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POLITICAL LAW CASES (2018)

BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Fundamental Powers of the State

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP., doing business under the name and style “Carlos Superdrug,” ELSIE M.
CANO, doing business under the name and style “Advance Drug,” Dr. SIMPLICIO L. YAP, JR., doing
business under the name and style “City Pharmacy,” MELVIN S. DELA SERNA, doing business under the
name and style “Botica dela Serna,” and LEYTE SERV-WELL CORP., doing business under the name and
style “Leyte Serv-Well Drugstore,” petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and
DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (DOH), DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (DOF),
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR and LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG),
respondents. (526 SCRA 130; G.R. No. 166494; June 29, 2007)

FACTS:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating pharmacies in the Philippines.
Public respondents, on the other hand, include the DSWD, DOH, DOF, DOJ, and the DILG, specifically
tasked to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for
the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore
establishments.
On 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of
services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial
services for the death of senior citizens;
Petitioners assail the said Act because it allegedly constitutes deprivation of private property and
compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital.

ISSUE: Whether Sec. 4(a) of the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” is constitutional.

HELD:
Yes. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. The State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can
impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program. The Senior Citizens
Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits
and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our
society.
Police power has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs.” For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights,
though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.

HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City Mayor of Marikina City vs. ST.
SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE and ST. SCHOLASTICA’S ACADEMY­MARIKINA

FACTS:
Respondent St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of
56,306.80 square meters, located in Marikina Heights. Located within the property are SSA-Marikina, the
formation house of the novices, the residence of the sisters and retirement house for the elderly. The property is
enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence.
Petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina that enacted Ordinance No. 192, entitled
"Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina." With subsequent ordinances in
1995 and 1998, to amend Sections 7 and 5, respectively.
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to respondents ordering them to
demolish and replace their wall to make it 80% see-thru, and also to move it back about six (6) meters to provide
parking space. Respondents requested for an extension of time to comply but petitioners insisted on the
enforcement of the subject ordinance and filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution; that demolishing their fence and constructing it six (6) meters back would result in a huge loss of
property on their part. It would also result in the destruction of the garbage house, covered walk, electric house,
storage house, comfort rooms, guards’ room, guards’ post, waiting area for visitors, waiting area for students,
Blessed Virgin Shrine, P.E. area, and the multi-purpose hall, resulting in the permanent loss of their beneficial
use. Thus the implementation of the ordinance would be tantamount to an appropriation of property without due
process of law which the petitioners could only do so through eminent domain. They also raised that the goal of
deterring criminality doesn’t exist as the walls of the school had served as sufficient protection for years already.

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The petitioners countered that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, by virtue of which,
they could restrain property rights for the protection of public safety, health, morals, or the promotion of public
convenience and general prosperity.
The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction, agreeing with the respondents that the order to
demolish would amount to an appropriation. It held that the petitioners could not take the respondents’ property
under the guise of police power to evade the payment of just compensation. The RTC ruled that even if the
parking space will be for the benefit of the students and patrons of SSA-Marikina, respondents were already
providing for sufficient parking. It also found that the 80% see-thru fence requirement could run counter to the
respondents’ right to privacy as the property also served as residence of the sisters. Lastly, it held that the
purpose of beautification could not be used to justify the exercise of police power.
The CA dismissed the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC decision, hence this petition.

ISSUE(S):
1. Whether city ordinance no. 192, series of 1994 is a valid exercise of police power;
2. Whether the aforementioned ordinance is an exercise of the power of eminent domain;
3. Whether the city violated the due process clause.
RULING:
1. NO.
2. YES.
3. YES.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an ordinance
and free it from alleged infirmity, two tests have been used by the court: the 1. rational relationship test and the 2.
strict scrutiny test.

Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest. Using the strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, governmental
interest.
Under the rational relationship test, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised
their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the ownership of the property remains with the
respondents. The Court is of the view that the implementation of the setback requirement would be tantamount to
taking private property for public use without just compensation, in contravention to the Constitution.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and "un-neighborliness," it is obvious
that providing for a parking area has no logical connection to, and is not reasonably necessary for, the
accomplishment of these goals.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled that the State
may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely
and even infringe on their private rights to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community.
Similarly, the Court cannot perceive how a see-thru fence will foster "neighborliness" between members of a
community. In fact, requiring the exposure of their property this way is violative of their right to privacy,
considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located within the property.
The right to privacy has long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution that
must be protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the right to be let alone, as
governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of its citizens. It is inherent in
the concept of liberty, enshrined in the Bill of Rights (Article III) in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.
*
G.R. No. 184203. November 26, 2014.
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, respondent.
G.R. No. 187583. November 26, 2014.*
PROVINCE OF BATAAN, represented by GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., and EMERLINDA S.
TALENTO, in her capacity as Provincial Treasurer of Bataan, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC
ZONE AUTHORITY, respondent.

Topic: Fundamental Powers of the State

Taxation; Assessment; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; In case of an erroneous assessment,

the taxpayer must exhaust the administrative remedies provided under the Local Government Code (LGC) before
resorting to judicial action.—Once an assessment has already been issued by the assessor, the proper remedy
of a taxpayer depends on whether the assessment was erroneous or illegal. An erroneous assessment
“presupposes that the taxpayer is subject to the tax but is disputing the correctness of the amount assessed.”
With an erroneous assessment, the taxpayer claims that the local assessor erred in determining any of the items
for computing the real property tax, i.e., the value of the real property or the portion thereof subject to tax and the

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proper assessment levels. In case of an erroneous assessment, the taxpayer must exhaust the administrative
remedies provided under the Local Government Code before resorting to judicial action.

Same; Same; Payment under protest and appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) are
“successive administrative remedies to a taxpayer who questions the correctness of an assessment.”—Payment
under protest and appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals are “successive administrative remedies to
a taxpayer who questions the correctness of an assessment.” The Local Board Assessment Appeals shall not
entertain an appeal “without the action of the local assessor” on the protest. If the taxpayer is still unsatisfied after
appealing with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, the taxpayer may appeal with the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals within 30 days from receipt of the Local Board’s decision.

Same; Same; In case of an illegal assessment, the taxpayer may directly resort to judicial action without
paying under protest the assessed tax and filing an appeal with the Local and Central Board of Assessment
Appeals (CBAA).—On the other hand, an assessment is illegal if it was made without authority under the law. In
case of an illegal assessment, the taxpayer may directly resort to judicial action without paying under protest the
assessed tax and filing an appeal with the Local and Central Board of Assessment Appeals.

Taxation; Notice of Delinquency; Injunction; In case the local government unit (LGU) has issued a notice
of delinquency, the taxpayer may file a complaint for injunction to enjoin the impending sale of the real property at
public auction.—In case the local government unit has issued a notice of delinquency, the taxpayer may file a
complaint for injunction to enjoin the impending sale of the real property at public auction. In case the local
government unit has already sold the property at public auction, the taxpayer must first deposit with the court the
amount for which the real property was sold, together with interest of 2% per month from the date of sale to the
time of the institution of action. The taxpayer may then file a complaint to assail the validity of the public auction.
The decisions of the Regional Trial Court in these cases shall be appealable before the Court of Tax Appeals,
and the latter’s decisions appealable before this court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Tax Exemptions; For persons granted tax exemptions or incentives before the effectivity
of the Local Government Code (LGC), Section 193 withdrew these tax exemption privileges; Nevertheless, local
government units (LGUs) may grant tax exemptions under such terms and conditions as they may deem
necessary.—For persons granted tax exemptions or incentives before the effectivity of the Local Government
Code, Section 193 withdrew these tax exemption privileges. These persons consist of both natural and juridical
persons, including government-owned or -controlled corporations: SEC. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption
Privileges.—Unless otherwise provided in this code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed
by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or -controlled corporations, except local
water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, non-stock and nonprofit hospitals and educational
institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon effectivity of this Code. As discussed, Section 234 withdrew all tax
privileges with respect to real property taxes. Nevertheless, local government units may grant tax exemptions
under such terms and conditions as they may deem necessary.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Local Government Code is necessary in cases of
erroneous assessments where the correctness of the amount assessed is assailed. The taxpayer must first pay
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the tax then file a protest with the Local Treasurer within 30 days from date of payment of tax. If protest is
denied or upon the lapse of the 60-day period to decide the protest, the taxpayer may appeal to the Local Board
of Assessment Appeals within 60 days from the denial of the protest or the lapse of the 60-day period to decide
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the protest. The Local Board of Assessment Appeals has 120 days to decide the appeal.

Same; Taxation; Tax Exemptions; Real Property Taxes; The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the
Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) is exempt from real property taxes by virtue of its charter. A provision
in the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 explicitly exempting the PEZA is unnecessary.—We rule that the
PEZA is exempt from real property taxes by virtue of its charter. A provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of
1995 explicitly exempting the PEZA is unnecessary. The PEZA assumed the real property exemption of the
EPZA under Presidential Decree No. 66. Section 11 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 mandated the
EPZA “to evolve into the PEZA in accordance with the guidelines and regulations set forth in an executive order
issued for this purpose.” President Ramos then issued Executive Order No. 282 in 1995, ordering the PEZA to
assume the EPZA’s powers, functions, and responsibilities under Presidential Decree No. 66 not inconsistent
with the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.

Facts:
6
In the exercise of his legislative powers, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
66 in 1972, declaring as government policy the establishment of export processing zones in strategic locations in
the Philippines. Presidential Decree No. 66 aimed “to encourage and promote foreign commerce as a means of
making the Philippines a center of international trade, of strengthening our export trade and foreign exchange
position, of hastening industrialization, of reducing domestic unemployment, and of accelerating the development
7
of the country.”

The issue common to both cases are as follows:

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To carry out this policy, the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) was created to operate,
8
administer, and manage the export processing zones established in the Port of Mariveles, Bataan and such
9
other export processing zones that may be created by virtue of the decree.
10
The decree declared the EPZA nonprofit in character with all its revenues devoted to its development,
11
improvement, and maintenance. To maintain this nonprofit character, the EPZA was declared exempt from all
taxes that may be due to the Republic of the Philippines, its provinces, cities, municipalities, and other
government agencies and instrumentalities.

However, sometime in 1998, the City Treasurer demanded that PEZA pay in real property taxes for the
period from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone. PEZA filed a
declaratory relief in the RTC of Pasay, but the City Treasurer maintained that PEZA is still liable.
75
In the order dated January 31, 2007, the trial court denied the PEZA’s petition for injunction. The trial
court ruled that the PEZA is not exempt from payment of real property taxes. According to the trial court, Sections
193 and 234 of the Local Government Code had withdrawn the real property tax exemptions previously granted
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to all persons, whether natural or juridical. As to the tax exemptions under Section 51 of the Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995, the trial court ruled that the provision only applies to businesses operating within the economic
zones, not to the PEZA.

The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the Province and its Provincial
79
Treasurer from selling PEZA’s properties at public auction scheduled on October 17, 2007. It also ordered the
Province to comment on the PEZA’s petition.
The Province reiterates that the PEZA is not exempt from payment of real property taxes. The Province points
out that the EPZA, the PEZA’s predecessor, had to be categorically exempted from payment of real property
taxes. The EPZA, therefore, was not inherently exempt from payment of real property taxes and so is the PEZA.
Since Congress omitted from the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 a provision specifically exempting the
PEZA from payment of real property taxes, the Province argues that the PEZA is a taxable entity. It cited the rule
99
in statutory construction that provisions omitted in revised statutes are deemed repealed.

ISSUE: Whether the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes.

HELD: YES.
234
In the interest of judicial economy and avoidance of conflicting decisions involving the same issues, we resolve
the substantive issue of whether the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes.
Real property taxes are annual taxes levied on real property such as lands, buildings, machinery, and other
236
improvements not otherwise specifically exempted under the Local Government Code. Real property taxes
237
are ad valorem, with the amount charged based on a fixed proportion of the value of the property. Under the
law, provinces, cities, and municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area have the power to levy real property
238
taxes within their respective territories.

The general rule is that real properties are subject to real property taxes. This is true especially since the Local
Government Code has withdrawn exemptions from real property taxes of all persons, whether natural or juridical:

SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax.—The following are exempted from payment of real property
tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person;
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, nonprofit or religious
cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable or educational purposes;
(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local water districts and
government-owned or -controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or generation
and transmission of electric power;
(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided under R.A. No. 6938; and
(e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection.
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property taxes previously granted to, or presently
enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or -controlled corporations are
hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. (Emphasis supplied)

The person liable for real property taxes is the “taxable person who had actual or beneficial use and possession
[of the real property for the taxable period,] whether or not [the person owned the property for the period he or
239
she is being taxed].”
The exceptions to the rule are provided in the Local Government Code. Under Section 133(o), local government
units have no power to levy taxes of any kind on the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities and
local government units:

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SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.—Unless otherwise provided
herein, the exercise of taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the
levy of the following:
....
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and local
government units.

Specifically on real property taxes, Section 234 enumerates the persons and real property exempt from real
property taxes:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax.— The following are exempted from payment of real property
tax:(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person; …xxx

The law created the PEZA’s charter. Under the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the PEZA was established
primarily to perform the governmental function of operating, administering, managing, and developing special
economic zones to attract investments and provide opportunities for preferential use of Filipino labor. Under its
charter, the PEZA was created a body corporate endowed with some corporate powers. However, it was not
270 271
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. Nothing in the PEZA’s charter provides that the PEZA’s
272
capital is divided into shares. The PEZA also has no members who shall share in the PEZA’s profits.
The PEZA does not compete with other economic zone authorities in the country. The government may even
subsidize the PEZA’s operations. Under Section 47 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, “any sum
necessary to augment [the PEZA’s] capital outlay shall be included in the General Appropriations Act to be
273
treated as an equity of the national government.”

The PEZA, therefore, need not be economically viable. It is not a government-owned or -controlled corporation
liable for real property taxes.

V. (B)
The PEZA assumed the nonprofit character, including the tax exempt status, of the EPZA

The PEZA’s predecessor, the EPZA, was declared nonprofit in character with all its revenues devoted for its
development, improvement, and maintenance. Consistent with this nonprofit character, the EPZA was explicitly
declared exempt from real property taxes under its charter. Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66 provides:
Section 21. Nonprofit Character of the Authority; Exemption from Taxes.—The Authority shall be nonprofit and
shall devote and use all its returns from its capital investment, as well as excess revenues from its operations, for
the development, improvement and maintenance and other related expenditures of the Authority to pay its
indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance and effective implementation of the policy enunciated in Section
1 of this Decree. In consonance therewith, the Authority is hereby declared exempt:
....
(b) From all income taxes, franchise taxes, realty taxes and all other kinds of taxes and licenses to be paid to
the National Government, its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and
instrumentalities[.]

The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, on the other hand, does not specifically exempt the PEZA from
payment of real property taxes.
Nevertheless, we rule that the PEZA is exempt from real property taxes by virtue of its charter. A provision in the
Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 explicitly exempting the PEZA is unnecessary. The PEZA assumed the real
property exemption of the EPZA under Presidential Decree No. 66.

C. Due Process

JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON vs. NLRC, RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS, INC. and
VICENTE ANGELES
FACTS:
Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny
Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were
dismissed for abandonment of work.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims, which the Labor Arbiter
favored, declaring the dismissals illegal and ordering private respondent to pay
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA because it found that petitioners had abandoned work, and were
not entitled to backwages and separation pay. Their motion for reconsideration was denied, thus petitioners filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA.
Among others, petitioners claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of
notice and hearing.

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Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had
abandoned their work. They were even sent two letters to the last known addresses of the petitioners advising
them to report for work. Still, they did not report for work however, because they had subcontracted to perform
installation work for another company.
After a careful review of the facts, the CA ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal
because they had abandoned their employment but still ordered the payment of money claims hence, this petition
for review.

ISSUE(S): Whether Riviera’s violation of the procedural requirements of notice and hearing for termination of
employees is also a violation of the Constitutional due process.

RULING:
To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also
enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself by virtue of his right
to due process. There are, however, two different due process concepts: a. constitutional due process and b.
statutory due process.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based
on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental
to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. Due process is that which comports with the deepest
notions of what is fair and right and just. It is a constitutional restraint on the legislative as well as on the
executive and judicial powers of the government provided by the Bill of Rights.
Due process under the Labor Code on the other hand, like Constitutional due process, has two aspects:
substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor Code; and
procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code.
Therefore statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due process.
Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in
criminal, civil or administrative proceedings. Statutory due process is found in the Labor Code and Implementing
Rules protecting employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
After carefully analyzing the consequences of the divergent doctrines in the law on employment
termination, we believe that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin
requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to hold that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing
sanctions on the employer.
The unfairness of declaring illegal or ineffectual dismissals for valid or authorized causes but not
complying with statutory due process may have far-reaching consequences. This would encourage frivolous
suits, where even the most notorious violators of company policy are rewarded by invoking due process. This
also creates absurd situations where there is a just or authorized cause for dismissal but a procedural infirmity
invalidates the termination.
The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress
employers. The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer
when it is in the right, as in this case. Certainly, an employer should not be compelled to pay employees for work
not actually performed and in fact abandoned.
An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article 282 should not be protected by the
Social Justice Clause of the Constitution. Social justice however, as the term suggests, should be used only to
correct an injustice.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should
not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee
for the violation of his statutory rights.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK INC. ET. AL V. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL

G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010

FACTS:
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372,
otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-
Terrorism Councilcomposed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as
Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto
Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions,
except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUES:
Whether or not RA 0372 is unconstitutional?
Whether or not RA 0372 can be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines?
RULING:
The Court did not rule on the matter because petitioners failed to satisfy the procedural requirements
necessary to declare a statute unconstitutional.

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In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis
mota of the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential,
renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injuryas a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government,
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by the
government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 (KARAPATAN ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEOPKE’S
RIGHTS) allege that they have been subjected to "close security surveillance by state security forces," their
members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by
"men with military build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the State. Even
conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that
petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported"surveillance" and the implementation of RA
9372.

***
Petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581 (BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) ET AL.,
would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondent's alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations
fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA).
The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure
under the law.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is
limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must
be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questionable.

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners’
apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has
been filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat
emanating from the so-called tagging.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as
well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific
provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members.

The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice
Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP
and NPA as terrorist organizations. Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an
application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA
9372. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely
without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.

***
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its
implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the
implementation of the law. It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a
public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.

***
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.

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Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as "communist
fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to
render an advisory opinion, which is not its function. Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have
become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory
actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the
anticipated reaction to it of a public official aremerely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
***

IMPORTANT PART

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace"
and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies
with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vaguenesswhen it lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to
the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a
facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its
actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge
against them.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend
that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some
form of expression protected by the free speech clause.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually
committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the
coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any
attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just
one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on
the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount
of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus
legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling
on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed
legislative lobbying in Congress.

D. Equal Protection

GARCIA VS. DRILON (G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013)

TOPIC: Equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials.

FACTS: Rosalie Jaype-Garcia, Private respondent married JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner. She claimed to be a
victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the

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part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. Private
Respondent filed for Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against the Petitioner pursuant to R.A. 9262.
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO.
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Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for
being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
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Appellate court dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his
pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly,
the challenge to the validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders
issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not R.A. 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause (Main
Issue)
II. Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground that the issue of constitutionality was not
raised at the earliest opportunity
III. Whether or not R.A. 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the constitution
IV. Whether or not R.A. No. 9262 is invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of
judicial power to the barangay officials

RULING:

I. No. R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that is required of a
valid classification is that:
A. it must be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences;
B. that it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
C. that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
D. that it must apply equally to each member of the class.

A. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be
victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of
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differences ... is the essence of true equality."

B. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family
and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which
the Philippines is a party.

C. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only

The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to
future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are
threatened by violence and abuse.

D. R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.

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II. Yes. The appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order. As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so
that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will
39
not be considered on appeal. Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
40
necessity of deciding it.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in
Petitioner’s Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction
to determine the same, subject to the review of the SC.
That the proceedings are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same
in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be
supported by evidence.

III. No. R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
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petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of
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the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the court is authorized to issue ex parte a
TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there
is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent
100
danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process.
Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which
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the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the
same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor,
and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
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necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence
and threats to their personal safety and security.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
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pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

IV. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
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Government. On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer
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the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."
BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad,
merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2)
threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and
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ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that
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these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding
"whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a
BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.

G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009

ANTONIO M. SERRANO vs. Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC.,

FACTS: Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his

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placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to national development, but
exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their
lump-sum salary either for the unexpired portion of their employment contract "or for three months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause). Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the
OFWs' constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and
denies them due process.

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents)
under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment.

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay
on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19,
1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days
of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days. Petitioner filed with
the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money
claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73.

In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary
period of three months only -- rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner's
employment contract - applying the subject clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00,
consisting of petitioner's "[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, +
US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month."

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA Decision. The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-
sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00
because R.A. No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been
actually performed, and for vacation leave pay."

Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly impairs the freedom of
OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas employment contracts a determinate employment period
and a fixed salary package. It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from
local Filipino workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are
entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local workers when their
dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate treatment is not reasonable as there is no substantial distinction
between the two groups; and that it defeats Section 18, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees the
protection of the rights and welfare of all Filipino workers, whether deployed locally or overseas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution and Section 18, Article II
and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector

HELD: The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law. Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of
deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category,
while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of
the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees
fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these
requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not
limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification
embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only
be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny
in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that
the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a

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legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to
prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.

Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble
proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The
command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national development," further
explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater
equality. x x x [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state
effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer employee
status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a
benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation
packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low salaried employees are limited to the rates
prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly
regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and
opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay.
Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life
are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real
economic and financial need for the adjustmen . This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the
people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve
the quality of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict
scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster. (Emphasis supplied)

Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the Court in the present case
also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs. Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an
invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment
contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of
one year or more.

It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions
thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their
claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired
portion of their employment contracts. The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a
differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment
periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more
and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3
months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from
such prejudice, simply because the latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one year.

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