1. De Guia v. Commission on Elections
78687, [January 31, 1989], 251 PHIL 764-772
G.R. No. 104712, [May 6, 1992], 284 PHIL 565-57
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES CONSTRUED ACCORDING TO ITS
OBJECT. — No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile.
We must therefore, as far as we can, define its meaning, its significance, its reason for being.
As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is
vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it
to enact the statute. If the statute needs construction, as it does in the present case, the most
dominant in that process is the purpose of the act. Statutes should be construed in the light
of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given
such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended. A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a
meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that
tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment.
FACTS: Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991.
It is “An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral
Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” Respondent
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment,
by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces
with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the
Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the
Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars, Resolution No. 2379, approving the
Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and Resolution
UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3,
R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion
to COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, and maintained that election
of Sanggunian members be “at large” instead of “by district”.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct
in assailing the aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions.
HELD: NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit
Spirit and purpose of the law – The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in
the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861, and that respondent COMELEC is cognizant of
its legislative intent.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must
therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has
oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely
expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact
the statute.
The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and
the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained single-
districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 will have to continue
to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be
elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166.
2. Salenillas v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No.
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; SECTION 119; PERSONS WITH RIGHT TO
REPURCHASE, "LEGAL HEIRS" NOT DISTINGUISHED. — From the foregoing legal
provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase
- the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the
private respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not
belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the property not through
inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-
in-law of the Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena
Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this
score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119
of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — To indorse the distinction made by the private respondent
and the appellate court would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public
Land Act which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself
and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in
clearing and cultivating it.
FACTS: The parents of Elena Salenillas, petitioners, were grantees of free patent. The
subject property was later sold to her and her husband. The property of petitioners was
mortgaged to Philippine National bank as security for a loan. For failure to pay their loan,
the property was foreclose by PNB and was bought at a public auction by private respondent.
Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of the
Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified petitioner from
being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property.
Issue:W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of
thePublic Land Act.
RULING: YES. Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act provides that "every conveyance of land
acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date or conveyance."
The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. The distinction made by respondent contravenes the very purpose of
the act. Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the
law should prevail.
Invoking the provision made under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, the petitioners, being
legal heirs, had the right to repurchase the said property as long as the 5-year period had not
yet proscribed. The Court held that when the petitioners expressed their desire to repurchase
the property in 1984, it was evident that the 5-year period had not yet proscribed, the public
auction having been in 1981 and the issuance of the Final deed in 1983.
Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and
Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her husband to
repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We
have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves
the purpose of the law should prevail.
 3. Commendador vs. Gen. Demetrio
G.R. No. 78687, [January 31, 1989], 251 PHIL 764-772
FACTS: The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution
for their alleged participation in the failed coup d'etat that took place on December 1 to 9,
1989. A Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order
No. 16 to investigate the petitioners. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena individually
addressed to the petitioners. The petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge
sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the
rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days to file their objections in writing through a
Motion for Summary Dismissal. The PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5
days to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to raise
peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14 by invoking Article
18 of Com. Act No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had
been discontinued under P.D. No.39.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS CAN MANIFEST THE RIGHT TO
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE.
RULING: YES. The petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right to
peremptory challenge was originally provided under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles
of War).
November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the
Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military
Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge.
January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of
the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. With the termination of martial law
and the dissolution of the military tribunals created there under, the reason for the
existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases,
the law itself ceases. Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying these rules, we
hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became
ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No.2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408
was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
4. Chua v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 88979, [February 7, 1992], 282 PHIL 970-990
8. ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LEGAL MAXIMS; EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST
EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS AND CASUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST;
CONSTRUED. — Specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP
including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The legislature would not have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention
been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned
or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est — A person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
9. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT
BAR. — The maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable
maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that: "No statute
can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an
omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment,
to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of
the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of
statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The
doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may
be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And
every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power,
right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim,
in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus."
FACTS: Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the
Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the
program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to
one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almost
fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the
Civil Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous
with the NIA project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations
under Sec.3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary
or regular employment. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil
action for certiorari.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS
GRANTED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6683.
RULING: YES. Petition was granted. Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous
employee, a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme
Court sees no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement
Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its
benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But
specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of
the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable
maxim in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that “what is implied
in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed”.
The Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable,
unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement
within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. In the interest of
substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she served the government not
only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15)
years in four (4) successive governmental projects.
5. People v. Manantan, G.R. No. L-14129
[July 31, 1962], 115 PHIL 657-671)
1. ELECTIONEERING; OFFICERS PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN POLITICS;
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. — A justice of the peace is included among the officers
enjoined from active political participation by Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. There was no need of including justices of the peace in the enumeration in
said Section 54 because the Legislature had availed itself of the more generic and
broader term "judge."
2. ID.; ID.; TERM "JUDGE" CONSTRUED. — The term "judge" not modified by any
word or phrase, is intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the
courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the
courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
Because of this, the lower court dismissed the case against him. The Solicitor General
appealed.
ISSUE: W/N A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE IS INCLUDED IN THE PROHIBITION OF
SECTION 54 OF THE REVISED ELECTION CODE
RULING: YES. Although petitioner argues that when Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code omitted the words “justice of peace” from the Revised Administrative Code
provision from which it was taken and thus making the intention of the legislature
clear in the omission, the word judge in the former provision was qualified or modified
by the phrase “of first instance.” The term “judge” in Section 54 is not modified or qualified,
making it broader and more generic to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of
the Courts of First Instance, Courts of Agrarian Relations, Courts of Industrial Relations
and justices of the peace. The rule of casus omissus has no applicability to the case at bar for
the maxim only applies and operate if and when the omission has been clearly
established

3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RULE OF "CASUS OMISUS" WHEN

APPLICABLE. — The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" can operate
and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case
at bar, the Legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities.
Rather, they were merely called by another term - "judge." The rule, therefore, has
no applicability to the instant case.

4. ID.; PENAL STATUTES; RUIN OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION. — The rule that

penal statutes are given strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single
factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (3
Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 56). The court may consider the spirit and
reason of a statute, as in this particular instance where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmaker (Crawford Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294).

5. ID.; ID.; RULE OF EXCLUSION. — Where a statute appears on its phase to limit
the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating
them, but no reason exist why other persons or things not so enumerated should
not have been included and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them,
the maxim expresio unius est exclusio, alterius, should not be invoked. (Blevins vs.
Mullally, 135 p. 307, 22 CAL. A pp. 519).

6. DOUBLE JEOPARDY; FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO RAISE ISSUE; WAIVER OF

DEFENSE. — As defendant neither raised the issue of double jeopardy by way of
resisting the appeal of the state, nor argued in his brief the said plea, he is deemed
to have waived this defense.

FACTS: Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of the Section
54 of the Revised Election Code which provides that “No justice, judge, fiscal.... shall aid any
candidate in any manner in any election, except to vote.” Defendant contends that this
provision excludes justice of the peace and as such, he is excluded from this prohibition.