LIM V STA.
CRUS- LIM petitioner’s parents were also decreed to give a monthly support for the three
Petitioner – Edward Lim
Respondent - Ma. Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim
FACTS:
1978 : Petitioner and Respondent met in 1978 in Cebu, Petitioner resides in
Makati spent his sem break from college, at that time 26 yrs old. College
student and working in the family business, Respondent resides in Gingoog,
Cagayan de Oro was a boarder in petitioner’s uncle house, was a secretarial
student after less than year of courtship,
two became sweetheart in early 1979, same year December 8, respondent
marry the petitioner, Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children
resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with
Edwards as to customary among those Chinese descents.
During their stay in Forbes Park, all living expenses provided by petitioner’s
grandparents. Petitioner’s salary of ₱6,000.00 for working in the family
distillery went straight to respondent. Despite set up and living arrangement,
they both continued to insist that they live separately and independently from
petitioner’s family
In 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children
with her (then all minors) and forcibly opened their cabinet and cleaned out
the contents thereof, which included petitioner’s passport, jewelry, and a land
title in petitioner’s name, AFTER a violent confrontation with Edward whom
she caught with the in-house midwife of his grandmother in what the trial
court described a very compromising situation. Respondent likewise filed a
criminal complaint for Concubinage and Physical Injuries against petitioner
which was eventually dismissed by the investigating prosecutor for lack of
merit.
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and
Mariano (defendants) in RTC for support. RTC ordered Edward to provide
monthly support of P6,000 Thereafter, the trial court directed petitioner to
give a monthly support of ₱6,000.00 and, in case of his inability to do so,
minor children in the amount of ₱34,000.00
October 29, 1999, petitioner filed a petition & sought the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
3 yrs after, July 22, 2002, petitioner filed an amended petition including an
allegation of his own psychological incapacity, as both he and respondent
were diagnosed with personality disorders—dependent personality disorder
and histrionic personality disorder.
Following the exchange of pleadings between the parties, petitioner
presented evidence consisting testimony from a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia C.
Villegas ; and Maxima Adato, petitioner's co-employee in the distillery in
addition petitioner included the report result that the parties were suffering
from personality disorder
RTC declared the marriage - null and void as the two were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. (ON THE
GROUND ART. 36))
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MARRIAGE IS NULL AND VOID ON
THE GROUND THAT BOTH ARE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITATED UNDER ARTICLE 36?
RULING: No. OSG appealed to CA disagreeing and questioning RTC’s
ruling and the said ordered had been reversed and set aside on March 25
2002
- ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals cites 3 factors characterizing
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations:
(1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, (3) incurability. We expounded
on the foregoing, to wit:
- The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
- it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
- It also states in Republic V CA, as the party alleging his own
psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, had the special
 albatross to prove that he and his wife were suffering from "the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage."
- Rather, Petitioner present petitioner presented the Psychiatric Report
of Dr. Villegas
- *READ THE REPORT OF PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE”
- The report and testimony of Dr. Villegas shows that she link
particular acts of the parties to the DSM IV's list of criteria for the
specific personality disorders but the results made by her where not
supported by any psychological test properly administered by
clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests use and
interpretation.
- The said report of Dr. Villegas was made only after maximum of 7
hours of interview without any separate psychological test cannot tie
the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own
factual finding on what happened in this case.
- The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a
mere statement of his theory or opinion
- -instead in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing
the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon
which the logic of his report is founded.
- Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
**notes: Hindi puede ung report kahit galling siya sa psychiatrist kasi ung
results na galling sa psychiatrist ay gawa lang sa paguusap nila nung parties
wala kahit anong psychological test na ginawa ung psychiatrist**
**Bakit bawal? The parties could fake their answer para magresult sila na
psychological incapacitated sila**
**Bakit bawal kahit galling lang na sa psychiatrist: there is possibility that
they only contracted the psychiatrist and the psychiatrist did not produce a
results from a psychological test that would help her to establish a good
evidence that the parties is psychological incapacitated**
PADILLA RUMBAUA V RUMBAUA
PETITIONER: Rowena Padilla-Rambaua
RESPONDENT: Edward Rumbaua
FACTS:
- Respondent and petitioner were childhood neighbors in Dupax del
Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. Sometime in 1987, they met again and
became sweethearts but Edward’s family did not approve of their
relationship. After graduation from college in 1991, Edward
promised to marry Rowena as soon as he found a job. The job came
in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted Edward as a
computer engineer. Edward proposed to Rowena that they first have
a “secret marriage” in order not to antagonize his parents. Rowena
agreed; they were married in Manila on February 23, 1993. Rowena
and Edward, however, never lived together; Rowena stayed with her
sister in Fairview, Quezon City, while Edward lived with his parents
in Novaliches.
- They saw each other every day during the first 6 months of their
marriage. At that point, Edward refused to live with Rowena for fear
that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his application
for a PAL scholarship.
- Seven months into their marriage, the couple’s daily meetings
became occasional visits to Rowena’s house in Fairview; they would
have sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, Edward enrolled at
FEATI University after he lost his employment with PAL.
- In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret
marriage. Edward’s mother tried to convince him to go to the United
States, but he refused.
- To appease his mother, he continued living separately from Rowena.
Edward forgot to greet Rowena during her birthday in 1992 and
likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special occasions.
Edward indicated as well in his visa application that he was single.
- In April 1995, Edward’s mother died then he blamed Rowena,
associating his mother’s death to the pain that the discovery of his
secret marriage brought.
- Pained by Edward’s action, Rowena severed her relationship with
Edward. They eventually reconciled through the help of Rowena’s
father, although they still lived separately.
- In 1997, Edward informed Rowena that he had found a job in Davao.
A year later, Rowena and her mother went to Edward’s house in
Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia Villanueva
(Cynthia).
- When she confronted Edward about it, he denied having an affair
with Cynthia. Rowena apparently did not believe Edwards and
moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the pain and anguish
that her discovery brought.
- Rowena filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Edward. Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also
presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract; and the
testimony, curriculum vitae, and psychological report of clinical
psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
- Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the
following tests on Rowena:
a Revised Beta Examination;
a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test;
a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test;
a Draw a Person Test; a Sach’s Sentence Completion Test;
and MMPI.
- She thereafter prepared a psychological report with his findings.
According to his evaluation, the character traits of Edward reveal
him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder – declared to be
grave, severe and incurable. However, at the end of his findings,
Dr. Tayag incorporated his personal idea about love.
- Love, according to him, means:
“Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as
it goes beyond the expectations people tagged with it. In love, “age
does matter.” People love in order to be secure that one will share
his/her life with another and that he/she will not die alone.
Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow or let love
die – it is a choice one had to face when love is not the love he/she
expected.”
RTC nullified the marriage of Rowena and Edward.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and denied the nullification of
the parties’ marriage.
a. observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not mention the
cause of the respondent’s so-called “narcissistic personality
disorder;” it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and thus
failed to give the court an insight into the respondent’s
developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she
came to the conclusion that the respondent’s incapacity was “deep-
seated” and “incurable.” Xxx
-The petitioner now argues :
a. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v. Molina
cannot be dispensed with because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which
relaxed the requirement, took effect only on March 15, 2003;
b. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case
to the RTC to recall her expert witness and cure the defects in her
testimony, as well as to present additional evidence, would temper
justice with mercy; and
c. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her
psychiatric report.
-The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be reversed and
set aside, and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; in
the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s decision be set aside and
the RTC’s decision be reinstated.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT INVALIDATING THE TRIAL COURT’S
DECISION AND REMANDING THE CASE FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS IS PROPER
RULING: NO. We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable
1. In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel for
the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages:
a. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.
2. The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC is procedural or remedial in character; it does not create or
remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy in aid of
or confirmation of already existing rights. The settled rule is that
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect, as we held
in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:
a. Procedural Laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statues - they may be
given retroactiveeffect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested
rights in rules of procedure.
3. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the
mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied
retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in
any pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification
prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes
and Navales v. Navales have since confirmed and clarified that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline
on the matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no
collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is
important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the
remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From
this perspective, the petitioner’s objection regarding
the Molina guideline on certification lacks merit.
A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper
4. A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings
amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper
at this stage.
a. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party
may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final
order already rendered and to grant a new trial within
the period for taking an appeal.
b. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on
the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence that could not have been guarded against by
ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved
party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the
aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced
at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if
presented.
5. In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the
evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for a
remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the
RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima
facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent
in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioner’s
counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a
new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that
the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First
Metro Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:
a. Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings
in the trial court as a result of the ignorance,
inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify
as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as
valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be
 an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be
employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had
not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or
learned. This will put a premium on the willful and
intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view
to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an
adverse decision, as in the instant case.
6. Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s
requested remand.
Petitioner failed to establish the respondent’s psychological incapacity
- Dr. Tayag’s testimony shows that she initially described the general
characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic personality
disorder, she did not really show how and to what extent the
respondent exhibited these traits. She mentioned the buzz words that
jurisprudence requires for the nullity of a marriage – namely,
gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the marriage,
psychological incapacity relating to marriage – and in her own
limited way, related these to the medical condition she generally
described. The testimony, together with her report, however, suffers
from very basic flaws, she was not able to rove that the PI existed at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June
25, 2004and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
Facts:
- In an earlier decision promulgated by the supreme court, it
dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
the parties upon finding that the petition had no merit.
- In the case, the petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent)
suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies
of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses
were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which
had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied
on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery,
and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as
mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.
- Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion.
A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not
totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her
marital and parental duties
- the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s
ruling that there was psychological incapacity. Petition denied
- In his Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioner implores the Court
to take a thorough 2nd look into what constitutes psychological
incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by
the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find
that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically
incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital obligation.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is psychological incapacity on the part of the
respondent.
RULING: YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held
that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the
previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
*****Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were
just given much respect in this case.****
- Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
o The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic
v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their application
to every instance practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the
drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity”
obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.”
Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts” in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours”
with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court.
o In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts,
which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the
field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions
of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and
thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of
being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-
depth diagnosis by experts.
- Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence
must be considered
- We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate
for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution
only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a
marriage that is null and void
- ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
o There is no requirement for one to be declared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by
a physician, because what is important is the presence of
evidence that adequately establishes the party’s
psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.”
o Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other
evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly
result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record,
the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as
an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.
o Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity
should be considered as conjectural or speculative and
without any probative value only in the absence of other
evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under
such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would
justify their exclusion as evidence.
- Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to
psychological and emotional temperaments
o The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court
deserved credence because it was in the better position to
view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they
were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the
appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be
accorded due importance and respect.
o The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to
such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and
treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate
basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage.
Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and
competently described the psychological incapacity of the
respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family
Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
 witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case
records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration;
after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19,
petitioner’s factual premises. 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on
o The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the
expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of Code.
marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family
Code the courts, “despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”

- Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of

parental duties

o The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should

not have delimited our determination of the presence
or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the
determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate
the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she
made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such
duties and responsibilities, she would have known that
bringing along her children of very tender ages to her
mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of
gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s
obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family
life, particularly on her very young children.
o The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to
her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of
parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose
them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her
children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of
her own personal and escapist desires.
o The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her
children’s moral and mental development. This disregard
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her
children.