G.R. No. L-58639; August 12, 1987 CRUZ, J.: By: Mercy _______________________________________________________________ Petitioner: CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION) Respondents: T HE HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR and RAMON PILONES Doctrine: We take this opportunity to reaffirm our concern for the lowly worker who, often at the mercy of his employers, must look up to the law for his protection. Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness and even favor and always with faith and hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nation's future. It is error to take him for granted. He deserves our abiding respect. How society treats him will determine whether the knife in his hands shall be a caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry weapon of defiance and revenge. The choice is obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should, we must resolve to lighten "the weight of centuries" of exploitation and disdain that bends his back but does not bow his head. ________________________________________________________________ Facts: ● Ramon Pilones, private respondent, was employed on February 16, 1978 on a probationary period of employment for six (6) months with petitioner CRP. ○ After said period, he underwent medical examination for qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he is suffering from PTB minimal. ○ Consequently, he was informed of the termination of his employment by respondent since his illness was not curable within 6 months. ● The private respondent was removed by the petitioner and complained to the Ministry of Labor. ○ His complaint was dismissed by the regional director; ■ reversed by the public respondent. ○ Required to reinstate the separated employee and pay him back wages, the petitioner brought the matter to SC, faulting the Deputy Minister (public respondent) with GAOD. ■ TRO was issued in the meantime. ● Public respondent: Ramon Pilones, the private respondent, was already a permanent employee at the time of his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure. ○ The alleged ground for his removal, to wit, "pulmonary tuberculosis minimal," was not certified as incurable within six months as to justify his separation. ○ Additionally, the private respondent insists that the petitioner should have first obtained a clearance, as required by the regulations then in force, for the termination of his employment. ● Petitioner: the private respondent was still on probation at the time of his dismissal and so had no security of tenure. ○ His dismissal was not only in conformity with company policy but also necessary for the protection of the public health, as he was handling ingredients in the processing of soft drinks which were being sold to the public.
Issue: W hether the dismissal was proper.
Held: NO. As to whether private respondent is a regular employee: ● The six-month period of probation started from February 16, 1978 and ended on August 17, 1978, but it is not shown that the private respondent's employment also ended then; on the contrary, he continued working as usual. ● Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, "an employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee." Hence, Pilones was already on permanent status when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days after he ceased to be a probationer. ● The petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the private respondent earlier because the x-ray examination was made only on August 17, 1978, and the results were not immediately available. That excuse is untenable. ○ SC noted that when the petitioner had all of six months during which to conduct such examination, it chose to wait until exactly the last day of the probation period. ○ In the light of such delay, its protestations now that reinstatement of Pilones would prejudice public health cannot but sound hollow and hypocritical. ■ By its own implied admission, the petitioner had exposed its customers to the employee's disease because of its failure to examine him before entrusting him with the functions of a "syrup man." Its belated concern for the consuming public is hardly persuasive, if not clearly insincere and self-righteous.
As to the alleged ground for dismissal: ● The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code reading as follows: Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. — Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. ● SC surmised that if the required certification was not presented, it was because the disease was not of such a nature or seriousness that it could not be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment. If so, dismissal was unquestionably a severe and unlawful sanction.
TOPIC: Protection to Labor We take this opportunity to reaffirm our concern for the lowly worker who, often at the mercy of his employers, must look up to the law for his protection. Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness and even favor and always with faith and hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nation's future. It is error to take him for granted. He deserves our abiding respect. How society treats him will determine whether the knife in his hands shall be a caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry weapon of defiance and revenge. The choice is obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should, we must resolve to lighten "the weight of centuries" of exploitation and disdain that bends his back but does not bow his head.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order of November 18, 1981, is LIFTED. The Order of the public respondent dated July 14, 1981, is AFFIRMED, but with the modification that the backwages shall be limited to three years only and the private respondent shall be reinstated only upon certification by a competent public health authority that he is fit to return to work. Costs against the petitioner. Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc G.R. No. 162994; September 17, 2004 TINGA, J.: By: Mercy _______________________________________________________________ Petitioner: DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON Respondents: G LAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC. Doctrine: No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. ________________________________________________________________ Facts: ● Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation. ● Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. ● Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. ○ Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. ● Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. ○ Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998. ● January 1999: Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Tecson’s superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs. ○ Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a relationship with an employee of a competitor company. ○ He explained that Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by Astra. ● August 1999: Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. ● September 1999: Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. ○ His application was denied in view of Glaxo’s "least-movement-possible" policy. ● November 1999: Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. ○ Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. ○ Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. ● During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but was not issued samples of products which were competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in product conferences regarding such products. ● Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. ○ Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of one-half (½) month pay for every year of service, or a total of ₱50,000.00 but he declined the offer. ● National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB): Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies is valid; affirmed Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory. ○ Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals assailing the NCMB Decision. ■ CA: DENIED the Petition for Review on the ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision: Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives.
Issue: Whether Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid.
Held: YES. T he Court finds no merit in the petition. ● Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry. ● The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. ● That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. ● The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. The only exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private conduct. Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this case. Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee. ● The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which forms part of respondent’s Employee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, such as that signed by Tescon, was made known to him prior to his employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction when he signed his employment contract and when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus, should be complied with in good faith." He is therefore estopped from questioning said policy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.