
husband, but never theirs.35

Doctrine of Merger advocated by Gujarat High Court, surpassing the autonomous right of Parsi
women over community norms could not be acceptable because it infringes the fundamental rights.
It makes Parsi women a Chameleon who has to change its colour after interfaith marriage. It seems
that marriage becomes a condition precedent for the Parsi women to enjoy civic and political rights
thereby denying their autonomy over their identity. The doctrine surpassed the religious freedom
by allowing the official gatekeeper to dictate the religion of the Parsi women. Supreme Court in
Sharaya Bano v Union of India36 affirmed the primacy of constitutional values supremacy over
these official gatekeepers’ mandate.

Even the limitation imposed seems arbitrary because this limitation is not uniform. It seems the
discretion of the trust to define their identity without any religious backing or justification. If there
exists a religious backing for deemed conversion and prohibiting the Parsis women marrying non
Parsi, then why did the trust permit the court to decide for interim relief? Why the trust did agree
to allow the Goolrokh Gupta to attend the funeral rites by way of memorandum. There are places
like Delhi, Iran, Chennai, and Allahabad etc. where women marrying non Parsi are permitted to
attend the religious rites or ceremonies. Indian Parsis are the advocate of the Iranian culture and
Iranian Zoroastrians are open in accepting the non-Zoroastrian spouse. If you go to Iran, there is

34
Special Marriage Act, 1954, No.43, Acts of Parliament, 1954, S. 4, See Statement of Object and Reason.
35
Satya Prasoon and Ashwini Tallur, Rescuing Individual Rights from the Chokehold of Groups Rights,
THE WIRE, Dec 3, 2017.
36
Sharaya Bano v Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1.
no discrimination whatsoever. Anyone and everyone are allowed to enter a fire temple.37 It, thus,
implies miscommunication by the religious denomination.

The reasoning of purity given by the Parsis does not hold valid because of its failure to answer the
sex-based discrimination which is prohibited by Article 15. Unlike Parsi Woman, a Parsi Man has
the autonomy to define their identity to practice the religion they want. This community norm of
the Parsis is a clear violation of the Article 15.

Constitution is a living document with enormous dynamism and for progressive nation. Dr
Ambedkar had, throughout the debate, felt that the Constitution can live and grow on the bedrock
of constitutional morality. He, while speaking on the same, said: “Constitutional morality is not a
natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated. We must realise that our people have yet to learn it.
Democracy in India is only a top-dressing on an Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic.”38
Constitutional Morality means bowing down before the constitutional norms and values.

Parsi Women’s religious identity is in conflict with the constitutional value of autonomy
guaranteed by Liberty. It appears that the rules are barbaric and contains no nexus between the
autonomy that a woman has to define her identity. It seems classifying women as second class and
granting separate citizenship giving altogether a separate identity. It thus becomes violative of the
rule of law by acting arbitrarily because when the caste of a person cannot be changed after inter-
caste marriage then how could religion of a person be allowed to change after her interfaith
marriage?

The traditions and conventions of the Parsis have to grow in order to ensure commitment to
constitutional morality. The democratic values survive and become successful where the people at
large and the persons in charge of the institution are strictly guided by the constitutional parameters
without paving the path of deviancy and reflecting in action the primary concern to maintain
39
institutional integrity and the requisite constitutional restraints. Thus, the identity of the Parsi
Women should be left in the hand of the autonomy of the woman.

JURISPRUDENTIAL JUSTIFICATION

37
Jyoti Shelar, The Conflict Within: Parsis and Gender Rights, THE HINDU, May 25, 2017.
38
Constituent Assembly Debates, 1948, Vol. VII.
39
SALMAN KHURSHID, TRIPLE TALAQ: EXAMINING FAITH (Oxford University Press 2018)
Traditionally, independence is connoted by the Autonomy which reflects the individualism. J S
Mill is the ardent supporter of the individualism. According to him, “Over himself, over his own
body and mind, the individual is sovereign.” 40 Mill expounds the concept of individual freedom.
The matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty. 41 When Parsi Women
did not have control over herself, how could she be a sovereign entity in respect of her life? Parsi
Women too should have sovereignty over her religious identity after they exercise their right to
choose her life partner.

Aristotle's argument concerns the question of what it is that makes an action 'voluntary', done of a
person's own free will, and in order to answer this question, he distinguished between actions
whose origin was 'inside' a person, and those whose origin was 'outside', which resulted from
external influences or pressure or compulsion. 42 But in the model of autonomy, an autonomous
action is seen as its point of origin; it must have an 'immaculate conception', as it were, from within
the self.43 Parsi women marrying outside community was from within, it is an autonomous action
whose origin lies ‘inside’. However, the acceptance of religious identity as non-Zoroastrian was
from ‘outside’ being not autonomous. It is the severity of pressure from the society that would
make an action non-voluntary. Parsi women like Goolrokh Gupta who did not accept their identity
from ‘outside’ keeps on challenging the decision in order to exercise her own free will. They desire
autonomy in a clear and comprehendible manner by demanding their religious identity originating
from ‘inside’.

Marshall suggests three characteristics which are crucial to 'perhaps everyone's identity': 'sex,
knowledge and understanding of one's origins and past experiences, and one's religious or other
belief system'.44 When Parsi Women experience and practice Zoroastrian religion, then her identity
after marriage cannot automatically deemed to be changed. However, her identity is largely created
by social force. It remained hostage to the community norms. Women are not allowed to take an

40
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS (Oxford University Press 1859).
41
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
42
J Grimshaw, ‘Autonomy and Identity in Feminist Thinking’ in M. Griffiths and M Whitford (eds), Feminist
Perspectives in Philosophy (Macmillan, London 1988).
43
Id.
44
LEIDEN MARSHALL, AUTONOMY, IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (5 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009).
independent and autonomous decision for her identity. Woman being acquainted and fathomable
of their past experience and origin that defines their identity has complete right to understand and
experience her future identity the way she likes.

Ros Hague in his book Autonomy and Identity: The Politics of who we are sees autonomy as a
process by which we change and develop our identity. Hague argues that identity is best understood
as changing, multiple and something we need to take control of ourselves and in order to support
this version of identity there needs to be a concept of autonomy which emphasizes self-direction
to control our identity.45 His concept of autonomy aims to be feminist to give space to develop
their identity rather than conforming to social stereotypes. It, therefore, supports the autonomy of
Parsi Women to control and create their identity without meeting requirement of the societal label.
Women are encouraged to take control of themselves, and support their identity by way of
exercising autonomy rather than remaining parasitic to the social order for the direction in order
to project their self-identity.

CONCLUSION

Discourses on women’s autonomy always remained subsumed within other discourses such as that
on rights and representations because Indian society even until the recent past did not treat women
as autonomous subjects.46 It was only after women successfully led autonomous movements in
different parts of India from the 1980s until the present times that there emerged a growing
realisation that women are autonomous subjects even when they represent their communities.47
However, Parsis Women still lagged behind. The movement led by non Parsi demanding their
religious identity will provide them as autonomous status.

The crux of problem lies in the fact that women are treated as part of families and communities
and not individuals.48 Each individual exists within a particular culture and is immersed in it from
birth, often including immersion in a particular religion or political ideology. 49 The choice of
religious identity is involuntary for the Parsi woman when her individual rights are automatically

45
ROS HAGUE, AUTONOMY AND IDENTITY: THE POLITICS OF WHO WE ARE (Routledge 2011).
46
Paula Banerjee, ‘Debates on Women Autonomy in India’ (2005) Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group <
http://www.mcrg.ac.in/pp4.pdf > accessed on 6 July 2018.
47
Id.
48
RANABIR SAMADDAR (ED.), THE POLITICS OF AUTONOMY: INDIAN EXPERIENCES, (SAGE, 2005).
49
Dinah Shelton, On Identity, 49 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1 (2016).
superseded on engaging interfaith marriage. Acceptance of changing the surname as a community
norm after the marriage could not be taken as a license of changing her religious identity as well.

Parsis claim exclusive rights to Zoroastrianism, so making the ethnic sacrifice may again be the
only way to save their ancient religion. Some 1,200 years ago, didn’t their forefathers bravely
abandon their millennia-long Persian identity for just such a worthier cause? 50 Allowing women
to exercise their freedom will encourage the people to profess and practice the religion by their
heart rather than compulsion.

Parsi’s Women identity should not be curtailed by anyone else except the women herself. She is
not a property that is mortgaged to her husband after the marriage. She should be allowed, after
exercising her right to autonomy, to choose not to secede to all the rights guaranteed by Zoroastrian
religion because it is her identity and she has complete right to define the same. Their religious
identity should, apart from birth, result from the conscious choices she makes during her life. There
are numerous constitutional and jurisprudential argument mentioned above in favour of the
autonomous religious identity of Parsi Women. If the supreme authority agrees with the
autonomous religious identity, then who are the community norms to curtail or overpower that
supreme authority. Law should take care of the Parsi women interests who are fundamental unit
of the society. Law should act as a negotiation between individual and community. Along with
law, individual should also concert commitment for the cause. After all, laying the strong
foundation of the constitution is the duty of every citizen of the country and overpowering it, will
result in the interference in the operation of the law.

The tradition of local autonomy and individual conscience among Parsis make it difficult to
enforce any autonomous decision by Parsi women of their identity and democratic discussion is
virtually the only way forward, uncertain though its outcome may be.51 Women in the democratic
institution should create an identity independent of the societal norms. It is true that the identity
keeps on changing but that change should not be because of force or pressure instead it should be
independent. The hallmark of democracy and free society necessitate Parsis women to define their
own identity in conflict between cultures and individuals. One should always remember the

50
Bachi Karkaria, Intermarry and be Damned: 2 Parsi Women Challenge Bias, TOI, May 21, 2017.
51
GANESH, supra note 23.
observation made by Justice Kennedy in Obergefell v. Hodges52, which emphasized liberty’s
protection of “certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.” Marriage, which is considered to be
sacred institution, should not become a weapon to rob the identity of the women.

52
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)