FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs.
COURT certification of non forum shopping with a mere
OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998
Facts:
M/V Pavlodar owned and operated by the Far
Eastern Shipping Company (FESC) arrived at the
port of Manila. Senen Gavino was assigned by the
Manila Pilot's Association (MPA) to conduct docking
manuevers for the safe berthing of the vessel.
Gavino stationed himself in the bridge, with the
master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him.
When the vessel was already about 2000 feet from
the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.
Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the
vessel. However the anchor did not hold as
expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken.
A commotion ensued between the crew members.
When Gavino inquired about the commotion,
Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to
it.
The bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the
pier causing considerable damage to the pier. PPA
filed a complaint for a sum of money against FESC,
Gavino and MPA. CA ruled in favor of PPA holding
them liable with MPA (employer of Kavankov)
entitled to reimbursement from Gavino.
Issue:
Are the counsels for the parties committed acts
which require the exercise of the court's disciplinary
powers?
Held:
YES. The records show that the law firm of Del
Rosario and Del Rosario thru its associate, Atty Tria,
is the counsel of record for FESC in both GR no
130068 and GR no 130150. GR 130068 which is
assigned to the Court's second division, commenced
with the filing of a verified motion for extension of
time which contained a certification against forum
shopping signed by counsel Tria stating that to the
best of his knowledge there is no action or
proceeding pending in the SC, CA or any other
tribunal.
Reviewing the records, the court finds that the
petition filed by MPA in GR no, 130150 then pending
with the third division was duly filed with a copy
thereof furnished by registered mail to counsel for
FESC (atty Tria). It would be fair to conclude that
when FESC filed its petition GR no 130068, it would
aready have received a copy of the copy of the
petition by MPA. It wa therefore encumbent upon
FESC to inform the court of the pending action. But
considering that it was a superfluity at that stage of
the proceeding , it being unnecessary to file such
motion for extension, the court disregarded such
error.
On the other hand it took the OSG, representing
PPA, an ordinately and unreasonably long period of
time to file its comment, thus unduly delaying the
resolution of these cases. In GR no 130068, it took
210 days before the OSG filed its comment. FESC
was not even furnished with a copy. In Gr no 130150
it took 180 days before comment was filed. This
disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file required
pleadings constitutes deplorable disservice to the
public and can only be categorized as inefficiency on
the part of the govt law office.
Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and
Del Rosario, specifically its asscociate Tria is
reprimaded and warned that a repetition of the same
acts shall be dealt with severely.
The original members of the legal tean of the OSG
are admonished and warned tha a repetition shall
also be dealt with more stringently.
Baka lang itanong kung ano ruling: The decision of
the CA is affirmed. Gavino, MPA and FESC are
declared solidarily liable with MPA entitled to
reimbursement from Gavino for such amount of the
adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the amount
equivalent to 75% of its prescribed reserved fund.
Del Rosario V. CA (1997)
G.R. No. 118325 January 29, 1997
Lessons Applicable: Proof and Proximate Cause
(Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Article 2229 of the Civil
Code, Article 2208 of the Civil Code
FACTS:
 Metal Forming Corp. advertised there metal
shingles as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND
STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL TILE
structure acts as a single unit against wind and
storm pressure due to the strong hook action on
its overlaps." The Spouses Del Rosario through
their contractor Engineer Puno purchased
believing their representation.
 The proper installation procedure expressly
specified in the former's brochures and
advertisements for installation, i.e., the metal tile
attached to the roof panels should be by 2 self-
drilling screws for 1 metal cleat but instead what
was attached was metal cleats with only 1-inch
ordinary nail each and others were fastened with
only 1 wood screw each so the roof was blown
by Typhoon Ruping 2 months later
 MFC replaced the roof free of charge, in
acknowledgment of its one-year warranty on the
materials and their installation. Esteban
Adjusters and Valuers, Inc. hired by the Spouses
Del Rosario determined that only with a single
wood screw or a combination of a single wood
screw and a 1-inch nail was used
 DTI: charged MFC administrative fine of
P10,000 otherwise its registration will
be deemed suspended and its establishment
closed until the fine was fully paid
 Office of the President: affirmed
 MFC declining to concede to liability for the other
damages to its electrical wiring, ceiling, furtures,
walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and
furniture, the Spouses Del Rosario filed in the
RTC for total damage of P1,008,003 also
praying for moral and exemplary damages
 RTC: favored Spouses Del Rosario Actual
damage P1,008,003, Moral
Damages P500,000, Exemplary
Damages P300,000 and Attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation P150,000
 CA: reversed holding there is no privity bet. the
Spouses Del Rosario and MFC
ISSUE: W/N the Spouses Del Rosario should be
awarded damages
HELD: YES. REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED, with
the modification that the award of actual damages
and attorney's fees is deleted, and the moral and
exemplary damages awarded are reduced from
P500,000.00 to P100,000.00, and from P300,000.00
to P50,000.00, respectively.
 Since MFC, in bad faith and with gross
negligence, infringed the express warranty made
by it to the general public in connection with the
"Banawe" tiles brought to and set up in the house
of the Del Rosarios who had relied on the
warranty, and thereby caused them
considerable injury, the identity of the individual
who actually dealt with MFC and asked the latter
to make such delivery and installation is of little
moment
 Actual or compensatory damages cannot be
presumed, but must be duly proved and proved
with reasonable degree of certainty.
 relied only on the report of the Esteban Adjusters
and Valuers, Inc. which contains no statement
whatever of the amount of the damage therefore
no evidentiary foundation upon which to lay an
award of actual damages
 law explicitly authorizes the award of moral
damages "in breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith."
 There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of
the psychological and mental trauma actually
suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them
of moral damages is warranted
 Article 2229 of the Civil Code
 damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, While exemplary
damages cannot be recovered as a matter of
right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate
or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded.
 Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich
one party or impoverish another but to serve as
a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to
curb socially deleterious actions
 moral damages awarded must be
commensurate with the loss or injury suffered
 Since the judgment does not say why attorney's
fees are awarded, there is no basis for such
award, which should consequently be removed
 It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is
the exception rather than the rule and counsel's
fees are not to be awarded every time a party
wins. The power of the court to award attorney's
fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code
demands factual, legal, and equitable
justification; its basis cannot be left to
speculation or conjecture. Where granted. the
court must explicitly state in the body of the
decision, and not only in the dispositive portion
thereof, the legal reason for the award of
attorney's fees.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. COURT
OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 119121. August 14, 1998
By: A. Halina
FACTS:

 On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four (4)
dump trucks owned by the National Power
Corporation (NPC) left Marawi city bound for
Iligan city.Unfortunately, enroute to its
destination, one of the trucks with plate no.
RFT-9-6-673 driven by a certain Gavino
Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with
a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in
the death of three (3) persons riding in the
Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical
injuries to seventeen other passengers.
 On June 10, 1980, the heirs of the victims
filed a complaint for damages against
National Power Corporation (NPC) and
PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO) before
the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte, Marawi City. When defendant
PHESCO filed its answer to the
complaint it contended that it was not the
owner of the dump truck which collided
with the Toyota Tamaraw but
NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it was
merely a contractor of NPC with the main
duty of supplying workers and
technicians for the latters projects. On
the other hand, NPC denied any liability and
countered that the driver of the dump truck
was the employee of PHESCO.
 Trial court absolved NPC and ordered
PHESCO, Inc. and Gavino Ilumba to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs thru the
Dansalan College the sum of P954,154.55
representing the actual or compensatory
damages incurred by the plaintiffs; and
P50,000.00 representing Attorneys fees.
 Dissatisfied, PHESCO appealed. CA
reversed the trial courts
judgment. Chagrined by the sudden
turnaround, NPC filed a motion for
reconsideration of said decision which was,
however, denied on February 9,
1995. Hence, this petition.
 NPC denies that the driver of the dump truck
was its employee. It alleges that it did not
have the power of selection and dismissal
nor the power of control over
Ilumba.[3] PHESCO, meanwhile, argues that
it merely acted as a recruiter of the
necessary workers for and in behalf of NPC.
ISSUE: Whether or not NPC is liable for the tort of
driver Gavino Ilumba
HELD: YES.
Before we decide who is the employer of Ilumba, it
is evidently necessary to ascertain the contractual
relationship between NPC and PHESCO. Was the
relationship one of employer and job (independent)
contractor or one of employer and labor only
contractor?

Job (independent) contracting is present if the
following conditions are met: (a) the contractor
carries on an independent business and undertakes
the contract work on his own account under his own
responsibility according to his own manner and
method, free from the control and direction of his
employer or principal in all matters connected with
the performance of the work except to the result
thereof; and (b) the contractor has substantial
capital or investments in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises and other
materials which are necessary in the conduct of his
business.
It must be noted that under the Memorandum, NPC
had mandate to approve the critical path network
and rate of expenditure to be undertaken by
PHESCO.[7] Likewise, the manning schedule and
pay scale of the workers hired by PHESCO were
subject to confirmation by NPC.[8] Then too, it
cannot be ignored that if PHESCO enters into any
sub-contract or lease, again NPCs concurrence is
needed.[9] Another consideration is that even in the
procurement of tools and equipment that will be
used by PHESCO, NPCs favorable
recommendation is still necessary before these
tools and equipment can be purchased.[10] Notably,
it is NPC that will provide the money or funding that
will be used by PHESCO to undertake the
project.[11] Furthermore, it must be emphasized that
the project being undertaken by PHESCO, i.e.,
construction of power energy facilities, is related to
NPCs principal business of power generation. In
sum, NPCs control over PHESCO in matters
concerning the performance of the latters work is
evident. It is enough that NPC has the right to wield
such power to be considered as the employer.[12]
Under this factual milieu, there is no doubt that
PHESCO was engaged in labor-only contracting
vis--vis NPC and as such, it is considered merely
an agent of the latter. So, even if Phesco hired
driver Gavino Ilumba, as Phesco is admittedly a
labor only contractor of Napocor, the statute itself
establishes an employer-employee relationship
between the employer (Napocor) and the employee
(driver Ilumba) of the labor only contractor
(Phesco). (Ecal vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 195 SCRA 224).
Consequently, we hold Phesco not liable for the tort
of driver Gavino Ilumba, as there was no
employment relationship between Phesco and
driver Gavino Ilumba. Under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, to hold the employer liable for torts
committed by his employees within the scope of
their assigned task, there must exist an employer-
employee relationship. (Martin vs. Court of Appeals,
205 SCRA 591).
Also, the position of NPC that even assuming that a
labor only contract exists between it and PHESCO,
its liability will not extend to third persons who are
injured due to the tortious acts of the employee of
the labor-only contractor, stated otherwise, its
liability shall only be limited to violations of the Labor
Code and not quasi-delicts is misplaced.It bears
stressing that the action was premised on the
recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict
against both NPC and PHESCO, hence, it is the
Civil Code and not the Labor Code which is the
applicable law in resolving this case.
An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by
an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the
substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
It is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and
not the Labor Code will determine the liability of
NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted by an
injured person for any negligent act of the
employees of the labor only contractor. This is
consistent with the ruling that a finding that a
contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent
to a finding that an employer-employee relationship
existed between the owner (principal contractor)
and the labor-only contractor, including the latters
workers.[20]
With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct
employer, Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.
In this regard, NPCs liability is direct, primary and
solidary with PHESCO and the driver.[21] Of course,
NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it,
shall have recourse against PHESCO and the
driver who committed the negligence which gave
rise to the action.[22]
 Finally, NPC, even if it truly believed that it was not
the employer of the driver, could still have disclaimed
any liability had it raised the defense of due diligence
in the selection or supervision of PHESCO and
Ilumba.[23] However, for some reason or another,
NPC did not invoke said defense. Hence, by opting
not to present any evidence that it exercised due
diligence in the supervision of the activities of
PHESCO and Ilumba, NPC has foreclosed its right
to interpose the same on appeal in conformity with
the rule that points of law, theories, issues of facts
and arguments not raised in the proceedings below
cannot be ventilated for the first time on
appeal.[24] Consequently, its liability stands.

 DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 10, 1994 and its
accompanying resolution dated February 9, 1995
are AFFIRMED without prejudice to the right of NPC
to demand from PHESCO and Ilumba
reimbursement of the damages it would be adjudged
to pay to complainants. No costs.

Southeastern College Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126389 – July 10, 1998
FACTS:
Private respondents are owners of a house near the
petitioner’s four-story school building along the same
road. During a typhoon, the roof of the petitioner’s
building was partly ripped off and blown away by
strong winds, landing on and destroying portions of
the roofing of private respondents’ house. In the
aftermath, an ocular inspection of the destroyed
building was spearheaded by the city building
official. In his report, he imputed negligence to the
petitioner for the structural defect of the building and
improper anchorage of trusses to the roof beams
which caused the roof be ripped off the building,
thereby causing damage to the property of
respondents. Respondents filed an action before the
RTC for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana. Petitioner contested that it had no liability,
attributing the damage to a fortuitous event. RTC
ruled in favor of respondents which was affirmed by
the CA. Hence present petition.’
ISSUE:
Whether or not the damage, in legal sense, can be
attributed to a fortuitous event.
RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that petitioner is not liable, the
damage being attributable to a fortuitous event.
Art 1174 of the Civil Code states that: “Except in
cases expressly specified by the law, or when it
is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption
of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable”
To be liable for a fortuitous event, the respondent
must prove that petitioners were negligent, with
which they fall short, merely relying on the report of
the city building official. This is the same official that
have approved the building plans of petitioner, who
made clear that there were no prior complaints
regarding the building. Since storms are common in
the country, the part of the building in question
should have failed against stronger typhoons that
preceded said storm, which it had not. Furthermore,
petitioner was able to present evidence that regular
maintenance was carried out. Respondents also
failed to support the claim of the actual loss they
suffered, merely relying on estimates without
considering that wear and tear of respondents’ home
which may have had a contributory effect to the
damage. Petition is granted and challenged decision
is reversed.
Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring (1967)
Petitioners: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
Respondents: LUZON STEVEDORING
CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Ponente: REYES, J.B.L.
Topic: Remedies for Breach
SUMMARY: (1-2 sentence summary of facts, issue,
ratio and ruling)
FACTS:
- Barge L-1892 owned by Luzon. was being towed
down the Pasig river by two tugboats "Bangus" and
"Barbero” (also owned by Luzon).
- The barge rammed against one of the wooden piles
of Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing the posts and
causing the bridge to list. At the time, the river’s
current was swift and the water was high due to
heavy rains in Manila.
- The Republic sued the company for the actual and
consequential damages caused (P200,000).
- Luzon disclaimed liability, on the grounds that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees; that the damages to
the bridge were caused by force majeure; that
plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the
Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to
navigation.
- CFI held Luzon liable for the damage caused by its
employee and ordered it to pay the actual cost of the
repair of the Nagtahan bailey bridge (P192,561.72),
with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing
of the complaint.
- Luzon appealed directly to SC, raising questions
both of fact and of law.
ISSUES:
 WON the collision of Luzon’s barge with the
supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was
in law caused by fortuitous event or force
majeure
o NO. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an
immovable and stationary object and provided with
adequate openings for the passage of water craft,
including barges, it is undeniable that the unusual
 event that the barge, exclusively controlled by
appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a
presumption of negligence on Luzon’s part or its
employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed
it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a
thing does not happen if proper care is used. In
Anglo American Jurisprudence, the inference arises
by what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur" rule.
o Luzon strongly stresses the precautions taken by
it: that it assigned two of its most powerful tugboats
to tow down river its barge; that it assigned to the
task the more competent and experienced among
its patrons, had the towlines, engines and
equipment double-checked and inspected; that it
instructed its patrons to take extra precautions; and
concludes that it had done all it was called to do,
and that the accident, therefore, should be held
due to force majeure or fortuitous event.
o These very precautions, however, completely
destroy the appellant's defense. For caso fortuito
or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far
as they exempt an obligor from liability) by
definition, are extraordinary events not forseeable
or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (A1174,
NCC). It is, therefore, not enough that the event
should not have been fore seen or anticipated,
as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere
difficulty to foresee the happening is not
impossibility to foresee the same.
NOTES:
SC: when a party appeals directly to the Supreme
Court, and submits his case there for decision, he is
deemed to have waived the right to dispute any
finding of fact made by the trial Court. The only
questions that may be raised are those of law
Dioquino vs. Laureano | G.R. No. L-25906 | - defendant Laureano also refused to pay the
May 28, 1970 | Ponente: Fernando, J.
Nature of Case: Liability on fortuitious events
Plaintiff(s): Pedro D. Dioquino
Defendant(s): Federico Laureano, Aida de
Laureano, Juanito Laureano
SUMMARY: While Federico Laureano was using the
car owned by Atty. Dioquino, some ‘mischievous
boys’ stoned the car which resulted to a broken
windshield. Although the car was driven by the
plaintiff’s driver, Laureano being only a passenger,
Dioquino proceeded against Laureano to claim
damages. Plaintiff also included Laureano’s wife and
father in the suit filed. Lower court ruled for Dioquino,
while dismissing the suit filed against the
defendant’s wife and father. Supreme Court granted
Laureano’s appeal because the case falls within the
definition of a fortuitous event, making defendant not
liable.
FACTS
• Atty. Dioquino, a practicing lawyer of Masbate,
owns the car
• Dioquino went to the office of the MVO, Masbate
to have his car registered
• Plaintiff met defendant Federico Laureano, a patrol
officer of said MVO office, who was waiting for a
jeepney to take him to the office of the Provincial
Commander (P.C.), Masbate
- Dioqunio requested defendant to introduce
him to one of the clerks in the MVO offive who
could facilitate the registration of his car
• Laureano rode on the car of Dioquino on his way
to P.C. Barracks
- car, driven by Dioquino’s river and with
Laureano as the sole passenger, was stoned
by some ‘mischievous boys’ —> windshield
was broken
• Laureano was only able to catch one of the boys
- boy admitted to having thrown the stone
- the father of the boy was called but no
satisfactory arrangements were made about
the damage to the windshield
• Laureano refused to file charges against the boy
and his parents believing that the stone-throwing
was merely accidental and that it was due to force
majeure
windshield himself
• Plaintiff now holds defendant Federico Laureano
accountable for the loss sustained
- also included in the action filed were the
defendant’s wife, Aida Laureano, and his
father, Juanito Laureano
• Lower court granted plaintiff’s action for damages
but absolved defendant’s wife and father of any
responsibility
• all 3 Laureanos’ appealed, raising the following:
1. lower court failed to dismiss such a suit as no
liability could have been incurred as a result
of fortuitous event
2. lower court failed to award damages against
plaintiff for the unwarranted inclusion of the
wife and the father in this litigation
ISSUE(S) + RULING
1. WON the lower court erred in not dismissing
the suit against Laureano — YES
• Art. 1174, Civil Code: "Except in cases expressly
specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no
person shall be responsible for those events
which could not be, foreseen, or which, though
foreseen were inevitable.”
• In obligations arising from contract that some
extraordinary circumstance independent of the
will of the obligor, or of his employees —>
essential element in fortuitous events
- if the above situation happens, there is no
liability
- the law does not require diligence beyond
what human are and foresight can provide
• Caso fortuito or force majeure are
extraordinary events not forseeable or
avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable (must be
impossible to foresee or to avoid)
• What happened to the car was clearly unforeseen
— it was a fortuitous event resulting in a loss which
must be borne by the owner of the car
2. WON damages could be awarded for the
unwarranted inclusion of defendant’s wife
and father in the litigation — NO
• Plaintiif included the wife and the father because,
according to him, the father was the administrator
of the inheritance of an undivided property to which
defendant could lay claim and the wife for the
conjugal partnership would be made to respond for
whatever liability would be adjudicated against the
husband
• Plaintiff was merely propmted by the desire to
inflict needless and unjustified vexation on them
(wife and father)
• Since plaintiff already suffered a pecuniary loss
which was the result of a fortuitous event (would
have not occured if defendent Laureano had not
borrowed his car), court feels that he is not to be
penalized further by his mistaken view of the law in
including them in his complaint
Decision of lower court REVERSED.
.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988
FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA
DORONIO petitioners, vs. EDGARDO AQUINO,
MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon
Primary School, a public educational institution located in
Tayug, Pangasinan- Edgardo Aquino was a teacher
therein. At that time, the school was fittered with several
concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school
shop that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that
the huge stones were serious hazards to the
schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio
Banez started burying them one by one. In fact, he was
able to bury ten of these blocks all by himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent
Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils,
aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal. Being their
teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside a one-
ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the
stone can be buried. The work was left unfinished. The
following day, also after classes, private respondent
Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to
continue the digging. These four pupils — Reynaldo
Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito
Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter and forty
centimeters deep. At this point, private respondent Aquino
alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside
the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about
by the digging.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the
concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his four
pupils got out of the hole. Then, said private respondent
left the children to level the loose soil around the open
hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty
meters away. Private respondent wanted to borrow from
Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get
some rope. Before leaving. , private respondent Aquino
allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone."
A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three
of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully
jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the
remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block
causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and
Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on
time but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block
caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall
in a standing position. As a result thereof, Ylarde
sustained injuries. Three days later, Novelito Ylarde died.
Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for
damages against both private respondents Aquino and
Soriano.
The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following
grounds:
(1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their
course called Work Education;
(2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person; and
(3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless
imprudence.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of
the lower court.
Petitioners base their action against private respondent
Aquino on Article 2176 of the Civil Code for his alleged
negligence that caused their son's death while the
complaint against respondent Soriano as the head of
school is founded on Article 2180 of the same Code.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article 2180
states:
Art. 2180. x x x
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody. 3
ISSUE:
Whether or not under the cited provisions, both private
respondents can be held liable for damages.
HELD:
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned
judgment of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered ordering
private respondent Edagardo Aquino to pay petitioners an
Imdemnity for the death of Child Ylarde, Exemplary
damages and Moral damages.
As regards the principal, Mariano Soriano
We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death
of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic
school and not a school of arts and trades.
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the
Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in
question should apply to all schools, academic as well
as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for
the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part
of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof,
and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to
the general rule. In other words, teachers in general
shall be liable for the acts of their students except where
the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the
head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the
canon ofreddendo singula sinquilis 'teachers' should
apply to the words "pupils and students' and 'heads of
establishments of arts and trades to the word
"apprentices."
As regards the teacher, Edgardo Aquino
From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that Aquino can
be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the
teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his
supervision over them and his failure to take the
necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their
persons. However, as earlier pointed out, petitioners base
the alleged liability of private respondent Aquino on Article
2176 which is separate and distinct from that provided for
in Article 2180. With this in mind, the question We need to
answer is this: Were there acts and omissions on the part
of private respondent Aquino amounting to fault or
negligence which have direct causal relation to the death
of his pupil Ylarde?
Our answer is in the affirmative. He is liable for damages.
The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in
leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a
direct causal connection to the death of the child
Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the
children to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging,
they just had to amuse themselves with whatever they
found. Driven by their playful and adventurous instincts
and not knowing the risk they were facing three of them
jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the
stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was
loose from the digging, it was also a natural consequence
that the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing
injury on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight.
Everything that occurred was the natural and probable
effect of the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino.
Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died
were it not for the unsafe situation created by private
respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the
pupils concerned to real danger.
We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that
the injuries which resulted in the death of the child Ylarde
were caused by his own reckless imprudence, It should
be remembered that he was only ten years old at the time
of the incident, As such, he is expected to be playful and
daring.
The degree of care required to be exercised must vary
with the capacity of the person endangered to care for
himself. The standard of conduct to which a child must
conform for his own protection is that degree of care
ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity,
discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or
similar circumstances. Bearing this in mind, We cannot
charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence.
The court is not persuaded that the digging done by the
pupils can pass as part of their Work Education. A single
glance at the picture showing the excavation and the huge
concrete block 7 would reveal a dangerous site requiring
the attendance of strong, mature laborers and not ten-
year old grade-four pupils.
We cannot comprehend why the lower court saw it
otherwise when private respondent Aquino himself
admitted that there were no instructions from the principal
requiring what the pupils were told to do. Nor was there
any showing that it was included in the lesson plan for
their Work Education.
The contention that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence
of a very cautious person is certainly without cogent basis.
A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that
bringing children to an excavation site, and more so,
leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an
accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not
assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is
sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge
concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present
to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco
parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the
children are protected from all harm in his company.
We close by categorically stating that a truly careful and
cautious person would have acted in all contrast to the
way private respondent Aquino did. Were it not for his
gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have
occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be alive
today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to his failure to take
the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's
parents suffered great anguish all these years.
SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC vs COURT OF
APPEALS
FACTS: on August 31, 1980, a Mercedes Benz
panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry
collided with a Cimarron which caused the death of
three persons and the injuries of several others. The
passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees
of the Project Management Consultants, Inc.
(PMCI). The Cimarron was owned by Salvador
Salenga, father of one of the employees of PMCI.
Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. The
driver of the truck claimed that a jeepney in front of
him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the
brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this
caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach
on a portion of the opposite lane. As a result, his
panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-
bound lane.
RTC: Rendered judgment for private respondents.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC
ISSUE: Whether or not the driver of Cimarron was
guilty of contributory negligence.
SC: First of all, it has not been shown how the
alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
contributed to the collision between the vehicles.
Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a
causal connection between the injury received and
the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. He must show that the violation of the statute
was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that
it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence,
consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like
any other negligence, is without legal consequence
unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.
Petitioner says that “driving an overloaded vehicle
with only one functioning headlight during nighttime
certainly increases the risk of accident,” that
because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there
was “decreased visibility,” and that the fact that the
vehicle was overloaded and its front seat
overcrowded “decreased [its]
maneuverability.”However, mere allegations such as
these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of
proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the
contributing cause of the injury.
Furthermore, based on the evidence in this case,
there was no way either driver could have avoided
the collision.
F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC vs THE COURT OF
APPEALS
FACTS: The furniture manufacturing shop of
petitioner in Caloocan City was situated adjacent to
the residence of private respondents. Sometime in
August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable
first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant
manager, to request that a firewall be constructed
between the shop and private respondents'
residence. The request was repeated several times
but they fell on deaf ears. In the early morning of
September 6, 1974, fire broke out in petitioner's
shop. Petitioner's employees, who slept in the shop
premises, tried to put out the fire, but their efforts
proved futile. The fire spread to private respondents'
house. Both the shop and the house were razed to
the ground. The cause of the conflagration was
never discovered. The National Bureau of
Investigation found specimens from the burned
structures negative for the presence of inflammable
substances.
Court of First Instance: the Court hereby renders
judgment, in favor of plaintiffs, and against the
defendant:
1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the
amount of P80,000.00 for damages suffered by said
plaintiffs for the loss of their house, with interest of
6% from the date of the filing of the Complaint on
January 23, 1975, until fully paid;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the
sum of P50,000.00 for the loss of plaintiffs'
furnitures, religious images, silverwares,
chinawares, jewelries, books, kitchen utensils,
clothing and other valuables, with interest of 6% from
date of the filing of the Complaint on January 23,
1975, until fully paid;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the
sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 as and by way
of attorney's fees;
4. With costs against the defendant;
5. Counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of
merit.
CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court but
reduced the award of damages. The damages to be
awarded to plaintiff should be reduced to P70,000.00
for the house and P50,000.00 for the furniture and
other fixtures with legal interest from the date of the
filing of the complaint until full payment.
ISSUE: whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is applicable in this cases
SC: The facts of the case likewise call for the
application of the doctrine, considering that in the
normal course of operations of a furniture
manufacturing shop, combustible material such as
wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and
lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care
on the part of petitioner or its employees was not
merely presumed. The Court of Appeals found that
petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its
shop and the residence of private respondents as
required by a city ordinance; that the fire could have
been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that
gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the
shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside
the shop [CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 33.]
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in
accordance with city ordinances would suffice to
support a finding of negligence.
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to
the neighboring houses were it not for another
negligent omission on the part of defendants,
namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high
enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it.
As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters
high, and beyond that height it consisted merely of
galvanized iron sheets, which would predictably
crumble and melt when subjected to intense heat.
Defendant's negligence, therefore, was not only with
respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect
to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
[Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., supra; Emphasis
supplied.]
In the instant case, with more reason should
petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had
failed to construct a firewall between its property and
private respondents' residence which sufficiently
complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The
failure to comply with an ordinance providing for
safety regulations had been ruled by the Court
as an act of negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R.
No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181.]
The Court of Appeals, therefore, had more than
adequate basis to find petitioner liable for the loss
sustained by private respondents.
2. Since the amount of the loss sustained by private
respondents constitutes a finding of fact, such
finding by the Court of Appeals should not be
disturbed by this Court [M.D. Transit & Taxi Co., Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-23882, February 17,
1968, 22 SCRA 559], more so when there is no
showing of arbitrariness.
In the instant case, both the CFI and the Court of
Appeals were in agreement as to the value of private
respondents' furniture and fixtures and personal
effects lost in the fire (i.e. P50,000.00). With regard
to the house, the Court of Appeals reduced the
award to P70,000.00 from P80,000.00. Such cannot
be categorized as arbitrary considering that the
evidence shows that the house was built in 1951 for
P40,000.00 and, according to private respondents,
its reconstruction would cost P246,000.00.
Considering the appreciation in value of real estate
and the diminution of the real value of the peso, the
valuation of the house at P70,000.00 at the time it
was razed cannot be said to be excessive.
3. While this Court finds that petitioner is liable for
damages to private respondents as found by the
Court of Appeals, the fact that private respondents
have been indemnified by their insurer in the amount
of P35,000.00 for the damage caused to their house
and its contents has not escaped the attention of the
Court. Hence, the Court holds that in accordance
with Article 2207 of the Civil Code the amount of
P35,000.00 should be deducted from the amount
awarded as damages. Said article provides:
Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured,
and he has received indemnity from the insurance
company for the injury or loss arising out of the
wrong or breach of contract complained of, the
insurance company is subrogated to the rights of the
insured against the wrongdoer or the person who
violated the contract. If the amount paid by the
insurance company does not fully cover the injury or
loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover
the deficiency from the person causing the loss or
injury. (Emphasis supplied.]
The law is clear and needs no interpretation. Having
been indemnified by their insurer, private
respondents are only entitled to recover the
deficiency from petitioner.
On the other hand, the insurer, if it is so minded, may
seek reimbursement of the amount it indemnified
private respondents from petitioner. This is the
essence of its right to be subrogated to the rights of
the insured, as expressly provided in Article 2207.
Upon payment of the loss incurred by the insured,
the insurer is entitled to be subrogated pro tanto to
any right of action which the insured may have
against the third person whose negligence or
wrongful act caused the loss [Fireman's Fund
Insurance Co. v. Jamila & Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-
27427, April 7, 1976, 70 SCRA 323.]
Under Article 2207, the real party in interest with
regard to the indemnity received by the insured is the
insurer [Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Heald Lumber Co.,
101 Phil. 1031, (1957).] Whether or not the insurer
should exercise the rights of the insured to which it
had been subrogated lies solely within the former's
sound discretion. Since the insurer is
not a party to the case, its identity is not of record
and no claim is made on its behalf, the private
respondent's insurer has to claim his right to
reimbursement of the P35,000.00 paid to the
insured.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
the following modifications as to the damages
awarded for the loss of private respondents' house,
considering their receipt of P35,000.00 from their
insurer: (1) the damages awarded for the loss of the
house is reduced to P35,000.00; and (2) the right of
the insurer to subrogation and thus seek
reimbursement from petitioner for the P35,000.00 it
had paid private respondents is recognized.
TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ
FACTS: The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and
operated by defendant-appellee Mercedes M. Teague
was a vocational school for hair and beauty culture
situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building. At
about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955,
a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located
about ten meters away from the institute. Soler Street
lay between that store and the institute. Upon seeing
the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute
shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued.
Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But,
after the panic was over, four students, including
Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, accident. Furthermore, when notice received at the
were found dead and several others injured on account Malabon station at 2.25pm, somebody should have
of the stampede. The deceased's five brothers and
sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes been dispatched to the scene of the trouble at once,
M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. or other measures taken to guard the point of
The Court of First Instance of Manila found for the danger; but more than an hour and a half passed
defendant and dismissed the case. CA reversed. before anyone representing the company appeared
on the scene, and in the meantime this child had
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is liable.
been claimed as a victim.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
The circumstances that the boy who was killed
RATIO: Petitioner was negligent and that such touched the wire after one of his companions had
negligence was the proximate cause of the death of warned him not to do so, did not relieve the
Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is
based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section company of responsibility, owing to his immature
491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila years and natural curiosity of a child to do
had not been complied with in connection with the something out of ordinary.
construction and use of the Gil-Armi building where the
petitioner's vocational school was housed. The mere
fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an
inference that such violation was the proximate cause
of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has
happened which was intended to be prevented by the
statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will
be deemed to be proximate cause of the injury.

JULIAN DEL ROSARIO vs MANILA ELECTRIC CO.

FACTS: This action was instituted by Julian del

Rosario for the purpose of recovering damages from
Meralco for the death of his son, Alberto, resulting
from a shock from a wire used by the defendant for
the transmission of electricity. Aug 4, 1930, shortly
after 2 o’clock in the afternoon trouble developed in
an overhead wire conducting electricity for lightning
purposes in the City of Manila. The wire soon parted
and one of the charged ends fell to the ground in
shrubbery close to the way. The lightning company
received a telephonic report of this incident at 2.25
p.m. and promised to send an inspector. At 4 p.m.,
the neighboring school turned out and as the
children went home one of the boys, of the age 9
years, touched the wire with his hand and received
a shock which resulted in his death. The CFI renders
decision in favor of Manila Electric. Co.

ISSUE: WON Manila Electric Co. is liable.

HELD: We are of the opinion that the presumption

of negligence on the part of the company from the
breakage of this wire has been overcome, and the
defendant is in our opinion responsible for the