1

Chun Doo Hwan Background And Military Careeraa

Chun Doo Hwan was born on January 18, 1931, in a remote mountainous farm village

in Hapchongun, South Kyongsang Province. He was the second son of a family of ten

children. He studied the Chinese classics at an early age but started his formal primary school

rather late. In 1940, at the age of nine, his family migrated to Manchuria where he entered

Horan primary school in Jilin Province. After a little more than a year, his family moved back

to Korea and settled down in Taegu, the third largest city in Korea. Following a period of

irregular education, Chun was finally admitted to Hido Primary School in Taegu as a fourth

grader in April 1944. It is said that Chun earned part of his school expenses as a newspaper

delivery boy to help his father who was engaged in the Chinese medicine business. In 1947

Chun was admitted to a six-year Taegu technical middle school, only to have this education

interrupted by the onset of the Korean War in June 1950. Chun passed the competitive

entrance examination to the newly-inaugurated four-year course in the Korean Military

Academy in December 1951. For the next four years from 1952 to 1955, which included the

Korean War years, Chun spent his days as a cadet at the academy. As a cadet Chun was

oriented more athletically than intellectually, serving at one time as captain of the academy's

soccer team. He had ample opportunity to display his leadership role while a cadet. His close

classmates, such as Roh Tae Woo and Kim Bok-dong, who would later play important roles

in assisting the military coups led by Chun in 1979 and 1980, were more intellectually-

oriented than was Chun. In 1955 Chun was commissioned as a second lieutenant, graduating

with the first class to receive four years of training at the Korean Military Academy. In

December 1958 Captain Chun married Lee Soon Ja, the daughter of a retired general, Lee

Kyudong, who once had served in the Korean Army Headquarters and was also a military

academy classmate of former President Park Chung Hee. Lee's two uncles were also army
 2

officers. At the time of their wedding Chun was recruited as a founding member of the

paratrooper special forces stationed at a base in Kimpo, outside of Seoul.

In 1959 Chun went to the United States for a five-month training program on

psychological warfare at the United States special combat school at Fort Black in North

Carolina. In April 1960 Chun became operations officer in the special forces and was on

United States-Republic of Korea joint maneuvers in Okinawa when the April 19, 1960,

student revolution took place in Korea. This resulted in the overthrow of President Syngman

Rhee's government. On May 16, 1961, then-Major General Park Chung Hee and his

followers led a military coup ousting the Posun Yun government. Chun gave Park his

allegiance and service and was credited, for instance, with having persuaded the cadets of the

Korean Military Academy to march through the Seoul streets in support of Park. During the

junta rule in the following months Chun was appointed one of Park's senior secretaries in

charge of civilian petitioning affairs. The subsequent career pattern of Chun in the military

was smooth and rapid. He served in the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and at the Army

headquarters and trained as a paratrooper. It is said that he took part in paratrooper sky

jumping exercises more than 500 times. As a lieutenant colonel Chun became deputy

commander of the First Paratrooper Special Forces in 1966 and battalion commander of the

Metropolitan Defense Division in 1967.

Military Coup By Chun Doo Hwan

In the immediate aftermath of Park’s assassination, there was confusion regarding the

procedures for succession. Not until December 6 did Prime Minister Choi Kyu-ha become

acting president. Army Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa shortly afterwards ordered Major

General Chun Doo-hwan, as head of the Security Command, to investigate the circumstances

of the assassination. Chun created a “Joint Investigation Headquarters” which put him in
 3

charge of all South Korean intelligence services. From that position of power, Chun Doo-

hwan and his fellow officers from Hanahoe, the political military club, arrested Jeong Seung-

hwa, Army Chief of Staff and Martial Law Commander, and detained President Choi Kyu-

hah (Choe Gyu-ha) to exhort his approval for their move and thus justify it. The unlawful

arrest of the Army Chief of Staff and the detention of the president, who is commander-in-

chief of the military, was an obvious mutiny.

To consolidate its power, Chun's faction mobilized armed forces stationed in Seoul

and adjoining areas, took over the Army Headquarters and the Ministry of National Defense

and arrested key officers at the Army Headquarter, successfully completing the coup. The

coup itself took only ten hours, from the evening of 12 December till dawn the next day, but

eight months passed before President Choi was forced to resign and Chun replaced him,

setting the record for the "longest coup in world history." While maintaining the martial law,

Chun and his faction thoroughly prepared and executed plans to manipulate public opinion in

order to lay the political and socio-psychological foundation that would justify their ascent to

power.

On 17 May 1980, Chun expanded martial law to the entire country, due to rumors of

North Korean infiltration into South Korea. To enforce the martial law, troops were

dispatched to various parts of the nation. The KCIA manipulated these rumors under the

command of Chun. General John A. Wickham (US Armed Forces in Korea) reported that

Chun's pessimistic assessment of the domestic situation and his stress on the North Korean

threat only seemed to be a pretext for a move into the Blue House (the Korean presidential

residence).[7] The expanded martial law closed universities, banned political activities and

further curtailed the press. The event of 17 May meant the beginning of another military

dictatorship.
 4

Many townsfolk were growing unhappy with the military presence in their cities, and

on 18 May, the citizens of Gwangju organized into what became known as the Gwangju

Democratization Movement. Chun ordered it to be immediately suppressed, sending in crack

military troops with tanks and helicopter gunships to retake City Hall and ordered the troops

to exercise full force. This led to a bloody massacre over the next two days, ultimately

leading to the collapse of the Gwangju Democratization Movement and the deaths of several

hundred Gwangju activists. Because of this remarkable "accomplishment", he was called

"The Butcher of Gwangju" by many people, especially among the students.

Gwangju People Democratic Movement

The dawning of democracy began in the southwestern city of Gwangju in 1980. From

May 18 to 27, protests against martial law became the pivotal crucible of a grassroots

campaign to overturn a despotic regime and assert civilian rule. Hundreds of civilians were

brutally massacred, beaten and tortured by the military, rendering Gwangju into a potent

symbol of people power that inspired similar subsequent movements around Asia.

On May 18, 1980, President Chun Doo Hwan's hard-line military rule led to a

confrontation in the city of Gwangju, located south of Seoul. The uprising, triggered by

student demonstrations led to Chun’s deployment of Special Forces unit trained for assault

missions. Shocked and angered by the indiscriminate shooting of tear gas and rubber bullets,

workers, shopkeepers and parents took to the streets to defend their children. In the end, 200

people were killed and hundreds wounded. The Gwangju Uprising gave birth to the national

struggle for democracy in South Korea after decades of dictatorships following the Korean

War. The spirit and legacy of the Gwangju Uprising resonates today with Koreans all over

the world in the global movement for democracy and human rights.
 5

The Gwangju uprising was also motivated by regionalism, with people in the

southwestern province of Jeolla resenting the fact that the Park government favored his home

region of Gyeongsang while their province benefited relatively little from industrialization in

the 1960s and ’70s. Park, Chun and the next two presidents, Roh Tae-woo (1988-92) and

Kim Young-sam (1993-98) all hailed from Gyeongsang, reinforcing a sense of regional

favoritism that began under Japanese colonial rule (1910-45). Jeolla’s favorite son, Kim Dae-

jung, was also the most prominent pro-democracy opponent of Park and nearly won the

presidential election in 1971 despite an uneven playing field. In 1980, the Chun government

arrested Kim and sentenced him to death for sedition in connection with the Gwangju

uprising, but he was granted exile in the U.S. where he became a prominent regime critic.

On May 18, 1980, President Chun Doo Hwan's hard-line military rule led to a

confrontation in the city of Gwangju, located south of Seoul. The uprising and bloodbath

lasted from May 18 through May 27. The Gwangju massacre became an important landmark

in the struggle for South Korean democracy.

According to reports, the uprising was triggered by student demonstrations on the

morning of May 18 in defiance of the new military edict closing the universities and stifling

any political dissent. City police were unable to control the crowd so the military dispatched a

Special Forces unit trained for assault missions to quell the protest. The troopers used tear

gas, batons and rubber bullets to put down the uprising but still workers, shopkeepers, and

parents took to the streets to defend their children. Then the military opened fire, killing

dozens of people, and wounding hundreds more.

On May 20, some 10,000 people demonstrated in Gwangju. Due to heavily

militarization, most major workplaces in South Korea had caches of weapons. Protestors

seized these weapons, buses, taxis, and even armored personnel carriers, forming armed
 6

militias. They fought against the army until finally, on May 21, the Special Forces withdrew

and the city was left to the citizens.

The next five days were unprecedented in Korean history. Instead of trade, people

shared. Massive communal meals for hundreds were cooked and distributed. Motor vehicles

were handed out to keep the city safe and to create a new distribution system that depended

on neither state nor capital. 15,000 citizens attended a memorial service for those killed on

May 24.

On May 25, 50,000 people gathered for a rally and adopted a resolution calling for the

abolition of martial law and the release of Kim Dae Jung, a leading pro-democracy political

prisoner. The citizens were sure that the massacre and resultant victory would surely

convince the United States to come to their aid. Instead, the US, who held joint-command

with the South Korean military, gave the military government the go-ahead to take troops

from the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) separating North and South Korea to take back

Gwangju. On May 27, at 3:30 A.M., the army swarmed Gwangju in Operation: Fascinating

Vacations. After light skirmishes, the army quashed the revolt in less than two hours. They

arrested 1,740 rioters, of whom 730 were detained for further investigation.

Looking back, the uprising started as student demonstrations but the military’s

random killings angered citizens into joining the student demonstrators, escalating it into a

massive uprising. According to later reports, nearly 200 persons were killed, including 26

soldiers and policemen; of the more than 150 civilians killed, only 17 died on the final day of

assault.

South Koreans were shocked that the government would use such brutal force against its

citizens. They felt further betrayed by the United States after discovering that General John

A. Wickham, Jr., had released South Korean troops from the DMZ to end the rebellion and
 7

that President Reagan had strongly endorsed Chun's actions. Clearly, the Gwangju Uprising

had an enormous impact. It ignited the floundering pro-democracy movement in Korea

culminating in 1987 when the People's Power movement finally broke the power of the South

Korean military. In Asia, first-hand accounts of the uprising were passed around Tiananmen

Square in 1989 and Indonesia in 1999.

Chun Doo Hwan Goverment and Political Process

Having suppressed the Gwangju uprising with brute force, General Chun Doo Hwan

further tightened his grip on the government. He and three of his close associates served as

the core of the junta committee, known as the Special Committee for National Security

Measures. The three were Lieutenant General Ch'a Kyuhon (deputy chief of staff of the

army), Major General Roh Tae Woo (commander of the Capital Garrison Command), and

Major General Chong Ho-yong (commander of the Special Forces). The junta vested in itself

the authority to pass laws and to make all decisions affecting the state until a new National

Assembly came into being.

On August 5, 1980, Chun promoted himself from lieutenant general to full general in

preparation for retiring from the army on August 22. On August 27 he was elected president

by the National Conference for Unification, receiving 2,524 of the 2,525 votes cast. The

single dissenting vote was invalidated for an unknown reason. Chun presented his objective

at his September 1 , 1980, inauguration: to create a new society where all past corrupt

practices would be replaced by mutual trust and justice. In order to accomplish this goal, he

planned to remove the old politicians from the scene; only those certified as "clean" would be

permitted to participate in building the new order.

In the economic field, Chun intended to do away with excessive protection of

industries and to encourage creativity. An increase in employment opportunities would be

 8

facilitated, and cooperation and coprosperity between labor and management would be

brought about. Farmers' income would be increased by continuing the Saemaul Movement.

One of Chun's inaugural promises was the promulgation of a new constitution and the

holding of a national referendum to approve it. On September 29, 1980, the government

announced the draft of a constitution that in many ways was the most democratic South

Korea had ever had—except for the supplementary provisions and the procedure for

presidential election. The guarantee of peoples' democratic rights was absolute, including the

right to privacy in communications, the prohibition of torture, and the inadmissability in court

trials of confessions obtained by force. The president, who was to be elected by an electoral

college and to serve a single seven-year term, was given strong powers, including the right to

dissolve the National Assembly, which in turn could bring down cabinets but not the

president. In the event that the constitution was amended to extend the president's term of

office, such changes were not to be applied to the incumbent. The document received the

overwhelming approval of the voters — 91.6 percent — at the national referendum held on

October 22, 1980.

The constitution, however, was a "promissory note." Until the new National

Assembly was elected and inaugurated, the Legislative Council for National Security, to be

appointed by Chun, would enact all laws. A supplementary provision in the constitution also

called for the dissolution of all existing political parties. In effect, by offering to bring in a

democratic government by June 1981, Chun had obtained a mandate to change the political

landscape in whatever form he chose. The new constitution placed South Korea under a

constitutional dictatorship from October 1980 to June 1981.

Chun zealously pushed his campaign to weed out corruption The clean-up campaign

began in May 1980 when Kim Chongp'il and others were forced to give up their wealth and

retire from politics. In June some 300 senior KCIA agents were dismissed. In July 1980,
 9

more than 230 senior officials, including former cabinet officers, were dismissed on

corruption charges. The ax also fell on 4,760 low-level officials in the government, state-

owned firms, and banks, with the proviso that the former officials not be rehired by such

firms within two years.

The Martial Law Command arrested 17 prominent politicians of both the government

and opposition parties for investigation and removed some 400 bank officials, including 4

bank presidents and 21 vice presidents. The government also announced the dismissal of

1 ,819 officials of public enterprises and affiliated agencies, including 39 (some 25 percent)

of the presidents and vice presidents of such enterprises and banks and 128 board directors

(more than 22 percent).

The "clean-up campaign" also extended to the mass media. On 31 July 1980, the 172

periodicals that allegedly caused "social decay and juvenile delinquency" were summarily

abolished, among them some of the finest intellectual magazines of liberal inclination and

prestigious journals for general audiences. This action resulted in the dismissal of hundreds of

journalists and staff. The daily newspapers not affected by the purge also were directed to

weed out "corrupting," that is, liberal writers. In the wake of Chun's purge, the government

also launched a massive reeducation program for the nation's elites. High government

officials, judges, prosecutors, business executives, college professors, and their spouses—

32,000 persons in all—were brought together for an intensive three-day training program at

Saemaul's New Community Training Centers in Suwon and elsewhere. The training regimen

included morning exercises, environmental cleanup, lectures on the New Community

Movement, and discussion sessions on "the proper way of life." This training program,

initiated under Park's regime, eventually was to be extended to the general public. In August

1980, the government launched another massive propaganda campaign, organizing "Bright

Society Rallies" in major cities where tens of thousands of citizens were mobilized to hear
 10

speeches. In addition, "Cleansing Committees" were established at all levels of government

down to the local ward (ri and dong) levels.

Even though Chun Doo Hwan's government had attained considerable results in

economy and diplomacy, his government failed to win public trust or support. In spite of

Chun's lofty pronouncements, the public basically regarded Chun as a usurper of power who

had deprived South Korea of its opportunity to restore democracy. Chun lacked political

credentials; his access to power derived from his position as the head of the Defense Security

Command—the army's nerve center of political intelligence—and his ability to bring together

his generals in the front lines.

Chun and his military followers failed to overcome the stigma of the Gwangju

incident, and the new "just society" that he promised did not materialize. In fact, between

1982 and 1983, at least two of the major financial scandals in South Korea involved Chun's

in-laws. The Chun government's slogans became hollow. While Park had gained respect and

popularity through the recordbreaking pace of economic development, Chun could not repeat

such a feat.

In the 1985 National Assembly elections, opposition parties together won more votes

than the government party, clearly indicating that the public wanted a change. Moreover,

increasing numbers of people had become more sympathetic to the students, who presented

increasingly radical demands.

One of the most serious problems the government faced was that the argument for

restricting democracy became less and less credible. The people had long been tolerant of

various restrictions imposed by succeeding governments because of the perceived threat from

the north, but the consensus eroded as the international environment moderated. More and

more people became cynical about repeated government pronouncements, viewing them as
 11

self-serving propaganda by those in power. This tendency was particularly pronounced

among the post-Korean War generation that constituted a majority of the South Korean

population.

The unpopular Chun regime and its constitutional framework was brought down in

1987 largely by the student agitation that beset the regime. Student activists set the tone and

agenda of the society as a whole because the government and the governmentcontrolled press

had lost their credibility. The opposition parties worked with the students, although they

disagreed on the ultimate aim—the politicians wanted reform, while the students demanded

revolution. The opposition politicians wanted constitutional reform to replace the existing

system of electing the president through the handpicked electoral college with direct popular

election. The students attacked not only the military leaders in power but also the entire

socio-political and economic establishment.

President Chun attempted to squash the opposition by issuing a declaration on April

13, 1987, to suspend the "wasteful debate" about constitutional reform until a new

government was installed at the end of his seven-year term. The declaration was, instead, his

regime's swan song. Chun wanted to have his successor "elected" by his handpicked

supporters; the public greeted the declaration with universal outrage. Even the Reagan

administration, which had been taciturn about South Korea's internal politics, urged the Chun

government not to ignore the outrage. Finally, on 29 June 1987, Roh Tae Woo, the

government party's choice as Chun's successor, made a dramatic announcement in favor of a

new democratic constitution that embodied all the opposition's demands.

Chun Doo Hwan Economic Policy and Process

On October 26, 1979, President Park Chung-bee was assassinated by the Korean

Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) director, KIM Jae-kyu. The death of President Park
 12

brought about confusion and instability due to the power vacuum caused by the eliminatian of

an absolute ruler that had governed the country for nearly two decades. Against the Korean

people’s hope to have a democratic government, Major General Chun Doo-whan came to

power.

Thousands of people went out to the streets to protest against the Chun government.

On May 18, 1980 in Gwangju, there was a massive demonstration by college students and

private citi Zens asking for democracy. The government sent troops and suppressed the

protest by force, which resulted in approximately 200 deaths and 800 injuries. As a result, the

CHUN Doo-whan goverment constantly faced anti-government protests despite the fact

that he was elected president by the electoral college in 1981. Before the election, a

constitutional amendment passed which limited the presidential term as a non-renewable,

single term of 7 years.

As soon as President Chun took office, his administration faced a number of serious

economic problems. Due to the second oil shock in 1979, inflation was high and was

threatening the economy. The policy efforts by the previous government to reduce inflation

were not successful due to the intense investment in the heavy chemical industry (HCI). The

economic structure was based on big business conglomerates (chaebol), which was causing

problems in the economic structural as well as an unequal distribu-

tion of wealth. To make matters worse, the international economic environment was not

friendly to Korean exports either. The second oil shock brought on an international recession,

which gave rise to protectionism in many countries. To confront with these problems,

the Chun administration adopted aggressive policy measures to continue to develop the

economy in order to compensate for the lack of political legitimacy.

a) Inflation Control
 13

Since the PARK Chung-bee administration mainly focused on growth, there were

inflation pressures. In the late 19708, lunation reached a dangerous level due to the second oil

shock and the heavy and chemical industrial drive. Although the Park Administration

recognized the seriousness of lunation, their policy response, such as the 4.17 Policies for

Stability,17 was not limited because Park did not want to slow down growth or the HCI drive.

The Chun Administration, however, was different. The government placed emphasis

on reducing inflation to acquire socio-economic stability. In addition, the Chum government

realized that continued inflation might reduce South Korea's international com-

petitiveness, which would slow down exports and, eventually, growth. Thus, controlling

inflation became one of the main policy objectives of the Chun Administration. To combat it,

the government adopted a tight fiscal policy, such as a government expendture freeze in

1984, raising interest rates, and reducing credit. The budget deficit was also reduced by 39

percent by 1985. A report by the Bank of Korea describes the period of the Chan administra-

tion as "a period of stability of prices."

b) Economic RestmctuHng

In addition to inflation control efforts, the Churn administration attempted to overhaul the

economic structure to enhance stability. To this end, the Chun government tried to reduce the

dependence of the economy on big business conglomerates (chaebol) and heavy

chemical industries with the Policies for Restraining Economic Centralization in 1980. This

policy was meaningful because its approach was to restructure the existing Korean economy.

After this policy was adopted, the government stepped up its efforts to distribute more

resources to medium and small size enterprises.

Another policy effort by the Chan administration was "rear-

ranging businesses" to improve the overall effectiveness of the national economy. Due to the
 14

government-led development approach. Some industries, such as shipping and construction

heavily relied on the government in the 1970s. Although these busi-

nesses were supported by the government through investment and favorable tax policies, they

failed to overcome the hurdles presented to them by the new international economic

environments in. the 19808. These included a global recession, increased protec-

tionism in developed countries, and international pressures for Korea to revalue their

currency. The government, therefore, selected unprofitable businesses and liquidated them

through acquisition (50 companies), merger (17 companies), and legal management (1 com-

pany). Until 1988, the number of those reorganized businesses had

reached 70.

In addition, the Chun Administration avoided direct government intervention in the

economy by cutting down or removing tax policies designed to support specific export-

oriented industries. Instead, the government put more emphasis on improving business

environment and economic infrastructures. The Chun government also changed the credit

allocation policies by introducing a cap on credit that can be assigned to one chaebol. The

new policy also required a government's approval before a chaebol invested in a new

business. This measure was to help correct the unfair relationship between big firms and

small businesses.

c) Effects of New Economic Policies

Policies adopted by the Chun administration to control inflation worked. Moreover, with the

changed role of the government in credit allocation and the economy in general, the Korean

economy got back on the track and resumed its rapid growth. The aver-
 15

age growth rate during the Chum Administration (1981-1987) was 8.7 percent and the

national GDP reached $100 billion. Considering that the growth rate of 1980 was -1.5

percent, the new policies to deal with economic problems worked effectively. Some

economic policy measures adopted by the Chun administration were only possible

because of its strong autonomy of the state. Also, it should be noted that the "three lows" in

economic conditions-low oil prices, low interest rates, and low exchange rates-provided a

friendly environment for economic recovery and growth. In summary, the Chun govement’s

new economic policies gave way to another economic take off in 1980s and a more

liberalized economy.

Conclusion

The challenge of his administration was to maintain internal political stability,

continue the momentum of economic growth, and successfully complete the 1988 Seoul

Summer Olympics, in which North Korea refused to participate. Despite the public's

skepticism, Chun left office, as promised, when his seven-year presidential term expired in

1988—though not as he originally planned. In 1987 he named his long-time friend and

military colleague, Roh Tae Woo, as his successor. Violent demonstrations erupted until Roh

made a dramatic speech endorsing direct presidential elections, restoration of civil rights for

Kim Dae Jung and other dissidents, and lifting press restrictions. The turbulence was quelled,

and Roh went on to win the presidential elections despite charges of fraud.

Chun left power amid widespread accusations of corruption, and was embarrassed by

an investigation that officially spared him but sent several family members (also in

government) to prison for having raised illegal funds from corporations. The former president

sought to mollify public anger by leaving his luxurious home in Seoul to live an ascetic life in

a Buddhist monastery for over a year. During Roh's presidency, which lasted until 1993,
 16

South Korea moved steadily toward a more democratic government and gained respect

around the world. Domestically, however, accusations of fraud still persisted, particularly

against Roh who faced charges of amassing a large slush fund while president.
 17

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