Datu Michael Abas Kida vs Senate of
the Philippines
GR No. 196271, Oct 18, 2011
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No.
10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the
Synchronization of the Elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) with the National and Local
Elections and for Other Purposes” was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM
regular elections to May 2013 to coincide
with the regular national and local
elections of the country.
The history of ARMM instituted first by
the provisions of Article X of the 1987
Constitution, mandated the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras specfically Sections
15 to 22 wherein the congress
promulgated the Republic Act (RA) No.
6734 which is the organic act that
established the ARMM and scheduled
the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials.Following
aforementioned arcticle is the RA No.
9054 which amended the ARMM Charter
and reset the regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001. RA No.
9140 further reset the first regular
elections to November 26, 2001. RA No.
9333 reset for the third time the ARMM
regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every
3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next
ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC
had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional
offices to be elected.
In these consolidated petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and madamus filed
directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality
of RA No. 10153.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the 1987 Constitution
mandates the synchronization of
elections.
2.Whether or not the passage of RA No.
10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the
petitions and UPHELD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
1.YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates
the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly
state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be
gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which
show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the
terms of the incumbent officials, sought
to attain synchronization of elections.
The Constitutional Commission
exchanges, read with the provisions of
the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent
indicators of the constitutional mandate
to hold synchronized national and local
elections, starting the second Monday of
May 1992 and for all the following
elections.
From the perspective of the Constitution,
autonomous regions are considered one
of the forms of local governments, as
evident from Article X of the Constitution
entitled Local Government. Autonomous
regions are established and discussed
under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the
article wholly devoted to Local
Government.
In this case, the ARMM elections,
although called “regional” elections,
should be included among the elections
to be synchronized as it is a “local”
election based on the wording and
structure of the Constitution.
Thus, the Supreme Court find the
contention that the synchronization
mandated by the Constitution does not
include the regional elections of the
ARMM unmeritorious.
NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES
NOT violate Section 26(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which refers to the
three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement.
Before bills passed by either the House
or the Senate can become law or statute
they must pass through three readings
on separate days, with the EXCEPTION
of when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bill’s immediate
enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, explained the
effect of the President’s certification of
necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed
with the requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on
separate days.The phrase “except when
the President certifies to the necessity of
its immediate enactment, etc.” in Art. VI,
Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a
law: [i] the bill has passed three readings
on separate days and [ii] it has been
printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show
that the President wrote to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives to certify
the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and
local elections. Following the Tolentino
ruling, the Supreme Court held the
President’s certification exempted both
the House and the Senate from having to
comply with the three separate readings
requirement.
TING v VELEZ-TING
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner,
- versus -
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.
G.R. No. 166562
March 31, 2009
Facts:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting
first met in 1972 while they were
classmates in medical school. They fell in
love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975
in Cebu City when respondent was
already pregnant with their first child. On
October 21, 1993, after being married for
more than 18 years to petitioner and
while their youngest child was only two
years old, Carmen filed a verified petition
before the RTC of Cebu City praying for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time
of the celebration of their marriage,
which, however, only became manifest
thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins
psychological incapacity consisted of the
following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which
adversely affected his family relationship
and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought
about by his excessive and regular
drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a
result of which Benjamin found it
necessary to sell the family car twice and
the property he inherited from his father
in order to pay off his debts, because he
no longer had money to pay the same;
and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and
immaturity as shown by his failure and
refusal to give regular financial support to
his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being
psychologically incapacitated. He
maintained that he is a respectable
person, as his peers would confirm. He
also pointed out that it was he who often
comforted and took care of their children,
while Carmen played mahjong with her
friends twice a week. Both presented
expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute
each others claim. RTC ruled in favor of
the respondent declaring the marriage
null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA
reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the Molina guidelines should
not be applied to this case
Issues:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule
on stare decisis when it refused to follow
the guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases,
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled
that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code
has been liberalized,
3. Whether the CAs decision declaring
the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void is in accordance
with law and jurisprudence.
Held:
1. No. respondent’s argument that the
doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos
and Molina should not be applied
retroactively for being contrary to the
principle of stare decisis is no longer new.
2. The Case involving the application of
Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
3. There is no evidence that adduced by
respondent insufficient to prove that
petitioner is psychologically unfit to
discharge the duties expected of him as
a husband, and more particularly, that he
suffered from such psychological
incapacity as of the date of the marriage
eighteen (18) years ago.
CASTRO vs. DALORIA
G.R. No. 163586
January 27, 2009
Austria-Martinez, J.
Petitioner: Sharon Castro
Respondents: v RTC Judge Hon. Merlin
Deloria, CA
CASE SUMMARY:
Sharon Castro was a BIR Officer in
Guimaras who was charged with
Malversation of Public Funds,
misappropriating worth P556,000. The
Ombudsman was tasked to prosecute
her, but she questioned the authority of
the Ombudsman, citing the original
decision of Uy vs. Sandiganbayan
decided in 1999 which held that the
Ombudsman had no prosecutorial
powers over cases cognizable by RTC.
The Supreme Court ruled that the
Ombudsman’s powers were plenary and
unqualified, covering all offending “public
officers”, and that the later Resolution of
the Uy case prevailed, curing the
restrictive defect in the Ombudsman’s
powers.
FACTS:
Sharon Castro, a Revenue Officer of BIR
Buenavista, Guimaras, was charged
before the Ombudsman with
Malversation of Public Funds. She was
accused of misappropriating public funds
worth P556,681.53 despite notice and
demand upon her account for the funds.
Castro filed a Motion to Quash, stating
that the Ombudsman lacked
jurisdiction. She said that the Information
failed to allege her salary grade— a
material fact in the crime charged. Citing
Uy vs.Sandiganbayan, since she had a
salary grade of 27, her case should be
within the jurisdiction of the RTC. She
also added that the prosecutorial powers
of the Ombudsman are limited to the
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
RTC denied the Motion to Quash,
recognizing the authority of the
Ombudsman in the case. RTC cited the
Resolution of Uy vs. Sandiganbayan in
2001 which reversed the original decision
in Uy vs. Sanidganbayan 1999, and
expressly recognizing the prosecutorial
and investigatory authority of the
Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the
RTC.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Ombudsman had the
authority to file a case against petitioner,
as of May 31, 2001, in the light of the
FIRST DECISION in the Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan case (1999), which
limited the powers of the Ombudsman.
2. W/N the Resolution of the Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan case (2001) violates the
constitutional provisions against ex-post
facto laws and the denial of due process.
HELD:
Ombudsman’s powers UPHELD.
RATIO:
The decision on Uy vs. Sandiganbayan in
1991 was that the Ombudsman‘s
prosecutorial powers were limited to
Sandiganbayan cases, while the
Resolution on the same case in
2001expressly held that the Ombudsman
shall have power to nall criminal cases
involving public officials.
Petitioner contends that the decision in
1991 should apply to her case, instead of
the 2001 Resolution, because the
Ombudsman instituted the action against
her in April 26, 2000. Hence, the
Information filed against
G.R. No. 187451 : August 29, 2012
JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by
ABDON VIRTUCIO, Petitioner,
v. JOSE ALEGARBES, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Jose Alegarbes (Alegarbes)
filed a homestead application for a 24-
hectare tract of unsurveyed land. His
application was approved on January 23,
1952. In 1955, however, the land was
subdivided into three (3) lots -- Lot Nos.
138, 139 and 140, Pls-19 - as a
consequence of a public land
subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to
Ulpiano Custodio (Custodio) while Lot
140 was allocated to petitioner Jesus
Virtucio (Virtucio).
Alegarbes opposed the homestead
applications filed by Custodio and
Virtucio, claiming that his approved
application covered the whole area,
including Lot Nos. 139 and 140. On
October 30, 1961, the Director of Lands
rendered a decision denying Alegarbes'
protest and amending the latter's
application to exclude Lots 139 and 140.
Only Lot 138 was given due course.
Alegarbes appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, who
dismissed the appeal. On appeal to the
Office of the President, the latter affirmed
the dismissal order. Thus, an order of
execution was issued by the Lands
Management Bureau of the DENR. It
ordered Alegarbes and all those acting in
his behalf to vacate the subject lot, but he
refused.
On September 26, 1997, Virtucio then
filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and ownership before the
RTC. The RTC ruled infavor of Virtucio.
The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that
Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot
140 by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition. He
argues that the period of acquisitive
prescription was interrupted on October
30, 1961 when Alegarbes filed a protest
before the Director of Lands. Virtucio
further claims that since 1954, several
extrajudicial demands were also made
upon Alegarbes demanding that he
vacate said lot. Those demands
constitute the "extrajudicial demand"
contemplated in Article 1155, thus, tolling
the period of acquisitive prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alegarbes
acquired ownership over the subject
property by acquisitive prescription?
HELD: The petition must fail. DENIED
CIVIL LAW: acquisitive prescription;
kinds of prescription
Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in
relation to its Article 712, provides that
prescription is a mode of acquiring
ownership through the lapse of time in
the manner and under the conditions laid
down by law. Under the same law, it
states that acquisitive prescription may
either be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession of things in good faith and
with just title for a period of ten years,
while extraordinary acquisitive jurisprudence, however, dictates that
prescription requires uninterrupted only a judicial summons can effectively
adverse possession of thirty years, toll the said period. Only in cases filed
without need of title or of good faith. before the courts may judicial summons
be issued and, thus, interrupt
There are two kinds of prescription
possession. Records show that it was
provided in the Civil Code. One is
only in 1997 when Virtucio filed a case
acquisitive, that is, the acquisition of a
before the RTC. The CA was, therefore,
right by the lapse of time as expounded
correct in ruling that Alegarbesbecame
in par. 1, Article 1106. Other names for
ipso jure owner of Lot 140 entitling him to
acquisitive prescription are adverse
retain possession of it because he was in
possession and usucapcion. The other
open, continuous and exclusive
kind is extinctive prescription whereby
possession for over thirty (30) years of
rights and actions are lost by the lapse of
alienable public land.
time as defined in Article 1106 and par.
2, Article 1139. Another name for
extinctive prescription is litigation of
DENIED.
action. These two kinds of prescription
should not be interchanged. Article 1155
of the New Civil Code refers to the
interruption of prescription of actions. Montajes vs. People
Interruption of acquisitive prescription, on G.R. No. 183449, March 12, 2012
the other hand, is found in Articles 1120-
Facts: The original period for filing the
1125 of the same Code.
petition for review with the CA was on
May 19, 2007, a Saturday. On May 21,
2007, a Monday (the next working day
Thus, Virtucios reliance on Article 1155
which followed the last day for filing which
for purposes of tolling the period of
fell on a Saturday), petitioner filed a
acquisitive prescription is misplaced. The
motion for extension of time to file a
only kinds of interruption that effectively
petition for review wherein he prayed that
toll the period of acquisitive prescription
he be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007
are natural and civil interruption. Civil
or up to June 5, 2007 within which to file
interruption takes place with the service
his petition. He then filed his petition for
of judicial summons to the possessor.
review on June 5, 2007. Was the petition
When no action is filed, then there is no
for review filed on time?
occasion to issue a judicial summons
against the respondents. The period of Held: The petition for review was filed
acquisitive prescription continues to run. out of time based on our clarification in
A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC that the 15-day
In this case, Virtucio claims that the
extension period prayed for should be
protest filed by Alegarbes against his
tacked to the original period and
homestead application interrupted the
commences immediately after the
thirty (30)-year period of acquisitive
expiration of such period. Thus, counting
prescription. The law, as well as
15 days from the expiration of the period
which was on May 19, 2007, the petition
filed on June 5, 2007 was already two
days late. However, we find the
circumstances obtaining in this case to
merit the liberal application of the rule in
the interest of justice and fair play.
Notably, the petition for review was
already filed on June 5, 2007, which was
long before the CA issued its Resolution
dated September 21, 2007 dismissing
the petition for review for being filed out
of time. There was no showing that
respondent suffered any material injury
or his cause was prejudiced by reason of
such delay. Moreover, the RTC decision
which was sought to be reversed in the
petition for review filed in the CA had
affirmed the MTC judgment convicting
petitioner of direct assault, hence, the
petition involved no less than petitioners
liberty. We do not find anything on record
that shows petitioner's deliberate intent to
delay the final disposition of the case as
he had filed the petition for review within
the extended period sought, although
erroneously computed. These
circumstances should have been taken
into consideration for the CA not to
dismiss the petition outright.
We have ruled that being a few days late
in the filing of the petition for review does
not automatically warrant the dismissal
thereof. And even assuming that a
petition for review is filed a few days late,
where strong considerations of
substantial justice are manifest in the
petition, we may relax the stringent
application of technical rules in the
exercise of our equity jurisdiction.
Courts should not be so strict about
procedural lapses that do not really
impair the proper administration of
justice. After all, the higher objective of
procedural rule is to insure that the
substantive rights of the parties are
protected. Litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on the merits and
not on technicalities. Every party-litigant
must be afforded ample opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his
case, free from the unacceptable plea of
technicalities.
Ramon Felipe vs. Jose Leuterio
May 30, 1952 92 SCRA 482
Ponente: Justice Bengzon
Facts: On March 12, 1950 an inter-
collegiate oratorical competition was held
in Naga City. Felipe was one of the
Judges and was the chairman. Nosce
was awarded the first price and Imperial
the second price. Imperial addressed a
letter to the Board of Judges protesting
the verdict and alleged that one of the
judges committed a mathematical error
on computing the scores. The Board
refused to amend their award, Imperial
filed a complaint in court. She asserts
that she should have ranked 3rd place in
the vote, which makes her score 9 or the
First place.
Issue: Whether the RTC reverse the
decision of the board of judges to obtain
a new award?
Held: Members of the court sometimes
are members of the board of judges in an
oratorical contest. But it is UNWRITTEN
in the law that in such contests the
decisions of the board of judges be final
and cannot be appealed. The
contestants do not have the right to the
prizes because theirs is only a privilege
to compete for the prize and did not
become a demandable right. The
respondent judge erred in his reasoning
that where there is a wrong there is
remedy. To quote “The flaw in his
reasoning lies in the assumption that
Imperial suffered some wrong at the
hands of the board of judges. If at all,
there was error on the part of one judge,
at most. Error and wrong do not mean the
same thing. "Wrong" as used in the
aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation
or violation of a right. As stated before, a
contestant has no right to the prize
unless and until he or she is declared
winner by the board of referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss
or injury, yet in law there are instances of
"damnum absque injuria". This is one of
them. If fraud or malice had been proven,
it would be a different proposition. But
then her action should be directed
against the individual judge or judges
who fraudulently or maliciously injured
her. Not against the other judges.”
University of the East vs Jader
TITLE: University of the East vs. Jader
CITATION: GR No. 132344, February 7,
2000
FACTS: Romeo Jader graduated at UE
College of law from 1984-88. During his
last year, 1st semester, he failed to take
the regular final examination in Practical
Court 1where he was given an
incomplete grade remarks. He filed an
application for removal of the incomplete
grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on
February 1, 1988 which was approved by
Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the
payment of required fees. He took the
exam on March 28 and on May 30, the
professor gave him a grade of 5.
The commencement exercise of UE
College of law was held April 16, 1988,
3PM. In the invitation, his name
appeared. In preparation for the bar
exam, he took a leave of absence from
work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He
had his pre-bar class review in FEU.
Upon learning of such deficiency, he
dropped his review classes and was not
able to take the bar exam.
Jader sued UE for damages resulting to
moral shock, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, sleepless nights due
to UE’s negligence.
ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable
for misleading a student into believing
JADER satisfied all the requirements for
graduation when such is not the case.
Can he claim moral damages?
HELD: SC held that petitioner was guilty
of negligence and this liable to
respondent for the latter’s actual
damages. Educational institutions are
duty-bound to inform the students of their
academic status and not wait for the latter
to inquire from the former. However,
respondent should not have been
awarded moral damages though JADER
suffered shock, trauma, and pain when
he was informed that he could not
graduate and will not be allowed to take
the bar examinations as what CA held
because it’s also respondent’s duty to
verify for himself whether he has
completed all necessary requirements to
be eligible for the bar examinations. As
a senior law student, he should have
been responsible in ensuring that all his
affairs specifically those in relation with
his academic achievement are in order.
Before taking the bar examinations, it
doesn’t only entail a mental preparation
on the subjects but there are other
prerequisites such as documentation and
submission of requirements which
prospective examinee must meet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum
of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal
interest of 6% per annum computed from
the date of filing of the complaint until fully
paid; the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees;
and the costs of the suit. The award of
moral damages is DELETED.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
LORETO DIONELA, respondents
No. L-44748. August 29, 1986
Facts: Loreto Dionela filed a complaint of
damages against Radio
Communiciations of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI) due to the telegram sent through
its Manila Office to the former, reading as
follows:
176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID
MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO
DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY
WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER
LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE
ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER
115 PM
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG
DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG
PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO
Loreto Dionela alleges that the
defamatory words on the telegram sent
to him wounded his feelings, caused him
undue embarrassment and affected
adversely his business because other
people have come to know of said
defamatory words. RCPI alleges that the
additional words in Tagalog was a private
joke between the sending and receiving
operators, that they were not addressed
to or intended for plaintiff and therefore
did not form part of the telegram, and that
the Tagalog words are not defamatory.
The RTC ruled that the additional words
are libelous for any person reading the
same would logically think that they refer
to Dionela, thus RCPI was ordered to pay
moral damages in the amount of P40,
000.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision ruling that the company was
negligent and failed to take precautionary
steps to avoid the occurrence of the
humiliating incident, and the fact that a
copy of the telegram is filed among other
telegrams and open to public is sufficient
publication; however reducing the
amount awarded to P15, 000.00
Issue: Whether or not the company
should answer directly and primarily for
the civil liability arising from the criminal
act of its employee.
Ruling: Yes. The cause of action of the
private respondent is based on Arts. 19
and 20 of the New Civil Code, as well as
on respondent’s breach of contract thru
the negligence of its own employees. By
adding extraneous and libelous matters
in the message sent to the private
respondent, there is a clear breach of
contract; for upon payment of the fixed
rate, the company undertakes to transmit
the message accurately.
In contracts, the negligence of the
employee (servant) is the negligence of
the employer (master). This is the master
and servant rule. As a corporation, the
petitioner can act only through its
employees. Hence the acts of its
employees in receiving and transmitting
messages are the acts of the petitioner.
To hold that the petitioner is not liable
directly for the acts of its employees in
the pursuit of petitioner’s business is to
deprive the general public availing of the
services of the petitioner of an effective
and adequate remedy.
In most cases, negligence must be
proved in order that plaintiff may recover.
However, since negligence may be hard
to substantiate in some cases, we may
apply the doctrine of RES IPSA
LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself),
by considering the presence of facts or
circumstances surrounding the injury.
The judgment of the CA is affirmed.
WASSMER VS. VELEZ
12 SCRA 648
Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz
Wassmer, following their mutual promise
of love decided to get married on
September 4, 1954. On the day of the
supposed marriage, Velez left a note for
his bride-to-be that day to postpone their
wedding because his mother opposes it.
Therefore, Velez did not appear and was
not heard from again.
Beatriz sued Velez for
damages and Velez failed to answer and
was declared in default. Judgement was
rendered ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiff P2.000 as actual damages
P25,000 as moral and exemplary
damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees.
Later, an attempt by the Court
for amicable settlement was given
chance but failed, thereby rendered
judgment hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not breach of promise
to marry is an actionable wrong in this
case.
Held: Ordinarily, a mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But formally set a wedding and go
through all the necessary preparations
and publicity and only to walk out of it
when matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpable and unjustifiable to good
customs which holds liability in
accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil
Code.
When a breach of promise to
marry is actionable under the same,
moral and exemplary damages may not
be awarded when it is proven that the
defendanr clearly acted in wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner.
 Whether or not the award for moral
damages is valid.
FRANCISCO HERMOSSISIMA,
plaintiff vs. RULING:

COURT OF APPEALS, et.al., The Supreme Court held that no moral

defendant damages can be had in the instant case
because it was the woman who virtually
No.L-14628. September 30, 1960 seduced the man by surrendering herself
FACTS: to him because she a girl ten years older
was overwhelmed by her love for him,
The complainant Soledad Cagigas is she wanted to bind him by having a fruit
thirty six years old, a former high school of their engagement even before they
teacher and a life insurance agent. The had the benefit of clergy.
petitioner Francisco Hermosisima is ten
years younger than complainant, and an
apprentice pilot. Intimacy developed
between them and thus sometime 1953
after coming from the movies, they had
sexual intercourse in his cabin. In
February 1954, the woman advised the
man that she is pregnant whereupon the
man promised to marry her. Their
daughter Chris Hermosisima was born
June 1954 in a private clinic. However,
subsequently the man married one
Romanita Perez. Hence, Soledad filed a
complaint against Francisco for
acknowledgement of her child as a
natural child of the petitioner, as well as
for support of said child and moral
damages for alleged breach of promise
to marry. The CFI declared the child a
natural daughter of the defendant,
ordered Francisco to support the child by
giving a monthly alimony, awarded actual
damages and moral damages. On
appeal of the petitioner, the CA affirmed
the assailed decision however increased
the amount for actual and moral
damages.
ISSUE: