DAZA V.

SINGSON

G.R. NO. 86344 DECEMBER 21, 1989

BASIS:
Article VI of the Constitution

Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as
ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representative, elected by
each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. x xx xx xx x

FACTS:

1. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was re-organized, resulting in a political realignment
in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned
from that party and joined the LDP.

2. On this basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the seat occupied by
petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP.

3. Subsequently, the chamber elected new set of representatives consisting of the original members
except the petitioner, who was replaced by Singson.

4. Petitioner challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of
his seat by the respondent.

5. Petitioner contents that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because
his election is permanent. He claims that the reorganization of the House representation in the
said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly
registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.

6. Respondent argues that the Constitution does not require that the political party to be registered
to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE: WON a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of
Commission on Appointments

HELD: Yes. The Court resolve the issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representative to
change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that
may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be
permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of
political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
another.

The clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the right
of representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political parties who are duly registered

1
with the Comelec. In this case, the LDP was granted its registration as a political party by the COMELEC.
Thus, shattering the argument of the petitioner that registration is required.

2
Daza v Singson
GR No. 86344 December 21, 1989
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.cralaw

FACTS:
(1) May 11, 1987 (After congressional elections) -- Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and
was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
(2) September 16, 1988 -- the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally
resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly
reducing their former party to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the
newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting
of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the
additional member from the LDP. The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his
removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.
Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a
temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from
serving in the Commission on Appointments.
(3) Arguments for the petitioner:
(a) he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is
permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan.
(b) the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent
political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained
political stability.
(4) Arguments for the respondent:
(a) the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of
this Court. (Main fact for judicial department)
(b) he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives
which changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner.
(c) nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can take cognizance of the case

HELD:
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent' s assertion, the Court
has the competence to act on the matter at bar.

RATIO:

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(1) What is before us is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be
reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of
the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. That is not a
political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco.
... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely,
a question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be
mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon
the validity of the proceeding in connection therewith.
... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover,
where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and
particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or
statutory rights ...' (1 6C.J .S., 439; emphasis supplied)
I t is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein."
(2) The case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not
be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

OTHER NOTES:
(1) Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as
ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by
each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

4
The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Sec. 12, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Facts:
Judge Manzano was appointed by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte
provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Executive Order No. 856. Before accepting the
appointment, Judge Manzano wrote a letter to the SC requesting that he be authorized to accept the
appointment and to assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position. He
petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his
position as Executive Judge and as a member of judiciary.

Issues:
Should the petition be granted?

Held:
No. An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on
Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving
the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among
the functions of the Committee are—

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found
to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to
proper authority for appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the
proper administration of criminal justice.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs
of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the
policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence.

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that the
Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice and
quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall
not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art.
VIII, Constitution

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 In Re: Rodolfo U. Manzano, 166 SCRA 246, October 05, 1988
Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Administrative functions, defined; Case at bar.—An examination
of Executive Order No. 856, as amended reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created
to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent
ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the
Committee are—Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who
may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper
authority for appropriate action; Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed
prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice. It is evident that such Provincial/ City
Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which
involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and
the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre
and Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black’s Law Dictionary).

Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Separation of Powers; Members of the Supreme Court and other Courts
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.—Under the
Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Sections 12, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee
on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is
constrained to deny his request. Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in
the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth: While the doctrine of separation of powers
is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government
precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to
assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise
there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a
higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of
an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to
the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his
sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with
nothing less.”

Same; Same; Same; Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should
render assistance to said committees which may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their
judicial duties.—This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Provincial/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC
Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the
adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of
an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should
render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but
only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fullfilment of their judicial duties. [In Re:
Rodolfo U. Manzano, 166 SCRA 246(1988)]

6
 Casibang v. Aquino
G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979
Makasiar, J.

Facts:

Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of

Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein
petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting
and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4)
open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971
Election Code.

In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two
months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional
Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was
thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January
17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme Court declared that there is no further judicial obstacle
to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting
his evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of
petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory
Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu
contended that “... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been
superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our
parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI.” He further
submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are
only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under
Section 9 of Article XVII.

The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution,
through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its
ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office
as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the
incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI
thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the
enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and
expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still
continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take
cognizance of a question or policy in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislative or Executive branch of the government.

Issue:

7
 whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit

Held:

No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic
pending election protest cases. The constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the
new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the
Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately
encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office,
albeit under protest or contest” and that “subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9,
Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers
of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective
position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings
beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect’s right to
the contested office.

The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only
by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been
proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections.
Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and
consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and
emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to
them by said constitutional provision.

Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent
(protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein
petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee)
would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office
pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.

There is a difference between the ‘term’ of office and the ‘right’ to hold an office. A ‘term’ of
office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its
functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A ‘right’ to hold a public office is the just and legal
claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the ‘term’ refers to
the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein
whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New
Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein
petitioners, in an election protest, of the ‘right’ of the private respondents to continue holding their
respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the ‘term’ to the
office, although the ‘right’ of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with
the ‘term’ thereof,” and that “it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New
Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their
respective offices under a new term. They hold their respective offices still under the term to which they
have been elected, although the same is now indefinite.

The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear,
try and decide election protests: “Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that ‘all
existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or

8
repealed by the National Assembly. ‘And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of
Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election
contest against those proclaimed elected,” and “according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New
Constitution ‘all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and
exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all
cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.’
Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and
exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners.”

While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as
well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such
power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective positions.

General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers
under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify
the aforesaid constitutional provision.

General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral
contests of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for
said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with the
existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain
crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts
issued by the President or his duly designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his
decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.

In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest case herein involved has
remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is
there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or
interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term “political
question” connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those
questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure”.

The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond
its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there
has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid. Political
questions should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the President or
Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon.

9
Case Digest: Dante O. Casibang vs. Honorable Narciso A. Aquino
20 August 1979

FACTS:

Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan. Casibang, his only
rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities
and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect. Respondent Yu
moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost
jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new Constitution and the new parliamentary
form of government.

ISSUES:

Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest moot and academic; and
Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local
government structure.
RULING:

As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, “the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by
the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the
Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately
encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office,
albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9,
Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers
of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective
position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings
beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to
the contested office.”
Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color.
For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government
code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining a more
responsive and accountable local government allocating among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal,
term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing form of local
government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose."

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Tanada vs Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the
Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s
Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was
contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to
choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the
following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the
minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to
come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court.
So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a
member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano
Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is
vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before
judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD:
No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term
Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada
to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the
elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a
separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members)
must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already
appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority
party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting)
concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such
rules comply with the Constitution.
Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, et al., G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957
10
JAN
En Banc

[CONCEPCION, J.]

FACTS: Petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to
respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio
and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the
said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to
respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action. Petitioners likewise prayed
that judgment be rendered ousting respondents from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate

11
Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the preliminary
injunction permanent.

Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions
the legality, and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents
Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is
without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the
members of the Electoral Tribunal

ISSUE: Was the dispute regarding the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal in the nature of a political question that will divest the Court of jurisdiction?

HELD: NO.

[T]he term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to “those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch
of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to
decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having
the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen “upon
nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes” in the Senate, and hence, is null
and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in
the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

“.. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover,
where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and,
particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional
or statutory rights ..” (16 C.J.S., 439).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.

12
CASE DIGEST : Sanidad Vs Comelec
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. G.R.
No. L-44684. October 12,1976 VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ELECTIONS,
respondent. G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976 RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and
ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE
NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. MARTIN, J,:

Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT
FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. The Commission on Elections, by
virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766
and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the
plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November
20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the
"OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio
and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which
provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it
violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the
Constitution.

Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is unconstitutional

Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the
power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for
the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the
end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured Neither Article IX-
C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the
Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners
themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their
freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In
fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.
2167 has no statutory basis. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of
expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason
was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is
tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite
issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to
freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of
the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be
unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec
spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full
dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions
in newspapers or to specific radio or television times

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PABLO C. SANIDAD AND PABLITO C. SANIDAD VS HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS &
HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER
G.R. NO. L-44640
OCTOBER 12, 1976

FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to call
for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”).
Its primary purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).
On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions that
are to be asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the citizen
wants martial law to continue, and the second one asks for the approval on several proposed
amendments to the existing Constitution.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national referendum in
October 16.
Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare
without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to
the Constitution.
Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that the
power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly
conferred to the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the implementation
of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert
that the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution and a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the
plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and
allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the
right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue raised is
political in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also asserts that
at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise
constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs 991 and
1033).
HELD: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3 maintained it
was of political nature and thus not justiciable.
The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one. This is
because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments to the
constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition.
After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the power
to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The
normal course has not been followed.
Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the president
undertook the proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect, through a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment procedure raises
a contestable issue.

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 Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

FACTS:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for
the first district of Tayabas.

On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National
Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to
file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and
praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly
or that the election of said position be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of
protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon
the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly
and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

RULING:

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the
other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the
limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission
is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority
under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant
to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by
the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in

15
the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the
legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in
the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the
National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had
actually been organized.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of
members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the
legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of
all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of
the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935,
cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of
the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost
against the petitioner.

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Angara vs Electoral Commission (G.R. No. L-45081)

FACTS: In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio
Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly in the first district of
Tayabas. The petitioner was proclaimed member-elect for the said district for receiving the most
number of votes and thereafter took his oath in office. A Motion of Protest was filed by Ynsua against
the election of the petitioner. The petitioner countered this with a Motion to Dismiss the Protest which
was denied by the Electoral Commission.

ISSUES: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy; and

Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming
cognizance of the protest filed over the election of herein petitioner.

HELD: The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through
its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, its
power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their
jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments.
The Judiciary, in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. This power of has been stated in Section 2, Article VIII
of the Constitution.

Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “x x x The Electoral Commission shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly.” In view of the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution, it is held that the Electoral
Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to
take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua. The petition of writ of prohibition against
the Electoral Commission is hereby denied.

17
CASE DIGEST : ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION
FACTS : At in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents,
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;

That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect
of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes. That on
November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office. That on December 8, 1935, the herein
respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the
election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of
Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared
elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said
position be nullified. That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the
Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of
the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to
prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b)
that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said
period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. That on December 27,
1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that
there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a
member of the National Assembly after confirmation. That the case being submitted for decision, the
Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's
"Motion to Dismiss the Protest. That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission
promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the
Protest. The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on
March 2, 1936. The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision,

ISSUE : Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

HELD : When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional
organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the
light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the
world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the
framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members
of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote
of 98 against 58

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in
its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge
and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of

18
determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting
through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission.
With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with
judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as
effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding
the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a
coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he
characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests
against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that
where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight
ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure
to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission..

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