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if a would-be gun buyer could evade them all simply by enlisting the
aid of an intermediary to execute the paperwork on his behalf. The
statute’s language is thus best read in context to refer to the actual
rather than nominal buyer. This conclusion is reinforced by this
Court’s standard practice of focusing on practical realities rather
than legal formalities when identifying the parties to a transaction.
Pp. 7–19.
(b) Abramski argues more narrowly that his false response was
not material because his uncle could have legally bought a gun for
himself. But Abramski’s false statement prevented the dealer from
insisting that the true buyer (Alvarez) appear in person, provide
identifying information, show a photo ID, and submit to a back-
ground check. §§922(b), (c), (t). Nothing in the statute suggests that
these legal duties may be wiped away merely because the actual buy-
er turns out to be legally eligible to own a gun. Because the dealer
could not have lawfully sold the gun had it known that Abramski was
not the true buyer, the misstatement was material to the lawfulness
of the sale. Pp. 19–22.
2. Abramski’s misrepresentation about the identity of the actual
buyer concerned “information required by [Chapter 44 of Title 18 of
the United States Code] to be kept” in the dealer’s records.
§924(a)(1)(A). Chapter 44 contains a provision requiring a dealer to
“maintain such records . . . as the Attorney General may . . . pre-
scribe.” §923(g)(1)(A). The Attorney General requires every licensed
dealer to retain in its records a completed copy of Form 4473, see 27
CFR §478.124(b), and that form in turn includes the “actual buyer”
question that Abramski answered falsely. Therefore, falsely answer-
ing a question on Form 4473 violates §924(a)(1)(A). Pp. 22–23.
706 F. 3d 307, affirmed.
No. 12–1493
_________________
UNITED STATES
——————
1 The
principal exception is for any buyer who has a state permit that
has been “issued only after an authorized government official has
verified” the buyer’s eligibility to own a gun under both federal and
state law. §922(t)(3).
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 3
——————
3 Reflecting that prior consensus, neither of Abramski’s principal
would be material if the straw purchaser knew that the true buyer was
not eligible to own a firearm. Post, at 6, n. 2. But first, that reserva-
tion is of quite limited scope: Unlike Abramski’s back-up argument,
which imposes liability whenever the true purchaser cannot legally buy
a gun, the dissent’s reservation applies only when the straw has
knowledge of (or at least reasonable cause to believe) that fact. And as
we will later note, straws often do not have such knowledge. See infra,
at 12–13. Second, the reservation (fairly enough for a reservation) rests
on an uncertain legal theory. According to the dissent, a straw buyer
might violate §922(a)(6) if a dealer’s sale to him aids and abets his
violation of §922(d)—a provision barring knowingly transferring a gun
to an ineligible person, see infra, at 8, 17–18. But that reasoning
presupposes that a firearms dealer acting in the ordinary course of
business can ever have the intent needed to aid and abet a crime—a
question this Court reserved not six months ago. See Rosemond v.
United States, 572 U. S. ___ (2014) (slip op., at 12, n. 8).
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 9
and tell him to pick up milk and eggs at the store, no English speaker
would say that the store ‘sells’ the milk and eggs to me.” Post, at 4.
But try a question more similar to the one the gun law’s text raises: If I
send my brother to the Apple Store with money and instructions to
purchase an iPhone, and then take immediate and sole possession of
that device, am I the “person” (or “transferee”) who has bought the
phone or is he? Nothing in ordinary English usage compels an answer
either way.
6 Contrary to the dissent’s view, our analysis does not rest on mere
of what the ATF does to combat gun trafficking by criminals. See Dept.
of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Following the
Gun: Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers, p. xi (June
2000) (noting that in several prior years “[a]lmost half of all [ATF
firearm] trafficking investigations involved straw purchasers”).
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 11
Abramski himself) that the rule of lenity defeats our construction. See
post, at 12–14. That rule, as we have repeatedly emphasized, applies
only if, “after considering text, structure, history and purpose, there
remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that
the Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended.” Maracich
v. Spears, 570 U. S ___, ___ (2013) (slip op. at 26) (quoting Barber v.
Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010)). We are not in that position here:
Although the text creates some ambiguity, the context, structure,
history, and purpose resolve it. The dissent would apply the rule of
lenity here because the statute’s text, taken alone, permits a narrower
construction, but we have repeatedly emphasized that is not the appro-
priate test. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U. S. 125, 138
(1998); Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 239 (1993).
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 19
It is so ordered.
——————
11 The dissent argues that our view would impose criminal liability for
No. 12–1493
_________________
UNITED STATES
I. Section 922(a)(6)
A
Under §922(a)(6), it is a crime to make a “false . . .
statement” to a licensed gun dealer about a “fact material
to the lawfulness of ” a firearms sale. Abramski made a
false statement when he claimed to be the gun’s “actual
transferee/buyer” as Form 4473 defined that term. But
that false statement was not “material to the lawfulness of
the sale” since the truth—that Abramski was buying the
gun for his uncle with his uncle’s money—would not have
made the sale unlawful. See Kungys v. United States, 485
U. S. 759, 775 (1988) (plurality opinion) (materiality is
determined by asking “what would have ensued from
official knowledge of the misrepresented fact”); accord id.,
at 787 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Therefore,
Abramski’s conviction on this count cannot stand.
Several provisions of the Act limit the circumstances in
which a licensed gun dealer may lawfully sell a firearm.
Most prominently, the Act provides that no one may “sell
or otherwise dispose of ” a firearm to a person who he
knows or has reasonable cause to believe falls within one
of nine prohibited categories (such as felons, fugitives,
illegal-drug users, and the mentally ill). §922(d). But the
Government does not contend that either Abramski or his
uncle fell into one of those prohibited categories. And no
provision of the Act prohibits one person who is eligible to
receive and possess firearms (e.g., Abramski) from buying
a gun for another person who is eligible to receive and
possess firearms (e.g., Abramski’s uncle), even at the
other’s request and with the other’s money.
The Government’s contention that Abramski’s false
statement was material to the lawfulness of the sale de-
pends on a strained interpretation of provisions that
mention the “person” to whom a dealer “sell[s]” (or “trans-
fer[s],” or “deliver[s]”) a gun. A dealer may not “sell or
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 3
——————
3 The facts of this case provide no occasion to address whether—as
ATF maintained for many years before adopting its current position—a
misrepresentation in response to Form 4473’s “actual buyer/transferee”
question would be “material to the lawfulness of the sale” if the cus-
tomer intended to transfer the gun to a person who he knew or had
reasonable cause to believe was prohibited by the Act from receiving or
possessing firearms. A falsehood that conceals an intention of that sort
may be material because a dealer who sold the gun knowing of that
intention might be “unlawfully aiding” the customer’s violation of
§924(d) (and the prohibited person’s violation of §924(g)). Cf. ATF,
Industry Circular 79–10 (1979), in (Your Guide To) Federal Firearms
Regulation 1988–89 (1988), p. 78; infra, at 10–11. I need not decide
that question here.
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 7
rule of lenity “because the statute’s text, taken alone, permits a nar-
rower construction,” ante, at 18, n. 10.
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 13
——————
6 The majority professes that it “need not, and do[es] not, opine on”
whether it would impose liability for “a false answer even to an ‘ultra
vires question’ ” because, given its reasoning on Count One, the ques-
tion at issue here was “part and parcel of the dealer’s determination of
the (true) buyer’s ‘name, age, and place of residence,’ which §922(b)(5)
requires the dealer to keep.” Ante, at 23, n. 11. But if that is really all
the majority means to decide, then why bother to invoke the require-
ment that the dealer keep such records as the regulations prescribe and
the regulation requiring the dealer to keep Form 4473? See ante, at
22–23. If the majority’s ruling is as limited as it claims, it ought to cite
§922(b)(5) and be done.