LEONIDAS EPIFANIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , G.R. No.

157057 June 26,

2007

FACTS: On August 15, 1990, Crisaldo Alberto (Crisaldo) and his cousin, Allan Perez (Allan),
were walking to their respective homes after spending time at the house of Crisaldo's father. Since
the pavement going to Crisaldo's house followed a narrow pathway along the local shrubs called
banganga, Allan walked ahead of Crisaldo. Suddenly, Crisaldo felt the piercing thrust of a bladed
weapon on his back, which caused him to cry out in pain. He made a quick turnaround and saw
his attacker, petitioner, also known as "Iyo (Uncle) Kingkoy." Petitioner stabbed Crisaldo again
but only hit the latter's left arm. When Allan heard Crisaldo's outcry, he rushed to Crisaldo's side
which caused petitioner to run away. Allan then brought Crisaldo to his father's house where
Crisaldo's wounds were wrapped in a blanket. Crisaldo was then brought to the Peñaplata Hospital
where he was given first aid and then transferred to the Davao Medical Center where he stayed for
three weeks to recuperate from his wounds.
Subsequently, petitioner was charged with Frustrated Murder. During his arraignment, petitioner
pleaded "not guilty." Petitioner's defense consisted mainly of denial. On July 5, 1994, the RTC
rendered its Decision convicting the petitioner. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA, which
affirmed the decision in toto.

ISSUE: Whether the accused was guilty of frustrated murder.

HELD: No. It must be stressed that it is not only gravity of the wounds alone which determines
whether a felony is attempted or frustrated.

In the case of US vs Eduave, Justice Moreland distinguished attempted from frustrated felony. He
said that to be an attempted crime, the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force
or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed
all the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which act it is his intention to
perform. On the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the
subjective phase in the commission of the crime.

In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound
inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical
intervention or attendance. If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the
crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill
the victim; or frustrated or attempted homicide/murder if the offender intended to kill the victim.
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used
in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d)
the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries
were inflicted by him on the victim.

In the present case, the intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond reasonable doubt
through the unwavering testimony of Crisaldo on the treacherous manner of execution of the attack
as well as the number of wounds he sustained. Crisaldo was stabbed from behind by petitioner.
When Crisaldo turned around, petitioner continued his assault, hitting Crisaldo on the left arm as
the latter tried to defend himself. Nonetheless, petitioner failed to perform all the acts of execution,
because Allan came to the aid of Crisaldo and petitioner was forced to scamper away. He did not
voluntarily desist from stabbing Crisaldo, but he had to stop stabbing when Allan rushed to help
Crisaldo and recognized petitioner. Thus, the subjective phase of the crime had not been
completed.

Moreover, the prosecution failed to present testimonial evidence on the nature of the wounds
sustained by Crisaldo. No evidence in this case was introduced to prove that Crisaldo would have
died from his wound without timely medical attendance. It is well-settled that where there is
nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the
character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused
and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated murder. Therefore,
the accused was found guilty of attempted murder.