COURSE OUTLINE IN

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

1 st Semester, AY 2018-2019

I. PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

 Vinzons-Chato vs Fortune Tobacco, GR No. 141309, Dec 23,

2008

II. Persons – any being, natural or artificial, capable of possessing

legal rights and

obligations.

 Quimiguing vs. Icao, G.R. No. 26795, 31 July 1970

 Continental Steel v. Arbitrator, GR No. 182836, 13 Oct 2009

 Martinez vs Martinez, GR No. 445, 31 Mar 1902

IV. Marriage

 Bolos v Bolos, G.R No. 186400, 20 October 2010

 Leus v St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, G.R.No. 187226,

January 28, 2015

 Republic v Albios, G.R. No. 198780, 16 October 2013

 Ninal v Badayog, G.R. No. 133778 14 Mar 2000

 Republic v Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, 28 Mar 2008

 Sevilla vs Cardenas, GR No. 167684, July 31, 2006

 Martinez vs. Tan, GR No. 4904, 5 Feb 1909

 People v Morigo, G.R. No. 145226, 6 Feb 2004

 Romulo v. People, G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014

 Van Dorn vs Romillo, GR Np. 68470, 8 Oct 1985

EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 141309 : December 23, 2008]

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner, v. FORTUNE TOBACCO

CORPORATION, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

It is a fundamental principle in the law of public officers that a duty owing to

the public in general cannot give rise to a liability in favor of particular
individuals.1 The failure to perform a public duty can constitute an individual
wrong only when a person can show that, in the public duty, a duty to
himself as an individual is also involved, and that he has suffered a special
and peculiar injury by reason of its improper performance or non-
performance.2

By this token, the Court reconsiders its June 19, 2007 Decision3 in this case.

As culled from the said decision, the facts, in brief, are as follows:

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654),
which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands
'Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to
an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two
days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing
a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect
subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA
7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes
which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes
an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less
than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."

On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A.

Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it
was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco
received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20,
1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of
RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993. The same letter
assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting
to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded
payment within 10 days from receipt thereof. On August 3, 1993,
respondent filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the
implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the
CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and
further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment
issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Court of Appeals. It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen
short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the
latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right
against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to
equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) respondent has no

cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority.
She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore
the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no
cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the
certification against forum shopping was signed by respondent's counsel in
violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should
sign the same.

On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss

holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely
decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to present
evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against forum
shopping was cured by respondent's submission of the corporate secretary's
certificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum
shopping. x x x x

xxx

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition

for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground
that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the
defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court
ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general
law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is
the special law that governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad
faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the
ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification against forum shopping
was cured by the submission of the corporate secretary's certificate giving
authority to its counsel to execute the same.4 [Citations and underscoring
omitted.]

In the aforesaid June 19, 2007 Decision, we affirmed the disposition of the
Court of Appeals (CA) and directed the trial court to continue with the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK.5

Petitioner, on July 20, 2007, subsequently moved for the reconsideration of

the said decision.6 After respondent filed its comment, the Court, in its April
14, 2008 Resolution,7 denied with finality petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

Undaunted, petitioner filed, on April 29, 2008 her Motion to Refer [the case]
to the Honorable Court En Banc.8 She contends that the petition raises a
legal question that is novel and is of paramount importance. The earlier
decision rendered by the Court will send a chilling effect to public officers,
and will adversely affect the performance of duties of superior public officers
in departments or agencies with rule-making and quasi-judicial powers. With
the said decision, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue will have reason to
hesitate or refrain from performing his/her official duties despite the due
process safeguards in Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue
Code.9 Petitioner hence moves for the reconsideration of the June 19, 2007
Decision.10

In its June 25, 2008 Resolution,11 the Court referred the case to the En
Banc. Respondent consequently moved for the reconsideration of this
resolution.

We now resolve both motions.

There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the "duty owing to
the public collectively" (the body politic), and the "duty owing to particular
individuals, thus:

1. Of Duties to the Public. - The first of these classes embraces those

officers whose duty is owing primarily to the public collectively - - - to the
body politic - - - and not to any particular individual; who act for the public
at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public treasury.
The officers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this class are
numerous and the distinction will be readily recognized. Thus, the governor
owes a duty to the public to see that the laws are properly executed, that fit
and competent officials are appointed by him, that unworthy and ill-
considered acts of the legislature do not receive his approval, but these, and
many others of a like nature, are duties which he owes to the public at large
and no one individual could single himself out and assert that they were
duties owing to him alone. So, members of the legislature owe a duty to the
public to pass only wise and proper laws, but no one person could pretend
that the duty was owing to himself rather than to another. Highway
commissioners owe a duty that they will be governed only by considerations
of the public good in deciding upon the opening or closing of highways, but it
is not a duty to any particular individual of the community.

These illustrations might be greatly extended, but it is believed that they are
sufficient to define the general doctrine.

2. Of Duties to Individuals. - The second class above referred to includes

those who, while they owe to the public the general duty of a proper
administration of their respective offices, yet become, by reason of their
employment by a particular individual to do some act for him in an official
capacity, under a special and particular obligation to him as an individual.
They serve individuals chiefly and usually receive their compensation from
fees paid by each individual who employs them.

A sheriff or constable in serving civil process for a private suitor, a recorder

of deeds in recording the deed or mortgage of an individual, a clerk of court
in entering up a private judgment, a notary public in protesting negotiable
paper, an inspector of elections in passing upon the qualifications of an
elector, each owes a general duty of official good conduct to the public, but
he is also under a special duty to the particular individual concerned which
gives the latter a peculiar interest in his due performance.12

In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance

or non-performance of a duty, it must first be determined which of the two
classes of duties is involved. For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R. Mechem
instructs, "[t]he liability of a public officer to an individual or the public is
based upon and is co-extensive with his duty to the individual or the public.
If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to that one he can incur no
liability."13

Stated differently, when what is involved is a "duty owing to the public in

general", an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against
the public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or
inaction of the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the individual but
no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform a public duty, the
officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no duty
to him as an individual.14 The remedy in this case is not judicial but
political.15

The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a
particular or special injury on account of the public officer's improper
performance or non-performance of his public duty. An individual can never
be suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the public only;
he must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage alone does
not constitute a wrong.16 A contrary precept (that an individual, in the
absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still institute an action against a
public officer on account of an improper performance or non-performance of
a duty owing to the public generally) will lead to a deluge of suits, for if one
man might have an action, all men might have the like-the complaining
individual has no better right than anybody else.17 If such were the case, no
one will serve a public office. Thus, the rule restated is that an individual
cannot have a particular action against a public officer without a particular
injury, or a particular right, which are the grounds upon which all actions are
founded.18

Juxtaposed with Article 3219 of the Civil Code, the principle may now
translate into the rule that an individual can hold a public officer personally
liable for damages on account of an act or omission that violates a
constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the
former. This is consistent with this Court's pronouncement in its June 19,
2007 Decision (subject of petitioner's motion for reconsideration) that Article
32, in fact, allows a damage suit for "tort for impairment of rights and
liberties."20

It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for
damages for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed the
plaintiff, meaning a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. Indeed, central to an award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of
law.21 Thus, in Lim v. Ponce de Leon,22 we granted the petitioner's claim for
damages because he, in fact, suffered the loss of his motor launch due to
the illegal seizure thereof. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we upheld
the right of petitioner to the recovery of damages as there was an injury
sustained by him on account of the illegal withholding of his horserace prize
winnings.
In the instant case, what is involved is a public officer's duty owing to the
public in general. The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum Circular
(RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued without the requisite notice, hearing and
publication, and which, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals,24 we declared as having "fallen short of a valid and effective
administrative issuance."25 A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested
with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to
promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid
administrative regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone,
but to the entire body politic who would be affected, directly or indirectly, by
the administrative rule.

Furthermore, as discussed above, to have a cause of action for damages

against the petitioner, respondent must allege that it suffered a particular or
special injury on account of the non-performance by petitioner of the public
duty. A careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals
that no particular injury is alleged to have been sustained by the
respondent. The phrase "financial and business difficulties"26 mentioned in
the complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate
into a "particular injury." In contrast, the facts of the case eloquently
demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the respondent, as the
latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment levied by the
former by virtue of RMC 37-93.

With no "particular injury" alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no

delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would
violate the primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or tortious
act or omission, the complaint then fails to state a cause of action, because
a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.27

A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect
or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages.28

The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of
action is to set up this defense in a motion to dismiss, or in the answer. A
motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action in the
complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein.
However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the "relevant and material
facts well-pleaded in the complaint and inferences deducible therefrom. The
admission does not extend to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does
it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice."29

The complaint may also be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is

obvious from the complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled
to any relief.30

The June 19, 2007 Decision and the dissent herein reiterates that under
Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public officer may accrue even
if he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of constitutional
rights, citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,31 where we said:

Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted
with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation
of the constitutional rights of petitioners, even on the pretext of justifiable
motives or good faith in the performance of duties.32

The complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner.
Without any allegation of bad faith, the cause of action in the respondent's
complaint (specifically, paragraph 2.02 thereof) for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code would be premised on the findings of this Court
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals (CIR v.
CA),33 where we ruled that RMC No. 37-93, issued by petitioner in her
capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, had "fallen short of a valid
and effective administrative issuance." This is a logical inference. Without
the decision in CIR v. CA, the bare allegations in the complaint that
respondent's rights to due process of law and to equal protection of the laws
were violated by the petitioner's administrative issuance would be
conclusions of law, hence not hypothetically admitted by petitioner in her
motion to dismiss.

But in CIR v. CA, this Court did not declare RMC 37-93 unconstitutional;
certainly not from either the due process of law or equal protection of the
laws perspective. On due process, the majority, after determining that RMC
37-93 was a legislative rule, cited an earlier Revenue Memorandum Circular
(RMC No. 10-86) requiring prior notice before RMC's could become
"operative." However, this Court did not make an express finding of violation
of the right to due process of law. On the aspect of equal protection, CIR v.
CA said: "Not insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have likewise infringed on
uniformity of taxation;" a statement that does not amount to a positive
indictment of petitioner for violation of respondent's constitutional right.
Even if one were to ascribe a constitutional infringement by RMC 37-93 on
the non-uniformity of tax provisions, the nature of the constitutional
transgression falls under Section 28, Article VI-not Section 1, Article III-of
the Constitution.

This Court's own summation in CIR v. CA: "All taken, the Court is convinced
that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and
effective administrative issuance," does not lend itself to an interpretation
that the RMC is unconstitutional. Thus, the complaint's reliance on CIR v.
CA-which is cited in, and a copy of which is annexed to, the complaint-as
suggestive of a violation of due process and equal protection, must fail.

Accordingly, from the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that paragraph 2.02

of respondent's complaint loses the needed crutch to sustain a valid cause of
action against the petitioner, for what is left of the paragraph is merely the
allegation that only respondent's "Champion", "Hope" and "More" cigarettes
were reclassified.

If we divest the complaint of its reliance on CIR v. CA, what remains of

respondent's cause of action for violation of constitutional rights would be
paragraph 2.01, which reads:

2.01. On or about July 1, 1993, defendant issued Revenue Memorandum

Circular No. 37-93 (hereinafter referred to as RMC No. 37-93) reclassifying
specifically "Champion", "Hope" and "More" as locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. A copy of the aforesaid circular is
attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as ANNEX "A". The
issuance of a circular and its implementation resulted in the "deprivation of
property" of plaintiff. They were done without due process of law and in
violation of the right of plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws. (Italics
supplied.)

But, as intimated above, the bare allegations, "done without due process of
law" and "in violation of the right of plaintiff to the equal protection of the
laws" are conclusions of law. They are not hypothetically admitted in
petitioner's motion to dismiss and, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, are
not deemed as facts.

In Fluor Daniel, Inc. Philippines v. EB. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd.,34 this
Court declared that the test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged,
the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint. In the instant case, since what remains of the complaint which is
hypothetically admitted, is only the allegation on the reclassification of
respondent's cigarettes, there will not be enough facts for the court to
render a valid judgment according to the prayer in the complaint.

Furthermore, in an action for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code

premised on violation of due process, it may be necessary to harmonize the
Civil Code provision with subsequent legislative enactments, particularly
those related to taxation and tax collection. Judicial notice may be taken of
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and of
the law creating the Court of Tax Appeals. Both statutes provide ample
remedies to aggrieved taxpayers; remedies which, in fact, were availed of by
the respondent-without even having to pay the assessment under protest-as
recounted by this Court in CIR v. CA, viz.:

In a letter, dated 19 July 1993, addressed to the appellate division of the

BIR, Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of
RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or
on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax
deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00.

On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a Petition for Review with the
CTA.35

The availability of the remedies against the assailed administrative action,

the opportunity to avail of the same, and actual recourse to these remedies,
contradict the respondent's claim of due process infringement.

At this point, a brief examination of relevant American jurisprudence may be

instructive.

42 U.S. Code 1983, a provision incorporated into the Civil Rights Act of
1871, presents a parallel to our own Article 32 of the Civil Code, as it states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.

This provision has been employed as the basis of tort suits by many
petitioners intending to win liability cases against government officials when
they violate the constitutional rights of citizens.
Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Investigation,36 has emerged as the leading case on the victim's entitlement
to recover money damages for any injuries suffered as a result of flagrant
and unconstitutional abuses of administrative power. In this case, federal
narcotics officers broke into Bivens' home at 6:30 a.m. without a search
warrant and in the absence of probable cause. The agents handcuffed
Bivens, searched his premises, employed excessive force, threatened to
arrest his family, subjected him to a visual strip search in the federal court
house, fingerprinted, photographed, interrogated and booked him. When
Bivens was brought before a United States Commissioner, however, charges
against him were dismissed. On the issue of whether violation of the Fourth
Amendment "by a federal agent acting under color of authority gives rise to
a cause of action for damages consequent upon his constitutional conduct,"
the U.S. Supreme Court held that Bivens is entitled to recover damages for
injuries he suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the Fourth
Amendment.

A number of subsequent decisions have upheld Bivens. For instance,

in Scheuer v. Rhodes,37 a liability suit for money damages was allowed
against Ohio Governor James Rhodes by petitioners who represented three
students who had been killed by Ohio National Guard troops at Kent State
University as they protested against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In Wood
v. Strickland,38 local school board members were sued by high school
students who argued that they had been deprived of constitutional due
process rights when they were expelled from school for having spiked a
punch bowl at a school function without the benefit of a full hearing. In Butz
v. Economou,39 Economou, whose registration privilege as a commodities
futures trader was suspended, without prior warning, by Secretary of
Agriculture Earl Butz, sued on a Bivens action, alleging that the suspension
was aimed at "chilling" his freedom of expression right under the First
Amendment. A number of other cases40 with virtually the same conclusion
followed.

However, it is extremely dubious whether a Bivens action against

government tax officials and employees may prosper, if we consider the
pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky,41 that a
Bivens remedy will not be allowed when other "meaningful safeguards or
remedies for the rights of persons situated as (is the plaintiff)" are available.
It has also been held that a Bivens action is not appropriate in the civil
service system42 or in the military justice system.43

In Frank Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the United

States of America,44 petitioner Vennes instituted a Bivens action against
agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) who alleged that he (Vennes)
owed $250,000 in tax liability, instituted a jeopardy assessment, confiscated
Vennes' business, forced a total asset sale, and put Vennes out of business,
when in fact he owed not a dime. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,
ruled:

The district court dismissed these claims on the ground that a taxpayer's
remedies under the Internal Revenue Code preclude such a Bivens action.
Vennes cites to us no contrary authority, and we have found none. Though
the Supreme Court has not addressed this precise question, it has strongly
suggested that the district court correctly applied Bivens:

When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has

provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional
violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not
created additional Bivens remedies.

xxx

Congress has provided specific and meaningful remedies for taxpayers who
challenge overzealous tax assessment and collection activities. A taxpayer
may challenge a jeopardy assessment both administratively and judicially,
and may sue the government for a tax refund, and have authorized taxpayer
actions against the United States to recover limited damages resulting from
specific types of misconduct by IRS employees. These carefully crafted
legislative remedies confirm that, in the politically sensitive realm of
taxation, Congress's refusal to permit unrestricted damage action by
taxpayers has not been inadvertent. Thus, the district court correctly
dismissed Vennes's Bivens claims against IRS agents for their tax
assessment and collection activities.

In still another Bivens action, instituted by a taxpayer against IRS

employees for alleged violation of due process rights concerning a tax
dispute, the U.S. District Court of Minnesota said:

In addition, the (Tax) Code provides taxpayers with remedies, judicial and
otherwise, for correcting and redressing wrongful acts taken by IRS
employees in connection with any collection activities. Although these
provisions do not provide taxpayers with an all-encompassing remedy for
wrongful acts of IRS personnel, the rights established under the Code
illustrate that it provides all sorts of rights against the overzealous
officialdom, including, most fundamentally, the right to sue the government
for a refund if forced to overpay taxes, and it would make the collection of
taxes chaotic if a taxpayer could bypass the remedies provided by Congress
simply by bringing a damage suit against IRS employees.45
American jurisprudence obviously validates the contention of the petitioner.

Finally, we invite attention to Section 227, Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax
Reform Act of 1997), which provides:

Section 227. Satisfaction of Judgment Recovered Against any Internal

Revenue Officer. - When an action is brought against any Internal Revenue
officer to recover damages by reason of any act done in the performance of
official duty, and the Commissioner is notified of such action in time to make
defense against the same, through the Solicitor General, any judgment,
damages or costs recovered in such action shall be satisfied by the
Commissioner, upon approval of the Secretary of Finance, or if the same be
paid by the person sued shall be repaid or reimbursed to him.

No such judgment, damages or costs shall be paid or reimbursed in behalf of

a person who has acted negligently or in bad faith, or with willful oppression.

Because the respondent's complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith
to the petitioner, any money judgment by the trial court against her will
have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the
complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.46

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT petitioner's motion for

reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision and DENY Respondent 's
motion for reconsideration of the June 25, 2008 Resolution. Civil Case No.
CV-97-341-MK, pending with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City,
is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO

QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELIX
ICAO, Defendant-Appellee.

Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.

Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of

Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil
Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and
another order denying amendment of the same
pleading.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:chanrobles

virtual law library

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in

the court below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were
neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that
defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse
with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her
consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs
supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she
claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's
fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action
since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after
hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and
dismissed the complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result

of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court,
sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable,
since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the
plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived

child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to
support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose
paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss),
even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived
child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article
742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament
may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the
testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the
testator Article 854, Civil Code).

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be

accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if they were
already born.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution
shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of 'representation.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code
declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children
"does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40
aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of
Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds
further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition
precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of
Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his
Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil
Code, clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en
el sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que
constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art.
30, no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de
antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1
Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married
man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the
original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of
his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:chanrobles virtual law library

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:chanrobles virtual law

library

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying,
plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the
complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action
was doubly in error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the
case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable
to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 182836 : October 13, 2009]

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING

CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF
UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS
(NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, assailing the Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the
Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting
bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano
(Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing

Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang
Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006,
a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

xxx

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE The Company agrees to grant a

bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the
employee's legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and
sisters) based on the following:

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

xxx

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

xxx

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE The Company shall grant

death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following
manner:

xxx

4.3 DEPENDENTS'Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00)

in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse,
and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the
legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to
be presented (e.g. death certificate).4

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano's unborn child. Hortillano's
wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while
she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.5 According to the Certificate of Fetal
Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal
Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.6

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano's claim for paternity leave

but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits,
consisting of the death and accident insurance.7

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano's claims

for bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the
grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences
held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,8 prompting the Union to
file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National
Capital Region (NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006,
the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole
issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other
death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2

and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty.
Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling
the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position
Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.

The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and
other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article
X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically
state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have
acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be
covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein
employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe
Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar
situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar
provisions of their CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an

employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus,
which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive
paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the
CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugan's child was only 24 weeks
in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillano's child who was
already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are
located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives
of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective
employees' unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel
who signed the existing CBA with the Union.

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that
all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor
of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of
the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without
legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement
to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent,
none of which existed in Hortillano's case. Continental Steel, relying on
Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil
personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never
acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought,
Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of
delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be
applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was
delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed
any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.

Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and
unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the
CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically
accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child
included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA - the death of
whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and
other death benefits - bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of
the latter term.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees
of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union,
were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that
the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-
employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted "company practice."

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary

Arbitrator, issued a Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:

This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement
leave with pay by the covered employees as provided under Article X,
Section 2 of the parties' CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be
present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of employee's
"dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".

On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident
insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the
parties' CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is
"death"; (b) such death must be of employee's "dependent"; (c) such
dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be
presented.18

Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an
employee's legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be
supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The
fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or
sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else,
specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent,
although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their
dependent, unborn child, legitimate.

In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered

ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano
the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00),
representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand
Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a
total amount of P16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack
of merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein
dispositions.

Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Review on Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano's

claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no
death of an employee's dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at
whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA
since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person,
and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality.
Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact
that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It
asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child's
birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine
qua non for Hortillano's entitlement to bereavement leave and other death
benefits under the CBA were lacking.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty.
Montaño's Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court
interpreted death to mean as follows:

[Herein petitioner Continental Steel's] exposition on the legal sense in which

the term "death" is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same
is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement
leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no
arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a
child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not
follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be
contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision,
undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with
whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has
proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term "death of a
legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and
death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steel's] theory, there
can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court, however, does not
share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less
than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this light,
bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee
and the latter's immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather
than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child.
[Continental Steel's] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for
statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.20

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of

Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED

for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED
and UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21

In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion
for Reconsideration23 of Continental Steel.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the
CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death
should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead
fetus never acquired a juridical personality.

We are not persuaded.

As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under

Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a
dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee;
and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The
requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3)
of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could
be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or
sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal
document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.

It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel

that the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental
argument for denying Hortillano's claim for bereavement leave and other
death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms
"death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are
indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the
interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself
admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define the
pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the
negotiation of the CBA.

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code
for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a
conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41
defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death.

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and
42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article
37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil
personality, which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired
and may be lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since
his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It
is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or
incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or
assumed by the child's parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other
death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the
unborn child upon the latter's death.

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a
definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that
civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state
that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.24 Life is not
synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality
first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother.
If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the
child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another
for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid
of someone else." Under said general definition,26 even an unborn child is a
dependent of its parents. Hortillano's child could not have reached 38-39
weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano's
wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in
question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee.
The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that
the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as
Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the
mother's womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child's status in

relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on
who is a legitimate child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful
marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no
legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code
cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as

follows:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have
been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of
children - - legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the
rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and
born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives
them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited

jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his
wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said
marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the
fourth element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the
CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other
death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano's claims for the same should have
been granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted
to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said
employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be
said that the parents' grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but
died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born
alive but died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave
and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the
intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating
that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting
labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.29 In the same way, the
CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor.
In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,30 we
pronounced:

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the

assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro
and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of
labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of
the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is
involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between
private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the
State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice
to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451
(1990)], we categorically stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the

scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-
balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA

265 (1991)], we declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor
pursuant to the social justice policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February

2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to
Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the
amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and
Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively,
grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 445. March 31, 1902. ]

PEDRO MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANCISCO

MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellee.

Carlos Ledesma, for Appellant.

Felipe Calderon, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. GUARDIANSHIP; PRODIGALITY. — In order to render a person legally

unfit to administer his own affairs his acts of prodigality must show a morbid
mind and a disposition to spend or waste the estate so as to expose his
family to want or to deprive his forced heirs of their inheritances.

2. ID.; ID. — Courts will not go further to restrain donations than to enforce
the express limitations imposed by law as required by public policy.

DECISION

COOPER, J. :

This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the
compulsory legal heir, against Francisco Martinez Garcia for a declaration of
prodigality against the father.

The allegations in the complaint are substantially: That Don Francisco

Martinez, owing to his advanced age, is dissipating and squandering his
estate by making donations to his second wife, Doña Anastacia Ilustre, and
to her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has given
over the administration of this estate to the management of his wife; that
the defendant has a propensity for litigation and has instituted groundless
actions against the plaintiff in order to take possession of the property held
in common with the plaintiff to give it to his wife and her relatives.

In a supplementary prayer plaintiff asked the court to direct that the

complaint be entered in the property register of the province, which was
done by order of the court.
The defendant in his answer denies the allegations in the complaint and sets
forth a state of facts quite inconsistent with those alleged in the complaint.

Among other things, it is stated that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff
a general power of attorney under which the plaintiff has administered the
community estate for several years; that the plaintiff has caused the ships
Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to the estate, to be
registered in his own name without the consent of the father and is
otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating the property of the estate,
which caused the defendant to revoke the power of attorney given to
plaintiff, and that the suit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff was
due to the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the fact that the power
of attorney had been revoked, refused to render an account of his
administration.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and
adjudged the costs against him. The plaintiff has appealed to this court.

The acts which constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code owing
to the difficulty of applying general rules to the varying circumstances of the
case and the different situations of persons.

The declaration of prodigality must be made in an ordinary action (en juicio

contradictorio). (Art. 221 of the Civil Code.)

The proceedings must be instituted by the consort or the forced heirs. (Art.
222 of the Civil Code.)

Under our law it may be inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a
morbid state of mind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the
estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support,
or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate.

Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and

affection. All persons who can contract and dispose of property may make
donations. (Art. 624 of the Civil Code.)

Donations may comprise all the actual property of the donor, except such as
is required for the support of the donor in a condition corresponding to his
circumstances. (Art. 634 of the Civil Code.)

And with further limitation that no person can give by a donation more than
what he can give by testament.
A donation is considered inofficious in all that exceeds such limits. (Art. 636
of the Civil Code.)

Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be

imposed upon the owner, but a law which would impose restrictions further
than such as are required by public policy may well be regarded unjust and
tending in a contrary direction, as destroying the incentive to acquire
property, and as subduing the generous impulse of the heart.

Beyond these limitations the law does not attempt to adjust claims to
generosity.

There were a number of witnesses introduced both by the plaintiff and by

the defendant whose testimony it is unnecessary to recount.

The testimony on the part of the plaintiff was wholly insufficient to support
the allegations of his complaint. It was vague, indefinite, and of an
inconclusive nature.

The father’s estate consisted of city property in Manila; of farms and of

certain vessels, two of which are steamships. There is no evidence offered to
show any transfers by sale or mortgage of these properties. This could have
been easily done if such existed. Donations of real property must be made in
a public deed (Art. 633 of the Civil Code), and the acquisition of vessels
must also be included in a written instrument, and produces no effect with
regard to third persons if not recorded in the Commercial Registry. (Art. 573
of the Code of Commerce.)

There is no proof that there was any money belonging to the estate, or other
personal property, the transfer of which could not be easily traced.

The son has been in possession of a greater part of the estate since
November, 1897, collecting the revenue from the ships and rents from the
city property.

The farms have been nonproductive on account of the disturbed conditions

of the country, and the revenue from even these has been in part collected
by the son.

While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have
greatly increased since her marriage, there is no evidence whatever to show
that there has been any perceptible diminution of the defendant’s property.
This can be accounted for only on the grounds that the father, so far from
being a prodigal, is still in the full exercise of his faculties and still possesses
the industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the accumulation of a
splendid estate after the date of his marriage with the mother of the
plaintiff, to one-half of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the
mother.

A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that

the plaintiff himself possesses that propensity for instituting lawsuits which
he unjustly attributes to his father.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed and costs of suits in
both courts is adjudged against the plaintiff.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 186400 : October 20, 2010

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner, v. DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.cralaw

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking a review of the December 10, 2008 Decision1cra1aw of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled
"Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos,"
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its
decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner and
respondent final and executory.

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo
Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No.
6211.

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a
Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the following
disposition:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between

petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated
on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under
Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by
law.

Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics
Office (NSO) copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He

timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the
appeal for Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or
new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal

was likewise denied.

On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006
decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment
filed by Cynthia.

Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1)
the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilos appeal;
2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the
September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which
declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also
prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the
essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of
abandoning him, the family home and their children.

As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the
assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement
of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and
Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinaceli3cra1aw to the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of
the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."

Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with

Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion
for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Courts Decision dated
December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11, 2009
Resolution,4cra1aw denied the motion for extension of time considering that
the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial
reconsideration was likewise denied.

Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising the following

ISSUES

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE

QUESTIONED DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING
THAT:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V.

SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE
CONSIDERING THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT
SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.

B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE

HONORABLE COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS
RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS
BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-
11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO
THE WORD "MARRIAGES."

C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE

ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO
MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY
CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A
PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY
WITH A PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES
ON APPEAL IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE

QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THIS CASE.

III

THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND

IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN
THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES
IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION
IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR
DELAY.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be

resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages

solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia,
the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the
aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code.

She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the
said case constituted a decision on its merits, still the same cannot be
applied because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico
case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to be
declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was
filed, after the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action
was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.

Danilo, in his Comment,6cra1aw counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not

applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February
14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious
nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as
null and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the
mere "failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not
"incapacitated," to render marital obligations as required under Article 36 of
the Family Code.

The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is
unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.
The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.7cra1aw The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered
by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that

the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. There is only room for application.9cra1aw As the statute is
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-
meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi
sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute
there should be no departure."10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There is no basis for petitioners assertion either that the tenets of

substantial justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and the
meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor.
Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be
faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere
expediency of claiming substantial merit.11cra1aw As a corollary, rules
prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings
are considered absolutely indispensableto prevent needless delays and to
orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these
rules are regarded as mandatory.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The appellate court was correct in denying petitioners motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary
period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As
pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court has made this clear as early as
1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has
consistently and strictly adhered thereto.

Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate courts denial
of petitioners motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because
petitioners earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the
running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already
attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It
follows that the same decision was already beyond the review jurisdiction of
this Court.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC

decision which denied due course to respondents appeal and denying
petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.

Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up

for review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus,
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to
appeal.14cra1aw In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br.
254,15cra1aw the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory,
not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system
and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the
right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity
to establish the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the
sacrosanct institution of marriage.

No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable

social institution. This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code.
Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability,
thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man

and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and

strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract,
but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds
no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation
is not the concern alone of the family members.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015

CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, Petitioner, v. ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE

WESTGROVE AND/OR SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO, OSB, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Cheryll Santos Leus (petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica’s College

Westgrove (SSCW), a Catholic educational institution, as a non-teaching
personnel, engaged in pre-marital sexual relations, got pregnant out of
wedlock, married the father of her child, and was dismissed by SSCW, in
that order. The question that has to be resolved is whether the petitioner’s
conduct constitutes a ground for her dismissal.

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated September
24, 2008 and Resolution2 dated March 2, 2009 issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188, which affirmed the Resolutions
dated February 28, 20073 and May 21, 20074 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 049222-06.

The Facts

SSCW is a catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite. In

May 2001, SSCW hired the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCW’s Director of
the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate.

Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of
wedlock. When SSCW learned of the petitioner’s pregnancy, Sr. Edna
Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), SSCW’s Directress, advised her to file a
resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the petitioner
informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign from her employment just
because she got pregnant without the benefit of
marriage.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in
writing why she should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual
relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof, which amounts to serious
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic
school.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In a letter7 dated May 31, 2003, the petitioner explained that her pregnancy
out of wedlock does not amount to serious misconduct or conduct
unbecoming of an employee. She averred that she is unaware of any school
policy stating that being pregnant out of wedlock is considered as a serious
misconduct and, thus, a ground for dismissal. Further, the petitioner
requested a copy of SSCW’s policy and guidelines so that she may better
respond to the charge against her.

On June 2, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that, pending the
promulgation of a “Support Staff Handbook,” SSCW follows the 1992 Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 MRPS) on the causes for
termination of employments; that Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS cites
“disgraceful or immoral conduct” as a ground for dismissal in addition to the
just causes for termination of employment provided under Article 282 of the
Labor Code.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On June 4, 2003, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Sr. Quiambao a

letter,9 which, in part, reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

To us, pre-marital sex between two consenting adults without legal

impediment to marry each other who later on married each other does not
fall within the contemplation of “disgraceful or immoral conduct” and
“serious misconduct” of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and
the Labor Code of the Philippines.

Your argument that what happened to our client would set a bad example to
the students and other employees of your school is speculative and is more
imaginary than real. To dismiss her on that sole ground constitutes grave
abuse of management prerogatives.

Considering her untarnished service for two years, dismissing her with her
present condition would also mean depriving her to be more secure in terms
of financial capacity to sustain maternal needs.10

In a letter11 dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained that

pre-marital sexual relations, even if between two consenting adults without
legal impediment to marry, is considered a disgraceful and immoral conduct
or a serious misconduct, which are grounds for the termination of
employment under the 1992 MRPS and the Labor Code. That SSCW, as a
Catholic institution of learning, has the right to uphold the teaching of the
Catholic Church and expect its employees to abide by the same. They
further asserted that the petitioner’s indiscretion is further aggravated by
the fact that she is the Assistant to the Director of the Lay Apostolate and
Community Outreach Directorate, a position of responsibility that the
students look up to as role model. The petitioner was again directed to
submit a written explanation on why she should not be dismissed.

On June 9, 2003, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she adopts her
counsel’s letter dated June 4, 2003 as her written
explanation.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Consequently, in her letter13 dated June 11, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed
the petitioner that her employment with SSCW is terminated on the ground
of serious misconduct. She stressed that pre-marital sexual relations
between two consenting adults with no impediment to marry, even if they
subsequently married, amounts to immoral conduct. She further pointed out
that SSCW finds unacceptable the scandal brought about by the petitioner’s
pregnancy out of wedlock as it ran counter to the moral principles that
SSCW stands for and teaches its students.

Thereupon, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City against SSCW and
Sr. Quiambao (respondents). In her position paper,14 the petitioner claimed
that SSCW gravely abused its management prerogative as there was no just
cause for her dismissal. She maintained that her pregnancy out of wedlock
cannot be considered as serious misconduct since the same is a purely
private affair and not connected in any way with her duties as an employee
of SSCW. Further, the petitioner averred that she and her boyfriend
eventually got married even prior to her dismissal.

For their part, SSCW claimed that there was just cause to terminate the
petitioner’s employment with SSCW and that the same is a valid exercise of
SSCW’s management prerogative. They maintained that engaging in pre-
marital sex, and getting pregnant as a result thereof, amounts to a
disgraceful or immoral conduct, which is a ground for the dismissal of an
employee under the 1992 MRPS.

They pointed out that SSCW is a Catholic educational institution, which

caters exclusively to young girls; that SSCW would lose its credibility if it
would maintain employees who do not live up to the values and teachings it
inculcates to its students. SSCW further asserted that the petitioner, being
an employee of a Catholic educational institution, should have strived to
maintain the honor, dignity and reputation of SSCW as a Catholic
school.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On February 28, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision,16 in NLRC
Case No. 6-17657-03-C which dismissed the complaint filed by the
petitioner. The LA found that there was a valid ground for the petitioner’s
dismissal; that her pregnancy out of wedlock is considered as a “disgraceful
and immoral conduct.” The LA pointed out that, as an employee of a Catholic
educational institution, the petitioner is expected to live up to the Catholic
values taught by SSCW to its students. Likewise, the LA opined
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Further, a deep analysis of the facts would lead us to disagree with the
complainant that she was dismissed simply because she violate[d] a Catholic
[teaching]. It should not be taken in isolation but rather it should be
analyzed in the light of the surrounding circumstances as a whole. We must
also take into [consideration] the nature of her work and the nature of her
employer-school. For us, it is not just an ordinary violation. It was
committed by the complainant in an environment where her strict adherence
to the same is called for and where the reputation of the school is at stake. x
x x.17

The LA further held that teachers and school employees, both in their official
and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior and act in a manner
that is beyond reproach.

The petitioner appealed to the NLRC, insisting that there was no valid
ground for the termination of her employment. She maintained that her
pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered as “serious misconduct”
under Article 282 of the Labor Code since the same was not of such a grave
and aggravated character. She asserted that SSCW did not present any
evidence to establish that her pregnancy out of wedlock indeed eroded the
moral principles that it teaches its students.18chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the NLRC

On February 28, 2007, the NLRC issued a Resolution,19 which affirmed the
LA Decision dated February 28, 2006. The NLRC pointed out that the
termination of the employment of the personnel of private schools is
governed by the 1992 MRPS; that Section 94(e) thereof cites “disgraceful or
immoral conduct” as a just cause for dismissal, in addition to the grounds for
termination of employment provided for under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
The NLRC held that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is a
“disgraceful or immoral conduct” within the contemplation of Section 94(e)
of the 1992 MRPS and, thus, SSCW had a valid reason to terminate her
employment.
The petitioner sought reconsideration20 of the Resolution dated February 28,
2007 but it was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution21 dated May 21, 2007.

Unperturbed, the petitioner filed a petition22 for certiorari with the CA,
alleging that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was
a valid ground for her dismissal. She maintained that pregnancy out of
wedlock cannot be considered as a disgraceful or immoral conduct; that
SSCW failed to prove that its students were indeed gravely scandalized by
her pregnancy out of wedlock. She likewise asserted that the NLRC erred in
applying Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.cralawred

The Ruling of the CA

On September 24, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed

Decision,23 which denied the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner. The
CA held that it is the provisions of the 1992 MRPS and not the Labor Code
which governs the termination of employment of teaching and non-teaching
personnel of private schools, explaining that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is a principle of statutory construction that where there are two statutes

that apply to a particular case, that which was specially intended for the said
case must prevail. Petitioner was employed by respondent private Catholic
institution which undeniably follows the precepts or norms of conduct set
forth by the Catholic Church. Accordingly, the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools followed by it must prevail over the Labor Code, a general
statute. The Manual constitutes the private schools’ Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 or the Education Act of 1982. x x
x.24

The CA further held that the petitioner’s dismissal was a valid exercise of
SSCW’s management prerogative to discipline and impose penalties on
erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations. The CA
upheld the NLRC’s conclusion that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock
is considered as a “disgraceful and immoral conduct” and, thus, a ground for
dismissal under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. The CA likewise opined
that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is scandalous per se given the
work environment and social milieu that she was
in, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under Section 94 (e) of the [MRPS], and even under Article 282 (serious
misconduct) of the Labor Code, “disgraceful and immoral conduct” is a basis
for termination of employment.
xxxx

Petitioner contends that her pre-marital sexual relations with her boyfriend
and her pregnancy prior to marriage was not disgraceful or immoral conduct
sufficient for her dismissal because she was not a member of the school’s
faculty and there is no evidence that her pregnancy scandalized the school
community.

We are not persuaded. Petitioner’s pregnancy prior to marriage is

scandalous in itself given the work environment and social milieu she was in.
Respondent school for young ladies precisely seeks to prevent its students
from situations like this, inculcating in them strict moral values and
standards. Being part of the institution, petitioner’s private and public life
could not be separated. Her admitted pre-marital sexual relations was a
violation of private respondent’s prescribed standards of conduct that views
pre-marital sex as immoral because sex between a man and a woman must
only take place within the bounds of marriage.

Finally, petitioner’s dismissal is a valid exercise of the employer-school’s

management prerogative to discipline and impose penalties on erring
employees pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations. x x x.25 (Citations
omitted)

The petitioner moved for reconsideration26 but it was denied by the CA in its
Resolution27 dated March 2, 2009.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues

Essentially, the issues set forth by the petitioner for this Court’s decision are
the following: first, whether the CA committed reversible error in ruling that
it is the 1992 MRPS and not the Labor Code that governs the termination of
employment of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools;
and second, whether the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a
valid ground to terminate her employment.cralawred

The Ruling of the Court

The Court grants the petition.

First Issue: Applicability of the 1992 MRPS

The petitioner contends that the CA, in ruling that there was a valid ground
to dismiss her, erred in applying Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS. Essentially,
she claims that the 1992 MRPS was issued by the Secretary of Education as
the revised implementing rules and regulations of Batas Pambansa Bilang
232 (BP 232) or the “Education Act of 1982.” That there is no provision in BP
232, which provides for the grounds for the termination of employment of
teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools. Thus, Section 94 of
the 1992 MRPS, which provides for the causes of terminating an
employment, is invalid as it “widened the scope and coverage” of BP 232.

The Court does not agree.

The Court notes that the argument against the validity of the 1992 MRPS,
specifically Section 94 thereof, is raised by the petitioner for the first time in
the instant petition for review. Nowhere in the proceedings before the LA,
the NLRC or the CA did the petitioner assail the validity of the provisions of
the 1992 MRPS.

“It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not
raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of
law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial
court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and
arguments belatedly raised would amount to trampling on the basic
principles of fair play, justice, and due
process.”28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In any case, even if the Court were to disregard the petitioner’s belated
claim of the invalidity of the 1992 MRPS, the Court still finds the same
untenable.

The 1992 MRPS, the regulation in force at the time of the instant
controversy, was issued by the Secretary of Education pursuant to BP 232.
Section 7029 of BP 232 vests the Secretary of Education with the authority to
issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of BP 232.
Concomitantly, Section 5730 specifically empowers the Department of
Education to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the
administration, supervision and regulation of the educational system in
accordance with the declared policy of BP 232.

The qualifications of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools,

as well as the causes for the termination of their employment, are an
integral aspect of the educational system of private schools. Indubitably,
ensuring that the teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools are
not only qualified, but competent and efficient as well goes hand in hand
with the declared objective of BP 232 – establishing and maintaining
relevant quality education.31 It is thus within the authority of the Secretary
of Education to issue a rule, which provides for the dismissal of teaching and
non-teaching personnel of private schools based on their incompetence,
inefficiency, or some other disqualification.

Moreover, Section 69 of BP 232 specifically authorizes the Secretary of

Education to “prescribe and impose such administrative sanction as he may
deem reasonable and appropriate in the implementing rules and regulations”
for the “[g]ross inefficiency of the teaching or non-teaching personnel” of
private schools.32 Accordingly, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the Court
sees no reason to invalidate the provisions of the 1992 MRPS, specifically
Section 94 thereof.cralawred

Second Issue: Validity of the Petitioner’s Dismissal

The validity of the petitioner’s dismissal hinges on the determination of

whether pregnancy out of wedlock by an employee of a catholic educational
institution is a cause for the termination of her employment.

In resolving the foregoing question, the Court will assess the matter from a
strictly neutral and secular point of view – the relationship between SSCW as
employer and the petitioner as an employee, the causes provided for by law
in the termination of such relationship, and the evidence on record. The
ground cited for the petitioner’s dismissal, i.e., pre-marital sexual relations
and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, will be assessed as to whether
the same constitutes a valid ground for dismissal pursuant to Section 94(e)
of the 1992 MRPS.

The standard of review in a Rule 45

petition from the CA decision in labor
cases.

In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, such as the
instant petition, where the CA’s disposition in a labor case is sought to be
calibrated, the Court’s review is quite limited. In ruling for legal correctness,
the Court has to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition
for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; the Court has to examine the
CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence
or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not
on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was
correct.33chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The phrase “grave abuse of discretion” is well-defined in the Court’s

jurisprudence. It exists where an act of a court or tribunal is performed with
a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.34 The determination of the presence or absence of grave abuse
of discretion does not include an inquiry into the correctness of the
evaluation of evidence, which was the basis of the labor agency in reaching
its conclusion.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Nevertheless, while a certiorari proceeding does not strictly include an

inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence (that was the
basis of the labor tribunals in determining their conclusion), the
incorrectness of its evidentiary evaluation should not result in negating the
requirement of substantial evidence. Indeed, when there is a showing
that the findings or conclusions, drawn from the same pieces of
evidence, were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence
on record, they may be reviewed by the courts. In particular, the CA
can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed
decision or resolution, made a factual finding not supported by substantial
evidence. A decision that is not supported by substantial evidence is
definitely a decision tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.36chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The labor tribunals’ respective

conclusions that the petitioner’s pregnancy
is a “disgraceful or immoral conduct”
were arrived at arbitrarily.

The CA and the labor tribunals affirmed the validity of the petitioner’s
dismissal pursuant to Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which provides
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec. 94. Causes of Terminating Employment – In addition to the just causes

enumerated in the Labor Code, the employment of school personnel,
including faculty, may be terminated for any of the following
causes:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx

e. Disgraceful or immoral conduct;

xxxx

The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of

wedlock, per se, is “disgraceful and immoral” considering that she is
employed in a Catholic educational institution. In arriving at such conclusion,
the labor tribunals merely assessed the fact of the petitioner’s
pregnancy vis-à-vis the totality of the circumstances surrounding the same.

However, the Court finds no substantial evidence to support the

aforementioned conclusion arrived at by the labor tribunals. The fact of the
petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not enough to
characterize the petitioner’s conduct as disgraceful or immoral. There must
be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and,
consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful
or immoral.

The totality of the circumstances

surrounding the conduct alleged to be
disgraceful or immoral must be assessed
against the prevailing norms of conduct.

In Chua-Qua v. Clave,37 the Court stressed that to constitute immorality, the

circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered
and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of conduct and
applicable laws.38 Otherwise stated, it is not the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the conduct per se that determines whether the same is
disgraceful or immoral, but the conduct that is generally accepted by society
as respectable or moral. If the conduct does not conform to what society
generally views as respectable or moral, then the conduct is considered as
disgraceful or immoral. Tersely put, substantial evidence must be presented,
which would establish that a particular conduct, viewed in light of the
prevailing norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful or immoral.

Thus, the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral

involves a two-step process: first, a consideration of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the
said circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the
society generally considers moral and respectable.

That the petitioner was employed by a Catholic educational institution per

se does not absolutely determine whether her pregnancy out of wedlock is
disgraceful or immoral. There is still a necessity to determine whether the
petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral in
accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct.

Public and secular morality should

determine the prevailing norms of conduct,
not religious morality.

However, determining what the prevailing norms of conduct are considered

disgraceful or immoral is not an easy task. An individual’s perception of what
is moral or respectable is a confluence of a myriad of influences, such as
religion, family, social status, and a cacophony of others. In this regard, the
Court’s ratiocination in Estrada v. Escritor39 is instructive.

In Estrada, an administrative case against a court interpreter charged with

disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Court stressed that in determining
whether a particular conduct can be considered as disgraceful and immoral,
the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and
religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind.40 That the
distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality is
important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.41 The Court further explained
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular,

not religious x x x. “Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved
only on grounds articulable in secular terms.” Otherwise, if government
relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and
morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity
to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a “compelled religion,”
anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions
upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that
would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full
religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those
whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive religious
freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of
religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality.

In other words, government action, including its proscription of

immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have
a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct
because it is “detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society” and not
because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or
the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might
have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over
what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law.
After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious
opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human
mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society
in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a
law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its
deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular
purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x
x.42 (Citations omitted and emphases ours)

Accordingly, when the law speaks of immoral or, necessarily, disgraceful

conduct, it pertains to public and secular morality; it refers to those
conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of human society.
Thus, in Anonymous v. Radam,43 an administrative case involving a court
utility worker likewise charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct,
applying the doctrines laid down in Estrada, the Court held
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For a particular conduct to constitute “disgraceful and immoral”

behavior under civil service laws, it must be regulated on account of
the concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be judged
based on personal bias, specifically those colored by particular
mores. Nor should it be grounded on “cultural” values not
convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of
public policy expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the same
time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy)
should be observed to the extent that they protect behavior that may be
frowned upon by the majority.

Under these tests, two things may be concluded from the fact that an
unmarried woman gives birth out of wedlock:

(1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not
ordinarily administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct. It may be a not-so-ideal situation and may cause complications
for both mother and child but it does not give cause for administrative
sanction. There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother
under those circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or
proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried
persons. Neither does the situation contravene any fundamental
state policy as expressed in the Constitution, a document that
accommodates various belief systems irrespective of dogmatic
origins.
(2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to
a woman other than the mother, then there is a cause for
 administrative sanction against either the father or the mother.
In such a case, the “disgraceful and immoral conduct” consists of
having extramarital relations with a married person. The sanctity
of marriage is constitutionally recognized and likewise affirmed by our
statutes as a special contract of permanent union. Accordingly, judicial
employees have been sanctioned for their dalliances with married
persons or for their own betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.

In this case, it was not disputed that, like respondent, the father of her child
was unmarried. Therefore, respondent cannot be held liable for disgraceful
and immoral conduct simply because she gave birth to the child Christian
Jeon out of wedlock.44 (Citations omitted and emphases ours)

Both Estrada and Radam are administrative cases against employees in the
civil service. The Court, however, sees no reason not to apply the doctrines
enunciated in Estrada and Radam in the instant
case. Estrada and Radam also required the Court to delineate what conducts
are considered disgraceful and/or immoral as would constitute a ground for
dismissal. More importantly, as in the said administrative cases, the instant
case involves an employee’s security of tenure; this case likewise concerns
employment, which is not merely a specie of property right, but also the
means by which the employee and those who depend on him
live.45chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It bears stressing that the right of an employee to security of tenure is

protected by the Constitution. Perfunctorily, a regular employee may not be
dismissed unless for cause provided under the Labor Code and other
relevant laws, in this case, the 1992 MRPS. As stated above, when the law
refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular morality and
not religious morality. Thus, the proscription against “disgraceful or immoral
conduct” under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause
for dismissal, must necessarily refer to public and secular morality.
Accordingly, in order for a conduct to be considered as disgraceful or
immoral, it must be “‘detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society’ and not because
the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.”

Thus, in Santos v. NLRC,46 the Court upheld the dismissal of a teacher who
had an extra-marital affair with his co-teacher, who is likewise married, on
the ground of disgraceful and immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the
1992 MRPS. The Court pointed out that extra-marital affair is considered as
a disgraceful and immoral conduct is an afront to the sanctity of marriage,
which is a basic institution of society, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We cannot overemphasize that having an extra-marital affair is an afront to
the sanctity of marriage, which is a basic institution of society. Even our
Family Code provides that husband and wife must live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Our laws, in implementing this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family underscore their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.47

The petitioner’s pregnancy out of

wedlock is not a disgraceful or immoral
conduct since she and the father of her
child have no impediment to marry each
other.

In stark contrast to Santos, the Court does not find any circumstance in this
case which would lead the Court to conclude that the petitioner committed a
disgraceful or immoral conduct. It bears stressing that the petitioner and her
boyfriend, at the time they conceived a child, had no legal impediment to
marry. Indeed, even prior to her dismissal, the petitioner married her
boyfriend, the father of her child. As the Court held in Radam, there is no
law which penalizes an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or
proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons;
that neither does such situation contravene any fundamental state policy
enshrined in the Constitution.

Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in an educational institution where

the teachings and doctrines of the Catholic Church, including that on pre-
marital sexual relations, is strictly upheld and taught to the students. That
her indiscretion, which resulted in her pregnancy out of wedlock, is
anathema to the doctrines of the Catholic Church. However, viewed against
the prevailing norms of conduct, the petitioner’s conduct cannot be
considered as disgraceful or immoral; such conduct is not denounced by
public and secular morality. It may be an unusual arrangement, but it
certainly is not disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of the law.

To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who

have no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a
child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of
morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section
94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.

Accordingly, the labor tribunals erred in upholding the validity of the

petitioner’s dismissal. The labor tribunals arbitrarily relied solely on the
circumstances surrounding the petitioner’s pregnancy and its supposed
effect on SSCW and its students without evaluating whether the petitioner’s
conduct is indeed considered disgraceful or immoral in view of the prevailing
norms of conduct. In this regard, the labor tribunals’ respective haphazard
evaluation of the evidence amounts to grave abuse of discretion, which the
Court will rectify.

The labor tribunals’ finding that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock
despite the absence of substantial evidence is not only arbitrary, but a grave
abuse of discretion, which should have been set right by the CA.

There is no substantial evidence to

prove that the petitioner’s pregnancy out of
wedlock caused grave scandal to SSCW
and its students.

SSCW claimed that the petitioner was primarily dismissed because her
pregnancy out of wedlock caused grave scandal to SSCW and its students.
That the scandal brought about by the petitioner’s indiscretion prompted
them to dismiss her. The LA upheld the respondents’ claim, stating
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In this particular case, an “objective” and “rational evaluation” of the facts

and circumstances obtaining in this case would lead us to focus our attention
x x x on the impact of the act committed by the complainant. The act
of the complainant x x x eroded the moral principles being taught and
project[ed] by the respondent [C]atholic school to their young lady
students.48 (Emphasis in the original)

On the other hand, the NLRC opined that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, when the complainant-appellant was already conceiving

a child even before she got married, such is considered a shameful and
scandalous behavior, inimical to public welfare and policy. It eroded the
moral doctrines which the respondent Catholic school, an exclusive
school for girls, is teaching the young girls. Thus, when the
respondent-appellee school terminated complainant-appellant’s
services, it was a valid exercise of its management prerogative.
Whether or not she was a teacher is of no moment. There is no separate set
of rules for non-teaching personnel. Respondents-appellees uphold the
teachings of the Catholic Church on pre-marital sex and that the
complainant-appellant as an employee of the school was expected to abide
by this basic principle and to live up with the standards of their purely
Catholic values. Her subsequent marriage did not take away the fact that
she had engaged in pre-marital sex which the respondent-appellee school
denounces as the same is opposed to the teachings and doctrines it
espouses.49 (Emphasis ours)

Contrary to the labor tribunals’ declarations, the Court finds that SSCW
failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove that the petitioner’s
indiscretion indeed caused grave scandal to SSCW and its students. Other
than the SSCW’s bare allegation, the records are bereft of any evidence that
would convincingly prove that the petitioner’s conduct indeed adversely
affected SSCW’s integrity in teaching the moral doctrines, which it stands
for. The petitioner is only a non-teaching personnel; her interaction with
SSCW’s students is very limited. It is thus quite impossible that her
pregnancy out of wedlock caused such a grave scandal, as claimed by
SSCW, as to warrant her dismissal.

Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proving that the
dismissal of the employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the
employer. It is incumbent upon the employer to show by substantial
evidence that the termination of the employment of the employees was
validly made and failure to discharge that duty would mean that the
dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal.50 “Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.”51chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Indubitably, bare allegations do not amount to substantial evidence.

Considering that the respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence to
prove their asserted cause for the petitioner’s dismissal, the labor tribunals
should not have upheld their allegations hook, line and sinker. The labor
tribunals’ respective findings, which were arrived at sans any substantial
evidence, amounts to a grave abuse of discretion, which the CA should have
rectified. “Security of tenure is a right which may not be denied on mere
speculation of any unclear and nebulous basis.”52chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petitioner’s dismissal is not a

valid exercise of SSCW’s management
prerogative.

The CA belabored the management prerogative of SSCW to discipline its

employees. The CA opined that the petitioner’s dismissal is a valid exercise
of management prerogative to impose penalties on erring employees
pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations.

The Court does not agree.

The Court has held that “management is free to regulate, according to its
own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring,
work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work,
processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations,
transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and discipline,
dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative,
however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due
regard to the rights of labor.” Management cannot exercise its prerogative in
a cruel, repressive, or despotic manner.53chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SSCW, as employer, undeniably has the right to discipline its employees

and, if need be, dismiss them if there is a valid cause to do so. However, as
already explained, there is no cause to dismiss the petitioner. Her conduct is
not considered by law as disgraceful or immoral. Further, the respondents
themselves have admitted that SSCW, at the time of the controversy, does
not have any policy or rule against an employee who engages in pre-marital
sexual relations and conceives a child as a result thereof. There being no
valid basis in law or even in SSCW’s policy and rules, SSCW’s dismissal of
the petitioner is despotic and arbitrary and, thus, not a valid exercise of
management prerogative.

In sum, the Court finds that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as there
was no just cause for the termination of her employment. SSCW failed to
adduce substantial evidence to establish that the petitioner’s conduct, i.e.,
engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and conceiving a child out of
wedlock, assessed in light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is considered
disgraceful or immoral. The labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in
upholding the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal as the charge against the
petitioner lay not on substantial evidence, but on the bare allegations of
SSCW. In turn, the CA committed reversible error in upholding the validity of
the petitioner’s dismissal, failing to recognize that the labor tribunals gravely
abused their discretion in ruling for the respondents.

The petitioner is entitled to

separation pay, in lieu of actual
reinstatement, full backwages and
attorney’s fees, but not to moral
and exemplary damages.

Having established that the petitioner was illegally dismissed, the Court now
determines the reliefs that she is entitled to and their extent. Under the law
and prevailing jurisprudence, “an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
reinstatement as a matter of right.”54 Aside from the instances provided
under Articles 28355 and 28456 of the Labor Code, separation pay is,
however, granted when reinstatement is no longer feasible because of
strained relations between the employer and the employee. In cases of
illegal dismissal, the accepted doctrine is that separation pay is available in
lieu of reinstatement when the latter recourse is no longer practical or in the
best interest of the parties.57chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In Divine Word High School v. NLRC,58 the Court ordered the employer
Catholic school to pay the illegally dismissed high school teacher separation
pay in lieu of actual reinstatement since her continued presence as a teacher
in the school “may well be met with antipathy and antagonism by some
sectors in the school community.”59chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In view of the particular circumstances of this case, it would be more

prudent to direct SSCW to pay the petitioner separation pay in lieu of actual
reinstatement. The continued employment of the petitioner with SSCW
would only serve to intensify the atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism
between the parties. Consequently, the Court awards separation pay to the
petitioner equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, with a
fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole year, from
the time of her illegal dismissal up to the finality of this judgment, as an
alternative to reinstatement.

Also, “employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent,
computed from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them
up to the time of their actual reinstatement but if reinstatement is no longer
possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal
termination up to the finality of the decision.”60 Accordingly, the petitioner is
entitled to an award of full backwages from the time she was illegally
dismissed up to the finality of this decision.

Nevertheless, the petitioner is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

“A dismissed employee is entitled to moral damages when the dismissal is
attended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is
done in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public policy.
Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal is effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner.”61chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

“Bad faith, under the law, does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of a known duty through some
motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of
fraud.”62chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
“It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one
alleging it”63 since basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he
who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.64 “Allegations of bad
faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.”65chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The records of this case are bereft of any clear and convincing evidence
showing that the respondents acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent
manner in dismissing the petitioner. That the petitioner was illegally
dismissed is insufficient to prove bad faith. A dismissal may be contrary to
law but by itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to entitle the dismissed
employee to moral damages. The award of moral and exemplary damages
cannot be justified solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his
employee without cause.66chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

However, the petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of 10%

of the total monetary award pursuant to Article 11167 of the Labor Code. “It
is settled that where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur
expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney’s fees is
legally and morally justifiable.”68chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Finally, legal interest shall be imposed on the monetary awards herein

granted at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.69chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarychanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition

is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 24, 2008 and Resolution dated
March 2, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The respondent, St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, is hereby declared

guilty of illegal dismissal and is hereby ORDERED to pay the petitioner,
Cheryll Santos Leus, the following: (a) separation pay in lieu of actual
reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service,
with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole year
from the time of her dismissal up to the finality of this Decision; (b) full
backwages from the time of her illegal dismissal up to the finality of this
Decision; and (c) attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award. The monetary awards herein granted shall earn legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the
finality of this Decision until fully paid. The case is REMANDED to the Labor
Arbiter for the computation of petitioner’s monetary awards.
SO ORDERED.c
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LIBERTY D.

ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA). in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC), declaring the marriage of Daniel
Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (Albios) as void from the
beginning.

The Facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married
before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59,
Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3cralawlibrary

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying
with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage
as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On
September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to
admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she
could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the
scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared.
Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the
schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio,
the dispositive portion of which reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very
beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner
shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right
over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of
respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience
only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she
contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him
the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC,
thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than
the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should
not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued
the Order,7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It
explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be
legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The
CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage
in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that
is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration
of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT

HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONE IN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American
citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave
their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into
that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it.
According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the
latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept
of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a
real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to
acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating
her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and,
therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its
petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage,
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon
of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led
to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of
particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries
only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as “limited purpose” marriages.11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a
child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration
purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the
couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who
use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14cralawlibrary

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization

Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of
marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a “marriage is a sham if
the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married.” This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now
requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage
was not “entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the
United States.” The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to
establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration
laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for
immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal
validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or

fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and
inexistent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States
made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of United States v.
Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in
the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to
obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand,
ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to
stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to
wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual
consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or
ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not
contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at
all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation
will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of
representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that
they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive,
they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to
enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily
understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18cralawlibrary

(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic
Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the
husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage
could not be avoided “merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose.”20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further
recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different
from a nonsubsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore,
been recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain
an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present,
United States courts have generally denied annulments involving “limited
purpose” marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular
purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23cralawlibrary

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a
conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from
its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration,
the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the
respondent to acquire American citizenship.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent
was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature
and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA
found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the
parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American
citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed
lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential
requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence
of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and
(2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent
requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of
the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties
must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.26cralawlibrary

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In
fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious
purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA
characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is
a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real
intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a
relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no
intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any
genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated,
defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.
Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to
create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to
further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention
to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a
limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for
the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the
parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together
is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites precribed by law
are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law, it shall be declared valid.28cralawlibrary

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does
not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any
attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to
marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost
any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered
into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all
the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration
in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize
marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void.
Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud

under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under
Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-
disclosure of a previous conviction involving moral turpitude; (2)
concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of
a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall
constitute fraud as a ground tor an action to annul a marriage. Entering into
a: marriage tor the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any oft he listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47
(3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and
Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage.

Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further
trivialize this inviolable institution. The Cout1 cannot declare such a marriage
void in the event the parties fail to quality for immigration benefits, after
they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments
in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to
enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again
abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social

institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of
the contracting parties. This Cout1 cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties,
and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil
Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000.]

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors

BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., Petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out
of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter
or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage
was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among
the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.chanrobles.com : law library

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is
"rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following
issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in

asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father,
Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father’s death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to
declare null and void their father’s marriage to respondent before his death,
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the
time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.
2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question
of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification
failed to state the basis of petitioner’s averment that the allegations in the
petition are ‘true and correct’." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3
However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal
and reinstated the petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State’s demonstration of
its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution" 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall
be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law
considers it not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.chanrobles.com.ph:red

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ father to respondent

Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority,
and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue
that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of
the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous
period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the
entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have
either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-
year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband
and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day
of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5
years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-
year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years,
then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to
have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of
the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly
fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united
in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 63: ". . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . .
."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage,
the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining
persons under oath. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 17 provides in part: ". . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 18 reads in part: ". . . In case of any impediment known to the local
civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars
thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . .
." chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely
prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during
the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs
are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The
law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be

said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started
living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with Respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived
with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband
and wife" .

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void
ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their father’s marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge’s ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20

cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the
trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any
time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to
the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are
not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared
by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The
first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage
cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can
be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for
nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no
legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the
alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53
and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing
voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the death of petitioner’s father

extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and Respondent. The
conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a
marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that
their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and
the death of either extinguished nothing.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary
in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not
require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace
of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties,
is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good
for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any
civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the
death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of
the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot
be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment
to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action
or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is

necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional

Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Endnotes:

1. The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court (RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo
City, reads: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant’s motion to
dismiss is hereby granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed
without costs." (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).

2. Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.

3. Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.

4. Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.

5. Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).

6. Now Article 3. Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized

unless all the requisites are complied with:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties, their consent, freely given;
(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

7. Now Article 4. Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of

exceptional character

x x x

8. Art 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter

2 of this Title but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.

9. Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).

10. Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G.R. No.
126010, December 8, 1999; See also Tuazon v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).

11. Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.

12. Article 1. Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of

permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal or family life . . .

13. Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).

14. Now Article 34. Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be
necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
15. Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.

16. Rollo, p. 29.

17. Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Articles 17 and 18, Family Code.

18. Article 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by
any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years . . .
."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

19. Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.

20. Art. 17. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the
following persons and within the periods indicated herein:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose

parent or guardian did not give his or her consent within five years after
attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person
having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached
the age of twenty-one;

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse,
who had no knowledge of the other’s insanity, or by any relative or guardian
or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of
either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after
regaining sanity;

(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45 by the injured party,

within five years after the discovery of the fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45 by the injured party,

within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence
disappeared or ceased;

For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party,
within five years after the marriage.

21. Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v. Retirement

Board, 272 III, App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.

22. In re Conza’s Estate, 176 III. 192, Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac
394 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.

23. Article 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.

24. Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143

SCRA 499 (1986); People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10)
4767 cited in People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.

25. 35 Am. Jur. 219-220.

26. 18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am. Jur. 221.

27. Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v.
Judge Brilliantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939 (1995).

28. Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).

29. Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and
further amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated February 23, 1998.
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 175581 : March 28, 2008]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JOSE A.

DAYOT, Respondent.

[G.R. NO. 179474]

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner, v. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No.
179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa),
respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared
the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were
married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas
V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn
affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna,
Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not
execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband
and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of
the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986.
Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa's house, the
latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City
Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded
pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign
the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially
refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal
could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to
the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered
that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece
of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa's house. When he
perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract
with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose's allegations and defended the
validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their
relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part
of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account
of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while
her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a
certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa
filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman,
since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without emolument.7

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It

disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence

presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint
does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled
case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the
marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was
valid. It dismissed Jose's version of the story as implausible, and rationalized
that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to
make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already
detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall
to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the
pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect
suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own
admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not
sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
"discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the
marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by
this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]

[Jose's] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact
that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa's]
name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on
May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now
claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the
name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This
Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his
company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a
lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife,
he would have written instead the name of his sister.

When [Jose's] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified
that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the
marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further
testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage
contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she
was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson
was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his
sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through
fraud.10

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose's action had
prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the
action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party
within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained
by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false
marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the
earliest instance. x x x.12

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the
Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals
found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate
court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose
and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a
ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not
exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action
for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the
prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose's
appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on

Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment
thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code
provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the
consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be
commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the
fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February,
1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed
the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose's assertion that his
marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled
that the marriage was solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one
of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage
between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the
affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and
wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the
marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements
contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the
good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit.
The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of
marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court
of Appeals dismissed Jose's argument that neither he nor Felisa was a
member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to
the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require that either
one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the
solemnizing officer's church or religious sect. The prescription was
established only in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the
parties' marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.chanrobles virtual law library His central opposition
was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a
marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant
in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man
and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the
affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Jose's Motion for Reconsideration and reversed
itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November
2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A.
Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay
City.19

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this
Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:

In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized

without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had
attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together
for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the
Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which

is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period
of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and
it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity - meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity -
that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated
to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order
to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony
and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the
union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from
the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is,
therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The

appellate court rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa's
motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No.
175581, praying that the Court of Appeals' Amended Decision dated 7
November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa
filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
assailing the appellate court's Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this
Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity
of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the
allowance of its Petition, to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY

OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS

MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied
Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one
of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which
does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that
Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for
bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to
avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage
would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To
reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related
arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise
to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For
her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court's ruling in Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the
affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting
that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic's position
that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity
of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with;
and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the
said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage
under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that
the parties' marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized
under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties
and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following
documents: (1) Jose's notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated
12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa's name as his wife; (2) Certification
dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District
24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose's company ID card, dated 2
May 1988, indicating Felisa's name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the
effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the
prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on
24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly,
the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the
essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; andcralawlibrary

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

(Emphasis ours.)

Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a

license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article
75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage
performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being
nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to
the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not
make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by
the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by

Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages
are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or
war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil
marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under

Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman
who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who
have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.36

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each
other."37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the
falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule

on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under
the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be
strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former
or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply,
it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained
the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other
expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a
marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period
requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be
had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of
five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory
requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy
to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall
state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized
the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found
no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for
five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted
marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together
only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was
introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or
March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited
Felisa's own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced
to live in her house.45

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the

minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises
when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Court's review.47 It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court
of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make
contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body
disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on
this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on
substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by
Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license,
is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the
statements in the parties' affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage,
since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The
argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit
legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners' reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds

that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we
speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima
facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated
more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an
apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There
is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of
marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which
spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment
of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the
parties' marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the
law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite
marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a
marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be
used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making
a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false
affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate
the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated
statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required
by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here,
there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation
in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it
refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force
and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that
based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the
fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a
misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of
marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of
nullity of the parties' marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is
deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a
marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from
1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose's subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual
on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose

and Felisa's marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other
conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the
right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any
time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the
five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-
year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and
refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the
marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved
at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.58

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the
marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED,
without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 167684 : July 31, 2006]

JAIME O.SEVILLA, Petitioner, v. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004
which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.

In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the

RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and
intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's
father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines,
he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to
a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On
the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a
marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime,
he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil
Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that
she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church
ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in
Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of
Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the
lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.

The trial court made the following findings:

In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969,
he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D.
Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they
executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo
Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied
them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil
wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in
San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the
same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p.
11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola,
with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994
(Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office."
On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in church
rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage
contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and
indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception
were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church
wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their
first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to
support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for
his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because
it became difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at that
time. They started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family
counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time
when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned.
Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in
1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in
1983.

Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that
when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to
him the circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of
Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was obtained
and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious
wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994
(Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March
11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of
San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994
(Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh.
"C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office."
Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified
copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a
Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that
it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19,
1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at
San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."

Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan,
identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and
September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar,
and testified that their office failed to locate the book wherein marriage
license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).

Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady
romantic relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in
October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya
ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked
her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned
back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came
back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton
Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents
were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced
them that she will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff
and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to
marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so her
father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where
she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch
and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church
wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since
defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in
the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual
consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two months
when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's
physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing
psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic
problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual
sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take
endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in
between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex
between them was far and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During
their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant
attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive
liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums.
Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed"
drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take barbiturates or
downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away
from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed
home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a
half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send some
financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher.
Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage
became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this
led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married
one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.

Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the
civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and
grandson came to stay with him after they returned home from Spain and
have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew
up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's
expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").

Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that

it was plaintiff's family that attended to all the preparations and
arrangements for the church wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that
she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the
church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with
the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and
defendant.

As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of

irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order for them to live their
own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when he applied for and
obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"),
it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a
certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During
his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25,
2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the
marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the
marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6

In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage
of the parties, the trial court made the following justifications:

Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage,
the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was
shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued
by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and
the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage
license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage
license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May
19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a
certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.

xxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O.
Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at
the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage
solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy
Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite
marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No.
601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be
cancelled.

Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property
registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a
copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor General for its record
and information.7

Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20

December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and
held:

In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme

Court explained that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less
than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."

In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil
registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein
marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the
employee handling is already retired." With said testimony We cannot
therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties'
marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of
the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license
was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but
rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no.
2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for
scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry
on marriage license no. 2720792.

xxx

Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis
of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective
with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception
that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the
Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law
to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the
presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a
marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage contracts
in question which show on their face that a marriage license was purportedly
issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and

3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the

presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted "fact of
marriage."9

At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the

certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no
Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the
parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and
void ab initio.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time
of the marriage of the parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12

Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential

requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and
Jaime is of no exception.

At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a
marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage license
based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As
ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13 :

[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as
in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the
trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals
and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to
refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence,
the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan

Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by

the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the decision in the earlier
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that

despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his
office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be
found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are
public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register
book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must

categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the
particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search.
Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as
stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. - a written statement signed by an officer

having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records
of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792
complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded
probative value.

The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office.
With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort
but we cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating
the above problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

: Local Civil Registrar

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued
by this Office with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert
all effort but we cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating
the above problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

: Local Civil Registrar

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage

License Application was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly
dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and
MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.

This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in
our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.

This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for
whatever legal intent it may serve.

San Juan, Metro Manila

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

: Local Civil Registrar

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and
understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded
work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty
whether or not such license was issued.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the

Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who
stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in
charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the
said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record
that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that
his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to
locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.

As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court
among other things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage
licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with
you those records?cralawlibrary
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for
subpoena?cralawlibrary

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you?cralawlibrary

A No, sir.

Q Why not?cralawlibrary

A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.

Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage

applications that your office maintains as required by the manual of the
office of the Local Civil Registrar?cralawlibrary

COURT

May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.

xxx

COURT

Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is
the number issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792
the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it
was never issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was
ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find
the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which
now, was this issued or not?

A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost
efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No.
2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the
certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable
presumptions.

In one case, it was held:

A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that

may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold
the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other
evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act
or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative

evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable

and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the
presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and
second certifications.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance

of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in
the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of
showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily
accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of
entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to
be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.24

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived
together for several years producing two offsprings,26 now adults
themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for
declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in
1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit
from his own deceit and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a
basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members
alone.29

"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order
of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio - Always
presume marriage."30

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima

facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.31

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his
emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v.
Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law
nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the
Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 4904. February 5, 1909. ]

ROSALIA MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANGEL

TAN, Defendant-Appellee.

Domingo Franco, for Appellant.

Doroteo Karagdag, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; MARRIAGE BY JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. — A

man and woman appeared before a justice of the peace and there signed
a statement setting forth that they had agreed to marry each other and
asked the justice to solemnize the marriage. Another document was then
signed by them, by the justice and by two witnesses, stating that the
man and woman appeared before the justice and ratified all that was
contained in the preceding instrument and insisted upon the marriage.
After the signing of these documents the justice announced to the man
and woman that they were married: Held, That, under the circumstances
in this case, there was a sufficient compliance with section 6 of General
Orders, No. 68, to constitute a valid marriage.

2. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ANSWER; AMENDMENT DURING TRIAL. —

Held, That the court did not err in allowing the defendant to amend his
answer during the progress of the trial.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the
defendant were married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the
justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province
of Leyte.

There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente

de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a
petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of
September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, in which they
state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage
before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the
marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same day, signed by
the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by
Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the presentation of the
petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed it were actually
present in the office of the justice on the day named; that they ratified
under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in that they
had there asked for. It also stated that being required to produce
witnesses of the marriage, they presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness
for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following this
is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the
witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of
September, 1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant
were legally married by the justice of the peace in the presence of the
witnesses on that day.

The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that
the parties were legally married on the day named. The evidence in
support of that decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff
admits that she signed. Second. The evidence of the defendant, who
testifies that he and the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace
at the time named, together with the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and
Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the document above mentioned.
Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named
witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita
Ballori appeared before the justice at the time named and did sign the
document referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified
to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the
court of the justice of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff, the
defendant, the two witnesses above-named, and the justice of the peace
were all present in the office of the justice of the peace at the time
mentioned.

The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that
she never appeared before the justice of the peace and never was
married to the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in
question, but says that she signed it in her own home, without reading it,
and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper
authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.

There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her
case, but which we think, when properly considered, is not entitled to
much weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in the town of
Palompon, her married brother and was there for about two weeks. The
wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left the
house except in her company. But she admitted on cross-examination
that she herself went to school every morning and that on one occasion
the plaintiff had gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this
witness loses its force when the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered.
She says that at the request of the defendant on the day named, about 5
o’clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a Chinese named Veles;
that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that she asked the
mother of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany her, the
witness, to her own house for the purpose of examining some dress
patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two girls left the
store, but instead of going to the house of the witness they went directly
to the office of the justice of the peace where the ceremony took place;
that after the ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that
the mother was approaching, and that they thereupon hurriedly left the
office of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the
mother later found them.

The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made

by the justice of the peace, who died after the ceremony was performed
and before the trial, and certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not
sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of the witnesses for the
defendant.

The testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the

appellant in his brief. It appears that during her first examination she was
seized with an hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her
examination was adjourned to a future day and was completed in her
house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her
collapse was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely
in stating that the office of the justice of the peace was at the time in the
municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not
think that the record justifies the claim of the Appellant. The statement as
to the location of the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards
corrected by the witness and we are satisfied that she told the facts
substantially as they occurred.

There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that
the plaintiff was not telling the truth when she said she did not appear
before the justice of the peace. This evidence consists of eight letters,
which the defendant claims were all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff
admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the
others was proven. No. 9 is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is
very angry and if he be informed that we have been married civilly, I am
sure that he will turn me out of the house.

"Do what you may deem convenient, as I don’t know what to do.

"Should I be able to go tomorrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can

not remain here.

"Yours, ROSAL"

Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on
the morning of the 25th of September, is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.

"ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning
because my sister-in-law w ill not let me go there; if it suits you, I believe
that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o’clock, is the best hour.

"Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing,

and have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese store, because I don’t like to
go without Pacita.

"The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should
know anything about it.

"Yours, ROSAL."cralaw virtua1aw library

It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita

Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the afternoon at the store of the
Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written
after the marriage before the justice of the peace. It is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.

"ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come

here by and by, at about 9 or 10, when you see that the tide is high
because my brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of loading
lumber.

"Don’t tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that
you are willing to celebrate the marriage at this time, because I don’t like
her to know to-day that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch as
she told me this morning that she heard that we would go to the court,
and that we must not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on
being married I must do it right.

"Tell her also that you have asked me to marry you.

"I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do
what he wishes.
"Yours, ROSAL."cralaw virtua1aw library

Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.

"ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday on the

steamer Rosa, for the purpose of asking my father’s permission for our
marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we deem
proper, and, if he does not wish us to marry without his permission, you
must request his consent.

"Tell me who said that my sister-in-law knows that we are civilly married;
my brother’s ill treatment is a matter of no importance, as every thing
may be carried out, with patience."cralaw virtua1aw library

It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the
steamer Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the plaintiff was on the
same boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she had no
communication with the defendant during the voyage. The plaintiff and
the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her
arrival in Ormoc, after consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and
commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of procuring
the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The
evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the decision of the court
below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the
peace at the time named.

It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the
peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to,
did not constitute a legal marriage. General Orders, No. 68, section 6, is
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the
parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in
question the justice of the peace said nothing until after the document
was signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant
said, "You are married." The petition signed by the plaintiff and defendant
contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be
married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the
marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the
justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the
justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage
were produced. A marriage took place as shown by the certificate of the
justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which certificate
gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in
due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they
took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such
presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the
woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in
the document signed by her, which admission can only mean that the
parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and
signed the said document which so states before the justice of the peace
who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the
defendant were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that
they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under
the circumstances in this particular case we are satisfied, and so hold,
that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.

The defendant’s original answer was a general denial of the allegations

contained in the complaint. Among these allegations was a statement
that the parties had agreed to be married on condition that the defendant
obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff’s parents. The defendant was
afterwards allowed to amend his answer so that it was a denial of all the
allegations of the complaint except that relating to the condition in regard
to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of
this amendment. After the trial had commenced the defendant was again
allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an admission of
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which related to
the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this second amendment
destroyed completely the first amendment and the defendant’s lawyer
stated that what he had alleged in his second amendment was what he
intended to allege in his first amendment, but by reason of the haste with
which the first amendment was drawn he had unintentionally made it
exactly the opposite of what he had intended to state. After argument the
court allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied that in this
allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see how the
plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She proceeded with the trial of the
case without asking for a continuance.

The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the

complaint is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the Appellant.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 145226. February 06, 2004]

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated
October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which
affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found
herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the
appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for
reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as

follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4)
years (from 1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with
each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete
from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they
became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work
there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition

appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were
married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan,
Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on
January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha

Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of

nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of
nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an

Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6 ςrνll

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that
the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a
prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but
subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution.
When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter
ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal
Case No. 8688, as follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio

Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7)
Months of Prision Correccionalas minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.7 ςrνll

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim

that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio.
Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals ,8 the trial court ruled that want of a
valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties
to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void
even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez
v. Gmur,9 which held that the court of a country in which neither of the
spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for
the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the
matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is
not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith
in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and the
fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law
does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as

CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was

pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil
Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab
initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken
from this decision, which then became final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby

AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.11 ςrνll

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed

that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil
Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to
be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of
contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved.
Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the
beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by
Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the
Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that
it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the
Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a
judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision,

contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a
difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be
a basis for good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of
merit.16 However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the
appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio
S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis.
The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared
void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of
the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein
petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY

THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE
AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY

THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17 ςrνll

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner

committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith
upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he
contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent
upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack
of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case.
The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised
Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent
are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference
between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act.
Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second
marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that
good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor
General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis ,18 which held that
bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur,
stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of
nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner
was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to
know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in
good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is
negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal
intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are
present in this case. In Marbella -Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the
elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the
pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed
down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to
wit:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing

the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the
Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage
contract.

SO ORDERED.21 ςrνll

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired
was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage
is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code.
As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other
words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law,
never married.24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had
long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the
time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of
bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must,
perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v.
Tan .25 In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already
celebrated. We held therein that:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as
void.26 ςrνll

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage
certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio .

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by

a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely
signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might
be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of
nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a
penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor
of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not
committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue
of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is
now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated

October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well
as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying
herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of
BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral
certainty.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and

TINGA, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and
concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz.

2 Records, pp. 114-119.

3 Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate
Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Marina L. Buzon, concurring and Eugenio S.
Labitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis, dissenting.

4Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for emphasis). See Exh.
B, the copy of their marriage contract. Records, p. 10.

5 The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1,

reads:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete
on August 23, 1990 and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and prejudice
of Lucia Barrete in the amount to be proved during trial.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.

6 Rollo, pp. 38-40.

7 Records, p. 119.

8 G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.

9 42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918).

10 58 Phil. 817 (1933).

11 Rollo, p. 43.

12 ART. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.

13Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.

14 Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

15 G.R. NOS. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85.

16 Rollo, p. 51.

17 Id. at 20-21.

18 G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.

19Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.

20 Supra.

21 CA Rollo, p. 38.

22 Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; andcralawlibrary
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.

23Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall

render the marriage void ab initio,except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable
as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

24 Rollo, p. 54.

25 G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.

26 Id. at 124.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner

Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen
were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day
of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused
to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong
tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents,
sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino
Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the
petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter
agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no
marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on
the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom,
the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the
rest of their invited guests.4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal

Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing
an illegal marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of “not guilty” to the crime charged on
arraignment.

The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the
incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne
was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw
the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their
wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6 She heard the
petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract.
Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She
saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given
to her by Joey.7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple
declare during the ceremony that they take each other as husband and
wife. 8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil
registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr.
where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to
the couple.9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied

that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of
the marriage as contemplated by law.10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, and imposed on him a P200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44
of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing
constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church
recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It
further ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s
marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which
imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law.
The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states
that a violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or
of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one
month, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the
penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC
imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of P200.00.12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the
circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in “blessing” the
couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It
further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses
deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The
RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section 39,
instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that

although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization
of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether
a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting
parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2)
they should declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.14 According to the CA, the
prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence
of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or
Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code.16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the
fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it covers violation of
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.

The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds:

First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define
what constitutes “an illegal marriage ceremony.” Assuming that a
marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55
of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions
require the verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband
and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing
which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the
solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the
prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties personally
declared that they take each other as husband and wife.18

Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State
cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of
matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the “blessing” into a
“marriage ceremony.”19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the “blessing”

in good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20

Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating

Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the filing of the
present case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a
penalty. The present case is not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage
Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a
regulation promulgated thereafter. 22

THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime

punishable under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, were proven by
the prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing

officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The
elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing
officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to

solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether
the alleged “blessing” by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance
of an “illegal marriage ceremony” which is punishable under Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a
“marriage ceremony” and what constitutes its “illegal” performance,
Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These
provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in
turn, was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial
amendments.

Article 625 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o prescribed form or
religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife.”26

Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and

particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for
the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly
found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a
marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the
contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their
declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take
each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties

appeared before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the
second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation,
the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as
husband and wife.

The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading
questions to Florida fails to persuade us. A judge may examine or cross-
examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the
credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw
out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot
be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen
to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge
objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it from belatedly
invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the
petitioner’s admission regarding the circumstances of the ceremony,
support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by
the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony
of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome
these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed
to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any
ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation
of church and State precludes the State from qualifying the church
“blessing” into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s
allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the
Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for
the solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any
religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital
rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law
be observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes

marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our family law is
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and
the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its
power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the
disintegration and mockery of marriage.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner

conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements set
by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as
a “blessing,” the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
marriage ceremony qualified this “blessing” into a “marriage ceremony”
as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner

of this marriage ceremony was illegal.

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of
marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present
case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no
marriage license, yet he conducted the “blessing” of their relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite

knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of
marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore,
was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these
requirements negates his defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage
certificate negates his criminal liability in the present case. For purposes
of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage
certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of
the Family Code, as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple

negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, does not make this an element of the crime.

The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall be imposed in
accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions
of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:

Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister

solemnizing marriage without being authorized by the Director of the
Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to
exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties
or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any
bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the
regulations and practices whereof require banns or publications previous
to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who
authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is
subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister
solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by
a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand
pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states

that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this
Act not specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated
by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling
of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the present case is
that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the
present case. As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found
violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this
provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352
falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which
provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be
promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such
regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of P200.00
pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998

ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS (Special Eight Division), HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, RTC,
Branch 14, 12th Judicial Region, Cotabato City, and FLORITA A.
VALLEJO, as Administratrix of the Estate of the late Roberto L.
Chua, Respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Assailed before us in this Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR Sp. No. 33101,
promulgated on 19 April 1994 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14, of Cotabato City in Special Procedure Case No. 331.

As culled from the records, the following facts have been established by
evidence:

During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private
respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union, the
couple begot two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson Alonzo
and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.

On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.

On 2 July 1992, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato City a Petition 1 which is reproduced hereunder:

IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION

OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER

THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF

MINORS ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO SP. PROC. NO/ 331

and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO, all

surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF

LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,

Petitioner

PETITION

COMES NOW the petitioner assisted by counsel and unto this Honorable
Court most respectfully states:

1. That she is of legal age, Filipino, married but separated from her
husband and residing at Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City, Philippines;

2. That sometime from 1970 up to and until late 1981 your petitioner
lived with Roberto Lim Chua as husband and wife and out of said union
they begot two (2) children, namely, Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua who was
born in General Santos City on April 28, 1977 and Rudyard Pride Alonzo
Chua who was born in Davao City on August 30, 1978. A xerox copy of
the birth certificate of each child is hereto attached as annex "A" and "B",
respectively.

3. That the aforementioned children who are still minors today are both
staying with herein petitioner at her address at Quezon Avenue, Cotabato
City;

4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above-mentioned minors, died

intestate on May 28, 1992 in Davao City.

5. That the aforementioned deceased left properties both real and

personal worth P5,000,000.00 consisting of the following:

a) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT

No. T-12835 with an area of 290 sq. m. estimated at P50,000.00

b) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT

No. T-12834 with an area of 323 sq. m. 50,000.00

c) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT

No. T-126583 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00

d) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT

No. T-126584 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00

e) Residential house in Cotabato City valued at 30,000.00

f) Residential house in Davao City valued at 600,000.00

g) Car, Colt Lancer with Motor No. 4G33-3 AF6393 210,000.00

h) Colt, Galant Super Saloon with Motor

No. 4G37-GB0165 545,000.00

i) Car, Colt Galant with Motor No. 4G52-52D75248 110,000.00

j) Reo Isuzu Dump Truck with Motor

No. DA640-838635 350,000.00

k) Hino Dump Truck with Motor No. ED100-T47148 350,000.00

l) Stockholdings in various corporations with par value

estimated at 3,335,000.00

Total P5,000,000.00

6. That deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and without legitimate
descendants or ascendants, hence, the above named minors Robert
Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, his children with
herein petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
(Article 988 of the Civil Code of the Philippines).

7. That the names, ages and residences of the relatives of said minors
are the following, to wit:

Names Relationship Ages Residence

1. Carlos Chua Uncle 60 Quezon Avenue,

Cotabato City

2. Aida Chua Auntie 55 Rosary Heights,

Cotabato City

3. Romulo Uy Uncle 40 c/o Overseas

Fishing Exporation
Co. Inc., Matina,
Davao City

6. That considering the fact that the aforementioned minors by operation

of law are to succeed to the entire estate of Roberto Lim Chua under the
provisions of Article 988 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, it is
necessary that for the protection of the rights and interest of Robert
Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, both minors and
heirs of deceased Roberto Lim Chua, a guardian over the persons and
properties of said minors be appointed by this Honorable Court.

7. That herein petitioner being the mother and natural guardian of said
minors is also competent and willing to act as the guardian of minors
Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua both staying
and living with her; that petitioner possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications of a guardian.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed:

1. That, upon proper notice and hearing, an order be issued declaring

minors ROBERTO RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO
CHUA as heirs to the intestate estate of deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA;

2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petitioner for the

administration of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA;

3. That the petitioner be also appointed the guardian of the persons and
estate of minors ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE
ALONZO CHUA;

4. That after all the property of deceased Roberto Lim Chua have been
inventoried and expenses and just debts, have been paid, the intestate
estate of Roberto Lim Chua be distributed to its rightful heirs, the minors
in this case, pursuant to the provisions of Article 988 of the New Civil
Code of the Philippines.

5. And for such other reliefs and remedies this Honorable Court may
consider fit and proper in the premises.

Cotabato City, Philippines, June 29, 1992.

(Sgd.) FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO

(Petitioner)

The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on 14
August 1992 and directed that notice thereof be published in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City
and or Davao City.
On 21 July 1992, herein petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua,
representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to
Dismiss 2 on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the
time of the decedent's death Davao City was his residence, hence, the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum.

Private respondent filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 3 dated

July 20, 1992 based on the following grounds:

(1) That this petition is for the guardianship of the minor children of the
petitioner who are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and
under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court the venue shall be at the
place where the minor resides;

(2) That the above-named minors are residents of Cotabato City:

(3) That the movant in this case has no personality to intervene nor
oppose in the granting of this petition for the reason that she is a total
stranger to the minors Robert Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo,
all surnamed Chua.

(4) That deceased Roberto L. Chua died a bachelor. He is the father of

the above-named minors with the petitioner in this case;

(5) That movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse of

the late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since
the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.

On 6 August 1992, private respondent Vallejo filed a Motion for Admission

of an Amended Petition 4 "in order that the designation of the case title
can properly and appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the
material averments in the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any
confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of
this petition." The amended petition 5 contained identical material
allegations but differed in its title, thus:.

IN RE: PETITION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF

ROBERTO L. CHUA, DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER
THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT AND RUDYARD, all
surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
Petitioner.

Paragraph 4 of the original petition was also amended to read as follows:

4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a

resident of Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao
City.

The petition contained exactly the same prayers as the original petition.

Petitioner opposed the motion to amend petition alleging that at the

hearing of said motion on 24 July 1992, private respondent's counsel
allegedly admitted that the sole intention of the original petition was to
secure guardianship over the persons and property of the minors. 6

On 21 August 1992, the trial court issued an Order 7 denying the motion
to dismiss for lack of merit. The court ruled that Antonietta Garcia had no
personality to file the motion to dismiss not having proven her status as
wife of the decedent. Further, the court found that the actual residence of
the deceased was Cotabato City, and even assuming that there was
concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts where the decedent
had resided, the R.T.C. of Cotabato had already taken cognizance of the
settlement of the decedent's estate to the exclusion of all others. The
pertinent portions of the order read:

At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19, 1992, counsel for
movant Antonietta G. Chua presented 18 Exhibits in support of her
allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent and that the latter
resides in Davao City at the time of his death. Exh. "1" was the xerox
copy of the alleged marriage contract between the movant and the
petitioner. This cannot be admitted in evidence on the ground of the
timely objection of the counsels for petitioner that the best evidence is
the original copy or authenticated copy which the movant cannot
produce. Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the
following: a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that no
such marriage contract was ever registered with them; a letter from
Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged
marriage that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage. Exhibit "2"
through "18" consist among others of Transfer Certificate of Title issued
in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a
resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued
at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato
City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where
the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the
decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao
City. Petitioner through counsels, objected to the admission in evidence
of Exhibits "2" through "18" if the purpose is to establish the truth of the
alleged marriage between the decedent and Antonietta Garcia. The best
evidence they said is the marriage contract. They do not object to the
admission of said exhibit if the purpose is to show that Davao City was
the business residence of the decedent.

Petitioner through counsels, presented Exhibit "A" through "K" to support

her allegation that the decedent was a resident of Cotabato City; that he
died a bachelor; that he begot two illegitimate children with the petitioner
as mother. Among these exhibits are Income Tax Returns filed in
Cotabato City from 1968 through 1979 indicating therein that he was
single; birth certificates of the alleged two illegitimate children of the
decedent; Resident Certificates of the decedent issued in Cotabato City;
Registration Certificate of Vehicle of the decedent showing that his
residence is Cotabato City.

It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth
of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best
evidence is a valid marriage contract which the movant failed to produce.
Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other
similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the
petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from
the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not
solemnized said alleged marriage. Consequently, she has no personality
to file the subject motion to dismiss.

On the issue of the residence of the decedent at the time of his death, the
decedent as a businessman has many business residences from different
parts of the country where he usually stays to supervise and pursue his
business ventures. Davao City is one of them. It cannot be denied that
Cotabato City is his actual residence where his alleged illegitimate
children also reside.
The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate
of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of
venue (Fule vs. CA, L-40502, November 29, 1976). Even assuming that
there is concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts of the places
where the decedent has residences, the Regional Trial Court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts (Section 1, Rule 73). It was
this Court which first took cognizance of the case when the petition was
filed on July 2, 1992, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 331 and an
order of publication issued by this Court on July 13, 1992.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby

denied for lack of merit.

On 31 August 1992, upon motion of private respondent, the trial court

issued an order appointing Romulo Lim Uy, a first cousin of the deceased,
as special administrator of the decedent's estate. 8

On the same day, the trial court, likewise, issued an Order appointing
Florita Vallejo as guardian over the persons and properties of the two
minor children. 9

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion dated 25 October 1993 10 praying

that the letters of administration issued to Vallejo be recalled and that
new letters of administration be issued to her. She, likewise, filed a
Motion dated 5 November 1993 11 to declare the proceedings a mistrial.
Both motions were denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22
November 1993. 12 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order
was denied by the trial court in an Order dated 13 December 1993. 13

Assailing the last two orders of the trial court, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition (Rule 65) with the respondent Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. No. Sp. 33101, alleging that the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion in:

(1) unilaterally and summarily converting, if not treating, the

guardianship proceedings into an intestate proceeding;

(2) summarily hearing the intestate proceedings without jurisdiction and

without any notice to herein petitioner whatsoever; and
(3) issuing the questioned order (sic) on the alleged pretension that
herein petitioner has no personality to intervene in SPL Proc. No. 331
questioning the highly anomalous orders precipitately issued ex-parte by
the public respondent R.T.C. without notice to the petitioners.

Petitioner in the main argued that private respondent herself admitted in

her opposition to petitioner's motion to dismiss filed in the trial court and
in open court that the original petition she filed is one for guardianship;
hence, the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued letters
of administration over the estate of Roberto L. Chua, thereby converting
the petition into an intestate proceeding, without the amended petition
being published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by
Section 3, Rule 79.

The Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on 19 April

1994, 14 denied the petition ratiocinating that the original petition filed
was one for guardianship of the illegitimate children of the deceased as
well as for administration of his intestate estate. While private respondent
may have alleged in her opposition to the motion to dismiss that petition
was for guardianship, the fact remains that the very allegations of the
original petition unmistakably showed a twin purpose: (1) guardianship;
and (2) issuance of letters of administration. As such, it was unnecessary
for her to republish the notice of hearing through a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. The amended petition was filed for the only
reason stated in the motion for leave: so that the "case title can properly
and appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the material
averments in the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any confusion or
misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this petition,"
which was for guardianship over the persons and properties of her minor
children and for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent
who was their father. In other words, there being no change in the
material allegations between the original and amended petitions, the
publication of the first in a newspaper of general circulation sufficed for
purposes of compliance with the legal requirements of notice.

Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the petitioner's remedy is appeal
from the orders complained of under Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules
of Court, not certiorari and prohibition.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes
to this Court contending that the appellate court committed the following
errors:

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL PETITION (Annex F, Petition)
WAS FOR A TWIN PURPOSE, TO WIT: FOR GUARDIANSHIP AND FOR
INTESTATE ESTATE PROCEEDINGS;

II

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO PUBLISH THE AMENDED
PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE THEREBY
CONTRAVENING THE RULES OF COURT AND THE RULINGS OF THE
SUPREME COURT.

III

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

NOT NULLIFYING THE ORDERS (Annex "P" to "T") PRECIPITATELY
ISSUED EX-PARTE BY THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
IN THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT PRIOR HEARING OR NOTICE
TO HEREIN PETITIONER THEREBY DEPRIVING THE LATTER (ANTONIETTA
GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA ) OF DUE PROCESS AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE
HEARD.

IV

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

SWEEPINGLY HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S REMEDY IS APPEAL. 15

In support of her first assignment of error, petitioner submits that the

Court of Appeals' conclusion that the original petition was one for
guardianship and administration of the intestate estate is contradicted by
the evidence on hand, asserting that the original petition failed to allege
and state the jurisdictional facts required by the Rules of Court in
petitions for administration of a decedent's estate, such as: (a) the last
actual residence of the decedent at the time of his death; (b) names,
ages and residences of the heirs; and (c) the names and residences of
the creditors of the decedent. Petitioner also reiterates her argument
regarding private respondent's alleged admission that the original petition
was one for guardianship and not for issuance of letters of administration,
pointing to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 20 July 1992,
where the private respondent alleged.

1. That this petition is for guardianship of the minor children of the

petitioner who are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and
under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court the venue shall be at the
place where the minor resides. 16

as well as to the statements made by counsel for the private respondent

during the 24 July 1992 hearing on the motion to dismiss:

ATTY. RENDON:

We filed our opposition to the motion to dismiss the petition because this
is a petition for guardianship of minors, not for intestate proceedings. So
this is a case where the mother wanted to be appointed as guardian
because she is also the litigant here. Because whenever there is an
intestate proceedings, she has to represent the minors, and under the
Rules of Court in any guardianship proceedings, the venue is at the place
where the minor is actually residing. 17

The petition is devoid of merit.

The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is
one which includes the issuance of letters of administration. The title of
said petition reads:

IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIPS, GUARDIANSHIP

OVER THE PERSON AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERTO ALONZO
AND RUDYARD ALONZO, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
OF ADMINISTRATION. 18

Likewise, the prayer of the petition states:

2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petition for the

administration of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA.
The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts required in a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Section 2, Rule 79 of
the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration - A petition for

letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent'

(c) The probative value and character of the property of the estate;.

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are
prayed;

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration. (emphasis ours).

The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for issuance of letters of

administration are: (1) the death of the testator; (2) residence at the
time of death in the province where the probate court is located; and (3)
if the decedent was a non-resident, the fact of being a resident of a
foreign country and that the decedent has left an estate in the province
where the court is sitting. 19

While paragraph 4 of the original petition stating:

(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above mentioned minors, died
intestate on May 28, 1992 in Davao City.

failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of his death,
the omission was cured by the amended petitions wherein the same
paragraph now reads:

(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a

resident of Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao
City. 20 (Emphasis in the original.)

All told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts required to
be stated in the petition for letters of administration. Consequently, there
was no need to publish the amended petition as petitioner would insist in
her second assignment of errors.

Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to

dismiss as she is not related to the deceased, nor does she have any
interest in his estate as creditor or otherwise. The Rules are explicit on
who may do so:

Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration - Any interested person,

may by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of
incompetency of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed
therein, or on the ground of the contestant's own right to the
administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any
competent person or persons named in the opposition..

Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters
of administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by
the estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor; his interest is material and direct, and not one that is
only indirect or contingent. 21

Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the
decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a
marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to produce. The lower
court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate
which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule,
together with other worthless pieces of evidence. The trial court correctly
ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order that:

. . . Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and

other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the
petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from
the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not
solemnized said alleged marriage. . . . 22

Under her third assignment of error, petitioner claims that the trial court
issued its orders, Annexes "P" to "T" without prior hearing or notice to
her, thus, depriving her of due process.
The orders referred to by petitioner are: Order dated 31 August 1992
appointing Romulo Lim Uy, first cousin of the deceased, as special
administrator of the estate; Order dated 31 August 1992 appointing
private respondent as guardian over the person and property of the
minors; Order dated 5 August 1993, directing the transfer of the remains
of the deceased from Davao City to Cotabato City; Order dated 6
September 1993 directing petitioner to turn over a Mitsubishi Gallant car
owned by the estate of the deceased to the special administrator; and
Order dated 28 September 1993, authorizing the sheriff to break open
the deceased's house for the purpose of conducting an inventory of the
properties found therein, after the sheriff was refused entry to the house
by the driver and maid of petitioner.

Apart from the fact that petitioner was not entitled to notice of the
proceedings of the trial court, not being able to establish proof of her
alleged marriage to the deceased, or of her interest in the estate as
creditor or otherwise, petitioner categorically stated in the instant petition
that on 25 October 1993 she filed a motion praying for the recall of the
letters of administration issued by the trial court and another motion
dated 5 August 1993 praying that the proceedings conducted by the trial
court be declared as a mistrial and the court orders relative thereto be set
aside and nullified. Petitioner further stated that her motions were denied
by the trial court in its Order dated 22 November 21, 1993 and that on 30
November 1993 she filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
denial which in turn was denied by the trial court on 13 December 1993.

Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that an

actual hearing should always and indispensably be held. 23 The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. 24 Here, even granting
that the petitioner was not notified of the orders of the trial court marked
as Exhibits "P" to "T," inclusive, nonetheless, she was duly heard in her
motions to recall letters of administration and to declare the proceedings
of the court as a "mistrial," which motions were denied in the Order dated
22 November 1993. 25 A motion for the reconsideration of this order of
denial was also duly heard by the trial court but was denied in its Order of
13 December 1993. 26

Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has

had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. 27
As to the last assignment of errors, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the proper remedy of the petitioner in said court was an ordinary
appeal and not a special civil action for certiorari; which can be availed of
if a party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Except for her bare allegation that an ordinary appeal
would be inadequate, nothing on record would indicate that extraordinary
remedy of certiorari or prohibition is warranted.

Finally, petitioner further argues as supplement to her memorandum that

the ruling of the Court of Appeals treating the Special Proceeding No. 331
as one for both guardianship and settlement of estate is in contravention
of our ruling in Gomez vs. Imperial, 28 which the petitioner quotes:

The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a function

pertaining property not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another
proceeding which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.

Petitioner's reliance on said case is misplaced. In the Gomez case, the

action before the lower court was merely one for guardianship. Therefore
said court did not have the jurisdiction to distribute the estate of the
deceased. While in the case at bar, the petition filed before the court was
both for guardianship and settlement of estate.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition of petitioner Antonietta Chua is

hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, Petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO,

JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON Respondents.chanrobles virtual law library

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van
Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and
August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge,
which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,
respectively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the

Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that
they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children
born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the
parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van
Dorn.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in

Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay
City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon
Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that
private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he
and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The
Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the
ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject
of this certiorari proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory

and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the
remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial
Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it
devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a
case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since
it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the
exception, and we have given it due
course.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the

alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the
divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no
community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the
Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether

the property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after
their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the
parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court
during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San
Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor
community obligations. 3As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty,
Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an

Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to
represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following: chanrobles virtual law library

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of

incompatibility.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the

Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the

court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx 4chanrobles virtual law library

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any

of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he
is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in
this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of

the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton
vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of

matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both
from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of
a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the

husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner

has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby

ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Without costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.