#13 Nera v. Garcia G.R. No. L-13160.

January 30, 1960 – resort to punctuation

Facts: Nera served as clerk in the Maternity and Children’s Hospital, a government institution under the
supervision of the Bureau of Hospitals and the Department of Health. He also served as manager and
cashier of the Maternity Employer’s Cooperative Association, Inc. Having hold of the positions, the fund of
the associatin is supposedly under his control. On May 11, 1956, he was charged before the Court of First
Instance of Manila with malversation for allegedly misappropriating a certain amount of money which
belongs to the association. After a few months, a certain Simplicio Balcos, filed an administrative complaint
case against Nera. Nera was suspended as clerk of the said hospital, as approved by respondent Garcia,
Secretary of Health. The petitioner asked PCAC to intervene on his behalf. PCAC recommended
respondents to lift the suspension of the petitioner. Respondents did not grant the lifting of suspension. The
petitioner asked for reconsideration but was still denied. The CFI ruled in favour of the petitioner. As a
result, respondents filed an appeal to the decision of the CFI. Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus to restrain respondents from proceeding with the administrative case
until the termination of the criminal case and annul the suspension and to compel respondents to lift the
suspension.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was illegally suspended thus, he must be reinstated in office and pay
back his salary

Held: Decision of CFI reversed.

Ratio: There are two relevant laws outlined by the Supreme Court in this case. First is the Sec. 694 of the
Administrative Code, entitled Removal or Suspension which states that suspension is applicable “if the
charge against such subordinate or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty.” According to the Supreme Court, because of the use of the comma,
dishonesty and oppression need not be committed in performance of duty.

On the other hand, the other law involved is the Sec. 34 of Civil Service Act which is entitled “Preventive
Suspension” which states that it is applicable “if the charge against such officer, or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or to believe that the performance of duty, or if there are strong
reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.”
According to the Supreme Court, with the use of comma, the charges of dishonesty and oppression or
grave misconduct need not be committed in the performance of duty – it is only applicable if neglect is
committed in performance of duty.

The Supreme Court held that the alleged misappropriation involved in the criminal case is not entirely
disconnected with the office of the petitioner. Even though Maternity Employee’s Cooperative Association,
which owns the funds, said to have been misappropriated, is a private entity, it is still an association
composed of the employees of the Maternity Children’s Hospital where petitioner was serving as an
employee. Moreover, if petitioner was designated to and occupied the position of manager and cashier of
said association, it was because he was an employee of the Maternity and Children’s Hospital. The
contention though indirect, and, in the opinion of some, rather remote, exists and is there.

StatCon maxim: The qualifying effect of a word or phrase may be confined to its last antecedent if the
latter is separated by a comma from the other antecedents.

#14 People v. Subido G.R. No. L-21734. September 5, 1975 – resort to punctuation

Facts: The CFI found Subido guilty of liber. Therefore, he was sentenced of 3 months of arresto mayor with
the accessory penalties of the law, pay the fine of P500.00, indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio
Lacson, of P10,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. However,
the Court of Appeals modified the judgment by removing the penalty of arresto mayor, reducing the
indemnity amount from P10,000 to P5,000 and mentioned nothing of the subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. As a result, Subido filed with the trial court to recognize the decision of the Court of Appeals
and to cancel his appeal bond.

Issue: Whether or not, the accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and indemnity prescribed
in the judgment of the Court of Appeals in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency?

Held: Yes

Ratio: The use of a comma (,) in the part of the sentence is to make “the subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency” refer not only to non-payment of the indemnity, but also to non-payment of the fine.

#15 In Re: Estate of Johnson G.R. No. 12767. November 16, 1918 – capitalization of letters
Facts: On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United
States, died in the city of Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with an estimated amount of P231,800.
The will was written in the testator’s own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only,
instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was
not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants
of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved under section 618. On February 9, 1916, however,
a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the
ground that 1) Johnson was, at the time of his death, a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of
America; 2) that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could
properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner alleged that
the law is inapplicable to his father’s will

Issue: Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part of the petition

Held: No.

Ratio: Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court through the three-week publication of
the notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted that in view of the statute concerned
which reads as “A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country,
which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and
which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and
recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of
these Islands” the “state”, being not capitalized, does not mean that United States is excluded from the
phrase (because during this time, Philippines was still a territory of the US).

#16 People v. Yabut G.R. No. 85472 September 27, 1993 – resort to headnotes or epigraphs

Facts: Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed another prisoner. He was
consequently charged for murder. Yabut alleged that it was Villanueva and not him who has given the fatal
blow. However, the court found him guilty. After conviction, he was punished with the maximum period for
murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in applying Art. 160.

Held: No

Ratio: Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code states that “Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any
person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve
such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony.”

StatCon maxim: Where the text of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor
propriety to resort to the headings or epigraphs of a section for interpretation of the text, especially where
such epigraphs or headings are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text
that follows.

#17 Tinio vs Francis – policy of law

#18 People vs. Manantan – prior laws from which the statute is based

Facts:

Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However,
Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said
section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the purview
of Section 54.

Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee
of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil
service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or
take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.".

Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code
wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province
and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil
service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein
otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted
revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.
Issue:

Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code?

Held:

Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First
Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include
justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and
broader term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges.

A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with
judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in
that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.

From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee.
Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words "justice of the
peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA 180,
it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as
already comprehended in the broader term "judge".

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under
the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar,
the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from
engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also,
the application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather
from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation
of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in
determining the meaning of penal laws.

Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of
the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now
within its encompass.

The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts
because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of
peace".

#19 Salaysay vs. Castro - resort to prior laws

98 Phil. 364; January 31, 1956.

Facts:

Engracio E. Santos is the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal,

and the Petitioner Nicanor G. Salaysay is the duly elected Vice-Mayor. In the month of

September, 1955 and for some time prior thereto, Santos was under suspension from his office

due to administrative charges filed against him and so Petitioner Salaysay acted as Mayor under

section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that in case of temporary disability

of the Mayor such as absence, etc., his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor. On

September 8, 1955, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay filed his certificate of candidacy for the

same office of Mayor. In Sept. 8, 1955, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay filed his certificate of

candidacy for the same office of Mayor. Interpreting said action of Salaysayin running for the

office of Mayor as an automatic resignation from his office of Vice Mayor, consequently,
forfeiting the office he was holding as acting Mayor. Salaysay refused to turn over the office of

Mayor and brought this action of prohibition with preliminary injunction against Executive

Secretary Castro, Governor Pascual and Sto.Domingo to declare invalid.

Issue:

Whether elected municipal official was considered resigned when he filed his certificate

of candidacy for an office other than the one he was elected or actually holding.

Ruling:

No, elected municipal official was considered resigned when he filed his certificate of

candidacy for an office other than the one he was elected or actually holding. It is urged that the

phrase “actually holding”, in section 27 of Republic Act No 180, was meant to refer only to

“permanent” incumbents and does not apply to those holding office in a temporary character.

The law is plain, simple and clear. The resignation therein provided is inapplicable to any

elective local official who runs for an office he actually holds. It does not qualify the nature of

said possession, as long as, it is “actual”. It is irrelevant, therefore, whether the office is held

temporarily or permanently. All this goes to show that we should not and cannot always be

bound by the phraseology or literal meaning of a law or statute but at times may interpret, nay,

even disregard loose or inaccurate wording in order to arrive at the real meaning and spirit of a

statute intended and breathed into it by the law-making body. Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum

de corpora constat which means false description does not preclude construction: vitiate the

meaning of the statute. The intention of the amendment by the President Roxas was to give and

extend privilege to the appointees and elected official for continuity in their office. This was not

applicable for the official who assumed the office by succession because of incapacitated of his

predecessor.

#20 Commissioner vs CTA –change in phraseology by amendments