Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Spring 1949
Recommended Citation
(1949) "Election Between Undisclosed Principal and Agent," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 24: Iss. 3, Article 15.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol24/iss3/15
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RECENT CASES
AGENCY
ELECTION BETWEEN UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL
AND AGENT
On a question of first impression in the federal courts,
a United States District Court has held that one suing both
an undisclosed principal and his agent need not elect which
defendant to pursue to judgment, at least until the court has
decided whether there was an agency relationship. Con-
ducive to the result was an obvious dissatisfaction, with the
entire doctrine which ordinarily requires an election of de-
fendants in the undisclosed principal situation.
Denunzio Fruit Co. brought a statutory 2 suit for breach
of contract in the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of California, joining as defendants Crane, in whose
name the contract was made, and Kasanjian, the partially
disclosed principal of Crane. The court took under advise-
ment a motion by both defendants at the close of the evidence
to compel Denunzio to elect which defendant it would
hold liable. In final disposition of the suit, the court dis-
missed the action against Kazanjian on the ground that Crane
had acted beyond his authority. Damages were awarded
against Crane. The district court further stated that there
was no error in refusing to compel Denunzio to elect at
the close of the evidence which of the defendants it would
hold liable. Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F.
Supp. 117 (S. D. Calif. 1948).
3. In a diversity case the question might well arise under the doc-
trine of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), whether the election
rule is a "procedural" matter to be governed by federal rules or a
matter of "substance" in which state law would govern. The state-
ment in the Denumzio case that election is a procedural rule was un-
necessary to the decision because federal jurisdiction was obtained on
the federal question ground. See note 2 supra. For a discussion
of substance and procedure under Erie v. Tompkins, see Note, 24 IND.
L. J. 418 (1949).
4. E.g., Pitt. Terminal Corp. v. Bennett, 73 F.2d 387 (3rd Cir.
1934). The liability of either A or P exists where P is partially dis-
closed as well as where he is undisclosed. Dorsey v. Martin, 58 F.
Supp. 722 (E. D. Pa. 1945); Barrell v. Newby, 127 Fed. 656 (7th Cir.
1904).
5. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 144, 186, 321, 322 (1933).
6. It has been held error to permit an action against P and A
to be prosecuted to judgment against both. The pleader should be put
to his election in limine. The Jungshoved, 290 Fed. 733 (2d Cir. 1923),
cert. denied 263 U. S. 707 (1923). Commencement of a suit against
A, at least with an attachment, is an election and bars suit against P.
Barrell v. Newby 127 Fed. 656 (7th Cir. 1904). The rendering of an
interlocutory decree against A is an election as a matter of law.
Johnson v. Garrigues, 30 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1929). But election in-
volves a choice, and a judgment against A has been held not to be an
election when T's suit against A had been in progress for two years
and knowledge of P came to T only a few days before judgment was
rendered but after there had been a verdict for T. Pitt. Terminal
Corp. v. Bennett, 73 F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1934).
7. See note 1 supra. The court in the Denunzw case quoted Judge
A. Hand, dissenting in Johnson v. Garrigues, 30 F.2d 251, 254 (2d
Cir. 1929). ". . . I feel that the doctrine of election ought only to
apply to a case where there has been both judgment and satisfaction,
and that anything less than a complete satisfaction or an estoppel in
pais affords no logical basis for barring a remedy against both agent
and undisclosed principal . . ." See Ore Steamship Corp. v. Hassell,
137 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1943) (The harsh election rule rests on
nothing more than barren logic and in the absence of estoppel there
should be no election until a judgment is actually satisfied).
8. FED. R. Civ. P., 18 (a) allows a plaintiff in his complaint to
join as many claims, independent or alternate, as he may have against
an opposing party. FED. R. CIv. P., 20 (a) permits a plaintiff to join
in one action as defendants all persons against whom plaintiff has any
right to relief arising out of the same "transaction." Judgment may be
given against one or more defendants according to their respective
448 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
DUE PROCESS
BROAD SCOPE OF STATE REGULATORY
POWER REAFFIRMED
The Family Security Life Insurance Company, a corpora-
tion, was promoted by South Carolina funeral directors. Most
of its stockholders and agents were either owners or em-
ployees of mortuaries.' The company had qualified to do
business and its agents had been duly licensed under the
provisions of a very comprehensive and stringent state in-