Short Paper: Beauchamp & Rasmussen

801074360

September 16, 2019

Lisa M. Rasmussen’s essay “Clinical Ethics Consultants are not “Ethics”

Experts—But They do Have Expertise” (2016), fits into Tom L. Beaucham’s description
of applied ethics which he equates to ethical theory. Beauchams’s describes applied
ethics as “the use of philosophical theory and methods of analysis to treat
fundamentally moral problems in the professions, technology, public policy, and the
like” (Beaucham 515). Rasmussen identifies a general moral principle which she then
uses as guidance to flesh out justification for expertise in the field clinical ethic
consolation. She also identifies a methodology that also serves to justify the expertise
of a clinical ethic consultant in the form or a checklist which is motivated from a general
principle (Rasmussen 13).

The general principle that Rasmussen starts from is “respect for autonomy” meaning
respecting ones wishes, desires, and goals in the context of their own beliefs and how
they view the world. From this principle she prescribes the default position of “allowing
individuals to make decisions based on their own notions of justification” which is
coined the procedural solution and is usually compatible with that person’s autonomy
(Rasmussen 6). However, Rasmussen is quick to provide an example when this might
not be the case such as a patient acquiescing to a loved one’s decision with the
consultant suspecting that the decision might actually go against the wishes of the
patient (Rasmussen 7-8). In this situation the default position or minor principle derived
from the general principle might be violated in some way to adhere to the general
principle. This complies with Beaucham’s vision of applied philosophy which he claims
is analogous to the method employed by Socrates. Hypothesis are tested and modified
accordingly until theoretical insight is achieved Beaucham (527-528). Rasmussen
invokes an unusual case to test her procedural solution and insight into her general
principal is achieved.

Another major aspect of Beaucham’s vision of applied ethics or ethical theory is the
bidirectional effects of general theory and practice. While it’s common to think that
general theory should inform theory in practice, Beaucham thinks much is to be gained
from implementing what we learn about practice into theory. He says, “Ideas of the
fundamental status of the theory may only serve to further the worship of this false idol”
(Beaucham 521). Rasmussen echoes this sentiment when she questions her “respect

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for autonomy” general principle for the patient by noting that almost all decisions have
effects on others. It is implied that sometimes because of what effects some options
might have on others, this effects what options the consultant chooses to present the
patient with (Rasmussen 8).

If one wanted to argue that Rasmussen’s essay is not applied ethics one could bring up
how she incorporates the influence amoral values into decisions (Rasmussen 1).
They’re argument might be that applied ethics only examines problems where only
ethical values our considered. To respond to this, I would claim that considering one’s
amoral values is actually a moral value decision of respecting one’s autonomy or I could
simply disagree and say that most moral decisions contain amoral values so that way of
framing applied ethics is useless.

One might also claim that according to Beaucham’s definition only foundational
problems are tackled by applied philosophy and that even one’s own mortality doesn’t
count as “foundational” since we are not talking about groups of people. I would argue
that the decisions made by the patient affect others as Rasmussen points out and
others could affect communities and so on. Also, justifying the expertise of clinical
ethics consultants improves relations between this profession and the community by
building trust.