Who We Are Work With Us

research forums events people expertspeak about ORF िह

HOME > EXP ERT SP EAK > RUSSIA-CHI NA BILAT ER A L T IES: TO WA RDS AN E NDU RING PART NER SHIP

RAISINA DEBATES JUL 31 2019

INDO-PACIFIC QUAD RUSSIA-CHINA SLOCS XI XINPING

This is the 84th article in the series The China Chronicles.

Read the articles here.

A decade ago, Bobo Lo famously described the Russia-China partnership as being an ‘axis of
convenience.’ It was then argued that a contentious history, potential areas of conflict, growing power
asymmetry and the desire to maintain a stable relationship with the West would ensure a limited
partnership.

However, driven by domestic factors and interests and a changing world order – not to mention a
strained relationship between Russia and the West - the dynamics have changed in the past years.

This rapprochement, which increased in the years following the financial crisis, has further
strengthened since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea. For Russia, the importanc
of the partnership has increased significantly due to deterioration of ties with the West. Now, China
remains its strongest external partner, as Moscow has struggled to diversify relations in Asia and the
relations with EU and US remain at a historic low.

From strength to strength – bilateral developments

The year 2019 marked 70 years of diplomatic relations between China and Russia with President Xi
Jinping referring to the ties as being at their best in history. Analysts have echoed this sentiment as
well, noting that the relationship has not been this good since the mid-1950s when Soviet Union was
actively involved in helping the People’s Republic of China establish itself.

Apart from regular meetings at the presidential level, regular ministerial level meetings have been
instituted which include twenty sub-commissions in addition to working groups that meet annually.
Bilateral trade touched $100 billion in 2018, wherein Russia mainly supplies natural resources to
China and imports machinery, equipment and consumer goods. While China’s share in Russia’s trade
stood at 14.1 percent, the reverse figure was at 1.7 percent. China’s heavy dependence on
hydrocarbons means the trade volume fluctuates with the rise and fall of commodity prices. Despite
the fears of Russia becoming a raw material appendage to China, the former is under no illusions abou
its ability to shift the reliance of its economy away from natural resources.

Due to Western sanctions, China has emerged as Russia’s key trade partner. In 2019, Russia became
the largest crude oil supplier to China, displacing Saudi Arabia. The $400 billion Power of Siberia dea
to supply natural gas to China, which has come under scrutiny for the pricing being in favour of China
was struck soon after the 2014 sanctions on Russia. The pipeline is exclusively for China hindering
Russia’s plans to diversify its exports across the Asian continent. China, which is worried about
SLOCs in Asia (that carry over 80 per cent of its oil imports) being blocked in case of any conflict,
has been actively looking towards direct pipelines from Russia and Central Asia to secure its energy
supplies while also maintaining diversified sources of imports to avoid becoming over-dependent on
one country.

Also, Russia has now changed its policy and allowed Chinese companies to invest in upstream sector
in the Far East and Siberia, reflecting a closer relationship that has overcome old fears of a ‘yellow
peril’ as well as the need to attract investment. Last year, the amount of Russian reserves in Yuan
reached 15 percent in an attempt to move away from dollar reserves.
In contrast to the economic ties, the strategic partnership is far more symmetrical in the military
domain. Most recently on July 23, for the first time, Russia and China conducted joint air patrols over
Sea of Japan and East China Sea. China’s defence ministry spokesperson noted that the patrol was a
step towards ‘upgrading joint operations capacity between China and Russia.’ This came soon after th
decree dated 18 July 2019, in which Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev directed the Defence
Ministry to conclude a military cooperation agreement with the PRC. Soon after followed the Chinese
White Paper on national defence noting that the military cooperation between ‘China and Russia
continues to develop at a high level.’

Due to increasing trust, Russia overturned its decades-old policy of not supplying the latest weaponry
to China by agreeing to the sale of Su-35 fighter jets and S400 missile defence system in 2015. The
former due to their range would be critical for China to maintain its claims over East and South China
Sea while the latter brings all the flights over Taiwan, South China Sea and East China Sea within
Chinese target range – complicating the US position and affecting the military balance of power in the
region.

Signs of change were already visible in the ‘ground-breaking presence’ of Chinese forces at the larges
ever-military drill in Russia called Vostok 2018. Never before has Russia invited a country to its
domestic drills not a part of CSTO, leading scholars to see this as a sign of lessening of the Chinese
threat in Russian minds. The two UNSC permanent members also coordinate positions on several
issues of critical importance like Iran, North Korea and Syria.

Strategic rationale
The two countries have an abiding interest in maintaining peace on their shared border, any
destabilization on which would take away resources for both countries from other priority areas, a
prospect they can ill-afford at this point. Russia has reconciled itself to the reversing of the Cold War
equations wherein it used to be the superpower. The main areas of contention – threat of Chinese
takeover of the Russian Far East, increased influence in Central Asia and reverse engineering of
military technology – have been analysed and found to be not consequential in deepening of ties.

The fact remains that Russia has through its pivot to the East failed to build strong relationships with
other players in the region. This combined with a breakdown of ties with the West has meant it is in
search of other partners to bolster its strategic presence. China fits the bill. This is not to say that
China does not need Russia. Apart from providing a stable strategic rear, Russia is a major energy and
arms supplier to Beijing. Any shift in Russian policy away from China and in favour of the US would
be detrimental to the position of the rising power – especially in Asia-Pacific. Given this, China has
taken care to accord due respect to the former superpower.

The two countries share ideas about a multipolar world order where US would not be the hegemonic
power. They also believe in non-interference in internal affairs of countries and a strict adherence to
sovereignty becoming powerful drivers for the relationship to flourish, despite their ideas on an
alternative world order on which the views and interests of the two are not convergent. Both Russia
and China have expressed their opposition to the Indo-Pacific, with foreign minister Sergei Lavrov
labelling it an ‘artificially imposed construct’ aimed at ‘containing China.’ However, the Russian side
has expressed willingness to ‘consider’ any idea that does not ‘rely on bloc mentality.' Both Moscow
and Beijing have been opposed to the Quad comprising US, India, Japan and Australia.

There is no denying the growing asymmetry of ties between the two partners, as China strengthens its
position as a major power while Russia has accepted that it would be unable to match the same.
However, given its long experience as a superpower, nuclear arsenal, permanent United Nations
Secure Council (UNSC) seat and a strong arms industry, Russia continues to extend its influence in
areas beyond its immediate neighbourhood including Syria and Afghanistan. In addition, its actions in
its immediate neighbourhood demonstrate that it cannot be ignored.

The two sides have however dismissed talk of any alliance as neither wants to alarm other regional
states and force them into closer ties with the US. In addition, in the event an alliance crystallised,
Russia would be the junior partner, a prospect it would rather avoid. The formation of an alliance has
also been held back due to concerns about economic dominance of China in the long-term over the
Russian Far East; and the latter becoming a raw material appendage to the rising power. China has als
not openly supported Russia’s actions in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea – instead choosing to
remain neutral. Russia has followed much the same policy in the case of the South China Sea (where i
maintains a close relationship with another claimant, Vietnam, including through sale of arms and join
drilling for oil in the disputed waters of South China Sea) and East China Sea.

However, the recent joint air patrol is an indication of the growing closeness of ties that pose a unique
challenge to US power, not to mention a cause of concern for India. While the profits from arms sales
are a factor for Russia, the deepening of military ties are real, a process that has gathered steam
because of a ‘shift in strategic thinking’ after 2014.

The strained ties with the West and continued sanctions have further pushed Russia into China’s arms
which is also dealing with its own trade war versus the US - and reduced chances of conflict. Even
though China might not always agree with Russia’s foreign policy adventures, given that it benefits
from close cooperation with the West, it has found benefit in maintaining semblance of equal
partnership with Moscow.

Conclusion
Evidently, the Russia-China strategic partnership has grown increasingly strong, despite the
asymmetrical nature of the relationship. The two sides have also managed to successfully navigate
their potential areas of conflict and recognised the strategic significance of each other in a changing
world order. Despite the challenges, the two sides have not engaged in conflict with each other and
have managed their divergent interests without them affecting the broader partnership.
 Concerns remain about the ability of Russia to be able to maintain its position vis-à-vis China as the
latter continues to grow, widening the capacities between the two countries. This does make Moscow
wary about its long-term implications, concerned about the possibility of rise of Chinese hegemony at
the regional and global level. However, in the short to medium-term, given the strategic rationale and
uncertain global conditions, the idea that Russia and China ‘will never be against each other’ even if
they are not always with each other will prevail.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

RESEARCH EVENTS PEOPLE

About ORF

Set up in 1990, ORF seeks to lead and aid policy thinking towards building a strong and prosperous India in a fair and equitable world. It h
ideas to forums shaping global debates. ORF provides non-partisan, independent analyses and inputs on matters of security, strategy, econo
decision-makers (governments, business communities, academia, civil society). ORF’s mandate is to conduct in-depth research, provide in

Topics

Climate, Food and Environment

Defence and Security

Development

Development Partnerships

Domestic Politics and Governance

Economics and Finance

Energy

Gender

Healthcare

International Affairs

Media and Internet

Content Type

Books and Monographs

Commentaries

Event Reports

GP-ORF Series

Issue Briefs and Special Reports

Monitors

Occasional Papers

ORF Discourse

ORF Videos

Policy Briefs

Primer

Series

Speeches

Working Papers

Archives

Programmes

Strategic Studies

Tech and Media

Energy and Climate Change

Sustainable Development

Economy and Growth

Political Economy

Initiatives

Cybersecurity and Internet Governance

Education and Skilling

Energy and Resources

Eurasian Studies

Future of Work

International Trade and Finance

Maritime Studies

Media Studies

Neighbourhood Studies

Nuclear and Space Studies

Political Reform and Governance

Public Health

Urban Policy

Geographies

Africa

Americas

China

European Union

India

Neighbourhood

Russia and Eurasia

The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia

USA and Canada

West Asia
 Who We Are

Work With Us

Media Inquiry

Partners

Newsletter Signup

Contact Us

      

Terms and Conditions ORF Privacy Policy Declaration of Contributions ORF © 2019 | D