CRUZ v. J.M. TUASON & COMPANY, INC.

and ARANETA
GR No. L-23749, April 29, 1977
PONENTE: BARREDO, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner’s complaint alleged two separate causes of action. That upon request of the
Deudors, he made permanent improvements valued at P30,400.00 on said land having an
area of more or less 20 quiñones and for which he also incurred expenses in the amount of
P7,781.74. Since defendants are being benefited by said improvements, he is entitled to
reimbursement from them of said amounts. In 1952, defendants availed of plaintiff's
services as an intermediary with the Deudors to work for the amicable settlement involving
50 quiñones of land, of which the 20 quiñones form part, and notwithstanding his having
performed his services, as in fact, a compromise agreement entered into between the
Deudors and the defendants was approved by the court, the latter have refused to convey
to him the 3,000 square meters of land occupied by him, which said defendants had
promised to do within ten years from and after date of signing of the compromise
agreement, as consideration for his services.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that
appellant's claim over the 3,000 sq. ms. is allegedly unenforceable under the statute of
frauds.

RULING:
The Court agree with appellant that the Statute of Frauds was erroneously applied by the
trial court. It is elementary that the Statute refers to specific kinds of transactions and that
it cannot apply to any that is not enumerated therein. In the instant case, what appellant is
trying to enforce is the delivery to him of 3,000 square meters of land which he claims
defendants promised to do in consideration of his services as mediator or intermediary in
effecting a compromise of the civil action, between the defendants and the Deudors.
Indeed, not all dealings involving interest in real property come under the Statute.
Moreover, appellant's complaint clearly alleges that he has already fulfilled his part of the
bargain to induce the Deudors to amicably settle their differences with defendants as, in
fact, through his efforts, a compromise agreement between these parties was approved by
the court. In other words, the agreement in question has already been partially
consummated, and is no longer merely executory. And it is likewise a fundamental principle
governing the application of the Statute that the contract in dispute should be purely
executory on the part of both parties thereto.