BEST EVIDENCE RULE
—It bears stressing that in an action to recover real property, the
G.R. No. 158554. May 26, 2005.*
SPS. RONALD HUTCHISON and VALENTINE NAVALLE-HUTCHISON,
petitioners, vs. ENRIQUE M. BUSCAS, respondent.
Actions; Evidence; In civil cases, the law requires that the party who alleges a
fact and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving
it.—In civil cases, the law requires that the party who alleges a fact and substantially
asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it. This evidentiary rule
is based on the principle that the suitor who relies upon the existence of a fact should
be called upon to prove it. Article 434 of the New Civil Code provides that to
successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
215
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 215
Hutchison vs. Buscas
who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the
land claimed, and; second, his title thereto. In the case at bar, we find that respondent
failed to establish these two (2) legal requirements.
Ownership; Land Titles; A party can claim a right of ownership only over the
parcel of land that was the object of the deed.—The first requisite: the identity of the
land. In an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right
to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the
location, area and boundaries thereof.Anent the second requisite, i.e., the claimant’s
title over the disputed area, the rule is that a party can claim a right of ownership
only over the parcel of land that was the object of the deed. Respondent sought to prove
these legal requisites by anchoring his claim on the Quitclaim Deed over a portion of
land which was executed by Arrastia in his favor. However, a cursory reading of the
Quitclaim Deed shows that the subject land was described, thus: x x x a portion of
that property situated at San Juan, Lubao, Pampanga which portion subject of this
sale consists of 7,581 square meters more or less, as indicated particularly in the
herein attached plan marked as Annex “A” and made an integral part hereof, and the
subject property with an “X” sign.
Same; Same; What defines a piece of land is not the size mentioned in the
instrument but the boundaries thereof which enclose the land and indicate its exact
limits.—The Quitclaim Deed specified only the extent of the area sold, i.e., 7,581 sq.
m. of Arrastia’s land. Annex “A” of the Deed, where the entire lot of Arrastia was
particularly described and where the specific portion of the property sold to
respondent was marked, was not presented by respondent at the trial. As the Deed
itself failed to mention the metes and bounds of the land subject of the sale, it cannot
be successfully used by respondent to identify the area he was claiming and prove his
ownership thereof. Indeed, the presentation of the Annex “A” is essential as what
defines a piece of land is not the size mentioned in the instrument but the boundaries
thereof which enclose the land and indicate its exact limits.
Same; Same; Actions; In an action to recover real property, the settled rule is that
the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title, not on the weakness of the
defendant’s title.
settled rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title, not on the
weakness of the defendant’s title. This requirement is based on two (2) reasons: first, it
is possible that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is the true owner of the
property in dispute,
216
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
16
Hutchison vs. Buscas
and second, the burden of proof lies on the party who substantially asserts the
affirmative of an issue for he who relies upon the existence of a fact should be called
upon to prove that fact. In the case at bar, as respondent failed to prove his title to and
identity of the contested land, there exists no legal ground upon which to turn over the
possession of the disputed area to him.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Octavio A. Del Callar for petitioners.
Avelino A. Morales for respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bar concerns a boundary dispute involving 6,471 square meters of land in
San Juan, Lubao, Pampanga. Petitioner spouses RONALD and VALENTINE
HUTCHISON seek the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 66077, dated February 19, 2003, holding that respondent ENRIQUE M. BUSCAS
is entitled to the possession of the disputed area.
The records show that on October 1, 1987, petitioner spouses purchased from V.A.
Development Enterprises, Inc. a 76,207-sq. m. land (designated as Lot No. 7216) in
San Juan, Lubao, Pampanga. They occupied the land after a title was issued in their
names.
On August 22, 1989, one Juanita Arrastia, the owner of a lot adjacent to that of
petitioner spouses, sold a portion of her land to respondent. The transaction, covering
7,581 sq. m. (designated as Lot No. 7047-A), was evidenced by a Quitclaim Deed in
favor of respondent. Respondent occupied 1,100 sq. m. of his land. However, he failed
to register the portion of the lot in his name and title to the property remained in
Arrastia’s name.
On January 10, 1995, respondent commissioned geodetic engineer Narciso
Manansala to survey his property. Manansala prepared a sketch/subdivision plan of
respondent’s lot. His survey
217
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 217
Hutchison vs. Buscas
revealed that 6,471 sq. m. thereof was occupied by petitioner spouses.
Respondent sent a demand letter to petitioner spouses to vacate the encroached
area. Petitioner spouses refused and insisted that it was part of their land. Thus,
respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer (Civil Case No. 1329) against
petitioner spouses before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lubao, Pampanga. After
trial, the MTC ruled in favor of respondent. However, on appeal, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) dismissed the case. It ruled that MTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter as it is a boundary dispute and the proper action should have been
an accion reinvindicatoriabefore the RTC.
Consequently, respondent filed a case for accion reinvindicatoriaagainst petitioner
spouses with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga.1 At the trial, respondent adduced in
evidence the Quitclaim Deed to prove his title over the disputed area. He likewise
testified on the survey conducted by Manansala. Another geodetic engineer, Angelito
H. Nicdao, testified that in the unlawful detainer case earlier filed by the respondent,
he was directed by the MTC judge hearing the case to conduct a verification survey of
the parties’ lots. In compliance with the order, he surveyed the two (2) lots using the
title of petitioner spouses and the records of the Bureau of Lands. 2His survey revealed
that petitioner spouses encroached on 6,471 sq. m. of the adjacent land claimed by
respondent. Respondent offered in evidence the verification plan and report of Nicdao
relative to his survey.
On the part of petitioner spouses, petitioner Valentine Hutchison testified that
she purchased Lot No. 7216 in Lubao, Pampanga, covering an area of 76,207 sq. m.,
and title thereto was duly issued in her name and that of her spouse.
_______________
1Civil Case No. G-3183.
2Exh. “D,” Verification Report, Folder of Exhibits at p. 86.
218
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hutchison vs. Buscas
After trial, the RTC dismissed3 the complaint for lack of merit. It ruled that
respondent’s Quitclaim Deed was not sufficient proof of ownership; that respondent
failed to clearly identify the property claimed as it was only marked with an “X” sign,
and; that petitioner spouses, as registered owners, are entitled to possession of the
disputed lot.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.4 It ruled
that respondent is entitled to possession of the disputed area as he was able to prove
his claim of ownership and the identity of the subject land.
Hence, this appeal where petitioner spouses assign the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE
RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED THE PROPERTY HE SEEKS TO
RECOVER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION OF LAW
THAT THE TITLE OF THE RESPONDENT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS THE
QUITCLAIM DEED OVER A PORTION OF LAND.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT THE
RESPONDENT STRENGTHENED HIS “TITLE” BY THE SURVEY HE CAUSED TO
BE PREPARED.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT THE
RESPONDENT PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THAT HIS
PROPERTY WAS ENCROACHED UPON BY THE PETITIONERS.
_______________
3 October 26, 1999 Decision, penned by Judge Gregorio Pimentel, Jr., Rollo at pp.
40-43.
4 CA Decision, dated February 19, 2003, Penned by Associate Justice B.A.
Adefuin-De La Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole
and Danilo B. Pine; Rollo at pp. 32-36.
219
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 219
Hutchison vs. Buscas
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT THE
RESPONDENT “IS DECLARED OWNER OF THE 6,471 SQUARE-METERS
DISPUTED LOT, AND THE PETITIONERS ARE THUS ORDERED TO VACATE
THE SAME.”
Petitioner spouses contend that there was a gross misapprehension of facts by the
Court of Appeals and its legal conclusions were contrary to law and
jurisprudence. They assert that respondent failed to identify the portion of land he was
claiming and prove his ownership thereof. They allege that: (a) respondent’s
identification of his 7,581 sq. m. property with a mere “X” mark on the Annex “A” of
the Quitclaim Deed is insufficient as the attached Annex “A” was not presented at the
trial, and; (b) the surveys conducted by the geodetic engineers cannot be used to
identify respondent’s lot as they were based on the records of the Bureau of Lands and
not on the document of title of respondent.
We find for the petitioner spouses.
In civil cases, the law requires that the party who alleges a fact and substantially
asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it. 5 This evidentiary rule
is based on the principle that the suitor who relies upon the existence of a fact should
be called upon to prove it.6
Article 434 of the New Civil Code7 provides that to successfully maintain an action
to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it
must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and; second, his title
thereto.In the case at bar, we find that respondent failed to establish these two (2) legal
requirements.
_______________
 Alonzo v. San Juan, G.R. No. 137549, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 45.
5 Moreover, the rules on evidence provide that where the contents of the document
Ramcar, Inc. v. Garcia, 114 Phil. 1026; 4 SCRA 1087 (1962).
6 are the facts in issue, the best evidence is the instrument itself. 12 In the case at bar,
7 Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s claim.
220
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hutchison vs. Buscas
The first requisite: the identity of the land. In an accion reinvindicatoria, the person
who claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of the
land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. 8 Anent the
second requisite, i.e., the claimant’s title over the disputed area, the rule is that a
party can claim a right of ownership only over the parcel of land that was the object of
the deed.9 Respondent sought to prove these legal requisites by anchoring his claim on
the Quitclaim Deed over a portion of land which was executed by Arrastia in his favor.
However, a cursory reading of the Quitclaim Deed shows that the subject land was
described, thus:
x x x a portion of that property situated at San Juan, Lubao, Pampanga which portion
subject of this sale consists of 7,581 square meters more or less, as indicated
particularly in the herein attached plan marked as Annex “A” and made an integral
part hereof, and the subject property with an “X” sign.
Thus, the Quitclaim Deed specified only the extent of the area sold, i.e., 7,581 sq. m. of
Arrastia’s land. Annex “A” of the Deed, where the entire lot of Arrastia was particularly
described and where the specific portion of the property sold to respondent was marked,
was not presented by respondent at the trial. As the Deed itself failed to mention the
metes and bounds of the land subject of the sale, it cannot be successfully used by
respondent to identify the area he was claiming and prove his ownership thereof.
Indeed, the presentation of the Annex “A” is essential as what defines a piece of
land is not the size mentioned in the instrument but the boundaries thereof
which enclose the land and indicate its exact limits.10
_______________
Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals, 362 SCRA 531 (2001).
8 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 348(2000).
9 Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66077, dated February 19, 2003, is hereby reversed and
10 Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals, 362 SCRA 531 (2001); Turquesa
v. Valera, 322 SCRA 573 (2000).
221
VOL. 459, MAY 26, 2005 221
Hutchison vs. Buscas
Neither can the surveys of the lots of petitioner spouses and respondent prove the
identity of the contested area and respondent’s ownership thereof. The records show
that when geodetic engineers Manansala and Nicdao surveyed the lands, they merely
relied on the self-serving statement of respondent that he owns the portion of the lot
adjacent to petitioner spouses. They were not shown the Deed of Quitclaim and its
Annex “A” or any other document of title which described the specific portion of the
land allegedly conveyed to respondent.11 Thus, the surveys cannot be given
evidentiary weight to prove the identity of the land sold to respondent and his
ownership thereof.
the identity of the land claimed and respondent’s ownership thereof are the very facts
in issue. The best evidence to prove these facts is the Quitclaim Deed and its Annex “A”
where respondent derives his title and where the land from which he purchased a part
was described with particularity, indicating the metes and bounds
thereof. Respondent’s failure to adduce in evidence Annex “A” of the Quitclaim Deed or
produce secondary evidence, after proof of its loss, destruction or unavailability, 13 is
fatal to his cause.
Finally, it bears stressing that in an action to recover real property, the settled
rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title, not on the weakness of the
defendant’s title.14 This requirement is based on two (2) reasons: first, it is possible
that nei-
_______________
Respondent’s testimony, June 16, 1998 TSN at pp. 28-29.
11
Sections 3 & 5, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
12
13 Section 5, Rule 130 (2), Rules of Court provides: x x x When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith
on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
14 Turquesa v. Valera, 322 SCRA 573 (2000).
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hutchison vs. Buscas
ther the plaintiff nor the defendant is the true owner of the property in
dispute,15 and second, the burden of proof lies on the party who substantially asserts
the affirmative of an issue for he who relies upon the existence of a fact should be
called upon to prove that fact.16 In the case at bar, as respondent failed to prove his
title to and identity of the contested land, there exists no legal ground upon which to
turn over the possession of the disputed area to him.
set aside. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, dismissing
the complaint for accion reinvindicatoria in Civil Case No. G-3183, is reinstated. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., Out of the Country.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Although as a general rule, a court should not, by means of a preliminary
injunction, transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another,
this rule admits of some exceptions, such as when the subject property is covered by a
torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the undisputed owner. (Cagayan De Oro
City Landless Residents Association, Inc. [COCLAI] vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA
220 [1996])
 A registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his
registered property by reason of laches. (Catholic Bishop of Balanga vs. Court of
Appeals, 264 SCRA 181 [1996])
——o0o——
_______________
15 Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Justice Edgardo L. Paras, vol. two,
14th ed. at p. 130.
16 Ramcar, Inc. v. Garcia, 114 Phil. 1026; 4 SCRA 1087 (1962).
G.R. No. 160065. February 28, 2006.*
FELINO EBREO, SPOUSES ANTONIO and EVELYN P. BERAÑA, IGNACIO
EBREO and ELEUTERIA CUETO, petitioners, vs. GIL EBREO, represented by His
Attorney-in-Fact, FELIXBERTO EBREO, FLAVIANO EBREO and HOMOBONO
CUETO, respondents.
Evidence; The testimony of an employee of the Assessor’s Office regarding a
certain tax declaration on which a deed of sale was annotated but who was neither
present when the deed of sale was executed nor did he personally see the said deed of
sale is inconclusive.—It is worth noting that Antonio Pajilan, an employee of the City
Assessor’s Office of Batangas City who testified regarding Tax Declaration No. 48221
dated 15 January 1973 on which was annotated the alleged sale between the heirs of
Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, was employed in the said office only in the year 1978.
Thus, he did not make nor did he witness the causing of the annotation as he was not
yet employed in the said office at that time. Likewise, he was neither present when
the deed of sale was executed nor did he personally see the said deed of sale. For these
reasons, the testimony of Pajilan is inconclusive.
Same; Presumption of Regularity; The presumption of regularity is a mere
presumption, not absolute nor inflexible and applies only in the absence of proof to the
contrary.—Petitioners next argue that Tax Declaration No. 48221 in the name of
Santiago Puyo enjoys the presumption of regularity in its issuance. It is a good time
as any to re-state that this rule is a mere presumption, not absolute nor inflexible and
applies only in the absence of proof to the contrary. Besides, the mere fact that the
disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of the
petitioners does not necessarily prove ownership. In the same manner, neither does
the payment of taxes conclusively prove ownership of the land paid for. It is merely
an indicium of a claim of ownership.
Same; Best Evidence Rule; When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
584
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
84
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
the original document; Exceptions.—To summarize, the testimonies of Pajilan,
Felino Ebreo and Asuncion Aguado are at most secondary evidence; hence, they are
inadmissible considering that the petitioners, as offerors of the Deed of Sale, thereof
failed to prove any of the exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court and to establish conditions for their admissibility. Even if they are admitted,
they have no probative value. This rule provides: SEC. 3. Original document must be
produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself except in the
following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is
in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists
of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Same; Same; It is axiomatic that before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to
prove with the requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability
of all the copies of the original of the said deed or document.—It is axiomatic that
before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite quantum of
evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original of the
said deed or document. As former Supreme Court Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran
declared: “Where there are two or more originals, it must appear that all of them have
been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced before secondary evidence can be given of
any one. For example, a lease was executed in duplicate, one being retained by the
lessor and the other by the lessee. Either copy was, therefore, an original, and could
have been introduced as evidence of the contract without the production of the other.
One of these originals could not be found. The non-production of the other was not
accounted for it was held that “under these circumstances, the rule is that no
secondary evidence of the contents of either is admissible until it is shown that
585
VOL. 483, FEBRUARY 28, 2006 585
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any
one.” Indeed, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the original of the deed, the offeror is mandated to prove the following: “(a)
the execution and existence of the original (b) the loss and destruction of the original
or its non-production in court; and (c) unavailability of the original is not due to bad
faith on the part of the offeror.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Elizabeth A. Andres for petitioners.
Euclides G. Forbes for respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Does an annotation in a tax declaration of an alleged Deed of Sale sufficiently prove
conveyance of title to a property? This is the issue presented to Us in the present
petition.
The factual antecedents of this case are narrated herein:
A Complaint dated 04 January 1994, docketed as Civil Case No. 4132 for
Partition, Reconveyance, Accounting and Damages, was filed by Gil Ebreo,
represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Felixberto Ebreo, Flaviano Ebreo and Homobono
Cueto against petitioners Felino Ebreo, Spouses Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn P. Beraña-
Ebreo, Ignacio Ebreo and Eleuteria Cueto before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Batangas City, Branch 7.
From plaintiffs’ account in their complaint, Felipe Ebreo died intestate in 1926
leaving behind as heirs his five children, Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio, and
Felipa.1 Subsequently, Felipa died leaving behind her heirs, Genoveva, Homobono and
Eleuteria all surnamed Cueto. Genoveva died in 1991 without any issue. Defendants-
spouses Antonio Ebreo
_______________
1Rollo, Annex “D,” pp. 53-58.
586
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
and Evelyn Beraña are the son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of defendant Felino,
one of the five children of Felipe Ebreo.
Felipe Ebreo left to his children an untitled parcel of land situated in Barangay
Sampaga, Batangas City, more particularly described as follows:
Isang palagay na lupang palayanin o linangin ipinamumuwis sa ilalim ng Tax
Declaration No. 39949 S-1953, na ang mga karatig sa Ilaya ay Prudencia Coz, sa
Silangan ay Pablo Cantro at Santiago Banaag, sa ibaba ay Ilat (Creek) at sa Kanluran
ay Marcos at Fortunato Banaag may luwang na 31,781 metros kuwadrados humigit
kumulang at may balor amiliorada na halagang P950.00, lalong kilala sa Lote 9046
ng sukat katastro dito sa Batangas.2
Pursuant to the subdivision made by their father Felipe, Lot No. 9046 was subdivided
into six lots identified as Lots A, B, C, D, E and F.3
On 11 September 1967, the five heirs of Felipe Ebreo, through themselves and
their representatives, executed and signed a document entitled, “Kasulatan ng
Pagbabahagi ng Lupa”4 where they extrajudicially partitioned the above-described
property except the portion known as Lot No. 9046-F. As agreed upon by these heirs,
Lot No. 9046-F, with an area of 13,799 square meters, shall remain under the co-
ownership of Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and the heirs of Felipa Ebreo. However,
plaintiffs were surprised to discover that Lot 9046-F was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of defendant Antonio Ebreo. Based on plaintiffs’ recitals, they
alleged that they never sold, ceded, conveyed or transferred their rights, share and co-
ownership over Lot 9046-F.
_______________
2 Id., pp. 54-55.
3Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit “A-1,” p. 2.
4Rollo, Annex “H,” pp. 75-76.
587
VOL. 483, FEBRUARY 28, 2006 587
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
Answering the complaint, the defendants countered that after the execution of
the Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa, by and among the heirs of the late Felipe
Ebreo, Lot 9046-F was sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo. By virtue of this sale, the
corresponding Real Property Tax Declaration was transferred in the name of Santiago
Puyo as owner. However, the deed of sale evidencing this transaction was never
presented.
As narrated by the defendants, Tax Declaration No. 39241,5beginning in the year
1969 covering Lot 9046-F was under the names of the heirs of Felipe Ebreo.
Thereafter, upon the sale of the lot by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, Tax
Declaration No. 39241 was cancelled and a new one, Tax Declaration No.
482216 dated 15 January 1973, was issued in the name of Santiago Puyo. On this tax
declaration, the alleged sale of Lot 9046-F by the Heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago
Puyo was annotated. Soon, Tax Declaration No. 48221 was cancelled by Tax
Declaration No. 40427for the year 1974, still in the name of Santiago Puyo. Upon the
sale by Santiago Puyo of Lot 9046-F to Antonio Ebreo on 23 July 1976, Tax
Declaration No. 4042 was cancelled and a new one, Tax Declaration No. 50669, 8 for
the year 1977, was issued in the name of Antonio Ebreo. This Tax Declaration was
later on revised and cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 075-534 upon the marriage of
defendant Antonio Ebreo to defendant Evelyn Beraña. From 1977 up to 1994,
defendants-spouses Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn Beraña religiously paid the taxes due
on the land.9
Defendants further alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot No. 9046-F by
the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo was executed and ratified sometime in
1968 before At-
_______________
5 Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit “10,” p. 25.
6 Id., Exhibit “9,” p. 24.
7 Id., Exhibit “4,” p. 17.
8 Id., Exhibit “7,” p. 22.
9 Rollo, Annex “E,” pp. 59-63.
588
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
torney Doroteo M. Chavez of Batangas City. From 1968 to 1976, Mr. Santiago Puyo
possessed said lot peacefully, continuously, publicly and in the concept of owner. As
stated earlier, on 23 July 1976, Lot No. 9046-F was sold by Santiago Puyo by way of
Absolute Sale, to defendant Antonio Ebreo. The Deed of Absolute Sale or “Ganap na
Bilihan ng Lupa”10 was duly executed and ratified before one Attorney Meynardo L.
Atienza.
After due proceedings, a decision11 dated 18 August 1997, was rendered by the
RTC which disposed:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered as follows:
 1. (1)Ordering the parties-in-interest (heirs of Felipe Ebreo and/or their
representatives) to partition Lot No. 9046-F among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance under Sec. 2, Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and in default thereof, the partition shall be conducted in
accordance with Sec. 3, et seq., of the same Rule.
2. (2)Ordering the dismissal of the Counterclaim of the defen-dants.
3. (3)Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the
sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency,
for and as attorney’s fee.
4. (4)Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.”12
Defendants-appellants appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. In a
decision13 dated 27 February 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal for lack of
merit and
_______________
10 Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit “1,” p. 13.
11 Penned by Judge Teodoro Tapia Riel.
12 Rollo, p. 50.
13 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58602; Penned by Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine
with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Renato C. Dacudao, concurring; Id.,
pp. 37-42.
589
VOL. 483, FEBRUARY 28, 2006 589
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held:
“The main issue in this case is whether or not a valid transfer of Lot No. 9046-F was
effected which conveyed ownership of the property to Santiago Puyo. The defendant-
appellants rely on the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo
in favor of Santiago Puyo. However, defendant-appellants failed to produce the
alleged Deed of Sale in violation of the Best Evidence Rule.
xxxx
The best evidence rule, applied to documentary evidence, operates as a rule of
exclusion, that is, secondary (or substitutionary) evidence cannot inceptively be
introduced as the original writing itself must be produced in court, except in the four
instances mentioned in Section 3. (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume II,
Seventh Revised Edition, p. 555). Defendant-appellants miserably failed to prove that
their case is included among the exceptions to the Rule.
The testimony of Felino Ebreo regarding the execution of the Deed of Sale cannot
be given credence. In fact, it was contradicted by his supposed co-sellers and co-
owners. His claim that it was borrowed by Eleuteria Cueto and never returned to him
was also refuted by Eleuteria Cueto. Not only are the testimonies of Felino Ebreo and
his son Antonio Ebreo self-serving, they are also uncorroborated by independent
witnesses. Defendant-appellants did not even look for a copy of the deed of sale on the
notarial registry of Atty. Chavez, the notary public who allegedly notarized the deed
of sale. Neither did they look for a copy in the archives of the Court where it should
have been submitted as required by the notarial law. In the words of the trial court,
“the decisive documentary evidence remains an elusive phantom and conspicuously
unproven.” The controversial deed of sale not having been produced as required by the
rules of evidence, the trial court was correct in ruling that Santiago Puyo acquired no
rights whatsoever to Lot No. 9046-F.
Since there was no valid transfer of the ownership of the subject lot from the heirs
of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, the subsequent transfer thereof to Antonio Ebreo is
ineffectual. It is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is selling
(Noel vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 78). Moreover, the fact that the tax
590
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
declarations for said lot were issued in the name of Antonio Ebreo is of no moment for
they are not conclusive proof of ownership. It must be remembered that a tax
declaration may be issued to any claimant even if it is not supported by any deed.
Neither can defendant-appellants’ open, adverse, notorious and continuous
possession of the land for several years amount to ownership for they are co-owners of
the land as evidenced by the “Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi Ng Lupa.” A co-owner
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners. (Trinidad v.
Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 188).”14
The motion for reconsideration of the defendants-appellants was denied in the
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 22 September 2003. 15 Hence this petition for
review on certiorari.
The following issues are submitted for resolution in this petition:
1. “1)Whether or not the annotation of the Deed of Sale appearing in Tax
Declaration No. 48221 is a sufficient proof of transfer in line with the
doctrine of presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
2. 2)Whether or not entries in official records are admissible in evidence to
establish the fact of valid transfer of Lot No. 9046-F that effectively
conveyed ownership of the property from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to
Santiago Puyo.”16
After a painstaking review of the records, we find the petition bereft of merit. First, it
is important to re-state the general rule that the findings of the trial court which are
factual in nature, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals deserve to be
respected and affirmed by this court provided
_______________
14 Id., pp. 40-41.
15 Id., p. 52.
16 Id., p. 136.
591
VOL. 483, FEBRUARY 28, 2006 591
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
they are supported by substantial evidence on record, as in the case at bench. 17
As recounted by defendants, now petitioners, Antonio and Evelyn Ebreo, Lot 9046-
F was sold by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo initially to Santiago Puyo sometime in 1967 or
1968 as evidenced by a deed of sale executed and ratified before Atty. Doroteo Chavez A Yes, Sir.
in Batangas City. Santiago Puyo caused the transfer of the tax declaration in his
name and caused the sale to be annotated therein. Only this annotation in the tax Q Can you inform before this Honorable Court, if this tax declaration was still existing
declaration was offered as proof of the sale. Santiago Puyo took possession, cultivated in your office or a copy thereof?
the land, exercised uninterrupted ownership and paid real estate taxes thereon for a A This tax declaration could not be found because our office was burned on May 29,
period of eight years.
Petitioners went on further to state that the Deed of Sale from the heirs of Felipe 1979, it could not be found anymore, Sir.
Ebreo to Santiago Puyo could not be presented because the copy on file with the Office Q You are also required by this Honorable Court to bring a copy of the tax declaration
of the City Assessor was lost in the fire which occurred in 23 May 1979 that gutted the No. 48221, do you have copy of the same?
building housing their office. From then on, petitioners advance that they have paid
the real estate taxes on the land and were in open, continous and uninterrupted A I have copy of that tax declaration, Sir.
possession until the Complaint for Partition, Reconveyance and Damages was filed by Q Will you please produce the same? Witness is producing a copy of tax declaration No.
the respondents. 32941 in the name of Santiago Puyo.
On the basis of the above narrations, petitioners insist that there was a valid
transfer of the lot from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, and thereafter A Can you explain how this tax declaration was placed in the name of Santiago Puyo?
from Santiago Puyo to them. To buttress this claim of sale by the heirs to Santiago _______________
Puyo, petitioners presented the testimony of Antonio Pajilan of the City Assessors
Office of Batangas City who testified on the annotation in Tax Declaration No. 48221.
18Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit “9,” p. 24.
The annotation reads: 593
_______________ VOL. 483, 593
FEBRUARY
17 Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 368, 378; 319 SCRA 354, 362

(1999); Vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 72, 77; 143 SCRA 77, 84 28, 2006
(1986); Republic of the Phils. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 229 Phil. 20, 25; 144 Ebreo vs. Ebreo
SCRA 705, 709-710 (1986); Cabatbat Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L- Q Previously this tax declaration was owned by Gil, Flaviano, Felino,
69679, 18 October 1988, 166 SCRA 451, 456.
592 Ignacio Ebreo and Genoveva, Eleuteria and Homobono Cueto under PD
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 32941 this tax declaration is under 48221 in the name of Santiago Puyo
Ebreo vs. Ebreo and this was transferred by a virtue of Deed of Sale annotated in the tax
declaration and in the Deed of Sale and purchase value was there:
Deed of sale 2,500.00 document docketed No. 312, Page 17, Book No. 6, Series of
D.V. P2,500.00
1967, Doroteo de Chavez, the Notary Public, Sir.
Doc. on file
Doc. No. 312 Q Can you explain why this annotation was placed or written in this tax
Page No. 17 declaration No. 48221?
Book No. VI
A This was placed under Tax Declaration No. 48221 because the office of
Series of 196718
the City Assessor transferred the tax declaration and annotated the
The testimony of Pajilan went on as follows: instrument used in the transfer of the tax declaration, Sir.
Q I am showing to you a tax declaration No. 32941 in the name of Gil Flaviano, Felino, Q Do you have copy of that document which is the basis of the transfer?
Ignacio, Genoveva, Eleuteria Cueto which is already marked as Exhibit “10” for the A We could not be located (sic) because as I have said earlier our office
defendants in this case and Exhibit “F” for the plaintiff, will you please examine the was burned on May 23, 1979, Sir.
same and identify it? Q So what does this phrase Deed of Sale, what do you mean by that?
A Witness is examining the document. I think this tax declaration is an owner’s copy, A I placed that, that is the title of the instrument used in the transfer of this
Sir. tax declaration, Sir.19
Q But this tax declaration was issued by your office, the City Assessor of Batangas?
It is worth noting that Antonio Pajilan, an employee of the City Assessor’s Office of
Batangas City20 who testified regarding Tax Declaration No. 48221 dated 15 January
1973 on which was annotated the alleged sale between the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to
Santiago Puyo, was employed in the said office only in the year 1978. Thus, he did not
make nor did he witness the causing of the annotation as he was not yet employed in
the said office at that time. Likewise, he was neither present when the deed of sale
was executed nor did he personally see the said deed of sale. For these reasons, the
testimony of Pajilan is inconclusive.
_______________
19TSN, 18 September 1995, pp. 4-7.
20Id., p. 16.
594
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
Petitioners next argue that Tax Declaration No. 48221 in the name of Santiago Puyo
enjoys the presumption of regularity in its issuance. It is a good time as any to re-
state that this rule is a mere presumption, not absolute nor inflexible and applies only
in the absence of proof to the contrary.21 Besides, the mere fact that the disputed
property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of the petitioners
does not necessarily prove ownership. In the same manner, neither does the payment
of taxes conclusively prove ownership of the land paid for. 22 It is merely
an indicium of a claim of ownership.23
Petitioners also presented the testimony of Felino Ebreo, father of petitioner
Antonio Ebreo, who testified that the heirs of Felipe Ebreo sold Lot 9046–F to
Santiago Puyo.24 When queried on the whereabouts of the document of sale, Felino
alleged that it was borrowed by his niece Eleuteria Cueto who is the daughter of one
of the heirs, Felipa Ebreo.25 According to Felino, Eleuteria refused to return the
document and even got angry when he tried to demand its return. 26 From Felino’s
account,27 there are three copies of the missing deed of sale. Lamentably, petitioners
failed to present any one of them.
_______________
REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(m).
21
Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 76792, 12 March 1990, 183
22
SCRA 102, 112; Del Rosario v. Republic of the Phils., 432 Phil. 824, 838; 383 SCRA
262, 274 (2002); Seriña v. Caballero, G.R. No. 127382, 17 August 2004, 436 SCRA 593,
604.
23 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73246, 2 March
1993, 219 SCRA 339, 348; Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 314 Phil. 57, 63; 244 SCRA 218,
222 (1995); San Miguel Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57667, 28 May 1990, 185
SCRA 722, 725; Heirs of Brusas v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 47, 55; 313 SCRA 176,
184 (1999).
24 TSN, 28 February 1995, p. 7.
25 Id., p. 9.
26 Id., p. 13.
27 Id., 22.
595
VOL. 483, FEBRUARY 28, 2006 595
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
Finally, petitioners presented Asuncion Aguado, step-daughter of Santiago Puyo, who
testified that her stepfather Santiago Puyo bought the subject lot from the Ebreo
heirs.28 Similar to Pajilan’s testimony, Aguado’s testimony cannot be given much
weight in view of the fact that save for her bare allegations that Lot 9046-F was
purchased by her stepfather Santiago Puyo, she was not likewise present when the
deed was executed. In her testimony she merely stated that her stepfather paid taxes
for his real estate properties but could not state with specificity if the payment was
made for Lot 9056-F.29
To summarize, the testimonies of Pajilan, Felino Ebreo and Asuncion Aguado are
at most secondary evidence; hence, they are inadmissible considering that the
petitioners, as offerors of the Deed of Sale, thereof failed to prove any of the exceptions
provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and to establish conditions for
their admissibility.30 Even if they are admitted, they have no probative value.31 This
rule provides:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself except in the following cases:
1. (a)When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
2. (b)When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
_______________
28 TSN, 17 May 1995, p. 4.
29 Id., p. 9.
30 Santos v. Santos, 396 Phil. 928, 940-941; 342 SCRA 753, 763-764 (2000).
31 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 852, 875; 258 SCRA 223, 242 (1996).
596
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
1. (c)When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought
to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
2. (d)When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
Under this rule, it is axiomatic that before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to
prove with the requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability
of all the copies of the original of the said deed or document. As former Supreme Court
Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran declared:
“Where there are two or more originals, it must appear that all of them have been
lost, destroyed or cannot be produced before secondary evidence can be given of any
one. For example, a lease was executed in duplicate, one being retained by the lessor
and the other by the lessee. Either copy was, therefore, an original, and could have
been introduced as evidence of the contract without the production of the other. One of
these originals could not be found. The non-production of the other was not accounted
for it was held that “under these circumstances, the rule is that no secondary evidence
of the contents of either is admissible until it is shown that originals must be
accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one.”
Indeed, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of
the original of the deed, the offeror is mandated to prove the following:
“(a) the execution and existence of the original (b) the loss and destruction of the
original or its non-production in court; and (c) unavailability of the original is not due
to bad faith on the part of the offeror.”32
_______________
32Santos v. Santos, supra note 30, pp. 941-942; p. 765 (citations omitted).
597
VOL. 483, FEBRUARY 28, 2006 597
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
On this score, the factual findings of the trial court are worth repeating. It held:
The pivotal document of sale allegedly executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in favor
of Santiago Puyo and chiefly relied upon by defendant Antonio Ebreo as the derivative
basis of his ownership is sadly missing and remains a phantom in the dark. The
testimonies of Felino Ebreo, Asuncion Aguado and Antonio Ebreo to prove by way
of recollection of witnessesthat Lot 9046-F was sold to Santiago Puyo sometime in
1967 for P2,500.00 by virtue of a deed notarized before deceased Atty. Doroteo Chavez
merits scant consideration. They were the verbal say-so of interested parties and
attributed acts to a party whose lips had been sealed by death. Quite evidently, their
testimony should be taken cum grano salis—with a grain of salt.
Both the testimonies of Asuncion Aguado and Antonio Ebreo lacked the legal
underpinning needed to prove the deed of sale. Their testimonies were not
recollection of witnesses who saw the execution and delivery of the document.
According to Sec. 4, Rule 130, the contents of the lost writing may be proved, inter
alia, by the recollection of witnesses. As matters stand, however, Aguado’s testimony
relates not to the execution of the document but to what her father (Santiago Puyo)
did with the property after it was already acquired. (t.s.n. pp. 4-7, Direct, May 17,
1995) Similarly, Antonio Ebreo’s testimony does not refer to the execution and
delivery of the deed of sale but of having allegedly seen said document when he
purchased the lot from Santiago Puyo. He testified that “when I bought it from
Santiago Puyo, he brought with him the Tax Declaration in the name of Santiago
Puyo as well as the deed of sale between my father and his brothers and
Santiago Puyo.” (t.s.n. pp. 13-14, Direct, Aug. 16, 1995). In fine, they were not
witnesses to the execution and delivery of the document of sale to qualify their
testimonies under the phrase “recollection of witnesses.”
Neither does the testimony of Felino Ebreo evoke faith and confidence. His
salutary recollection of the missing document failed to instill credulity. For one, it was
uncorroborated by any of the parties to the alleged deed of sale. In fact, such sale
was directly controverted by his supposed co-sellers and co-owners Gil and
Flaviano. (t.s.n. pp. 7-8, Direct, July 18, 1994; t.s.n. pp. 22-
598
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
23, Cross, Sept. 29, 1994) Then too, it appears rather unusual for the heirs to retain
Lot 9046-F in co-ownership in their partition agreement of 1967 and sell the said Lot
that very same year (1967) if not on the same occasion. Felino Ebreo did not give the
exact date of the supposed sale to Santiago Puyo except to say that it was sold in
1967. The Court got the impression, though, that it was on the same occasion as the
partition agreement. (t.s.n. pp. 6-7, 14-16, Direct, Feb. 28, 1995) More important,
his humanistic bias to favor his son Antonio Ebreo and his natural interest to defend
his actuations leading to the issuance of the Tax Decl. 50669 (Exh. “2”) which he
signed caution us to accept his testimony with great care. He does not have the cold
neutrality of a disinterested party. He was covetous of gain. The Tax Decl. No. 50669
that transferred in 1976 the property in the name of Antonio Ebreo was signed by
Felino Ebreo himself (Exh. “2”). This illustrated a dialectical connection between him
and his favored son Antonio Ebreo. Finally, Felino Ebreo’s claim that he could not
produce it because it was borrowed by his niece Eleuteria Cueto and never returned to
him was squarely refuted by said Eleuteria Cueto when she testified in rebuttal for
the plaintiffs. (t.s.n. pp. 9, 12-13, Direct, Feb. 28, 1995) (See testimony of
Eleuteria Cueto in rebuttal on July 17, 1997)
While many things have been said about the crucial deed of sale, the decisive
documentary evidence remains an elusive phantom and conspicuously unproven. The
ownership of Santiago Puyo becomes moreover doubtful because while the alleged sale
was executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in 1967 yet the earliest Tax Declaration in
the name of Santiago Puyo was issued only in 1973 (Exh. “9”) or 1974 (Exh. “4”) as far
as the record of this case can reveal. The issuance of a new tax declaration in the
name of the sunrise owner (Puyo) which was late by six (6) or seven (7) years
naturally cast a slur on the veracity of the sale.
The typewritten entry on Tax Decl. No. 48221 (Exhs. “9” and “9-A”) detailing the
particulars of the alleged deed of sale in favor of Santiago Puyo is patently suspicious
and a very very poor ersatz for the primary document. While the sale allegedly took
place in 1967, said deed was annotated on Exh. “9” which however only “begins with
the year 1973.” Moreover, while the alleged sale took place in 1967, yet Tax. Decl. No.
32941 (Exh. “10”) that was issued on Feb. 7, 1968 still carried the names of Gil,
Flaviano, Felino and Ignacio, all EBREO and Genoveva, Eleuteria and Homobono,
all CUETO and not the name of Santiago Puyo. There even appears thereon the
599
VOL. 483, FEBRUARY 28, 2006 599
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
annotation that the 1968 tax was paid on Jan. 29, 1968—with no mention of Santiago
Puyo despite his having allegedly acquired the property the year before (1967).
Riveting further its attention to the typewritten entry on Exh. “9”, the Court finds
it rather strange that such an entry appears on the Tax Declaration. Firstly, it is not a
widely accepted practice to make such annotation. Secondly, there is more than meets
the eye in the conspicuous presence of this annotation only on this particular Tax
Declaration (Exh. “9”). All other tax declarations in this case do not have similar entry
to identify the documentary basis for the issuance of the latest tax Panganiban (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo,
declaration. Thirdly, not even Tax Decl. Nos. 50669 and 075-534 (Exhs. “2” and “3”) of Sr., JJ., concur.
Antonio Ebreo carry such annotation to indicate that he acquired the property by Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
virtue of Doc. No. 70, Page No. 15, Book No. I, Series of 1976 of the Notarial Register Notes.—Photocopies may be admitted for failure of the other party to tender an
of Atty. Meynardo L. Atienza. The pregnant suspicion lurks that the alleged appropriate objection to their admission, though their probative value is nil
particulars of the document of sale from Santiago Puyo to Antonio Ebreo were nevertheless. (Security Bank & Trust Company vs. Triumph Lumber and Construction
belatedly annotated. Corporation, 301 SCRA 537 [1999])
As icing on the cake, Gil Ebreo categorically stated it was Felino Ebreo who _______________
authored the transfer. He testified on cross-examination that it was his eldest brother
Felino Ebreo who was the caretaker of the lot and in-charge of the payment of 33Rollo, pp. 46-49.
taxes. It was his brother Felino who sold the subject lot known as Lot No. 601
9046-F in favor of his son Antonio Ebreo. (t.s.n. pp. 16-17, Cross, July 18, 1994)
VOL. 483, FEBRUARY 28, 2006 601
The evidence tended to show that indeed it was Felino Ebreo who had the opportunity
to cause the transfer as it was he (Felino) who took possession of the lot and acted as Rabanal vs. People
its overseer. (t.s.n. pp. 3-4, Direct, Nov. 17, 1994) Only the original document is the best evidence of the fact as to whether the heirs
The alleged document of sale executed between Santiago Puyo and Antonio Ebreo executed a Deed of Partition wherein the entire inherited property was conveyed to
denominated as “Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa” (Exh. “1”), was ineffectual for the only one of them. (Santos vs. Santos, 342 SCRA 537 [2000])
purpose of transferring ownership of disputed Lot No. 9046-F to said Antonio Ebreo
because the alleged vendor Santiago Puyo has not, as heretofore explained, acquired it ——o0o——
from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo as the transaction has no supporting document of
sale. It is self-evident that the seller cannot transfer more than what he has
or as oftenly stated hyperbolically, the river cannot rise above its
source. Moreover, Clerk of Court Jose C. Corales certified that the Ganap na Bilihan
ng Lupa (Doc. No. 70, Page No. 15, Book No. I, Series of 1976) despite diligent efforts
could not be found in the old CFI vault located at the Capitol Building, Batangas City.
(Exh. “E”—Rebuttal)
600
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ebreo vs. Ebreo
The fact that tax declarations for Lot [No.] 9046-F were issued in the name of
defendant Antonio Ebreo (Exhs. “2” and “3”) and that he paid the taxes for the land
(Exh. “8”) provides no evidentiary value that he was the owner thereof. The
existence of the tax declarations and payment of taxes did not transmogrify
his possession into ownership. Tax declarations are not sufficient evidence to
prove possession in the concept of owners. (Martinez, D., Summary of 1990
Supreme Court Rulings, Part. II, p. 734) Tax receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership.”33
In sum, considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax
declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the
subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the petitioners to adduce in
evidence the original or a copy of the deed consistent with Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. In the absence of the said document, the exhortations of petitioners
regarding the existence of said deed of sale must fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 February 2003 affirming in
toto the decision of the trial court dated 18 August 1997 is likewise AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.