Politics and the Limits of Modernity

Author(s): Ernesto Laclau

Source: Social Text, No. 21, Universal Abandon? The Politics of Postmodernism (1989), pp. 63-
82
Published by: Duke University Press
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Politics and the Limits of Modernity
ErnestoLaclau

The themeofpostmodernity, whichfirstappearedwithin aesthetics,

has been displacedtoeverwiderareasuntilithasbecomethenew
horizonofour cultural, philosophical,and politicalexperience.In
thelatter realm,towhichI shallherelimitmyanalysis, postmodern-
ityhasadvancedbymeansoftwoconverging intellectual
operations
whose complexinterweavings and juxtapositions have,however,
alsocontributed toa largeextent toobscuring theproblems athand.
Bothoperations share, without one
doubt, characteristic: theattempt
toestablish boundaries, thatis tosay,toseparatean ensembleofhis-
toricalfeaturesand phenomena(postmodern)fromothersalso
appertaining tothepastandthatcanbe groupedundertherubricof
modernity. In bothcases the boundariesof modernity are estab-
lishedinradically differentways. The first
announces a weakening of
themetaphysical andrationalist of
pretensions modernity, byway of
challenging thefoundational statusofcertain narratives.
Thesecond
challengesnottheontological statusofnarrativeas such,butrather
thecurrent validityofcertainnarratives:thosethatLyotard hascalled
metanarratives (meta-recits), whichunified thetotalityofthehistor-
icalexperience ofmodernity (including scienceas one ofitsessen-
tialelements)within theprojectofglobal,humanemancipation.
In whatfollows, I shallconsiderthestatusofmetanarratives and
offer as basictheses:1) thattherehas beena radicalchangein the
thought andculture ofthepastfewdecades(concerning whichthere
no
wouldbe inconvenience inconsidering itas theentry toa sortof
postmodernity), which, however, passesneither through a crisisnor,
muchless,to an abandonment of metanarratives;2) thatthevery

63

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64 ErnestoLaclau

idea of the abandonmentof metanarratives is logicallycontradictory

foritreproduceswithinpostmoderndiscoursethe "logic of founda-
tions"thatsupposedlycharacterized modernity; and 3) thatthedeci-
sive change relatesto the new statusof the discursiveand the new
languagegamespracticedaroundnarratives -of all sorts,metanarra-
tivesincluded.The veryidea of a boundarybetweenmodernity and
postmodernity markedby theoutmodednessof metanarratives pre-
supposes a theoreticaldiscoursein which the end of somethingis
thinkable,which is to say,transparent and intellectually graspable.
Whatdoes itmeanforsomethingto "end"?It maybe conceived,in a
teleologicalsense, as theattainment of itshighestform;in a dialec-
ticalsense, as itstransformation intoitscontrary; in themovementof
the eternalreturn,as a momentin theperiodicbecomingof forms;
or as an annihilationthatmanifests itsradicalcontingency. This is to
say that a discourse is required that can conceive and construct the
separation--eventemporalseparation--of two entities.
To merely
proclaimthe end ofsomethingis an emptygesture.
Even worse,theuncriticalintroduction of the categoryend intoa
discourse,to substitute an effective "makingan end" forthevoluri-
taristtransparency ofa simplyannouncedand postulatedend,means
to smuggle back in what was to have been jettisoned.This can
happen in twoways.First,insofaras somethingends,somethingrad-
icallydifferent mustcommence.In such a case, it is impossibleto
avoid the categoryof the "new" and the idea of an innovativevan-
guard,which is preciselywhatthe discourseof postmodernity pur-
portsto have leftbehind.On theotherhand,to postulatetheoutmo-
dedness of metanarratives (withouttakinginto considerationwhat
happensto othernarrative species) is to achieverathermodestintel-
lectualgains in comparisonwiththeobjectivessought.The logic of
identity,of fullpresence,is simplydisplaced,fullyintact,fromthe
of
field totality to thefieldof multiplicity of atomizednarratives.
If thereis a sense of postmodernity, is, an ensemble of pre-
that
theoreticalreferencesthatestablishcertain"familyresemblances"
among itsdiversemanifestations, thisis suggestedby theprocess of
erosionand disintegration ofsuchcategoriesas "foundation," "new,"
"identity,""vanguard," and so on. What the "situation ofpostmodern-
ity" challenges is not so much the discriminationand choice
betweensocial and culturalidentitiesbut the statusand logic of the

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 PoliticsandtheLimitsofModernity65

construction of thoseidentities. Consequently, drawingup the limits

of modernity involvesa more complexand evolvingoperationthan
merelysettingboundaries.Postmodernity cannotbe a simple rejec-
tion of modernity;rather,it involvesa different modulationof its
themesand categories,a greaterproliferation of itslanguagegames.
Some of these games,whichavoid conceivingthe traditionwith
which theyplay in termsof rejectionor affirmation of the radical
novelty of the present,have long been inscribed in the intellectual
historyof this century.What Heidegger has called the "de-struction
of thehistoryof ontology"is an example:
Theanswer(to thequestionofBeing)is notproperly conceivedif
whatitassertspropositionallyis justpassedalong,especially ifitgets
circulatedas a free-floating
result,so thatwe merely getinformed
abouta "standpoint"whichmayperhapsdiffer fromthewaythishas
hithertobeentreated. Whether theansweris a "new"one remains
quitea superficialproblemandis ofno importance. Itspositive
charactermustlie in itsbeingancientenoughforus to learnto
conceivethepossibilitieswhichthe"ancients" havemadereadyfor
us.1
Thisexcludesthepossibility ofa simplerejection.Instead,itattempts
to tracethegenealogyof thepresent,dissolvetheapparentobvious-
ness of certaincategoriesthatare thetrivializedand hardenedsedi-
mentationsof tradition, and in thisway bringto view the original
problem to which theyconstitute a response.So, too, in Heidegger:
IfthequestionofBeingis to haveitsownhistory madetransparent,
thenthishardened tradition
mustbe loosenedup,and the
concealments whichithasbrought aboutbytaking thequestionof
Beingas ourclue,we areto destroy thetraditional
content ofancient
ontologyuntilwe arriveatthoseprimordialexperiences inwhichwe
achievedourfirstwaysofdetermining thenatureofBeing--the ways
whichhaveguidedus eversince.2
Thissame argumentcan be extendedto themostdiversetheoretical
discourses. Consider,for example, the categoryof "class" within
marxism.Centralto theseriesof recentexchangesare thefollowing
questions:Is itclassesor social movementsthatconstitute
thefunda-
mentalagentsof historicalchange in advancedindustrialsocieties?
Or, is the workingclass in the process of disappearing?But these
questionsare quitesecondarybecause,whateveranswerstheyelicit,
theypresupposewhatis fundamental: theobviousnessand transpar-

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 Laclau
66 Ernesto

encyof the category "class."The "de-struction" of the history of

marxism, in Heidegger's sense,involvesshowingthata category
suchas "class,"farfrom beingobvious, isalready a synthesis ofdeter-
a
minations,particular response to a more primary questionofsocial
agency.Because the contemporary situationposes thisproblem
againinmuchmorecomplexterms thanwereavailabletoMarx,itis
necessary tounderstand hisresponseas a partialandlimited synthe-
sis,while appreciating clearlytheoriginalsenseofhis ques-
more
tions.Thesenseofan intellectual intervention emergesonlywhenit
is possibleto reconstitute thesystem of questionsthatit seeksto
answer. On theotherhand,whenthesequestionsaretakenas simply
obvious,theirsenseis obscuredifnotentirely lost.Itis precisely the
limitation oftheresponses thatkeepsalivethesenseofa question.
In sketching outthelimitsofmodernity, we mustbe agreedon
what,inmodernity, isbeingputtothetest.Ifwe questionthespecific
valuesof thesocial/politicallintellectual projectthatbeganglobally
withtheEnlightenment, thenarrative of itscrisisrequirestheaffir-
mationofothervalues;this,however, notchangetheontologi-
does
cal statusofthecategory ofvalueas such.In thisregard, itis impor-
tantto pointoutthatthecritics ofmodernity havenoteventriedto
introduce different values.Whenthetheorists oftheeighteenth cen-
are
tury presented as the initiatorsof a of
project "mastery" that
wouldeventually leadtoAuschwitz, itisforgotten thatAuschwitz was
repudiated bya setofvaluesthat,in largepart,also stemfromthe
eighteenth century.So,too,whencriticism is directed atthecategory
oftotality implicitin metanarratives, only the possibility ofreuniting
the partialnarratives intoa globalemancipatory narrative comes
underfire;thecategory of"narrative"itself is leftcompletely unchal-
lenged.I wouldliketoarguethatitis precisely theontological status
ofthecentralcategories ofthediscourses ofmodernity, andnottheir
content, thatis at stake;thattheerosionofthisstatusis expressed
the
through "postmodern" andthatthiserosion,farfrom
sensibility;
a
being negative phenomenon, represents an enormousamplifica-
tionofthecontent andoperability ofthevaluesofmodernity, making
itpossibleto groundthemon foundations muchmoresolid than
thoseof the Enlightenment project(and itsvariouspositivist or
Hegelian-Marxist reformulations).

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 Politicsand the Limitsof Modernity 67

Languageand Reality

Postmodernity does notimplya changein thevaluesofEnlighten-

mentmodernity butrather a particular weakening oftheirabsolutist
character. Itis therefore necessary to delimit an analyticterrainfrom
whosestandpoint thisweakening is thinkable anddefinable. Thister-
rainis neither arbitrary norfreely accessibleto theimagination, but
on thecontrary itis thehistorical sedimentation ofa setoftraditions
whosecommondenominator is thecollapseoftheimmediacy ofthe
given.Wemaythusproposethattheintellectual historyofthetwen-
tiethcentury wasconstituted on thebasisofthreeillusionsofimme-
diacy (the referent,the phenomenon, andthesign)thatgaveriseto
thethreeintellectual traditions ofanalytical philosophy, phenome-
nology, andstructuralism. Thecrisisofthatillusionofimmediacy did
not,however, result solelyfrom the abandonment ofthosecatego-
riesbutrather from a weakening oftheiraspirations toconstitutefull
presencesand fromtheensuingproliferation of languagegames
whichitwaspossibletodevelopiroundthem.Thiscrisisoftheabso-
lutistpretensions of "theimmediate" is a fittingstartingpointfor
engaging those intellectualoperations that characterizethe specific
"weakening" we callpostmodernity Eachofthesethreeintellectual
traditions might serveas an equallyvalidpointofdeparture forour
analysis; in what follows, however, I shallbase myargument on the
in
crisis structuralism.
As is wellknown,structuralism was constituted aroundthenew
centrality itaccordedtothelinguistic model.Ifwe wantto concen-
trateon thecrisisof "immediacy," whichoriginally pretendedto
characterize thenotionof thesign,we shouldconcentrate notso
muchon theinvasion ofnewonticareasbythelinguistic modelbut
on the internal transformation of the linguistic model itself.The
crisisconsisted precisely in the increasing ofdefining
difficulty the
limitsoflanguage, or, more accurately, ofdefining thespecificiden-
tityofthelinguistic object.
In thisrespect, I couldmentionthreefundamental stagesin the
structuralisttradition. Thefirst is associated withSaussure, who,as it
is wellknown, triedtolocatethespecific of
object linguistics inwhat
he calledlangue,an abstraction fromtheensembleoflanguagephe-
nomenabased on a set of oppositionsand definitions, themost

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68 ErnestoLaclau

important ofwhichare: langue/parole, signifier/signified,

syntagm/
paradigm. twobasicprinciples
The thatoversawtheconstitution of
thelinguistic object were the propositions thatthere are no positive
termsin language, onlydifferences, and thatlanguageis formnot
substance.Bothprinciples werecentralto the category of value,
whichacquiredincreasing importance vis-t-vissignification in the
subsequent evolution of the structuralist tradition.
The increasing refinement oflinguistic formalism soon led,how-
ever,to an understanding that Saussurean theory basedon a set
was
ofambiguities thatcouldonlybe coveredoverbyrecourseto prin-
ciples thatcontradicted its basic postulates. Take the distinction
betweensignifier andsignified: iflanguageis all formand notsub-
stance,and ifthereis a perfect isomorphism betweentheorderof
thesignifier andthatofthesignified, howis itpossibleto establish
the difference betweenthe two?Saussurecould onlydo so by
recoursetotheideaofsubstance, phonicinone case,conceptual in
the other.As forthe distinction betweenlangue and parole-
betweenlanguageas collective "treasure" and itsuse byeach indi-
vidualspeaker-this distinction can be maintained only if one
assumesa subjectexteriorto thelinguistic system. Consequently,
oneofthefundamental oppositions ofthissystem wasrequiredtobe
externallydefined, thusconfining linguistic formalism withina new
limit.Beyondthispointitwas impossible to posita "linguistics of
discourse," ifbydiscourse we meana linguistic unitgreater thanthe
sentence. Saussurehadspokenofsemiology as a generalscienceof
signsin social life,but so as
long langue remained anchoredin the
materialityof the linguistic sign, such a project could notproceed
beyonda vaguely metaphorical andprogrammatic level.
Fromthispointon,post-Saussurean structuralism emphasized lin-
guisticformalism in itsbidto transcend theambiguities and incon-
sistenciesofSaussure's ownwork.This,then,is thesecondphase,in
whichHjelmslev, forexample,brokewiththestrictisomorphism
betweentheorderofthesignifier andtheorderofthesignified by
defining units smaller than the sign,whosedistinctive features areno
longerisomorphic. In thismanner, he was able to establish thedif-
ference between the two orders on purely formal grounds. Further-
more,thecritiquethathad been takingplace,oftheCartesianism
inherent in thecategory ofthesubject, madeitpossibleto progres-
sivelyshowthatthelinguistic interventions of individual speakers

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 Politicsand the Limitsof Modernity 69

revealpatternsand regularities conceivableonlyas systems ofdiffer-

ences. This enabled thelinguisticmodel to be expanded to thefield
of discourse.
Therewas,however,one further development.Once linguistic for-
malismhad radicallyeradicatedsubstance,therewas no wayof dis-
tinguishing betweenthosesystemsofdifferential positionsproperto
speech and the "extralinguistic" or "extradiscursive"actions to
which theyare linked,forboth speech and actionsare differential
positionswithinoperationsof much largerscope. But ifthisdevel-
opmentexpandedthevalue rangeof the "linguisticmodel,"thelin-
guisticobjecttendedto lose itsspecificity.In thissecond momentof
theradicalizationofstructuralism, thestablecharacteroftherelation
betweensignifier and signifiedhad not,however,been questioned;
only the structuralisomorphismbetweenthe twohad been broken.
The boundariesof linguistics had been expanded,but the immedi-
acy and the characteristicof fullpresence of its objectswere only
reaffirmed.
Whenthepresenceand self-evidenceof theseobjectshave faded,
we can detectthe transition to a thirdmoment,which,followinga
certaintradition,we can denominatepoststructuralism. Atissue now
was the fixedlinkbetweensignifierand signified.The quasi-Carte-
sian transparency thatstructuralformalism had establishedbetween
thepurelyrelationalidentities of thelinguisticsystemservedonlyto
make themmorevulnerableto anynew systemof relations.In other
words, as the ideal conditionsof closure were definedmore pre-
cisely,itwas increasingly more difficultto hold to theclosed charac-
ter of the system.From this point the radical questioningof the
immediacyand transparency of thesigntakesplace, thesundryvari-
antsofwhichare well known:the critiqueof thedenotation/conno-
tationdistinction in thelaterBarthes,theaffirmation of theprimacy
of thesignifier and theincreasingcentrality ofthe "real"vis-a-visthe
symbolicin Lacan,theemphasison the constitutive characterofdif-
ference,and thecritiqueofthe metaphysics ofpresencein Derrida.
The crisisoftheimmediacyofthesignappearsto be dominatedby
a double movement:while thesignifiedwas ever less closed within
itselfand could be definedonlyin relationto a specificcontext,the
limitsof thatcontextwere increasingly less well defined.In effect,
the verylogic of limitwas increasingly more difficult to define.For
Hegel, forexample,theperceptionof a limitwas theperceptionof

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70 EmestoLaclau

whatis beyondit;thelimit, then,lieswithin theconceivable. Struc-

turalism's relationalism
radical would thus be subsumable under the
category oftheinfinite regress. Thispointcouldbe generalized: the
mostdiverseforms ofcontemporary thought arepermeated bythe
relational characterofidentities inconjunction withtheimpossibility
ofintellectualmastery over the context. Consider thevariouscontor-
tionsofHusserl'sego/splits, andhisefforts toaffirm thetranscenden-
of the subject:the weakeningof the distinction
tal constitutivity
betwensemantics andpragmatics in Wittgensteinian and post-Witt-
gensteinian philosophy; thecharacter ofKuhn'sparadigms; theunre-
solvedproblemsinthetransition from epistemes todispositifs inFou-
cault;thepragmatic turnofdogmaless empiricism inQuine.Someof
these examples,especiallyHusserl's,are attempts to breakthe
impasseby means of an essentialist reaffirmation of closure. How-
ever,in the majority of cases, the realization of the of
openness con-
texthas beenthepointofdeparture fora radicalantiessentialist cri-
tique.
Letus turnourattention, atthispoint,to thevariousdimensions
openedup bytheunfixed character ofthesignifier/signified relation,
thatis,ofall identity.In thefirst place,itseffect is polysemic: ifa plu-
ralityofsignifieds is joinedin an unstablefashionto certainsignif-
iers,thenecessary resultis theintroduction ofequivocality (in the
Aristoteliansense). But ifone can affirm that this instability not
does
dependentirely on the equivocality of the signifier buton thecon-
textsinwhich the is
signifierused, itis no longer questionofequiv-
a
ocalitybutofambiguity in the
andunfixity, strict senseoftheterms.
Forexample,whenI say"downthehill"or "thesoftdownon his
cheek"3thetermdownis equivocal:itsmeaning variesinrelation to
different contexts,although in eachcontext itsmeaningis perfectly
clear.On theotherhand,ifI speakabout"democracy" inthepoliti-
cal contextofWestern Europeduring the cold war years,theambi-
guity of the term proceeds from the context itself, whichis consti-
tuted to some extent by the simultaneous presenceof communist
and anticommunist discourses.The term,therefore, is radically
ambiguous andnotsimply polysemous. Itis nota matter ofitsmean-
ingone thingincommunist discourse andanother inanticommunist
discourse;this,ofcourse,mayhappen,butifthatwerethesole dis-
tinguishing circumstance, we wouldbe leftwitha plurality ofper-
fectlywell-defined contexts and, consequently, with a case of simple

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 Politicsand the Limitsof Modernity 71

equivocalness.Somethingverydifferent, however,takesplace: since

both discoursesare antagonistic and yetoperatelargelyin thesame
argumentative context,thereis a looseningof the relationalsystems
thatconstitutethe identityof the term.Thus, the termbecomes a
floatingsignifier. This radicalambiguity, whichsubvertsthe fixity of
the sign,is preciselywhatgivesthecontextitsopenness.
Threeconsequencesfollowfromtheabove. First,thattheconcept
of discourseis notlinguistic butpriorto thedistinction betweenthe
linguisticand the extralinguistic. If I am buildinga wall and I tell
someone "handme a brick"and thenplace iton thewall,myfirstact
is linguisticand the second is behavioral,but it is easy to perceive
thattheyare bothconnectedas partof a totaloperation,namely,the
constructionof the wall. This relationalmomentwithinthe total
operationis neitherlinguistic norextralinguistic,foritincludesboth
typesofactions.If,on theotherhand,we thinkabout itpositively, the
concepts thatapprehend it must be prior to the linguistic/extra-
linguisticdistinction.Thisinstanceofgroundis called discourseand
is thereforecoterminouswith the "social." Because every social
action has a meaning, it is constitutedin the formof discursive
sequences thatarticulatelinguisticand extralinguistic elements.4
A second consequence is thattherelationalcharacterof discourse
is preciselywhatpermitsthe generalizationof the linguisticmodel
withinthe ensemble of social relations.It is not thatrealityis lan-
guage, but thatthe increasingformalization of the linguisticsystem
broughtaboutthedefinition ofa setofrelationallogicsthatembrace
more thanthelinguisticnarrowly defined.The act of placinga brick
butitsrelationto the linguisticact ofpre-
on a wall is not linguistic,
viouslyaskingforthebrickis a particulardiscursiverelation:a syn-
tagmaticcombinationof the two acts. The relationallogics of the
social widen considerably, which opens up the path towarda new
of
conceptualization objectivity.
The thirdconsequence clearlyderives fromthe two previous
ones. The radicalrelationalism ofsocial identitiesincreasestheirvul-
nerabilityto new relationsand introduceswithinthemtheeffectsof
ambiguity to whichwe referred above.
These threeconsequencesgive us a framework thatmakespossi-
ble an approximationto the postmodernexperience.If something
has characterizedthe discoursesof modernity, it is theirpretension
dominatethefoundationofthesocial,to givea ratio-
to intellectually

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72 ErnestoLaclau

nalcontextto thenotionofthetotality ofhistory, andto base inthe

theprojectofa globalhumanemancipation.
latter Assuch,theyhave
beendiscoursesaboutessencesandfully present identitiesbasedin
onewayor another the of a
upon myth transparent society.Postmod-
ernity,on the contrary, beginswhenthisfullypresentidentity is
threatened byan ungraspable exterior thatintroduces a dimension
ofopacityandpragmatism intothepretended immediacy andtrans-
parency of its This
categories. gives rise to an unbreachable abyss
betweenthereal(in theLacanian sense)andconcepts, thusweaken-
ingtheabsolutistpretensions ofthelatter. Itshouldbe stressed that
this"weakening" does not in anywaynegate the contents of the
projectofmodernity; itshowsonlytheradicalvulnerability ofthose
contentstoa pluralityofcontexts thatredefine theminan unpredict-
ableway.Once thisvulnerability is acceptedinall itsradicality, what
does notnecessarily followis eithertheabandonment oftheeman-
cipatoryvaluesor a generalized skepticism concerning them,but
rather,on the contrary,the awareness of the complexstrategic-dis-
cursiveoperations impliedbytheiraffirmation anddefense.
The narration of thebeginnings of postmodernity-as withall
beginnings--involves a multiple genealogy. In the nextsection,I
shallattempt totracethisinrelation toa particular tradition--marx-
ism-whichconstituted bothone ofthehighest pointsoftheeman-
cipatorynarrativesofmodernity andone oftheirfirst crises.Whence
theemergenceofa post-marxism or a postmodern marxism result-
ingfromthe new relationalcontexts in which thecategories clas-
of
sicalmarxism wereinvolved. Subjectto increasing tensions, these
categoriesbecameinvolved in newerand evermorecomplexlan-
guagegames.

Capitalism,UnevenDevelopment,and Hegemony
Letus clarify question;thenarrative
thesenseofourgenealogical
thecausesofa cer-
toestablish
thatis beingsoughtdoesnotattempt
tainprocess,ifbycauses we meanthatwhichpossesses all theinter-
nal virtualitiesthatbringabout an effect.If thatwere the case, we
would have simplyinscribedthe past anew onto the rationalistic
transparency of a conceptuallygraspable foundation.On the con-
trary, thedissolutionof a founda-
it is rathera questionof narrating

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 Politicsand the Limitsof Modernity 73

theradicalcontingency
tion,thusrevealing ofthecategories
linked
to thatfoundation.
My intentionis rather
revelatory thanexplana-
tory.
I shallbeginwitha central tenetofmarxism: thatcapitalism exists
onlybydintoftheconstant transformation ofthemeansofproduc-
tionand theincreasing dissolution of preexistingsocial relations.
The history ofcapitalism, therefore, is,on theone hand,thehistory
oftheprogressive destruction ofthesocialrelations generated byit
and, on the the
other, history of itsborder with socialforms exterior
to it.Actually,itis a questionoftwobordersthattheverylogicof
capitalism mustconstantly recreateand redefine. Such a situation
engenders twoconceptual alternatives:eitherthemovement ofthese
bordersis a processofcontingent struggle whoseoutcomeis largely
indeterminate, or itis History brought to a predetermined andpre-
determinable endbya cunning Reason,whichworkson thecontra-
dictionsofthatHistory. It is clearthata philosophy ofhistory can
only be formulated along the lines of the second And
alternative.
thereis littledoubtthatclassical-marxism followedthoselines.Suf-
fice it to mentionthe prefaceto A Contributionto theCritiqueof
PoliticalEconomy.5
Letus considerthislatteralternative in relationto theradically
relationalcharacter ofidentitydiscussedabove.Ifthelimitsofthe
systemcan be subverted bya reality exterior to it,then,insofaras
everyidentity is the
relational, new relationsofexterioritycannot but
transform theidentities. canremainstableonlyina closed
Identities
system.Is thereanycompatibility, then,betweentheideaofhistorical
the
agents--particularlyworking class--asidentities definedwithin
thecapitalistsystem, and thefactthat thesystem alwaysactsupona
exterior
reality toit?Yes,ifone acceptsthesolution putforthbyclas-
sical marxism: thatthe relationof exteriority can be internally
defined,sinceeveryexterior relationis destinedaprioritosuccumb
as a resultofcapitalist expansion.The internallogicofcapitalthus
comesto constitute therationalsubstrate ofHistory andtheadvent
ofsocialismis thought tobe madepossibleonlybytheresults ofthe
internalcontradictions of capitalism.
Ifthiswereall,little wouldbe lefttosayandtheattempts to trace
within marxist discourses thegenealogy ofa post-marxism wouldbe
doomedtofailure. Butthisis notthewholestory. In fact,
emergent
withinmarxismare diversediscoursesinwhichtherelationbetween

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74 ErnestoLaclau

the "internal"and the "external"has become increasingly complex

and has begun to deconstructthe categoriesof classical marxism.
The language games played around these categoriesbecame ever
more difficultand risky:"classes,"forexample,were conceived as
constitutedbyrelationalcomplexesquite removedfromthoseorig-
inallyattributedto them.
The historyof marxismhas metwithseveralsuch nodal moments
of ambiguityand discursiveproliferation. However,those phenom-
ena grouped under the rubricof "uneven and combined develop-
ment"mustbe singledout forspecial considerationbecause of the
varietyand centralityoftheeffectstheyhave produced.In a recently
publishedbook,6 I have described the basic lines of the emergence
and expansion of thisconcept of uneven and combined develop-
ment,and so I shall onlysummarizeitsdistinctive featureshere.At
thebeginning,thisconceptattempted onlyto characterizean excep-
tional context.The Russian bourgeoisie, having entered history
belatedly and consequentlyhaving been rendered incapable of
takingon thedemocratic tasksofoverthrowing czaristabsolutism,
gaveway tothe working class who assumed these tasks.Butthetasks
"proper" to the working class are socialistand not democratic.
Therefore, how does one define the "exceptionality" of one class
takingover another class'stasks?The name given to thistakingover
was "hegemony," butthenatureof therelationit impliedwas far
from beingclear.Wastherelation betweentheworking classandthe
democratic tasksittookon internal orexternal toitsnatureas class?
Andwhatdo we makeofthefactthatthisunevendevelopment soon
ceasedtohaveanexceptional character? Thesocialupheavals proper
to theage ofimperialism necessitated evermorecomplexarticula-
torypractices as a result
oftheiroperation ineverlessorthodox his-
toricalcontexts. Trotskycame to understand uneven and combined
development as thehistorical law of our era. But what,then,is
normaldevelopment supposedto be?
AtthispointI canreturn tosomeofthepointsmadeearlier. Every
(social or other type of) identityis relationaland vulnerable to the
subversion ofanyexteriority. Thisimpliesthatthecombination of
taskspropertounevendevelopment cannotbutmodify thenature of
thesocialagentsthatenactthem.Suchwas clearlythecase in the
emergence, duringtheeraofpopularfronts, ofsuchentities as "the
masses,"the"national," the"popular," etc.,excludedfrommarxist

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 Politicsand the Limitsof Modernity 75

discoursein theheydayof theSecondInternational. Butthisalso

implied,necessarily, thatthesuturing, foundational, andmetaphysi-
calvalueofclassist categories hadbeenradically questioned. Thatis,
ifclassistidentitiesaresubverted an
by exteriority, by new relational
and articulatorycontexts, theycannotbe thefoundationofHistory.
Thepragmatism andthecontingency passfromthetasktotheagents,
andthegroundofpossibility ofa philosophy ofHistory is dissolved.
Thisradicalquestioning ofthelogicoffoundations isprecisely the
weakening effectthatI andmycolleagueChantal Mouffe foundtobe
intrinsicto postmodern experience. Andbyexploring thosepoints
in themarxist tradition inwhichtheweakening effect operates, we
can tracethegenealogy ofa post-marxism. Let'slookat twoexam-
ples:SorelandGramsci. Sorelwasclearon twoissues:thatthelogic
of capitalistdevelopment did notmovein thedirection thatMarx
predicated, and that the participation of the workingclass in the
democratic politicalsystem led to itsintegrationwithin thatsystem.
The firstprocessweakenedthelogicofcapitalas thefoundation of
History;thesecondproducedthesameeffect ofweakening byshow-
ingthatthesocialidentity oftheworking classwasvulnerable tothe
newsystem ofrelations byvirtueofthatclass'sverypoliticalpartici-
pation.Sorel'sresponseto thisis wellknown:on theone hand,he
positeda theory ofmyth thatimplieda radicalrelationalism, foronly
violenceand thetotalseveranceof relations betweentheworking
classandthepolitical system permitted a proletarianidentity, andon
theother, theabsoluterejection oftheunderlying rationality ofHis-
tory,insofaras social relationsassumestructural coherenceonly
whenpatterned bymyth.
Gramscipresentsus withan identicalrelationalism thatleads,
however, totheoppositesolution. Sorelrejected allrelations ofexte-
and a
riority proposed pristine proletarian Gramsci,
identity. on the
contrary, fullyexplored the multiplicity of relational ensembles
whichdevelopedintheItalyofhistime,thussystematically expand-
ingthefieldofhegemonic relations,butas a resultofthathe hadto
acknowledge thatthepolitical subjects werenottheclassesbutwhat
he denominated as collectivewills.WhereSorelsawallparticipation
withinthepolitical system as a lossofidentity, Gramsci conceivedof
hegemonicarticulations as a processof creatingidentities. Both,
however, positedthesame relational, and ultimately ungrounded,
characterofidentities.

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76 ErnestoLaclau

Ifwe situatethese twoexamplesin a broaderhistoricalperspec-

tive,the directionour genealogicalexplorationshould takeis more
easilydiscerned.The systematic discoveryof discursiveareas in the
marxist traditionsaw the emergenceof new entitiesand categories
that,ratherthan prolong the basic concepts of classical marxism
throughtheircumulativeenrichment, added a logicallyunintegrat-
able supplementto them,in the mannerofwhatDerridahas called
the "logic of supplementarity" - thathingelikediscursiveplay that
rendersoppositionambiguous.I do notthinkitis an exaggerationto
argue that the fundamentalterminologicaladditionsto marxism,
fromLenin to Gramsci,constitutesupplementsin thisverysense.
The genealogyof marxism,then,coincideswiththe deconstruction
of itsmythof origins.
This mythis continuallynourishedby a multitudeof operations
thattend to conceal itsfissures.These operationsfindtheircrudest
formin thegloriousand invinciblemarxism-Leninism Ala Soviet,but
itat least has thevirtueof beingvisible,in the conspicuousclumsi-
ness ofthebureaucrat;thetrahisondes-clercs showsa greatersophis-
tication,which operates,however, in the service of concealment.All
of Lukics's sophisticationis reduced to mediationsthatmake the
highestformsof "bourgeois"culturecompatiblewitha transparent
notionofclass notmuchdifferent fromthatheld bya memberofthe
SovietAcademyof Science.More recently, a highlycapable groupof
Germantheoristswasteda greatdeal of theirtime,as well as thatof
theirreaders,in thealchemisticquest oftrying to derivetheconcept
of the Statefromthe conceptof Capital.When it comes to thelast
instance,the convictionsof the "refined"materialist are not much
different fromthoseof thevulgarmaterialist. Whatall thismeans is
thatthe historyof marxismloses its plurality;the languagegames
withinthathistoryand itsrelationto our periodare definedand cod-
ifiedbeforehand.Marxismis accepted or rejectedin toto; Marx's
textsare notread as one readstextsbyFreud,Hegel,or Plato,thatis,
byquestioningthemfromtheperspectiveof our own problemsand
presentsituation.
Rather,a finalrevelationis awaitedthatwill allow us to distance
ourselvesfromthereality we liveand to inhabita different history,an
illusory one to be sure.But when we take up our current problems,
our engagementwiththemis merelyimpressionistic and pragmatic.
Mostfrequently, the ultimateact of servilityand faithin the unityof

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 Politicsand the Limitsof Modernity 77

marxismis to abandonitcompletely;butthisservesonlyto maintain

the mythof itscoherenceand unity.
This attitudehas become so generalizedthatthe precedingargu-
mentsprobablysound a bitoutdated.Thisindifference to themarxist
tradition, however, leads to an loss
important as regardsthe consti-
tutionof a radicalpolitics.In the firstplace, thereis an impoverish-
ment of the tradition.If the isolated strugglescannot be inserted
withina wider horizon that"totalizes"an ensemble of an experi-
ence, the resultis the impossibility of constructing a radicalimagi-
nary. Furthermore, an abstract,nondeconstructive rejectionof a tra-
ditionin no wayimpliesgoingbeyondit.Thisbringsus back to our
originalproblem: to affirmthe end of somethingmeans nothing
unlesswe specifytheformin whichitends. BothSpinoza's philoso-
phyand Hitlerismhave historically come to an end in some sense,
but the different formsin whichwe conceivetheirend and closure
impingeupon us, withrespectto not onlyhow we determineour
relationto thepastbutalso how we defineour present.
Letus returnto our argumentsconcerningthedestruction ofa tra-
dition,in theHeideggeriansense. To set thelimitsof an answeris to
re-createthe originalmeaningof the question.To set the historical
limitsof marxismis to reestablisha livingdialogue withthattradi-
tion,to endow itwitha certaincontemporaneity againstthetimeless-
ness thatitsorthodoxdefendersattribute to it. In thissense, "post-
marxism"is notan "ex-marxism," foritentailsan activeinvolvement
in itshistoryand in thediscussionof itscategories.Butthisinvolve-
mentdoes not implya dogmaticaffirmation of itsunityand coher-
ence; rather,it requires of
specification its plurality. By tracingour
currentproblemswithinthe marxisttradition--inthe writingsof
Luxemburg,Bauer,Sorel, or Gramsci,in which manyviolentlyre-
pressedintuitions broughtabout deconstructive effects- itbecomes
a
possible to construct discoursethatcan creatively appropriatethe
past.Historicalamnesiais a recipeforparochialismat best.Atworst,
it leads to the appropriationof one's strugglesby antagonisticdis-
courses.
Here, however,it is necessaryto be more precise: if we are to
reconstructradical tradition(because this is preciselywhat this is
about),notas a necessarydeparturefroma pointoforigin,butas the
genealogyof thepresent,it is clear thatmarxismcannotbe itsonly
pointofreference. The pluralityofcurrentsocial struggles, emerging

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78 ErnestoLaclau

in a radicallydifferent and more complex world than could have

been conceived in the nineteenthcentury, entailsthe necessityof
breaking with the provincialmyth of the "universalclass." Ifone can
it is
talkabout universality, only in the sense of the relativecentrali-
ties constructedhegemonicallyand pragmatically. The strugglesof
theworkingclass,ofwomen,gays,marginalpopulations,third-world
masses,mustresultin theconstruction oftheirown reappropriations
oftraditionthroughtheirspecificgenealogicalefforts. Thismeans,of
course, thatthere is no a prioricentrality determined at the level of
structure,simply because there is no rational foundation of History.
that
The only"rationality" Historymightpossess is the relativeratio-
nalitygiven to it by thestrugglesand the concretepragmatic-hege-
monic constructions. Sorel'sand Gramsci'sbasic intuitionsoughtto
be radicallydevelopedwiththisin mind.Onlythus,byloweringthe
ontologicalpretensionsof marxistcategoriesand treatingthemnot
as thegroundof Historybutas pragmaticand limitedsynthesesof a
historicalrealitythatsubvertsand surpassesthem,will itbe possible
to entertaintheircurrent Thisputsus squarelywithinthedis-
validity.
cussion around postmodernity fromthe pointof view of marxism.
Two centralproblemsare at stake.The firstis thatof the conse-
quences ofthecollapseofthediscourseoffoundationfromthepoint
ofview of a radicalpoliticaldiscourse:does notthiscollapse lead to
politicalnihilism,to the impossibility of givinga foundationto the
politicalpractice and critique? The second refersto the unityof the
emancipatoryprojectas conceivedbytheEnlightenment: does not
anddispersion
theplurality ofthecurrent implyits
socialstruggles
abandonment
necessary as a globalproject?

andCommonSense
The ProcessofArguing

Thecollapseofthemyth offoundations deprives Historyandsociety

ofan ultimate meaning,ofanabsolutepointofdeparture forpolitical
reasoning in thesenseofa Cartesian cogito.In classicalontological
terms,this means thatthesocialis groundless; ifwe accepttherela-
tionalcharacter theidealconditions
ofall identity, ofclosurefora
system are neverachievedand therefore all identitymoreor lessa
is
floating This
signifier. lackof closuremodifies thenatureandimpor-
tanceofpoliticalargument intwo important senses.Inthefirst
place,

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 Politicsand the Limitsof Modernity 79

ifan ultimategroundis posited,politicalargumentwould consistin

discoveringthe actionof a realityexternalto the argumentitself.If,
however,thereis no ultimateground,politicalargumentincreasesin
importancebecause, throughtheconvictionthatitcan contribute, it
itselfconstructs, to a certainextent,thesocial reality.
Societycan then
be understoodas a vastargumentative texturethroughwhichpeople
constructtheirown reality.7
However,in a second sense, thistransition fromargumentas dis-
coveryto argumentas social construction entailsa necessarymodi-
ficationofthetypeofargument.On theone hand,ifwe could takeas
a pointof departurea foundationof the social operatingas cogito,
the argumentwould be of a logical or algorithmic typeinsofaras it
would constitute a forumof judgmentbeyondappeal. Withoutsuch
a forum,however,the argumentwould have the tendencyto prove
theverisimilitude ofan argumentratherthanitstruth, thusbecoming
pragmaticand open-ended.This bringsus back to the Aristotelian
notionofphronesis. Letus suppose thatwe are trying to determineif
an enemyis to attackby land or by sea. Recourse to an algorithm
would be to no avail;we could, however,reasonthatone possibility
is morelikelythantheother.Thisgreaterlikelihoodis,in turn,deter-
mined by otherargumentsused on otheroccasions. The ensemble
ofargumentsconstitutes thetextureofa group'scommonsense.And
thiscommonsense,extendedin time,is whatconstitutes a tradition
(of struggle, ofexerciseofpower,etc.).Now,since thistraditionis by
definition open-ended-that is,ungroundedin anyultimatealgorith-
miccertainty-itis responsiveto thediverseargumentative practices
thattakeplace in society.One argumentanswersanother,but in this
processofcounterargumentation, theargumentitself, thatis,itsown
identity,is itselfmodified in one way or another.
Here is the basis forour answer to the firstquestion.Abandon-
mentof the mythof foundationsdoes not lead to nihilism,just as
uncertainty as to how an enemywill attackdoes not lead to passivity.
It leads, rather,to a proliferation of discursiveinterventions and
argumentsthatare necessary,because there is no extradiscursive
realitythatdiscourse mightsimplyreflect.Inasmuch as argument
and discourse constitutethe social, their open-ended character
becomes thesource ofa greateractivismand a more radicallibertar-
ianism.Humankind,havingalwaysbowed to externalforces--God,
Nature,the necessarylaws of History--cannow,at the thresholdof

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80 ErnestoLaclau

postmodernity, consideritself
forthefirsttimethecreatorandcon-
structorof itsownhistory. The dissolution of themythof founda-
tions-and theconcomitant dissolutionofthecategory "subject"-
further radicalizesthe emancipatory offeredby the
possibilities
Enlightenment andmarxism.
Another objectioncouldbe raisedto thiswithdrawal offounda-
tions:wouldn'tthiseliminate anymotivation foraction?Arewe not
thenin thesituation,evokedbySartre, ofa chooserwithno motive
tochoose?This,however, isnota validobjection,forthelackoffoun-
dationsleads onlyto theaffirmation that"human"as such is an
empty butsocialagentsarenever"humans"
entity, ingeneral.On the
contrary,socialagentsappear in concrete situationsand are consti-
tutedbypreciseandlimited discursivenetworks. In thissense,lack
of grounding does notabolishthe meaningof theiracts;it only
affirmstheirlimits,
theirfinitude,andtheirhistoricity.

Global Emancipationand EmptySignifiers

I shallnow takeup thesecondproblemofwhether thedispersion

and pluralityofsocialstruggles dissolvetheglobalcharacter ofthe
emancipatory project. To be sure,one cannot smuggle in the unity
andtotality ofa projectonceone has rejecteditsfoundation. Butis
unity offoundation theonlyform oftotalizingpractice insociety? Are
therenotalso totalizing effects on thelevel of what we have called
pragmatichegemonicpractices? Rememberthatany identity is
ambiguousinsofar as itis unableto constitute itselfas a precisedif-
ference withina closedtotality. Assuch,itbecomesa floating signif-
ierwhosedegreeofemptiness depends on the distance thatsepa-
ratesit fromitsfixedness to a specificsignified.(Earlier, we used
"democracy" as an exampleofsucha signifier.) Thisdegreeoffixity
ofa signifiervaries in inverse proportion to the extentofitscircula-
tionin a givendiscursive formation. The ambiguity ofthesignifier
"democracy" is a directconsequence ofitsdiscursive centrality;only
thosesignifiers aroundwhichimportant socialpractices takeplace
aresubjecttothissystematic effectofambiguity. (Thesameargument
couldbe madeforthe"imprecision" ofpopulistsymbols.)
effective
In reality, ambiguity doesnotariseonlyfrom theattempts
tofixsignifierstoantagonistic discourses, although this lattercase is

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 Politicsand the Limitsof Modernity 81

more interesting to us. It mayhave a multiplicity of sources,and it

can be ascribed to the phenomenonof symbolicrepresentation. A
signifieris emptiedwhen itis disengagedfroma particularsignified
and comes to symbolizea long chain of equivalentsignifieds.This
displacementand expansionof thesignifying functionconstitute the
symbol.
The relationship betweena foundationand whatitfoundsis quite
different froma symbolicrepresentation and thatwhich is symbol-
ized. In foundationallogic thereis a necessary,determining relation
between the foundingagencyand the foundedentity;in symbolic
representation, on theotherhand,no such internalmotivation exists
and the chain of equivalentsignifiedscan be extendedindefinitely
The formeris a relationof delimitation and determination, i.e.,fixa-
tion.The latteris an open-endedhorizon.
It is the contrapositionbetween foundationand horizon thatI
thinkenablesus to understandthechangein theontologicalstatusof
emancipatorydiscoursesand, in general,of metanarratives, in the
transition frommodernity to postmodernity. A formationthatis uni-
fiedor totalizedin relationto a horizonis a formation withoutfoun-
dation;itconstitutes itselfas a unityonlyas itdelimitsitselffromthat
whichitnegates.The discoursesof equalityand rights,forexample,
need not relyon a commonhuman essence as theirfoundation;it
sufficesto posit an egalitarianlogic whose limitsof operationare
givenbytheconcreteargumentative practicesexistingin a society.A
horizon,then,is an emptylocus,a pointin whichsocietysymbolizes
its verygroundlessness,in whichconcreteargumentative practices
operateover a backdropof radicalfreedom,of radicalcontingency.
The dissolutionof the mythof foundationsdoes not dissolve the
phantomofitsown absence.Thisabsence is- at leastin thelastthird
of the nineteenthcentury-theconditionof possibilityforaffirming
the historicalvalidityof our projectsand theirradicalmetaphysical
contingency. This double insertionconstitutesthe horizon of post-
modernfreedom,as well as thespecificmetanarrative of our age.

NOTES
1. Martin Heidegger,Beingand Time,trans.
LindaRusseli(Oxford:OxfordUni-
versityPress,1985),40.
2. Ibid.,22.

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82 ErnestoLaclau

3. The example is fromJ. Lyons,Introductionto TheoreticalLinguistics(Cam-

bridge:Cambridge Press,1968),69.
University
4. Itwouldnotbe correct toargue,giventhefunctionalcharacterofthediscur-
sive,thateverydiscursive
sequencepresupposes thisis no doubttrue,but
language;
language in turnalsopresupposesvocalchords.Thus,ratherthandefinetheabstract
conditionsofexistenceofsomething, weshoulddefinethestructural inwhich
totality
theseconditions arearticulated.
5. Thatthereare,hereandthere, ofa different
hints perspectiveinMarx'sworkis
undeniable; forexample,thewell-known lettertoVeraZasulichon thepossibilities
openedup bytheRussian peasantcommunes. Buttheywereonlyhints; therecanbe
no doubtthathisthinking movedintheoppositedirection.
6. ErnestoLaclauand ChantalMouffe,
Hegemonyand SocialistStrategy:
Towardsa
Radical DemocraticPolitics(London:Verso,1985).
7. AsI saidabove,thisargumentative
fabric
isnotsolelyverbal;
itisalsointerlaced
withnonverbal actions
towhichitgivesrise.Thus,everynonverbal actionhasmean-
ing,and,reciprocally,
every hasa performative
verbalargument dimension.

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