1.

1 DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGE

G.R. No. 189607

RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution2 that affirmed the same. The CA reversed the
Decision3 dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.

The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the parties on the ground that respondent
had a previous valid marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes on the other hand, that respondent was not
prevented from contracting a second marriage if the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not
have to await a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.

The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in holding thus and consequentially
reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the second marriage.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979,
respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, 4 praying that his marriage
to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the
RTC. The reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.

Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they
had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing
officer belonged.5

On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On 22 January 2003, the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision 6 declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista
was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision dated
22 January 2003 had become final and executory. 7

On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence 8 claiming that the proof adduced by petitioner was
insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous. In his
Opposition, 9 petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact
that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she
entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's
demurrer in its Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.

In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab
initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. 12 The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage between RENATO A.
CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen Parish Church, San
Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the
Family Code. 13

The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979,
makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that
she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC
stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said that even
if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first
marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14

Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were concerned. 15 His motion, however,
was denied by the RTC in its Order16 dated 6 September 2007. Thereafter, both petitioner17 and Respondent18 filed their
respective Notices of Appeal.

In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity
of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in
1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law
in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code. 20 Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil
Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 21

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the questioned CA Resolution 22 dated
16 September 2009.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage to petitioner valid be affirmed in
toto, and that all properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared conjugal. In his Reply to the
Comment,24 petitioner reiterated the allegations in his Petition.

OUR RULING

We deny the Petition.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.25 In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of
the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve
this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 26 81,27 82,28 and 83 (first
paragraph);29 and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 30 8531 and 86.32

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void marriage is
nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until
annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be
collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal
fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment
are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a
voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.33

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and Odayat v. Amante, 36 that the Civil Code contains no express provision
on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. 37

In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second marriage was contracted
in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage was contracted after the death of the second
wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until annulled, which made the second marriage null and
void for being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its performance,
hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual antecedents.
In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial decree was necessary to establish
the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and
Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is
now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage. 38 A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous
and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this requirement:

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy, therefore, the
nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of
the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of
a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations
indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could
conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by
the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone.40 (Emphases supplied)1âwphi1

However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of Appeals, 42 the requirement of a judicial decree of
nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children
of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue to be
governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:

x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second
marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom
he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since
the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the
effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that
time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void
for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so
would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code
has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of
petitioner and the children is patent x x x. (Citations omitted)

As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court thus concludes that
the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the
absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the
second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen
the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009 and
Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 173614 : September 28, 2007]

LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI,
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order, 1 dated 3 May
2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of
its Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents' Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli
(Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico.
Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo,
Cagayan.3 They begot seven children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle
and Joseph Lloyd.4 On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal
Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away. 7

In impugning petitioner's marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into without the requisite
marriage license. They argued that Article 348 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been
living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to
petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision.
Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter's death, or on 1 May
2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio
could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the
additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's serious illness which made its performance impossible.

In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years
openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born
Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She
further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by
the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the
contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order, 9 granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated
on its position in the following manner:

The Complaint should be dismissed.

1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003
provides in Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is
exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their
late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null and void. 12 (Emphasis supplied.)

The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said
motion, the RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC
reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog, 15 which was on
the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the
death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a void
marriage are still living.16 Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to
declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:

The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme
Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after
his death. The Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Niñal v. Bayadog is now superseded
by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme
Court has rejected the case of Niñal v. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held
that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their
marriage and such right is purely personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.

It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Niñal v. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view
of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal v. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to
determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage
will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have
only an inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper
that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage void. However, upon the
death of the parent his heirs have already a vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right
should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by
substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.

If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is
illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all,
ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be
allowed to file the petition after the death of the parent.

For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is
applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the
void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was
not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable. 17

Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:

In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case. 18

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied
the said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised therein. 19

Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether the case
law as embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.

At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.

We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and
the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the
litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court. 20 Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief
from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in
the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. 21 However, it cannot be gainsaid that this
Court has the discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of
the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction. 22 Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the
instant Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the
case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Niñal
which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death.

We grant the Petition.

In reinstating respondents' Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
their father's marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the
reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Niñal
recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 23 What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the
marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from
the facts, petitioner's marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:

Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. 24

Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
with the ruling in Niñal, because they vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner
to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.'

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no
explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only
inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the
law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity,
but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan,
Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to
Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,

vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a
marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation
sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the
Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage
license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth,
respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
(trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child." 4

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was
facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save
her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to
get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and
wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not
valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the
child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower
court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide
support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial
declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and
validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing
to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with
respondent, saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and
reward him of his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by
petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the
marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State,
through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the
Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the
child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent. 7 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1)
declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring
the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant. 8

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. 9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown by the
evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the
affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and
respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a
substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction
to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for
support. Citing several authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus,
there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the
parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented
would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden
of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial
of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.

In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file
their respective comments on the petition.13

In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their
marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for
that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward
testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she
adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA
testing to prove paternity and filiation.15

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null
and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states
that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner
hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court
showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their
affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent
is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of
petitioner and thus entitled to support.18

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the daughter of
petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. 19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we
held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. 20

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court
may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary,
to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. 22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. 23 In the instant case, it is clear from
the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five
years.24 However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-
examination, thus—

ATTY. CARPIO:

Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last five years
on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.25

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim
of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.28

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving
additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:

1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better
Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;30

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the
latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner
was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At
times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant
which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely
forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to
"B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2"
and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding
ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of
kissing the petitioner.31

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV
No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated
16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
1.2 NEED FOR COURT DECLARATION

G.R. No. 137110 August 1, 2000

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as "void."

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 in CA-
GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy
as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of
Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the
court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days
of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision
mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.

Costs against accused."2

The Facts

The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial court’s judgment, as follows: "From the evidence adduced by
the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June
27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly
executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was ‘single’. There is no dispute
either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having
been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo
B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further
blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the
same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29,
1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated
when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by
accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.

"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of
Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.

"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed
an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision
dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.

"Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage
with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful
marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally
dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present,
namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved
or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that
he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential
requisites for validity. x x x

"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d]
been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused.

"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991,
accused’s prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any
judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the
nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married
man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly
married to his first wife."3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:

"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final judgment
declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after,
when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act
of any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved." 4

Hence, this Petition.5

The Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

"A

Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.

"B

Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing
bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.

"C

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt." 6

 The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage

Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings."

The elements of this crime are as follows:

"1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity." 7

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that
petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a
second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.

Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a
competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. 8 Thus, he concludes that
there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries 9 of former Justice Luis Reyes that "it is now
settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is
voidable, it is not a defense."

Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime
had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be
obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.

We agree with the respondent.

To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been
characterized as "conflicting."10 In People v. Mendoza,11 a bigamy case involving an accused who married three times, the
Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during
the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with
bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted while
the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there
was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the
third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon,12 which involved substantially the same facts.

But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v.
GSIS,13 Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court
awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her
children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: "And with respect to the right of the second
wife, this Court observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."

In Tolentino v. Paras,14 however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not
necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving
spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the
first wife, holding that "the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the first
spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage."

In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,15 the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage.
After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had
previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: "x x x
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such
fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x."

Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,16 the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need for
such declaration of nullity.

In Domingo v. CA,17 the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery and
the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family Code has
settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and
void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again
cannot be charged with bigamy."18

Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new
provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.

In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:

"Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as
contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court."

The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person
during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish
its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages."19

The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family
Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage, as follows:

"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such marriage void."

In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void was necessary. Verily, the
Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code
Revision Commitee has observed:

"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be null and
void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second
marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA
315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree
is necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033)."20

In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that there is no need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary
before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted
of bigamy.

The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,21 which involved an administrative Complaint
against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyer’s argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage
because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." The Court
further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code." Significantly, it observed
that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was "bigamous and
criminal in character."

Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his view on the
subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage: 22

"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As
with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second
marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x."

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a
letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he
committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime
had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy
cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action
as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.

Damages

In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied her
claim of damages and attorney’s fees.23

Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief
from this Court.24 In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which
we quote hereunder:

"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that
she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted matrimony with Dr.
Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.

xxx xxx xxx

"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire belief, especially as
she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the plunge anyway, relying
on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already living with another man.

"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the consequences of her
act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in this case,
ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own
willful making."25

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000

ARTHUR TE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division,
dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 239711 and CA-G.R. SP No. 261782 and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not
live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave
birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her. 3

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with
a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).4
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she learned about
petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990.5 This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409. 6

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to
private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her
pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.7

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an
administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the
ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their
knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. With respect to
petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with
Santella that he was still single.8

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of
court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during
the hearings of said case.

The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990 which stated that the same
could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused.9 The
RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis. 10

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel; (2)
violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence
even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges
promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient for
conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971. 11

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative case for the
revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency
of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98,
respectively of the RTC of Quezon City. 12 When the Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16,
1991,13 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely abused
its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the
administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could
render nugatory petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an
overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite the
pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same respondent involving the same set of facts in
other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178. 14

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.

On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the consolidated petitions. The
appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence
that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion
to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law. 15 The Court of Appeals likewise
affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds to
support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of
bigamy.16

Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion
to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no
prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action
involved is a civil case.17

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the same was denied. 18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL

[CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.19

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent has
rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot and
academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts
and rules.20

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.21 The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.22

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for
bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge
of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. 23 Petitioner’s
argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal
proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him
from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza24 and People vs. Aragon25 cited by petitioner that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The
prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to
private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be
invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under
the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.26 In Landicho vs. Relova,27 we held that:

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists. 28

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and
subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings before
the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have
previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. 29

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC
Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the
existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case:

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body
against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed
before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently
with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or
quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the
issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral
conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and
for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage. 30 The existence of these other charges justified the
continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence in
the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second
marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and private
respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no showing that the
requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract
between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that there was
no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by him ever took place. 31

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. 32 In this case, the Court
of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer
on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second,
petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate
court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such
evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 33 In view of the trial court’s
finding that a prima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense. 34

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence in view of
the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is liable for
the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an
adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether
or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case. 35 The RTC’s observation that there was a prima facie case
against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that
petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be
the conclusion.36 Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was
precisely because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence in
his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by both parties.

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been
granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner manifested
that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the
judge said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration had not yet been
filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit
for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required said counsel to produce a
medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to
evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner,
the judge’s hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of his
motion to inhibit.
We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show
that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. 37 In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,38 this Court held
that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section
1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear
and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. 39

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those expressly mentioned in
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge
Peralejo. Said provision of law states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons
other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for
determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial. 40 The
instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not
deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the
criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything
unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered
an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel
to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the
judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly. 41

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution 2 dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117
under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael
M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January
12, 1999.

Contrary to law.

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.

The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.

On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon.
Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated
November 17, 2000).

On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev.
Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union,
appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).

Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court
of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18,
TSN dated November 22, 2000).

On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).

In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.

Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.

xxxx

Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.

Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum.

This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accused’s bigamous marriage
to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.

Costs against the accused.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001. 3

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo
was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to
both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy
knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that
petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her
marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her
previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of
sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy
had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s
1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said
decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration
of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar
as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy."5

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner alleges that:

V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE
THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.

V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF
PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO
MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO.

V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A
PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL
SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.

V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT
CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE
OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.

V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT
IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that right after the
presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the
pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a
prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy,
initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while
the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 6 the Court categorically stated that:

x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x

xxxx

x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the
case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the
fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil
case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x 7

The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People, 8 where it was held thus:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge
of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 9

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be
affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a
valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the
celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a
court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of
petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference.10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage."11

Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25
of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall
prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."

Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from
that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or
accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-
serving.12 Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as
early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to support
her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo
does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:

x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who allegedly actually told Uy about her previous
marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of
any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.13

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from
the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to
being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. 15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that
the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi1

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again,
petitioner is mistaken.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the
Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty,
as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might
be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.16

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which
ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore,
correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years
and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.

However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by
final judgment17 to be void ab initio on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was
subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus,
petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months
and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21,
2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other
respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months
and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR
BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as "Pablito Sicad Braza,"
were married1 on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef 2 and Janelle Ann3 on May 8,
1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo 4 on June 4, 1980.

Pablo died5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.

During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began
introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon
made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate 6 from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:

Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR

Date of Birth : 01 January 1996
Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular
Father : Pablito S. Braza
Date Received at the Local January 13, 1997
Civil Registrar :
Annotation : "Late Registration"
Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997"
Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22,
1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy7 of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22,
1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental a petition8 to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said
marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners
prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father
and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed
Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3)
the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration
of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order 9 of September 6, 2007, dismissed the
petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a
family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn
the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in
an ordinary adversarial action.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order 10 of November 29, 2007, they filed the present
petition for review.

Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an
action to correct entries in the civil registrar. Citing Cariño v. Cariño,11 Lee v. Court of Appeals12 and Republic v. Kho,13 they
contend that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a
petition under Rule 108.14

The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code15 charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil
registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a
harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. 16

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between
Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the
court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records 17 and that the rest of
the prayers are merely incidental thereto.

Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage
as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 18 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the
petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.1avvphi1

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a
direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the
court a quo.

Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.

Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half of the death benefits
received by the first after the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with the husband while the
latter’s marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two marriages, it being essential
to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.

In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein petitioners
before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are
illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that they are not the latter’s
children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all between
the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as
the petitioners’ mother and the substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral
attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.

In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their respective birth
records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese, because their parents were
never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought to be made were substantial and not merely innocuous,
the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower court’s grant of the
petition.

It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

1.3 WHO MAY FILE ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY

G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the
Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be
declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and
set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage,
status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo
Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441)
square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a
portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE,
points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot
159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C.
Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines
1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West.,
along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX
(1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49;
por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un
 punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que
es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y
Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50;
por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un
punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana,
que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan
y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS. 3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid
the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir,
petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots
are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT
No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo
II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent,
Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the
compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel
of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated
in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and
respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to
Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved
accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally
divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the
court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of
property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in
Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a
nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was
neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the
subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He
argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds,
should be reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of petitioner's complaint.
Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's
marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with
another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney's fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion
was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of
Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as
parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract
evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner
presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of
respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another
case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las
Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo. 5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation,
discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite
on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of
the requisite marriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of
the late Teofilo E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the
interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said
Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to
issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
 7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo
S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff
herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo
S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon.

SO ORDERED.6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and
in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public
policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary
judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover
upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a
marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the
case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code
expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods
explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to
prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May
13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own brother
and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of
their marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left
by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that
the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the
material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench,
Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While
it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence
of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the
failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage
between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents
it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the
existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by
Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
 "That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962
as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number
of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason that it was
the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the
same."

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the veracity and
credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed
out in a trial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not proof that a marriage
did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof
that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized,
rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the
same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his
putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had
effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment
in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the
possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement
to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare allegation that appellant
Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole,
insufficient to support what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation.
Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding
the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the
last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his
household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in
order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II. 8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De
Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in
denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of
the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of this
case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance
not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals
committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court
providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the
capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings
nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the
rule on judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the
pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our
perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place
in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the
pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by
the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003 12 is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence
to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded actions for
nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal
separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions. 14 (Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the
case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists
between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered.15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and
intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence.
Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be
presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
 SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the
trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State
is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.16

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule
made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or
by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage.
They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the
engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence,
they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. 18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of
the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never
intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law.
They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. 19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on
March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and
is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place. 23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. 24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare
the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person
to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-
interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-
in-interest.26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One
having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not
the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. 27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be
based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file
the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.

In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because
of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court
for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce
decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a
valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial
court should declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the
contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial
court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-
Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.29 (Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are
respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. 30

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are
transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and
child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

 (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. 31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother,
does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of
the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
(Underscoring supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from
succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the
deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. 33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad.
This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the
decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II
is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other
half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code.
This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon
the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal
personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the
ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage
in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence
of descendant, illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject
marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of
action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo
Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is
a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the
filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. 36

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare allegation that
respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from
his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent
Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court,
such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by
Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by
Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage. 37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of
property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding
that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and filiation of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the
late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos,
the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its
calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE
NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December
11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding
that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant
suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved
due to their father's death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded
on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true
and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage
license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76
of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during
the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required
in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code
provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice
the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
 Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith
make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he
shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by
the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages
and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law
sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void
after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows
"the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains
to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot
be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during
the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken
place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before
or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either,
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if
the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity
of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

2.1 VOID MARRIAGES

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition
prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and
void.1

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a
"well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead,"2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage
annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.3

During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British
subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker
lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose,
Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet
Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.

Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a
seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas,
respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter
informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his
ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless.
He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England,
the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired
from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of
knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even
after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the
Philippine government authorities.

Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet
Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December
1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet
Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade
Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so,
she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She further
claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.

The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as
amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica
Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.4

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded belief for such
declaration.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form
a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where the following
allegations are made:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a well-founded belief on the part of
Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and

2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition was a proper case of the declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41, Family Code.5

The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife
is already dead."6

The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which provides that:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).

When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded,7 the following crucial
differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry.8 Also,
Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires
either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.9 The Family
Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article
41 of the Family Code:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 10

Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements.11

Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he had complied with
the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead.

The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give
rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.

United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing spouse. In that
case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief that
his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the
whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:

While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom
he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for
the purpose of securing information concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife
was dead. He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain
Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the
help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast
city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.

Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire the whereabouts of your wife?

A Yes, Sir.

Court:

How did you do that?

A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London and I went to London to look for her I could not find
her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed
efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:

. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference between London and Liverpool, for a
humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one — place in England, the port where his ship docked and
where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City,
or Parañaque, would announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places
of destination does not appear to be fatal. 16

is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool,
on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do
not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one
particular person there — which is in effect what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.

The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal
background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The
same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all
returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.

Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her
whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that
since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its
nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious
doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the
missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.

Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his
employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from
January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose.
Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of
residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in
London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's
subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.

In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:

. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relationship for
life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis
supplied)

By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the
conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that
respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.

In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve
the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements
of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of
the Family Code emphasizes that.

. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)

In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.

. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State bas the strongest interest;
the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth
the following basic state policy:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. . . .

The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:

The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall
be recognized or given effect. 24

In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was already
dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's decision declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. Costs against respondent.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.

ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco
Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street,
Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.

In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon
inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to
wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.

Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him.

Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in
his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest
on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.

For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative
action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro.

Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the
complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who
called the police to arrest complainant.

Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that
while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same
was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went
through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage
license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.

Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was
solemnized without a license.

Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can
enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place
in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of
the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was
impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).

Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went
through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license.
Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an
opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to
secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and
illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of
morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his
everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690
[1994]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with
prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive
of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3
Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between
them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be
to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be
an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband
and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by
the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of
the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral
conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship
with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it
defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it
did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and
duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote
that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other.
There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr.
Sison testified:8

COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic)
the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically
fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and
Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank
these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even
more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

MARCOS VS. MARCOS

SUPREME COURT

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as
a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."2

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51
and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children,
their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was
solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their
appropriate action consistent with this Decision.

"SO ORDERED."

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by
Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev.
Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh.
A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them
sought a discharge from the military service.

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee
Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became
acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.

"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing
unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business
ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see
him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment,
they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him
despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the
way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were
already living separately.

"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military,
she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged from the
military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development
Corporation.

"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were
already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their
house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her
mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge
in her sister's house.

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).

"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to
look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence,
he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Parañaque, while the
appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically
abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY,
Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because
of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence
presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:

"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which
should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the
essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-
complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the
decision.

"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological
findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the
appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties
were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was
assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that
he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor
medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no
evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental -
not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave,
ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."4

Hence, this Petition.5

Issues

In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:

"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological
incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject
himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition."7

The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's
psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of
Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized
that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the
psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.

In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity
referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9 were laid down by this Court as follows:

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.

xxx xxx xxx

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx xxx xxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."10

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:11
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In
fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies
of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to
the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present
at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a
period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and
moral support, and even left the family home.

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a
taxi driver.1âwphi1

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.12 At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal
separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its
invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe
the guidelines outlined in Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical
examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164493 : March 10, 2010

JOCELYN M. SUAZO, Petitioner, v. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA)1cЃa in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.2cЃa The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyns marriage with
respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.

THE FACTS

Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents of Laguna at that time. After
months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their
parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter,
Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the
Mayor of Biñan.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos parents after their marriage. They
had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as household help. Angelito,
on the other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent
quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. They
now have children.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she
alleged in her complaint:

xxxx

8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their relationship had been marred with bitter
quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted
physical injuries upon her every time they had a troublesome encounter;

9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his indolence and his
excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations making life
unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their separation in fact in July 1987;

10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their marriage and became very apparent
as time went and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;

xxxx

cralawAngelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological examination with
psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn).chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn,
her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the alleged incidents of physical
beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these declarations but significantly
declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before they were married.

cralawAsst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:

Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married?

A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his behavioural (sic) pattern before you got
married?

A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you got married (sic), is there any signs
(sic) of violence?

A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Q. Even to other people?

A. He also quarrel (sic).3cЃa

cralawMaryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:

cralawQ. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the marriage the respondent is suffering
from anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious and severe apparently incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and
long-standing before the marriage.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?

A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when I examined her, the petitioner was
found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital relationship with respondent.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which is your report there is a statement rather on the last page, last paragraph which
state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that marriage between the two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even
before the actual celebration of marriage. Respondent(s) immature, irresponsible and callous emotionality practically
harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a person
suffering from Anti Social Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his capacity
to provide love, caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic and long-standing in proportion
and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the wedding and became manifest thereafter due to
stresses and pressure of married life. He apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does
chronic mean?

A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long before he entered marriage apparently, it
came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic).chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because psychological disorder are not detrimental to
men but to others particularly and this (sic) because the person who have this kind of disorder do not know that they have
this kind of disorder.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Q. So in other words, permanent?

A. Permanent and incurable.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or at the time of the wedding or became
manifest thereafter?

A. Yes, maam.cra|aw"

xxxx

Court:

Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?

A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality Disorder (sic).chanroblesvirtua|
awlibary

Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?

A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of
the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)?

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are suffering that kind of disorder
(sic).chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Court:

Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?

A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the respondent (sic).chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Court:

Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?
A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often than not he even shouted at them for no
apparent reason (sic).chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Court:

Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?

A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Court:

Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?

A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Court:

Q. How was the petitioner tortured?

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent (sic).chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Court:

Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?

A. Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Court:

Q. Why did you know?

A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is not aware that this kind of
personality affect the other party (sic).chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Court:

Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?

A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under the influence of alcohol, they do not
have peaceful harmonious relationship during the less than one year and one thing what is significant, respondent allowed
wife to work as housemaid instead of he who should provide and the petitioner never receive and enjoy her earning for
the five months that she work and it is also the petitioner who took sustainance of the vices. (sic)

Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner?

A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital relationship but what he need is to sustain his
vices thru the petitioner (sic).chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Court:

Q. What are the vices?

A. Alcohol and gambling.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Court:

Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?

A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality Disorder, he is good for nothing
person.4cЃa

cralawThe psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report pertinently states:5cЃa

Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for "Nullity of Marriage" versus ANGELITO D.
SUAZO

GENERAL DATA
This pertains to Jocelyns]

BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY

xxxx

Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest among 4
siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler. While mother is a
sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit relationship. Familial
relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles were part and parcel of their day to day
living.

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately suppressed so much so that it does not create
inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her
socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She may be sensitive yet capable of containing the effect of such
sensitiveness; in order to remain in goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future in spite of difficulties she had gone
through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that she set simple life goals which is (sic) commensurate
with her capabilities and limitations. However, she needs to prioritize her interest in order to direct her energy toward
specific goals. Her tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping mechanism that she is able to discharge
negative trends appropriately.

REMARKS :

Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above]6cЃa

The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the Philippines strongly opposed the petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the psychologist failed to
examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said about him was purely hearsay.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:

While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered as psychologically
incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person to be unfit to comply with his marital
obligation, such as "immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to
infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and
habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks" (The Family Code of
the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)

The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing that
the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with the respondent. On the contrary, the respondent has not
shown love and respect to the petitioner manifested by the formers being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler,
drunkard and worst of all a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the misbehavior and attitude of the
respondent, decided, after one year and four months of messy days, to leave the respondent.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life with the respondent, she already
suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her and that she was the one who worked as a
housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain the latters niece (sic) and because they were living with her husbands
family, she was obliged to do the household chores an indication that she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that she
served as a servant in his (sic) husbands family.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the time of their marriage, she and her
husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage by her relatives. The petitioner and the respondent had
never developed the feeling of love and respect, instead, the respondent blamed the petitioners family for said early
marriage and not to his own liking.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals,7cЃa the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist testimony quoted above] would only tend to show that
the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity which is not only grave but also
incurable.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198,
wherein the Supreme Court held that:

x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]

The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the
psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting that there is psychological incapacity
on the part of the respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and,
therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the respondent is a speculation and conjecture
and without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the
surname of the respondent, although they are now separated, and a grim and sad reminder of her husband who made
here a slave and a punching bag during the short span of her marriage with him. The law on annulment should be liberally
construed in favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be an instrument to protect persons with
mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein respondent.8cЃa

THE CA RULING

The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:

True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs
Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological
incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality of the
evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse,
children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in the absence
of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whose mental and psychological capacity was in
question.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was psychologically incapable of
entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties of marriage due to an underlying psychological
illness. Only the wife gave first-hand testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As observed by the
Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical
abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically
or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality
syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence
that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply
to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356
SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he
had been forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a permanent compulsion because
he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive work and more stable relationships with another. The element of
permanence or incurability that is one of the defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not
present.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married life of the petitioner with the
respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be extinguished. As the Supreme Court
intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution in our
country and the foundation of the family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity is not to be
a mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.

THE PETITION

Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling based on the
following arguments:
cralaw1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in
declaring the marriage null and void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of
Appeals) holds that "the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioners psychological
incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown
that the trial courts factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis-à-vis petitioners
defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous";

2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission was intentional to give the courts a
wider discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that would make a person unable to contract
marriage from mental incapacity as follows:

"1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

cralaw(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;

(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties which are to be
mutually given and accepted;

(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic nature.cra|aw"

cralawThe decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC, being clothed with
discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the law itself
which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to define what constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary,
she further claims, the OSG relied on generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a
marriage that actually exists only in name.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no
basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.

The Law, Molina and Te

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely introduced an abstract concept
psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage without any concrete
definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of
psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Santos v. Court of Appeals9cЃa declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."10cЃa

The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in Republic v. Court of
Appeals11cЃa (Molina) as follows:

cralaw(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.chanroblesvirtua|
awlibary

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.12cЃa

cralawMolina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of Santos.13cЃa

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,14cЃa further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition
under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.15cЃa

Pesca v. Pesca16cЃa clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending, under the reasoning
that the courts interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit.cra|aw"

On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage
at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the
time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented, including expert opinion, if any,
briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to
consider during the pre-trial conference the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in
the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity
or annulment of marriage must be proved.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to us were invariably decided based on the
principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-
Te17cЃa (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken
from the Canon Law.18cЃa Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its
application.19cЃa

Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of the Canon Law.

Going back to its basic premise, Te said:

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a
marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v.
Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.chanroblesvirtua|
awlibary

Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in
Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court,
aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.chanroblesvirtua|
awlibary

With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the concept should be
applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had,
somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio
v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting20cЃa follows Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon
Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages:21cЃa
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach
thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the
parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these
experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the
Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.chanroblesvirtua|
awlibary

Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,22cЃa merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its
evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as follows:

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

xxxx

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause
of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos
asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.23cЃaUnderscoring supplied]

This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.24cЃa

Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what
should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
he or she is about to assume.25cЃa It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown.26cЃa Mere difficulty, refusal or
neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in
some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.27cЃa

If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability
requisites. This is proof of Santos continuing doctrinal validity.

The Present Case

As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological incapacity to perform essential
marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled
to undertake because of the differences in the trial court and the appellate courts appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyns
presented evidence.

a. The Expert Opinion Evidence

Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root cause, gravity and
incurability of Angelitos alleged psychological condition.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence the psychologists testimony and the
psychological evaluation report that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist
evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information
coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon
which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and
with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and
in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity
that is grave, severe and incurable.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is
mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is
desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the
parties. For a determination though of a partys complete personality profile, information coming from persons intimately
related to him (such as the partys close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of
Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by
supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested
party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion
or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to
Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion
that psychological incapacity exists.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report and testimony simply provided a general
description of Angelitos purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as
chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can
they be found in her testimony.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is chronic or incurable; Angelito has long been
afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage, as basic trust
was not developed. However, she did not support this declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her
conclusion on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the
psychologists own equivocation on this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have realized that it
was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyns assumed
knowledge of Angelitos family background and upbringing.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent was Angelitos personality
disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on Angelitos awareness of and his capability to undertake
the duties and responsibilities of marriage.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns or requisites of psychological
incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyns cause.

b. Jocelyns Testimony

The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the psychologists testimony impel us to
proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyns testimony, to find out whether she provided the court with sufficient facts to support
a finding of Angelitos psychological incapacity.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelitos habitual drunkenness,
gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the
marriage. Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to
be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with him. She
testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took place whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage
or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related
jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by
themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital
obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in
the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or
illness.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While we may concede that physical
violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not
constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus
is irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even
assuming, therefore, that Jocelyns account of the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence
does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence, specifically the Santos
requisites.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now find to be clearly and manifestly
erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is
Jocelyns main anchor in her present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary,
the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the present
case.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
PAZ VS. PAZ

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenging the October 7,
2005 amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004 decision3 (original decision)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The Factual Antecedents

On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To support his family,
Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that
Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her
children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the
RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.8

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions
business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable
differences with her mother-in-law.9

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home.10 He
testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair
with Alvin.11

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National
Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness,"13 but
had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship";14 her
"transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in
attaining her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good
marital and family relationship."16

The RTC Ruling

In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity
were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to comply with her marital
obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity is only a ground for legal
separation, not for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage.

Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its
original decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its amended decision,20 the CA found two
circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s
unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of abandoning
the conjugal dwelling.

The OSG then filed the present petition.

The Petition

The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a
psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do
not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.

The Case for the Respondent

Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her grave and incurable
psychological incapacity.

The Issue

The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence

on Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It
provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization."

In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations";21 not merely the refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical
antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the
errant spouse.23

Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s

psychological incapacity

In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when
he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home,24 as well as his continued financial
support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair,25 but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged
affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26 To constitute psychological incapacity, it must
be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely
prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No evidence on record exists to support
Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological
incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness.28
Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our mind, does not suffice as a
consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to enter into a
marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply
be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their
marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be
fully established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the
evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s
refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship30 is a mere generalization
unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.

In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s psychological incapacity; thus, the CA committed a
reversible error when it reconsidered its original decision.1âwphi1

Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity.32 It cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.

Costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

HERNANDEZ VS. CA

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the petition for
annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic
Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).2 Three children were born to them, namely, Maie, who was
born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B),3 Lyra, born on May 22, 1985 (Exh. C),4 and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).5

On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the
annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that
from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to
support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking
sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another
woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that, because of his
promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She
averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner
prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the
total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as
the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased
during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June
12, 1992.6

On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an order directing the
assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion between the parties.7 Only
petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of
collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial.8

Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:9

Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who
is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent,
a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when
she was no longer private respondents teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.

Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner provided
his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came from petitioners salary as a faculty member of the
Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling Tupperware products, as well as engaging in
the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron.

From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help petitioner in her
businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and had other women,
petitioners business suffered. Private respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on
fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita
Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia. When
petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded
with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he would end the affairs,
but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When
private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondents infidelity in the hope of
saving their marriage.

Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San
Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991, because he
availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead
of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the
entire amount within four months of his retirement.

While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became
worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. He had relations with a
certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a Japayuki; Myrna Macatangay, a
secretary at the Road Master Drivers School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and,
Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh. E).10 When petitioner
confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined at
the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh.
F).11
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a
result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received treatment at the Zapote
Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).12

Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then
barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent
time with them.

On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J)13 with F & C Realty Corporation whereby she agreed
to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite and
placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of
interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale (Exh. K)14 was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529
(Exh. M)15 was duly issued.

According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten letter16 to private respondent expressing her frustration
over the fact that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing
him to sell their owner-type jeepney17 and to divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told
private respondent of her intention to file a petition for the annulment of their marriage.

It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioners letter. By this time, he had already abandoned
petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle East. Since
then, private respondents whereabouts had been unknown.

Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University, testified during the hearing
on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private respondent to her
(Alfaro) as the formers sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in
accounting. She observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In
November 1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro
wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she thought private respondent was not
ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared happy during the early
part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that private respondent started drinking with his friends and going home
late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioners claim that private respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on
relationships with different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner was once
hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first year of petitioners marriage, Alfaro tried to
talk to private respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent
was not close to his children and that he had abandoned petitioner.18

On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision19 dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:20

The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support of her claim that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for
the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) - not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or
annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows:

Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of
the petitioner;

....

(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

....

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

....

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

....
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological incapacity as a ground for the
declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such
incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as grounds for legal separation.

In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of
the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the gonorrhea transmitted to the petitioner by respondent
occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The
provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the
same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of this ground (fraud) at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of petitioners marriage with the respondent on this
ground, as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the
trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court of Appeals held:22

It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment,
gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.

We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondent-husband was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellants declaration that
at the time of their marriage her respondent-husbands character was on the borderline between a responsible person and
the happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In
fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husbands youth and very good looks, who was
admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to be the college professor of her
respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a normal
one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).

The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and there is no proof that the
same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred

I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.

II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH
HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.

III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF
THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.

IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER
REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF
P3,000.00 PER CHILD.

V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.

The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the
ground of private respondents psychological incapacity.

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that private respondents
psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact that the acts of
incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the
annulment of their marriage.

Art. 36 of the Family Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.23
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,24 we held:

Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should
occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so
that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were
married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume
the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was
presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved
that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and
not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work
for his family. Private respondents parents and petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he
eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount
he received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the
initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his family. Petitioner
concludes that private respondents condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very
objectives of marriage.

However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondents youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out in Republic
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:25

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondents
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.26 Thus,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.27
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial
courts finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondents psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage,
are entitled to great weight and even finality.28 Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and
arbitrary can these be overturned.

The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioners contentions on the issue of
permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of
petitioner over the real property. These matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal
separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

2.2 Criteria for Pyschological Disorders

G.R. No. 176464 February 4, 2010

EDWARD N. LIM, Petitioner,

vs.

MA. CHERYL STA. CRUZ-LIM, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition raises a far-from-novel issue, i.e., the invalidity of a marriage on the ground of either or both of the parties’
psychological incapacity. However, similar petitions continue to hound the lower courts, even with the stringent
requirements for the grant of declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, given the facility
with which married persons are diagnosed with personality disorders.

The instant petition for review on certiorari assails the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74822,
which reversed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 140, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 99-1852.

First, the all too familiar antecedents of man-meets-woman; they get married after a whirlwind relationship; and, not
surprisingly, the marriage goes awry.

Petitioner Edward N. Lim and respondent Maria Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim met in 1978 in Cebu, where petitioner, who resides
in Makati City, spent a semestral break from college; and respondent, who resides in Gingoog City, Cagayan de Oro, was
a boarder in petitioner’s uncle’s house. At that time, petitioner was twenty-six (26) years old, a college student, and
working in the family business, while respondent was a secretarial student.

After less than a year of courtship via long distance phone calls, petitioner and respondent became sweethearts in early
1979. Within that year, or on December 8, 1979, the two were wed at the Don Bosco Church in Makati City, with a
reception at Midtown Ramada Hotel.

As is customary among those of Chinese descent, petitioner and respondent took up residence with the former’s
grandparents and parents in Forbes Park, Makati City. The couple was blessed with three (3) children: Lester Edward,3
Candice Grace,4 and Mariano III.5

During their stay in Forbes Park, all living, household and medical expenses were paid and provided by petitioner’s
grandparents. Petitioner’s salary of ₱6,000.00 for working in the family distillery went straight to respondent. Despite all
these amenities, the setup and living arrangement rankled respondent, who continued to insist that they live separately
and independently from petitioner’s family.

October 14, 1990 proved to be a black-letter day for the union of petitioner and respondent. That morning, respondent
registered a complaint, which was recorded in the police blotter of the Makati City police, about a prior incident where she
caught petitioner in their house in a compromising situation with the stay-in caregiver of petitioner’s grandmother. This
incident landed on the pages of a tabloid newspaper, Abante, where petitioner, his grandparents’ house and the family
business were all named and identified. Naturally, this caused embarrassment and humiliation to petitioner and to the rest
of his family and relatives.

Also, on that same day, respondent finally left petitioner and brought with her their three (3) children. Respondent forcibly
opened their cabinet and cleaned out the contents thereof, which included petitioner’s passport, jewelry, and a land title in
petitioner’s name.

Respondent likewise filed a criminal complaint for Concubinage and Physical Injuries against petitioner which was
eventually dismissed by the investigating prosecutor for lack of merit.

Subsequently, respondent filed with the RTC of Makati City an action for support against petitioner and petitioner’s
parents. Thereafter, the trial court directed petitioner to give a monthly support of ₱6,000.00 and, in case of his inability to
do so, petitioner’s parents were also decreed to give a monthly support for the three minor children in the amount of
₱34,000.00.6

On October 29, 1999, petitioner filed a petition and sought the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the
ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Three years thereafter, on July 22,
2002, petitioner filed an amended petition including an allegation of his own psychological incapacity, as both he and
respondent were diagnosed with personality disorders—dependent personality disorder and histrionic personality
disorder, respectively.
Following the exchange of pleadings between the parties, petitioner presented evidence, which consisted of the
testimonies of Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas, a psychiatrist; and Maxima Adato, petitioner’s co-employee in the distillery. In
addition, petitioner offered in evidence Dr. Villegas’ Psychiatric Report, which concluded that the parties were suffering
from personality disorders. Respondent, despite filing an Answer to the petition denying the allegations therein, waived
her right to present evidence.

Based on the foregoing, primarily on the Psychiatric Report, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void as the two were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The RTC disposed of the case, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby DECLARES the marriage of EDWARD N. LIM and MA. CHERYL
STA. CRUZ on December 8, 1979 in Makati City VOID AB INITIO on ground of psychological incapacity of both parties
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code with all the effects and consequences of all the existing provisions of law.

As regards the custody of the children, considering that all of them are over seven (7) years of age, the Court shall take
into account the choice of each of the child, unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Let copies thereof be sent to the Office of Local Civil Registrar of Makati City and the National Statistics Office, Quezon
City who are directed to CANCEL from their respective Civil Registries the marriage of EDWARD N. LIM and CHERYL
STA. CRUZ on December 8, 1979 in Makati City.

The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses shall be liquidated, partitioned, and distributed in accordance with the provisions
of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.7

Disagreeing completely with the RTC’s disposition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed to the CA,
questioning the RTC’s finding that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The appellate court granted the OSG’s appeal and reversed the trial court. It ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated March 25,
2002 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between herein parties is hereby declared subsisting and
valid.8

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari positing the singular issue of whether the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is null and void on the ground of the parties’ psychological incapacity.

We deny the petition.

The seminal ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals9 cites three (3) factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform
the essential marital obligations: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, (3) incurability. We expounded on the foregoing, to
wit:

The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.

Given the foregoing stringent requisites and without going into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,10 petitioner, as the party alleging his own psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, had the special
albatross to prove that he and his wife were suffering from "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."11

Instead, petitioner presented the Psychiatric Report of Dr. Villegas, the conclusions drawn are reprinted in full:

PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE:

Edward is of Chinese descent, born and grew up in a Philippine environment. He was raised and educated in Philippine
school. However, despite his prominent Filipino exposure, his immediate family still practice a strong cultural Chinese
tradition within his home. Very clannish, all family members has to stay in one roof, in a communal style of living, with the
elders in this case, the grandparents are recognized as the authority. Most of the family members tend to rebel, but at the
end, tendency to be submissive and passive were developed. But despite physical closeness, Edward did not build close
attachments to his parents. The father was exceptionally temperamental and moody, while the mother was extremely
asocial, isolated, withdrawn and seclusive, that repelled him from both of them.
Surrogate parenting from his grandparents satisfied his dependency needs. He developed into a kind, obedient,
submissive and passive adult, which became the center of jealousy and rivalry among the siblings. Under stressful
situation, he became depressed and had suicidal intentions. He felt so secure with his grandparents, that he subordinated
his needs to them. He allowed them to assume responsibilities for major areas of his life, as in his family decision and
independence. He has difficulty expressing disagreements with others, especially with his wife, because of fear of loss of
support or approval. So that even an abusive spouse may be tolerated for long periods, in order not to disturb the sense
of attachments. A persevering worker, he had difficulties initiating change due to lack of self-confidence in judgment or
abilities, rather than lack of motivation or energy. Within 10 years in marriage, he tried hard to grant his wife’s wishes, but
to no avail. His wife left him in October, 1990 together with their three children, whom he missed very much. The death of
his grandfather in 1994 was a big blow to him, but he finds solace and security in visiting his grave every Sunday since
then.

On the other hand, Cheryl was initially congenial, which lasted only for a short period of time. Later, her immaturity
interfered with her behavioral pattern and adjustment. Apparently, she could not recognize realities in their family set-up
and will insist on her fantasized wishes. When not granted, she’ll go into tantrums, moodiness, anger, hostilities,
exhibitions and dramatizations, just to get attention and to emphasize her wants. Her attention-getting devices will be
endless and her suggestibility to the influence of others is very fertile.

Based on the family background, pattern of behavior, and outcome of their marriage, clinical evidence showed that Mr.
Edward Lim is suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder, while Cheryl is suffering from Histrionic Personality
Disorder associated with immaturity, that render both of them psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.1avvphi1

The root cause of the above clinical condition on the part of Edward was due to overindulgence and overprotection of his
surrogate parents, that left no room for him to develop his own abilities, encouraging too much dependence, lack of self-
confidence, self-doubt, passivity, pessimism, and depression. How much of the Dependent Disorder was due to
developmental defect and how much was due to strong Chinese culture and traditions, will be difficult to assess.

On the part of Cheryl, the root cause was due to unsatisfied dependency needs that finds gratification in adult stage, in
the form of attention-seeking devices, manifested in her clinical symptoms. Both existed prior to marriage, but became
obviously manifested only after the celebration, due to marital stresses and demands. Both disorders are considered
permanent and incurable, because they started early in their developmental stage and therefore became so engrained in
their personality structure. Both are severe and grave in degree, because they hampered their normal functioning,
specifically related to a difficult heterosexual adjustment.12

In addition, Dr. Villegas testified in the lower court as to the findings contained in the Psychiatric Report. Thus, on direct
examination, Dr. Villegas’ testimony consisted of the following:

Q- Can you tell the Court how you happened to know the petitioner?

A- He was referred to me by his counsel for psychological and psychiatric evaluation related to his application for nullity of
marriage in this Honorable Court, ma’am.

Q- And were you able to actually conduct an examination for the purposes that you have stated?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- How many times were you able to examine or meet the petitioner?

A- I met him three (3x) times, ma’am. That was on January 10, January 14 and January 17, year 2000.

Q- And is there any other witness or person that you have met for the purpose of evaluating the behavior and personality
of petitioner?

A- Yes, ma’am. I was able to interview a long time employee that they have in their company in the person of Mrs. Emmy
Adato who herself know the petitioner since he was eight (8) years old, ma’am.

xxxx

Q- Do you affirm before this Honorable Court the conclusions that you have arrived at to be correct?

A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- And what was the conclusion after you conducted the evaluation of the character of petitioner, as well as that of the
respondent?

A- After my intensive interview about the circumstances of their marriage, family background of the petitioner and also the
family background of the respondent, it is the opinion of the examiner that the petitioner Mr. Edward Lim is suffering from
DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage, ma’am. On the other hand, based on the informations and clinical data gathered from the
petitioner and my other informant, Ms. Emmy Adato, it is the opinion of the examiner that the respondent is suffering from
HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY DISORDER associated with an immaturity that renders her psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

Q- In your capacity as expert, a psychiatrist of forty (40) years, can you conclude that this deficiencies or defects that you
found are sufficient ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- Do you conclude also these deficiencies are continuous and permanent?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- Would you conclude therefore – would you consider it as valid ground for the annulment of the marriage?

A- Yes, ma’am.13

On cross examination by the prosecutor, Dr. Villegas testified as follows:

Q- Doctor, you have testified that it was only the petitioner whom you have examined and evaluated with (sic)?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- And the other person whom you have interviewed was the employee of the petitioner?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- No other person whom you have interviewed?

A- None, ma’am.

Q- You did not interview the surrogate parents of petitioner?

A- No, ma’am.

Q- Did you attempt to communicate with the respondent of this case for the purpose of interviewing her?

A- Yes, ma’am. [A]nd I have made this through the petitioner who has contacted his children in Cagayan De Oro, ma’am.

Q- So you are telling us, Doctor, that the respondent is in Cagayan De Oro?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- And despite your invitation, she did not appear to you?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- So based from your Report on the circumstances of marriage, the information regarding the marriage of parties in this
case came from the petitioner?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- And the family background you have made on Cheryl, the respondent also came from the petitioner?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- And the interview you have made on Adato, the employee of petitioner, she gave you some background of the
respondent here?

A- Yes, ma’am.
Q- But most of the informations you have gathered from her were pertaining to the petitioner?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- So practically, the evaluation you have made were based on the interview only on both the employee and the petitioner
himself?

A- Yes, ma’am.

Q- You did not conduct a series of tests to determine or evaluate further?

A- No, ma’am.

Q- You have not collaborated with any psychologists so as to get some psychological evaluation on petitioner?

A- No, ma’am. But the clearer picture of the case presented to me is a very clear picture already of the psychiatric
disorder which did not necessitated (sic) the assistance of a psychologist because it is obvious, the signs and symptoms
are obviously manifested by the parties.

Q- How many times did you meet the petitioner?

A- Three (3) times ma’am.

Q- And the duration of interview or examination on petitioner is how long?

A- It lasted for about one and a half hours to two and a half hours.

Q- For each session?

A- For each session.

Q- So you were able to examine him for a duration of six (6) hours, more or less. In the six (6) or seven (7) hours, you
were able to make the conclusions which you have made in your report?

A- Yes, ma’am. A psychiatric interview is a very structured interview…

Q- When did you find out that you don’t have to resort to psychological evaluation?

A- Even on my interview, I already kn[e]w that I will not be referring this case to a psychological evaluation because the
signs and symptoms are already very clear.

Q- What are these signs and symptoms?

A- The family background, for example, which gave the rootcause, of this case are very, very typical ground that can bring
about…

Q- Did you not have any suspicion that the petitioner might be giving you some informations which would given (sic) some
presumption to nullifying his marriage?

A- I have no basis to doubt that kind of information that he might be lying. During the one and a half to two hours of
interview based on his reactions, the way he answers me, the way he grimaces and also, his statements that he has been
giving me are very sincere on his part, that he even, despite the fact that that happened already about eleven years ago, I
could still appreciate how much he feels, so devastated, so frustrated and disappointed about family life.

Q- You made a conclusion about the personality of both the petitioner and the respondent. Would you say that even if
petitioner would marry again, the same manifestations would exist in the second marriage?

A- It would depend again on the personality profile of the would be partner that he will be having. So it is not really
absolute in his case, in a personality profile, but it would again depend on the personality profile of the would-be partner
that he will be having, ma’am.14

It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn between the
"psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas’ sparse testimony
does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas’ testimony did not illuminate on the parties’
alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect on their marriage:
Q- Doctora, you gave a conclusion that the respondent is suffering from Histrionic Personality Disorder associated with
immaturity. Did you discover the antecedents of this disorder?

A- Yes, your honor.

Q- What did you find out?

A- I found out from her family background that the parents were separated. She lived with a stepfather and therefore their
family relationship were only preoccupied by earning a living and no attention were given to the children. When the
children were growing up, specifically Cheryl – (interrupted).

Q- By the way, who supplied you this information?

A- The petitioner.

Q- You never discussed the matter with the respondent or any of her relatives, except the husband?

A- None, ma’am.

Q- Now, you have interviewed Mr. Lim three (3) times. What tests did you give to him aside from the interview?

A- I did not give him any test because a psychological examination is given by a psychologist who acts as a laboratory
aide to a psychiatrist and therefore, if there are some doubts in our clinical interviews, that is the time we refer the case to
a psychologist for a sort of clarification in our clinical interviews.

Q- As far as the gravity of the disorder of petitioner is concerned do you have any suggestions as to the cure of the same?

A- Because the psychological/psychiatric incapacity has been formed or developed during his early years of development,
I would say that it is ingrained in his personality and therefore, no amount of psychiatric assistance or medicines can help
him improve his personality, your honor.15

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),16 provides general diagnostic criteria
for personality disorders:

A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual’s
culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:

(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)

(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, lability, and appropriateness of emotional response)

(3) interpersonal functioning

(4) impulse control

B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations.

C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important
areas of functioning.

D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early adulthood.

E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of another mental disorder.

F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or
a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).

The alleged personality disorders of the parties have the following specified diagnostic criteria:

301.6 DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER

A pervasive and excessive need to be taken care of that leads to submissive and clinging behavior and fears of
separation, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the
following:

(1) has difficulty making everyday decisions without an excessive amount of advice and reassurance from others;
(2) needs others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his or her life;

(3) has difficulty expressing disagreement with others because of fear of loss of support or approval. Note: do not include
realistic fears of retribution;

(4) has difficulty intiating projects or doing things on his or her own (because of a lack of self-confidence in judgment or
abilities rather than a lack of motivation or energy);

(5) goes to excessive lengths to obtain nurturance and support from others, to the point of volunteering to do things that
are unpleasant;

(6) feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone because of exaggerated fears of being unable to care for himself or
herself;

(7) urgently seeks another relationship as a source of care and support when a close relationship ends;

(8) is unrealistically preoccupied with fears of being left to take care of himself or herself.

301.5 HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY DISORDER

A pervasive pattern of excessive emotionality and attention seeking, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety
of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:

(1) is uncomfortable in situations in which he or she is not the center of attention;

(2) interaction with others is often characterized by inappropriate sexually seductive or provocative behavior;

(3) displays rapidly shifting and shallow expressing of emotions;

(4) consistently uses physical appearance to draw attention to self;

(5) has a style of speech that is excessively impressionistic and lacking in detail;

(6) shows self-dramatization, theatricality, and exaggerated expression of emotion;

(7) is suggestible, i.e., easily influenced by others or circumstances; and

(8) considers relationships to be more intimate than they actually are.

Significantly, nowhere in Dr. Villegas’ Psychiatric Report and in her testimony does she link particular acts of the parties to
the DSM IV’s list of criteria for the specific personality disorders.

Curiously, Dr. Villegas’ global conclusion of both parties’ personality disorders was not supported by psychological tests
properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests’ use and interpretation. The supposed
personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully established by
psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of people’s intelligence, thinking, or
personality.17

Concededly, a copy of DSM IV, or any of the psychology textbooks, does not transform a lawyer or a judge into a
professional psychologist. A judge should not substitute his own psychological assessment of the parties for that of the
psychologist or the psychiatrist. However, a judge has the bounden duty to rule on what the law is, as applied to a certain
set of facts. Certainly, as in all other litigations involving technical or special knowledge, a judge must first and foremost
resolve the legal question based on law and jurisprudence.

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by
separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on
what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his
theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis
for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74822 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166738 August 14, 2009

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, Petitioner,

vs.

EDWARD RUMBAUA, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges, through her petition for review on certiorari,1 the decision
dated June 25, 20042 and the resolution dated January 18, 20053 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
The challenged decision reversed the decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the marriage of the petitioner
and respondent Edward Rumbaua (respondent) null and void on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The
assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner’s complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage against the
respondent before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances:
the respondent reneged on his promise to live with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial
support to her; he blamed her for his mother’s death; he represented himself as single in his transactions; and he
pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman in Novaliches, Quezon City.

Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service, as personal service proved futile.5 The RTC
ordered the provincial prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties and to ensure that no fabrication or
suppression of evidence would take place.6 Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongson’s report negated the presence of collusion
between the parties.7

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition.8 The
OSG entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya to assist in all hearings of the
case.9

The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate her charges.

The petitioner related that she and the respondent were childhood neighbors in Dupax del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya.
Sometime in 1987, they met again and became sweethearts but the respondent’s family did not approve of their
relationship. After graduation from college in 1991, the respondent promised to marry the petitioner as soon as he found a
job. The job came in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted the respondent as a computer engineer. The
respondent proposed to the petitioner that they first have a "secret marriage" in order not to antagonize his parents. The
petitioner agreed; they were married in Manila on February 23, 1993. The petitioner and the respondent, however, never
lived together; the petitioner stayed with her sister in Fairview, Quezon City, while the respondent lived with his parents in
Novaliches.

The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day during the first six months of their marriage. At that point, the
respondent refused to live with the petitioner for fear that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his application
for a PAL scholarship. Seven months into their marriage, the couple’s daily meetings became occasional visits to the
petitioner’s house in Fairview; they would have sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, the respondent enrolled at FEATI
University after he lost his employment with PAL.10

In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret marriage. The respondent’s mother tried to convince him to
go to the United States, but he refused. To appease his mother, he continued living separately from the petitioner. The
respondent forgot to greet the petitioner during her birthday in 1992 and likewise failed to send her greeting cards on
special occasions. The respondent indicated as well in his visa application that he was single.

In April 1995, the respondent’s mother died. The respondent blamed the petitioner, associating his mother’s death to the
pain that the discovery of his secret marriage brought. Pained by the respondent’s action, the petitioner severed her
relationship with the respondent. They eventually reconciled through the help of the petitioner’s father, although they still
lived separately.

In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a job in Davao. A year later, the petitioner and her
mother went to the respondent’s house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia Villanueva (Cynthia).
When she confronted the respondent about it, he denied having an affair with Cynthia.11 The petitioner apparently did not
believe the respondents and moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the pain and anguish that her discovery
brought.12

The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that communication between her and respondent had ceased.
Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract;13 and the
testimony, curriculum vitae,14 and psychological report15 of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).

Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the following tests on the petitioner: a Revised Beta
Examination; a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a Draw a Person Test; a Sach’s
Sentence Completion Test; and MMPI.16 She thereafter prepared a psychological report with the following findings:

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an average intellectual level. Logic and reasoning remained intact.
She is seen to be the type of woman who adjusts fairly well into most situations especially if it is within her interests. She
is pictured to be faithful to her commitments and had reservations from negative criticisms such that she normally adheres
to social norms, behavior-wise. Her age speaks of maturity, both intellectually and emotionally. Her one fault lies in her
compliant attitude which makes her a subject for manipulation and deception such that of respondent. In all the years of
their relationship, she opted to endure his irresponsibility largely because of the mere belief that someday things will be
much better for them. But upon the advent of her husband’s infidelity, she gradually lost hope as well as the sense of self-
respect, that she has finally taken her tool to be assertive to the point of being aggressive and very cautious at times – so
as to fight with the frustration and insecurity she had especially regarding her failed marriage.

Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a very self-centered manner as he believes that the world revolves
around him. His egocentrism made it so easy for him to deceitfully use others for his own advancement with an extreme
air of confidence and dominance. He would do actions without any remorse or guilt feelings towards others especially to
that of petitioner.

REMARKS

Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes beyond the expectations people tagged with it. In love,
"age does matter." People love in order to be secure that one will share his/her life with another and that he/she will not
die alone. Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow or let love die – it is a choice one had to face when
love is not the love he/she expected.

In the case presented by petitioner, it is very apparent that love really happened for her towards the young respondent –
who used "love" as a disguise or deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence she extended towards him. He made her
believe that he is responsible, true, caring and thoughtful – only to reveal himself contrary to what was mentioned. He
lacked the commitment, faithfulness, and remorse that he was able to engage himself to promiscuous acts that made
petitioner look like an innocent fool. His character traits reveal him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder - declared to
be grave, severe and incurable.17 [Emphasis supplied.]

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of April 19, 2002. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the
petitioner and Dr. Tayag, and concluded as follows:

xxxx

Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of his wife. Respondent imposed limited or block [sic] out
communication with his wife, forgetting special occasions, like petitioner’s birthdays and Valentine’s Day; going out only on
occasions despite their living separately and to go to a motel to have sexual intercourse.

It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant facts in this case which show the psychological incapacity of
respondent, at the time of the celebration of the marriage of the parties, to enter into lawful marriage and to discharge his
marital responsibilities (See Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This incapacity is "declared grave, severe and incurable."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage between petitioner Rowena Padilla Rumbaua and respondent
Edwin Rumbaua is hereby declared annulled.

SO ORDERED.18

The CA Decision

The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA.19 The CA decision of June 25, 2004 reversed and
set aside the RTC decision, and denied the nullification of the parties’ marriage.20

In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not mention the cause of the respondent’s so-called
"narcissistic personality disorder;" it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and thus failed to give the court an insight
into the respondent’s developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she came to the conclusion that the
respondent’s incapacity was "deep-seated" and "incurable."

The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the incapacity to be psychological, although its manifestations
may be physical. Moreover, the evidence presented must show that the incapacitated party was mentally or physically ill
so that he or she could not have known the marital obligations assumed, knowing them, could not have assumed them. In
other words, the illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty to perform
the essential obligations of marriage. In the present case, the petitioner suffered because the respondent adamantly
refused to live with her because of his parents’ objection to their marriage.

The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her motion in its resolution of January 18, 2005. 21

The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner argues in the present petition that –

1. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v. Molina22 (the Molina case) cannot be dispensed with because
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the requirement, took effect only on March 15, 2003;

2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the RTC to recall her expert witness and cure the
defects in her testimony, as well as to present additional evidence, would temper justice with mercy; and

3. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric report.

The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be reversed and set aside, and the case be remanded to the
RTC for further proceedings; in the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s decision be set aside and the RTC’s
decision be reinstated.

The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC was applicable although it took effect after the
promulgation of Molina; (b) invalidating the trial court’s decision and remanding the case for further proceedings were not
proper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.23

The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the memoranda they filed.

THE COURT’S RULING

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable

In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel
for the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Emphasis supplied.]

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC24 -- which this Court promulgated on March 15, 2003 and duly published -- is geared towards the
relaxation of the OSG certification that Molina required. Section 18 of this remedial regulation provides:
SEC. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated.lawphil.net It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of
the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19, 2002 should be vacated for prematurity, as it was rendered
despite the absence of the required OSG certification specified in Molina. According to the petitioner, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC, which took effect only on March 15, 2003, cannot overturn the requirements of Molina that was promulgated as early
as February 13, 1997.

The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.

The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural or remedial in character; it does not create or
remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmation of already existing rights. The settled rule
is that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect,25 as we held in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:26

Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statues - they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are
no vested rights in rules of procedure.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be
applied retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on the
certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes27 and Navales v. Navales28 have since confirmed
and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although
Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties
would take place. Thus, what is important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that
he be certified to be present. From this perspective, the petitioner’s objection regarding the Molina guideline on
certification lacks merit.

A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper

The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts’ decisions and the remand of the case to the RTC for further
reception of evidence are procedurally permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was
the fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding the case to the RTC would allow her to
cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in this regard that while mistakes of counsel bind a party, the rule should be
liberally construed in her favor to serve the ends of justice.

We do not find her arguments convincing.

A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper
at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or
final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new
trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been
guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired;
or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and
produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if presented.

In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for a
remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima
facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the
petitioner’s counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that
ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that the petitioner apparently adverts to
is that cited in Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:29

Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or
incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-
opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show
that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful and
intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse
decision, as in the instant case.
Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s requested remand.

Petitioner failed to establish the

respondent’s psychological incapacity

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that "a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization." In Santos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to "no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage."

We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v.
Court of Appeals where we said:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity
must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.31 These requisites must be strictly
complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family Code does not define "psychological incapacity," fleshing
out its terms is left to us to do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.32 We emphasized this approach in the
recent case of Ting v. Velez-Ting33 when we explained:

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article
36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence
insufficient to prove that the respondent is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband.

a. Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of respondent’s condition

The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a) reneged on his promise to cohabit with her; (b) visited
her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting cards during special
occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e) blamed her for the death of his mother; and (f) told
her he was working in Davao when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997.

These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and should be
distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations that
characterize some marriages. In Bier v. Bier,34 we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – had to be shown and
was not shown in this cited case.

In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it
was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. As the petitioner’s testimony reveals, respondent merely
refused to cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing his application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of
antagonizing his family. The respondent’s failure to greet the petitioner on her birthday and to send her cards during
special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner for his mother’s death and of representing himself as single in
his visa application, could only at best amount to forgetfulness, insensitivity or emotional immaturity, not necessarily
psychological incapacity. Likewise, the respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot
automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity
was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and
faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later.

To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character flaws. The presence of these imperfections,
however, does not necessarily warrant a conclusion that he had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that
rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties and obligations. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:35

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations.
Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is
different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.

b. Dr. Tayag’s psychological report and court testimony

We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions
deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above.36 For,
effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see
and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to
be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who "believes that the world revolves around him"; and who
"used love as a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." Dr. Tayag then
incorporated her own idea of "love"; made a generalization that respondent was a person who "lacked commitment,
faithfulness, and remorse," and who engaged "in promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look like a fool"; and finally
concluded that the respondent’s character traits reveal "him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of
Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable."

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the
respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature.
Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered
"Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable" – is an
unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent.
While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.

Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayag’s subsequent testimony in court cured whatever deficiencies attended her
psychological report.

We do not share this view.

A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the parties were
married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that
respondent’s condition was grave and incurable. To directly quote from the records:

ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:

Q: I would like to call your attention to the Report already marked as Exh. "E-7", there is a statement to the effect that his
character traits begin to suffer narcissistic personality disorder with traces of antisocial personality disorder. What do you
mean? Can you please explain in layman’s word, Madam Witness?

DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:

A: Actually, in a layman’s term, narcissistic personality disorder cannot accept that there is something wrong with his own
behavioral manifestation. [sic] They feel that they can rule the world; they are eccentric; they are exemplary, demanding
financial and emotional support, and this is clearly manifested by the fact that respondent abused and used petitioner’s
love. Along the line, a narcissistic person cannot give empathy; cannot give love simply because they love themselves
more than anybody else; and thirdly, narcissistic person cannot support his own personal need and gratification without
the help of others and this is where the petitioner set in.

Q: Can you please describe the personal [sic] disorder?

A: Clinically, considering that label, the respondent behavioral manifestation under personality disorder [sic] this is already
considered grave, serious, and treatment will be impossible [sic]. As I say this, a kind of developmental disorder wherein it
all started during the early formative years and brought about by one familiar relationship the way he was reared and
cared by the family. Environmental exposure is also part and parcel of the child disorder. [sic]

Q: You mean to say, from the formative [years] up to the present?

A: Actually, the respondent behavioral manner was [present] long before he entered marriage. [Un]fortunately, on the part
of the petitioner, she never realized that such behavioral manifestation of the respondent connotes pathology. [sic]

xxxx

Q: So in the representation of the petitioner that the respondent is now lying [sic] with somebody else, how will you
describe the character of this respondent who is living with somebody else?

A: This is where the antisocial personality trait of the respondent [sic] because an antisocial person is one who indulge in
philandering activities, who do not have any feeling of guilt at the expense of another person, and this [is] again a buy-
product of deep seated psychological incapacity.

Q: And this psychological incapacity based on this particular deep seated [sic], how would you describe the psychological
incapacity? [sic]

A: As I said there is a deep seated psychological dilemma, so I would say incurable in nature and at this time and again
[sic] the psychological pathology of the respondent. One plays a major factor of not being able to give meaning to a
relationship in terms of sincerity and endurance.

Q: And if this psychological disorder exists before the marriage of the respondent and the petitioner, Madam Witness?

A: Clinically, any disorder are usually rooted from the early formative years and so if it takes enough that such
psychological incapacity of respondent already existed long before he entered marriage, because if you analyze how he
was reared by her parents particularly by the mother, there is already an unhealthy symbiosis developed between the two,
and this creates a major emotional havoc when he reached adult age.

Q: How about the gravity?

A: This is already grave simply because from the very start respondent never had an inkling that his behavioral
manifestation connotes pathology and second ground [sic], respondent will never admit again that such behavior of his
connotes again pathology simply because the disorder of the respondent is not detrimental to himself but, more often than
not, it is detrimental to other party involved.

xxxx

PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:

Q: You were not able to personally examine the respondent here?

DR. NEDY TAYAG:

A: Efforts were made by the psychologist but unfortunately, the respondent never appeared at my clinic.

Q: On the basis of those examinations conducted with the petitioning wife to annul their marriage with her husband in
general, what can you say about the respondent?

A: That from the very start respondent has no emotional intent to give meaning to their relationship. If you analyze their
marital relationship they never lived under one room. From the very start of the [marriage], the respondent to have
petitioner to engage in secret marriage until that time their family knew of their marriage [sic]. Respondent completely
refused, completely relinquished his marital obligation to the petitioner.

xxxx

COURT:

Q: Because you have interviewed or you have questioned the petitioner, can you really enumerate the specific traits of the
respondent?

DR. NEDY TAYAG:

A: One is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the respondent and the dependent attitude of the respondent.

Q: Even if he is already eligible for employment?

A: He remains to be at the mercy of his mother. He is a happy-go-lucky simply because he never had a set of
responsibility. I think that he finished his education but he never had a stable job because he completely relied on the
support of his mother.

Q: You give a more thorough interview so I am asking you something specific?

A: The happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly dependent attitude on the part of the mother merely because respondent
happened to be the only son. I said that there is a unhealthy symbiosis relationship [sic] developed between the son and
the mother simply because the mother always pampered completely, pampered to the point that respondent failed to
develop his own sense of assertion or responsibility particularly during that stage and there is also presence of the simple
lying act particularly his responsibility in terms of handling emotional imbalance and it is clearly manifested by the fact that
respondent refused to build a home together with the petitioner when in fact they are legally married. Thirdly, respondent
never felt or completely ignored the feelings of the petitioner; he never felt guilty hurting the petitioner because on the part
of the petitioner, knowing that respondent indulge with another woman it is very, very traumatic on her part yet respondent
never had the guts to feel guilty or to atone said act he committed in their relationship, and clinically this falls under
antisocial personality. 37

In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayag’s answer was very vague and inconclusive, thus:

ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO

Q: Can this personally be cured, madam witness?

DR. NEDY TAYAG

A: Clinically, if persons suffering from personality disorder curable, up to this very moment, no scientific could be upheld to
alleviate their kind of personality disorder; Secondly, again respondent or other person suffering from any kind of disorder
particularly narcissistic personality will never admit that they are suffering from this kind of disorder, and then again
curability will always be a question. [sic]38

This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the general characteristics of a person suffering from a
narcissistic personality disorder, she did not really show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited these traits. She
mentioned the buzz words that jurisprudence requires for the nullity of a marriage – namely, gravity, incurability, existence
at the time of the marriage, psychological incapacity relating to marriage – and in her own limited way, related these to the
medical condition she generally described. The testimony, together with her report, however, suffers from very basic flaws.

First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondent’s exact condition except in a very general
way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how
the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is
grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the
respondent’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical
to the success of the petitioner’s case.

Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner
related to her. As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, only the petitioner.
Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires, of course, that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.39
If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be
admitted and given credit.40 No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this
case, particularly about the respondent’s early life and associations, and about events on or about the time of the
marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no more than a diagnosis that
revolves around the one-sided and meager facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion
that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of the
respondent’s life were examined and given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better
qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his determination to improve himself through studies, his care and attention in
the first six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also what character and qualities the
petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what events led
the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are
important because not a few marriages have failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the
spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity.
The continued separation of the spouses likewise never appeared to have been factored in. Not a few married couples
have likewise permanently separated simply because they have "fallen out of love," or have outgrown the attraction that
drew them together in their younger years.

Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to secure a remand of this case to the trial courts for the
introduction of additional evidence; the petitioner’s evidence in its present state is woefully insufficient to support the
conclusion that the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent should be nullified on the ground of the respondent’s
psychological incapacity.

The Court commiserates with the petitioner’s marital predicament. The respondent may indeed be unwilling to discharge
his marital obligations, particularly the obligation to live with one’s spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot presume psychological
defect from the mere fact that respondent refuses to comply with his marital duties. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough
to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown
to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.41

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated June 25, 2004 and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.

MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's Decision for lack of legal
and factual basis.

xxxx

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented
the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been
sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts
opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time
devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not
actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result.
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she
neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times
a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without
abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played
mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong
sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the
second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done
was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second
grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to
beauty salons orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent
during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that
respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able to prove that respondent
had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with
obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for legal separation, but it does not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD,
there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence
points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and
incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were
neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick,
and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts tosee and take care of her children despite her
estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial
duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite
having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to Malyn’s actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.
There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s
Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually
assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did
not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from
dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but
certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision and its
December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.2

In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look into what constitutes
psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the testimonies of three expert
witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform
their respective essential marital obligation.

Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the
party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although
the Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by
reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in
order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not
unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision "with less specificity than expected" in
order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its application."4 Illustrative of the "less specificity than expected" has been
the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have
limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired
that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the
provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.5

On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage have
rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed independently of "but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."7

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — whatis decreed as canonically invalid should also
be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned
the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so
strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less
specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of
nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."10

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts,
which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of
experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious
judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis
by experts.11

II

The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party’s psychological incapacity
should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence
are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous.12 In every situation where the findings of the trial court are
sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from
substituting its own judgment.13 It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and
substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage as an
inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution14 only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage
that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.15

In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of
marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and solid.

Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to
view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.16 The position and role of the trial judge in
the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded
due importance and respect.

Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates,a
psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the petitioner’s version of
the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely
generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the
nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological
incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by
the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore
be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.17

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as on her interviews of the
petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be unilateral under such
circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into
consideration other factors extant in the records, including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue
from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert
testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullityof marriages, for by
the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties."18

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly determine the issue of
psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal examination
and interview of the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings
of the experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is no requirement for one to bedeclared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of
evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to."20

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result
from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid
for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity
should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence
to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify
their exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure
adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been
based on the parties’ upbringing and psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates’ expertopinion should be considered
not in isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.

Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was expectedto compare the expert
findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.

In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive and dependent
tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the respondent’s psychological data, Dr. Dayan
indicated that:

In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways. Although she likes to
be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her relationship but she may not be that
demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to
minimize opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be
assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a
less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous
value on having significant others would depend on most times.

xxxx

But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly
demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She became relationship-dependent.25

Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test26 conducted on the
respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:

Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?

A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are several scores wherein
Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score of dependency, narcissism and compulsion.

Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?

A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be considered as
acceptable.

Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?

A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84.27

It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that the
respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates
relevantly testified:

ATTY. GONONG

Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms. So, more or less, could
you please tell me in more layman’s terms how you arrived at your findings that the respondent is self-centered or
narcissistic?

A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background, her fatherdied in a
vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to partly assume the
breadwinner’s role in her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings against the
fact that her own mother was unable to carry out her respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and
her siblings considering that the husband died prematurely. And there was an indication that Elena Fernandez on several
occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother because she herself never
experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a precedent in her background, in her
childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat
somekind of experience or the lack of care, let’s say some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to sustain it even on to
your own life when you have your own family. I did interview the son because I was not satisfied with what I gathered from
both Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he could not see,
according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of Elena and that he preferred to live with the father
actually.

Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?

A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still insearch of this. In
her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to another. There is this need for attention, this
need for love on other people.

Q : And that led you to conclude?

A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife and as a mother.28

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in
the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the
reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of
the findings of the expert witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.

The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila Archdiocese and
Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father Healy’s expert
testimony, we have once declared that judicial understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by canonical
thought, and by experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological incapacity adopted under
Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.

Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondent’s level of immaturity and irresponsibility with regard to
her own children and to her husband constituted psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:

ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as you read it
based on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you say to that claim of respondent?

A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility with
regards to her own children.

Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically incapacitated is not true?

A : Yes. It should be rejected.

Q : Why do you say so?

A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been manifested running through
their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility because her family was dysfunctional and then her being
a model in her early life and being the bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of prominence and then
begun to inflate her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became an obsession and that led to
her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had embraced.

Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on the relationship of the
respondent with her husband?

A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and toher children. She had
her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and associating with friends. They were the priorities of
her life.

Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?

A : Secondary.

Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?

A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody takes for granted. The
concentration on the husband and the children before everything else would be subordinated to the marriage withher. It’s
the other way around.

Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.

Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?

A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.

Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?

A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of Narcissus, the myth,
and then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty
and prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.

xxxx

Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this narcissism afflicting
respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?

A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious obligations which she has
ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.

Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already existing at the time or
marriage or even thereafter?

xxxx

A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring with you into the marriage
and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept these responsibilities. And now you show that you don’t
accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling them and you don’t care about them.

Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?

A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended [sic] upon her and she was
a model at Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much that this became the top priority in her life. It’s her
lifestyle.

Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?

A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she was neglecting such
fundamental obligations.

Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that you mentioned?

A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family background situation. Say, almost
for sure would be incurable now.

Q : What specific background are you referring to?

A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so important to give in her job
and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual situation for a young girl and her position in the family was
exalted in a very very unusual manner and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the pressure, in
going along with it and putting it in top priority.31

Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings commanded respect.
The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial determination of the parties’ psychological
incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would
warrant the nullity of marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject as
esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard his opinions and findings.
Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the cause of justice. The Court
observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount
but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in
such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and
they were asked togive professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions
were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past
decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand
the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to
all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential
obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for
hetero sexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the obligations of
marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship
because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to
the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to
the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility;
(6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties.
Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where
the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently
fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment
on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised(lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at
the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure
to carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into."

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause
of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v.
Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.33

Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the standards set in Molina,34 the
courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, viz:

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
standards in Molina, thus:

xxxx

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another three--including,
as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court."

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much
regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving
all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live
with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the
very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far fromwhat was intended by the Court, Molina has become
a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, tocontinuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the
personality disorders of the said individuals.

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards
against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against
collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of
cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot demolishing the
foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted
with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that
sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let itbe
noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To
indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly
stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate
once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.35

III

In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:

Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she
neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times
a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always withthe permission of her husband and without
abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that theywere with their mother when she played
mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong
sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the
second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done
was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second
grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or
absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties
and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and
responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions
would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.

Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life,
particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37 – the
parties’ eldest son – in his deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked
on playing mahjong, viz:

ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do you remember any habit or activity or practice which
your mother engaged in, before the separation?

WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t remember.

xxxx

ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you remember?

WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…

ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?

WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we would get there by lunch then
leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She brought you?

WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.

ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?

WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out by herself.38

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of
parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her
children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the
observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current psychological
state of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood experience.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated
her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the
Family Code, to wit:

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated
children, parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing of such children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or
wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to
provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) x x x x

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance,
industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;

(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association
with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies
and morals;

(6) x x x x

(7) x x x x

(8) x x x x

(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)

The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that both
the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her
answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.

The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:

ATTY. BRETAÑA:

Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?

A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those short temper of the
petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even the time that they were together, that they
were living in, she also had noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also
dependent and she was one who determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even those kinds of
problems that she had seen.

Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude that Mr. Kalaw
was behaviorally immature?

A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was not really thinking of marriage
except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her. And even that time he was not also a
monogamous person.

Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I think so, Sir.

Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you that in his younger years
he was often out seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to page 18. He also admitted to you that the thought of
commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to you, my questions is, is it possible for
such a person to enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and given his admission that he was a womanizer?
Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?

A : Sir, it’s difficult.

Q : It would be difficult for that person?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?

A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.

Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the respondent?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his psychological capacity to
perform his duties as a husband is concerned?

A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role of husband to Malyn.

Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was psychologically incapacitated
to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner was behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a
mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question again and request you to answer that directly?

A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the
defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised the matter in her
answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of
whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of
them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have already accepted and
come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law, was already beyond
repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own
children. It would be a greater injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and
their children to endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero decried in her erudite
dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:41

It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and
compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today.1âwphi1 It is not, in effect,
directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit
relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by
private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and towhich he is legally
entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn
a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to perform an
essential marital obligation. In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent was
afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to
declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not preclude
striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court
and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of
the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the
strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of
course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and
the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and
the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as
prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial
of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact
merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into
account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages
contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in
turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are
not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.42 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the
psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192718 February 18, 2015

ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner,

vs.

LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the November 20, 2009
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010 Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, which reversed
and set aside the September 20, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br.37),
declaring the marriage between petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) and private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz)
null and void.

The Facts:

Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.

On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, Branch 23, Cagayan de
Oro City (RTC-Br. 23). On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the petition. Robert appealed this judgment before the CA
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261. On January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision "due to
lack of participation of the State as required under Article 48 of the Family Code."3 The case was remanded to the RTC
for further proceedings and its records were thereafter transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter was
designated as Family Court pursuant to the Family Code Act of 1997.

In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological
and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and
responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear
manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the
heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.

Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert who manifested
psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did not appear during the trial. Assistant City
Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal appeared for the State. When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in
California, USA, and had married an American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing
and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her duties
both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room
because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2) it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one
who washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her sister who took care
of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she
dated different men; (5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was not
home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6) she
would contract loans without his knowledge.

In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist II of
Northern Mindanao Medical Center.

On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment with the
Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).

On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on the
ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as contemplated by the second paragraph of
Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).

Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal with the CA. The OSG argued
that Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Luz. It pointed out that the real cause of the
marital discord was the sexual infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG contended, should not result in the nullification of
the marriage under the law, but merely constituted a ground for legal separation.

The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision. The decision, including
the decretal portion, partially reads:

[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly noted by the
Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. x x x.

xxxx

In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence adduced by Robert fell short of establishing the
fact that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived [her] of the
ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.

xxxx

We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee’s undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a court compels Us to
apply the law at all costs, however harsh it may be on whomsoever is called upon to bear its unbiased brunt.

FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.5

Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010 Resolution,6 stating that the
arguments of Robert were mere rehash of the same ground, arguments and discussion previously pointed out by him, and
that no new substance was brought out to warrant the reconsideration or reversal of its decision.

Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION
OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL GAP TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OFTHE RTC DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

II

THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF
THE CATHOLIC BISHOP’S CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACKOF DUE DISCRETION.

III
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.

Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his marriage even in the absence of any medical,
psychiatric or psychological examination of the wife by a competent and qualified professional. To bolster his claim, he
avers that the Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited grave lack of discretion in judgment concerning
the essential rights and obligations mutually given and accepted in marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the
NAMT.

Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men coupled with the fact that she failed to function
as a home maker to her family and as a housewife to him incapacitated her from accepting and complying with her
essential marital obligations. For said reason, he asserts that the case of Luz was not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but
clearly an illness that was rooted on some debilitating psychological condition which incapacitated her to carry out the
responsibilities of a married woman. Robert avers that a sex maniac is not just a mere sexual infidel but one who is
suffering from a deep psychological problem.

Position of the State

The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Robert was not sufficient to support
a finding that Luz was psychologically incapacitated. His evidence fell short of establishing his assertion that at the time of
their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which deprived her of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.

With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG claims that the same were only given
persuasive value and were not controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of marriage. Further, the decision was based on
grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights and obligations due to outside factors other than
psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. The OSG also raises the strong possibility of
collusion between the parties as shown by the events that took place after the issuance of the March 7, 1996 RTC
Decision. The OSG wrote:

Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March 7, 1996 Decision unmistakably show the
collusion between the parties to obtain the reliefs pleaded. Among others, respondent’s Retraction of Testimony was
executed without the presence of counsel sometime in 1998, a few months before she married an American. This
irregularity was even noticed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:

xxxx

The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became indispensable, in the present recourse, when, in
a whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE FACE executed a "Retraction of Testimony" and a "Waiver of
Custody" waiving custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a minor, her son by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the
Appellee, in the Court a quo, obdurately denied the material allegations of the Appellant’s complaint and declared that it
was the Appellant who was psychologically incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the present recourse,
to the extent of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Trial
Court is strongly suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or a modus vivendi between the parties, outlawed by the
Family Code of the Philippines and the Constitution. x x x

The Court’s Ruling

The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

The petition is bereft of merit.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization. "Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe
love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.7

Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.8

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,9 the Court reiterated the well-settled guidelines in
resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,10 based on
Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.

xxxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.

xxxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.

xxxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. x x x.

xxxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

x x x.

xxxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. x x x.

Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Robert’s evidence failed to establish the
psychological incapacity of Luz.

First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage. Other than his
self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no other
witnesses to corroborate his allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony was self-serving and had no serious value
as evidence.

Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically identified, and
sufficiently proven during the trial. Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that her disposition of not cleaning the
room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving different male visitors, was grave,
deeply rooted, and incurable within the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.

The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of the parties'
marriage. The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.11 Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or
be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.12

As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds
for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity. Robert argues that the series of sexual indiscretion of
Luz were external manifestations of the psychological defect that she was suffering within her person, which could be
considered as nymphomania or "excessive sex hunger." Other than his allegations, however, no other convincing
evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania, and that it was grave,
deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological incapacity embodied in Article 36. To stress, Robert’s
testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of psychological incapacity.

In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the Philippines,13 the Court ruled that the
respondent’s act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially
when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The
petitioner must be able to establish that the respondent’s unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality,
which made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center,
Cagayan deOro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological in capacity of Luz. There was nothing in the records that
would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was subjected to a psychological examination. The finding as to
her psychological incapacity was based entirely on hearsay and the self-serving information provided by Robert.

Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it is
true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,14 the Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still
it is subject to the law on evidence. Thus:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence– what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be
decreed civilly void x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered
must be specified.

In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be given value since it was not offered during
the trial, and the Court has in no way of ascertaining the evidence considered by the same tribunal.

Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by
the NAMT was not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature similar to Article
36 of the Family Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from grave lack of
discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For
clarity, the pertinent portions of the NAMT decision are as follows:

The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the deposition of the petitioner – the
respondent understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which she was duly cited for Contempt of Court – and
premised on the substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman Respondent demonstrated in the
external forum through her action and reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due
discretion in judgement for marriage intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of judgement as
manifested by her emotional ambivalence x x x.
WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the Divine Name and having in mind the Law, the
Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby declares and decrees the confirmation of the nullity decision
rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN –
JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N. 63/2000 on the ground provided by Canon 1095 par. 2CIC on the part of the woman
Respondent – but NOT on the part of the man Petitioner for lack of evidence. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)15

In Santos v. Santos,6 the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It went out to state that a part
of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations
to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In Najera v. Najera,17 the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether to consider an annulment by the
NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the only ground recognized in our law. In the said case, the NAMT
decision was also based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled that it was not similar to, and only
annulments under the third paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be considered. Elucidating, the Court wrote: Petitioner’s
argument is without merit.

In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered the
Matrimonial Tribunal’s decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before
this Court and correctly held that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:

The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on
February 11, 2004, reads as follows:

[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
summons from the Court dated June14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard,
hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law
and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the
break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up
with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his
friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but
later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now
lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol
abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this
led to final separation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having
considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and
decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground
contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.

However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the
testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellant’s mother), Sonny de la Cruz
(member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to
the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But
unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant’s sister-in-law and friends of the
opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latter’s testimonies, this
Court is without any clue. True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court
held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded
as follows:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence– what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be
decreed civilly void x x x.

And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered
must be specified.

Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the Decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of which We have no
way of ascertaining their truthfulness. Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence
presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no
ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.[31]

Santos v. Santos18 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the
Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to
the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations
to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the
second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:

The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard,
hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law
and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having
considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and
decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground
contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x.

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of
respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the
psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in the original; Underscoring
supplied)

Hence, Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the NAMT was based on the
second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under
Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of psychological nature similar to Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos 19), which for ready reference reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

xxxx

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph of Canon 1095 should also be
covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include. What would prevent members of other religious
groups from invoking their own interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if not
inconsistent, interpretations?

To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be legislating from the
bench.1âwphi1 As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,20 interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.

In Republic v. Galang,21 it was written that the Constitution set out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as
the basic social institution, and the marriage was the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution
protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the
burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a
situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and
serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of
the marital tie.

In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence
to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.

As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for legal separation. Hence, this decision is without
prejudice to an action for legal separation if a party would want to pursue such proceedings. In this disposition, the Court
cannot decree a legal separation because in such proceedings, there are matters and consequences like custody and
separation of properties that need to be considered and settled.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, dated
November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009

DIGNA A. NAJERA, Petitioner,

vs.

EDUARDO J. NAJERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which found
petitioner Digna A. Najera and respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal separation, but not annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The facts are as follows:

On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative
Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership
of Gains.1

Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the
United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint
Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan.2 They are childless.

Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage as shown
by the following facts:

(a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the Special Services Division of the Provincial
Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did not exert enough effort to find a job and was dependent
on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land
a job as a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.

(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support and she had to rely on her
own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.

(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months each year. In May 1989, when he came home
from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her of having an affair with another man. He
took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it. When she refused, he insulted her and uttered "unprintable
words" against her. He would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he was always drunk.

(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994, as had been happening every year, he quarreled
with petitioner. He continued to be jealous, he arrived home drunk and he smoked marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while he
was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a
bolo. She was able to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her body.
She was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was reported at the Bugallon Police Station.

(e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with his mother at Banaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.

Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her as the sole administrator of their
conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered (1) declaring their marriage void ab initio in
accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative, decreeing legal separation of petitioner and
respondent pursuant to Title II of the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
petitioner and respondent and the forfeiture in

favor of petitioner of respondent’s share in the said properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family Code;
and (4) granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.

On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of petitioner to effect service by publication as provided
under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer3 wherein he denied the material allegations in the petition and averred that
petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and guilty of infidelity. He claimed that the
subject house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and money. As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award
of ₱200,000.00 as moral damages, ₱45,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and ₱1,000.00 as appearance fee for every scheduled
hearing.

On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance.

On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order4 terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed a Formal
Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally
their conjugal properties.

On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a Compliance manifesting that after conducting an
investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the parties.5 The initial hearing of the case was held on
November 23, 1998.

Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia Aldana; psychologist Cristina
R. Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
Bugallon, Pangasinan.

Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an accounting clerk in a government agency in
Manila. She and respondent married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by their marriage contract.6 At the time of their
marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the
Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary of ₱5,000.00. It was petitioner’s brother who helped
respondent find a job as a seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent was
employed as a seaman, and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment of ₱1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went home
in 1989 and then returned to work after three months. Every time respondent was home, he quarreled with petitioner and
accused her of having an affair with another man. Petitioner noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana and every
time he went out of the house and returned home, he was drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that
respondent was involved in drugs.7

In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their earnings. In 1991, they constructed a house on
the lot.8

On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the boyfriend of petitioner’s sister. Respondent,
however, did not allow petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived home at around midnight, petitioner asked him
about the party, the persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with, but he did not answer her. Instead,
respondent went to the kitchen. She asked him again about what happened at the party. Respondent quarreled with her
and said that she was the one having an affair and suddenly slapped and boxed her, causing her eyes to be bloodied.
When she opened her eyes, she saw respondent holding a bolo, and he attempted to kill her. However, she was able to
parry his attack with her left arm, causing her to sustain injuries on different parts of her body. When respondent saw that
she was bloodied, he got nervous and went out. After 10 minutes, he turned on the light in the kitchen, but he could not
find her because she had gone out and was hiding from him. When she heard respondent start the motorcycle, she left
her hiding place and proceeded to Gomez Street toward the highway. At the highway, she boarded a bus and asked the
conductor to stop at a clinic or hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and proceeded to the clinic of one Dr.
Padlan, who sutured her wounds. After a few hours, she went home.9

When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her parents who were residing about 300 meters
away. She then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in order to open the door. She found that their
personal belongings were gone, including her Automated Teller Machine card and jewelry.10
Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.11

Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Petitioner
learned that he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment from him.12

Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while respondent’s parents were separated. Respondent’s
brothers were also separated from their respective wives.13

Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological incapacity of respondent.14

Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who was abroad. She
confirmed her Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:

It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are rooted in the kind of
family background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and separated from Respondent’s father. This turn of
events left an irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging from his alcoholic and marijuana habit. In time, he seemed
steep in a kind of a double bind where he both deeply loved and resented his mother.

His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her appears to be an offshoot of deep-seated
feelings and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to resolve his childhood conflicts and anger, he turned to
his wife as the scapegoat for all his troubles.

Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted with a Borderline Personality Disorder
as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive
tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo Najera’s psychological impairment as traced to his parents’ separation,
aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage to Petitioner Digna Aldana.

Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to cause irreparable damage
organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior across time render his impairment grave and
irreversible. In the light of these findings, it is recommended that parties’ marriage be annulled on grounds of
psychological incapacity on the part of Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his marital duties and responsibilities
to Digna Aldana-Najera.15

Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondent’s psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the
composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with
borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses.16

Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he received
a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner
without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter.17

On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent,
but not the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna Najera and respondent/defendant Eduardo Najera;

2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the petitioner/plaintiff and respondent/defendant, and to divide
the same equally between themselves pursuant to their Joint Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998.18

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution19 dated May 2, 2000.

Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and judgment of the Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto.
No costs.20
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated August 5, 2004.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
contrary to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198.

2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent Eduardo Najera.

3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is practically the same set of facts
established by petitioner’s evidence submitted before the trial court and therefore the same conclusion ought to be
rendered by the Court.

4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an expert in Psychology.21

The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code.22

Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent which is
his dysfunctional family background. With such background, respondent could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

The Court is not persuaded.

Republic v. Court of Appeals23 laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, thus:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.1avvphi1

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -- what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church -- while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other -- shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."24 The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.25 In
fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."26 What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.27

In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to
satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
The root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates’ conclusion that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal knowledge and
evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable.28 Moreover, the trial court correctly found that
petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may be
gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates’ testimony:

Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a borderline personality disorder. [D]id you find any
organic cause?

A No, sir.

Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time of the marriage of the respondent?

A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondent’s family] background, there was strong basis that
respondent developed mal-adoptive pattern.

Q Did you interview the respondent’s family?

A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).

xxxx

Q Have you [seen] the respondent?

A He is not in the country, sir.

Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report which the respondent is allegedly affected, is this curable?

A The chances are nil.

Q But it is curable?

A It depends actually if the established organic damage is minimal.

Q What is this organic damage?

A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.

Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not seen him (respondent)?

A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted the respondent with borderline personality disorder. This [is]
based on his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive tendencies, and his uncontrollable
impulses.

Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?

A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.29

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or
grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondent’s abandonment of petitioner without justifiable
cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation30 only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code.

Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
which her counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on February 11, 2004, twelve days before the decision
was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended that the Court of Appeals failed to follow Guideline No. 7 in
Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus:

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church – while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other – shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

Petitioner’s argument is without merit.

In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered the
Matrimonial Tribunal’s decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before
this Court and correctly held that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on
February 11, 2004, reads as follows:

x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent
(despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be
heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required
by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the
break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up
with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his
friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but
later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now
lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol
abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this
led to final separation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having
considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and
decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground
contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.

However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the
testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellant’s mother), Sonny de la Cruz
(member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to
the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But
unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant’s sister-in-law and friends of the
opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latter’s testimonies, this
Court is without any clue.1avvphi1

True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be
decreed civilly void x x x.

And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered
must be specified.

Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the Decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of which We have no
way of ascertaining their truthfulness.

Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano
vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify
the judgment of the Trial Court.31

Santos v. Santos32 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the
Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to
the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations
to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the
second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:

The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite
summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard,
hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law
and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having
considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and
decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground
contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of
respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the
psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053, dated February
23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all
things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed
the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its decision
are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as
evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the
house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making
love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned
his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing
happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband
and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They
were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there
was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by
just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed
since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese
General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was
asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she
had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the
country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological
incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very
much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that,
according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further
claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have
sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue
because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that
she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant,
will consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the
purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh.
"2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out
that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch
and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual
intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated."2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the
defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before
the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without making
any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity
inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that
there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the
parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should
aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the
trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced
since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in
the complaint shall always be proved.3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of
marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and
101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that
there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never
had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of
the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether
or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of
both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with
his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such
abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019,
January 4, 1995).4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis
of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have
been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent
would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been
coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for
private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing
her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least,
there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be.
What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable
of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of
private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the
refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal
of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of
this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with
him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the
entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for
her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs.
Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from
incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her
marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to
perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation."
After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act
with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged
approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity
(Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and
not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This
is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for
two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 155800 : March 10, 2006]

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into
matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and
breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the
guilty spouse's capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November
2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After
careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and
through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6
December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his
petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8

As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy's parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such
incident occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends
that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet,
not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she
postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to
that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had
taken place.15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner
claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2
million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she
admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments
of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned
a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture
dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a
normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent
and constant lying

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.22 They further asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They
concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her
husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.25

(2) She told petitioner about David's attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David's act of
touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School
for two (2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3)
commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank.
She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she
reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the
Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea
Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband's
whereabouts.30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of
P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to
her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not
sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her
psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33 together with the
screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him
to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He
postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the
one who administered and interpreted respondent's psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument
called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's propensity to lying about
almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondent's fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the
Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the pendency
of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal's ruling was affirmed with modification by both the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due
discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of
the Vatican.39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the
RTC's judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent's
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the
application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein
that the evidence conclusively establish respondent's psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is
likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner.
Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent.43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question
remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Court's
1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45 ), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited
the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court
has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before
Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family
Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was
a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for
a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article
36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for
nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their
reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class
as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party's mental capacity was not a
ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time
of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a
spouse's incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the
enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of
the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the
grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45
(2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely
given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and
Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological
incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a
marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990
edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee.
Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under
Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the
same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital
obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were
answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to
a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice
(now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence
since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36,
with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court
that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by
avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather,
the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was
not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought,
and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the
Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary
framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the
Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation,
and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at
present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize
other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon
law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code
committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as
one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still
existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence
in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into
the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church
thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting
psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have
favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the
Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded
to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the
strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of
course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and
the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and
the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as
prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial
of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact
merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into
account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a
nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio
marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote
wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity
under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein
operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"' by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally'subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous
opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal's participation in the hearings
before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these
facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her
character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his
own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, and certifications from
Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged
singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant
behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered
petitioner's evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest
with petitioner.80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the
cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter
between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the
State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would
necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court's decision. The initiatory complaint alleged
that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating
ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of
lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others.81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert
witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist
who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that
[are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in
the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on
assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q - Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of her marriage?cralawlibrary

A - Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards
the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and
expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is
going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be
based on love, trust and respect.

Q - Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories,
she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q - Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the
respondent has been calling up the petitioner's officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him
on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what
can you say about this, Mr. witness?cralawlibrary

A - If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her
suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That
is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out
in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with
another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is
pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q - Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of the marriage?cralawlibrary

A - Yes, Ma'am.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the
psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and]
she loves to fabricate about herself."84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial
transcripts of respondent's testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the
subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede
and Lopez's common conclusion of respondent's psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of
petitioner's version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual
premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner's expert
witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in
its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for
telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has
this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe
making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and
constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on
love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and
pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87

Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child's real parentage as she only confessed when
the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation
before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of
petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent's psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave
in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner
into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least
abide by the truth. Petitioner's witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent's inveterate proclivity to telling
lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent's inability to
understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and
the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be
expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had
amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological
condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. Respondent's ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is
impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent's ability to adhere to the truth, her
avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud
under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to
draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46.
The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of
the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar
would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties
was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no
reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner's efforts to bring the matter to its
attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question
in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90 Such decree of
nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact,
respondent's psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence
of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal's consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and
wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment
faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious
impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in
Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage
option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and
implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of
its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment
formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially
binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of
due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical
bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway
since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner's allegations. Had the trial
court instead appreciated respondent's version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of
the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial
trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent's condition was incurable and that Dr.
Abcede did not testify to such effect.95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their
marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories,
and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent's condition is incurable? It would seem,
at least, that respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been
easier had petitioner's expert witnesses characterized respondent's condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent
on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts' taciturnity on this point.

The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995.
These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not
expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the
deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation
of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's opinion expressed during the
deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the
Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that
remained silent on whether respondent's psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least,
there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court's
decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this
case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply
retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of
the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The
requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that
necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the
expert witnesses that respondent's psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal
necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply
Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially
those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not
have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability,
since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by
the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability
of respondent's psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled
by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of
psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the
degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in
the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited
by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent's
avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid
sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live
together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA,
respondents.

Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.

De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's
order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.

On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition
which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29,
1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License
No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April
25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when
Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia
and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by
her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for
support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while
on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he
had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and
thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and
refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not
authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and
Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and
such properties be placed under the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab
initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private
respondent has no property which is in his possession.

On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She
explained:

Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and void
(citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity
of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under
the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first
marriage with another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage should first be
judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court
ruled in explicit terms, thus:

And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed
to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)

The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases
of Aragon and Mendoza.

Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his possession is an issue that may be
determined only after trial on the merits.1

A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the
absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the
motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.

Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that
the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.

On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by
petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there
being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case
prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and
subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the
status of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by
petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be
invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and
52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be
raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since
the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the
remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate
the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.5

Hence, this petition.

The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.

First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the
same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal
properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary
and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J
contains no allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.

On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not
for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the properties acquired
during coverture.

There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous
marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning.8 Petitioner
himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.9

The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier
ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to
observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:

Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for
the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10

This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in
Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower
court's order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated
that "if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial
declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."

Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,
that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was
still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."

In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In
granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death
certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent
during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."

However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that
there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married
each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and
for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 14 Where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family
Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.

B. Article 39. —

The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void,
except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also voidable marriages. He then
suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:

The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:

The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked

only . . .

On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid and
that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a
judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as
provided in Article 41.

Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a marriage and
the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some
judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in
the provision.

Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and
not annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are
presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if
this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase to
"invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.

Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa
explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party
should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa
added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions
which are brought on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise
the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that
there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It
will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and
suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:

The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .

Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent
marriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:

For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only
be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He
proposed that they say:

For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked
on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.

After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of the provision as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her
first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18

Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the
defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage
and living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said
that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that
the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."

As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be
maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will
warrant dismissal of the same.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the
same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for
careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally
emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .,"
in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the
interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."

That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances
where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in
case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well
as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In
such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage
which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the
nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished
merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential
requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this
so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And
the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For
such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the
exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity
of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.

That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of the
parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage
license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23

Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive.
Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will
result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis
on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.

Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated
that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof.
Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis
supplied)

Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests
that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been
acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court but would
be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is
actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private
respondent's money.

The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties."

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the
delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25
Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:

Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated,
but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or
conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the
guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent
spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation
of law. (n) 26

Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the
necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that
in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The
Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before
whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that
the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the
Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002]

LENI O. CHOA, Petitioner, vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding,
provided the petitioner can show that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due course is not
plain, adequate or speedy under the circumstances. Indeed, when the plaintiffs evidence is utterly and patently insufficient
to prove the complaint, it would be capricious for a trial judge to deny the demurrer and to require the defendant to present
evidence to controvert a nonexisting case. Verily, the denial constitutes an unwelcome imposition on the courts docket and
an assault on the defendants resources and peace of mind. In short, such denial needlessly delays and, thus, effectively
denies justice.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 16, 2000
Decision1 and the May 22, 2000 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100. The decretal portion
of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[3cräläwvirtualibräry

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[4

The Facts

Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and
Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a
Complaint[5 for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-8098.
Afterwards he filed an Amended Complaint[6 dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner based on her alleged psychological incapacity.

The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last witness testified, he submitted his
Formal Offer of Exhibits[7 dated February 20, 1998. Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence)[8 dated May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed
thereafter.

Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order9 denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It held that [respondent]
established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert.10 After her Motion for Reconsideration11 was
denied in the March 22, 1999 Order,12 petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari,[13
docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
was not available. The proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was
handed down later, to take an appeal therefrom.14 In any event, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent judge in issuing the assailed Orders.[15cräläwvirtualibräry

The CA also ruled that the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence rests on the sound exercise of the [trial]
courts discretion.[16 Further, the [p]etitioner failed to show that the issues in the court below [had] been resolved arbitrarily
or without basis.[17cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, this Petition.18

The Issues

In her Memorandum,19 petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

1) Upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is she under
obligation, as a matter of inflexible rule, as what the Court of Appeals required of her, to present her evidence, and when
an unfavorable [verdict] is handed down, appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law, despite the palpably and
patently weak and grossly insufficient or so inadequate evidence of the private respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of
marriage case, grounded on psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family Code? Or under such circumstances,
can the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be directly and immediately resorted to by the petitioner; and

2) In upholding the lower courts denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, did the Court of Appeals wantonly violate,
ignore or disregard in a whimsical manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in Molina (G.R. No. 108763,
February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14, 1995, 58 SCRA 17)?[20cräläwvirtualibräry

Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence? and (2) in its
denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:

Resort to Certiorari

Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to Evidence despite the patent weakness and gross insufficiency of
respondents evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
Echoing the CA, respondent counters that appeal in due course, not certiorari, is the proper remedy.

We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.

However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People,[21 this Court declared that appeal -- not certiorari -- in due time was
indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive
exercise of judicial authority.

In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and allow certiorari when the lower court
acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:
No appeal may be taken from:

xxx

(c) An interlocutory order;

xxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65. 22cräläwvirtualibräry

In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:

SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.[23cräläwvirtualibräry

Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may
be assailed through a petition for certiorari.24 In Cruz v. People, this exception was stressed by the Court in this wise:

Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge interlocutory orders of the
trial court may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with
grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.25

Second Issue:

Denial of Demurrer to Evidence

Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in exceptional circumstances, this Court is now tasked to
determine whether the present case falls under the exception; that is, whether the RTC indeed committed a patent error or
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that
the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or
sustain the issue.26 The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict.[27 In passing
upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.[28cräläwvirtualibräry

We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced that the evidence against
respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a
declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.

First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latters
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for
perjury,29 false testimony,[30 concubinage[31 and deportation.[32 According to him, the filing and the prosecution of these
cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from
the country. He contends that this is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her
husband as the father of her children, had acted to the contrary.[33cräläwvirtualibräry

We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented, even if
taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to
establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on
absurdity.

Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his documentary offerings, sufficient
to prove petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. He testified in these words:

Q Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. What do you mean by that?
A Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that time she even want it aborted by taking pills.
She was even immature, carefree, and she lacked the intention of procreative sexuality.34

xxx

ATTY. CHUA:

And you consider her that she was carefree, she is psychologically incapacitated? Will you please elaborate on this what
you mean by carefree approximating psychologically incapacitated?

ATTY. MIRANO:

I think we better ask the witness what he means by carefree.

ATTY. CHUA:

Okay.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

WITNESS:

She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the child, she wants me to hire an attendant in
order to take care of the child. Even when the children were sick she does not bother to let the children see a doctor.35

xxx

STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua):

ATTY. CHUA:

Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of your marriage to the defendant, did you notice any characteristic or traits
which you consider as psychological incapacity?

WITNESS:

Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she wont talk to me when I call her up by telephone.
So, all she wanted for me to visit her everytime and even at the time when I am busy with some other things. So, I think
that is all.[36cräläwvirtualibräry

Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects of petitioners personality;
namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an intention of procreative sexuality.
None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Far from it.

In Santos v. CA,[37 this Court clearly explained that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.[38 Said the Court:

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.[39cräläwvirtualibräry
Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina,[40 we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each
other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting
their marital union.

Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the
disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological
incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.41cräläwvirtualibräry

Respondents pious peroration that petitioner lacked the intention of procreative sexuality is easily belied by the fact that
two children were born during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged defect was already
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert testimony presented by respondent. His
witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity.
Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. The pertinent portions of his testimony are quoted thus:

ATTY. CHUA:

And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both parties, meaning the husband and the wife in the
present case have a personality which is normal. That is your conclusion?

WITNESS:

They are normal, but they cannot mix together.

Q. So as a general proposition, both of them are of normal personality, only that they are not compatible with each other?

A. Yes.

Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any personality disorder, bordering on
abnormality?

A. Yes.

Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are perfectly match?

A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody who knows how to handle marriage, that
should try to intervene.

Q. You mean expert advise or services should be needed by the couple?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of them practises what we call maximum tolerance and give and take,
will that serve the purpose?

A. That would served the purpose of getting well.

Q. Yes?

A. Yes.

Q. Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be harmonized?

A. Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both of them are personally disordered. It cannot be harmonized. So this
case, if only they have tried professional help to take care of their marital problem, it could have been solved.

Q. Or the situation could have been remedied?

A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody who is an expert. Not just any from Tom, Dick and Harry could
handle this. That means from the very beginning they have personalities which they were incompatible. So if anybody
would handle that, they will not mix, they will be always quarreling with each other. They should not have got married.42

xxx

Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion was sought by the plaintiff, and you found out that both are normal?

A. With different personalities. So that they were incompatible.

Q. Normal, simply incompatible.

A. Yes, with personalities different from each other, which I mentioned there in my last page. That they are like oil and
water, immiscible. Like oil and water, they will not mix.

Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say the husband told you about the frequent quarrels had with the
wife. Did he ever tell you that was a serious or major quarrel?

A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty quarrels.[43

xxx

Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities?

A. Yes.[44

xxx

Q. Now, you mentioned that you maybe able to make them reconcile?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things could be worked out?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise of those who possess the necessary
[expertise] could be worked out?

A. Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family therapy.[45

xxx

Q. Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is psychological inc[a]pacity existing in this case?

A. Yes.

Q. Because of the

A. The incompatibility.

Q. Incompatibility.

A. Yes.[46cräläwvirtualibräry

His testimony established merely that the spouses had an incompatibility, a defect that could possibly be treated or
alleviated through psychotherapy. We need not expound further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to
establish the psychological incapacity of petitioner.

Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by
respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so.
In fact, his Professional Opinion47 began with the statement [I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, x x x.
[48 The expert witness testified thus:
ATTY. CHUA

Q Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours, you gathered most of your material data from the plaintiff who is the
husband?

WITNESS

A Yes. By the way, I requested the husband Alfonso, if it was possible for me to interview Leni, and he said, he doesnt
know.

ATTY. CHUA

Q He doesnt know. Now, Doctor if we were to request you to conduct the same personal interview and written
psychological examination on the part of the wife, [w]ould you be willing to do that?

WITNESS

A Sure for a fee. I maybe able to make them reconcile.49cräläwvirtualibräry

Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by
respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side.
Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.

Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioners character, not only through the
descriptions given by respondent, but also through the formers at least fifteen hours[50 of study of the voluminous
transcript of records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to examine the records of
this case, we still find his assessment of petitioners psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.

As to respondents argument -- that because Dr. Gauzons testimony had never been objected to, the objection raised
thereafter was deemed waived -- the Supreme Court has already ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of
admissibility of evidence could not be raised for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence should be
disregarded whether objected to or not, because it has no probative value.51cräläwvirtualibräry

We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately.52
Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by respondent and taken into account
the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to
proceed further with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously, grossly and clearly
insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of
discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Courts rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the
process of litigation would have been a total waste of time and money for the parties and an unwelcome imposition on the
trial courts docket.

We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.53 Any decision, order or resolution of a lower court tantamount to
overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion.
[54cräläwvirtualibräry

There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the case at bar. An
appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders maintaining the
baseless action of respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted trial, which would further
clog the court dockets with another futile case.[55cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged
psychological incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, Petitioner, v. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage
having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda
Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on
petitioners complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it
was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal
case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998.1 Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family
Code.2cräläwvirtualibräry

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein.3 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.4 It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which
the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be
determinative of the criminal case.5 Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the
same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed.6
Its two essential elements are:7cräläwvirtualibräry

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency
of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a
prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been
adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the
indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not
for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage.8 Whether or not the first
marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at
the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted
provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been
valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.9cräläwvirtualibräry

In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to
invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise,
all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage
and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally
void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:10cräläwvirtualibräry

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such
authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a
second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the
other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More
specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years.11 The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial
question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that
the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward
the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds."12 Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.13 No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the
intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final
judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,14 he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such
a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a
recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a
prejudicial question.15 This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse.16 The
contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in
disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.17 The legality of a marriage is a matter of
law and every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he
entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay
his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of
the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the
criminal case.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was contracted rests upon
the defense,18 but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be
stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of
the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when
respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was
only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial
question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above, this cannot be
done.

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage
will also be void.19 The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner.20 Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity
would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus,
a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action
against him.21cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of
Quezon City is REVERSEDand SETASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELYproceed with Criminal Case No.
Q98-75611.

SO ORDERED.
EFFECTS OF NULLITY

ART 50-54

TENEBRO VS. CA

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold
that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact
to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual
who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990.
The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived
together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had
been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed
that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 013095-L, reads:

That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity
were it not for the subsisting first marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took
place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment
from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from
the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of
said marriage.9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL
– WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic)
THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF
THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12

Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage
to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to
the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the
crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14

Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first
marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage
contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at
the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes
and Tenebro were legally married.16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics
Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3,
1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between
Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.

To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself
would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as
follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated
between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995
and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests
as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a
marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the
absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence
of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact
that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.19
There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes
lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this
testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage,
and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.

Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by
requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the
National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997,
respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private respondent in
this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of
bigamy was not committed.21

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws
are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological
capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid
first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage,
and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal
liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the
sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the
permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a
marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely
given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and
marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the
presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen
years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas.
Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license
before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date
of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that
said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself
that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise
of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his
marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the
accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity
of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of
which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic
social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which
has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall
be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a
duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of
the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
VOIDABLE MARRIAGE

GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT

ART. 45-48 FC

ART 344 RPC

AQUINO VS. DELIZO

G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960

FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.

CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo.

The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged,
among other things, that defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein
petitioner Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact that she was pregnant by another
man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer,
defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.

At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to
represent the State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff however, testified and the only documentary
evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any
evidence despite the reservation made by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.

On June 16, 1956, the trial court — noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was born within
180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff
does not constitute such fraud sa would annul a marriage — dismissed the complaint. Through a verified "petition to
reopen for reception of additional evidence", plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the child born
of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce before
the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was denied.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to present
the proof of the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion
for reception of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have
had sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's
claim that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate court,
nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be denied,
that the case be remanded to the lower court for new trial. In support of the motion, plaintiff attached as annexes thereof
the following documents:

1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brother-in-law and plaintiff's brother, with whom defendant was living at
the time plaintiff met, courted and married her, and with whom defendant has begotten two more children, aside from her
first born, in common-law relationship) admitting that he is the father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and
that he and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;

2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B") admitting her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law and
plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her marriage to plaintiff and her having hidden this fact from plaintiff before and up to
the time of their marriage;

3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew Cesar Aquino and defendant lived together as husband and
wife before December 27, 1954, the date of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;

4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing her date of birth to be April 26, 1955;

5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of defendant with Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law;

6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel Aquino, the third child of Cesar Aquino and defendant; and

7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to as late as November, 1954, the November,
1954 photo itself does not show defendant's pregnancy which must have been almost four months old at the time the
picture was taken.

Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant Conchita Delizo and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, who was representing the Government, to answer the motion for reconsideration, and deferred action on the prayer
for new trial until after the case is disposed of. As both the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an answer, and stating
that it "does not believe the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes", the Court of Appeals, on August 6,
1959, denied the motion. From that order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for certiorari.

After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained.

Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art.
86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed, which was also an
action for the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of
the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage of
pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here
the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that
stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or
fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a
woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen
so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is
only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus,
making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as claimed by
plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was
pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Even
physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective symptoms,
can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine,
Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).

The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before
they got married and therefore the child could be their own. This statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no
support or justification in the record.

Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with what has already been
adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should,
therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her answer thereto.
Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been
ordered of represent the Government precisely to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion
and its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing evidence. In the circumstance, we think that justice
would be better served if a new trial were ordered.

Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for new trial. Without costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

Barrera, J., concurs in the result.

BUCCAT VS. MANGONO DE BUCCAT

G.R. No. 47101 April 25, 1941

GODOFREDO BUCCAT, demandante-apelante,

vs.

LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT, demandada-apelada.

D. Feliciano Leviste, D. Tomas P. Panganiban y Doña Sotera N. Megia en representacion del apelante.

Doña Luida Mangonon de Buccat en su propia representacion.

HORRILLENO, J.:

Este asunto se ha elevado a esta Superioridad por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Baguio, ya que solo suscita una
cuestion puramente de derecho.

El 20 de marzo de 1939 el demandante inico la presento causa, en la que no comparecio la demandada, no obstante
haber sido debidamente emplazada. Por lo que, permitido el demandante a presentar sus pruebas, el Juzgado inferior
fallo el asunto a favor de la demandada. De ahi esta apelacion.

El demandante pide la anulacion de su matrimonio habido con la demandada Luida Mangonon de Buccat el 26 de
noviembre de 1938, en la Ciudad de Baguio, fundandose en que, al consentir en dicho matrimonio, lo hizo porque la
demandada le habia asegurado que ella era virgen.

De la decision del Juzgado inferior se desprenden los siguientes hechos:

El demandante conocio a la demandada el mes de marzo de 1938. Despues de varias entrevistas, ambos quedaron
comprometidos el 19 de septiembre del mismo año. El 26 de noviembre de igual año, el demandante contrajo matrimonio
con la demandada en la catedrla catolica de la Ciudad de Baguio. Desoues de convivir maritalmente por espacio de
ochenta y nueve dias, la demandada dio a luz un niño de nueve meses, el 23 de febrero de 1939. De resultas de este
acontecimiento, el demandante abandono a la demandada y no volvio a hacer vida marital con ella.

No vemos razon alguna para revocar la sentencia apelada. En efecto, es inverosimil la alegacion del demandante y
apelante que el ni siguiera habia sospechado el estado gravido de la demandada, estando esta, como queda probado, en
condicion preñada muy avanzada. Por lo que no ha lugar a estimar el fraude de que habla el apelante. Lo alegado por
este en el sentido de que no ses raro hallar a personas de abdomen desarrollado, nos parece pueril para merecer
nuestra consideracion, tanto mas cuanto que el demandante era estudiante de primer año de derecho.

El matrimonio es una institucion sacratisima: es el cimiento en que descansa la sociedad. Para anularlo, son menester
pruebas claras y fehacientes. En este asunto no existen tales pruebas.

Hallando la sentencia apelada ajustada a derecho, debe ser confirmada, como por la presente la confirmamos, en todas
sus partes, con las costas al apelante. Asi se ordena.

Avanceña, Pres., Imperial, Diaz y Laurel, MM., estan conformes.

WEGEL VS. SEMPIO DIY

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.

Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City,
herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on
July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva
Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A.
Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia,
while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the
first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the
issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against
both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia
asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and

(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of
the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of
therespondent Judge-

(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on
"agreed facts;" and

(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties
because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly
married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such
fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded
VOID under the law.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

ALCAZAR VS. ALCAZAR

G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009

VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner,

vs.

REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated 24 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch
85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint for the
annulment of her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.

The Complaint,2 docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by petitioner before the RTC on 22 August 2002.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan
(Pabustan), at the latter’s residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but
respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23
October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture
shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to
call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a
co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why
she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home to
petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents’ house in
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to
see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of respondent’s whereabouts.
Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his
parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner
concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for
annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code).
There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.

Per the Sheriff’s Return3 dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a copy of petitioner’s Complaint, was served
upon respondent on 30 September 2002.4

On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion5 to direct the public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.

As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November 2002 an Order6 directing the public prosecutor to
conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to submit a report thereon; and to appear
in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.

On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her Report manifesting that she
had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in January 2003, but respondent never
participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that no collusion took place between the parties, and
measures were taken to prevent suppression of evidence between them. She then recommended that a full-blown trial be
conducted to determine whether petitioner’s Complaint was meritorious or not.

Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.

On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L.
Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.
Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in her Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated
petitioner’s testimony.

Petitioner’s third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of petitioner and respondent:

After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner is found to be free from any underlying
personality aberration neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits, which may possibly impede her normal
functioning (sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the sudden breakdown
of marital life between petitioner and respondent was clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder that the
respondent is harboring, making him psychologically incapacitated to properly assume and comply [with] essential roles
(sic) of obligations as a married man.

The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically classified as
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and incurable by any
treatment.

People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or
behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as
indicated by five (or more) of the following:

1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and talents, expect to be recognized as superior
without commensurate achievements)

2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love

3. believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or should associate with, other special or
high status people (institutions)

4. requires excessive admiration

5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or automatic compliance
with his or her expectations

6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends

7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others

8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her

9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.

The root cause of respondent’s personality disorder can be attributed to his early childhood years with predisposing
psychosocial factors that influence[d] his development. It was recounted that respondent is the first child of his mother’s
second family. Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation composed his immediate environment in his growing up years.
Respondent had undergone a severe longing for attention from his father who had been unfaithful to them and had died
early in life, that he was left alone to fend for the family needs. More so that they were coping against poverty, his
caregivers failed to validate his needs, wishes or responses and overlooked the love and attention he yearned which led
to develop a pathological need for self-object to help him maintain a cohesive sense of self-such so great that everything
other people offer is "consumed." Hence, he is unable to develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is
no capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others.

The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence as it already existed long before
he entered into marriage. Since it already started early in life, it is deeply engrained within his system and becomes a[n]
integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such to be permanent and incurable.7

Tayag concluded in the end that:

As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the fact that it has long been (sic) ceased to exist and have
their different life priorities. Reconciliation between them is regarded to be (sic). The essential obligations of love, trust,
respect, fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual help and support, and commitment, did not and will
no lon[g]er exist between them. With due consideration of the above-mentioned findings, the undersigned recommends,
the declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent.8
On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who
replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to the admission of petitioner’s evidence and manifested
that she would no longer present evidence for the State.

On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioner’s Complaint for annulment of her marriage to
respondent, holding in substance that:

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not living with
the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of their marriage or that these are incurable.

That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED.9

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 but it was denied by the RTC in an Order11 dated 19 August 2004.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a Decision12
dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove respondent’s psychological incapacity. Other than petitioner’s
bare allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove respondent’s personality disorder that made him completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,13 the appellate court
ruled that the evidence should be able to establish that at least one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that said person could not have known the marital obligations to be assumed; or knowing the marital obligations,
could not have validly assumed the same. At most, respondent’s abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for legal
separation under Article 5 of the Family Code.1avvphi1

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution14 dated 28 August 2008.

Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY

INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.15

At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the RTC was for annulment of
marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:

ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

xxxx

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues
and appears to be incurable; x x x.

Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.16 Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent
inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.17 Non-consummation of a marriage
may be on the part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of
one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical
conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result of making
the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.18

No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically incapable to
consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and respondent
had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical
incapacity on respondent’s part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Petitioner’s
Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.

One curious thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence presented by petitioner and
the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsel’s mistake or gross
ignorance.19 But even said reason cannot save petitioner’s Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that
the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural technique.20 Although this rule is
not a hard and fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and
inexcusable as to result in the violation of his client’s substantive rights,21 petitioner failed to convince us that such
exceptional circumstances exist herein.

Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based on Article 36 of
the Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the evidence presented by petitioner
during the trial.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.23

The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,24 to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint,
c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.

Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we scrutinized the totality
of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.

Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner
soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half later,
he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that
respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much
insight into respondent’s psychological state.

Tayag’s psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioner’s cause. It must be noted that Tayag
was not able to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear for examination despite Tayag’s invitation.25
Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect
Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of respondent’s psychological condition, since her
source of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.

Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the
latter’s experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said conclusion. Tayag did not
particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" that showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Tayag likewise failed to explain how such a personality disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to
perform his obligations as a husband. We emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that
respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders him "truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."26
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations.

In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into petitioner’s marital life and, as a
result, we perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each other, with the
husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his wife.

To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither
can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the
parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited
remedy that addresses only a very specific situation – a relationship where no marriage could have validly been
concluded because the parties; or where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing
when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly
entered into a marriage.271avvphi1

An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos28]:

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.

Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitute psychological incapacity.29

As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual
infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion30 dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner claims that she
was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that
respondent is living-in with another woman named "Sally."
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.31

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of
married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.32 Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.33 In the case at
bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that respondent’s failure to communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia
to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him
from knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

We are not downplaying petitioner’s frustration and misery in finding herself shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no
longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answers to every individual problem.34

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City,
Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
MARRIAGE WHEN ONE SPOUSE IS ABSENT

ART 41-44

ART 349 RPC

VALDEZ VS. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 180863 September 8, 2009

ANGELITA VALDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12, 2007 dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdez’s petition
for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971, petitioner gave birth to the
spouses’ only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because the latter was unemployed
and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for
him to return but, finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents’ home in Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac.
Three years passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st. He and petitioner
talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed a document to that effect.1 That was the last time
petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didn’t hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.2

Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985.3 Subsequently, however,
Virgilio’s application for naturalization filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security was denied because
petitioner’s marriage to Sofio was subsisting.4 Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of
Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

The RTC rendered its Decision5 on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that
Angelita "was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead." It said that
under Article 41 of the Family Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and that
she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts
to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.

The RTC found that, by petitioner’s own admission, she did not try to find her husband anymore in light of their mutual
agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioner’s daughter testified that her mother prevented her from looking for her
father. The RTC also said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have been only 61
years old by then, and people who have reached their 60s have not become increasingly low in health and spirits, and,
even assuming as true petitioner’s testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is no evidence that he
continues to drink and smoke until now.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.6 She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in this case and not the
Family Code since petitioner’s marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took
effect. Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a vested right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter
provisions of the Family Code should not be applied against her because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where Articles 384
and 390 on declaration of absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be found, was not expressly repealed by
the Family Code. To apply the stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had acquired under the
Civil Code.

The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10, 2007.7

Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and Motion for Reconsideration.

In its Manifestation and Motion,8 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended that the Court set aside the
assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement
of "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner
could not be expected to comply with this requirement because it was not yet in existence during her marriage to Virgilio
Reyes in 1985. The OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner already acquired a vested
right as to the validity of her marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio under the Civil Code. This
vested right and the presumption of Sofio’s death, the OSG posits, could not be affected by the obligations created under
the Family Code.9

Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by Article 41 of the Family Code.10 Title XIV
of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly repealed by the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the
Family Code provides that its provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights.11

The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must state that we are denying the
Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.

Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision
of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the
correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.12

The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to prove a "well-founded
belief" that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family Code, to wit:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20,
1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with
any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

Article 390 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If
he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession
may be opened.

The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:

For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee.
The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable
the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.13

Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court proceedings independent of the
settlement of the absentee’s estate.

In re Szatraw14 is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish national in 1937. They lived
together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the husband, on the pretext of visiting some friends, left
the conjugal abode with their child and never returned. After inquiring from friends, petitioner found that her husband went
to Shanghai, China. However, friends who came from Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen there. In 1948,
petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband arguing that since the latter had been
absent for more than seven years and she had not heard any news from him and about her child, she believes that he is
dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:

The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed
property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner. The
rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact
that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be
invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for
decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot
be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced
nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final
determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the
petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that
the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a
declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not
improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to
that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that
reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved
in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the
parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and
obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status
determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or
the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no
collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration
that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum
only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to
have such particular fact finally determined.1avvphi1 If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because
he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary
period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof,
then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.15

In Lukban v. Republic,16 petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10,
1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel. She did not hear from him after
that day. Her diligent search, inquiries from his parents and friends, and search in his last known address, proved futile.
Believing her husband was already dead since he had been absent for more than twenty years, petitioner filed a petition
in 1956 for a declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to
contract a subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the antecedents in Gue v. Republic17 are similar to Szatraw. On
January 5, 1946, Angelina Gue’s husband left Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China. From that
day on, he had not been heard of, had not written to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his whereabouts.
Despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11 years, she asked the court for a declaration of the
presumption of death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's
husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law.18

From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law19 and no
court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year
of absence,20 Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.

Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry,
and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.

Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is not required. Petitioner could not
have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her
marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself
states:

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will, ultimately,
result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be
untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.

In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death can be granted
under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was
capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal
and valid.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

EFFECTS OF PENDING ACTION/DECREE

Rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages

Art 49-54 FC

YU VS. YU

G.R. No. 164915 March 10, 2006

ERIC JONATHAN YU, Petitioner,

vs.

CAROLINE T. YU, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On January 11, 2002, Eric Jonathan Yu (petitioner) filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals alleging
that his estranged wife Caroline Tanchay-Yu (respondent) unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child
Bianca. The petition, which included a prayer for the award to him of the sole custody of Bianca, was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 68460.
Subsequently or on March 3, 2002, respondent filed a petition against petitioner before the Pasig Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the absolute community of property. The petition included a
prayer for the award to her of the sole custody of Bianca and for the fixing of schedule of petitioner’s visiting rights "subject
only to the final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68460."

In the meantime, the appellate court, by Resolution of March 21, 2002, awarded petitioner full custody of Bianca during
the pendency of the habeas corpus case, with full visitation rights of respondent.

Petitioner and respondent later filed on April 5, 2002 before the appellate court a Joint Motion to Approve Interim Visitation
Agreement which was, by Resolution of April 24, 2002, approved.

On April 18, 2002, respondent filed before the appellate court a Motion for the Modification of her visiting rights under the
Interim Visitation Agreement. To the Motion, petitioner filed an Opposition with Motion to Cite Respondent for Contempt of
Court in light of her filing of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC which, so he contended,
constituted forum shopping.

By Resolution of July 5, 2002, the appellate court ordered respondent and her counsel to make the necessary
amendment in her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig City RTC in so far as the custody aspect
is concerned, under pain of contempt.

In compliance with the appellate court’s Resolution of July 5, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Admit Amended Petition
before the Pasig RTC. She, however, later filed in December 2002 a Motion to Dismiss her petition, without prejudice, on
the ground that since she started residing and conducting business at her new address at Pasay City, constraints on
resources and her very busy schedule rendered her unable to devote the necessary time and attention to the petition. The
Pasig RTC granted respondent’s motion and accordingly dismissed the petition without prejudice, by Order of March 28,
2003.

On June 12, 2003, petitioner filed his own petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the absolute
community of property before the Pasig RTC, docketed as JDRC Case No. 6190, with prayer for the award to him of the
sole custody of Bianca, subject to the final resolution by the appellate court of his petition for habeas corpus.

The appellate court eventually dismissed the habeas corpus petition, by Resolution of July 3, 2003, for having become
moot and academic, "the restraint on the liberty of the person alleged to be in restraint [having been] lifted."

In the meantime, respondent filed on July 24, 2003 before the Pasay RTC a petition for habeas corpus, which she
denominated as "Amended Petition," praying for, among other things, the award of the sole custody to her of Bianca or, in
the alternative, pending the hearing of the petition, the issuance of an order "replicating and reiterating the enforceability
of the Interim Visiting Agreement" which was approved by the appellate court. The petition was docketed as SP Proc. No.
03-0048.

Not to be outdone, petitioner filed on July 25, 2003 before the Pasig RTC in his petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage an urgent motion praying for the custody of Bianca for the duration of the case.

Acting on respondent’s petition, Branch 113 of the Pasay RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, a Hold Departure Order
and Summons addressed to petitioner, drawing petitioner to file a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action, forum shopping and litis pendentia, he citing the pending petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage which he filed before the Pasig RTC.

The Pasay RTC, in the meantime, issued an Order of August 12, 2003 declaring that pending the disposition of
respondent’s petition, Bianca should stay with petitioner from Sunday afternoon to Saturday morning and "with the
company of her mother from Saturday 1:00 in the afternoon up to Sunday 1:00 in the afternoon." To this Order, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the Pasay RTC did not have jurisdiction to issue the same. He likewise
filed a Manifestation of August 14, 2003 stating that he was constrained to submit to the said court’s order but with the
reservation that he was not submitting the issue of custody and himself to its jurisdiction.

Respondent soon filed her Answer with Counter-Petition on the nullity case before the Pasig RTC wherein she also
prayed for the award of the sole custody to her of Bianca, subject to the final disposition of the habeas corpus petition
which she filed before the Pasay RTC.

By Omnibus Order of October 30, 2003, the Pasig RTC asserted its jurisdiction over the custody aspect of the petition
filed by petitioner and directed the parties to comply with the provisions of the Interim Visitation Agreement, unless they
agreed to a new bilateral agreement bearing the approval of the court; and granted custody of Bianca to petitioner for the
duration of the case.

The Pasay RTC in the meantime denied, by Order of November 27, 2003, petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The court, citing
Sombong v. Court of Appeals,1 held that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint
of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of a writ of habeas corpus as a remedy; rather, a writ of habeas
corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over the child.2 And it further held that the filing
before it of the habeas corpus case by respondent, who is a resident of Pasay, is well within the ambit of the provisions of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.3

On the issue of forum shopping, the Pasay RTC held that it is petitioner, not respondent, who committed forum shopping,
he having filed (on June 12, 2003) the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC while his petition
for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals was still pending.4

The Pasay RTC held that assuming arguendo that petitioner’s filing before the Pasig RTC of the declaration of nullity of
marriage case did not constitute forum shopping, it (the Pasay RTC) acquired jurisdiction over the custody issue ahead of
the Pasig RTC, petitioner not having amended his petition before the Pasig RTC as soon as the Court of Appeals
dismissed his petition for habeas corpus5 (on July 3, 2003).

Finally, the Pasay RTC held that there was no litis pendentia because two elements thereof are lacking, namely, 1) identity
of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and 2) identity with respect to the
two preceding particulars in the two cases such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless
of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.6

Petitioner thereupon assailed the Pasay RTC’s denial of his Motion to Dismiss via Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus before the appellate court wherein he raised the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO

DISMISS DESPITE THE EVIDENT LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF CUSTODY, LITIS
PENDENTIA, AND DELIBERATE AND WILLFUL FORUM-SHOPPING ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT CAROLINE T.
YU.7

B. RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WHIMSICALLY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND ARBITRARILY IN ISSUING THE AUGUST 12,
2003 ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT CAROLINE T. YU OVERNIGHT VISITATION RIGHTS OVER THE MINOR
CHILD BIANCA AND DENYING PETITIONER’S URGENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE SAID ORDER.8
(Underscoring supplied)

By Decision of August 10, 2004,9 the appellate court denied petitioner’s petition, it holding that the assumption of
jurisdiction by the Pasay RTC over the habeas corpus case does not constitute grave abuse of discretion; the filing by
respondent before the Pasay RTC of a petition for habeas corpus could not be considered forum shopping in the strictest
sense of the word as before she filed it after petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus filed before the appellate court was
dismissed; and it was petitioner who committed forum shopping when he filed the declaration of nullity of marriage case
while his habeas corpus petition was still pending before the appellate court.

In fine, the appellate court held that since respondent filed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Pasig RTC during the pendency of the habeas corpus case he filed before the appellate court, whereas respondent filed
the habeas corpus petition before the Pasay RTC on July 24, 2003 after the dismissal on July 3, 2003 by the appellate
court of petitioner’s habeas corpus case, jurisdiction over the issue custody of Bianca did not attach to the Pasig RTC.

As for the questioned order of the Pasay RTC which modified the Interim Visiting Agreement, the appellate court, noting
that the proper remedy for the custody of Bianca was filed with the Pasay RTC, held that said court had the authority to
issue the same.

Hence, the present petition filed by petitioner faulting the appellate court for

I. . . . DECLARING THAT PETITIONER ERIC YU COMMITTED FORUM-SHOPPING IN FILLING THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE WITH PRAYER FOR CUSTODY BEFORE THE PASIG FAMILY COURT
AND THAT THE LATTER COURT WAS BARRED FROM ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE CUSTODY ASPECT
OF THE NULLITY CASE IN RECKLESS DISREGARD OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BEFORE THE FAMILY COURTS VESTS THE LATTER WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO
DETERMINE THE NECESSARY ISSUE OF CUSTODY.
II. . . . APPL[YING] THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE BY RULING THAT THE PASIG FAMILY COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE CUSTODY ASPECT OF THE NULLITY CASE ON THE BASIS OF THE JULY 5, 2002
RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA GR SP NO. 68460 WHEN THE SAID RESOLUTION CLEARLY
APPLIES ONLY TO THE NULLITY CASE FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON MARCH 7, 2002 DOCKETED AS
JDRC CASE NO. 5745 AND NOT TO HEREIN PETITIONER’S JUNE 12, 2003 PETITION FOR NULLITY DOCKETED AS
JDRC CASE NO. 6190.

III. . . . DECLARING THAT THE PASIG FAMILY COURT MUST YIELD TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE PASAY COURT
INSOFAR AS THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY IS CONCERNED IN GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL
STABILITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE.

IV. . . . RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CAROLINE DID NOT COMMIT FORUM-SHOPING IN FILING THE
HABEAS CORPUS CASE WITH PRAYER FOR CUSTODY BEFORE THE RESPONDENT PASAY COURT DESPITE
THE FACT THAT AN EARLIER FILED PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE WITH PRAYER
FOR CUSTODY IS STILL PENDING BEFORE THE PASIG FAMILY COURT WHEN THE FORMER CASE WAS
INSTITUTED.

V. . . . RULING THAT RESPONDENT CAROLINE YU DID NOT SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE PASIG
FAMILY COURT BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS FACTUAL FINDING THAT SHE FILED ON AUGUST 25, 2003 AN
OMNIBUS OPPOSITION IN PETITIONER’S ACTION FOR NULLITY BEFORE THE PASIG COURT.10 (Underscoring
supplied)

The petition is impressed with merit.

The main issue raised in the present petition is whether the question of custody over Bianca should be litigated before the
Pasay RTC or before the Pasig RTC.

Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity of marriage case before the Pasig RTC, regardless of which party would
prevail, would constitute res judicata on the habeas corpus case before the Pasay RTC since the former has jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter.

There is identity in the causes of action in Pasig and Pasay because there is identity in the facts and evidence essential to
the resolution of the identical issue raised in both actions11 – whether it would serve the best interest of Bianca to be in
the custody of petitioner rather than respondent or vice versa.

Since the ground invoked in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations12 as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code, the
evidence to support this cause of action necessarily involves evidence of respondent’s fitness to take custody of Bianca.
Thus, the elements of litis pendentia, to wit: a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both
actions; b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and c) the identity
in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other,13 are present.

Respondent argues in her Comment to the petition at bar that the Pasig RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the custody
issue raised therein.

"[T]he subsequent dismissal of the habeas corpus petition by the Court of Appeals on 3 July 2003 could not have the
effect of conferring jurisdiction over the issue on the Pasig court. For the Pasig court to acquire jurisdiction over the
custody issue after the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition before the Court of Appeals, the rule is that petitioner must
furnish the occasion for the acquisition of jurisdiction by repleading his cause of action for custody and invoking said
cause anew."14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And respondent cites Caluag v. Pecson,15 wherein this Court held:

Jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular case is something more than the general power conferred by law upon a
court to take cognizance of cases of the general class to which the particular case belongs. It is not enough that a court
has power in abstract to try and decide the class litigations [sic] to which a case belongs; it is necessary that said power
be properly invoked, or called into activity, by the filing of a petition, or complaint or other appropriate pleading.
(Underscoring supplied by Caroline.)16

Specific provisions of law govern the case at bar, however. Thus Articles 49 and 50 of the Family Code provide:
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action [for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage] and in the absence of
adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses
and the custody and support of their common children. x x x It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the
other parent. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)17

Art. 50. x x x x

The final judgment in such cases [for the annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage] shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the
delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such other matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings."
(Emphasis and underscoring added)

By petitioner’s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he automatically submitted the
issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. After the appellate court subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus
case, there was no need for petitioner to replead his prayer for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of the Family
Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded. That that is so gains light from Section
21 of the "Rule on Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages"18 which
provides:

Sec. 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes.–Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of
the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated
in previous judicial proceedings. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since this immediately-quoted provision directs the court taking jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage to resolve the custody of common children, by mere motion of either party, it could only mean that the filing of a
new action is not necessary for the court to consider the issue of custody of a minor.19

The only explicit exception to the earlier-quoted second paragraph of Art. 50 of the Family Code is when "such matters
had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings," which is not the case here.

The elements of litis pendentia having been established, the more appropriate action criterion guides this Court in
deciding which of the two pending actions to abate.20

The petition filed by petitioner for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is the more appropriate action
to determine the issue of who between the parties should have custody over Bianca in view of the express provision of the
second paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code. This must be so in line with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of
suits.21

The appellate court thus erroneously applied the law of the case doctrine when it ruled that in its July 5, 2002 Resolution
that the pendency of the habeas corpus petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 68460 prevented the Pasig RTC from acquiring
jurisdiction over the custody aspect of petitioner’s petition for declaration of nullity. The factual circumstances of the case
refelected above do not justify the application of the law of the case doctrine which has been defined as follows:

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It is a term applied to an established rule
that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the
question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of
the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, italics in the original)22

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 10, 2004 decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE,and another is entered DISMISSING Pasay City Regional Trial Court Sp. Proc. No. 03-0048-CFM and ordering
Branch 69 of Pasig City Regional Trial Court to continue, with dispatch, the proceedings in JDRC No. 6190.

SO ORDERED.

TUASON VS. CA
G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996

EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondents.

PUNO, J.:p

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioner's appeal from an order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati in
Civil Case No. 3769.

This case arose from the following facts:

In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition
for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent
alleged that she and petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two children; that at the time of
the marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which
became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that in one of their fights, petitioner
inflicted physical injuries on private respondent which impelled her to file a criminal case for physical injuries against him;
that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a one-year suspended
penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer, and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and
cohabited with three women in succession, one of whom he presented to the public as his wife; that after he left the
conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their
children compelling private respondent to accept donations and dole-outs from her family and friends; that petitioner
likewise became a spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets
and incurring large obligations with banks, credit card companies and other financial institutions, without private
respondent's consent; that attempts at reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioner's refusal to
reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent prayed for powers of administration to save
the conjugal properties from further dissipation.1

Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As affirmative defense, he claimed that he and private
respondent were a normal married couple during the first ten years of their marriage and actually begot two children
during this period; that it was only in 1982 that they began to have serious personal differences when his wife did not
accord the respect and dignity due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata; that due to the "extreme
animosities " between them, he temporarily left the conjugal home for a "cooling-off period" in 1984; that it is private
respondent who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another man; that petitioner's work as
owner and operator of a radio and television station exposed him to malicious gossip linking him to various women in
media and the entertainment world; and that since 1984, he experienced financial reverses in his business and was
compelled, with the knowledge of his wife, to dispose of some of the conjugal shares in exclusive golf and country clubs.
Petitioner petitioned the court to allow him to return to the conjugal home and continue his administration of the conjugal
partnership.

After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private respondent presented four witnesses, namely,
herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a Canon Law expert and marriage counselor of both private respondent and petitioner; Ms.
Adelita Prieto, a close friend of the spouses, and Atty. Jose F. Racela IV, private respondent's counsel. Private respondent
likewise submitted documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of her husband's relationship with other
women, his apprehension by the authorities for illegal possession of drugs; and copies of a prior a church annulment
decree.2 The parties' marriage was clerically annulled by the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimonial which was affirmed by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986.3

During presentation of private respondent's evidence, petitioner, on April 18, 1990, filed his Opposition to private
respondent's petition for appointment as administratrix of the conjugal partnership of gains.

After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception of petitioner's evidence on May 11, 1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing , a counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on the
ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to return on the first week of June.4 The court granted
the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990.5

On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court declared petitioner to have
waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.

On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private respondent's marriage to petitioner and
awarding custody of the children to private respondent. The court ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage contracted by Ma. Victoria L. Tuason and Emilio R. Tuason on June
3, 1972 is declared null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant under
Sec. 36 of the Family Code. Let herein judgment of annulment be recorded in the registry of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
where the marriage was contracted and in the registry of Makati, Metro Manila where the marriage is annulled.

The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and the defendant is hereby awarded to the plaintiff.

The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of the other effects of annulment as provided for under
Arts . 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the Philippines.6

Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal was taken from the decision.

On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a "Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties."7 Petitioner opposed the motion on October 17, 1990.8

Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed with the trial court a petition for relief from
judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision.

The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991.9

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court denying his petition for relief from judgment. On
July 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the trial court. 10

Hence this petition.

The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstances of the case.

We rule in the negative.

A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding thereof. — When a judgment or
order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment,
order or proceeding be set aside.

Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on the ground of
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good,
substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. 11 If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and
determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. 12

In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private respondent had already become final and
executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Petitioner however claims that the decision of
the trial court was null and void for violation of his right to due process. He contends he was denied due process when,
after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence
and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for private respondent. Petitioner justifies his absence at the hearings
on the ground that he was then "confined for medical and/or rehabilitation reason." 13 In his affidavit of merit before the
trial court, he attached a certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of the Narcotics Command, Drug Rehabilitation
Center which states that on March 27, 1990 petitioner was admitted for treatment of drug dependency at the Drug
Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police. 14 The records, however, show that the former counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of this
confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the country for which reason the
decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. 15
The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is
negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of
counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment valid and regular on its face. 16

Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of petitioner's confinement and medical
treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any reason why his
former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case
deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent alone. To compound the
negligence of petitioner's counsel, the order of the trial court was never assailed via a motion for reconsideration.

Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may have lost his right to present evidence
but he was not denied his day in court. As the record show, petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the
proceedings below. He filed his answer to the petition, cross-examined private respondent's witnesses and even
submitted his opposition to private respondent's motion for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. 17

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exception cases where there is no other
available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available or adequate remedy. When a party has
another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial
or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. 18 Indeed, relief will not
be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due
to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru
inexcusable negligence. 19

Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code which provides that in actions
for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because the law "looks
with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default." He contends that when he failed to
appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and
inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance. 20

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecution
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and
to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession
of judgment.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.

In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. 21

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. 22 Hence, in all
cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to
appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare
him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the
parties.23 The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.24 Our Constitution is
committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. 25 Our family law is based on the policy
that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The state can find no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and,
hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one,
petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and
contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing
several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the
litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated.
Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the
parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under
these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.

Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses, particularly Dr. Samuel Wiley and Ms. Adelita
Prieto, as biased, incredible and hearsay. Petitioner alleges that if he were able to present his evidence, he could have
testified that he was not psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage as indicated by the fact that during their
first ten years, he and private respondent lived together with their children as one normal and happy family, that he
continued supporting his family even after he left the conjugal dwelling and that his work as owner and operator of a radio
and television corporation places him in the public eye and makes him a good subject for malicious gossip linking him with
various women. These facts, according to petitioner, should disprove the ground for annulment of his marriage to
petitioner.

Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioner's psychological
incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us. 26 Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial
court's factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses vis-a-vis petitioner's defenses
are clearly and manifestly erroneous. 27

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 37925 is affirmed.

Regalado, Romero and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

LEGAL SEPARATION (GROUNDS)

G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner,

vs.

HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18,
Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S. GANDIONCO, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

A special civil action for certiorari, with application for injunction, to annul (1) the Order of the respondent Judge, dated 10
December 1986, ordering petitioner to pay support pendente lite to private respondent (his wife) and their child, and (2)
the Order of the same respondent Judge, dated 5 August 1987, denying petitioner's motion to suspend hearings in the
action for legal separation filed against him by private respondent as well as his motion to inhibit respondent Judge from
further hearing and trying the case.

On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, 10th Judicial District, Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by respondent Judge, a complaint
against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages.
This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 10636. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed with the Municipal
Trial Court, General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage, which was docketed on 23 October 1986
as Criminal Case No. 15437111. On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite,
pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation.
The respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered The payment of support pendente lite.

In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such
as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against
him the private respondent. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which states:

SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. — Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense. as contemplated in the first Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be
observed:

(a) After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. . . .

The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is petitioner's position that such civil action arises
from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so that all proceedings related to legal separation will
have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. Authority for this position is this
Court's decision in the case of Jerusalem vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano. 1
Petitioner's contention is not correct.

In Jerusalem, the Court's statement to the effect that suspension of an action for legal separation would be proper if an
allegation of concubinage is made therein, relied solely on Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of the then provisions of the Rules of Court
on criminal procedure, to wit:

Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses.-Except as otherwise provided by law, the following rules shall
he observed:

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right
to institute it separately;

(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has
been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;

(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the
same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered ... (Emphasis supplied)

The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Rules do, that the civil action to be suspended, with or upon
the filing of a criminal action, is one which is "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense". In other words, in view
of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage,
may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the
same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof,
such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from
inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Judge in his Order dated 5
August 1987:

The unreported case of JERUSALEM vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano, Judge of CFI of Antique, et al., L-11935, April 24, 1959
(105 Phil. 1277) is not controlling. It applied paragraph C of Sec. 1, of then Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the
same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered. (Emphasis supplied)

The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which refers to "civil actions to enforce the
civil liability arising from the offense" as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 111-which is a civil action
"for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply
referred to "Civil action arising from the offense."

As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights
of the spouses and their relations to each other, within the contemplation of Articles 7 to 108, of the Civil Code."2

Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal
separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.

Petitioner's assumption is erroneous.

A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in
the action for legal separation. 3 No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco
vs. Tayao 4 has been modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed
and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under
such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a criminal action. That
requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been
uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.5

Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as we find no proof of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed
of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. 6 If petitioner finds the amount of support
pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same. 7
Petitioner lastly seeks to have the respondent Judge disqualified from hearing the case, as the grant of support pendente
lite and the denial of the motion to suspend hearings in the case, are taken by the petitioner as a disregard of applicable
laws and existing doctrines, thereby showing the respondent Judge's alleged manifest partiality to private respondent.

Petitioner's contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as
to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case, on the
ground of bias and manifest partiality. This is more so, in this case, where we find the judge's disposition of petitioner's
motions to be sound and well-taken.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO S.
EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.

D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.

REYES J.B.L., J.:

Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on
the ground that the death of the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case,
abated the cause of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario
Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to have the
case prosecuted to final judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the
main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived
together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they
acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named
Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of
the conjugal partnership profits.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special
defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration
of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated
according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial could be
completed (the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her
death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" 1on two (2) grounds, namely:
that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and
that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario
Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case. 2In the body of the order, the court stated
that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of whether or not the
plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider but the
motion was denied on 15 September 1969.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and
domestic relations court, the petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was given due course and
answer thereto was filed by respondent, who prayed for the affirmance of the said order. 3chanrobles virtual law library

Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them
after the court below dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the
affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the
Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute - for the lower court did not act on the motion for
substitution) stated the principal issue to be as follows:

When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a marriage,
does the death of a party abate the proceedings?

The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suit to one for declaration of
nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has acquiesced to the
dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page 22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the
counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are
not inseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim,
for legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-
condition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation,
abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being
no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article
100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing
that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself - actio personalis moritur cum persona.

... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot
even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The
action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.") 4
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding
brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of
a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has
settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of
the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in
holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208;
Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St.
Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W.
659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141.
5chanrobles virtual law library

The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412;
1 Corpus Juris 208).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the
decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the
point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: .

Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: chanrobles virtual law library

(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but
the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, without
prejudice to the provisions of article 176; chanrobles virtual law library

(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in
the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian; chanrobles virtual law library

(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover,
provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law.

From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute
community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or
community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of
testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by
the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and
intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is
not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant
continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.

Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty
(30) days, or within such time as may be granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in
Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim
for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but
actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.

Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in the
enumeration..chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a
more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is
apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest
in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired
by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a
proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the
Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven
consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as
soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the
liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and
not in the annulment proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No
special pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
LEGAL SEPARATION (DEFENSES)

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner,

vs.

SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.

Joselito J. Coloma for petitioner.

BENGZON, J.:

Action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife Serafina, on the ground of adultery. The court of first
instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was confession of judgment, plus
condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription.

We granted certiorari to consider the application of articles 100 and 101 of the New Civil Code, which for convenience are
quoted herewith:

ART. 100.—The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of
or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by
either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

ART. 101.—No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order
to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

The record shows that on July 5, 1955, the complaint for legal separation was filed. As amended, it described their
marriage performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery by Serafina, in March 1951 with Jose Arcalas, and in June
1955 with Nelson Orzame.

Because the defendant made no answer, the court defaulted her, and pursuant to Art. 101 above, directed the provincial
fiscal to investigate whether or not collusion existed between the parties. The fiscal examined the defendant under oath,
and then reported to the Court that there was no collusion. The plaintiff presented his evidence consisting of the testimony
of Vicente Medina, Ernesto de Ocampo, Cesar Enriquez, Mateo Damo, Jose de Ocampo and Capt. Serafin Gubat.

According to the Court of Appeals, the evidence thus presented shows that "plaintiff and defendant were married in April
5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot
several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife
was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital
relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year.
Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose
Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then
they had lived separately.
"On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson
Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a
petition for legal separation."

The Court of Appeals held that the husband's right to legal separation on account of the defendant's adultery with Jose
Arcalas had prescribed, because his action was not filed within one year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her
infidelity. (Art. 102, New Civil Code) We must agree with the Court of Appeals on this point.1

As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, the appellate court found that in the night of June 18, 1955, the husband upon
discovering the illicit connection, expressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation and defendant readily agreed to
such filing. And when she was questioned by the Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated her conformity to the legal
separation even as she admitted having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these facts virtually to
mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could not be decreed.

As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant
outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment
usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading
expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.2 This is not occur.

Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as
there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would
not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based
exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes
the separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it.

The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated from her husband, is no
obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her
willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes
precautions against collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.

Needless to say, when the court is informed that defendant equally desires the separation and admitted the commission of
the offense, it should be doubly careful lest a collusion exists. (The Court of Appeals did not find collusion.)

Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement.

. . . between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having
committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to
obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the
divorce. (Griffiths vs. Griffiths, 69 N. J. Eq. 689 60 Atl. 1099; Sandoz vs. Sandoz, 107 Ore. 282, 214 Pas. 590.).

In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been
committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of
grounds therefor.

Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told
the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to
prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.

In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to
the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it. (Williams vs. Williams, [N. Y.] 40
N. E. (2d) 1017; Rosenweig vs. Rosenweig, 246 N. Y. Suppl. 231; Conyers, vs. Conyers, 224 S. W. [2d] 688.).

And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion. (Pohlman vs. Pohlman,
[N. J.] 46 Atl. Rep. 658.).

We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the latter had left him in 1952)
constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after
having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to
search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.
Two decisions3 are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court inferred the husband's consent to or
condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful examination, a vital difference will be found: in both
instances, the husband had abandoned his wife; here it was the wife who "left" her husband.

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the appealed decision and decree
a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects. Costs of all instances against Serafina Florenciano.
So ordered.

G.R. No. L-10699 October 18, 1957

WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

JUANITA YAMBAO, defendant-appellee.

Jimenez B. Buendia for appellant.

Assistant City Fiscal Rafel A. Jose for appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his
lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at
the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she
begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that
thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document (Annex A ) liquidating their conjugal partnership and
assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share. The complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation
agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the
plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable.

Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently declared the wife in default, for failure to answer in due time, despite
service of summons; and directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to—

investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, whether or not a collusion exists between the parties and to
report to this Court the result of his investigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of copy of this order. The City Fiscal
or his representative is also directed to intervene in the case in behalf of the State. (Rec. App. p. 9).

As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His questions
(strenuously objected to by Brown's counsel) elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another
woman and had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on
the ground that, while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that
barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code, providing:

ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation or
of consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by
either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

that there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown's action had prescribed under Article 102 of the same
Code:

ART. 102 An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after date when such cause occurred.

since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in 1945.

Brown appeared to this Court, assigning the following errors:

The court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila to act as counsel for the defendant, who defaulted.

The court erred in declaring that there was condonation of or consent to the adultery.

The court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.

Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was not his
wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as consel for the defaulting wife, "when the power of the prosecuting officer is limited to
finding out whether or not there is collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, to intervene for
the state which is not the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he intervened for Juanita Yambao, the
defendant-appellee, who is private citizen and who is far from being the state.".

The argument is untenable. Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by
mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of
agreement to defend divorce proceedings" (Cyclopedia Law Dictionary; Nelson, Divorce and Separation, Section 500), it
was legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wife's default
was calculated, or agreed upon, to enable appellant to obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought without regard
to the legal merits of his case. One such circumstance is obviously the fact of Brown's cohabitation with a woman other
than his wife, since it bars him from claiming legal separation by express provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
Wherefore, such evidence of such misconduct, were proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered
circumstantial evidence of collusion between the spouses.

The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more
than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or
interruption cannot be made depend upon the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs, Cheong Gee, 43 Phil,
43; Ramirez vs. Gmur 42 Phil. 855; Goitia vs. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy that the injury by the
Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or
annulment are fully justified or not.

The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did not
petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release
from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be filed except within
one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when
such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof,
because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy
of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.

Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy sought (commission of similar
offense by petitioner and prescription of the action), it becomes unnecesary to delve further into the case and ascertain if
Brown's inaction for ten years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it did not, his situation would
not be improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error.

The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must necessarily fail with them.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

LEGAL SEPARATION (WHEN TO FILE/TRY ACTIONS)

G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970chanrobles virtual law library

ELENA CONTRERAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CESAR J. MACARAIG, Defendant-Appellee.

Jose T. Nery for plaintiff-appellee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The City fiscal for defendant-appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Cesar J. Macaraig in his own behalf.

DIZON, J.:

Appeal taken by Elena Contreras from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila in Civil Case
No. 00138 dismissing her complaint upon the ground that the same was filed more than one year from and after the date
on which she had become cognizant of the cause for legal separation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

The following, facts found by the trial court are not in dispute:

Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of Quiapo, Manila. Out of their Marriage,
three children were born: Eusebio C. Macaraig, on January 11, 1953; Victoria C. Macaraig, on March 26, 1956; and
Alexander C. Macaraig, on August 4, 1958. All the children are in the care of plaintiff
wife.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Sometime in 1958, the couple acquired rights, as lessee and purchaser under a conditional sale agreement, to own a
house and lot, known as Lot 4, Block 8 of the Philamlife Homes in Quezon City which they transferred in favor of their
three children on October 29, 1958 (Exh. F). Installment payments are being made by plaintiff's father. The spouses own
no other conjugal property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Immediately before the election of 1961, defendant was employed as manager of the printing establishment owned by
plaintiff's father known as the MICO Offset. In that capacity, defendant met and came to know Lily Ann Alcala, who place
orders with MICO Offset for propaganda materials for Mr. Sergio Osmeña, who was then a Vice-Presidential candidate.
After the elections of 1961, defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent at Malacañang. He began to be
away so often and to come home very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained that he was out on a series of
confidential missions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with Lily
Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following October, returned to the conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos'
report from defendant in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away. Although plaintiff, in April 1963, also received
rumors that defendant was seen with a woman who was on the family way on Dasmariñas St., she was so happy that
defendant again return to the family home in May, 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him
because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. All this while, defendant, if and whenever he
returned to the family fold, would only stay for two or three days but would be gone for a period of about a
month.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father's
employee, to verify the reports. The latter was driven by Lubos to the house in Singalong and between 5:00 and 6:00
o'clock that afternoon, she saw defendant was carrying a baby in his arms. Mrs. Antioquia then went to the parish priest of
Singalong where she inquired about the child of Cesar Macaraig and Lily Ann Alcala and she was given a copy of the
baptismal certificate of Maria Vivien Mageline Macaraig (Exh. G) which she gave to plaintiff sometime in October,
1963.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his
family. Mr. Macaraig, after talking to his son and seeking him with the latter's child told plaintiff that he could not do
anything.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In November, 1963, plaintiff requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, and the latter
obliged and arranged a meeting at her home in Buendia between plaintiff and Lily Ann Alcala. Lily Ann said she was willing
to give up defendant as she had no desire to be accused criminally but it was defendant who refused to break relationship
with her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, Victoria and Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia
Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on España Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to
Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the
conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave
Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation. When defendant did not interpose any
answer after he was served summons, the case was referred to the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to the
provisions of Article 101 of the Civil Code. After a report was received from Asst. Fiscal Primitivo M. Peñaranda that he
believed that there was no collusion present, plaintiff was allowed to present her evidence. Defendant has never appeared
in this case.

The reasons relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the complaint are set forth in the appealed decision as follows:

Under the facts established by plaintiff's evidence, although the infidelity of the husband is apparent, yet the case will have
to be dismissed. Article 102 provides that, an action for legal separation cannot be instituted except within one year after
plaintiff "became cognizant of the cause." In the absence of a clear-cut decision of the Supreme Court as to the exact
import of the term "cognizant," the practical application of said Article can be attended with difficulty. For one thing; that
rules might be different in case of adultery, which is an act, and for concubinage, which may be a situation or a
relationship.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In respect of concubinage, the word 'cognizant' may not connote the date when proof thereof sufficient to establish the
cause before a court of law is possessed. Otherwise, the one year period would be meaningless for practical purposes
because all a wife would have to do would be to claim that the necessary proof was secured only within one year before
the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, it should be hard to concede that what the law envisages (and, in a way,
encourages) is the filing of a complaint within one year after the innocent spouses has received information of the other's
infidelity, howsoever baseless the report might be.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Court believes that the correct rule lies between the two extremes. At the time a wife acquired information, which can
be reasonably relied upon as true, that her husband is living in concubinage with another woman, the one-year period
should be deemed to have started even if the wife shall not then be in possession of proof sufficient to establish the
concubinage before a court of law. The one-year period may be viewed, inter alia, as an alloted time within which proof
should be secured. It is in the light of this rule that the Court will determine whether or not plaintiff's action for legal
separation has prescribed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After her husband resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent in Malacañan, subsequent to the elections of 1961, he
would seldom come home. He allayed plaintiff's suspicions with the explanation that he had been away on 'confidential
missions.' However, in September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, plaintiff's driver, reported to plaintiff that defendant was living in
Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. As a matter of fact, it was also Lubos who brought Mrs. F. Antioquia (when plaintiff had
asked to verify the reports) to the house in Singalong where she saw defendant, Lily Ann and the
baby.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year after the date plaintiff become
cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of the cause of action. It is consonant with the
philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a
disruption of its status.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the instant action, the Court has to find that plaintiff became cognizant of defendant's infidelity in September, 1962.
Plaintiff made successive attempts to induce the husband to amend his erring ways but failed. Her desire to bring
defendant back to the connubial fold and to preserve family solidarity deterred her from taking timely legal action.

The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be
counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or from December 1963. Computing the period of
one year from the former date, it is clear that plaintiff's complaint filed on December 14, 1963 came a little too late, while
the reverse would be true if said period is deemed to have commenced only in the month of December
1963.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The period of "five years from after the date when such cause occurred" is not here
involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Upon the undisputed facts it seems clear that, in the month of September 1962, whatever knowledge appellant had
acquired regarding the infidelity of her husband, that is, of the fact that he was then living in Singalong with Lily Ann
Alcala, was only through the information given to her by Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car. Much as such hearsay
information had pained and anguished her, she apparently thought it best - and no reasonable person may justifiably
blame her for it - not to go deeper into the matter herself because in all probability even up to that time, notwithstanding
her husband's obvious neglect of his entire family, appellant still cherished the hope - however forlorn - of his coming back
home to them. Indeed, when her husband returned to the conjugal home the following October, she purposely refrained
from bringing up the matter of his marital infidelity "in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away" - quoting the very
words of the trial court. True, appellant likewise heard in April 1963 rumors that her husband was seen with a woman on
the family way on Dasmariñas Street, but failed again to either bring up the matter with her husband or make attempts to
verify the truth of said rumors, but this was due, as the lower court itself believed, because "she was so happy that
defendant again returned to the family home in May 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with
him because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away." As a matter of fact, notwithstanding all these
painful informations which would not have been legally sufficient to make a case for legal separation - appellant still made
brave if desperate attempts to persuade her husband to come back home. In the words of the lower court, she "entreated
her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his family" and also
"requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul" for the same purpose, but all that was of no
avail. Her husband remained obdurate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time when appellant really
became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December 1963 when, quoting from the
appealed decision, the following happened -

In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, Victoria and Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia
Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on España Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to
Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the
conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave
Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her
husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that
appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was
only then that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside and another is hereby rendered holding that appellant is entitled to
legal separation as prayed for in her complaint; and the case is hereby remanded to the lower court for appropriate
proceedings in accordance with law.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ.,
concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994

ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C. PACETE, EVELINA C. PACETE and EDUARDO C.
PACETE, petitioners,

vs.

HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION (CONCHITA) ALANIS PACETE, respondents.

Juan G. Sibug and Rodolfo B. Quiachon for petitioners.

Julio F. Andres, Jr. for private respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cotabato,
Branch I, in Cotabato City, gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their
answer in Civil Case No. 2518, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision of 17 March 1980 which,
among other things, decreed the legal separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent Concepcion Alanis
and held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la Concepcion.

On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation
(between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married
to Pacete on 30 April 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato, Cotabato; that they had a child named Consuelo
who was born on 11 March 1943; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her
marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor
vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his
children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that
reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979. They filed a motion for an extension of twenty
(20) days from 30 November 1979 within which to file an answer. The court granted the motion. On 18 December 1979,
appearing through a new counsel, the defendants filed a second motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days from
20 December 1979. On 07 January 1980, the lower court granted the motion but only for twenty (20) days to be counted
from 20 December 1979 or until 09 January 1980. The Order of the court was mailed to defendants' counsel on 11
January 1980. Likely still unaware of the court order, the defendants, on 05 February 1980, again filed another motion
(dated 18 January 1980) for an extension of "fifteen (15) days counted from the expiration of the 30-day period previously
sought" within which to file an answer. The following day, or on 06 February 1980, the court denied this last motion on the
ground that it was "filed after the original period given . . . as first extension had expired."1

The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The plaintiff
was then directed to present her evidence.2 The court received plaintiff's evidence during the hearings held on 15, 20, 21
and 22 February 1980.

On 17 March 1980, the court3 promulgated the herein questioned decision, disposing of the case, thus —

WHEREFORE, order is hereby issued ordering:

1. The issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation of the marriage between, the plaintiff, Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis
Pacete and the herein defendants, Enrico L. Pacete, in accordance with the Philippine laws and with consequences, as
provided for by our laws;

2. That the following properties are hereby declared as the conjugal properties of the partnership of the plaintiff,
Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and the defendant, Enrico L. Pacete, half and half, to wit:

1. The parcel of land covered by TCT No. V-815 which is a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Langcong, Municipality
of Matanog (previously of Parang), province of Maguindanao (previously of Cotabato province) with an area of 45,265
square meters registered in the name of Enrico Pacete, Filipino, of legal age, married to Conchita Alanis as shown in
Exhibits "B" and "B-1" for the plaintiff.

2. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20442, with an area of 538 square meters and covered by
Tax Declaration No. 2650 (74) in the name of Enrico Pacete, situated in the Poblacion of Kidapawan, North Cotabato,
together with all its improvements, which parcel of land, as shown by Exhibits "K-1" was acquired by way of absolute deed
of sale executed by Amrosio Mondog on January 14, 1965.

3. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20424 and covered by Tax Declaration No. 803 (74), with
an area of 5.1670 hectares, more or less, as shown by Exhibit "R", the same was registered in the name of Enrico Pacete
and the same was acquired by Enrico Pacete last February 17, 1967 from Ambag Ampoy, as shown by Exhibit "R-1",
situated at Musan, Kidapawan, North Cotabato.

4. A parcel of land situated at Lanao, Kidapawan, North Cotabato, with an area of 5.0567 hectares, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 4332 (74), as shown by Exhibit "S", and registered in the name of Enrico Pacete.

5. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9750, situated at Lika, Mlang, North Cotabato, with an
area of 4.9841 hectares and the same is covered by Tax Declaration No. 803 (74) and registered in the name of Enrico
Pacete and which land was acquired by Enrico Pacete from Salvador Pacete on September 24, 1962, as shown by
Exhibit "Q-1".

6. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9944, with an area of 9.9566 and also covered by Tax
Declaration No. 8608 (74) and registered in the name of the defendant Enrico L. Pacete which Enrico L. Pacete acquired
from Sancho Balingcos last October 22, 1962, as shown by Exhibit "L-1" and which parcel of land is situated at (Kialab),
Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato.

7. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9227, situated at Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato, with an
area of 12.04339 hectares, more or less, and also covered by Tax Declaration No. 8607 (74) both in the name of the
defendant Enrico L. Pacete which he acquired last October 15, 1962 from Minda Bernardino, as shown by Exhibit "M-1".

8. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9228, situated at Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato, with an
area of 10.8908 hectares, registered in the name of Enrico Pacete and also covered by Tax Declaration No. 5781 (74) in
the name of Enrico Pacete and which parcel of land he acquired last September 25, 1962 from Conchita dela Torre, as
shown by Exhibit "P-1".

9. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10301, situated at Linao, Matalam, North Cotabato, with
an area of 7.2547 hectares, registered in the name of Enrico Pacete and also covered by Tax Declaration No. 8716 (74)
also in the name of Enrico Pacete which Enrico Pacete acquired from Agustin Bijo last July 16, 1963, as shown by Exhibit
"N-1".

10. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12728 in the name of the defendant, Enrico L. Pacete, with
an area of 10.9006 hectares, situated at Linao, Matalam, North Cotabato and is also covered by Tax Declaration No. 5745
(74) in the name of Enrico Pacete, as shown on Exhibit "O" and which Enrico Pacete acquired last December 31, 1963
from Eliseo Pugni, as shown on Exhibit "0-1".

3. Ordering the Cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-34243 covering Lot No. 1066, issued in the name of
Evelina Pacete, situated at Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato, and ordering the registration of the same in the joint name of
Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete as their conjugal property, with address on the part of
Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete at Parang, Maguindanao and on the part of Enrico L. Pacete at Kidapawan, North
Cotabato.

4. Ordering likewise the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. V-20101, covering Lot No. 77, in the name of
Eduardo C. Pacete, situated at New Lawaan, Mlang, North Cotabato, and the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of
Title in the joint name of (half and half) Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete.

5. Ordering likewise the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-29890, covering Lot 1068, situated at Kiab,
Matalam, North Cotabato, with an area of 12.1031 hectares, in the name of Emelda C. Pacete and the issuance of a new
Transfer Certificate of Title in the joint name (half and half) of Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete;
and declaring that the fishpond situated at Barrio Tumanan, Bislig, Surigao Del Sur, with an area of 48 hectares and
covered by Fishpond Lease Agreement of Emelda C. Pacete, dated July 29, 1977 be cancelled and in lieu thereof, the
joint name of Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and her husband, Enrico L. Pacete, be registered as their joint
property, including the 50 hectares fishpond situated in the same place, Barrio Timanan, Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
6. Ordering the following motor vehicles to be the joint properties of the conjugal partnership of Concepcion (Conchita)
Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete, viz:

a. Motor vehicle with Plate No. T-RG-783; Make, Dodge; Motor No. T137-20561; Chassis No. 83920393, and Type,
Mcarrier;

b. Motor vehicle with Plate No. T-RG-784; Make, Dodge; Motor No. T214-229547; Chassis No. 10D-1302-C; and Type,
Mcarrier;

c. Motor vehicle with Plate No. J-PR-818; Make, Ford; Motor No. GRW-116188; Chassis No. HOCC-GPW-1161-88-C;
Type, Jeep;

d. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-583; Make, Ford: Motor No. F70MU5-11111; Chassis No. HOCC-GPW-1161188-G;
Type, Stake;

e. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-584; Make, Hino; Motor No. ED300-45758; Chassis No. KB222-22044; Type, Stake;
and

f. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-585; Make, Ford: Motor No. LTC-780-Dv; Chassis No. 10F-13582-K; Type, Stake.

7. Ordering the defendant Enrico L. Pacete to pay the plaintiff the sum of P46,950.00 which is the share of the plaintiff in
the unaccounted income of the ricemill and corn sheller for three years from 1971 to 1973.

8. Ordering the defendant, Enrico L. Pacete, to reimburse the plaintiff the monetary equipment of 30% of whether the
plaintiff has recovered as attorney's fees;

9. Declaring the subsequent marriage between defendant Enrico L. Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion to be void ab
initio; and

10. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of this suit.4

Hence, the instant special civil action of certiorari.

Under ordinary circumstances, the petition would have outrightly been dismissed, for, as also pointed out by private
respondents, the proper remedy of petitioners should have instead been either to appeal from the judgment by default or
to file a petition for relief from judgment.5 This rule, however, is not inflexible; a petition for certiorari is allowed when the
default order is improperly declared, or even when it is properly declared, where grave abuse of discretion attended such
declaration.6 In these exceptional instances, the special civil action of certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by
default is available.7 In the case at bench, the default order unquestionably is not legally sanctioned. The Civil Code
provides:

Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order
to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

The provision has been taken from Article 30 of the California Civil Code,8 and it is, in substance, reproduced in Article 60
of the Family Code.9

Article 101 reflects the public policy on marriages, and it should easily explain the mandatory tenor of the law. In Brown v.
Yambao, 10 the Court has observed:

The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more
than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or
interruption can not be made to depend upon the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs. Cheong Gee, 43
Phil. 43; Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Goitia v. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by
the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation
or annulment are fully justified or not.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must
"in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the
parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the inclusion of the following
provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. — If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see
to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less
than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive
domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.

It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. 11 That other remedies, whether principal or
incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the
statutory requirements aforequoted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the proceedings below, including the Decision of 17
March 1980 appealed from, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEGAL SEPARATION (EFFECTS OF FILING A PETITION)

G.R. No. L-33352 December 20, 1974

TEODORO E. LERMA, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCEPCION DIAZ, respondents.

Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Parlade & Associates for petitioner.

Villareal, Matic & Associates for private respondent.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p

Before Us for resolution are: (1) the petition for review by certiorari filed by Teodoro E. Lerma on March 21, 1971 to set
aside the resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44906-R dismissing his petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction filed therein; and (2) the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of our resolution
dated February 8, 1974 denying his urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order to enjoin the enforcement of certain orders of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City (hereinafter
referred to as the lower court) ordering the petitioner to pay support pendente lite to Concepcion Diaz, the private
respondent herein.

Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are husband and wife. They married on May 19, 1951. On August 22, 1969 the
petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez (Crim. Case No. 0519 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal). On November 18, 1969 the respondent filed with the lower court, presided by Judge
Leonor Ines Luciano, a complaint1 against the petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of
their children2 and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory, who
was then and until now is in her custody. The respondent's complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds:
concubinage and attempt against her life.

The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent's application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense the
adultery charge he had filed against the respondent.

Judge Luciano granted the respondent's application for support pendente lite in an order dated December 24, 1969, which
she amended in an order dated February 15, 1970 to the following effect: (1) the respondent was declared entitled to
support pendente lite from the date of the filing of the complaint; and (2) the amount of such monthly support was reduced
from P2,250.00 to P1,820.00.

On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction to annul the aforementioned orders on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of
discretion. The next day the respondent court gave due course to the petition and issued a writ of preliminary injunction to
stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said orders.

The respondent court, in its decision of October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed orders and granted the petitioner an
opportunity to present evidence before the lower court in support of his defense against the application for support
pendente lite.

The respondent moved to reconsider the decision on the ground that the petitioner had not asked that he be allowed to
present evidence in the lower court. The respondent court, in its resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside the decision of
October 8 and rendered another, dismissing the petition. This is now the subject of the instant proceeding for review.

On January 23, 1974 the petitioner filed an urgent motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order,
alleging (1) that during the pendency of this appeal and until December 5, 1973 the respondent had never sought the
enforcement of the assailed orders of the lower court granting support pendente lite; (2) that on December 5, 1973 the
respondent filed with the lower court an urgent motion praying that the petitioner be ordered to pay the awarded support
pendente lite, both current and in arrears, on the ground that in the absence of an injunction from this Court the assailed
orders should be executed; (3) that the petitioner filed his opposition to the motion, pointing out that for the previous three
years the respondent did not ask for the enforcement of the orders and her belated move came only "after petitioner had
filed new adultery charges against her and her second paramour" and after the petitioner had sought custody of their son
Gregory; (4) that in connection with the first adultery charge, the respondent and her co-accused, Teddy Ramirez, had
been convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its decision rendered on September 26, 1972 and said judgment
of conviction was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals; (5) that Judge Luciano issued an order dated January 19, 1974,
ordering the petitioner to pay the respondent the awarded support pendente lite within 15 days; and (6) that unless the
lower court was enjoined from enforcing its assailed orders, the present petition would be rendered moot and academic,
to the prejudice of the petitioner.

On January 28, 1974 this Court, acting on the petitioner's motion, resolved "to issue a temporary restraining order
effective immediately and until further orders from this Court." The order was addressed to Judge Luciano, her agents and
representatives.

Required to comment on the petitioner's urgent motion for preliminary injunction, the respondent filed an opposition, with a
prayer for the immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order issued ex-parte. The opposition reiterated the grounds of
her motion dated December 5, 1973 filed in the lower court, to wit: (1) that an order granting support pendente lite,
although interlocutory, is immediately executory even if appealed, unless enjoined; (2) that the dismissal of the petition by
the respondent Court of Appeals rendered functus oficio the writ of preliminary injunction it had previously issued; and (3)
that under Article 292 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "during the proceedings for legal separation, or for
annulment of marriage, the spouses and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property ...," such
support is mandatory even if there be a showing that the wife is guilty of adultery.

In a minute resolution dated February 8, 1974 We denied the petitioner's urgent motion for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On February 28, 1974 the petitioner filed this instant motion for reconsideration. On March 6, 1974 We issued another
resolution setting aside the resolution of February 8, 1974 and reinstated the temporary restraining order previously
issued until further orders. On the same day the respondent filed her opposition to the motion for reconsideration and later
asked that it be set for oral argument. The petitioner's pending motion was set for hearing on April 22, 1974 and then reset
for May 20, 1974. On the latter date counsel for both parties appeared. In lieu, however, of oral argument the Court
allowed them to file memoranda.
The petition assails the resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals on two main grounds:

I. IT IS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HOLD THAT THE LOWER COURT, IN GRANTING SUPPORT
PENDENTE LITE TO RESPONDENT CONCEPCION DIAZ, DID NOT COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 292 OF THE CIVIL CODE
MAKE IT MANDATORY DURING THE PENDENCY OF LEGAL SEPARATION PROCEEDINGS TO GRANT SUPPORT
PENDENTE LITE TO HEREIN RESPONDENT.

The foregoing alleged errors refer to the two aspects, procedural and substantive, of the disputed orders granting support
pendente lite.

As correctly stated by the respondent court in its decision (which was later reconsidered in its resolution under review),
the procedural law on support pendente lite is Rule 61 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 5 thereof, which
partly provides:

The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such order as equity and justice may require,
having due regard to the necessities of the applicant, the means of the adverse party, the probable outcome of the case,
and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper elucidation of the questions involved. ...

The petitioner maintains that the above-quoted provision was disregarded by the lower court when it issued the disputed
orders without provisionally determining the pertinent facts of the case, particularly insofar as they might have a bearing
on its probable outcome, merely relying on the bare allegations of the complaint. The petitioner also claims he was
deprived of the opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense of adultery against the respondent's application
for support pendente lite.

The question of whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to present evidence in the lower court in support of that
his wife had committed adultery has become academic. The petitioner, in his motion filed February 28, 1974 for
reconsideration of the denial by this Court of his petition for preliminary injunction, manifested that on September 26, 1972
the court of First Instance of Rizal decided the adultery case of the respondent and found her and her co-accused,
Teodoro Ramirez, guilty of the charge, sentencing them to a term of imprisonment. This has not been denied by the
respondent. Neither is it denied that on March 30, 1970, as a result of the adulterous relations with Teodoro Ramirez for
which she was later on convicted, the said respondent gave birth prematurely to a baby boy, who however died the same
day. When the respondent entered the hospital for delivery, she registered under the assumed name of "Gloria Santos,"
and when the child died had it falsely identified in the death certificate as the child of one Rosario R. Salita, a close friend
of hers. For the falsification thus committed Rosario E. Salita was criminally charged and convicted, although the
respondent herself was acquitted on reasonable doubt. The petitioner's motion of February 28 also states, without denial
on the part of the respondent, that after Teodoro Ramirez another man, this time a Manila policeman by the name of Jose
Gochangco, became her paramour, as a consequence of which criminal charges of adultery have been filed against them
before the Fiscal of Manila. Photographs of the two, showing them in intimate pose, were submitted to this Court. Their
veracity has not been disputed.

The legal issue posed by the foregoing facts is whether adultery is a good defense against the respondent's claim for
support pendente lite. In Quintana v. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285, which was an action by the wife against the husband for
support, based upon a written contract, this Court held that adultery is a good defense. This ruling was reiterated in the
subsequent cases of Sanchez v. Zulueta, 68 Phil. 110, and Mangoma v. Macadaeg, et al., 90 Phil. 508. See also Olayvar
v. Olayvar, 98 Phil. 52.

The respondent Court of Appeals, in upholding the questioned orders of the lower court, relied on Article 292 of the Civil
Code, which reads:

ART. 292. During the proceedings for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children shall be
supported from the conjugal partnership property. After the final judgment of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage,
the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order
that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, the judgment specifying the terms of such order.

It is suggested that while adultery may be a defense in an action for personal support, that is, support of the wife by the
husband from his own funds, it is not a defense when the support is to be taken from the conjugal partnership property.

We do not see that the distinction is material in this case. In the first place Article 292 is not in itself the source of the legal
right to receive support. It merely states that the support, not only of the spouses but also of the children, shall be taken
from the conjugal property during the pendency of the legal separation proceeding. It does not preclude the loss of such
right in certain cases. In the second place, the said article contemplates the pendency of a court action and, inferentially at
least, a prima facie showing that the action will prosper. For if the action is shown to be groundless the mere filing thereof
will not necessarily set Article 292 in operation. This is also the sense of Section 5 of Rule 61, supra, which requires,
among other things, when support pendente lite is applied for, that the court determine provisionally "the probable
outcome of the case."

Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that "the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided
there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage ... (and) where both spouses are offenders, a
legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them ..."

In a provisional sense at least, within the meaning of Rule 61 (Section 5), the probable failure of the respondent's suit for
legal separation can be foreseen since she is not an innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the Court of
First Instance. It is true that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court of Appeals, but the same undoubtedly
satisfies the standard of provisional showing set by the aforesaid Rule. If legal separation cannot be claimed by the guilty
spouse in the first place, the fact that an action for that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be used as a
means to obtain support pendente lite, which, without such action, would be denied on the strength of the decisions of this
Court recognizing adultery as a good defense. Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all that an erring spouse has to
do to circumvent such defense would be to file a suit for legal separation no matter how groundless.

The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of
a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code,
which states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from
each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a
ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law
granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the
recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921
one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the
substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.

What has been said above, of course, is not meant to be a prejudgment of either the legal separation proceeding pending
in the lower court or the criminal case for adultery pending in the Court of Appeals. It is to be understood only in the light
of Rule 61, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, which specifically governs the subject of support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals of January 20, 1971 and the orders of respondent Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court herein complained of, dated December 24, 1969 and February 15, 1970, all are set aside
and their enforcement enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending action for legal
separation between the parties. No pronouncement as to costs.

Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Esguerra, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994

SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents.

Leven S. Puno for petitioner.

Benigno M. Puno for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The subject of this petition is the preliminary injunction issued by the respondent court pending resolution of a case on
appeal. We deal only with this matter and not the merits of the case.

As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties, petitioner
Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of some of their
conjugal, properties for fifteen years.

Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children. Four
years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at

#17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he was
sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to
defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment.

In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged
that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children and that they were depending for their
support on the rentals from another conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes Park which was on lease to Nobumichi
Izumi. She also informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and
was instead maintaining a separate residence in Don Antonio Heights, Fairview, Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and
their three children.

In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal
properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin the
petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering
any of the conjugal properties.

After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage on October 5,
1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement in 1985 at a separate residence. The court
thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties,
declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife.1

This decision was appealed to the respondent court. Pendente lite, the respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the administration of their properties in
Greenhills and Forbes Park. She alleged inter alia that he had harassed the tenant of the Forbes Park property by
informing him that his lease would not be renewed. She also complained that the petitioner had disposed of one of their
valuable conjugal properties in the United States in favor of his paramour, to the prejudice of his legitimate wife and
children.

The petitioner opposed this motion and filed his own motion to prevent his wife from entering into a new contract of lease
over the Forbes Park property with its present tenant, or with future tenants, without his consent.

After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992, granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by his
wife.2
The petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the conjugal
properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other because no right will be
violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family Code, reading as follows:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of the administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or the authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

He further notes that the respondent court failed to appoint an administrator of the conjugal assets as mandated by Art. 61
of the Code, thus:

Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other.

The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to
administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have
the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.

The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that the petition has no merit.

We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass of conjugal
assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct,
taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's
administration pending resolution of the appeal.

The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly provided in the
above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that after a petition for legal
separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either
one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.

While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the
decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as
administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the
respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.

The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the
action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the
pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff
asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the
plaintiff.3

As observed by Francisco, "Injunction is primarily a preventive remedy. Its province is to afford relief against future acts
which are against equity and good conscience and to keep and preserve the thing in the status quo, rather than to remedy
what is past or to punish for wrongful acts already committed. It may issue to prevent future wrongs although no right has
yet been violated."4

The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years now, apparently
without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused
prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be
renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the rentals.

In her motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the respondent wife alleged that the petitioner's harassment of
their tenant at Forbes Park

would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the income therefrom on which they depend for their
subsistence. She also testified the numerous . . . including various dollar accounts, two houses in Quezon City and Cebu
City, and a Mercedes Benz. The private respondent also complained that on June 10, 1991, the petitioner executed a
quitclaim over their conjugal property in Apple Valley, San Bernardino, California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma Cumareng, to
improve his paramour's luxurious lifestyle to the prejudice of his legitimate family.

These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show that the injunction is necessary to protect the
interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets.

The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation.5 Regardless
of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured
spouse in the action for legal separation), the private respondent has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal
estate. There is also, in our view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner
may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court
had earlier declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him
in the meantime to participate in its management.

Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole
mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without
interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the
Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. It is so ordered.

4.5 EFFECT OF DECREE

ARTICLE 63-64, FC

DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION OF ACP AND CPG

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.

D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.

REYES J.B.L., J.:p

Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on
the ground that the death of the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case,
abated the cause of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario
Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to have the
case prosecuted to final judgment.

On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the
main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived
together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they
acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named
Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of
the conjugal partnership profits.

In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special
defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration
of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated
according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.

Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial could be
completed (the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her
death.

On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation"1 on two (2) grounds, namely:
that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and
that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.

On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario
Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.

On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case.2 In the body of the order, the court stated
that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of whether or not the
plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider but the
motion was denied on 15 September 1969.

After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and
domestic relations court, the petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was given due course and
answer thereto was filed by respondent, who prayed for the affirmance of the said order.3

Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them
after the court below dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the
affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the
Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.

But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute — for the lower court did not act on the motion
for substitution) stated the principal issue to be as follows:

When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a marriage,
does the death of a party abate the proceedings?

The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suit to one for declaration of
nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has acquiesced to the
dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page 22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the
counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are
not inseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim,
for legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition.

The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation,
abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? .
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being
no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article
100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing
that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.

... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot
even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The
action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.")4 .

Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding
brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of
a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has
settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of
the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in
holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208;
Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St.
Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W.
659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5

The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412;
1 Corpus Juris 208).

A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the
decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the
point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: .

Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:

(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; .

(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but
the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, without
prejudice to the provisions of article 176;

(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in
the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian;

(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover,
provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law.

From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute
community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or
community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of
testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by
the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and
intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is
not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant
continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.

Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty
(30) days, or within such time as may be granted...

The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in
Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim
for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but
actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in the enumeration..

A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a
more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.

As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is
apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest
in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired
by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a
proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the
Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven
consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as
soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the
liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and
not in the annulment proceeding.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No
special pronouncement as to costs
CUSTODY

DETERMINING THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD

G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-appellant,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents-appellees.

ROMERO, J.:

In this petition for review, we are asked to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals1 granting custody of six-year old
Leouel Santos, Jr. to his maternal grandparents and not to his father, Santos, Sr. What is sought is a decision which
should definitively settle the matter of the care, custody and control of the boy.

Happily, unlike King Solomon, we need not merely rely on a "wise and understanding heart," for there is man's law to
guide us and that is, the Family Code.

The antecedent facts giving rise to the case at bench are as follows:

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in
1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.

From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of
his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.

Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent
spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy
because petitioner could not afford to do so.

The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not
aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private respondents claim that
although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son.

On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel
Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and
clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.2

After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the
child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.3

Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals.4 In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court
affirmed the trial court's

order. 5 His motion for reconsideration having been denied,6 petitioner now brings the instant petition for review for a
reversal of the appellate court's decision.

The Court of Appeals erred, according to petitioner, in awarding custody of the boy to his grandparents and not to himself.
He contends that since private respondents have failed to show that petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father, substitute
parental authority granted to the boy's grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is inappropriate.
Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by the private respondents in having custody over the boy, are flimsy and
insufficient to deprive him of his natural and legal right to have custody.

On the other hand, private respondents aver that they can provide an air-conditioned room for the boy and that petitioner
would not be in a position to take care of his son since he has to be assigned to different places. They also allege that the
petitioner did not give a single centavo for the boy's support and maintenance. When the boy was about to be released
from the hospital, they were the ones who paid the fees because their daughter and petitioner had no money. Besides,
Julia Bedia Santos, their daughter, had entrusted the boy to them before she left for the United States. Furthermore,
petitioner's use of trickery and deceit in abducting the child in 1990, after being hospitably treated by private respondents,
does not speak well of his fitness and suitability as a parent.

The Bedias argue that although the law recognizes the right of a parent to his child's custody, ultimately the primary
consideration is what is best for the happiness and welfare of the latter. As maternal grandparents who have amply
demonstrated their love and affection for the boy since his infancy, they claim to be in the best position to promote the
child's welfare.

The issue to be resolved here boils down to who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.

The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria
potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter' s needs.7 It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of
their intellect and the education of their heart and senses.8 As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task;
no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."9

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized
by law. 10 The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only
in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. 11 When a parent entrusts
the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. 12 Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the
law still disallows the same. 13

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them
in their custody and

company. 14 The child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.
15

The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. 16 In case of
absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. 17 Only in case of the
parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. 18
The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United
States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they physically apart but are also emotionally
separated. There has been no decree of legal separation and petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed. 19

Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his minor son to his
parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of
the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to
him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents.

The Court of Appeals held that although there is no evidence to show that petitioner (Santos Sr.) is "depraved, a habitual
drunkard or poor, he may nevertheless be considered, as he is in fact so considered, to be unsuitable to be allowed to
have custody of minor Leouel Santos Jr." 20

The respondent appellate court, in affirming the trial court's order of October 8, 1990, adopted as its own the latter's
observations, to wit:

From the evidence adduced, this Court is of the opinion that it is to be (sic) best interest of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
that he be placed under the care, custody, and control of his maternal grandparents the petitioners herein. The petitioners
have amply demonstrated their love and devotion to their grandson while the natural father, respondent herein, has shown
little interest in his welfare as reflected by his conduct in the past. Moreover the fact that petitioners are well-off financially,
should be carefully considered in awarding to them the custody of the minor herein, lest the breaking of such ties with his
maternal grandparents might deprive the boy of an eventual college education and other material advantages (Consaul
vs. Consaul, 63 N.Y.S. 688). Respondent had never given any previous financial support to his son, while, upon the other
hand, the latter receives so much bounty from his maternal grandparents and his mother as well, who is now gainfully
employed in the United States. Moreover, the fact that respondent, as a military personnel who has to shuttle from one
assignment to another, and, in these troubled times, may have pressing and compelling military duties which may prevent
him from attending to his son at times when the latter needs him most, militates strongly against said respondent.
Additionally, the child is sickly and asthmatic and needs the loving and tender care of those who can provide for it. 21

We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to
have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit
parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still
preferred over the grandparents. 22 The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that
at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support
for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not
be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is
inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his
past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father
a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.

His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform who are assigned to
different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children. It is not just to
deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their children merely because of the normal consequences of their
duties and assignments, such as temporary separation from their families.

Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground
to wrest custody from him.

Private respondents' attachment to the young boy whom they have reared for the past three years is understandable. Still
and all, the law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when the parent
present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a fact which has
not been proven here.

The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by private respondents as grandparents should not be seen as
incompatible with petitioner' right to custody over the child as a father. Moreover, who is to say whether the petitioner's
financial standing may improve in the future?

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1992 as well as
its Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel Santos
Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr.

SO ORDERED.

ii. ROLE OF CHILD’S PREFERECE

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.

MELO, J.:

This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which went sour. The innocent victims are two children
horn out of the same union. Upon this Court now falls the not too welcome task of deciding the issue of who, between the
father and mother, is more suitable and better qualified in helping the children to grow into responsible, well-adjusted, and
happy young adulthood.

Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo
was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In 1977,
Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In
1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer
and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16, 1986,
their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines,
Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and
given the name Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for
the break-up, stating he was always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that
Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to household expenses.

Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the
children and went back to California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls
to keep in constant touch with her children.

Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed,
he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug
and her family.

Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against
her and she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was actually rendered only on
September 29, 1994. (Per Judge Harriet O. Demetriou, Branch 70, RTC, Pasig, pp. 210-222, Rollo). Teresita, meanwhile,
decided to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against
herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court.

On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over
Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be
agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.

On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices de Pano and Ibay-Somera concurring,
reversed the trial court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.

Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the main contending that the Court of Appeals disregarded
the factual findings of the trial court; that the Court of Appeals further engaged in speculations and conjectures, resulting
in its erroneous conclusion that custody of the children should be given to respondent Teresita.

We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody over the children through an automatic and blind
application of the age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code which reads:

Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure.

and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides:

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court.
The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age
unless the parent chosen is unfit.

The decision under review is based on the report of the Code Commission which drafted Article 213 that a child below
seven years still needs the loving, tender care that only a mother can give and which, presumably, a father cannot give in
equal measure. The commentaries of a member of the Code Commission, former Court of Appeals Justice Alicia Sempio-
Diy, in a textbook on the Family Code, were also taken into account. Justice Diy believes that a child below seven years
should still be awarded to her mother even if the latter is a prostitute or is unfaithful to her husband. This is on the theory
that moral dereliction has no effect on a baby unable to understand such action. (Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, 1988 Ed., p. 297.)
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law rather than an appreciation of relevant facts
and the law which should apply to those facts. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a
ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or
over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. Discretion is given to the court to
decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration. In Unson III
vs. Navarro (101 SCRA 183 [1980]), we laid down the rule that "in all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the
sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into
account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents", and in Medina vs. Makabali
(27 SCRA 502 [1969]), where custody of the minor was given to a non-relative as against the mother, then the country's
leading civilist, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained its basis in this manner:

. . . While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic
principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines. Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be
ordered separated from the mother (do). This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria
potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the
offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents into a radically different institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and
doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pena, now "there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."

As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of
parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and
development (Civil Code, Art. 356).

(pp. 504-505.)

In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all
relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian.
The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his
choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen
parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.

In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Rosalind celebrated her seventh
birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1995. Both are studying in reputable
schools and appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they
would want to live. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to investigate if the parent thus
chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial responsibility.

Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the records to discover the choice of the children and
rather than verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply followed statutory presumptions and
general propositions applicable to ordinary or common situations. The seven-year age limit was mechanically treated as
an arbitrary cut off period and not a guide based on a strong presumption.

A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the
"torture and agony" of a mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of her character
being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While
the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to
suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other
parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the
paramount consideration.

We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial court because it gave greater attention to the
choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody.

When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child psychologist, Rita Flores Macabulos, to determine
the effects of uprooting her from the Assumption College where she was studying. Four different tests were administered.
The results of the tests are quite revealing. The responses of Rosalind about her mother were very negative causing the
psychologist to delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by Rosalind was an incident where she
saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their house and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to
talk to her mother even on the telephone. She tended to be emotionally emblazed because of constant fears that she may
have to leave school and her aunt's family to go back to the United States to live with her mother. The 5-1/2 page report
deals at length with feelings of insecurity and anxiety arising from strong conflict with the mother. The child tried to
compensate by having fantasy activities. All of the 8 recommendations of the child psychologist show that Rosalind
chooses petitioners over the private respondent and that her welfare will be best served by staying with them (pp. 199-
205, Rollo).

At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the purpose of securing the travel clearance
required before minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the child Rosalind
refused to go back to the United States and be reunited with her mother. She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was
more attached to her Yaya who did everything for her and Reginald. The child was found suffering from emotional shock
caused by her mother's infidelity. The application for travel clearance was recommended for denial (pp. 206-209, Rollo).

Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age reference in the law applies to the date when the petition for
a writ of habeas corpus is filed, not to the date when a decision is rendered. This argument is flawed. Considerations
involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained at the time that either parent is given custody over the child. The
matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a future character change
and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined and adjusted (Unson III v. Navarro, supra, at p.
189). To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time
that either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the present time, both children are over 7 years of age and are thus
perfectly capable of making a fairly intelligent choice.

According to respondent Teresita, she and her children had tearful reunion in the trial court, with the children crying,
grabbing, and embracing her to prevent the father from taking them away from her. We are more inclined to believe the
father's contention that the children ignored Teresita in court because such an emotional display as described by Teresita
in her pleadings could not have been missed by the trial court. Unlike the Justices of the Court of Appeals Fourth Division,
Judge Lucas P. Bersamin personally observed the children and their mother in the courtroom. What the Judge found is
diametrically opposed to the contentions of respondent Teresita. The Judge had this to say on the matter.

And, lastly, the Court cannot look at petitioner [Teresita] in similar light, or with more understanding, especially as her
conduct and demeanor in the courtroom (during most of the proceedings) or elsewhere (but in the presence of the
undersigned presiding judge) demonstrated her ebulent temper that tended to corroborate the alleged violence of her
physical punishment of the children (even if only for ordinary disciplinary purposes) and emotional instability, typified by
her failure (or refusal?) to show deference and respect to the Court and the other parties (pp. 12-13, RTC Decision)

Respondent Teresita also questions the competence and impartiality of the expert witnesses. Respondent court, in turn,
states that the trial court should have considered the fact that Reynaldo and his sister, herein petitioner Guillerma Layug,
hired the two expert witnesses. Actually, this was taken into account by the trial court which stated that the allegations of
bias and unfairness made by Teresita against the psychologist and social worker were not substantiated.

The trial court stated that the professional integrity and competence of the expert witnesses and the objectivity of the
interviews were unshaken and unimpeached. We might add that their testimony remain uncontroverted. We also note that
the examinations made by the experts were conducted in late 1991, well over a year before the filing by Teresita of the
habeas corpus petition in December, 1992. Thus, the examinations were at that time not intended to support petitioners'
position in litigation, because there was then not even an impending possibility of one. That they were subsequently
utilized in the case a quo when it did materialize does not change the tenor in which they were first obtained.

Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to the court must be construed to have been presented not to sway the
court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it. The persons who
effected such examinations were presented in the capacity of expert witnesses testifying on matters within their respective
knowledge and expertise. On this matter, this Court had occasion to rule in the case of Sali vs. Abukakar, et al. (17 SCRA
988 [1966]).

The fact that, in a particular litigation, an NBI expert examines certain contested documents, at the request, not of a public
officer or agency of the Government, but of a private litigant, does not necessarily nullify the examination thus made. Its
purpose, presumably, to assist the court having jurisdiction over said litigation, in the performance of its duty to settle
correctly the issues relative to said documents. Even a non-expert private individual may examine the same, if there are
facts within his knowledge which may help, the court in the determination of said issue. Such examination, which may
properly be undertaken by a non-expert private individual, does not, certainly become null and void when the examiner is
an expert and/or an officer of the NBI.

(pp. 991-992.)
In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held in Salomon, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (185
SCRA 352 [1990]):

. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose upon
such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is
peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions
upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias
in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and
observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which reserve to illuminate his statements. The
opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and
circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect
(20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to
the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.

(p. 359)

It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with the opportunity to assess the witnesses' character and to observe
their respective demeanor that the trial court opted to rely on their testimony, and we believe that the trial court was
correct in its action.

Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social Worker Lopez stated that Rosalind and her aunt were about to
board a plane when they were off-loaded because there was no required clearance. They were referred to her office, at
which time Reginald was also brought along and interviewed. One of the regular duties of Social Worker Lopez in her job
appears to be the interview of minors who leave for abroad with their parents or other persons. The interview was for
purposes of foreign travel by a 5-year old child and had nothing to do with any pending litigation. On cross-examination,
Social Worker Lopez stated that her assessment of the minor's hatred for her mother was based on the disclosures of the
minor. It is inconceivable, much less presumable that Ms. Lopez would compromise her position, ethics, and the public
trust reposed on a person of her position in the course of doing her job by falsely testifying just to support the position of
any litigant.

The psychologist, Ms. Macabulos, is a B.S. magna cum laude graduate in Psychology and an M.A. degree holder also in
Psychology with her thesis graded "Excellent". She was a candidate for a doctoral degree at the time of the interview.
Petitioner Reynaldo may have shouldered the cost of the interview but Ms. Macabulos services were secured because
Assumption College wanted an examination of the child for school purposes and not because of any litigation. She may
have been paid to examine the child and to render a finding based on her examination, but she was not paid to fabricate
such findings in favor of the party who retained her services. In this instance it was not even petitioner Reynaldo but the
school authorities who initiated the same. It cannot be presumed that a professional of her potential and stature would
compromise her professional standing.

Teresita questions the findings of the trial court that:

1. Her morality is questionable as shown by her marrying Reynaldo at the time she had a subsisting marriage with another
man.

2. She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on a love affair with one of the Reynaldo's fellow NSC employees.

3. She is incapable of providing the children with necessities and conveniences commensurate to their social standing
because she does not even own any home in the Philippines.

4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.

It is contended that the above findings do not constitute the compelling reasons under the law which would justify
depriving her of custody over the children; worse, she claims, these findings are non-existent and have not been proved
by clear and convincing evidence.

Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of a child under 7 years of age not to be separated from
the mother, without considering what the law itself denominates as compelling reasons or relevant considerations to
otherwise decree. In the Unson III case, earlier mentioned, this Court stated that it found no difficulty in not awarding
custody to the mother, it being in the best interest of the child "to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not

to say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had placed herself . . . might create in the moral and social
outlook of [the child] who was in her formative and most impressionable stage . . ."
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They understand the difference
between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be better served in an
environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the
records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has been trying his
best to give the children the kind of attention and care which the mother is not in a position to extend.

The argument that the charges against the mother are false is not supported by the records. The findings of the trial court
are based on evidence.

Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on December 17, 1984 in California (p. 13,
Respondent's Memorandum; p. 238, Rollo; pp. 11, RTC Decision). Less than a year later, she had already driven across
the continental United States to commence living with another man, petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were
married on October 7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this disadvantage on her part, this matter of her having contracted a
bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita tried to picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told
Reynaldo about her marriage to Lustado on the occasion when she was raped by Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet
Demetriou of the Pasig RTC lent no weight to such tale. And even if this story were given credence, it adds to and not
subtracts from the conviction of this Court about Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious crime against privacy. Confiding to
one's potential rapist about a prior marriage is not a very convincing indication that the potential victim is averse to the act.
The implication created is that the act would be acceptable if not for the prior marriage.

More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage only much later. In fact, the rape incident itself is
unlikely against a woman who had driven three days and three nights from California, who went straight to the house of
Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon arriving went to bed and, who immediately thereafter started to live with him in a
relationship which is marital in nature if not in fact.

Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed the testimony of the various witnesses that while married to Reynaldo,
Teresita entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the house of petitioner Reynaldo and
respondent Teresita. Perdencio had been assigned by the National Steel Corporation to assist in the project in Pittsburgh
and was staying with Reynaldo, his co-employee, in the latter's house. The record shows that the daughter Rosalind
suffered emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in their
house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home and the children, bound for California. When
Perdencio Gonzales was reassigned to the Philippines, Teresita followed him and was seen in his company in a Cebu
hotel, staying in one room and taking breakfast together. More significant is that letters and written messages from
Teresita to Perdencio were submitted in evidence (p.12, RTC Decision).

The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not fall under "compelling reasons" is
neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over seven years old and their clear choice is the
father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts,
and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy,
which from the records appears to have become final (pp. 210-222, Rollo).

Respondent court's finding that the father could not very well perform the role of a sole parent and substitute mother
because his job is in the United States while the children will be left behind with their aunt in the Philippines is misplaced.
The assignment of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or was a temporary one. He was sent there to oversee the purchase of a
steel mill component and various equipment needed by the National Steel Corporation in the Philippines. Once the
purchases are completed, there is nothing to keep him there anymore. In fact, in a letter dated January 30, 1995,
Reynaldo informs this Court of the completion of his assignment abroad and of his permanent return to the Philippines (ff.

p. 263, Rollo).

The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over seven years old. Their
choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person,
thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under
the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the
presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in
the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children
understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her
behavior.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the
decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City and
presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors
Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special pronouncement is made as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

c. OTHER EFFECTS

G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962

ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner,

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.

Martin B. Laurea and Associates for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor.

BARRERA, J.:

On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp Proc. No. 433) a petition which reads:
1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of
this petition;

2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria;
that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled
'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her;
that the said partial decision is now final;

3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L.
Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for
many years now;

4. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to
live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using
her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are had, she be allowed to resume
using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal.

The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Article 370
(should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code requires
the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she
employed before the legal separation. Upon petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for change
of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a
businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married name would give rise to
confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by the State.

The contention of the Republic finds support in the provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code which reads:

ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation. (Emphasis supplied)

Note that the language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall
continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is
unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife
should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.

The appellee contends, however, that the petition is substantially for change of her name from Elisea L. Santamaria, the
one she has been using, since her marriage, to Elisea Laperal, her maiden name, giving as reason or cause therefor her
being legally separated from the husband Enrique R. Santamaria, and the fact that they have ceased to live together for
many years.

There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the procedure prescribed in Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court for change of name has been observed. But from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these
opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her
husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which
refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with
regards to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact
of legal separation alone — which is the only basis for the petition at bar — is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to
justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the
mandatory provisions of Article 372.

It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner owns extensive business
interests, the continued used of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding is however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon
which the petition was based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly, with the issuance
of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and her husband had automatically
been dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil Cod). Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of December 1, 1960, granting the petition, is hereby set aside and the petition
dismissed. Without costs. So ordered.