Republic of The Philippines Supreme Court: City of Manila - DIVISION

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
City of Manila
________ DIVISION
ARVIN A. PASCUAL,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. ____________________

- VERSUS - (CA-G.R. No. SP. No. 146445)
SITEL PHILIPPINES CORP.

MICHAEL LEE,
ASWIN SUKUMAR,
PHOEBE MONICA ARGANA,
REMIL CANDA, and
AMOR REYES,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PETITION FOR REVIEW
Petitioner, by counsel, and to this Honorable Supreme Court,

most respectfully states:
I.
NATURE OF THE PETITION
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Revised Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision
of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 15 January 2018 in CA-G.R.
No. SP. No. 146445 entitled Sitel Philippines Corp., et. al. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission and Arvin A. Pascual, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follow:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition

for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated March
04, 2016 and the Resolution dated April 27, 2016, issued
by the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC
LAC No. 10002757-15 (NLRC NCR CASE No. 05-05071-
15 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Labor Arbiter dated September 8, 2015 is
REINSTATED.”
1
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
Also sought to be reversed and set aside in this Petition is the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 25 June 2018 in the
above entitled case which denied Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for failure to advance substantial arguments or
establish clear and compelling grounds to reverse, amend or set aside
Its 15 January 2018 Decision.
II.
THE PARTIES
Petitioner ARVIN A. PASCUAL (“Pascual”) is a Filipino citizen,

of legal age, married and with residence and postal address at 28-B
14th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City 1109, where he may be served
with summons and other processes of this Honorable Court.
Respondent SITEL PHILIPPINES CORPORATION (“Sitel”) is a

corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and with
business and postal address at 4/F Sitel Building, Ortigas Home Depot
Complex One Julia Vargas Ave., Barrio Ugong 1605, Pasig City where
it may be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable
Court.
Respondents Sitel’s Chief Operating Officer MICHAEL LEE

(“Lee”), a foreign national; Sitel’s Officer-in-Charge HR Field Services
Manila Region ASWIN SUKUMAR (“Sukumar”) also a foreign national;
Sitel’s Sr. Operations Manager - Comcast Customer Service Group
and Head of Manila Quality Team REMIL CANDA (“Canda”); Sitel’s
Operations Manager - Comcast Customer Service Group AMOR
REYES (“Reyes”); and Sitel’s Human Resources Manager PHOEBE
MONICA ARGANA (“Argana”) are all of legal ages and Filipino
citizens. All of these Sitel Officers could be served with summons and
other processes of this Honorable Court at 4/F Sitel Building, Ortigas
Home Depot Complex One Julia Vargas Ave., Barrio Ugong 1605,
Pasig City.
III
TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION
On 11 July 2018, Petitioner Arvin A. Pascual received a copy of

the Honorable Court of Appeals’ Resolution1 dated 25 June 2018
denying his Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Court of
Appeals’ Decision2 of 15 January 2018 in the case entitled Sitel
Philippines Corp., et. al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission and
Arvin A. Pascual docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP. No. 146445.
1 Certified true copy attached as Annex A
2 Certified true copy attached as Annex B
2
As provided for under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, Pascual has fifteen (15 days) or until 26 July 2018 within which
to file this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Thus, Pascual seasonably filed this Petition within the allowed

period of time.
IV
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1] On 8 December 2014, Pascual was compelled to give up

employment in Sitel after eight (8) long years of service. Pascual’s
coerced resignation consequent to hostile work environment,
diminution in pay, and pattern of discriminatory acts committed by
respondents took place barely four (4) months after his promotion as
supervisor-coach assigned to Sitel’s Comcast Customer Service
Group account. Pascual sent his notice of resignation3 via email to
Sitel’s Chief Operating Officer Michael Lee (“Lee”) on December 8,
2014.
The contents of Pascual’s resignation letter are fraught with

colors of gripes, disappointments, frustrations and heartaches against
respondents. Contents that would undeniably reveal that the element
of voluntariness is absent.
2] The following day or on 9 December 2014, Pascual sought

immediate official recourse to contest his separation from service
through a complaint for illegal withholding of salary, illegal suspension,
and constructive dismissal with the National Labor Relations
Commission.
3] Deeply concerned that an offense of job abandonment may

be imputed against him and to prevent respondent Reyes from further
inflicting harm or damage against his person and professional career,
Pascual personally met respondent Reyes on 11 December 2014 at
the Comcast CSG production floor and tried to furnished her with a
copy of his resignation letter. However, respondent Reyes refused to
acknowledge in writing her copy of the notice.
4] On 16 December 2014,4 Pascual sent a letter to respondent

Argana pleading for the immediate release on or before 22 December
2014 of all monies illegally withheld from his salaries during pay
3 Annex T up to Annex T-3 of Pascual’s position paper attached hereto as Annex F

4Annex W of Pascual’s position paper copy of which was personally received on 16 December
2014 by Shiela Morales – HR Assistant of respondent Argana.
3
periods November 6 to 20, 2014 and November 21, 2014 to December
5, 2014. Respondent Argana denied the request of Pascual without
offering any plausible or legal explanation.
5] Being at the throes of financial trauma, one of Pascual’s

prayer is reinstatement. Although in an account other than Comcast
Customer Service Group because it would be uncomfortable for him to
continue working under the hostile eyes of respondents Reyes and
Canda.
6] Regrettably, respondents downrightly turned down Pascual’s

desired reinstatement during the mandatory conciliation-mediation
proceedings under SEnA of the Department of Labor and Employment
justifying that he is already resigned.
7] At the risk of a protracted legal battle against an employer

such as respondent Sitel with vast and superior resources as well as
skilled legal services, coupled with the uncertainty of winning and the
prospect of a prolonged unemployment, Pascual nevertheless is
vigorously pursuing the litigation of his action against respondents for
the protection of his constitutional right to security of tenure. Pascual’s
job being his only possession and means of livelihood.
LABOR ARBITER RULING
8] On 8 September 2015, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a

Decision5 holding that –
8.1] It was Pascual who terminated his own employment,

not respondents, by sending a resignation letter via email to
respondent Lee on 8 December 2014 and the same was duly
accepted.
8.2] Pascual’s resignation was irrevocable on the basis of

the following phrases in the resignation letter “returning to
and working at the Comcast CSG x x x would be
unreasonable or unlikely given the pervading
circumstances in the workplace.”6
8.3] Pascual’s five-day suspension is not illegal being a valid

exercise of management prerogative;
5 Annex C
6 Annex C, LA Decision, page 7
4
8.4] Reinstatement is denied;7 and
8.5] The amount of Php14,738.69 was illegally withheld

from Pascual’s salary as his absences were duly covered
with verified medical certificates.8 Sitel did not appeal this
LA’s ruling.
9] Pascual assailed the LA’s Decision with respect to the issues

pertaining to his resignation and suspension by way of appeal to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
NLRC RULING
10] In a Decision9 promulgated on 4 March 2016, the NLRC

affirmed the LA’s finding that the amount of Php14,738.69 was indeed
illegally withheld by respondents from Pascual’s salary as his
absences were duly covered with verified medical certificates.
Respondents did not move to reconsider the NLRC’s ruling.10
11] On the issue of Pascual’s 5-day suspension, the NLRC

similarly affirmed that Pascual’s five-day suspension is a valid exercise
of management prerogative.
12] On the issue of constructive dismissal, the NLRC ruled in the

affirmative inasmuch as Pascual’s claim of forced resignation is
supported by substantial evidence extant in the records of the case.
Moreover, his narration of facts did past the test of credibility being
more consistent with logic and ordinary human experience. On the
contrary, respondents failed to overcome their burden to prove that
Pascual indeed voluntarily resigned.
13] The NLRC further ratiocinated that the LA's inordinate

nitpicking on the circumstances surrounding the events prior to the
issuance of Sitel’s suspension order on 21 November 2014 evolved into
findings and conclusions that are not in accord with prudence, common
sense and sound judgment. It judiciously pointed that the LA failed to
consider the series of events that transpired during and after 21
November 2014 when the suspension order was served to Pascual.
Events so unbearable on the part of Pascual leaving him with no option
but to forego with his continued employment. These events are as
follows:

9 Annex D
10 Annex D, NLRC Decision, page 23
5
13.1] that Sukumar casted aspersions upon the credibility of
Pascual and his legal counsel when the suspension order
was served to him on 21 November 2014;11
13.2] that Reyes berated Pascual in front not only of

Pascual’s subordinates in the call center floor, but other
officers on 3 December 2014;12
13.3] Diminution in pay in the amount Php14,738.69 from

Pascual’s salary despite submission of verified medical
certificates;13
13.4] Pascual’s various plea for the release of the

aforestated illegally withheld amount were all ignored by
Respondents;14
13.5] After illegally withholding the amount of Php14,738.69,

it was only then that Pascual was given opportunity by Reyes
to explain why he must not be meted a 3-day suspension for
allegedly being on AWOL. Worse, Pascual was only given
24 hours to file his answer to the charges of AWOL. A
discriminatory act of Reyes inasmuch as Sitel’s company
rules provide an employee who is being charged with the
same infraction must be given 48 hours to answer;15 and
13.6] That officials higher in rank than Pascual like individual

respondents [Canda, Argana] were not subjected to
disciplinary investigation by Sitel despite their inactions for a
number of months on the Remion case prior to Pascual’s
transfer to Comcast Customer Service Group. The NLRC
finds no valid and acceptable explanation on this unequal
treatment by all of the respondents in the manner by which
the disciplinary investigation of the Remion case was
undertaken.16
14] Respondents sought the NLRC to reconsider its 4 March

2016 Decision that Pascual was constructively dismissed. In a
Resolution17 issued on 13 May 2016, the NLRC denied respondents’
motion for reconsideration reasoning, among others, that Pascual
“vividly presented, by way of documentary and testimonial
evidence, his experiences and the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable
12 Annex D, NLRC Decision, pages 21-22
14 Annex D,NLRC Decision, page 23
17 Annex E
6
working conditions he was made to endure by respondents.
These averments have not been successfully refuted by
respondents x x x”18
15] Dissatisfied with the NLRC’s Decision and Resolution,

respondents filed a petition for certiorari with application for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals.
COURT OF APPEALS RULING
16] On 15 January 2018, the Court of Appeals (CA), relying

principally on the allegations of the respondents and the Decision of
the LA dated 8 September 2015, nullified the NLRC’s Decision of 4
March 2016 and Resolution of 13 May 2016 ascribing grave abuse of
discretion. The ratiocinations of the CA are summarized as follows:
16.1] It was Pascual who created the harsh, hostile and

unfavorable condition in the workplace by refusing to
cooperate in the investigation of the Remion case thereby
antagonizing respondents;19
16.2] There is no basis for the finding of the NLRC that a

harsh, hostile and unfavorable condition had already been
set for Pascual. The latter (Pascual) failed to support, by
substantial evidence, the allegations that harsh, hostile and
unfavorable environment had been intentionally set for him
by Sitel;20
16.3] The acts of Pascual before and after 18 December

2014 letter of resignation, clearly shows that Pascual
intended to voluntarily resign from his job. These acts are
as follows:21
a] on 8 December 2014, Pascual sent an email to

Sitel’s CEO Phil Lee manifesting his intention to
resign;
b] on 11 December 2014, Pascual brought a copy of

the resignation e-mail he sent to Phil Lee to Reyes,
asked her to read it and acknowledge its receipt;
18 page 3 of NLRC Resolution copy attached as Annex E

19 Annex B, CA Decision, page 9
7
c] on 12 December 2014, Pascual e-mailed a copy
of the resignation letter to Reyes;
d] on 15 December 2014, Pascual sent a hard copy

of the resignation letter via registered mail; and
e] on 18 December 2014, Pascual went back to

Reyes’ office with a resignation letter dated that
same day.
16.4] The LA was correct that it was Pascual who

relinquished his employment given that he was only
penalized with suspension.22
17] At this point, Pascual pleads to this Honorable Court to

rectify the above rulings of the Court of Appeals for not only do they
contravene the law and prevailing jurisprudence. These are also
irrational and unjust because material facts or circumstances have
been overlooked or misinterpreted by the Court of Appeals.
V
REASON FOR ALLOWING THE PETITION
ALTHOUGH THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT PASCUAL

WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED BY RESPONDENTS IS
FACTUAL IN NATURE AND AS A GENERAL RULE IS BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF RULE 45 PETITION, THE DIVERGENCE IN THE
FINDINGS OF FACT BY THE LABOR ARBITER, THE NLRC, AND
THE COURT OF APPEALS SUCH AS IN THIS CASE, BEHOOVES
THIS HONORABLE COURT TO REVIEW THE RECORDS AND THE
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES TO RESOLVE THIS FACTUAL
ISSUE AND RENDER SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE TO THE PARTIES
CONSISTENT WITH PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.
Jurisprudence has established that this Honorable Court is not

a trier of facts, and only errors of law are generally reviewed in
petitions for review on certiorari. Jurisprudence, though, has taught us
as well that this rule is not absolute. It admits of exceptions. In
Peñaflor vs. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corp., this Honorable
Court held that “In the labor law setting, We wade into factual issues
when conflict of factual findings exists among the labor arbiter, the
NLRC, and the CA.”23

23 G.R. No. 177114, 21 January 2010
8
In a similar vein, in the recent case of Reyes vs. Global Beer24
this Honorable Court enumerated the circumstances when It may look
into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings of
the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, as follows:
“As a general rule, only questions of law raised via a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are reviewable by this Court. Factual
findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, including labor
tribunals, are accorded much respect by this Court as they are specialized
to rule on matters falling within their jurisdiction especially when these
are supported by substantial evidence. However, a relaxation of this rule
is made permissible by this Court whenever any of the following
circumstances is present:
x x x
3. when there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. when the findings of fact are conflicting;”
x x x
Applying the foregoing jurisprudential principles and given the

fact that in the present case the Labor Arbiter’s finding that Pascual
was not constructively dismissed was reversed by the NLRC, whose
Decision was in turn overturned by the CA, reinstating the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision that there is no constructive dismissal, this conflict
falls within the ambit of one of the recognized exceptions.
VI
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT
PASCUAL WAS AT RESPONDENTS’ OFFICE ON 18 DECEMBER
2014 AND TENDERED HIS RESIGNATION LETTER DATED 18
DECEMBER 2014 AND THAT PASCUAL’S ACT BEFORE AND AFTER
THE 18 DECEMBER LETTER OF RESIGNATION CLEARLY SHOWS
THAT HE INTENDED TO VOLUNTARILY RESIGN FROM HIS JOB.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
PHYSICAL ACT OF SENDING RESIGNATION LETTER VIA EMAIL
AND REGISTERED MAIL IS CONCLUSIVE THAT PASCUAL’S
RESIGNATION IS VOLUNTARY NOTWITHSTANDING SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE THAT THE TEST OF VALIDITY OF RESIGNATION
IS DETERMINED BY CONSIDERING THE TOTALITY OF
CIRCUMSTANCES BEFORE AND AFTER THE RESIGNATION.
24 G.R. No. 222816, 4 October 2017
9
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE NLRC’S
DECISION DATED 4 MARCH 2016 AND RESOLUTION DATED 27
APRIL 2016 WHICH DECLARED THAT PASCUAL WAS
CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED NOTWITHSTANDING SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE THAT DIMINUTION IN PAY IS TANTAMOUNT
TO CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL.
VII
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS
THERE IS NOT AN IOTA OF EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT

PASCUAL WAS AT SITEL’S OFFICE ON 18 DECEMBER 2014 AND
TENDERED A RESIGNATION LETTER DATED THE SAME DAY TO
RESPONDENT REYES.
18] The reason adduced by the Court of Appeals in holding that

Pascual voluntarily resigned and subsequently ascribed grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the NLRC is Pascual’s “acts before and
after the December 18, 2014 letter of resignation.”25 Surprisingly,
nowhere could be found in the Court of Appeals’ Decision of 15
January 2018 what are these acts of Pascual after the 18 December
2014 tender of resignation.
19] In the same Decision of the Court of Appeals, it is stated

that “x x x and (v) on December 18, 2014, respondent went back
to the petitioner’s office with a resignation letter dated that same
day.” The records of the case, though, are barren of any documentary
or testimonial evidence that could prove that Pascual was physically
present at the respondents’ office on 18 December 2014 and tendered
a resignation letter dated 18 December 2014 as well. Hence, this
conclusion of the Court of Appeals is highly speculative. A bare claim
unsupported by proof.
20] Let it be underscored that even the fabricated Acceptance

of Resignation Letter document (Annex “8” of respondents, position
paper reproduced below for ready reference) belied the concocted
story of respondents that Pascual hand carried a resignation letter at
respondents’ office on 18 December 2014 and personally submitted
it to respondent Reyes.
10
21] A mere cursory examination of respondents’ fabricated
Acceptance of Resignation Letter document (hereafter referred to as
“fabricated document”) would readily reveal the following flaws and
inconsistencies:
21.1] It is dated 19 December 2014. It is not dated 18

December 2014;
21.2] It was signed by respondent Reyes on 19 December

2014;
21.3] The upper right hand portion of the fabricated

document indicates “hand delivered.” Clear as broad
daylight, Pascual was never at respondent Reyes’ office on
18 December 2014 considering the date of the fabricated
document and the date it was signed by respondent Reyes;
and
21.4] There is nothing in the fabricated document which

states that Pascual submitted a resignation letter dated
December 18, 2014. The body of the fabricated document
merely states: “This is to formally accept your resignation
received December 18, 2014 and effective December 18,
2018.”
22] Simple logic, even common sense, would dictate that there
is no more reason for Pascual to come back at respondents’ office on
18 December 2014 or any date thereafter and personally tendered his
11
letter of resignation to respondent Reyes given the fact that on 11
December 2014 the latter respondent already refused to acknowledge
receipt Pascual’s letter of resignation.
23] In fact, it was this refusal to acknowledge by respondent

Reyes and grave concern of Pascual that an offense of job
abandonment may be imputed against him by respondents that
constrained Pascual to resort to other modes of service of his
resignation letter (via email and registered mail), as follows:
23.1] a copy of his resignation letter26 dated 9 December

2014 was sent via electronic mail on 12 December 2014
(9:24 A.M.) with a notation beneath the signature line, as
follows:
“EXPLANATION
Service through electronic mail of the foregoing letter was

resorted to due to the refusal of Ms. Amor Reyes to acknowledge
receipt copy of this letter when I performed a personal service on
the wee hour of the morning on 11 December 2014, Comcast
Customer Service Group Production Floor.”
23.2] another copy was sent via registered mail with return
card on 15 December 2014 which was received by a certain
Rommie Ybanez on 18 December 2014 as evidenced by a
certification issued by the Pasig City Central Post Office27.
The copy sent by Pascual via registered mail has a similar
notation beneath the signature line, as follows:
“EXPLANATION
Service through electronic mail as well registered mail with

return card of the foregoing letter was resorted to due to the
refusal of Ms. Amor Reyes to acknowledge receipt copy of this
letter when I performed a personal service on the wee hour of
the morning on 11 December 2014, Comcast Customer Service
Group Production Floor.”
24] Needless to say, it is axiomatic in labor law that the employer

who interposes the defense of voluntary resignation of the employee
in an illegal dismissal case must prove by clear, positive and
convincing evidence that the resignation was voluntary; and that the
employer cannot rely on the weakness of the defense of the employee.
The requirement rests on the need to resolve any doubt in favor of the
26 Annex U up to Annex U-3 of Pascual’s position paper, Annex F

27 Annex V up to Annex V-3 of Pascual’s position paper, Annex F
12
working man. (Grande vs. Philippine Nautical [G.R. No. 213137, 1
March 2017])
25] It is worth noting, that a party alleging a critical fact must

support his allegation with substantial evidence, for any decision based
on unsubstantiated allegation and unreliable documentary evidence
[similar to the Acceptance of Resignation Letter document fabricated by
respondents] cannot stand, as it will offend due process. (Carlos vs.
Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 168096, 28 August 2007]) [Boldfacing
supplied and phrases in blue font mine]
26] Equally telling is that the fact of filing a resignation letter

alone does not shift the burden of proving that the employee’s
dismissal was for a just and valid cause from the employer to the
employee even if the resignation is irrevocable. (Peñaflor vs. Outdoor
Clothing [G.R. No. 177114, 13 April 2010])
27] It appears indubitably that other than the fact that Pascual
sent copies of his resignation letter via email and registered mail as
stated in the 15 January 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
records are bereft of any evidence that its execution was voluntary.
28] Precisely because of the unrefuted series of events that

transpired during and after 21 November 2014 when the suspension
order was served to Pascual enumerated in the 4 March 2016 Decision
of the NLRC, Pascual was compelled to sever his ties with respondent
Sitel leading to his constructive dismissal. These series of events,
found by the NLRC as buttressed by substantial evidence, are as
follows:
28.1] that respondent Sukumar casted aspersions upon the

credibility of Pascual and his legal counsel when the
suspension order was served to him on 21 November 2014;
28.2] that respondent Reyes berated Pascual in front not

only of Pascual’s subordinates in the call center floor, but
other officers on 3 December 2014;
28.3] Diminution in pay consequent to respondents’ act of

withholding the amount Php14,738.69 from Pascual’s salary
despite submission of verified medical certificates;
28.4] Pascual’s various plea for the release of the

aforestated illegally withheld amount were all ignored by
respondents;
13
28.5] After peremptorily withholding the amount of
Php14,738.69, it was only then that Pascual was given
opportunity by respondent Reyes to explain why he must not
be meted a 3-day suspension for allegedly being on AWOL.
Worse, Pascual was only given 24 hours to file his answer to
the charges of AWOL. A discriminatory act of Reyes
inasmuch as Sitel’s company rules provide an employee who
is being charged with the same infraction must be given 48
hours to answer; and
28.6] That officials higher in rank than Pascual like individual

respondents [Canda, Argana] were not subjected to
disciplinary investigation by Sitel despite their inactions for a
number of months on the Remion case prior to Pascual’s
transfer to Comcast Customer Service Group. The NLRC
finds no valid and acceptable explanation on this unequal
treatment by all of the respondents in the manner by which
the disciplinary investigation of the Remion case was
undertaken.
29] It is worth noting that jurisprudence is abound with cases that

recite the circumstances leading to an employee’s constructive
dismissal. “Constructive dismissal is a cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or
both.”28 It also “exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility
or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee
leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued
employment.”29 In the same vein, it “exists when the resignation on the
part of the employee was involuntary due to the harsh, hostile and
unfavorable conditions set by the employer.”30 Relevantly, “an
employee who is forced to surrender his position through the
employer’s unfair or unreasonable acts is deemed to have been
illegally terminated and such termination is deemed to be
involuntary.”31 The test of constructive dismissal is whether a
reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt
compelled to give up his position under the circumstances.32
30] All told, the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it used a
wrong consideration in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the NLRC. The conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals is
28 McMer Corporation vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 193421, 4 June 2014)

29 PhilAm vs. Gramaje (G.R. No. 156963, 11 November 2004)
30 ICT Marketing Services vs. Sales (G.R. No. 202090, 9 September 2015)
31 Siemens Phils. vs. Domingo (G.R. No. 150488, 28 July 2008)
32 McMer Corporation vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 193421, 4 June 2014)
14
fundamentally wrong and there is no legal principle upon which it can
be sustained. Noticeable too is the fact that what the Court of Appeals
did was at best a selective appreciation of portions of the entire
evidence.
PASCUAL’S PHYSICAL ACT OF SENDING COPIES OF HIS

RESIGNATION LETTER VIA EMAIL AND REGISTERED MAIL TO
RESPONDENTS DOES NOT ESTABLISH A FACT THAT HIS
RESIGNATION IS VOLUNTARY.
31] The Court of Appeals, in its Decision of 15 January 2018,

discussed the nature of resignation citing the jurisprudential principles
laid down by the Supreme Court in Chiang Kai Shek College vs.
Torres (G.R. No. 189456, 2 April 2014). The obvious intention is to
buttress its conclusion that Pascual voluntary resigned on the basis of
the following acts of Pascual:
31.1] on December 8, 2014, Pascual sent an email to Sitel’s

CEO, Phil Lee manifesting his intention to resign;
31.2] on December 11, 2014, Pascual brought a copy of the

resignation e-mail he sent to Phil Lee to Reyes, asked her
to read it and acknowledge its receipt;
31.3] on December 12, 2014, Pascual e-mailed a copy of

the resignation letter to Reyes;
31.3] on December 15, 2014, Pascual sent a hard copy of

the resignation letter via registered mail; and
31.4] on December 18, 2014, Pascual went back to the

petitioner’s office with a resignation letter dated that same
day.
32] The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Chiang Kai

Shek case regarding the nature of resignation, as follows:
“Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a

situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be
sacrificed for the favor of employment, and opts to leave rather
than stay employed. It is a formal pronouncement or
relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the
office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to
relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the
acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must
be considered in determining whether, he or she, in fact, intended
to sever his or her employment.”
15
33] From the foregoing nature of resignation, two factors are
indispensably necessary to be assessed in order to establish with
utmost certainty whether the execution of the resignation letter by the
employee is voluntary or involuntary. In this regard, none of the acts
mentioned by the Court of Appeals in paragraph no. 31 is
determinative that Pascual voluntarily resigned.
34] As stated by this Honorable Court in Grande vs. Phil.

Nautical Training School.33 “In order to withstand the test of validity,
resignations must be made voluntarily and with the intention of
relinquishing the office, coupled with an act of relinquishment.
Therefore, in order to determine whether the employees truly intended
to resign from their respective posts, we must take into consideration
the totality of circumstances in each particular case.” Guided by these
norms, the two factors that comprise the totality of circumstances as
could be gleaned from the Chiang Kai Shek case are the following:
34.1] FIRST FACTOR: the circumstances that transpired in

the workplace antecedent to the relinquishment of the job.
At this point, the following pronouncements of the
Supreme Court are instructive:
a] Thus, in Peñaflor vs. Outdoor Clothing (G.R. No.
177114, 21 January 2010) and San Miguel
Properties vs. Gucaban (G.R. No. 153982, 18 July
2011) the Supreme Court was able to establish with
utmost certainty that the execution of the resignation
letter was not voluntary after a careful and thorough
analysis of the circumstances pervading in the
workplace.
b] So that even though the resignation letter is

undated and a simple one-liner – “Please accept my
irrevocable resignation effective at the close of office
on March 15, 2000” as in the Peñaflor case, the
involuntary nature of Peñaflor’s resignation was
established due to a careful and thorough analysis of
the circumstances pervading in the workplace.
c] It should be noted that in rendering its judgment for

or against the voluntariness of the execution of the
resignation letter, the Supreme Court dwell as well
into the contents of the resignation letter such as it did
in Gilles vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 149273, 5
33 G.R. No. 213137, 1 March 2017
16
June 2009), ICT Marketing vs. Sales (G.R. No.
202090, 9 September 2015), and Lagahit vs. Pacific
Concord (G.R. No. 177680, 13 January 2016).
d] It well to note that in Chiang Kai Shek College vs.

Torres (G.R. No. 189456, 2 April 2014), the Supreme
Court did not only analyze the contents of Torres’
resignation letter which the latter claimed to be
involuntarily executed. It also took into account the
circumstances that transpired in the workplace
antecedent to the writing of Torres’ resignation letter.
In the end, the Supreme Court held that Torres’
profession, the gravity of her infraction, and the fact
that she waited until the close of the school year to
challenge her impending resignation demonstrate
that she had bargained for a graceful exit and is now
trying to renege on her obligation.
34.2] SECOND FACTOR: the acts of the employee after

tender of resignation.
At this point, the following pronouncements of the

Supreme Court are instructive:
a] “Further, petitioner immediately filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal. Resignation, it has been held, is
inconsistent with the filing of a complaint.” (ICT
Marketing vs. Sales [G.R. No. 202090, 9 September
2015])
b] “We find from the records that Peñaflor sought

almost immediate official recourse to contest his
separation from service through a complaint for illegal
dismissal. This is not the act of one who voluntarily
resigned; his immediate complaints characterize him
as one who deeply felt that he had been wronged.”
(Peñaflor vs. Outdoor Clothing [G.R. No. 177114, 21
January 2010])
c] “Indeed, it would have been illogical for private

respondent herein to resign and then file a complaint
for illegal dismissal. Resignation is inconsistent with
the filing of the said complaint.” (San Miguel
Properties vs. Gucaban [G.R. No. 153982, 18 July
2011])
17
d] “Villareal’s immediate filing of a Complaint for
illegal dismissal to ask for reinstatement negates the
fact of voluntary resignation” (Peak Ventures vs. Heirs
of Nestor B. Villareal [G.R. No. 184618, 19 November
2014])
35] Prescinding from the above discussions, the conclusion is

inescapable that the Court of Appeals reversibly erred when it reversed
the NLRC’s ruling that Pascual was constructively dismissed and
affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling that Pascual voluntarily resigned. The
Court of Appeals inordinate nit picking on the physical act of submitting
a resignation via email and registered mail, led the Court of Appeals to
a conclusion not in accordance with jurisprudence.
BOTH THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NLRC CONCLUDED THERE

WAS DIMINUTION IN PASCUAL’S SALARY IN THE TOTAL
AMOUNT OF PHP14,738.69 WHICH RESPONDENTS REFUSED
TO PAY DESPITE VARIOUS PLEA BY PASCUAL.
36] It bears stressing that one of the reasons cited by the NLRC
in its Decision of 4 March 2016 in finding that Pascual was constructively
dismissed is the illegal withholding of his salary by respondents in the
amount of Php14,738.69.
37] The NLRC could not be more correct in its pronouncement

that Pascual was constructively dismissed when respondents illegally
withheld Pascual’s salary. Time and again, this Honorable Court have
declared that “that where an employee ceases to work due to a
demotion of rank or a diminution of pay, an unreasonable situation
arises which creates an adverse working environment rendering it
impossible for such employee to continue working for her employer.
Hence, her severance from the company was not of her own making
and therefore amounted to an illegal termination of employment.”34
38] This Honorable Court have held in jurisprudence that “What

made it impossible, unreasonable or unlikely for respondent to continue
working for SHS was the unlawful withholding of his salary. For said
reason, he was forced to resign x x x x It would be absurd to require
respondent to tolerate the unlawful withholding of his salary for a longer
period before his employment can be considered as so impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely as to constitute constructive dismissal. Even
granting that the withholding of respondent’s salary on November 30,
34 Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores (G.R. No. 150092, 27 September 2002)
18
2005, would not constitute an unlawful act, the continued refusal to
release his salary after the payroll period was clearly unlawful.”35
39] Also instructive along this line is Francisco vs. NLRC36 where
this Honorable Court declared that “A diminution of pay is prejudicial to
the employee and amounts to constructive dismissal.”
40] From these jurisprudential considerations and given the

undeniable fact that there was diminution in Pascual’s pay in the amount
of Php14,738.69, the Court of Appeals erred, contrary to law and
jurisprudence, and likewise abused its discretion in reinstating the
Decision of the labor arbiter holding that Pascual voluntarily resigned.
VIII
CONCLUDING STATEMENT
41] Pascual, at the time of his constructive dismissal by

respondents, has already rendered eight (8) long and faithful years of
service. His employment is his sole source of livelihood in order to
support three (3) children who are fully dependent on him for their
education, health, food, clothing, shelter, etc. It is most unlikely,
therefore, that he will disregard eight (8) years of employment service
and sacrifice the vital needs of his family by rendering himself jobless
most especially on a month of December without any extremely
compelling reason. Thus, bringing untold hardships and sorrows on
those dependent upon him for support.
42] Considering the hard times in which we are in, it is

incongruous for Pascual to simply give up his work after receiving a
mere suspension from respondents. “No employee would recklessly
abandon his job knowing fully well the acute unemployment problem
and the difficulty of looking for a means of livelihood nowadays. With a
family to support, we doubt very much that respondent would so easily
sacrifice his only source of income and unduly expose his family to
hunger and untold hardships. Certainly, no man in his right mind would
do such thing.”37
43] At the risk of a protracted legal battle against an employer

such as respondent Sitel with vast and superior resources as well as
skilled legal services, coupled with the uncertainty of winning and the
prospect of a prolonged unemployment, Pascual nevertheless is
vigorously pursuing the litigation of his action against respondents for
35 SHS Perforated Materials, Inc. vs. Manuel F. Diaz (G.R. No. 185814, 13 October 2010)
36 G.R. No. 170087, 31 August 2006
37 Hantex Trading vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 148241, 27 September 2002)
19
the protection of his constitutional right to security of tenure. Pascual’s
job being his only possession and means of livelihood.
44] Equally telling at this point is the jurisprudential yardstick laid

down by this Honorable Court in Peñaflor vs. Outdoor Clothing
Manufacturing Corp.38 The pertinent portions of which state that:
“Another basic principle is that expressed in Article 4 of the Labor Code

– that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor
Code should be interpreted in favor of the workingman. This principle
has been extended by jurisprudence to cover doubts in the evidence
presented by the employer and the employee. As shown above, Peñaflor
has, at very least, shown serious doubts about the merits of the
company’s case, particularly in the appreciation of the clinching evidence
on which the NLRC and CA decisions were based. In such contest of
evidence, the cited Article 4 compels us to rule in Peñaflor’s favor.”
45] In the end, all that Pascual pleads before this Honorable
Court is to carefully re-examine the facts, carefully apply the proper
laws and jurisprudence in their appropriate perspective and in
accordance with their intent, and hopefully, arrive at a more
circumspect decision to ensure protection of a lowly working man like
petitioner herein.
46] Also forming part of this Petition are the following documents
filed by the parties with the labor arbiter and the NLRC:
Annex “F” - Pascual’s position paper

Annex “G” - Pascual’s reply to Sitel’s position paper
Annex “H” – Pascual’s rejoinder to Sitel’s reply to Pascual’s position
paper
Annex “I” - Sitel’s position paper
Annex “J” - Sitel’s reply to Pascual’s position paper
Annex “K” - Pascual’s memorandum on appeal
Annex “L” - Sitel’s answer to Pascual’s memorandum on appeal
Annex “M” - Pascual’s rejoinder to Sitel’s answer to Pascual’s
memorandum on appeal
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, petitioner Arvin A. Pascual respectfully prays
that this Honorable Court render judgment modifying the Decision
dated 15 January 2018 and Resolution dated 25 June 2018 of the
Court of Appeals by:
1] declaring the Petitioner Pascual is constructively dismissed;

and
38 G.R. No. 177114, 21 January 2010
20
2] Reinstating the Decision dated March 4, 2016 and the
Resolution dated 13 May 2016 issued by the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 10-002757-15 (NLRC
NCR Case No. 05-05071-15).
Petitioner likewise prays for such other reliefs and remedies as

may be deemed just or equitable under the premises.
Bocaue, Bulacan for the City of Manila, 24 July 2018.
Respectfully submitted.
AMADO S. SANDEL, JR.

Counsel for Petitioner
Crossing Mart, McArthur Highway,
Biñang 2nd, Bocaue, Bulacan
IBP Lifetime Member No. 02437
Roll of Attorneys No. 27207
PTR No. 1123128, Bocaue,
Bulacan, January 3, 2018
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0000370
August 1, 2016
Telephone Nos. (044) 278-6706
and (0917)587-5397
VERIFICATION
and
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
I, ARVIN A. PASCUAL, of legal age, Filipino citizen, and with

residence and postal address at No. 28 14th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon
City, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law do hereby
deposes and says that:
1] I am the Petitioner in the above-entitled Petition;
2] I have caused the preparation the foregoing Petition for

Review on Certiorari and have read the allegations contained therein;
3] The allegations in the said Petition for Review on Certiorari

are true and correct of my personal knowledge and/or on the basis of
copies of authentic documents and records in my possession;
21
4] I hereby certify that I have not commenced any other action
or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency;
5] To the best of my knowledge and belief, no such action or

proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency;
6] If I should thereafter learn that a similar action or

proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, I undertake to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
this Honorable Court; and
7] I executed this verification and certification against forum

shopping to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and to comply with
the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the Honorable
Supreme Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature

this 24th day July 2018 in the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of
Bulacan.
ARVIN A. PASCUAL
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, this 24th day of July

2018, in Bocaue, Bulacan, Affiant exhibiting to me his Driver’s License
No. N02-93-203385 issued by the Land Transportation Office
(expiration date July 20, 2019) bearing his photograph and signature
as competent proof of identity.
AMADO S. SANDEL, JR.

Notary Public
Until December 31, 2018
PTR No. 1123128
January 3, 2018, Bocaue, Bulacan
Roll of Attorneys No. 27207
Doc. No. :
Page No. :
Book No. :
Series of 2018.
22
WRITTEN EXPLANATION
Service of this PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI to

the Honorable Court of Appeals Former First (1st) Division,
respondents Sitel Philippines Corporation, Michael Lee, Aswin
Sukumar, Phoebe Monica Argana, Remil Canda, and Amor Reyes and
Atty. Jose Gerardo F.C. Villacarlos (counsel of record of respondents)
was not done personally but through registered mail due to distance
and lack of manpower to effect personal service.
AMADO S. SANDEL, Jr.
Copy furnished:
COURT OF APPEALS
FORMER FIRST (1ST) DIVISION
Ma. Orosa Street, Ermita
Manila
RR No. _____________________________
At: Bocaue, Bulacan
On July _______, 2018
SITEL PHILIPPINES CORPORATION

4/F Sitel Building, Ortigas Home Depot Complex
One Julia Vargas Ave., Barrio Ugong 1605
Pasig City
RR No. _____________________________
At: Bocaue, Bulacan
On July _______, 2018
ATTY. JOSE GERARDO F.C. VILLACARLOS

INES & VILLACARLOS LAW OFFICES
Unit 707 7th Floor South Center Tower
2206 Market Street, Madrigal Business Park
Alabang, Muntinlupa City
RR No. _____________________________
At: Bocaue, Bulacan
On July _______, 2018
23

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. ____________________

SITEL PHILIPPINES CORP.

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Petitioner, by counsel, and to this Honorable Supreme Court,

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition

Petitioner ARVIN A. PASCUAL (“Pascual”) is a Filipino citizen,

Respondent SITEL PHILIPPINES CORPORATION (“Sitel”) is a

Respondents Sitel’s Chief Operating Officer MICHAEL LEE

On 11 July 2018, Petitioner Arvin A. Pascual received a copy of

Thus, Pascual seasonably filed this Petition within the allowed

1] On 8 December 2014, Pascual was compelled to give up

The contents of Pascual’s resignation letter are fraught with

2] The following day or on 9 December 2014, Pascual sought

3] Deeply concerned that an offense of job abandonment may

4] On 16 December 2014,4 Pascual sent a letter to respondent

3 Annex T up to Annex T-3 of Pascual’s position paper attached hereto as Annex F

5] Being at the throes of financial trauma, one of Pascual’s

6] Regrettably, respondents downrightly turned down Pascual’s

7] At the risk of a protracted legal battle against an employer

LABOR ARBITER RULING

8] On 8 September 2015, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a

8.1] It was Pascual who terminated his own employment,

8.2] Pascual’s resignation was irrevocable on the basis of

8.3] Pascual’s five-day suspension is not illegal being a valid

8.5] The amount of Php14,738.69 was illegally withheld

9] Pascual assailed the LA’s Decision with respect to the issues

10] In a Decision9 promulgated on 4 March 2016, the NLRC

11] On the issue of Pascual’s 5-day suspension, the NLRC

12] On the issue of constructive dismissal, the NLRC ruled in the

13] The NLRC further ratiocinated that the LA's inordinate

7 Annex C, LA Decision, page 7

13.2] that Reyes berated Pascual in front not only of

13.3] Diminution in pay in the amount Php14,738.69 from

13.4] Pascual’s various plea for the release of the

13.5] After illegally withholding the amount of Php14,738.69,

13.6] That officials higher in rank than Pascual like individual

14] Respondents sought the NLRC to reconsider its 4 March

15] Dissatisfied with the NLRC’s Decision and Resolution,

COURT OF APPEALS RULING

16] On 15 January 2018, the Court of Appeals (CA), relying

16.1] It was Pascual who created the harsh, hostile and

16.2] There is no basis for the finding of the NLRC that a

16.3] The acts of Pascual before and after 18 December

a] on 8 December 2014, Pascual sent an email to

b] on 11 December 2014, Pascual brought a copy of

18 page 3 of NLRC Resolution copy attached as Annex E

d] on 15 December 2014, Pascual sent a hard copy

e] on 18 December 2014, Pascual went back to

16.4] The LA was correct that it was Pascual who

17] At this point, Pascual pleads to this Honorable Court to

ALTHOUGH THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT PASCUAL

Jurisprudence has established that this Honorable Court is not

22 Annex B, CA Decision, page 11

Applying the foregoing jurisprudential principles and given the

24 G.R. No. 222816, 4 October 2017

THERE IS NOT AN IOTA OF EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT

18] The reason adduced by the Court of Appeals in holding that

19] In the same Decision of the Court of Appeals, it is stated

20] Let it be underscored that even the fabricated Acceptance

25 Annex B, CA Decision, page 10

21.1] It is dated 19 December 2014. It is not dated 18