FIRST DIVISION imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the
current of the water, and (3) that the land where accretion
[G.R. No. L-61647. October 12, 1984.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF
LANDS), Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES,
MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C.
TANCINCO, Respondents.
The Solicitor General for Petitioner.
Martin B. Laurea for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE BINDING IN
THE SUPREME COURT; EXCEPTIONS, The rule that the
findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
binding upon this Court admits of certain exceptions. Thus in
Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97
SCRA 734) we held that this Court retains the power to
review and rectify the findings of fact of said courts when (1)
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, and impossible; (3) where
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the: judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the
court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee.
2. CIVIL LAW; OWNERSHIP; RIGHT OF ACCESSION;
REQUISITES OF ACCRETION. — The above-quoted article
requires the concurrence of three requisites before an
accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have
taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and
takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLUVION MUST BE THE EXCLUSIVE
WORK OF NATURE; CASE AT BAR. — The requirement that
the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the
river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New
Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention.
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant
case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the
addition to the said property was made gradually through the
effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that it
is preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of
land came into being because of the effects of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue Rivers. There is evidence that the
alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and
not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being
not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but
as result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and
encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is not
even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river’s
current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of
water. The private respondents’ own evidence shows that the
water in the fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the
pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter deep on the
side of the pilapil facing river.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAW GIVES RIPARIAN OWNER THE RIGHT
TO ANY LAND OR ALLUVION; RATIONALE. — The reason
behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land
or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the
danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his
land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and
other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters
and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject
to incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper
that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owner
thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion
(Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian
owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by
special works expressly intended or designed to bring about
accretion. When the private respondents transferred their
dikes towards the river beds, the dikes were meant for
reclamation purposes and not protect their property from the
destructive force of the waters of the river.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate
Court) affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VIII, which found that
Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-131892 are accretion to the land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 and
ordered their registration in the names of the private
respondents.
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes,
Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C.
Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio
Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan
and Bocaue rivers.
On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an
application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their
fishpond property and particularly described as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Lot 1 — Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
"A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-131892),
situated in the Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by
Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; on the SE., along lines 2-3-4, by
Meycauayan River; on the S.W., along lines 4-5-6-7-8-9, by
Bocaue River; on the NE., along line 9-10, by property of
Joaquina Santiago; on the E., NE., and NW., along lines 10-
11-12-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-
111877). . . . containing an area of THIRTY THREE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN (33,937)
SQUARE METERS. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Lot 2 — Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
"A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan Psu-131892),
situated in the Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan, Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by
property of Rafael Singson; on the S., along line 2-3, by
Meycauayan River; on the SW., along line 3-4, by Lot 3 of
plan Psu-131892; and on the N., along line 4-1, by property
of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877). . . . containing an
area of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THREE
(5,453) SQUARE METERS. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Lot 3 — Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
"A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan Psu-131892),
situated in the Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan, Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by
property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877); and along
line 2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-131892; on the S., along line
3-4, by Meycauayan River, on the SW., along line 4-5, by Lot
1 of plan Psu-131892; and along line 5-6 by property of
Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877), and on the NW.,
along line 6-1, by property of Joaquina Santiago. . . .
containing an area of ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
EIGHTY FIVE (1,985) SQUARE METERS. . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C.
Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a
written opposition to the application for registration.
On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial
withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to
Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of
the Commissioner appointed by the Court.
On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the
application and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1
and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision
granting the application on the finding that the lands in
question are accretions to the private respondents’ fishponds
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709. The
dispositive portion of the decision
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2 of plan Psu-
131892 (Exh. H) are accretions to the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 of the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan, they belong to the owner of said property.
The Court, therefore, orders the registration of Lots 1 & 2
situated in the barrio of Ubihan, municipality of Meycauayan,
province of Bulacan, and more particularly described in plan
Psu-131892 (Exh. H) and their accompanying technical
descriptions (Exhs. E, E-1) in favor of Benjamin Tancinco,
married to Alma Fernandez and residing at 3662
Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.; Azucena Tancinco
Reyes, married to Alex Reyes, Jr., residing at 4th St., New
Manila, Quezon City; Marina Tancinco Imperial, married to
Juan Imperial, residing at Pasay Road, Dasmariñas Village,
Makati, Rizal; and Mario C. Tancinco, married to Leticia
Regidor, residing at 1616 Cypress St., Dasmariñas Village,
Makati, Rizal, all of legal age, all Filipino citizens."cralaw
virtua1aw library
On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals.
On August 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a
decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court. The
dispositive portion of the decision
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan at
pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan nang walang bayad."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court admits of
certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS
Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734) we held that this Court
retains the power to review and rectify the findings of fact of
said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, and
impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee.
There are facts and circumstances in the record which render
untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the
private respondents’ fishponds.
The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of
under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what
actually happened is that the private respondents simply
transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the
Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to
speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of
the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters
of the river.
On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the
testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acuña to the effect that:chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
x x x human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of
". . . when witness first saw the land namely, Lots 1 & 2,
they were already dry almost at the level of the Pilapil of the
property of Dr. Tancinco, and that from the boundaries of the
lots, for about two (2) arms length the land was still dry up
to the edge of the river; that sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil
was established on the boundaries of Lots 1 & 2 and soil
from the old Pilapil was transferred to the new Pilapil and this
was done sometime in 1951; that the new lots were then
converted into fishpond, and water in this fishpond was two
(2) meters deep on the side of the Pilapil facing the
fishpond . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence
establishes the fact of accretion without human intervention
because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion
was complete.
We agree with the petitioner.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three
requisites before an accretion covered by this particular
provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made
through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks
of rivers.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect
of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes
from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by
nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever
to prove that the addition to the said property was made
gradually through the effects of the current of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the
observation of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to
believe that almost four (4) hectares of land came into being
because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
The lone witness of the private respondents who happens to
be their overseer and whose husband was first cousin of their
father noticed the four hectare accretion to the twelve
hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents claim that at
this point in time, accretion had already taken place. If so,
their witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual and
imperceptible increase to their land in the years before 1939.
However, the witness testified that in that year, she
observed an increase in the area of the original fishpond
which is now the land in question. If she was telling the
truth, the accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence
that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-
made and not the exclusive result of the current of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits
came into being not because of the sole effect of the current
of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike
towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought
to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and
gradually by the river’s current on the fishpond adjoining it.
It is under two meters of water. The private respondents’
own evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is two
meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and
only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the
river.
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right
to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate
him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the
location of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are
exposed to floods and other evils produced by the
destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful
provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or
danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be
compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of
Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not
acquire the additions to his land caused by special works
expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion.
When the private respondents transferred their dikes
towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation
purposes and not to protect their property from the
destructive force of the waters of the river.
We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that
the testimony of the private respondents’ lone witness to the
effect that as early as 1939 there already existed such
alleged alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It should be
noted that the lots in question were not included in the
survey of their adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940
and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of
Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960. The
alleged accretion was declared for taxation purposes only in
1972 or 33 years after it had supposedly permanently
formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said
areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed only
after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards
the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private
respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of
a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.chanrobles
law library : red
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1
& 2 in the names of the private respondents. These lots were
portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are
therefore classified as property of the public domain under
Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to
registration under the Land Registration Act. The
adjudication of the lands in question as private property in
the names of the private respondents is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
private respondents are ordered to move back the dikes of
their fishponds to their original location and return the
disputed property to the river to which it belongs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la
Fuente, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-30829 August 28, 1929
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, applicant-
appellant,
vs.
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, ET AL., claimants.
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, appellee.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant.
Vicente O. Romualdez for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the Government of the Philippine Islands
from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, rendered in
cadastral case No. 30, G. L. R. O. Record No. 359 of the municipality
of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, ordering the registration of the two
parcels of land known as lots 1 and 2 described in the application, in
favor of the Colegio de San Jose in accordance with the provisions of
law, without special pronouncement as to the costs, it being
understood, however, that the lease of said lands executed by the
aforesaid Colegio de San Jose in favor of Carlos Young y Baldwin is
valid and subsists under the terms and conditions set forth in the
instruments, Exhibits Y-1 and Y-2, and providing for the issuance of
the proper decree once said decision becomes final.
In support of the appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged
errors as committed by the court below in its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in not holding that the parcels of land
in question are part of the bed of Laguna Lake and, therefore,
belong to the public domain.
2. The lower court erred in finding that said lands are included
in the title of the appellee and in finding that the appellee has
been in the possession and occupation of the same.
3. The lower court erred in qualifying as extraordinary
inundations the fact that the lands in dispute are under water
during the rainy season.
4. The lower court erred in decreeing the registration of the
lands in dispute to the appellee and in denying the appellant's
motion for a new trial.
The pertinent facts necessary to decide the questions of fact and of
law raised in the instant appeal, are as follows:
During the months of September, October and November every year,
the waters of Laguna de Bay cover a long strip of land along the
eastern border of the two parcels of land in question, the width of
which strip varies from 50 to 70 meters according to the evidence of
the Colegio de San Jose and up to the eastern border of the pass
claimed by the municipality of San Pedro Tunasan, according to some
witnesses for the Insular Government; and, according to other
witnesses for the Insular Government, the flooded strip includes the
aforementioned pass itself, which is usually completely covered with
water, so that the people can fish in said flooded strip.
The claimant Colegio de San Jose contends, and its evidence tends
to prove, that the above-named parcels of land are a part of
the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan belonging to said claimant,
which has been in possession thereof since time immemorial by
means of its tenants or lessees and farmers.
On the other hand, the Government of the Philippine Islands contends
that the said two parcels of land belong to the public domain, and its
evidence tends to prove that they have always been known as the
shores of Laguna de Bay, and they are situated alongside the highway
running parallel to said shore; that the water of the lake has receded a
great distance on that side; that said parcels of land had been under
water formerly; that at present, during the rainy season, the water of
the lake reaches the highway, and that when the water recedes the
people of the place occupy and cultivate said lands during the dry
season.
The only question to be decided in the present appeal is whether the
two aforesaid parcels of land in controversy belong to the Hacienda
de San Pedro Tunasan and are owned by the claimant Colegio de
San Jose, or whether they belong to the public domain as a part of the
bed of Laguna de Bay.
It is of primary importance to determine whether the body of water
called Laguna de Bay is naturally and legally a lake or a lagoon.
The Enciclopedia Juridica Espanola, volume XXI, pages 124 and 125,
defines "lake" and "lagoon" as follows:
LAKE. A body of water formed in depressions of the earth.
Ordinarily fresh water, coming from rivers, brooks, or springs,
and connected with the sea by them.
LAGOON. A small lake, the hollow bed of which is bounded by
elevations of land.
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth;
it contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks or springs, and
is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. According to the
definition just quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake.
Inasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake, we must resort to the legal
provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds
and shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of the
parcels of land in question.
Article 407 of the Civil Code says the following in its pertinent part:
ART. 407. The following are of public ownership:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Lakes and ponds formed by nature on public lands, and
their channels.
xxx xxx xxx
And article 44 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, provides as
follows:
ART. 44. Natural ponds and lakes existing upon public lands
and fed by public waters, belong to the public domain.
xxx xxx xxx
It is beyond discussion that Laguna de Bay belongs to the public
domain, being a natural lake existing upon public lands, and fed by
public waters from rivers, brooks and springs.
Now then, what is the bed of Laguna de Bay?
Article 74 of the Law of Waters cited above defines the bed of lake as
follows:
ART. 74. The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is
the ground covered by their waters when at their highest
ordinary depth.
This definition raises the question: Which is the natural bed or basin of
Laguna de Bay?
The evidence shows tat during the dry season, that is, during the
months of December, January, February, March, April, May, June, July
and August, the water of the lake at its highest depth reaches no
farther that the line forming the northeastern boundary of the two
parcels of land in controversy, and that it is only during the wet
season, that is, during the months of September, October, and
November, that said water rises to the highway, completely covering
said parcels of land. Therefore, the waters of Laguna de Bay have two
different levels during the year:
One during the dry season, which obtains during nine months, and the
other during the wet season, which continues for three months. Which
of these two heights marks the land limit of the waters of Laguna de
Bay, that is, which of them forms its natural bed or basin? The law
says, the highest ordinary depth. Now then, which of the two aforesaid
depths of the waters of Laguna de Bay is the ordinary one? The word
"ordinary" is defined in the Dictionary of the Spanish Academy as
follows:
ORDINARY. Not exceeding the average; common, natural,
occurring always or most of the time; not going beyond what
happens or takes place.
The word extraordinary is defined in the same dictionary as follows:
EXTRAORDINARY. Uncommon, transcending the general
rule, order or measure; exceeding, surpassing, or going
beyond that which is ordinary, commonly met with, current,
settled, or admitted by the majority.
According to the foregoing definitions of the words "ordinary" and
"extraordinary," the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay
during the dry season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth they
attain during the rainy season is the extraordinary one; inasmuch as
the former is the one which is regular, common, natural, which occurs
always or most of the time during the year, while the latter is
uncommon, transcends the general rule, order of measure, and goes
beyond that which is the ordinary depth. If, according to the definition
given by article 74 of the Law of Waters quoted above, the natural bed
or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their waters when at
their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of Laguna de
Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at their highest depth
during the dry season, that is, up to the northeastern boundary of the
two parcels of land in question.
Inasmuch as, according to article 407 of the Civil Code, cited above,
lakes and their beds belong to the public domain, and inasmuch as,
according to article 74 of the Law of Waters cited above, the bed of
lake is the ground covered by its waters at their highest ordinary
depth; whereas the waters of Laguna de Bay at their highest depth
reach no farther than the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of
land in question, said parcels are outside said bed and, consequently,
do not belong to the public domain.
The Government of the Philippine Islands also contends that as the
waters of Laguna de Bay have receded very much, as a result of
which the two parcels of land under discussion, which had been under
water before, were left uncovered, the claimant Colegio de San Jose
which owned the estate bordering upon said Laguna de Bay, did not
acquire said two parcels of land, in accordance with the provisions of
article 367 of the Civil Code, as follows:
ART. 367. The owners of estates bordering on ponds or
lagoons, do not acquire the land left dry by the natural
decrease of the waters, nor lose those inundated by them in
extraordinary floods.
As may be seen, the legal provision quoted above, cited by the
appellant in support of its contention, refers to ponds and lagoons,
and has therefore no application to the case at bar, which refers to a
lake, a lagoon being legally distinct in character from a lake.
Having pointed out that the inundations of the two parcels of land in
question during the months of September, October and November, is
extraordinary, the legal provision applicable to the case is that
contained in article 77 of the aforesaid Law of Waters, which reads:
ART. 77. Lands accidentally inundated by the waters of lakes,
or by creeks, rivers, and other streams, shall continue to be
the property of their respective owners.
If, as we have seen, the two parcels of land in litigation form no part of
the bed of Laguna de Bay, and consequently, do not belong to the
public domain, they must belong to the claimant Colegio de San Jose
as a part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, owned by it, the
northeastern part of which borders on said lake, and in accordance
with the legal provision just quoted, the fact that they are inundated by
its waters during extraordinary risings, which take place during the
months of September, October and November, does not deprive said
claimant of the ownership thereof.
Article 84 of the said Law of Waters further provides:
ART 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous
to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or
sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of
such lands.
xxx xxx xxx
Even if, therefore, the two parcels of land in litigation were considered
as accretions gradually deposited by accessions or sediments from
the waters of Laguna de Bay, they would still, according to the legal
provision just quoted, belong to the claimant Colegio de San Jose as
owner of the lands bordering on said Laguna de Bay.
The appellant also contends that the two parcels of land form a part of
the shores of Laguna de Bay and are therefore of public ownership,
citing paragraph 3 of article 1 of the Law of Waters, which says:
ART. 1. The following are part of the national domain open to
public use:
xxx xxx xxx
3. The shores. — By the shore is understood that space
covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide. Its
interior or terrestrial is the line reached by the highest
equinoctial tides. Where the tides are not appreciable, the
shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea
during ordinary storms or tempests.
As the court below correctly held, this legal provision refers to the
waters of the sea, being included under Title I, which treats of the
ownership and use of said waters of the sea. Lake waters, being
terrestrial waters, their ownership and use are governed by Title II of
said Law of Waters. In the same manner as the shore of the sea is
that space covered and uncovered by the waters during the tides, its
interior or terrestrial limit being the line reached by its highest ordinary
depth. In the instant case, the interior or terrestrial limit of the Laguna
de Bay is the ground covered by its waters in its highest ordinary
depth, that is, up to the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of
land in question.
Summarizing, we find: (1) That the natural bed or basin of Laguna de
Bay is the ground covered by its waters at their highest ordinary depth
during the dry season, that is, during the months of December,
January, February, March, April, May, June, July and August; (2) that
the highest depth reached by said waters during the rainy season, or
during the months of September, October and November, is
extraordinary; (3) that the two parcels of land in litigation form an
integral part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan belonging to the
claimant Colegio de San Jose; (4) that said two parcels of land, being
accidentally inundated by the waters of Laguna de Bay continue to be
the property of the claimant Colegio de San Jose (art. 77, Law of
Waters of August 3, 1866); (5) that even supposing that the said two
parcels of land have been formed by accession or deposits of
sediment by the waters of said Laguna de Bay, they still belong to the
said claimant Colegio de San Jose, as owner of the land of
the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, bordering on said Laguna de
Bay (art. 84, Law of Waters of August 3, 18660; (6) that the provisions
of the Law of Waters regulating the ownership and use of the waters
of the sea are not applicable to the ownership and use of lakes, which
are governed by special provisions.
In the view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and
so hold, that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, without
special pronouncements as to costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Villamor and Johns, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 82220 July 14, 1995
PABLITO MENESES and LORENZO MENESES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO
QUISUMBING, NORBERTO QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO
QUISUMBING (Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamed
Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO QUISUMBING (Perla,
Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all
surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING, SR.
(Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed
Quisumbing) and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO QUISUMBING (Fe,
Johnny, Ma. Luisa, Norberto, Jimmy, Ma. Victoria, Elsa and
Oscar, all surnamed Quisumbing), all represented by Atty. Galileo
Brion, respondents.
G.R. No. 82251 July 14, 1995
CESAR ALMENDRAL, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO QUISUMBING, respondent.
G.R. No. 83059 July 14, 1995
EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF
EMILIO QUISUMBING (Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamed
Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO QUISUMBING, (Perla,
Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all
surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING, SR.
(Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed
Quisumbing) and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO QUISUMBING (Fe,
Johnny, Ma. Victoria, Elsa and Oscar, all surnamed
Quisumbing), petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PABLITO MENESES, LORENZO
MENESES and BRAULIO C. DARUM, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
For review in these consolidated petitions is the Decision dated
August 31, 1987 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07049
affirming the Decision dated March 26, 1984 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 37, Calamba, Laguna, in Civil Case No. 474-83-C
which declared as null and void the original certificates of title and free
patents issued to Pablito Meneses over lots found by the court to be
accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion land owned by
Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing.
I thereto which, after it was duly surveyed, was identified as Psu-
On March 1, 1977, Braulio C. Darum, then the District Land Officer of
Los Baños, Laguna, issued to Pablito Meneses Free Patent No. (IV-5)
P-12807 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1268 covering Lot 1585
with an area of 417 square meters, and Free Patent No (IV-5) 12808
and Original Certificate of Title No P-1269 for Lot 190 with an area of
515 square meters. Both lots are located in Los Baños, Laguna.
Pablito Meneses acquired said property from Silverio Bautista through
a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights executed on May 5, 1975 in
consideration of Bautista's "love and affection" for and "some
monetary obligations" in favor of Pablito Meneses (Rollo, p. 45). After
the execution of said document, Pablito Meneses took possession of
the land, introduced improvements thereon, declared the land as his
own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty taxes. In turn,
Bautista acquired the 900-square-meter land from his aunt, Sergia
(Gliceria) M. Almeda. He had been occupying the land since 1956.
On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of the
land as far back as September 6, 1919 when their matriarch, Ciriaca
Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing was issued Original Certificate of Title
No. 989 covering a lot with an area of 859 square meters located in
Los Baños, Laguna with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern
boundary. The same parcel of land was registered on August 14, 1973
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33393 in the names of
Ciriaca's heirs: Emilio, Manuel, Eduardo, Norberto, Perla, Josefina,
Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed
Quisumbing.
In 1962, the Quisumbing instituted and accion publiciana in the then
Court of First Instance of Biñan, Laguna to recover possession over a
portion of the property from Dominga Villamor and Lorenzo Lanuzo
docketed as Civil Case No. B-350. On January 3, 1966, the case was
decided in favor of the Quisumbings. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
sustained the Quisumbings' right over the property.
In LRC Case No. B-327, the Quisumbings applied for registration and
confirmation of title over an additional area of 2,387 square meters
which had gradually accrued to their property by the natural action of
the waters of Laguna de Bay. In its Decision of September 28, 1978,
the Court of First Instance of Biñan confirmed the Quisumbings' title
208327. The additional area was divided into two lots in the survey
plan approved by the Director of Lands on November 16, 1964. In
ordering the confirmation and registration of title on favor of the
Quisumbings, the land registration court said:
. . . There is no doubt that the applicants' right to the
property was bolstered by the unappealed decision of
the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350 of this
Court when the properties applied for were classified
as accretions made by the waters of the Laguna Lake. .
. . (G.R. No. 82229, Rollo, p. 20).
On April 17, 1979, the Quisumbings filed Civil Case No. 07049 before
the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, Calamba against
Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Braulio C. Darum and Cesar B.
Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles issued to
Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor
of Los Baños, using his brother Pablito as a "tool and dummy,"
illegally occupied their "private accretion land" an August 6, 1976, and,
confederating with District Land Officer Darum and Land Inspector
Cesar Almendral, obtained free patents and original certificates of title
to the land.
On March 26, 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that
the lands registered by the Meneses brothers are accretion lands to
which the Quisumbings have a valid right as owners of the riparian
land to which nature had gradually deposited the disputed lots. In so
holding, the trial court relied heavily on the decision of the Court of
Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350, and quoted the following portions of
the appellate court's decision:
Plaintiffs-appellees are titled owners of a (sic) 859
square meters of land under TCT No. 25978 of the
Laguna Land Registry, the northwest boundary of
which is the Laguna de Bay.
It is ascertained that the northwest portion of
Quisumbing's lot is bounded by the Laguna de Bay.
The nature of the Laguna de Bay has long been settled
in the case of Government of the Philippines v. Colegio
de San Jose (55 Phil. 423) when it held that:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water
formed in depression of the earth; it
contains fresh water coming
from rivers and brooks and springs, and
is connected with Manila Bay by the
Pasig River. According to the definition
first quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake.
Consequently, since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the
authorities cited by the appellants referring to seashore
would not apply. The provision of the law on waters will
govern in determining the natural bed or basin of
the lake. And accordingly, to Art. 84 of the Law of
Waters of August 3, 1866:
Accretions deposited gradually upon
land contiguous to creeks, streams,
rivers and lakes by accessions or
sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such
lands.
Since the title indicate(s) that the northwest portion of
the property is bounded by Laguna de Bay, which is
a lake, even if the area where Lanuza's house and
Villamor's house for that matter is located is not
included within the title, it must necessarily be
an accretion upon appellees' land by accessions or
sediments from the waters thereof which should belong
to the owner of the adjacent land. The authorities cited
by the appellants treat of the ownership of accretions
by water of the sea under Title I. Lakewaters being
terrestrial waters, their ownership is governed by Title II
of the Law of Waters. As held in the Colegio de San
Jose case, the provisions of the Law of Waters
regulating the ownership and use of sea water are not
applicable to the ownership and use of lakes which are
governed by different provisions. As pointed out by the
lower court, no act of appropriation is necessary in
order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation as
the law does not require the same (Ignacio Grande, et
al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17652,
June 30, 1962 citing Roxas vs. Tuazon, 9 Phil. 408;
Cortez vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567 and 3 Manresa,
C.C. pp. 321-326, pp. 4-5) (Records, pp. 80-84).
The trial court also found that the free patents issued to Pablito
Meneses had been procured through fraud, deceit and bad faith,
citing the following facts as bases for its conclusion: (1) The Deed of
Waiver and Transfer of Rights allegedly executed by Silverio Bautista
in favor of Pablito Meneses was a simulated contract for lack of
consideration; (2) The said instrument was sworn to before Mayor
Lorenzo Meneses who had no authority to notarize deeds of
conveyances; (3) Although the lots subject of the deed of conveyance
were placed in his brother's name, Mayor Meneses actually exercised
rights of ownership thereto; (4) Land Inspector Cesar Almendral
admitted having anomalously prepared the documents to support the
free patent applications of Pablito Meneses and, having personally
filled up the blank forms, signed them in the absence of the persons
concerned; (5) Almendral kept the documents in his possession from
1979 to 1980 despite orders from the Director of Lands to produce
and surrender the same; (6) District Land Officer Braulio Darum
approved the free patent applications and issued the questioned titles
without the required cadastral survey duly approved by the Director of
Lands and despite the pendency of LRC Case No. B-327 involving the
contested lots; (7) Darum represented the Bureau of Lands in LRC
Case No. B-327 without authority from the Director of Lands and after
he had withdrawn his appearance in said case, persisted in filing a
motion to set aside the order for the issuance of a decree in favor of
the Quisumbings; (8) Darum and Almendral in bad faith, refused to
produce the missing original records of the free patent applications
and their supporting documents; and (9) When Darum was not yet an
oppositor in LRC Case No. B-327, he admitted in his letter to the Land
Registration Commission that the contested lots are portions of the
land being claimed by the Quisumbings contrary to his later
representation in the joint answer to the petition that the subject lots
are not portions of Lots 1 and 2, Psu-208327 owned by the
Quisumbings. Accordingly, the trial court disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the lands covered by Pablito
Meneses' Original Certificate of Title No. P-1268/Free
Patent No. 12807 (Exh. "J"), covering Lot No. 1585,
consisting of 417 square meters and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1269/Free Patent No. 12808
(Exh. "H"), covering Lot No. 190, consisting of 515
square meters, both located at Los Baños, Laguna, as
accretion lands forming parts of a bigger accretion land
owned by plaintiffs as declared in a final judgment
(Exh. "A"), rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Biñan, Laguna, in LRC Case No. B-327, which bigger
accretion land is directly adjacent to or at the back of
plaintiffs' riparian land, and consequently, declaring as
null and void and cancelled Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1269/Free Patent No. 12808;
2. Directing that the Register of Deeds of Laguna or his
Deputy at Calamba, Laguna, to make the
corresponding entries of cancellation in his Registry of
the above mentioned Original Certificate of Titles/Free
Patents;
3. Directing defendants Lorenzo Meneses and Pablito
Meneses and all persons acting in their behalves to
vacate the subject lands and surrender the possession
thereof to the plaintiffs immediately; and
4. Directing the defendants to pay jointly and severally,
the plaintiffs the sums of:
a) P20,000.00, plus P500.00 per month
from January, 1977, until the subject
property is completely vacated, as
actual and compensatory damages;
b) P350,000.00, as moral damages;
c) P70,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d) P40,000.00, as attorney's fees; and
e) the costs (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
Thereafter, the Quisumbings filed a motion for execution pending
appeal which the trial court granted in its Order of September 7, 1984
subject to the posting by the Quisumbings of a bond in the amount of
P500,000.00. The defendants unsuccessfully moved for the
reconsideration of said order.
The Quisumbings also filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint
against Pablito Meneses, Silverio Bautista, Pablo Silva, Virgilio Cruz
and Cesar Almendral for violation of paragraphs (e) and (j), Section 3
of Republic Act No. 3019, for conspiring in the approval and grant of
the free patents over portions of Lots 1 & 2 of Psu-208327 owned by
the heirs of Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing. In due course, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the defendants guilty as
charged. The case was elevated to this Court but on August 27, 1987,
the judgment of conviction was affirmed (Meneses v. People, 153
SCRA 303 [1987]).
Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the decision
in Civil Case No. 07049 to the Court of Appeals. On August 31, 1987,
the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit and
affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.
The defendants-appellants filed two motions for the reconsideration of
the appellate court's decision but it was denied in the Resolution of
February 23, 1988 which in pertinent part stated:
However, for humanitarian considerations, and
considering the appeal of the defendants-appellants for
a reduction of the moral and exemplary damages, We
favor the reduction of the moral damages from
P350,000.00 to P50,000.00 and the exemplary
damages from P70,000.00 to P5,000.00. In all other
respects, We find no justification for modifying the
dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court
(G.R. No. 82220, Rollo, p. 67).
Pablito and Lorenzo Meneses filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 82220. Cesar
Almendral filed a motion in G.R. No. 82251 for a 45-day extension
within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. After this Court
had granted them a 30-day extension, Almendral still failed to file any
petition. The Quisumbings also filed a petition for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 83059, solely on the issue of the propriety of
the reduction of the amount of damages in the Court of Appeals'
Resolution of February 23, 1988. Upon motion of petitioners in G.R.
No. 83059, the three petitions were consolidated in the Resolution of
August 1, 1988.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 retell the same errors they had raised
before the Court of Appeals, contending in the main: (1) that the lands
in question were not accretion lands but lands of the public domain;
(2) that no conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended
the issuance of the free patent and titles to Pablito Meneses; and (3)
that the Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights was founded on a valid
consideration.
As regards the issue of whether the lands in question are accretion
lands, petitioners relied on the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in Republic of the Philippines v. Braga, CA-G.R. No. 55390-R,
October 23, 1980, holding that the property involved therein was part
of the natural bed of the Laguna de Bay and therefore what had to be
determined was whether said property was covered by water when
the lake was at its highest depth.
Petitioners' assigned errors in G.R. No. 82220 are evidently factual
issues which have been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by
the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this
Court (Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 229
SCRA 533 [1994]) and they carry even more weight when the Court of
Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court (Binalay v.
Manalo, 195 SCRA 374 [1991]). The jurisdiction of this Court is thus
limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a showing that the
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion (BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA
566 [1941]). We find no such showing in this case.
Petitioners' protestations notwithstanding the final decision of the
Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350 has a bearing in the
resolution of this case for while the lots occupied by Villamor and
Lanuzo may not be the very same lots petitioners are claiming here,
the two cases refer to the same accretion lands northwest of the
original land owned by the Quisumbings.
In the same vein, the decision of the land registration court in LRC
Case No. B-327 ordering the confirmation and registration of title in
favor of the Quisumbings over 2,387 square meters of accretion land
is binding on petitioners in G.R. No. 82220. As correctly pointed out by
the Court of Appeals, said decision, being the result of a proceeding in
rem, binds the whole world, more so because it became final and
executory upon the Bureau of Lands' failure to interpose an appeal.
Since petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 claim that "the foreshore
land known as Lots 190 and 1585 are part of Laguna de Bay" and
therefore the Quisumbings "have no legal right to claim the same as
accretion land," we quote the following pertinent portions of the
decision in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 532 (1984) which,
although the case deals with the registration of a reclaimed land along
the Laguna de Bay, is nonetheless enlightening:
Laguna de Bay is a lake. While the waters of a lake are
also subject to the same gravitational forces that cause
the formation of tides in seas and oceans, this
phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the
case of lakes. Thus, the alternation of high tides and
low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could hardly
account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de
Bay as observed four to five months a year during the
rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which bring about
the inundation of a portion of the land in question.
Since the rise in the water level which causes the
submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period
(four to five months a year) than the level of the water
at which the land is completely dry, the latter should be
considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna
de Bay. Therefore, the land sought to be registered is
not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither
can it be considered as foreshore land. The Brief for
 the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate
definition of a foreshore land, to wit:
. . . . that part of (the land) which is
between high and low water and left dry
by the flux and reflux of the tides.
The strip of land that lies between the
high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the
flow of the tide.
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in
water of a portion of the land in question is due to the
rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay
from different sources." Since the inundation of a
portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides"
it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the
meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of
Lands. The land sought to be registered not being part
of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore
land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a
public land and therefore capable of registration as
private property provided that the applicant proves that
he has a registerable title (at pp. 538-539).
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the
Civil Code requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the
deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it
be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
rivers (or the sea coast). While the trial court mainly relied on the
findings in Civil Case No. B-350 that the lands in controversy are
accretion lands and it has not determined on its own the presence of
said requisites, it is too late now for petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 to
claim otherwise. Consequently, the lands held to be accretion lands
could only benefit the Quisumbings, who own the property adjacent to
the lands in controversy (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 350
[1992]).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 also assert that the principle of
indefeasibility of title should favor them as the one-year period
provided for by law to impugn their title had elapsed. They also urged
that, having been granted by the state, their title is superior to that of
the Quisumbings. We hold, however, that in the light of the fraud
attending the issuance of the free patents and titles of Pablito
Meneses, said assertions crumble. Such fraud was confirmed by this
Court in Meneses v. People, 153 SCRA 303 (1987) which held the
petitioners therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act in the issuance of the same free patents and titles.
Unlike the petition in G.R. No. 82220, the petition in G.R. No. 83059
(questioning the reduction of the damages awarded to the
Quisumbings by the Court of Appeals in the Resolution of February
23, 1988) is meritorious. The task of fixing the amount of damages is
primarily with the trial court (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155
[1966]). While it is the appellate court's duty to review the same, a
reduction of the award of damages must pass the test of
reasonableness. The Court of Appeals can only modify or change the
amount awarded as damages when they are palpably or scandalously
and reasonably excessive (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
226 SCRA 423 [1993]; Prudenciano v. Alliance Transport System, Inc.,
148 SCRA 440 [1987]).
There is no justification for the radical reduction by the Court of
Appeals of the damages awarded by the trial court. Its action was
premise merely on "humanitarian considerations" and the plea of the
defendants-appellants. We may agree with the Court of Appeals in
reducing the award after scrutinizing its factual findings only if such
findings are diametrically opposed to that of the trial court
(Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra). But as it is,
the Court of Appeals affirmed point by point the factual findings if the
lower court upon which the award of damages had been based.
We, therefore, see no reason to modify the award of damages made
by the trial court. Respondent Braulio C. Darum in G.R. No. 83059
must also be solidarily liable for said damages in his capacity as a
public officer. A public official is by law not immune from damages in
his personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside
the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of
immunity for official actions (Vidad v. RTC of Negros, Br. 42, 227
SCRA 271 [1993]).
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82220 is DENIED while the
petition in G.R. No. 83059 is GRANTED. The Decision dated August
31, 1987 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED while its Resolution of
February 23, 1988 insofar as it reduces the amount of damages
awarded to the Quisumbing family is SET ASIDE. Costs against
petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 and respondent Braulio Darum in G.R.
No. 83059.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108065. July 6, 1993.]
SPOUSES FELIX BAES AND RAFAELA BAES, Petitioners,
v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Lorenzo F. Miravite, for Petitioners.
The Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; RIGHT OF ACCESSION; UNDER
ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE THE RIPARIAN OWNER IS
ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR THE DAMAGE TO OR
LOSS OF HIS PROPERTY DUE TO NATURAL CAUSES OR, FOR
MORE REASON, DUE TO ARTIFICIAL MEANS. — If the
riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to
or loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all the
more reason to compensate him when the change in the
course of the river is effected through artificial means. The
loss to the petitioners of the land covered by the canal was
the result of a deliberate act on the part of the government
when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina
creek. It was therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses
for their loss.
2. ID.; PETITIONERS, HAVING ALREADY BEEN
COMPENSATED, CANNOT NOW CLAIM ADDITIONAL
COMPENSATION; REASON. — We find, however, that the
petitioners have already been so compensated. Felix Baes
was given Lot 3271-A in exchange for the affected Lot 2958-
B through the Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated June
20, 1970. This was a fair exchange because the two lots
were of the same area and value and the agreement was
freely entered into by the parties. The petitioners cannot now
claim additional compensation because, as correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, . . . to allow petitioners to
acquire ownership of the dried-up portion of the creek would
be a clear case of double compensation and unjust
enrichment at the expense of the state. The exchange of lots
between the petitioners and the Republic was the result of
voluntary negotiations. If these had failed, the government
could still have taken Lot 2958-B under the power of eminent
domain, upon payment of just compensation, as the land
was needed for a public purpose.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
This is an appeal by way of certiorari from the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the ruling
of the trial court in Civil Case No. 0460-P, the dispositive
portion of which read thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring null and
void TCT Nos. 14405, 29592, 29593, 29594, 29595, and TCT
No. 29593’s derivative titles TCT Nos. 124725, 124726,
124727 and 124729, and ordering the Register of Deeds for
Pasay City to cancel them and issue new ones in their stead
in the name of the plaintiff after segregating from TCT No.
29593 452 sq. m., the actual area of Lot 2958-C (covered by
cancelled TCT No. 11043) belonging to defendant Felix Baes.
The counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Register of Deeds
for Pasay City.
SO ORDERED.
The controversy began in 1962, when the government dug a
canal on a private parcel of land, identified as Lot 2958 and
covering an area of 33,902 sq.m., to streamline the Tripa de
Gallina creek.
This lot was later acquired by Felix Baes, who registered it in
his name under TCTl No. 10990 and then had it subdivided
into three lots, namely: (a) Lot 2958-A, with an area of
28,889 sq.m.; (b) Lot 2958-B, with an area of 3,588 sq.m.;
and (c) Lot 2958-C, with an area of 452 sq.m., covered by
TCT Nos. 11041, 11042 and 11043, respectively.
In exchange for Lot 2958-B, which was totally occupied by
the canal, the government gave Baes a lot with exactly the
same area as Lot 2958-B through a Deed of Exchange of
Real Property dated June 20, 1970. 1 The property, which
was near but not contiguous to Lot 2958-C, was
denominated as Lot 3271-A and later registered in the name
of Felix Baes under TCT No. 24300. The soil displaced by the
canal was used to fill up the old bed of the creek.
Meanwhile, Baes had Lot 2958-C and a portion of Lot 2958-A
designated as Lot 1, Blk. 4, resurveyed and subdivided. On
January 12, 1968, he submitted a petition for the approval of
his resurvey and subdivision plans, claiming that after the
said lots were plotted by a competent surveyor, it was found
that there were errors in respect of their bearings and
distances.
The resurvey-subdivision plan was approved by the Court of
First Instance of Pasay City in an order dated January 15,
1968. 2
As a result, the old TCTs covering the said lots were canceled
and new ones were issued, to wit: (a) Lot 1-A, Blk. 4, with
672 sq.m., under TCT No. T-14404; (b) Lot 1-B, with 826
sq.m., representing the increase in area after the resurvey,
under TCT No. T-14405; (c) Lot 2958-C-1, with 452 sq.m.,
under TCT No. T-14406; and (d) Lot 2958-C-2, with 2,770
sq.m. representing the increase after resurvey, under TCT
No. T-14407.
Lots 2958-C-1 and 2958-C-2 were later consolidated and this
time further subdivided into four (4) lots, namely, Lot 1, with
an area of 147 sq.m.; Lot 2, with an area of 950 sq.m.; Lot
3, with an area of 257 sq.m.; and Lot 4, with an area of
1,868 sq.m., which were respectively issued TCT Nos.
29592, 29593, 29594, and 29595.
In 1978, the Republic of the Philippines discovered that Lot
1-B (with TCT No. 14405 and an area of 826 sq.m.), on
which the petitioners had erected an apartment building,
covered Lot 3611 of the Pasay Cadastre, which is a filled-up
portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek. Moreover, Lot 2958-C
(covered by TCT Nos. 29592 to 29595, with an increased
area of 2,770 sq.m. after resurvey and subdivision) had been
unlawfully enlarged.
On November 17, 1982, it filed a petition for cancellation of
TCT Nos. 14405 and 29592 to 29595. 3
Baes did not object in his answer to the cancellation of TCT
Nos. 29592, 29594 and 29595 and was not able to prove
during the trial that the government utilized a portion of Lot
2 under TCT No. 29593. The trial court therefore decreed
(correctly) that the original Lot 2958-C (with an area of 452
sq.m.) be reverted to its status before the resurvey-
subdivision of Lot 2958-C.
The only remaining dispute relates to Lot 1-B (TCT No.
14405), which the petitioners, relying on Article 461 of the
Civil Code, are claiming as their own. The government
rejects this claim and avers that the petitioners had already
been fully compensated for it on June 20, 1970 when they
agreed to exchange their Lot 2958-B with Lot 3271-A
belonging to the government.
Article 461 of the Civil Code states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
River beds which are abandoned through the natural change
in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners
whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to
the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the
old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying
the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of
the area occupied by the new bed. (Emphasis supplied)
A portion of the Tripa de Gallina creek was diverted to a
man-made canal which totally occupied Lot 2958-B (with an
area of 3,588 sq.m.) belonging to Felix Baes. Thus, the
petitioners claim that they became the owners of the old bed
(which was eventually filled up by soil excavated from Lot
2958-B) by virtue of Article 461.
The petitioners rely heavily on Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino’s
interpretation of this Article, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
This article (461) refers to a natural change in the course of
a stream. If the change of the course is due to works
constructed by concessioners authorized by the government,
the concession may grant the abandoned river bed to the
concessioners. If there is no such grant, then, by analogy,
the abandoned river bed will belong to the owners of the land
covered by the waters, as provided in this article, without
prejudice to a superior right of third persons with sufficient
title. (Citing 3 Manresa 251-252; 2 Navarro Amandi 100-
101; 3 Sanchez Roman 148)
We agree.
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the
damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes,
there is all the more reason to compensate him when the
change in the course of the river is effected through artificial
means. The loss to the petitioners of the land covered by the
canal was the result of a deliberate act on the part of the
government when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa
de Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated to compensate
the Baeses for their loss.
We find, however, that the petitioners have already been so
compensated. Felix Baes was given Lot 3271-A in exchange
for the affected Lot 2958-B through the Deed of Exchange of
Real Property dated June 20, 1970. This was a fair exchange
because the two lots were of the same area and value and
the agreement was freely entered into by the parties. The
petitioners cannot now claim additional compensation
because, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General,
. . . to allow petitioners to acquire ownership of the dried-up
portion of the creek would be a clear case of double
compensation and unjust enrichment at the expense of the
state.
The exchange of lots between the petitioners and the
Republic was the result of voluntary negotiations. If these
had failed, the government could still have taken Lot 2958-B
under the power of eminent domain, upon payment of just
compensation, as the land was needed for a public purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.
Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 94283. March 4, 1991.]
 MAXIMO JAGUALING, ANUNCITA JAGUALING and
MISAMIS ORIENTAL CONCRETE PRODUCTS,
INC., Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTEENTH
DIVISION), JANITA F. EDUAVE and RUDYGONDO
EDUAVE, Respondents.
Cabanlas, Resma & Cabanlas Law Offices,
for Petitioners.
Jaime Y . Sindiong for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; OWNERSHIP; ALLUVIAL DEPOSITS; BELONGS
TO THE OWNER OF THE LAND OF THE MARGINS OF BANKS
NEAREST IT. — The parcel of land in question is part of an
island that formed in a non-navigable and non-flotable river;
from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it
increased to its present size due to the gradual and
successive accumulation of alluvial deposits. In this regard
the Court of Appeals also did not err in applying Article 465
of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island belongs to
the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner
thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer
than the property of private respondents, they are deemed
ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds
to the length of their property along the margin of the river.
2. ID.; ID.; ACCRETION; LANDS FORMED BY IT BELONG TO
THE RIPARIAN OWNER. — Lands formed by accretion belong
to the riparian owner. This preferential right is, under Article
465, also granted the owners of the land located in the
margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they
are in the best position to cultivate and attend to the
exploitation of the same.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIFIC ACT OF POSSESSION, NOT
REQUIRED. — In fact, no specific act of possession over the
accretion is required.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO PRESCRIPTION. — If, however,
the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same
may yield to the adverse possession of third parties, as
indeed even accretion to land titled under the torrens system
must itself still be registered.
5. ID.; ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION; THIRTY (30) YEARS
POSSESSION REQUIRED IN CASE OF BAD FAITH; CASE AT
BAR. — Petitioners may, therefore, acquire said property by
adverse possession for the required number of years under
the doctrine of acquisitive prescription. Their possession
cannot be considered in good faith, however, because they
are presumed to have notice of the status of private
respondents as riparian owners who have the preferential
right to the island as recognized and accorded by law; they
may claim ignorance of the law, specifically Article 465 of the
Civil Code, but such is not, under Articles 3 and 526 of the
same code, an adequate and valid defense to support their
claim of good faith. Hence, not qualifying as possessors in
good faith, they may acquire ownership over the island only
through uninterrupted adverse possession for a period of
thirty years. By their own admission, petitioners have been
in possession of the property for only about fifteen years.
Thus, by this token and under the theory adopted by
petitioners, the island cannot be adjudicated in their favor.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS QUASI IN REM; CONCLUSIVE
ONLY BETWEEN PARTIES. — This petition is an upshot of the
action to quiet title brought by the private respondents
against petitioners. As such it is not technically an action in
rem or an action in personam, but characterized as quasi in
rem, which is an action in personam concerning real
property. Thus, the judgment in proceedings of this nature is
conclusive only between the parties and does not bind the
State or the other riparian owners who may have an interest
over the island involved herein.
 DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Between the one who has actual possession of an island that
forms in a non-navigable and non-flotable river and the
owner of the land along the margin nearest the island, who
has the better right thereto? This is the issue to be resolved
in this petition.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The parties to this case dispute the ownership of a certain
parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental with an area of 16,452 square meters, more or less,
forming part of an island in a non-navigable river, and more
particularly described by its boundaries as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
North — by the Tagoloan River,
South — by the Tagoloan River,
East — by the Tagoloan River and
West — by the portion belonging to Vicente Neri.
Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental 1 an action to quiet title and/or remove a
cloud over the property in question against petitioners.
Respondent Court of Appeals 2 summarized the evidence for
the parties as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The appellant [private respondent Janita Eduave] claims that
she inherited the land from his [sic] father, Felomino
Factura, together with his co-heirs, Reneiro Factura and
Aldenora Factura, and acquired sole ownership of the
property by virtue of a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with
sale (Exh. D). The land is declared for tax purposes under
Tax Decl. No. 26137 (Exh. E) with an area of 16,452 square
meters more or less (Exh. D). Since the death of her father
on May 5, 1949, the appellant had been in possession of the
property although the tax declaration remains in the name of
the deceased father.
The appellants further state that the entire land had an area
of 16,452 square meters appearing in the deed of
extrajudicial partition, while in [the] tax declaration (Exh. E)
the area is only 4,937 square meters, and she reasoned out
that she included the land that was under water. The land
was eroded sometime in November 1964 due to typhoon
Ineng, destroying the bigger portion and the improvements
leaving only a coconut tree. In 1966 due to the movement of
the river deposits on the land that was not eroded increased
the area to almost half a hectare and in 1970 the appellant
started to plant bananas [sic].
In 1973 the defendants-appellees [petitioners herein] asked
her permission to plant corn and bananas provided that they
prevent squatters to come to the area.
The appellant engaged the services of a surveyor who
conducted a survey and placed concrete monuments over the
land. The appellant also paid taxes on the land in litigation,
and mortgaged the land to the Luzon Surety and Co., for a
consideration of P6,000.00.
The land was the subject of a reconveyance case, in the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Branch V, at
Cagayan de Oro City, Civil Case No. 5892, between the
appellant Janita Eduave v. Heirs of Antonio Factura which
was the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the
amicable settlement of the parties, dated May 31, 1979.
(Exh. R);
That the heirs of Antonio Factura, who are presently the
defendants-appellees in this case had ceded a portion of the
land with an area of 1,289 square meters more or less, to
the appellant, Janita Eduave, in a notarial document of
conveyance, pursuant to the decision of the Court of First
Instance, after a subdivision of the lot No. 62 Pls-799, and
containing 1,289 square meters more or less was designated
as Lot No. 62-A [sic], and the subdivision plan was approved
as Pls-799-Psd-10-001782. (Exh. R; R-1 and R-2);
The portion Lot No. 62-A, is described as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A parcel of land (Lot No. 62-A, Psd-10-001782 being a
portion of Lot 62, Pls-799, Tagoloan Public Land Subdivision)
situated in Bo. Sta. Cruz, Municipality of Tagoloan, Province
of Misamis Oriental. Bounded on the W, and on the N along
lines 4-5-1 by Lot 62-B of the subdivision plan-10-001782;
on the E by line 1-2 by Lot 64; Pls-799; on the S, along line
2-3-4 by Saluksok Creek, containing an area of one thousand
two hundred eighty nine (1,289) square meters more or
less."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appellant also applied for concession with the Bureau of
Mines to extract 200 cubic meters of gravel (Exh. G & G-1);
and after an ocular inspection the permit was granted (Exh.
K, and K-1 and K-2). That the appellant after permit was
granted entered into an agreement with Tagoloan
Aggregates to extract sand and gravel (Exh. L; L-1; and L-
2), which agreement was registered in the office of the
Register of Deeds (Exh. M; M-1; and M-2).
The defendants-appellees [petitioners herein] denied the
claim of ownership of the appellant, and asserted that they
are the real owners of the land in litigation containing an
area of 18,000 square meters more or less. During the
typhoon Ineng in 1964 the river control was washed away
causing the formation of an island, which is now the land in
litigation. The defendants started occupying the land in 1969,
paid land taxes as evidenced by tax declaration No. 26380
(Exh. 4) and tax receipts (Exhs. 7 to 7-G), and tax
clearances (Exhs. 8 & 9). Photographs showing the actual
occupation of the land by the defendants including
improvements and the house were presented as evidence
(Exh. 11 to 11-E). The report of the Commissioner who
conducted the ocular inspection was offered as evidence of
the defendants (Exh. G).
The sketch plan prepared by Eng. Romeo Escalderon (Exh.
12) shows that the plaintiffs’ [private respondents’] land was
across the land in litigation (Exh. 12-A), and in going to the
land of the plaintiff, one has to cross a distance of about 68
meters of the Tagoloan river to reach the land in litigation. 3
On 17 July 1987 the trial court dismissed the complaint for
failure of private respondents as plaintiffs therein to establish
by preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership over
the land in litigation. The court found that the island is a
delta forming part of the river bed which the government
may use to reroute, redirect or control the course of the
Tagoloan River. Accordingly, it held that it was outside the
commerce of man and part of the public domain, citing
Article 420 of the Civil Code. 4 As such it cannot be
registered under the land registration law or be acquired by
prescription. The trial court, however, recognized the validity
of petitioners’ possession and gave them preferential rights
to use and enjoy the property. The trial court added that
should the State allow the island to be the subject of private
ownership, the petitioners have rights better than that of
private respondents. 5
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, respondent court found
that the island was formed by the branching off of the
Tagoloan River and subsequent thereto the accumulation of
alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of
the Civil Code, 6 the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the trial court, declared private respondents as the lawful
and true owners of the land subject of this case and ordered
petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver possession of
the land to private respondents. 7
In the present petition, petitioners raise the following as
errors of respondent court, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. Whether [or not] respondent court correctly applied the
provisions of Articles 463 and 465 of the new Civil Code to
the facts of the case at bar; and
2. Whether [or not] respondent court gravely abused its
discretion in the exercise of its judicial authority in reversing
the decision appealed from.8
Petitioners point out as merely speculative the finding of
respondent court that the property of private respondents
was split by the branching off or division of the river. They
argue that because, as held by the trial court, private
respondents failed to prove by preponderance of evidence
the identity of their property before the same was divided by
the action of the river, respondent court erred in applying
Article 463 of the Civil Code to the facts of this
case.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
It must be kept in mind that the sole issue decided by
respondent court is whether or not the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint for failure of private respondents
[plaintiffs below] to establish by preponderance of evidence
their claim of ownership over the island in question.
Respondent court reversed the decision of the trial court
because it did not take into account the other pieces of
evidence in favor of the private respondents. The complaint
was dismissed by the trial court because it did not accept the
explanation of private respondents regarding the initial
discrepancy as to the area they claimed: i.e., the prior tax
declarations of private respondents refer to an area with
4,937 square meters, while the Extra-Judicial Partition with
Sale, by virtue of which private respondents acquired
ownership of the property, pertains to land of about 16,452
square meters.chanrobles law library
The trial court favored the theory of petitioners that private
respondents became interested in the land only in 1979 not
for agricultural purposes but in order to extract gravel and
sand. This, however, is belied by other circumstances
tantamount to acts of ownership exercised by private
respondents over the property prior to said year as borne out
by the evidence, which apparently the trial court did not
consider at all in favor of private respondents. These include,
among others, the payment of land taxes thereon, the
monuments placed by the surveyor whose services were
engaged by the private respondent, as evidenced by the
pictures submitted as exhibits, and the agreement entered
into by private respondents and Tagoloan Aggregates to
extract gravel and sand, which agreement was duly
registered with the Register of
Deeds.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Private respondents also presented in evidence the testimony
of two disinterested witnesses: Gregorio Neri who confirmed
the metes and bounds of the property of private respondents
and the effects of the typhoon on the same, and Candida
Ehem who related on the agreement between private
respondents and petitioners for the latter to act as
caretakers of the former. 9 The trial court disregarded their
testimony without explaining why it doubted their credibility
and instead merely relied on the self-serving denial of
petitioners. 10
From the evidence thus submitted, respondent court had
sufficient basis for the finding that the property of private
respondents actually existed and was identified prior to the
branching off or division of the river. The Court of Appeals,
therefore, properly applied Article 463 of the Civil Code which
allows the ownership over a portion of land separated or
isolated by river movement to be retained by the owner
thereof prior to such separation or isolation. 11
Notwithstanding the foregoing and assuming arguendo as
claimed by petitioners that private respondents were not able
to establish the existence and identity of the property prior
to the branching off or division of the Tagoloan River, and
hence, their right over the same, private respondents are
nevertheless entitled under the law to their respective
portion of the island.
It is clear petitioners do not dispute that the land in litigation
is an island that appears in a non-flotable and non-navigable
river; they instead anchor their claim on adverse possession
for about fifteen years. It is not even controverted that
private respondents are the owners of a parcel of land along
the margin of the river and opposite the island. On the other
hand, private respondents do not dispute that the island in
question has been in the actual physical possession of
petitioners; private respondents insist only that such
possession by petitioners is in the concept of caretakers
thereof with the permission of private respondents.
This brings Us, as phrased earlier in this opinion, to the
underlying nature of the controversy in this case: between
the one who has actual possession of an island that forms in
a non-navigable and non-flotable river and the owner of the
land along the margin nearest the island, who has the better
right thereto?
The parcel of land in question is part of an island that formed
in a non-navigable and non-flotable river; from a small mass
of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its
present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation
of alluvial deposits. In this regard the Court of Appeals also
did not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. 12 Under
this provision, the island belongs to the owner of the land
along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more
accurately, because the island is longer than the property of
private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the
owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of
their property along the margin of the river.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
What, then, about the adverse possession established by
petitioners? Are their rights as such not going to be
recognized? It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion
belong to the riparian owner. 13 This preferential right is,
under Article 465, also granted the owners of the land
located in the margin nearest the formed island for the
reason that they are in the best position to cultivate and
attend to the exploitation of the same. 14 In fact, no specific
act of possession over the accretion is required. 15 If,
however, the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof,
the same may yield to the adverse possession of third
parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under the
torrens system must itself still be registered. 16
Petitioners may, therefore, acquire said property by adverse
possession for the required number of years under the
doctrine of acquisitive prescription. Their possession cannot
be considered in good faith, however, because they are
presumed to have notice of the status of private respondents
as riparian owners who have the preferential right to the
island as recognized and accorded by law; they may claim
ignorance of the law, specifically Article 465 of the Civil
Code, but such is not, under Articles 3 and 526 of the same
code, an adequate and valid defense to support their claim of
good faith. 17 Hence, not qualifying as possessors in good
faith, they may acquire ownership over the island only
through uninterrupted adverse possession for a period of
thirty years. 18 By their own admission, petitioners have
been in possession of the property for only about fifteen
years. Thus, by this token and under the theory adopted by
petitioners, the island cannot be adjudicated in their
favor.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
This case is not between parties as opposing riparian owners
contesting ownership over an accession but rather between a
riparian owner and the one in possession of the island.
Hence, there is no need to make a final determination
regarding the origins of the island, i.e., whether the island
was initially formed by the branching off or division of the
river and covered by Article 463 of the Civil Code, in which
case there is strictly no accession because the original owner
retains ownership, or whether it was due to the action of the
river under Article 465, or, as claimed by petitioners,
whether it was caused by the abrupt segregation and
washing away of the stockpile of the river control, which
makes it a case of avulsion under Article 459. 19
We are not prepared, unlike the trial court, to concede that
the island is a delta which should be outside the commerce
of man and that it belongs to the State as property of the
public domain in the absence of any showing that the legal
requirements to establish such a status have been satisfied,
which duty properly pertains to the State. 20 However, We
are also well aware that this petition is an upshot of the
action to quiet title brought by the private respondents
against petitioners. As such it is not technically an action in
rem or an action in personam, but characterized as quasi in
rem, 21 which is an action in personam concerning real
property. 22 Thus, the judgment in proceedings of this
nature is conclusive only between the parties 23 and does
not bind the State or the other riparian owners who may
have an interest over the island involved herein.
WHEREFORE, We find no error committed by respondent
court and DENY the petition for lack of sufficient merit. The
decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-31163 November 6, 1929
URBANO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE C. BERNABE, ET AL., defendants.
PABLO TIONGSON and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
BULACAN, appellants.
Arcadio Ejercito and Guevara, Francisco and Recto for appellants.
Eusebio Orense And Nicolas Belmonte for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This appeal was taken by the defendants Pablo Tiongson and the
Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan from the judgment of the Court of First of
said province, wherein said defendant Pablo Tiongson was ordered to
pay the plaintiff Urbano Santos the value of 778 cavans and 38 kilos
of palay, at the rate of P3 per cavan, without special pronouncement
as to costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged
errors committed by the lower court in its judgment, to wit:
1. The court erred in holding that it has been proved that in the
cavans of palay attached by the herein defendant Pablo
Tiongson from the defendant Jose C. Bernabe were included
those claimed by the plaintiff in this cause.
2. The court erred in ordering the defendant Pablo Tiongson to
pay the plaintiff the value of 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay,
the refund of which is claimed by said plaintiff.
3. The court erred in denying the defendants' motion for a new
trial.1awphil.net
The following facts were conclusively proved at the trial:
On March 20, 1928, there were deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's
warehouse by the plaintiff Urbano Santos 778 cavans and 38 kilos of
palay and by Pablo Tiongson 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of the same
grain.
On said date, March 20, 1928, Pablo Tiongson filed with the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan a complaint against Jose C. Bernabe, to
recover from the latter the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay
deposited in the defendant's warehouse. At the same time, the
application of Pablo Tiongson for a writ of attachment was granted,
and the attachable property of Jose C. Bernabe, including 924 cavans
and 31 1/2 kilos of palay found by the sheriff in his warehouse, were
attached, sold at public auction, and the proceeds thereof delivered to
said defendant Pablo Tiongson, who obtained judgment in said case.
The herein plaintiff, Urbano Santos, intervened in the attachment of
the palay, but upon Pablo Tiongson's filing the proper bond, the sheriff
proceeded with the attachment, giving rise to the present complaint.
It does not appear that the sacks of palay of Urbano Santos and those
of Pablo Tiongson, deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse, bore
any marks or signs, nor were they separated one from the other.
The plaintiff-appellee Urbano Santos contends that Pablo Tiongson
cannot claim the 924 cavans and 31 ½ kilos of palay attached by the
defendant sheriff as part of those deposited by him in Jose C.
Bernabe's warehouse, because, in asking for the attachment thereof,
he impliedly acknowledged that the same belonged to Jose C.
Bernabe and not to him.
In the complaint filed by Pablo Tiongson against Jose C. Bernabe,
civil case No. 3665 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, it is
alleged that said plaintiff deposited in the defendant's warehouse
1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay, the return of which, or the value
thereof, at the rate of P3 per cavan was claimed therein. Upon filing
said complaint, the plaintiff applied for a preliminary writ of attachment
of the defendant's property, which was accordingly issued, and the
defendant's property, including the 924 cavans and 31 ½ kilos of palay
found by the sheriff in his warehouse, were attached.
It will be seen that the action brought by Pablo Tiongson against Jose
C. Bernabe is that provided in section 262 of the Code of Civil
Procedure for the delivery of personal property. Although it is true that
the plaintiff and his attorney did not follow strictly the procedure
provided in said section for claiming the delivery of said personal
property nevertheless, the procedure followed by him may be
construed as equivalent thereto, considering the provisions of section
2 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the effect that "the provisions of
this Code, and the proceedings under it, shall be liberally construed,
in order to promote its object and assist the parties in obtaining
speedy justice."
Liberally construing, therefore, the above cited provisions of section
262 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the writ of attachment applied for
by Pablo Tiongson against the property of Jose C. Bernabe may be
construed as a claim for the delivery of the sacks of palay deposited
by the former with the latter.
The 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay belonging to the plaintiff Urbano
Santos, having been mixed with the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay
belonging to the defendant Pablo Tiongson in Jose C. Bernabe's
warehouse; the sheriff having found only 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos
of palay in said warehouse at the time of the attachment thereof; and
there being no means of separating form said 924 cavans and 31 1/2
of palay belonging to Urbano Santos and those belonging to Pablo
Tiongson, the following rule prescribed in article 381 of the Civil Code
for cases of this nature, is applicable:
Art. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two things of identical or
dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs
accidentally, if in the latter case the things cannot be separated
without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture
proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the
value of the things mixed or commingled.
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, we will
take the proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay which were
attached and sold, thereby giving Urbano Santos, who deposited 778
cavans, 398.49 thereof, and Pablo Tiongson, who deposited 1,026
cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of P3 per cavan.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified, and
Pablo Tiongson is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff Urbano Santos
the value of 398.49 cavans of palay at the rate of P3 a cavan, without
special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
Johns, J., dissents.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-13281. August 31, 1960.]
 SIARI VALLEY ESTATES, INC., Petitioner, v. FILEMON
LUCASAN, ET AL., Respondents.
Orendain & Sarmiento for Petitioner.
Barrios, Lucasan & Lucasan for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LEVY AND EXECUTION; NOTICES; REQUIREMENT IF LAND
IS REGISTERED; PURPOSE. — The requirement that the
notice of levy should contain a reference to the number of
the certificate of title and the volume and page in the
registration book where the certificate is registered is made
in order that the debtor as well as a third person may be
properly informed of the particular land or property that is
under the custody of the court. This can only be
accompanied by making a reference to the certificate of title
covering the property. The situation differs if the land is
unregistered, in which case it is enough that the notice be
registered under Act 3344.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN NOTICE IS LEGALLY INEFFECTIVE. —
A notice of levy as regards a registered land which contains
no reference to the number of its certificate of title and the
volume and page in the registry book where the title is
registered is legally ineffective and as such does not have the
effect of binding the property for purposes of execution.
Consequently, a sale carried out by virtue of said levy is
invalid and of no legal effect.
3. ID.; ID.; WHEN FAMILY HOME NOT EXEMPT FROM
EXECUTION. — A family home constituted after a debt had
been incurred. whether the debt is undisputed or inchoate, is
not exempt from execution. The reason behind this ruling is
to protect the creditor against a debtor who may act in bad
faith by constituting such family home just to defeat the
claim against him.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On January 30, 1952, the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte rendered decision ordering Filemon
Lucasan to deliver to the Siari Valley Estates, Inc. the cattle
inside the former’s pasture or pay its value amounting to
P40,000.00 and damages in another sum of P40,000.00. This
decision was affirmed in toto by the Supreme Court, and
when the same became final and executory, a writ of
execution was issued. In carrying out this writ, the sheriff
proceeded to levy on certain parcels of lands belonging to
defendant. These lands were sold by the sheriff at public
auction to the corporation as the highest bidder on January
14, 1956. The judgment debtor having failed to redeem the
land within the period of one year, on January 26, 1957, the
sheriff issued in favor of the purchaser the final certificate of
sale, copy of which was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga. On February 16, 1957,
upon petition of the corporation, a writ of possession was
issued directing the sheriff to place said corporation in
possession thereof. Notwithstanding said writ, however, the
corporation failed to take possession of the lands, hence it
filed a motion reiterating its petition that it be placed in their
possession.
This time judgment debtor Filemon Lucasan filed an
opposition alleging that he was in possession of one of the
parcels of land sold at public auction on which he has erected
a house and which he has extrajudicially constituted as a
family home, the rest being in possession of third parties. On
April 30, 1957, the court, overruling the opposition, issued
an order directing the sheriff to place the corporation in
possession of the lands sold to it. On August 7, 1957, debtor
Lucasan filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied,
the court reiterating its previous order with little amendment,
but on a second motion for reconsideration, the court on
August 23, 1957 issued another order allowing the
corporation to take possession of all the lands sold, with the
exception of parcel 1 on which the family home was
constituted, holding that the levy and sale made by the
sheriff with regard to said parcel were not made in
accordance with law and so are null and void. Having failed
to have this last order reconsidered, the corporation
interposed the present petition for certiorari.
It appears that parcel 1 is a registered land covered by
Certificate of Title No. OCT-2492, Patent No. 50967, duly
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Norte in the name of Filemon Lucasan. On
this land stands a big house of mixed materials which is
assessed in the amount of P23,270.00 as evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 7653. It also appears that Filemon Lucasan
and his wife constituted this house and the lot on which it
stands into a family home, the pertinent document having
been registered in the office of the register of deeds on June
21, 1955. In opposing the petition of the corporation for a
writ of possession insofar as this property is concerned,
Lucasan contended that said lot and house having been
constituted as a family home are beyond the reach of judicial
execution. He contended that the levy made by the sheriff on
said property is legally ineffective because it was not effected
in accordance with what is prescribed in Section 14, Rule 39,
in relation to Section 7, Rule 59, of the Rules of Court.
There is merit in this contention. The evidence shows that
when this property was levied on execution by the sheriff to
satisfy the judgment rendered against Filemon Lucasan in
favor of petitioner corporation the notice of levy merely
described the property as unregistered land and the same
was registered under Act 3344 in the office of the register of
deeds. It also appears that in the notice of sale the property
was merely described according to the boundaries and area
appearing in the tax declaration and not according to what
appears in the certificate of title. On the other hand, the rule
provides that real property shall "be levied on in like manner
and with like effect as under an order of attachment"
(Section 14, Rule 39), and the provision regarding
attachment of real property postulates that the attachment
shall be made "by filing with the register of deeds a copy of
the order, together with the description of the property
attached, and a notice that it is attached, and by leaving a
copy of said order, description, and notice with the occupant
of the property, if any there be," and that "Where the
property has been brought under the operation of the Land
Registration Act, the notice shall contain a reference to the
number of the certificate of title and the volume and page in
the registration book where the certificate is registered"
(Section 7 [a], Rule 59).
These provisions should be strictly construed if their purpose
has to be accomplished. The requirement that the notice of
levy should contain a reference to the number of the
certificate of title and the volume and page in the registration
book where the certificate is registered is made in order that
the debtor as well as a third person may be properly
informed of the particular land or property that is under the
custody of the court. This can only be accomplished by
making a reference to the certificate of title covering the
property. The situation differs if the land is unregistered in
which case it is enough that the notice be registered under
Act 3344. This conclusion finds support in the following
authorities:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"An attachment levied on real estate not duly recorded in the
registry of property is not an incumbrance on the attached
property, nor can such attachment, unrecorded in the
registry, serve as a ground for decreeing the annulment of
the sale of the property, at the request of another creditor."
(Gonzales Diez v. Delgado and Imperial, 37 Phil., 389).
". . . In conformity with the provisions of section 71 of the
Land Registration Act, the sheriff of the City of Manila filed a
notice of the levy with the register of deeds, which notice
was entered in the primary entry book of the register’s
office, but was afterwards, on May 20, 1920, returned to the
sheriff with the information that the property was registered
in the name of Buenaventura Dizon, having been conveyed
to the latter by the defendant in execution, Celerino Arellano,
and that, therefore, no memorandum of the notice had been
entered upon the outstanding certificate of title. It may be
noted that the notice contained no ‘reference to the number
of the certificate of title of the land to be effected and the
volume and page in the registry book where the certificate is
registered, and that to that extent, the notice did not meet
the requirements of said section 71." (De Ocampo v.
Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 50 Phil., 140, 141; Italics
supplied)
Since the notice of levy made by the sheriff as regards parcel
number 1 which is a registered land contains no reference to
the number of its certificate of title and the volume and page
in the registry book where the title is registered, it follows
that said notice is legally ineffective and as such did not have
the effect of binding the property for purposes of execution.
Consequently, the sale carried out by virtue of said levy is
also invalid and of no legal effect.
The second issue raised is: Is the family home extrajudicially
established by respondent on the lot and house in question
exempt from execution?
Respondent sustains the affirmative considering that the
money judgment rendered against him was appealed to the
Supreme Court in which event, he contends, the same could
not be considered as a debt at the time the family home was
constituted for it was still inchoate and as such cannot come
under the provisions of Article 243 (2) of the new Civil Code.
The article above referred to provides that "The family home
extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution"
except "for debts incurred before the declaration was
recorded in the Registry of Property." What is the meaning of
the word debt used in this article? Does it refer to a debt that
is undisputed, or may it also refer to any pecuniary
obligation even if the same has not yet been finally
determined? In other words, can a judgment for a sum of
money be considered a debt within the meaning of this
provision even if said judgment is still pending appeal?
We are inclined to uphold the affirmative considering the real
purpose of the law. The reason why a family home
constituted after a debt had been incurred is not exempt
from execution is to protect the creditor against a debtor
who may act in bad faith by resorting to such declaration just
to defeat the claim against him. If the purpose is to protect
the creditor from fraud it would be immaterial if the debt
incurred be undisputed or inchoate, for a debtor acting in
good faith would prefer to wait until his case is definitely
decided before constituting the family home. Indeed, it may
result, as in this case, that the Supreme Court may affirm
the judgment of the lower court. If the contention of
respondent be sustained a debtor may be allowed to
circumvent this provision of the law to the prejudice of the
creditor. This the Court cannot countenance. Hence, we are
persuaded to conclude that the money judgment in question
comes within the purview of the word debt used in Article
243 (2) of the new Civil Code.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed,
without prejudice on the part of petitioner to file a new
petition for execution following strictly the requirements of
the rule on the matter. No pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Concepción, J., concurs in the result.