G.R. No.
L-35156 November 20, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable
doubt, of the crime of murder by the Circuit Criminal
Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt. Guillermo
Masana of the Philippine Constabulary. Accordingly, he
was sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P12,000.00, to pay the
amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the
costs.
The information alleges:
That on or about April 24, 1971, in the
Municipality of Indang, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a double-bladed
dagger, with evident premeditation and
treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt.
Guillermo Masana while the latter was in
the performance of his official duties,
inflicting upon him stab wounds on the
different parts of his body which directly
caused his death.
Contrary to law
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We
glean the following facts:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971,
the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana together with PC
soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman
Ricardo Ligsa and Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang,
Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of
the Indang market (pp. 2,3, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10,
19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).
While they were eating, they saw, through the glass
panel of the restaurant, appellant outside the restaurant
blowing his whistle. Their attention having been drawn to
what appellant was doing, Lt. Masana then in civilian
clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went
out of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked
the latter, after Identifying himself as a PC officer,
whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a
license. Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana
appellant moved one step backward and attempted to
draw his gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately
grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave
it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana told the appellant
to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel
followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a
separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters
from the table of Lt. Masana's three companions — Fidel,
Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After the
two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's
gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana pulled out a piece
of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon
the receipt for the gun, and after signing it, he asked
appellant to countersign the same, but appellant refused
to do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun
to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the
latter that they would talk the matter over in the municipal
building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about
to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled out a double-
bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several
times, on the chest and stomach causing his death
several hours thereafter (pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30,
1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).
While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three
companions of Lt. Masana — PC soldier Virgilio Fidel,
Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica
— who were all seated at a separate table about one and
one-half (1 1/2) meters away from that occupied by the
accused and Lt. Masana stood up to assist Lt. Masana
but Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite,
who happened to be taking his lunch in the same
restaurant, was quicker than any of them in going near
the combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the
accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger
from the accused-appellant. Immediately thereafter, the
Chief of Police brought the accused to the municipal
building of Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp.
19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n., Jan. 20,
1972), while the companions of Lt. Masana brought the
latter to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he
expired several hours later as a result of the stab wounds
inflicted by the accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22,
1971). Dr. Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-Legal Officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, conducted an
autopsy of the cadaver of Lt. Masana and made the
following findings, which are embodied in his Report,
Exhibits "D" and "D-1 " (pp. 88-89, rec.), and which reads
as follows:
Postmortem findings.
General:
Fairly developed and nourished male
subject in rigor mortis with postmortem
lividity over the dependent portions of the
body. Pupils are dilated. Finger and toe tips
are pale. There is an exploratory
laparotomy incision at the abdomen,
measuring 21 cm. long, 3 cm. left of the
anterior midline, with eighteen (18) stitches
applied. There are surgical incisions at the
left and right abdomen, measuring 2 cm.
long, 9 cm. from the anterior midline and 2
cm. long, 6.5 cm. from the anterior midline
with two (2) stitches applied and a rubber
drain sticking out of each, respectively.
TRUNK:
(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9
by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior midline,
128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep,
directed posterior wards and slightly
upwards, passing superficially between
muscles and tissues.
(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2
by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior midline,
121 cm. above the heel, 5.5. cm. deep,
directed posterior wards, downwards and to
the left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th
intercostal space.
(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9
by 0.2 cm. just left of the anterior midline,
96 cm. above the heel 11 cm. deep,
directed posterior wards, upwards and to
the left, perforating the greater curvature of
the stomach and the gastric vessels,
grazing the liver, perforating the diaphragm
and infero-medial border of the lower lobe
of the right lung.
(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region,
measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from the
posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.
UPPER EXTREMITIES:
(5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the
distal third of the left arm, measuring 3 by
0.5 cm., just medial to its anterior midline.
(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the
proximal phalange of the right index finger,
measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its
posterior midline.
Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood
clots accumulated in the thoracic cavity.
There are four (4) sutures applied at a
lacerated wound at the greater curvature of
the stomach.
There is nothing remarkable in the
unaffected organs internally.
REMARKS:
Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest
due to severe shock and intrathoracic
hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab
wounds of the body, perforating the
stomach, gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm
and lower lobe of the right lung.
Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand,
maintains and relies on the following facts:
At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971,
the accused and his wife were in a restaurant near the
market place of Indang, Cavite, in order to take their
lunch. They had just come from Mandaluyong, Rizal
where they reside (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971).
Inside the restaurant, the accused saw three persons to
his right, eating, while to his left he saw a person whom
he later learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking beer
alone. While the accused and his wife were waiting for
the food to be served, Lt. Masana approached him and
asked him whether he was Floro Rodil and whether he
was a member of the Anti- Smuggling Unit. After
receiving an affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the
accused to join him in his table. The accused accepted
the invitation so the two moved over to the officer's table
where the deceased offered beer to the accused who,
however, refused saying he was still hungry. In the
course of their conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused
not to report any matter about smuggling to the PC. The
accused informed the officer that he had not reported any
smuggling activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then
asked the accused for his identification card as a
member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the latter did
by showing his ID card, Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his picture
and indicating that he was an officer of the Anti-
Communist League of the Philippines (pp. 62-68, t.s.n.,
Dec. 7, 1971).
Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's
ID was fake, and after the accused insisted that it was
genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it away from the
accused when the latter was about to put it back in his
pocket. Because of his refusal to give his Id card to Lt.
Masana the latter got mad and, in an angry tone of voice,
demanded: "Will you give it to me or not?" (P. 7 1, Ibid).
Still the accused refused to surrender his ID to Lt.
Masana Thereupon, the latter pulled a gun from his waist
and hit the accused on the head with its handle two (2)
time Immediately, blood gushed from his head and face.
When Lt. Masana was about to hit the accused for the
third time, the latter parried the right hand of the officer,
pulled his "pangsaksak" and stabbed the officer two or
three times and then pushed him away from him and ran
out of the restaurant (pp. 74,75,79, Ibid).
The accused went in the direction of the municipal
building of Indang, Cavite, where he intended to
surrender to the authorities. But on his way, he met
Primo Panaligan, the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite.
The Chief of Police asked him why his head and face
were bloody and he answered that he was hit by Lt.
Masana on the head with a gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). If
here upon, the Chief of Police asked somebody to
accompany the accused to the municipal building.
Arriving there, one Victor, a policeman of Indang, Cavite,
accompanied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose clinic was
just across the street where the municipal building is
located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971). After
he was given first aid treatment, he was brought back by
the Indang policeman to the municipal, building where he
was detained for two days before he was picked up by
the Philippine Constabulary operatives and transferred to
the 121th PC Headquarters in Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91,
t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n.,
Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).
After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision
sentencing the accused as heretofore stated.
I
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be
proven by clear, sufficient, satisfactory and convincing
evidence (People vs. Libed 14 SCRA 410, 413; People
vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17; People vs. Solaña, 6
SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA 473; 477;
People vs. Paras, 80 Phil. 149; 152; People vs. Berio 59
Phil. 533; 536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509, 514).
Moreover, to prove justification, the accused must rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were
weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused had
admitted the killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48,
57; People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs.
Navarro, 25 SCRA 491; 496; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA
60, 65-66; People vs. Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270;
People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil 586-588; People vs.
Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 7 7 2). The rationale for this
jurisprudence is that, having admitted the wounding or
killing of the victim, the accused must be held criminally
liable for the crime unless he establishes to the
satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-
defense.
In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the
deceased, Lt. Guillermo Masana who committed unlawful
aggression when the latter hit him on his head with the
handle of his gun after he refused to surrender his
(accused's) ID to him.
This claim does not merit belief.
The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to
the deceased because the same was his and he also
spent money for it, the latter hit him with the handle of his
(deceased's) gun. WE cannot perceive how this refusal of
the accused could have provoked or enraged the
deceased to the extent of initiating the aggression by
drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its butt,
knowing that the accused was no longer armed after the
latter's gun had earlier been taken away from him.
Besides, an agent of authority, like the deceased,
ordinarily is not authorized to use force, except in an
extreme case when he is attacked, or subject to active
resistance, and finds no other way to comply with his
duty or cause himself to be obeyed by the offender.
Furthermore, the records reveal an unrebutted fact to the
effect that the deceased was unarmed when the incident
happened, he being then on leave. As a matter of fact, he
was then in civilian clothing (pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan. 20,
1972). WE are, therefore, inclined to believe that it was
the accused who had every reason to be resentful of the
deceased and to be enraged after the deceased refused
to heed his plea that his gun be returned him; because
he might be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms.
Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the inescapable
conclusion that it was the accused, not the deceased,
who initiated the aggression which ended in the fatal
wounding of the deceased resulting in his death.
The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the
deceased before he parried the third blow. This claim is
belied by the record. During the trial, the court a
quo asked the accused to show the scar produced by the
injuries inflicted by the deceased when he refused to give
his ID thus —
Court
Q Where is that scar?
 (Witness showing his right
side of the head to the Court)"
[pp. 86,88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].
Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused
corroborated the foregoing testimony in his medical
findings, Exhibit "3", which reads:
Injuries:
(1) lacerated wound 1/2 inch, parietal
region.
(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inches, rt ear
lobe
(3) contusion, right mastoid area [Exh. "3";
p. 116, rec] .
The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed
person (pp. 76-77, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971). It also shows that
before the stabbing incident took place, the deceased
and the accused were facing each other. If that was the
case, and considering that the deceased was, according
to the accused, holding the gun with his right hand, why
was the accused hit on the right side of his head and and
on his right ear lobe WE find that this particular claim of
the accused that it was the deceased who first hit him
twice with the handle of his gun before parrying the third
blow and then stabbing the latter is definitely belied not
only by the location of the scar but also by the medical
finding of Dr. Ochoa aforequoted. Indeed, if the
protagonists were facing each other, and it appearing
that they were both right- handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov. 22,
1971), the blow given by one, if not parried by the other,
would perforce land on the left, and not on the right, side
of the body of the recipient of the blow. WE, therefore,
reject such claim for being improbable, the same being
contrary to the natural course of human behavior.
The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state
witness PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, is that the victim parried
with both hands the thrust of the appellant with such
force that appellant bumped his head on the edge of the
table causing blood to ooze from the resulting injury on
his head.
When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of
Indang, Cavite, on his way to the municipal building from
the scene of the stabbing incident purportedly to
surrender to the authorities, he claims that he told the
Chief of Police that Lt. Masana hit him on his head with
the handle of his (Masana's) gun. On his return from the
clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his injuries were treated, he
was detained in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite
for two days before he was transferred to the Tagaytay
PC Headquarters. During all this time, he did not give any
written statement, much less inform any PC or other
police agency that he stabbed Lt. Masana in self-
defense. It was only on July 8, 1971. after the lapse of
more than two and one-half (2 1/2) months that he
claimed self-defense during the preliminary investigation
of the case before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite
(pp. 44, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). If the accused had really
acted in self-defense, he would surely have so informed
the Chief of Police at the first opportunity. He only
allegedly told the Chief of Police, who allegedly asked
him why his head and face were bloody, that Lt. Masana
hit him with a gun. He did not tell the Police Chief that he
was surrendering for stabbing the deceased in self-
defense. This claim of the accused made before the
municipal judge of Indang, Cavite, on July 8, 1971
aforesaid constitutes an exculpatory statement made so
long after the crime was committed on April 24, 1971.
Such claim does not deserve credence since the same is
obviously an afterthought, which cannot overthrow the
straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses PC
soldier Virgilio Fidel and Coast Guard serviceman
Ricardo Ligsa both disinterested and unbiased
witnesses, whose testimony as peace officers, in the
absence of any showing as to any motive that would
impel them to distort the truth, must be afforded full faith
and credit as a whole.
The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that
same day after he was treated by Dr. Ochoa, confirms
the testimony of the state witnesses that the police was
present during the incident between the appellant and the
victim and that the police chief embraced appellant and
grabbed the knife from appellant, whom he thereafter
brought to the municipal building.
II
Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or
murder or homicide complexed with assault upon an
agent of authority?
According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed
was murder because "it was established by the
prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant
suddenly and without giving the victim a chance to
defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a
dagger, inflicting upon mortal wounds on the chest and
stomach. ...Needless to say, such a sudden and
unexpected attack with a deadly weapon on an unarmed
and unsuspecting victim, which made it impossible for the
latter to flee or defend himself before the fatal blow is
delivered, is alevosia or treachery" (p. 14, Appellee's
brief).
In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited
the cases of U.S. vs. Cornejo (28 Phil. 475); People vs.
Palomo (43 O.G. No. 10, 4190).
WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or
treachery is belied by the following testimony of Virgilio
Fidel, star witness for the prosecution:
COURT
Q What is the truth?
A The truth is that when I saw
that Floro Rodil stabbed Lt.
Guillermo Masana, Masana
parried him and his head
(Rodil's head) bumped on the
edge of a table; that is why he
sustained an injury and blood
oozed from his head (pp. 8-9,
 t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972;
emphasis supplied).
Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:
ATTY. MUÑOZ
Q You said that Floro Rodil's
head was bumped on the
edge of a table and you saw
blood oozing from his head, is
that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who bumped the head of
Rodil on the table?
A When Masana parried his
stab with his hands he
accidentally bumped his head
on the table.
Q Is it not a fact that Floro
Rodil is much bigger than Lt.
Masana
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean, by simple
parrying, Floro Rodil was
pushed to the extent that he
bumped his head on the
table?
A The force of Lt. Masana
might have been strong in
parrying.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the head of Rodil
bumped on the table, was Lt.
Masana already stabbed?
A It could be that he was
already stabbed or he was not
yet stabbed.
pp 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972;
emphasis supplied].
After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of
the testimony of Virgilio Fidel, one of the prosecution
witnesses, WE can only conclude that the assailant and
the victim were indeed face to face when the stabbing
took place. As such the attack was not treacherous
because the victim was able to ward off the same with his
hand. As a matter of fact, the force he used in warding off
the attack was so strong that the accused bumped his
head on a table nearby, causing injuries to him which
necessitated medical treatment. In short, the attack on
the victim was made on the spur of the moment. The
suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to
support a finding of treachery (People vs. Torejas, et al.,
43 SCRA 158, 167). Besides, the record failed to show
that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim
so as to insure the commission of the crime, making it at
the same time possible or hard for the victim to defend
himself or retaliate (People vs. Saez, 1 11 Phil. 546, 553,
citing the case of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738).
Neither does it show that the accused employed means
directly and specially tending to insure the killing without
risk to himself. On the contrary, it shows that the accused
was easily within striking distance of his three
companions, two of whom were police officers.
Furthermore, there was an altercation between the
accused and the victim about the confiscation by the
latter of the gun belonging to the former, and at the
moment when the victim was about to stand up, the
accused drew a knife from his pocket and with it stabbed
the victim in the chest. Clearly, therefore, the impelling
motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was the
latter's performance of official duty, which the former
resented. This kind of evidence does not clearly show the
presence of treachery in the commission of the
crime. Alevosia is not to be presumed, but must be
proved as conclusively as the act which it qualifies
(People vs. Abril, 51 Phil. 670, 675). This is so because
in the explicit language of the Revised Penal
Code, alevosia or treachery exists when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make [Art. 14, par. 16, Revised
Penal Code].
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant
knew because the victim, who was in civilian clothing,
told him that he was an agent of a person in authority; he
cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide
with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for
the simple reason that the information does not allege the
fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the
time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in
authority. The information simply alleges that appellant
did attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the
latter was in the performance of his official duties, ..."
Such an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for
the essential averment to justify a conviction of the
complex crime, which necessarily requires the imposition
of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the
graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such
knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in
the information; otherwise, in the absence of such
allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying
circumstance, although proven, would only be
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Applying this principle, the attack on the victim, who was
known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be
considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt or
with insult to the public authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the
Revised Penal Code), or as an "insult or in disregard of
the respect due the offended party on account of his
rank, ..." (par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code).
It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that
the person attacked was a person in authority or his
agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused
must have the intention to offend, injure, or assault the
offended party as a person in authority or agent of a
person in authority (People vs. Villaseñor 35 SCRA 460
[19701, People vs. Rellin 72 Phil. 1038 [1947]; US vs.
Alvear et al., 35 Phil. 626 [1916]).
In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov.
29, 1967), it was held that failure to expressly alleged in
the information that the accused had knowledge that the
person attacked was a person in authority does not
render the information defective so long as there are
facts alleged therein from which it can be implied that the
accused knew that the person attacked was a person in
authority. Thus, the information for Direct Assault upon a
person in authority reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal
accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of
Assault upon a Person in Authority,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August,
1960, in Barrio Cumba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a public
school teacher in the school bonding of
Lian, duly qualified and appointed as such
and while in the performance of her official
duties or on the occasion therefor, by then
and there pulling his dagger, embraced and
kissed. and repeatedly trying to embrace
and kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester
Gonzales. That the crime was committed
with the aggravating circumstances of
having committed it inside the school
building and during school classes.
Contrary to law.
And the ruling of the Court was:
Direct assault is committed 'by any person
or persons who, without a public uprising, ...
shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority
or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on
occasion of such performance' (See Art.
148, Revised Penal Code).
By express provision of law (Com. Act No.
578, now part of Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 1978), "teachers, professors, and
persons charged with the supervision of
public or duly recognized private schools,
colleges and universities shall be deemed
persons in authority, in applying the
provisions of article 148." This special
classification is obviously intended to give
teachers protection, dignity, and respect
while in the performance of their official
duties. The lower court, however, dismissed
the information on the ground that there is
 no express allegation in the information that
the accused had knowledge that the person
attacked was a person in authority. This is
clearly erroneous.
Complainant was a teacher. The
information sufficiently alleges that the
accused knew that fact, since she was in
her classroom and engaged in the
performance of her duties. He therefore
knew that she was a person in authority, as
she was so by specific provision of law. It
matters not that such knowledge on his part
is not expressly alleged, complainant's
status as a person in authority being a
matter of law and not of fact, ignorance
thereof could not excuse non- compliance
on his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This
article applies to all kinds of domestic laws,
whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc,
74 Phil 15) and whether substantive or
remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254)
for reasons of expediency, policy and
necessity.
But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch
V (68 SCRA 305, Nov. 28, 1975), the information for
Direct Assault reads:
That on or about the 17th day of January,
1974, at Barrio Languyin, Municipality of
Potillo, Province of Quezon, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto
Busto, Paulo Coralde, Dony Grande and
Jose Astjada each of whom was armed with
a piece of wood, except Paulo Coraide
conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, box and strike with said
pieces of wood one Rufino Camonias a
councilman of barrio Languyin of said
municipality, duly elected and qualified as
such while said councilman was engaged in
the actual performance of his duties.
The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:
Of importance in this case is the lack of
allegation in the complaint or in the
information that the offended party was an
agent of a person in authority and that such
fact was known to the accused. The
absence of such allegation is fatal in this
case."
The People appealed to this Court through a petition for
review on certiorari.
This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is
not a petition for review on certiorari but the refiling of a
valid information against the accused, for the following
considerations:
The Solicitor General in his comment of
November 4, 1975 duly observed that '(I)t is
patent that the acquittal of the accused
herein is not on the merits. There is want of
factual finding upon which their conviction
or acquittal could have been based.'
It need only be observed that contrary to
the fiscal's contention, the information was
deficient in that it did not allege an essential
element of the crime of direct assault that
the accused had knowledge of or knew the
position of authority held by the person
attacked, viz. that of a barrio councilman
(and hence the agent of a person in
authority under Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 1978) [See U.S. vs. Alvear 35 Phil. 626;
People vs. Rellin 77 Phil. 1038; Vol. 11,
Padilla's Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed., p.
225].
What was held in People vs. Balbar 21
SCRA, 119,1123, cited by the fiscal is that it
is sufficient that the information alleged that
the accused knew the position of authority,
held by the offended party, in that case a
public school teacher, then engaged in the
performance of her official duties, and that it
is not necessary to allege further that the
accused also knew that such position was
that of a person in authority, since 'this is a
matter of law' thus:
Complainant was a teacher.
The information sufficiently
alleges that the accused knew
that fact, since she was in her
classroom and engaged in the
performance of her duties. He
therefore knew that she was a
person in authority, as she
was so by specific provision of
law. It matters not that such
knowledge on `his part is not
expressly alleged,
complainant's status as a
person in authority being a
matter of law and not of fact,
ignorance whereof could not
excuse non-compliance on his
part (Article 3, Civil Code).
This article applies to all kinds
of domestic laws, whether civil
or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc,
74 Phil. 15) and whether
substantive or remedial
(Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil,
254) for reasons of
expediency, policy and
necessity.
Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a
mere dismissal of the information for failure
to charge an offense and was not a
decision on the merits with factual findings
as per the trial judge's own disavowal it is
 patent that the fiscal's proper course is not
the present petition but the refiling of a valid
information against respondents-accused,
as herein indicated.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed
without prejudice to the refiling of a valid
information against respondents-accused
as hereinabove indicated (emphasis
supplied).
The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI
of Quezon, etc., supra, applies to the instant case;
because the information in the former is strikingly similar
to the information in the latter and does not allege facts
from which inference can be deduced that the accused
knew that the person assaulted is a person, or an agent
of a person, in authority.
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank
should be appreciated because it is obvious that the
victim, PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as a PC officer
to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-
Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and
social status to the victim.
The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary
meaning, and as such, refers to a high social position or
standing as a grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language
Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded official standing or
social position or station (75 CJS 458); or to the order or
place in which said officers are placed in the army and
navy in relation to others (Encyclopedic Law Dictionary,
Third Edition, Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster
Longsdorf, p. 90); or to the designation or title of
distinction conferred upon an officer in order to fix his
relative position in reference to other officers in matters of
privileges, precedence, and sometimes of command or
by which to determine his pay and emoluments as in the
case of army staff officers (Bouvier's Law Dictionary,
Third Edition, p. 2804); or to a grade or official standing,
relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of
comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status or
scale of comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 100).
Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by
his corporal (People vs. Mil 92 SCRA 89, 105-106, July
30, 1979), the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel
Transaction of the Civil Service Commission by a clerk
therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb.
13, 1975), the murder by a pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs.
Cabling, 7 Phil. 469. 474; People vs. Aragon & Lopez,
107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of a municipal mayor
(People vs. Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the
murder -of a city chief of police by the chief of the secret
service division (People vs. Hollero 88 Phil. 167), assault
upon a 66-year old District Judge of the Court of First
Instance by a justice of the peace (People vs.
Torrecarreori CA 52 OG 7644), the killing of a Spanish
consul by his subordinate — a mere chancellor (People
vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597, 606607), and the killing of an
army general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29,
1953).
As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the
Court of Appeals, those "generally considered of high
station in life, on account of their rank (as well as age or
sex), deserve to be respected. Therefore, whenever
there is a difference in social condition between the
offender and the offended party, this aggravating
circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert M.A. — The
Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).
The difference in official or social status between a P.C.
lieutenant and a mere member of an anti-smuggling unit,
is patent.
If the accused herein were charged with the complex
crime of murder with assault against an agent of a person
in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult
to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating
because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of
assault against a person in authority or an agent of a
person in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant
is accused of murder only. Consequently, either
aggravating circumstance should be considered in the
imposition of the penalty.
Thus, in the following cases where the charge was
merely murder or frustrated murder, the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated:
(1) People vs. Benito, supra — the appellant, a clerk in
the Civil Service Commission, was charged with and
convicted of the murder of the assistant chief of the
personnel transaction of the said Commission;
(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra — the appellants were
charged with and convicted of murder for the death of
Army Col. Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the
injuries inflicted on Army Gen. Mariano Castaneda;
(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. — appellants were
accused and convicted of robbery with homicide for the
killing of District Judge Bautista of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-35]; and
(4) People vs. Hollero supra — where the accused chief
of the Secret Division of the Bacolod City Police
Department was convicted of murder for the killing of the
chief of police.
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to,
public authority under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the
case at bar.
The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that
Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang was present
as he was taking his lunch in the same restaurant when
the incident occurred.
As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one
who embraced or grabbed the accused from behind,
wrested the dagger from him and thereafter brought him
to the municipal building of Indang. And appellant
admittedly knew him even then as the town chief of
police, although he now claims that he went to the
municipal building to surrender to the chief of police who
was not allegedly in the restaurant during the incident.
While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et
al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-158), People vs. Siojo (61 Phil. 307,
317), and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court
ruled that the term public authority refers to a person in
authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police
is not a public authority but merely an agent of a person
in authority; there is need of re-examining such a ruling
since it is not justified by the employment of the
term public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article
14 instead of the term person in authority which is
specifically used in Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised
Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning of the
doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why
the phrase public authority should comprehend only
persons in authority. The lawmaker could have easily
utilized the term "persons in authority" in the aforesaid
paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much the same way that it
employed the said phrase in Articles 148 and 1452. The
lawmaker must have intended a different meaning for the
term public authority, which may however include, but not
limited to persons in authority.
Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio
captain, barrio lieutenant or barangay captain is a person
in authority or a public authority. Even a public school
teacher is now considered a person in authority under CA
578 amending Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code
(Sarcepudes vs. People, 90 Phil 228). So is the town
municipal health officer (People vs. Quebral et al., 73 Phil
640), as well as a nurse, a municipal councilor or an
agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (People vs.
Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 26, 1955; People vs.
Reyes, et al O.G.S. 11 p. 24).
The chief of police should therefore be considered a
public authority or a person in authority; for he is vested
with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order
and is specifically duty bound to prosecute and to
apprehend violators of the laws and municipal
ordinances, more than the aforementioned officials who
cannot prosecute and who are not even enjoined to
arrest malefactors although specifically mentioned as
persons in authority by the decided cases and by Article
152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief of police heads
and supervises the entire police force in the municipality
as well as exercises his authority over the entire territory
of the municipality, which is patently greater than and
includes the school premises or the town clinic or barrio,
to which small area the authority or jurisdiction of the
teacher, nurse, or barrio lieutenant, respectively, is
limited.
With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating
circumstance, the appellant should therefore be
condemned to suffer the maximum period of reclusion
temporal the penalty prescribed for homicide.
WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF HOMICIDE
AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A
PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE
RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON
ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, APPELLANT FLORO RODIL
IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN
INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT
RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM
IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.
Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ.,
concur.
Fernando, C.J., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the judgment's imposition of the maximum
penalty for homicide, although I join Mme. Justice
Herrera's partial dissent insofar as she holds that the
aggravating circumstance of contempt of or insult to the
public authorities may not be appreciated. However,
disregard of rank was properly appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance, and hence the maximum
penalty for homicide is properly imposed in the absence
of any mitigating circumstance.
Barredo, J., concur.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I believe that neither the aggravating circumstance of
contempt of, or insult to the public authorities under
Article 14, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, nor that of
insult or disregard of the respect due to the offended
party on account of his rank under Article 14, par. 3 of the
same Code, is applicable to the present case.
1. For the circumstance of contempt of, or with insult to,
public authorities to be considered aggravating, it is
essential (a) that the crime is committed in the presence
of a public authority, not a mere agent of the authorities
(People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil. 307 [19351; People vs. Verzo,
et al 21 SCRA 1403 [1967]; and (b) that the public
authority is engaged in the exercise of his functions and
is not the person against whom the crime is committed
(People vs. Siojo, citing U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150
[191]; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated
January 24, 1881, 1 Viada 310), nor the one injured by
the commission of the offense (People vs. Pardo, 79 Phil.
568 [1947]).
In this case, Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine
Constabulary is not a public authority nor a person in
authority as these terms are defined by Article 152, par. 1
of the Revised Penal Code for he is not directly vested
with jurisdiction, that is, power or authority to govern and
execute the laws or to hear and decide a cause; he is a
mere agent of a person in authority as defined by Article
152, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, he being a
member of the Philippine Constabulary which is a
government military agency in charge of the maintenance
of public order and the protection and security of fife and
property. In fact, the Decision itself calls him an agent of
a person in authority (p. 13).
And even if Lt. Masana were a person in authority, this
aggravating circumstance cannot be taken into account
because it is he himself who is the offended party
(People vs. Siojo, supra).
2. Neither can the second circumstance, that of disregard
of the respect due to rank, be made to apply. It is not the
existence alone of rank of the offended party that
determines the presence of this aggravating
circumstance. There must be a difference in the social
condition of the offender and the offended party.
El concepto de dignidad en su aspects
general no esta constituido solo por el
caracter de authoridad solo por la funcion
publica o cargo que desempene el ofendido
sino tambien pro la diferencia de condicion
social entre la victims y el ofensor ...
(Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal
Decimotercera edicion Tomo I, p. 554).
Where the offender and the offended party are of the
same rank, this aggravating circumstance does not
apply.
Las personas constituidas en dignidad, y
que por esta razon merecen mayor respeto,
son las que generalmente se consideran
por todo el mundo como superiores o mas
elevadas que el que comets el delito: tales
son los sacerdotes y las Autoridades
respecto de los particulares, los maestros
con relacion a sus discipulos, los
guardadores respecto de sus pupilos, etc.
Siempre, pues, que hay diferencia de
condicion social entre el ofensor y el
ofendido, concurrira la agravante de este
numero, mas no cuando hay igualdad Asi
pues, si un Sacerdote o un Magistrado
calumnian a otro Sacerdote o Magistrado
respectivamente, no existira la
circunstancia de agravacion que
comentamos. (Viada Codigo Penal
Reformado de 1870, Tomo II, p. 316).
The provision contemplates such a different in rank as
that of a teacher where the offender is a pupil (U.S. vs.
Cabiling, 7 Phil. 469 [1907]) (although a teacher is now
considered a person in authority); a Judge where the
offender is a private citizen (People vs. Valeriano, et al.,
90 Phil. 15 [1951]); a General of the Philippine Army
where the offender is a private citizen (People vs. Torres,
et al., L- 4642, May 29, 1953); a Chief of Police, a
superior of the accused, who was chief of a division of
the secret police (People vs. Hollero 88 Phil. 167 [1951]);
a ranking official of the Civil Service Commission where
the offender is a clerk thereat (People vs. Benito, 74
SCRA 271 [1976]); a Consul who was killed by a
chancellor in the Consulate, who is a subordinate
(People vs. Martinez Godinez, 106 Phil 597 [1959]).
In the case at bar, the difference in the social condition
and rank of the victim, a Lieutenant in the Philippine
Constabulary, and that of the accused, who is a member
of an anti-smuggling unit and an officer of the Anti-
Communist League of the Philippines, is not of such a
degree as to justify consideration of disrespect of rank
due to the offended party as an aggravating
circumstance.
In the absence of the two aggravating circumstances
discussed above or of any mitigating circumstance, the
penalty imposable is reclusion temporal in its medium
period, and the accused should be sentenced to an
indeterminate term of imprisonment ranging from ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the judgment's imposition of the maximum
penalty for homicide, although I join Mme. Justice
Herrera's partial dissent insofar as she holds that the
aggravating circumstance of contempt of or insult to the
public authorities may not be appreciated. However,
disregard of rank was properly appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance, and hence the maximum
penalty for homicide is properly imposed in the absence
of any mitigating circumstance.
Barredo, J., concur.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I believe that neither the aggravating circumstance of
contempt of, or insult to the public authorities under
Article 14, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, nor that of
insult or disregard of the respect due to the offended
party on account of his rank under Article 14, par. 3 of the
same Code, is applicable to the present case.
1. For the circumstance of contempt of, or with insult to,
public authorities to be considered aggravating, it is
essential (a) that the crime is committed in the presence
of a public authority, not a mere agent of the authorities
(People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil. 307 [19351; People vs. Verzo,
et al 21 SCRA 1403 [1967]; and (b) that the public
authority is engaged in the exercise of his functions and
is not the person against whom the crime is committed
(People vs. Siojo, citing U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150
[191]; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated
January 24, 1881, 1 Viada 310), nor the one injured by
the commission of the offense (People vs. Pardo, 79 Phil.
568 [1947]).
In this case, Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine
Constabulary is not a public authority nor a person in
authority as these terms are defined by Article 152, par. 1
of the Revised Penal Code for he is not directly vested
with jurisdiction, that is, power or authority to govern and
execute the laws or to hear and decide a cause; he is a
mere agent of a person in authority as defined by Article
152, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, he being a
member of the Philippine Constabulary which is a
government military agency in charge of the maintenance
of public order and the protection and security of fife and
property. In fact, the Decision itself calls him an agent of
a person in authority (p. 13).
And even if Lt. Masana were a person in authority, this
aggravating circumstance cannot be taken into account
because it is he himself who is the offended party
(People vs. Siojo, supra).
2. Neither can the second circumstance, that of disregard
of the respect due to rank, be made to apply. It is not the
existence alone of rank of the offended party that
determines the presence of this aggravating
circumstance. There must be a difference in the social
condition of the offender and the offended party.
El concepto de dignidad en su aspects
general no esta constituido solo por el
caracter de authoridad solo por la funcion
publica o cargo que desempene el ofendido
sino tambien pro la diferencia de condicion
social entre la victims y el ofensor ...
(Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal
Decimotercera edicion Tomo I, p. 554).
Where the offender and the offended party are of the
same rank, this aggravating circumstance does not
apply.
Las personas constituidas en dignidad, y
que por esta razon merecen mayor respeto,
son las que generalmente se consideran
por todo el mundo como superiores o mas
elevadas que el que comets el delito: tales
son los sacerdotes y las Autoridades
respecto de los particulares, los maestros
con relacion a sus discipulos, los
guardadores respecto de sus pupilos, etc.
Siempre, pues, que hay diferencia de
condicion social entre el ofensor y el
ofendido, concurrira la agravante de este
numero, mas no cuando hay igualdad Asi
pues, si un Sacerdote o un Magistrado
calumnian a otro Sacerdote o Magistrado
respectivamente, no existira la
circunstancia de agravacion que
comentamos. (Viada Codigo Penal
Reformado de 1870, Tomo II, p. 316).
The provision contemplates such a different in rank as
that of a teacher where the offender is a pupil (U.S. vs.
Cabiling, 7 Phil. 469 [1907]) (although a teacher is now
considered a person in authority); a Judge where the
offender is a private citizen (People vs. Valeriano, et al.,
90 Phil. 15 [1951]); a General of the Philippine Army
where the offender is a private citizen (People vs. Torres,
et al., L- 4642, May 29, 1953); a Chief of Police, a
superior of the accused, who was chief of a division of
the secret police (People vs. Hollero 88 Phil. 167 [1951]);
a ranking official of the Civil Service Commission where
the offender is a clerk thereat (People vs. Benito, 74
SCRA 271 [1976]); a Consul who was killed by a
chancellor in the Consulate, who is a subordinate
(People vs. Martinez Godinez, 106 Phil 597 [1959]).
In the case at bar, the difference in the social condition
and rank of the victim, a Lieutenant in the Philippine
Constabulary, and that of the accused, who is a member
of an anti-smuggling unit and an officer of the Anti-
Communist League of the Philippines, is not of such a
degree as to justify consideration of disrespect of rank
due to the offended party as an aggravating
circumstance.
In the absence of the two aggravating circumstances
discussed above or of any mitigating circumstance, the
penalty imposable is reclusion temporal in its medium
period, and the accused should be sentenced to an
indeterminate term of imprisonment ranging from ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Abad Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-40330 November 20, 1978
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADO DANIEL alias "AMADO ATO", accused-
appellant.
Eraulio D. Yaranon for appellant.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor
General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Rosalio A. de
Leon for appellee.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J:
This case originated from the Court of First Instance of
Baguio City by virtue of a complaint filed by 13-year old
Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado
Ato" of rape alleged to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of
September, 1965, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the herein accused,
armed with a sharp instrument and by
means of force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersignedcomplaint, against her will, and
in her own room situated at No. 25 Interior,
Pinsao, Guisad, Baguio City.
That in the commission of the crime, the
aggravating circumstance that it was
committed in the dwelling of the offended
party, the latter not having givenprovocation
for it, is present. (p. 1, CFI record)
The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano The crime of rape shall be
Belmonte, after due trial rendered its decision on May 30, punished by reclusion
1966, finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to perpetua.
suffer "not more than TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal and not less than SIX (6) Whenever the crime of rape is
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, and to pay committed with the use of a
the costs." 1 deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty
His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been shall be reclusion perpetua to
denied, accused filed a notice of appeal; forthwith the death.
case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the
On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No.
Tenth Division rendered a decision the dispositive portion 296, as amended) —
of which follows:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
the guilt of the accused Amado Daniel has modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and rules of court may provide, final judgments
he should accordingly suffer the penalty for and decrees of inferior courts as herein
the crime herein charged. provided, in —

We find, however, that the sentence (1) All criminal cases involving offenses for
imposed the accused in the judgment which the penalty imposed is death or life
appealed from is not in accordance with imprisonment; ...
law.
WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case
Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on to the Supreme Court for appropriate
June 20, 1964, amended Article 335 of the further proceedings pursuant to law. 2
Revised Penal Code, providing that —
By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of
Appeals the case was certified to this Court and in a
Resolution of March 6, 1975, the same was ordered
docketed. 3
Preliminary question —
The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary
question which strikes at the very root of a long standing
practice and procedure evoked for the last forty years or
so since the creation of the Court of Appeals. 4
Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal
in a criminal case where the offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua or death certified to it by the Court
of Appeals with findings of facts and of the guilt of the
accused, but without imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua or death on the appellant pursuant to Rule 124,
Section 12, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court?5
Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other
,Justices, expresses the view that for this Court to
acquire jurisdiction over the appeal, the decision before
Us must have imposed on the appellant the penalty
either of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts
warranted.
The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this
Opinion, believe otherwise and hold the view that the
dispositive portion of the decision as written and
rendered is in accordance with the Constitution and the
law, and vests jurisdiction on the Court to act on the
appeal.
A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28,
1947, 6 a case was certified to this Court by the Court of
Appeals without findings of facts and simply on the
ground that it was "on the opinion that the penalty that
should be imposed ill this case is reclusion perpetua, as
recommended by the Solicitor-General, and not reclusion
temporal, as imposed by tile lower court." The question
arose as to the proper procedure to be followed by the
appellate court in certifying cases to this Court under
Section 145-K of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 52 which read:
Whenever in any criminal cases submitted
to a division the said division should be of
the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, the said
Court shall refrain from entering judgment
thereon and shall forthwith certify the case
to the Supreme Court for final
determination, as if the case had been
brought before it on appeal.
In disposing of the issue several matters came up which
evoked different, and We may say, strong reactions from
the Justices then composing the Court, but for brevity we
shall not dwell on them. Simply stated, it is was ruled that
the Court of Appeals was duty bound to make its findings
of facts to support its opinion that the penalty to the
imposed upon the appellant was either life imprisonment
or death so as to bring the case within the jurisdiction of
this Court.
From the Resolution written for the Court by then Mr.
Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran, We quoted the following
pertinent portions:
The jurisdiction of this Court predicated
upon the opinion of the Court of Appeals,
as provided in the above-quoted provisions
of the law, must of necessity defend upon
the correctness of that opi nion There is
nothing in the law precluding this Court
from exercising ing its authority to pass
upon such question which concerns its own
jurisdiction. And in order that this Court may
exercise its power of review the Court of
appeals is bound to make in its order f
certification such findings of facts as are
necessary to support its conclusion that
either life imprisonment or death is the
penalty to be imposed. This is indeed
covered by Rule 52, section 3, which
provides th where a court to which an
appeal has been taken has no appellate
jurisdiction over lic case and it certifies the
same to the proper court, it must do so
"with a specific and clear statement of
grounds therefor." the requirement of with
and specific grounds is precisely a device
to prevent erroneous transmissions of
jurisdiction from a lower to a superior court.
Furthermore, the words "shall refrain from
entering judgment thereon" appearing in the
provision above quoted, are sufficient
indication that the Court of Appeals, at the
time of certifying the case to this Court, had
already examined the evidence and was
ready to render judgment on the merits, but
having found from the facts established by
proof that the penalty to be imposed is
either death or life imprisonment, instead of
entering judgment thereon , it certifies the
case to the Supreme Court for final
determination. Since the Certification is the
only ground for determining our jurisdiction,
it must contain not only conclusions of law
but also findings of fact, the latter being
more important than the former for they
supply the real basis for determining
jurisdiction ...
The instant case cannot be compared with
cases coming directly from a Court of First
Instance wherein either life imprisonment or
death penalty is imposed, for in such cases,
if we assume jurisdiction even where the
judgment appears to be erroneous on its
face, it is because the Court of First
Instance has already exhausted its
jurisdiction by rendering judgment on the
merits containing both findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and under such
circumstance it is more practical for the
administration of the law that this Court
should exercise its appellate jurisdiction by
examining the evidence and correcting all
errors both of fact and of law that might
have been committed by the trial court. But
here, the Court of Appeals is refraining from
rendering judgment on the merits and is
refusing to complete the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction because it believes
that such jurisdiction belongs to the
Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds to
transfer the case to this Court. lt is in that
transfer that we believe we may intervene
in order to prevent an erroneous transfer,
xxx xxx xxx
Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is
merely a method designed to make
effective the appellate jurisdiction of both
the Court of Appeals and this Court, as
defined by law. According to the law of
jurisdiction (section 138, Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259),
offenses, for which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment, including
offenses arising from the same occurrence
or committed on the same occasion, come
within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, and the remaining offenses
fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals ...
We are of the opinion and so hold,
therefore, that in a case like this, the Court
of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court,
must state its findings of fact necessary to
support its conclusion that the penalty to be
imposed is either life imprisonment or
death. While this Court will not review the
findings of fact, it will pass upon the
correctness of the legal conclusions derived
therefrom. And if this Court finds the
conclusions to be correct, it will assume
jurisdiction. If it finds them to be wrong, the
case will be returned to the Court of
Appeals. (pp. 613-616, supra, emphasis
supplied)
In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court
considered that there was substantial compliance with
the law as the order of certification made reference to the
opinion and recommendation of the Solicitor General
whose brief contained sufficient findings of fact to warrant
the conclusion that life imprisonment should be imposed
upon the appellant. Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado
and Briones concurred in the Resolution.
Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion
concurred with the principle that the Court of Appeals is
bound to make its findings of fact and study the evidence
so as to determine whether the appellant is guilty or not,
but dissented from that portion of the Resolution which
accepted the case as he was of the opinion that the case
should have been remanded to the Court of Appeals.7
Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and
dissented from the majority insofar as it held that it was
necessary for the Court of Appeals or a division thereof
to state the reasons for its opinion that death penalty or
life imprisonment should be imposed. He particularly
dissented from statements that if this Court found the
conclusions of the Court of Appeals to be wrong, the
case should be returned to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings. According to Justice Tuason when a
case is certified to this Court it is placed, by force of the
Court of Appeals' opinion, within the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court for the latter to decide the appeal on the
merits; findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are neither
essential nor necessary. Justice Tuason was joined in his
dissent by Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became
Chief Justice of this Court and Justice Sabino Padilla.8
B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step
further than that ruled in Ramos — that is, for the Court
of Appeals not only to make its findings of fact and
finding of guilt, but also to impose the penalty either
of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts warrant in
order that We may exercise Our appellate jurisdiction.
We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to
the letter and spirit of the law which confers on the
Supreme Court the exclusive prerogative to review on
appeal and impose the corresponding penalty in criminal
cases where the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua or death.
Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, in "(A)ll criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment."9 This jurisdiction is constitutional: the
Supreme Court ma not be deprived thereof by, Congress
then, now the National Assembly. 10
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn
provides that the foregoing appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is exclusive.
Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is
one of jurisdiction - the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or
death.
The present controversy springs from the construction
given to the second paragraph of Sec. 12, Rule 124,
Rules of Court 11 more particularly to the use of the
phrases "should be imposed" and "shall refrain from
entering judgment", viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to
a division the said division should be of the
opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, the
said court shall refrain from entering
judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify
the case to the Supreme Court for final
determination, as if the case had been
brought before it on appeal. (Emphasis
supplied)
As we construe it, the Rule cited does not
charge the appellate court with the duty of
 imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua or death. All that the Rule requires
is that should the Court of Appeals be of the
opinion that death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, it "shall
refrain from entering judgment thereon ...
The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering
judgment". Thus, the Court of Appeals shall refrain from
rendering judgment if and when it is of the opinion
that reclusion perpetua or death is the proper penalty for
the crime committed. This can be the only logical
interpretation considering that the Court of Appeals is
without jurisdiction to impose the penalties concerned.
The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated with
an "entry of judgment" as the latter is understood in Rule
36 in relation to Section 8, Rule 121 and Section 16, Rule
124, Rules of Court. "Entry of judgment" presupposes a
final judgment — final in the sense that no appeal was
taken from the decision of the trial or appellate court
within the reglementary period. A judgment in a criminal
case becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant
has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.12 It is
only then that there is a judgment which is to be entered
or recorded in the book of entries of judgments. 13
It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section
12, second paragraph, Rule 124 enjoins the Court of
Appeals from entering judgment" when there is no
judgment to be entered .
But then the argument is advanced — what is there to be
reviewed by the Supreme Court when the decision being
certified contains no penalty or sentence, as
distinguished from appeals from the Court of First
Instance where there is a complete judgment to be
passed upon. The answer is simple. Section 12 itself
states that the case is for final determination by the
Supreme Court as if the case had been brought before it
on appeal. Hence, based on the findings of facts of the
appellate court which as a rule are conclusive and
binding on Us, this Court "will pass upon the correctness
of the legal conclusions derived therefrom" (People v.
Ramos, supra) and impose the correct penalty for the
offense committed.
We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the
phrase shall refrain from rendering judgment " there
would be no cause for any ambiguity. We can only
assume that the intent of the Rule was so clear to the
Court when it drafted the Revised Rules of Court that it
did not envision a possible contrary or adverse
interpretation or ambiguity in its implementation under the
phraseology used. It is incumbent upon Us to construe
the Rule in the spirit and intent it was conceived and in
harmony with pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
On the merits of the appeal —
1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the
prosecution consists solely of the testimony of the
offended party. Here We have the declaration of the
victim, who at the time of the incident was a little less
than 13 years of age, on the basis of which the trial court
found the charge of rape duly established. The
happenings are briefly summarized in the People's brief
as follows:
The offended party in this case is Margarita
Paleng who was born on November 20,
1952 (p. 3, t.s.n., Manipon). She is a native
of Balangabang Tublay, Mountain Province
(pp. 3, 12, Id.) At the time of the incident in
question on September 20, 1965,
complainant was temporarily boarding at a
house located at Pinsao Guisad Baguio
City, as she was then a first year high
school student at the Baguio Eastern High
School (pp. 3, 12, 20, Id.; p. 36, Estigoy).
On September 20, 1965, at about three
o'clock in the afternoon, she had just
arrived in the City from Tublay in a Dangwa
bus (p. 3, Manipon). Because it was then
raining and the bus was parked several
meters away from the bus station, she
waited inside the bus (pp. 3, 22, Id.). After
about three minutes of waiting, the accused
came and started molesting her by inquiring
her name and getting hold of her bag (pp.
4, 22-24, Id.). But she did not allow him to
hold her bag (p. 24, Id.). She called the
attention of the bus driver and the
conductor about the actuation of the
accused, but it seemed that the former
were also afraid of him (pp. 24-25, Id.).
Despite the rain, she left the bus and went
to ride in a jeep parked some 100 meters
away (pp. 4, 25, Id.). The accused closely
followed her (p. 4, Id.). When the jeep
started to go, the accused also rode and sat
beside her (p. 5, Id.).
When the jeep reached Guisad, she
alighted on the road but she still had to
negotiate a distance of ten meters (p.
5, Id.). The accused also alighted and again
he tried to carry her bag (p. 5, Id.). Although
he was not allowed to carry her bag, her
was adamant in following her (p. 5, Id.).
Reaching her boarding house, she opened
the door and was about to close it when the
accused dashed in and closed the door
behind him (pp. 31-32, Id.). When she
entered her room, the accused went in (p.
7, Id.). He pulled a dagger eight inches long
and threatened her: "If you will talk, 1 will
kill you". (p. 7, Id.). Margarita was stunned
into silence because of her fear (p. i Id.).
Thereupon, the accused held her hair with
his left hand and forced her Lo lie down in
bed (p. 7, Id.) He also placed his left hand
with a handkerchief in Margarita's mouth, at
the same time holding the dagger and her
neck with his right hand (pp. 7-8, Id.). She
was forcibly made to the down and, at this
moment, the accused removed the buttons
of his pants (p. 8, Id.). He then put down the
dagger on tile bed (p. 8, Id.). Her attempts
to extricate herself from the accused was to
no avail assile was only 4 ft. and 8 inches
tall and weighed about 95 to 100 pounds (p.
35, Id.) while the accused was 5 ft. and 7
inches tall and weighed about 126 pounds
(pp. 8, 59, Id.). He then held his penis (pp.
8. 36, Id.), used his thigh to separate the
legs of Margarita (p. 38, Id.). tried, but
failed. to remove her panty (p. 36, Id.). He
nonetheless guided his penis and inserted it
inside the vagina of the complainant after
prying open the part of her panty covering
her private parts (pp. 9, 36, Id.). Then he
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
the offended party (p. 9, Id.). Margarita lost
consciousness. When she recovered, he
was already gone (p. 9, Id.).
The following morning, her father came to
visit her. She confided to him the terrible
misfortune which befell her (pp. 9-10, Id.).
She was immediately brought to the Baguio
General Hospital where she was examined
(p. 10, Id.). Then they proceeded to the
Police Department. The Chief of Police
accompanied them to the Health Center
where she was again examined by Dr.
Perfecto O. Micu who thereafter submitted
his medical report (Exh. C; p. 3, rec.; pp.
11, 14-16, Id.). Margarita and her father
gave their respective statements before the
police authorities (Exh. B, pp, 5-6, rec.; p.
11, t.s.n.). She signed her criminal
complaint prepared by the Fiscal's Office of
Baguio (Exh. A; p. 1, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n. (pp.
2-4, Brief at p. 83, rollo
The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu was
called to the witness stand and he testified on the
physical examination conducted on the person of
Margarita Paleng on September 23, 1965 and his
findings as contained in the report were as follows:
1. Hymen-circular-stellate type with healing
lacerations at 6:00, 8:00, 9:00 and 11:00
o'clock positions in the face of a clock.
2. Contusions at the base of the hymen at
3:00 & 9:00 o'clock regions.
3. Vaginal Orifice - tight and hardly admits 2
fingers.
4. Vaginal wall — tight and vaginal folds are
prominent.
5. Vaginal smear — negative for
spermatozoa and for gram negative intra or
extra-cellular diplococci. (Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI
record)
Dr. Micu concluded that "defloration was recent". He
further declared that the condition of the hymen revealed
that Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the incident
complained of, and that the number of lacerations and
contusions at the base of the hymen indicated the degree
of force exerted to effect the sexual act. 14
For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita
were acquainted with each other since 1963, and there
were occasions when they rode together in a bus; that
the incident of September 20, 1965 inside the room of
Margarita was with the latter's consent, and in fact it was
the second time he had carnal knowledge with her, the
first time having occurred inside a shack; that he
promised Margarita that he would marry her, but to his
surprise, she filed the instant complaint against him. 15
2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent
reasons for discarding the findings of facts of the trial
court which were sustained by the Court of Appeals after
the latter had examined the evidence as a result of which
it certified the case to this Court.
Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the
complainant. But what possible motive could a thirteen-
year old girl barely in her teens have in fabricating a story
that could only bring down on her and her family shame
and humiliation and make her an object of gossip and
curiosity among her classmates and the people of her
hometown. It cannot be denied that a public trial involving
a crime of this nature subjects the victim to what can be a
harrowing experience of submitting to a physical
examination of her body, an investigation by police
authorities, appearance in court for the hearing where
she has to unravel lewd and hideous details of a painful
event which she would prefer to forget and leave it
unknown to others. If Margarita did forego all these and
preferred to face the cruel realities of the situation it was
due to her simple and natural instincts of speaking out
the truth.
The insinuation that this complaint was filed because
appellant had not married the girl although he promised
to marry her, is preposterous. On September 20, 1965,
Margarita was only twelve years and ten months old and
was not of marriageable age, hence, marriage was a
legal impossibility. And as regards appellant's testimony
that the complaint was instigated by the Chief of Police of
Tublay who was Margarita's uncle, the trial court did not
give credit to such a declaration.
Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that
Margarita had the opportunity to ask for help or attract
the attention of other people before she reached her
boarding house, she failed to do so. According to counsel
there were people at the Dangwa station, in the busy
streets, in the market place, in the jeepney parking place
where the girl took a jeep to proceed to the boarding
house, and in the neighboring houses the closest of
which was about 5 meters away, but no attempt was ever
made by complainant to seek help so as to prevent
appellant from molesting her. 16
Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was
well aware all the time from the moment she saw the
appellate inside the bus that the latter had intentions
of abusing or raping her. All that the appellant did inside
the bus was to hold her bag and she caged the attention
of the driver and the conductor to the impertinence of
appellant but the two did not do anything about it. 17 And
when Margarita walked from the bus to the jeepney
station, although she saw appellant walking behind her
she did not suspect that he was following her. To a
question propounded by His Honor whether she
suspected that appellant was following her, Margarita
answered: "No sir, I did not suspect." 18 All along
Margarita could not call the attention of the people in the
street or shout for help inasmuch as at that particular
moment the appellant was not doing anything against
her. And when Margarita reached the boarding house
there were no persons around 19 and in fact she went
straight to her room and it was at that particular moment
when appellant barged into the room before she could
close the door. In short, the Poor girl was simply taken by
surprise by the forced entrance of appellant who
immediately took out an 8-inch long dagger and said "If
you will talk I will kill you."
Persons can have different reactions to a situation like
that — some may manifest an aggressive or violent
attitude of confronting a molesting or impertinent fellow
while others, like 12-year old Margarita, may assume a
silent. fearful attitude.
Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not
offer any resistance to the acts of the accused at the time
the latter was allegedly forcing himself on her as shown
by the medical findings that there were no signs of extra-
genital injuries on the girl's body, and no blood stains on
her dress and underwear.
The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and
destroy the veracity of Margarita's straightforward and
positive declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old
farmer in the prime of his manhood, weighing 126 lbs and
five feet 21 and six inches tall,20 overpowered her and
succeeded in accomplishing the sexual act despite her
resistance. Margarita was less than 13 years of age, was
4' 8 " in height, and weighed around 95 lbs.21
In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need
but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired
result, all consideration of whether it was more or less
irresistible, is beside the point. 22
All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused
is sufficient for him to consummate his evil purpose.
In U.S. v. Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar situation. A
12 year old girl was sexually abused in the woods by a
man of superior physical strength. In holding the accused
Villarosa guilty of rape the Court held:
It is a doctrine well established by the
courts that in order to consider the
existence of the crime of rape it is not
necessary that the force employed in
accomplishing it be so great or of such
character as could not be resisted; it is only
necessary that the force used by the guilty
party be sufficient to consummate the
purpose which he had in view. (4 Phil. 434,
437 citing Judgment May 14, 1878,
Supreme Court of Spain. The Villarosa
doctrine has been followed in numerous
cases involving the crime of rape and one
 of the latest is People v. Equec, 1977, per
Justice Enrique Fernando, 70 SCRA 665.)
And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon
Aquino, the force or violence necessary in rape is
naturally a relative term, depending on the age, size, and
strength of the parties and their relation to each other. 23
Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on
the victim and the latter submits herself against her will
because of fear for her life and personal safety. In this
case of Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with a
dagger and with it threatened to kill the girl if she would
talk or scream for help. Her fear naturally weakened
whatever resistance Margarita could muster at the time
and as a result appellant was able to consummate his
coitus on the victim. 24
One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant,
Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who at the time of the trial in
1965 was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that
appellant voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test with
the National Bureau of Investigation and the report of the
lie detector examiner is in appellant's favor, that is, the
latter was telling the truth on the questions propounded to
him one of which was whether he forced Margarita
Paleng into having sexual intercourse with him and the
reply was "No". 25
On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and
conclusions meritorious and We quote from his decision
the following:
As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the
Court does not put much faith and credit on
it. It is well known that the same is not
conclusive. Its efficacy depends upon the
time, place and circumstances when taken
and the nature of the subject. If subject is
hard and the circumstances, as in this
instant, were not conducive to affect the
subject emotionally, the test will fail. The
subject had nothing more to fear because
the trial was over. He was not confronted by
the victim or other persons whom he had a
reason to fear. Naturally, his reaction to the
questions propounded was normal and
unaffected and the apparatus could not
detect it. (pp. 172-173, CFI record)
To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is
rape with the use of a deadly weapon with the
aggravating circumstance of having been committed in
the dwelling of the offended party. Although Margarita
was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her
room constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling"
as the term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code.
It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns
the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a
boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the
sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed
is death pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended. However, for lack of the necessary
number of votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to be
applied.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of
conviction of Amado Daniel for the crime of rape as
charged, and We sentence him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and order him to indemnify
Margarita Paleng by way of moral damages in the
amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and
pay the costs.
Decision Modified.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, J., concurs.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ.,
concur in the result on the merits.
Castro, C.J., Makasiar, Fernando and Fernandez, JJ.,
took no part.
Guerrero, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The phrase shall refrain from entering judgment thereon"
found in section 12 of Rule 124 and in section 34 of the
Judiciary Law means that the Court of Appeals should
not decide the case. The Court of Appeals has been
certifying to this Court criminal cases, wherein the
imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua without
rendering any judgment but merely expressing its opinion
that the penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneous
and that the imposable penalty is death or reclusion
perpetua. Invariably, this Court accepted those cases
and decided the same. This Court's jurisdiction in criminal
cases, as defined in the Constitution, cannot be
diminished but it can be enlarged.
Appealed criminal cases may be divided into three
classes: (1) those wherein the lower court imposed the
penalty of death or reclusion perpetua and which are
within this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction; (2)
criminal cases wherein the trial court imposed reclusion
temporal or a lesser penalty and which fall within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and (3)
criminal cases wherein the trial court imposed a penalty
of reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty but a Division of
the Court of Appeals, while in the process of deciding the
case, comes to the conclusion that the imposable penalty
is death or reclusion perpetua. That third class of criminal
cases should be elevated to this Court "for final
determination".
Reclusion perpetua was properly imposed in this case
upon the appellant who is a pedophiliac.
CASTRO, C.J., dissenting:
 1 judgment" in the inhibitory clause "shall refrain from
The preliminary issue at bar is: What is the correct
course of action that the Court of Appeals should take
when, in a criminal case properly appealed to it, that
court determines that the penalty of death or reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed instead
of the lesser penalty imposed by the court a quo? Should
it refrain from rendering judgment and forthwith certify the
case to the Supreme Court? Or should it render
judgment imposing what it considers as the proper
penalty (either life imprisonment or death) but refrain
from entering judgment and thereafter certify the case to
the Supreme Court?
At the center of scrutiny is the pertinent provision of
section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and
the Identical statement in the second paragraph of
section 12 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, both of
which read:
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to
a division [of the Court of Appeals] the said
division should be of the opinion that the
penalty of death or life imprisonment should
be imposed, the said court shall refrain from
entering judgment thereon and shall
forthwith certify the case to the Supreme
Court for final determination, as if the case
had been brought before it on appeal.
Justices Claudio Teehankee, Cecilia Munoz Palma and
Ramon C. Aquino interpret the phrase "entering
entering judgment" to mean "rendering judgment" or
"pronouncing judgment," arguing that [t]his can be the
only logical interpretation considering that the Court of
Appeals is without jurisdiction" to impose the penalties of
death and life imprisonment. They thus opt to maintain
the present practice1 of requiring no more than a
forwarding certification (embodying findings of fact
supporting the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed) by the Court of
Appeals for the purpose of placing such case within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
For the reasons hereunder stated, we consider their
interpretation unwarranted and therefore reject the
conclusion that it leads to.
2.
Section 34 of the amended Judiciary Act and the second
paragraph of section 12 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
must be construed in the light of the unequivocal
phraseology of paragraph (d), subsection (2), section 5 of
Article X of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final
 judgments and decrees of inferiors courts in
— jurisdiction over final judgments of inferior courts in
xxx xxx xxx
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death, life imprisonment;
Varying the language of this provision only to the extent
necessary to carry out its intention, the first subdivision of
the third paragraph of section 17 of the Judiciary Act
made exclusive the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, in the following words:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal as the law or
rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts as herein
provided in -
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for
which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment: ...
The constitutional mandate, given due statutory
acknowledgment, sets forth the pertinent appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. We accord capital
significance to the phrases "final judgments and decrees
of inferior courts and "the penalty imposed." These
phrases are crystal-clear. Read together with the
remainder of the provision, they state in precise and
unmistakable terms the sole intended inescapable
meaning that the Supreme Court shall have appellate
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or
life imprisonment. No hermeneutic expertise or exercise
can validly fashion some other meaning or intention.
3.
The constitutionally determined nature of the criminal
cases falling within the periphery of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court fixes our perspective,
defines and delimits our judicial prerogative in the
interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act, and
dictates the manner in which the law in question should
be read and made operative.
This being so, the clause enjoining the Court of Appeals
to "refrain from entering judgment" whenever it "should
be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed" cannot validly be
interpreted as a bar to that appellate court's "rendering
judgment." If the meaning given to the law by the minority
should prevail and the case is forwarded, as this case
before us was, to the Supreme Court on a bare
certification by the Court of Appeals, then we have the
unacceptable happenstance of an ordinary legislative act
upstaging the fundamental law, since, plainly, the
Supreme Court will be constrained to exercise its power
to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal" in
criminal cases where NO "final judgment" in which "the
penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment" has been
rendered or pronounced.
The minority view would thus result not only in an
unconstitutional imposition on the Supreme Court of
assumption of jurisdiction over a case that is beyond its
original appellate competence but would also compel
abandonment by the Court of Appeals of appellate
jurisdiction legally and duly vested in and acquired by it.
4.
Because sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act does not and cannot
have primacy or ascendancy over the Constitution, we
assert that the Court of appeals is legally empowered to
impose the penalties of death and life imprisonment. Four
basic and compelling considerations underlie our view.
First: There is no law — no law at all — that states such
prohibition in categorical terms. The minority view rests
solely on the strained interpretation foisted on the very
law under consideration — and this interpretation, as we
have said, is entirely unwarranted.
Second: In the case at hand, the Court of appeals duly
and legally assumed appellate jurisdiction over the
accused Amado Daniel's appeal from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Baguio sentencing him to suffer
a penalty less than life imprisonment. This cannot be
debated since section 29 of the Judiciary Act specifically
places such appeal within the Court of Appeals'
jurisdictional ambit with the statement that
The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all cases, actions,
and proceedings, not enumerated i section
seventeen of this Act, properly brought to it.
Thus, absent any constitutional or legal constraints, the
Court of Appeals should have rendered the proper
judgment in the case. For, verily, judicial jurisdiction is
"the power with which judges are invested for
administering Justice — that is, for trying civil or criminal
cases, or both, and deciding them and rendering
judgment, ..., 2 (emphasis supplied)
Third: Harking back to the Constitution, the Court of
Appeals, by unmistakable constitutional categorization, is
an "inferior court." And it is its judgments as such inferior
court which, so the Constitution plainly states, are the
subject of the Supreme Court's plenary power of review,
revision, reversal, modification or affirmance.
Fourth: Absurdity and incongruity should not be read into
the law so as to support the view that a panel of three
Justices of the Court of Appeals is denied the power to
impose the penalties of life imprisonment and death at
the same time that such power is recognized in a single
judge of a lower court of admittedly lesser category,
5.
The resulting conclusion that the Court of Appeals must
impose the proper penalty does not justify the
apprehension that the Supreme Court will be hampered
in the exercise of its jurisdiction because the findings of
fact made by the inferior appellate court "will have to be
respected." This stated procedural practice has never
been honored in the absolute. The ultimate function of
the Supreme Court is to render justice. And we need not
elaborate on or belabor the numerous occasions when,
to attain this objective, the Court shunted aside
technicalities to bare wide open the controversy and
inquire into each and every aspect, be it legal or factual
or a mixture of both.
And this is one perfect instance where the avowed ends
of justice must override practice and procedure, for, no
less than human life is at stake. And this would not be a
novelty. When a trial court's judgment imposing the death
penalty is elevated to this Court en consulta, we strip the
case into minutiae: fact by fact, detail by detail, facet by
facet. We see no reason why, when a decision imposing
the penalty of death or life imprisonment is rendered by
the Court of Appeals, the same manner of meticulous
inquiry should not be resorted to by the Supreme Court.
A sentence imposing death or life imprisonment is of the
self-same gravity, whichever is the sentencing tribunal.3
6.
It is rather obvious that the phrase "entering judgment" is
completely disparate from the term "rendering judgment."
There is no need to perambulate and meander the
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of
court need merely be read to perceive the strikingly sharp
antithesis between the two phrases. These sections read:
Section 1. Rendition of judgments. — All
judgments determining the merits of cases
shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it
[sic] is based, signed by him, and filed with
the clerk of the court.
Section 2. Entry of judgments and orders.—
If no appeal or motion for new trial is filed
within the time provided in these rules, the
judgment or order shall be entered by the
clerk. The recording of the judgment or
order in the book of entries of judgments
shall constitute its entry. The record shall
contain the dispositive part of the judgment
or order and shall be signed by the clerk,
with a certificate that such judgment or
order has become final and executory.
The word "enter" (which undeniably is the root of
"entering") with reference to judgments has acquired a
definite meaning in our procedure. There simply exists no
ambiguity to warrant embroiled interpretation. We need
not hammer out meaning from the word "entered." It is
there. Section 2, Rule 36 chisels out the legal import of
the word.4 To repeat and stress the Rule, "[t]he recording
of the judgment or order in the book of entries of
judgments shall constitute its entry. Upon the other hand,
the rendition of judgment is the judicial act of the writing
by the judge of the decision and the filing thereof with the
clerk of court. 5
Such being the precise acceptations of the terms
"entering judgment" and "rendering judgment," we see no
cogent reason why our indisputably learned lawmakers
should have written in the former when they meant the
latter. If, as the minority would have it, the intention was
just that, why then has not section 34 of the Judiciary Act
been accordingly amended, considering that the said Act
has been amended no less than ninety (90) times 6 since
its enactment thirty years ago in 1948?
The conclusion is thus ineluctable that section 34 of the
Judiciary Act means exactly what it says. (And its
intendment cannot and should not be altered through tile
expedient of palpably tortuous and torturous statutory
interpretation.) This rightly projects the limited character
of the said section — a procedural device designed to
effect and make effective the jurisdictions of both the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Read as
written, this section neither imposes nor curtails
constitutionally and legally established jurisdictions. The
Court of Appeals can and must render a decision and
impose the proper penalty of death or life imprisonment,
and, to effect the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
refrain from entering its judgment, and forthwith certify tile
case to the Supreme Court.
7.
Aside from according the respect that is due to the
Constitution and setting aright the import of section 34 of
tile Judiciary Act, our reading of the law will obviate
unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of
criminal cases between the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals. We advert to that portion of
the Ramos 7decision, cited with approval by Justice
Muñoz Palma, which states:
We are of the opinion and so hold,
therefore, that in a case like this, the Court
of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court,
must state its findings of fact necessary to
support its conclusion that the penalty to be
imposed is either life imprisonment or
death. While this Court will not review the
findings of fact, it will pass upon the
correctness of the legal conclusions derived
thereof And if this Court finds the
conclusions to be correct, it will assume
jurisdiction. If it finds then to be wrong the
case will be returned to the Court of
Appeals. (emphasis supplied)
We particularly and especially object to the return of the
ease to the Court of Appeals if the Supreme Court "finds"
the legal conclusions in the certification "to be wrong."
This incident will never come to pass if section 34 is
correctly construed — that is, as we construe it — for, the
Supreme Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case
from the very inception and can, without bothering the
Court of Appeals which has fully completed the exercise
of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.
8.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court directs that, henceforth,
should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that the
penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment)
should be imposed in any criminal case appealed to it
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less
than reclusion perpetua the said Court, with a
comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and
discussion of the law involved, render judgment
expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either
death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances
warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith
certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to
this Court for review.
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and
Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The phrase shall refrain from entering judgment thereon"
found in section 12 of Rule 124 and in section 34 of the
Judiciary Law means that the Court of Appeals should
not decide the case. The Court of Appeals has been
certifying to this Court criminal cases, wherein the
imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua without
rendering any judgment but merely expressing its opinion
that the penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneous
and that the imposable penalty is death or reclusion
perpetua. Invariably, this Court accepted those cases
and decided the same. This Court's jurisdiction in criminal
cases, as defined in the Constitution, cannot be
diminished but it can be enlarged.
Appealed criminal cases may be divided into three
classes: (1) those wherein the lower court imposed the
penalty of death or reclusion perpetua and which are
within this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction; (2)
criminal cases wherein the trial court imposed reclusion
temporal or a lesser penalty and which fall within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and (3)
criminal cases wherein the trial court imposed a penalty
of reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty but a Division of
the Court of Appeals, while in the process of deciding the
case, comes to the conclusion that the imposable penalty
is death or reclusion perpetua. That third class of criminal
cases should be elevated to this Court "for final
determination".
Reclusion perpetua was properly imposed in this case
upon the appellant who is a pedophiliac.
CASTRO, C.J., dissenting:
1
The preliminary issue at bar is: What is the correct
course of action that the Court of Appeals should take
when, in a criminal case properly appealed to it, that
court determines that the penalty of death or reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed instead
of the lesser penalty imposed by the court a quo? Should
it refrain from rendering judgment and forthwith certify the
case to the Supreme Court? Or should it render
judgment imposing what it considers as the proper
penalty (either life imprisonment or death) but refrain
from entering judgment and thereafter certify the case to
the Supreme Court?
At the center of scrutiny is the pertinent provision of
section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and
the Identical statement in the second paragraph of
section 12 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, both of
which read:
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to
a division [of the Court of Appeals] the said
division should be of the opinion that the
penalty of death or life imprisonment should
be imposed, the said court shall refrain from
entering judgment thereon and shall
forthwith certify the case to the Supreme
Court for final determination, as if the case
had been brought before it on appeal.
Justices Claudio Teehankee, Cecilia Munoz Palma and
Ramon C. Aquino interpret the phrase "entering
judgment" in the inhibitory clause "shall refrain from
entering judgment" to mean "rendering judgment" or
"pronouncing judgment," arguing that [t]his can be the
only logical interpretation considering that the Court of
Appeals is without jurisdiction" to impose the penalties of
death and life imprisonment. They thus opt to maintain
the present practice1 of requiring no more than a
forwarding certification (embodying findings of fact
supporting the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed) by the Court of
Appeals for the purpose of placing such case within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
For the reasons hereunder stated, we consider their
interpretation unwarranted and therefore reject the
conclusion that it leads to.
2.
Section 34 of the amended Judiciary Act and the second
paragraph of section 12 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
must be construed in the light of the unequivocal
phraseology of paragraph (d), subsection (2), section 5 of
Article X of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferiors courts in
—
xxx xxx xxx
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death, life imprisonment;
Varying the language of this provision only to the extent
necessary to carry out its intention, the first subdivision of
the third paragraph of section 17 of the Judiciary Act
made exclusive the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, in the following words:
 The Supreme Court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal as the law or
rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts as herein
provided in -
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for
which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment: ...
The constitutional mandate, given due statutory
acknowledgment, sets forth the pertinent appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. We accord capital
significance to the phrases "final judgments and decrees
of inferior courts and "the penalty imposed." These
phrases are crystal-clear. Read together with the
remainder of the provision, they state in precise and
unmistakable terms the sole intended inescapable
meaning that the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments of inferior courts in
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or
life imprisonment. No hermeneutic expertise or exercise
can validly fashion some other meaning or intention.
3.
The constitutionally determined nature of the criminal
cases falling within the periphery of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court fixes our perspective,
defines and delimits our judicial prerogative in the
interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act, and
dictates the manner in which the law in question should
be read and made operative.
This being so, the clause enjoining the Court of Appeals
to "refrain from entering judgment" whenever it "should
be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed" cannot validly be
interpreted as a bar to that appellate court's "rendering
judgment." If the meaning given to the law by the minority
should prevail and the case is forwarded, as this case
before us was, to the Supreme Court on a bare
certification by the Court of Appeals, then we have the
unacceptable happenstance of an ordinary legislative act
upstaging the fundamental law, since, plainly, the
Supreme Court will be constrained to exercise its power
to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal" in
criminal cases where NO "final judgment" in which "the
penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment" has been
rendered or pronounced.
The minority view would thus result not only in an
unconstitutional imposition on the Supreme Court of
assumption of jurisdiction over a case that is beyond its
original appellate competence but would also compel
abandonment by the Court of Appeals of appellate
jurisdiction legally and duly vested in and acquired by it.
4.
Because sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act does not and cannot
have primacy or ascendancy over the Constitution, we
assert that the Court of appeals is legally empowered to
impose the penalties of death and life imprisonment. Four
basic and compelling considerations underlie our view.
First: There is no law — no law at all — that states such
prohibition in categorical terms. The minority view rests
solely on the strained interpretation foisted on the very
law under consideration — and this interpretation, as we
have said, is entirely unwarranted.
Second: In the case at hand, the Court of appeals duly
and legally assumed appellate jurisdiction over the
accused Amado Daniel's appeal from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Baguio sentencing him to suffer
a penalty less than life imprisonment. This cannot be
debated since section 29 of the Judiciary Act specifically
places such appeal within the Court of Appeals'
jurisdictional ambit with the statement that
The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all cases, actions,
and proceedings, not enumerated i section
seventeen of this Act, properly brought to it.
Thus, absent any constitutional or legal constraints, the
Court of Appeals should have rendered the proper
judgment in the case. For, verily, judicial jurisdiction is
"the power with which judges are invested for
administering Justice — that is, for trying civil or criminal
cases, or both, and deciding them and rendering
judgment, ..., 2 (emphasis supplied)
Third: Harking back to the Constitution, the Court of
Appeals, by unmistakable constitutional categorization, is
an "inferior court." And it is its judgments as such inferior
court which, so the Constitution plainly states, are the
subject of the Supreme Court's plenary power of review,
revision, reversal, modification or affirmance.
Fourth: Absurdity and incongruity should not be read into
the law so as to support the view that a panel of three
Justices of the Court of Appeals is denied the power to
impose the penalties of life imprisonment and death at
the same time that such power is recognized in a single
judge of a lower court of admittedly lesser category,
5.
The resulting conclusion that the Court of Appeals must
impose the proper penalty does not justify the
apprehension that the Supreme Court will be hampered
in the exercise of its jurisdiction because the findings of
fact made by the inferior appellate court "will have to be
respected." This stated procedural practice has never
been honored in the absolute. The ultimate function of
the Supreme Court is to render justice. And we need not
elaborate on or belabor the numerous occasions when,
to attain this objective, the Court shunted aside
technicalities to bare wide open the controversy and
inquire into each and every aspect, be it legal or factual
or a mixture of both.
And this is one perfect instance where the avowed ends
of justice must override practice and procedure, for, no
less than human life is at stake. And this would not be a
novelty. When a trial court's judgment imposing the death
penalty is elevated to this Court en consulta, we strip the
case into minutiae: fact by fact, detail by detail, facet by
facet. We see no reason why, when a decision imposing
the penalty of death or life imprisonment is rendered by
the Court of Appeals, the same manner of meticulous
inquiry should not be resorted to by the Supreme Court.
A sentence imposing death or life imprisonment is of the
self-same gravity, whichever is the sentencing tribunal.3
6.
It is rather obvious that the phrase "entering judgment" is
completely disparate from the term "rendering judgment."
There is no need to perambulate and meander the
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of
court need merely be read to perceive the strikingly sharp
antithesis between the two phrases. These sections read:
Section 1. Rendition of judgments. — All
judgments determining the merits of cases
shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it
[sic] is based, signed by him, and filed with
the clerk of the court.
Section 2. Entry of judgments and orders.—
If no appeal or motion for new trial is filed
within the time provided in these rules, the
judgment or order shall be entered by the
clerk. The recording of the judgment or
order in the book of entries of judgments
shall constitute its entry. The record shall
contain the dispositive part of the judgment
or order and shall be signed by the clerk,
with a certificate that such judgment or
order has become final and executory.
The word "enter" (which undeniably is the root of
"entering") with reference to judgments has acquired a
definite meaning in our procedure. There simply exists no
ambiguity to warrant embroiled interpretation. We need
not hammer out meaning from the word "entered." It is
there. Section 2, Rule 36 chisels out the legal import of
the word.4 To repeat and stress the Rule, "[t]he recording
of the judgment or order in the book of entries of
judgments shall constitute its entry. Upon the other hand,
the rendition of judgment is the judicial act of the writing
by the judge of the decision and the filing thereof with the
clerk of court. 5
Such being the precise acceptations of the terms
"entering judgment" and "rendering judgment," we see no
cogent reason why our indisputably learned lawmakers
should have written in the former when they meant the
latter. If, as the minority would have it, the intention was
just that, why then has not section 34 of the Judiciary Act
been accordingly amended, considering that the said Act
has been amended no less than ninety (90) times 6 since
its enactment thirty years ago in 1948?
The conclusion is thus ineluctable that section 34 of the
Judiciary Act means exactly what it says. (And its
intendment cannot and should not be altered through tile
expedient of palpably tortuous and torturous statutory
interpretation.) This rightly projects the limited character
of the said section — a procedural device designed to
effect and make effective the jurisdictions of both the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Read as
written, this section neither imposes nor curtails
constitutionally and legally established jurisdictions. The
Court of Appeals can and must render a decision and
impose the proper penalty of death or life imprisonment,
and, to effect the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
refrain from entering its judgment, and forthwith certify tile
case to the Supreme Court.
7.
Aside from according the respect that is due to the
Constitution and setting aright the import of section 34 of
tile Judiciary Act, our reading of the law will obviate
unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of
criminal cases between the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals. We advert to that portion of
the Ramos 7decision, cited with approval by Justice
Muñoz Palma, which states:
We are of the opinion and so hold,
therefore, that in a case like this, the Court
of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court,
must state its findings of fact necessary to
support its conclusion that the penalty to be
imposed is either life imprisonment or
death. While this Court will not review the
findings of fact, it will pass upon the
correctness of the legal conclusions derived
thereof And if this Court finds the
conclusions to be correct, it will assume
jurisdiction. If it finds then to be wrong the
case will be returned to the Court of
Appeals. (emphasis supplied)
We particularly and especially object to the return of the
ease to the Court of Appeals if the Supreme Court "finds"
the legal conclusions in the certification "to be wrong."
This incident will never come to pass if section 34 is
correctly construed — that is, as we construe it — for, the
Supreme Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case
from the very inception and can, without bothering the
Court of Appeals which has fully completed the exercise
of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.
8.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court directs that, henceforth,
should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that the
penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment)
should be imposed in any criminal case appealed to it
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less
than reclusion perpetua the said Court, with a
comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and
discussion of the law involved, render judgment
expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either
death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances
warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith
certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to
this Court for review.
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and
Fernandez, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312 July 5, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUSTOM BERMAS y BETITO and GALMA
ARCILLA, accused-appellants.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On April 20, 1985 at around 8:30 in the evening, Catalino
Bellen, Arturo Abion, Teodoro Cas, Antonio Abion,
Renato Abion, Jesus Lotera and Expedito Bonaobra
were aboard their fishing boat Sagrada Familia tending to
their fishing nets when bursts of gunfire from a high-
powered automatic rifle shattered the air killing Catalino
Bellen and Teodoro Cas while mortally wounding Arturo
Abion. Renato Abion, Jesus Lotera and Expedito
Bonaobra sustained serious gunshot wounds which too
would have caused the deaths of Lotera and Bonaobra
had it not been for the intervention of timely medical
assistance.
For the crime, accused Rustom Bermas y Betito and one
John Doe were indicted for Multiple Murder with Multiple
Frustrated Murder in an
Information 1 alleging —
That on or about the 20th day of April 1985
at 8:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less,
at the sea of Barangay Namanday,
Municipality of Bacacay, Province of Albay,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with evident premeditation,
conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, with treachery, taking advantage of
nighttime, employing means to afford
impunity, with the use of high powered
firearms and with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously,
suddenly and unexpectedly attack, fire and
shoot with automatic firearms CATALINO
BELLEN, ARTURO ABION, TEODORO
CAS, ANTONIO ABION, RENATO ABION,
JESUS LUTERA and EXPEDITO
BONAOBRA while all the latter were on
board their fishing boat, "Sagrada Familia",
and tending their fishing net, thereby
causing the instantaneous death of
CATALINO BELLEN, ARTURO ABION,
and TEODORO CAS, and serious wounds
to ANTONIO ABION, RENATO ABION,
JESUS LOTERA and EXPEDITO
BONAOBRA, which injuries could have
caused the subsequent death of the
aforenamed four victims thereby accused
performing all the direct acts of execution
which could have produced the crime of
consummated murder insofar as the latter
named persons are concerned, but,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons
of timely and able medical assistance
rendered to them.1âwphi1.nêt
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, accused Rustom Bermas, assisted by
counsel de parte, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the
crime charged. 2 During the pre-trial scheduled on June
5, 1985, the prosecution and the defense stipulated —
1. That the defense admits the identity of
the accused;
2. That the defense admits the death of
Catalino Bellen, Arturo Abion and Teodoro
Cas at Namanday, Bacacay, Albay; and
that the cause of their deaths are gunshot
wounds (only for the fact of death);
3. That the other names of the victims
appearing in the information were also
present during the incident who also
sustained injuries as a result thereof;
4. That the accused has a brother by the
name of Sgt. Bonifacio Bermas;
The prosecution admitted: 1.) That the
affidavits which are all contained in the
records will be the basis of the testimonies,
except for some details;
2. That the middle name of Jose Abion and
the other Abions in the information is
Barrameda;
3. That it was a certain P.C. Constable
enlisted personnel Arcilla who had an
altercation with Santiago Abion, Jr. which
was in October 10;
4. That the accused is a Barangay
Councilman of Barangay Liwan, Rapu-rapu,
Province of Albay; and finally;
5. The prosecution admits that the accused
is an employee of the Asian for Generation
Resources. 3
During the course of the proceedings, the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal moved to amend the Information
claiming that the John Doe described therein strongly
shows that said person was CIC Galma Arcilla of the
255th PC Company stationed at Cale, Tiwi, Albay. 4 The
motion was granted by the trial court 5 which, however,
stressed that it would be without jurisdiction to try Arcilla
unless the quondam Minister of National Defense or the
President of the Philippines waives jurisdiction to have
the accused tried by a Military Tribunal and that they
agree to let the civil courts try him. 6 A copy of the order
together with the records was sent to the Judge Advocate
General's Office (JAGO) for appropriate action. 7
Trial, meanwhile, proceeded with regard to accused
Bermas. On September 25, 1986 8 the court a
quo rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, and finding the accused
RUSTOM BERMAS of Barangay Liguan,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER mentioned were deprived of
WITH MULTIPLE FRUSTRATED MURDER had the victim lived up to the
and ATTEMPTED MURDER, as charged age of sixty (60) years;
and as found during the trial, after a
painstaking scrutiny of all the evidences 3. The sum of SEVEN
presented, and considering all the attendant THOUSAND (P7,000.00)
circumstances, this court hereby sentences PESOS for funeral wake and
said accused to suffer the penalty burial expenses;
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the
accessories of the law. 4. The sum of TWENTY FIVE
THOUSAND (P25,000.00)
Said accused is further ordered to pay PESOS for and as moral
jointly and severally with whoever is found damages.
guilty as his co-principal in the commission
of the crime, the following: To the heirs of the late TEODORO CAS, namely: Antonia
Cas, widow and children: Maria Veronica, Weldy and
To the heirs of the late CATALINO Honey Bee:
BELLEN, namely Lydia Bellen, widow, and
children Mary Rose, Rey, Zenaida and 1. The sum of THIRTY
Queenie: THOUSAND (P30,000.00)
PESOS for and as indemnity
1. The sum of THIRTY for the death of the victim;
THOUSAND (P30,000.00)
PESOS for the death of 2. The sum of ONE
Catalino Bellen; HUNDRED THIRTY NINE
THOUSAND EIGHT
2. The sum of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX
HUNDRED EIGHTY TWO PESOS AND SEVENTY FIVE
THOUSAND SEVEN CENTAVOS (P139,836.75)
HUNDRED FIFTY consisting of the future
(P182,750.00) PESOS earnings which the heirs
consisting of the future mentioned were deprived of
earnings which the heirs
 had the victim lived up to the
age of sixty (60) years;
3. The sum of TWENTY FIVE
THOUSAND (P25,000.00)
PESOS for and as moral
damages;
4. The sum of SIXTEEN
THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED (P16,700.00) for
and as funeral wake and
burial expenses;
To the heirs of the late ARTURO ABION, namely Arsenia
Abion, widow and the children: Renato, Armando,
Antonio, Nestor and Rebecca:
1. The sum of THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00)
PESOS for and as civil
indemnity for the death of
Arturo Abion;
2. The sum of TWENTY FIVE
THOUSAND (P25,000.00)
PESOS for and as moral
damages;
3. The sum of NINETY ONE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY (P91,250.00) PESOS
consisting of the future
earnings which the heirs
mentioned were deprived of
had the victim lived up to the
age of sixty (60) years;
4. The sum of NINE
THOUSAND (P9,000.00)
PESOS for and as wake,
funeral and burial expenses;
To EXPEDITO BONAOBRA, the following:
1. The sum of TWO
THOUSAND (P2,000.00)
PESOS for and as medical
and hospitalization expenses;
2. The sum of FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS for and as moral
damages;
3. The sum of FOUR
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P4,500.00) PESOS for and
as unrealized earnings during
the period of his incapacity;
To JESUS LOTERA, the following:
1. The sum of TWO
THOUSAND (P2,000.00)
 PESOS for medical and
hospitalization expenses;
2. The sum of FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS for and as moral
damages;
3. The sum of FOUR
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P4,500.00) PESOS for
unrealized earnings during the
period of his incapacity;
To ANTONIO ABION, the following:
1. The sum of ONE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P1,500.00) PESOS for and
as medical and hospital
expenses;
2. The sum of THREE
THOUSAND (P3,000.00)
PESOS for and moral
damages;
3. The sum of THREE
THOUSAND (P3,000.00)
PESOS for and as unrealized
earnings during the period of
his incapacity.
Proportionate cost against accused Rustom
Bermas.
SO ORDERED. 9
Meanwhile, the JAGO sent a letter to the trial court dated
September 2, 1986 10 informing the latter that the waiver
of military jurisdiction over the person and the case of
accused Galma Arcilla as required under P.D. No. 1850,
as amended, was no longer necessary as said accused
had been discharged from military service effective
August 15, 1986 per Special Order No. 150 dated August
28, 1986 issued by the General Headquarters of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines. 11
Considering that Arcilla was indicted together with
Bermas with the amendment of the information
identifying him as Bermas' co-accused and that custody
over him was turned over to the trial court by the
Philippine Constabulary, Region V Command, 12 he was
thereafter arraigned and with the assistance of counsel
entered a plea of "Not guilty." 13
During the pre-trial on October 3, 1986, the accused and
the prosecution stipulated —
1. That Galma Arcilla was
once a member of the 255th
Philippine Constabulary
Company of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines
stationed at Cale, Tiwi, Albay;
 2. That on April 20, 1985 he
was still a member of the
255th PC Company;
3. That he knows Sgt. Rody
Madrilejos, the Supply Officer
of 255th PC Company
stationed at Cale, Tiwi, Albay;
and
4. That he knows his co-
accused Rustom Bermas and
a certain Expedito Bonaobra,
Barangay Captain of
Cawayan, Bacacay, Albay. 14
The case thereafter proceeded to trial. On November 20,
1989, the court a quo rendered judgment 15 against
accused Arcilla, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, and finding the accused
GALMA ARCILLA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
MULTIPLE MURDER WITH MULTIPLE
FRUSTRATED MURDER, as charged and
as found during the trial, after a painstaking
scrutiny of all evidences presented, and
considering all the attendant circumstances,
this Court hereby sentences said accused
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessories of the
law.
Said accused was further ordered to pay jointly and
severally with Rustom Bermas, who was earlier found
guilty of the charges and sentenced accordingly, the
monetary awards set forth in the earlier Decision dated
September 25, 1986. 16
Bermas and Arcilla thereafter interposed separate
appeals seeking the reversal of the trial court's judgment.
Bermas' appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 76414 while
Arcilla's was docketed as G.R. No. 94312. Upon motion
of the Solicitor General 17 the Court resolved to
consolidate the appeals per its Resolution dated January
28, 1991. 18
Insisting on his innocence, accused-appellant Galma
Arcilla alleges
that —
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE MASKED
COMPANION OF RUSTOM BERMAS
WHO FIRED THE ARMALITE RIFLE TO
THE VICTIMS (sic) WHO WERE THEN AT
SEA IN A BANCA (BASNIGAN) AT
NAMANDAY, BACACAY, ALBAY WAS NO
OTHER THAN ACCUSED GALMA
ARCILLA, DESPITE THE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES TO
IDENTIFY THAT GALMA ARCILLA IS THE
SAME MAN.
 II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE ARMALITE RIFLE
M-16 CAL. 5.56 OF THE ACCUSED WAS
USED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME ON APRIL 20, 1985.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE DEATH THREAT
MADE BY RUSTOM BERMAS, JAIME
VIBAL AND ANGEL DAYTO ON APRIL 4,
1985 TO THE ABION FAMILY . . .
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING WEIGHT TO THE BALLISTIC
REPORT B-146-85, EXHIBIT K, [WHICH
IS] FAVORABLE TO THE PROSECUTION,
AND WITH DISFAVOR TO THE ACCUSED
WHICH IS MARKED AS EXHIBIT 2 AND 2-
A.
V VIII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE OPEN
COURT TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESS SGT. RUDY MADRILEJOS
THAT HE SEIZED AND GOT THE
ARMALITE RIFLE M-16 CAL. 5.56 OF THE
ACCUSED FROM THE POSSESSION OF
SGT. NONITO LODOR.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONY
OF [THE] PROSECUTION REBUTTAL
WITNESS THAT RUSTOM BERMAS HAS
A BROTHER WHO IS A MILITARY MAN
WITH AN ARMALITE AND RUBEN
URSABIA WHO IS ALSO A MILITARY
MAN, [AND IS] A CONSTANT
COMPANION OF RUSTOM BERMAS.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
STATING THAT "IT IS ON RECORD THAT
CERTAIN INCIDENTS HAPPENED
LEADING TO THE FAMILY OF THE
ABIONS THE SUBJECT OF AN EXISTING
BAD BLOOD WITH THE ACCUSED,
GALMA ARCILLA . . .
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
STATING THAT "IT WAS CLEARLY
SHOWN DURING AND IMMEDIATELY
BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME WHEN THE ACCUSED HIMSELF
 ASKED THE INMATES OF THE BOAT,
BASNIGAN, THAT THEY WERE LOOKING
FOR SOMEBODY ELSE AND INQUIRING
AS TO WHO OWNS THE BASNIGAN IN
QUESTION: THAT WHEN HE WAS
INFORMED THAT IT WAS OWNED BY
JOSE ABION, THE OUTBURST OF
BULLETS FROM THE ARMALITE OF THE
ACCUSED COMMENCED INFLICTING
DEATHS (sic) AND INJURIES UPON THE
INMATES WHOSE NAMES WERE
MENTIONED EARLIES (sic) IN THIS
DECISION.
IX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STATING
THAT THE THRUST OF THE DEFENSE
OF THE ACCUSED IS AN ALIBI. 19
For his part, accused-appellant Rustom Bermas avers
that —
I — WITHOUT THE EVIDENCE AS
AGAINST THE APPELLANT AND
COMPANY TO THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD, THE TRIAL COURT FOUND
REVENGE OR ILL-FEELINGS AT THE
ABION FAMILY AS THE MOTIVE BEHIND
THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.
II — THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS
FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT WAS "A
CONSPIRATOR, A PRINCIPAL BY
INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION OR
EVEN BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION. 20
On the other hand, the Solicitor General recommends
that, save for the modifications that: a.] the accused-
appellants be meted penalties of reclusion perpetua for
each crime of murder and ten (10) years of Prision
Mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, for each
crime of frustrated murder and two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correcional, as
minimum to eight (8) years of Prision Mayor, as
maximum for attempted murder; and b.] the civil
indemnity should be increased to fifty thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos, the decisions dated September 25,
1986 and November 20, 1989 be affirmed in all other
respects. 21
The prosecution's version of the incident with regard to
accused Rustom Bermas's participation therein is
summed thus by the Solicitor General in the People's
brief 22 dated April 30, 1997:
On April 20, 1985, around 8:30 p.m., at the
sea of Namanday, Bacacay, Albay,
Expedito Bonaobra, barangay captain of
Cawayan, Bacacay, Albay, 23 together with
Arturo Abion, Catalino Bellen, Renato
Abion, Antonio Abion, Jesus Lotera and
Teodoro Cas were on board a fishing boat
(basnigan) named "Sagrada Familia"
owned by Jose Abion 24 They intended to
catch fish that night and brought with them
two (2) pressure gas lamps, a fishing net,
rope and a pole used for the net. 25
Subsequently, a small paddled boat (sibiran
or sibid-sibid) with two (2) men on board
approached the fishing boat.
The sibiran proceeded to the prow of the
fishing boat and went around it four (4)
times. 26 As the sibiran circled the fishing
boat the second time, Bonaobra and
Renato recognized appellant (Bermas) as
the one paddling the sibiran. 27 he was
wearing a denim (maong) jacket and denim
pants. 28 Thereupon, Bonaobra ordered
Arturo Abion to remove the shade of the
gas lamp so that they could recognize
appellant's campanion (sic). 29 After Arturo
removed the shade (pantalla),
the sibiran went around the fishing boat two
(2) more times. 30 Those notwithstanding,
appellant's (Bermas) companion could not
be recognized because his face was
covered with a mask and only his eyes
could be seen. Appellant's (Bermas)
companion was then wearing a blue long-
sleeved jacket and maong pants. 31
Bonaobra asked appellant if he and his
companion were going to catch fish
(magpadarao man kamo). Appellant
answered in the affirmative and told
Bonaobra that they were looking for
somebody. Appellant then asked Bonaobra
who owned the fishing boat and Bonaobra
informed him that Jose Abion owned it.
Thereafter, appellant and his companion
pretended to paddle away. When
the sibiran was about seven (7) meters
away from the fishing boat, appellant's
companion fired his Armalite rifle at
Bonaobra and his companions. They heard
two (20) volleys fired at them. 32 They lay
down but they could not avoid the attack.
The fishing boat was hit and so was one of
the pressure gas lamps. 33
After five (5) minutes, Arturo Abion,
Renato's father, said that one of them must
find a way to enable them to leave that
place. Renato crawled towards the prow of
the fishing boat and turned off the
remaining pressure gas lamp. He then
loosened the rope tied to the boat's anchor.
After that Renato lost
consciousness. 34 The fishing boat was
carried away by the currents of the sea
towards the shore of Galicia, Rapu-Rapu.
Jose, Rudy and Santiago Abion found them
the following morning. 35 Arturo Abion and
Catalino Bellen were already dead while
Antonio Abion, Renato Abion, Jesus Lotera
and Bonaobra were seriously
wounded. 36 The body of Teodoro Cas was The autopsy conducted by Dr. Evelyn A.
missing. Amador, Municipal Health Officer, Bacacay,
Albay, on the bodies of Arturo Abion,
Rudy and Jose transferred those injured to Catalino Bellen and Teodoro Cas revealed
a kumpit, a small basnigan or fishing boat the following:
run by motor while Santiago was left with
the dead bodies of Arturo and Bellen. Rudy Arturo Abion
and Jose maneuvered the kumpit to
Bacacay, Albay where they brought those Date, time and place of autopsy:
injured to [the] Albay Provincial
Hospital. 37 On their way to Bacacay, Albay, April 22, 1985; 10:30 A.M., INP Compound,
Jose asked Bonaobra who shot them and Bacacay, Albay.
he answered that it was appellant (Bermas)
and a companion. Upon their arrival at the Findings:
shore of Bacacay, Albay, Rudy also asked
Bonaobra who shot them. Bonaobra told Ext
him that they had been shot by appellant ern
(Bermas) and a companion. 38 al:
1.
Santiago Abion brought the fishing boat to Bo
Sitio Cagbulacao where Station dy
Commander Saliao took the bodies of wit
Arturo and Bellen for autopsy. When h
Station Commander Saliao left, Santiago sig
emptied the fishing boat of sea water. In the ns
process, he found two (2) slugs inside the of
fishing boat, one already deformed and the de
other still round in shape. He took the slugs co
and gave it to his brother Jose five (5) days mp
later. Jose in turn brought the two (2) slugs osi
to the police station. The body of Teodoro tio
Cas was found on April 23, 1895 (sic) in n
Guinangayan, Albay. 39
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Date, time and place of autopsy: ns
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s
pro April 24, 1985, 6:00 A.M., INP, Bacacay
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S
e Dr. Cesar Ong Chua, resident physician at the Albay
v Provincial Hospital, Legaspi City treated the injuries of
e Bonaobra, Renato, Jesus and Antonio. The medical
r certificates he issued to these persons stated the
e following findings:
b
r Antonio Abion
a
i Gunshot wound
n
i — macerated around 5 x 6
n cm., P3rd Right leg, posterior
j aspect.
u
r
 — multiple abrasion ranging
from 2-4 cm., P3rd, right
thigh, posterior aspect.
Operations:
— Debridement and ligation
of bleeder
(Record, p. 218)
Expedito Bonaobra
Gunshot wound
— macerated wound, 4 x 6
cm. right shoulder
— fracture, acromias, right
shoulder
— A-C separation, right
shoulder.
(Record, p. 214)
Renato Abion
Gunshot wound
— lacerated wound, 2 cm., 2 cm., lateral to
the sternal border, 5th ICS, with skin
blasting ranging from 0.5 to 1 cm. anterior
chest.
— P.O. entry – 2 cm., P3rd, left forearm,
anterior aspect.
— P.O. exit – 4 x 4 cm., P3rd, posterior-
lateral aspect, left forearm.
— macerated wound 4 x 5 cm. bone deep
and massive tissue injury, right hand
dorsum.
— lacerated wound, 2 x 1 cm.
(Record, p. 219)
Jesus Lotera
Gunshot wound
— point of entry – 1cm. D3rd, lateral
aspect, left thigh.
— point of exit 7 x 4 cm., D3rd, posterior
aspect, left thigh
— lacerated wound 8 x 4 cm., P3d, left
thigh, posterior aspect.
Operations:
Debridement and ligation of bleeders.
(Record, p. 219)
Dr. Chua testified that the injuries inflicted
on Bonaobra, Antonio and Jesus would
have caused their death without timely
medical attention, while those inflicted on
Renato would not have killed him even
without timely medical intervention. 40
Vicente R. De Vera, a ballistician of the
Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory
Service, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
declared that an examination of [the]
Armalite rifle M16 with serial number
3265859 41 and two (2) fired bullets,
recovered from the fishing boat marked as
T and T-1, shows that the bullets were fired
from said rifle. 42 Sgt. Rudy Madrilejos, a
supply sargeant of 255 PC Company
Station at Calo, Tiwi, Albay, testified that a
rifle caliber 5.56 mm m16 with serial
number 3265859 had been issued to
Galma Arcilla. 43
Santiago Abion testified that on October 13,
1984, he and his wife Nelly went to a public
dance at Namanday, Bacacay, Albay. He
saw appellant (Bermas), Arcilla and Ruben
Ursabin drinking gin about five arms length
away. 44 He and his wife went home at
about 9:30 o'clock p.m. the following day, at
apimd (sic) 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
Daniel Abion went to Santiago's house
Daniel warned Santiago that he was being
suspected by Arcilla as the person who had
mauled him. However, Daniel admitted that
he was the one who mauled Arcilla after the
latter had beaten up Leopoldo. 45
On October 15, 1984, Santiago went to the
house of his brother Rudy. 46 Rudy was not
there as he was selling fish. 47 Suddenly,
six (6) armed men barged into Santiago's
house and asked Nelly, who was then
pregnant, the whereabouts of her husband.
According to Santiago, he saw the armed
men, because he peeped through the
window of Rudy's house. He also
recognized one of the armed as Ruben
Ursabin. Santiago's wife, Nelly was so
scared that she suffered a miscarriage. 48
On April 4, 1985, at around 8:30 o'clock
p.m., Santiago bought cigarettes from the
store of Asterio Bellen. On his way home,
he saw appellant (Bermas), Angel Daybo
and Jaime Sibal. He passed by his cousin's
house. Salvador Abion called him and
asked for a cigarette. Later appellant
(Bermas), Daybo and Sibal entered the
house of Salvador. Appellant pounded his
palm on the table, hit the wall, pointed his
finger at Santiago and uttered "babalonan
co an mga baraca pag oli co" (I will bring
the baraca when I go home). "Baraca" is
the appellation of the Abion family. 49
The People's account with regard to accused Galma
Arcilla's participation in the incident, which was dubbed
as the "Namanday Massacre," 50 is identical with the
above-quoted factual narrative.
Additionally, in the appellee's brief dated September 3,
1993, 51 the prosecution narrated —
. . . that sometime in October 1984, while
appellant was drinking with Rustom
Bermas, Ruben Ursabia and Angel Dayto
inside the dance hall of Namanday,
Bacacay, Albay, appellant was involved in a
fistfight, where he boxed Leopoldo Abion on
the chest. 52 When Leopoldo Abion's
brother Daniel Abion, arrived, appellant
went out of the dance hall. 53 Daniel Abion,
however, was able to hit appellant on the
face with a piece of
wood. 54
Santiago Abion corroborated the testimony
of Renato Abion that on October 13, 1984,
at about 8:30 p.m., appellant, Rustom
Bermas and Ruben Ursabia were drinking
inside the dance hall of Namanday,
Bacacay,
Albay. 55 Santiago Abion further testified
that: a) on October 14, 1984, at about 2:00
p.m., Ruben Ursabia and five other armed
persons who were looking for him (Santiago
Abion) went to his house, but they did not
find him there because he was at the
nearby house of his brother; b) on April 4,
1985, at about 8:30 p.m., when Santiago
Abion was at the door of the house of his
cousin, Salvador Abion, Rustom Bermas
pounded on a table and said to Santiago
Abion "Balunon co an mga baraka sa pag-
uli co" (I will bring home the baraka), the
baraka being the death threat to the Abion
family; 56 and c) a day after the "Namanday
Massacre", or on April 21, 1985, Santiago
Abion found two (2) slugs inside the fishing
boat, "Sagrada Familia", which were
submitted to the police authorities for
examination. 57
xxx xxx xxx
Sgt. Rudy Madrilejos testified that on
February 14, 1985, he issued to appellant
an Armalite rifle, which is particularly
described as rifle caliber 5.56 MM M16 with
Serial Number 3265859. 58 Sgt. Rudy
Madrilejos further testified that when he
was ordered by the Provincial headquarters
of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) to bring
back said Armalite rifle for ballistic
examination, he got it from Sgt. Nonito
Lodor on April 2, 22 or 23, 1985. 59
Cpl. Teodoro Berango testified that the investigation
conducted by the military on the "Namanday Massacre"
found appellant as the principal suspect of the
crime. 60 Cpl. Berango then requested the Provincial
Commander to recall the Armalite rifle issued to
appellant. 61 In the course of the investigation, Cpl.
Berango was informed that appellant and Rustom
Bermas had a drinking spree on April 20, 1985 at Liguan,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay, which is only two (2) kilometers away
from Namanday, Bacacay, Albay. 62
Gracia Dagcel testified that sometime in April 1989, one
Capt. Mapalo and other persons went to her house at
Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay to apprehend her for illegal
possession of firearms; on that occasion appellant, then
a constable in the Philippine Constabulary, wore a
mask." 63
The accused-appellants, on the other hand, presented a
contrasting picture.
Accused-appellant Galma Arcilla insists, in sum, that he
was some place else at the time of the commission of the
crime.
He testified that he is a resident of Malilipot, Albay and
was a member of the 255th PC Company stationed at
Cale, Tiwi, Albay where he held the position of Assistant
Detachment Commander of the Pamal Checkpoint at
Tiwi. 64 As a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), he was issued an Armalite M-16, Cal.
5.56 automatic rifle 65 by the Philippine Constabulary
(PC) through Sgt. Rudy Madrilejos. 66 At the time of the
incident, his rifle was in the possession of Sgt. Nonito
Lodor, Commander of the Intelligence Operations Post
(IOP) Detachment at Capantagan, Tiwi, Albay 67 to whom
he usually entrusts it whenever he goes home to see his
family. 68 It was in the possession of Lodor on the said
date because on April 17, 1985, he went home upon
being informed by the uncle of his wife that his wife was
sick 69 and stayed there up to April 24, 1985. 70
At the time of the commission of the felony on April 20,
1985 and at about 8:00 p.m., he was at his house in
Santicon, San Antonio, Malilipot, Albay, drinking with his
friends Benito Bobiles, Filoteo Bobiles, and Florencio
Berchez who came to his house bringing with them three
(3) round bottles of gin and chicken 71 to commemorate
the death anniversary of Benito Bobiles' father. They
celebrated the occasion at Arcilla's house instead of the
Bobiles residence because Arcilla's wife was sick with flu
and fever at that time and Arcilla could not leave because
he had to tend to her as well as the household chores. 72
They started drinking at 6:00 p.m. and ended at 11:00
p.m. 73 Arcilla subsequently sent his brother-in-law to buy
two (2) more bottles of gin after they consumed the three
(3) brought by Benito, Filoteo and Florencio. 74 During the
drinking session, the only times Arcilla and his
companions went out were those times when they had to
attend to their personal needs. 75 After the drinking
session ended at 11:00 p.m., Arcilla's visitors went home
while Arcilla himself never went out after they finished
drinking because he went to bed. 76
Rustom Bermas, who is employed as a "spotter" working
eight-hour shifts at a local mining firm and a councilman
of Barangay Liguan 77 had a similar story to tell.
As gleaned from his testimony and that of his co-
witnesses Manuel Balbastro, Vicente Bonaobra and Jose
Belir, on April 20, 1984, he was already working at 7:00
a.m. having reported for work at 6:00 a.m. 78 At the end
of his work shift, he and his co-workers
dispersed. 79 Outside the workplace, he met with Manuel
Balbastro, Vicente Bonaobra, Nestor Semeniano and
Jose Belir. 80
Upon meeting, the group decided to drink 81 with each of
them initially pitching in to buy liquor. 82 They started
drinking at past 5:00 p.m. 83 at Bermas' house. 84 They
left Bermas' house at past 7:00 p.m. after consuming two
(2) bottles of gin 85 and proceeded to the store of Solano
Mecaller where they stayed up to 9:00 p.m. 86 At the
Mecaller store, they consumed one (1) flat bottle (lapad)
of Andy Player whisky. 87 From the Mecaller store, they
proceeded to a boat or sampan which was docked at the
pantalan or pier 88 where they consumed one (1) "long
neck" of Andy Player whisky. 89 While they were at the
sampan nobody went out to buy liquor because they
bought what they consumed at the Mecaller
store. 90 They stayed there up to past 1:00 a.m. after
which they parted ways. 91
In fine, accused-appellant Galma Arcilla insists he is
innocent because: 1.] none of the twelve (12) prosecution
witnesses identified him as the masked man who fired at
the victims; 2.] the automatic rifle used in the felony is not
the firearm issued to him; 3.] he was not in possession of
the rifle at the time of the commission of the crime; 4.]
Rustom Bermas together with Jaime Vibal and Angel
Dayto threatened the Abion Family with death before the
commission of the crime; 5.] Rustom Bermas has a
brother who is a member of the PC as well as a constant
companion who are both PC soldiers similarly armed with
automatic Armalite rifles and such firearms could have
been the ones used by Bermas and his masked
companion in the perpetration of the felony.
We disagree.
That indeed the prosecution witnesses may not have
identified the masked man who fired the automatic rifle at
the victims is of no moment. Well-settled is the rule that
direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the
only matrix whence a trial court may draw its conclusions
and findings of
guilt. 92
The evidence is replete with enough proven details to
sustain the guilt of accused-appellant Galma Arcilla at the
very least on the basis of circumstantial evidence. The
totality of such evidence would be sufficient if: a.] there is
more than one circumstance; b.] the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been established; and c.] the
combination of all these circumstances is such as to
warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 93 A
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence
can be sustained when the circumstances proven form
an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the malefactor. These circumstances proven
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of
guilt. 94
Assaying the facts against the foregoing legal yardsticks,
We defer to exhaustive findings of the trial court which
pointedly observed that:
It is on record that certain incidents
happened leading to the family of the
Abions the subject of an existing bad blood
with the accused, Galma Arcilla, viz:
a) A fist fight during a dance
at Namanday on October 13,
1985 where accused Galma
Arcilla was the aggressor and
Leopoldo Abion was
subjected to fist blows by him
hitting the latter on his chest,
this writhing in pain and sitting
on a corner of the dance hall
at Namanday when moments
later, the brother of Leopoldo,
Daniel Abion, arrived and hit
Galma Arcilla with a piece of
wood; thus, an even situation
transpired that accused
Galma Arcilla kept on looking
for an opportunity of revenge
against the Abions. After
Daniel left, Rustom Bermas,
the usual confederate and
companion of the accused,
arrived for the purpose of
getting even with the Abions,
but luckily nothing happened
because Daniel had left
already;
b) The apparent show of bad
blood with the Abions when
on October 14, 1985, Galma
Arcilla was with a group of
men forced open the window
of the house of Santiago
Abion with the use of the tip of
a gun, looking for the latter,
thus his wife got scared and
was hospitalized. This
incident was reported to the
PC-INP of Bacacay, Albay,
showing the abuses of these
men in uniform including the
accused in this case;
c) The accused, being a PC
enlisted man and with
authority to possess firearm, a
healthy and well-built fellow in
the prime of his life, will never
allow himself to be outdone
and controlled by anybody,
such as this simple family of
fishermen of the same
barangay as the accused;
 d) At the precise moment of
the multiple killing and
frustrated murder with the use
of an Armalite rifle, the
accused availing of the mantle
of darkness, masking himself
beyond recognition and
looking for his prey, the family
with whom he entertained
rancor and grudge for the
purpose of revenge, thus
accused himself, before firing,
asserted for himself that
indeed the subject of his prey
the Abions were there, thus
the moment of truth
happened.
The accused made manifest that they were
looking for someone else and asked for the
owner of the "basnigan"; that when
informed that the same is owned by Jose
Abion, the family they were looking for,
without delay, the burst of fire was made
upon the helpless fishermen consisting
mostly of the persons coming from the said
Abion clan, leading to the multiple killing of
three men, namely Catalino Bellen, Arturo
Abion and Teodoro Cas as shown by their
respective autopsy reports, Exhibits "F," "G,
and "H," and injuries to four persons,
namely Antonio Abion, Jesus Lotera,
Renato Abion and Expedito Bonaobra
where all were medically attended to as
shown by their respective medical
certificates, Exhibits "Q," "R," "P" and "O''.
The treacherous killing of the three victims
and four who were seriously injured are
indeed the physical evidence constituting
this case.
Physical evidence is the
highest order which speaks
more eloquently than all
witnesses put together, Pp. v.
Bardaje, 99 SCRA 3881; Pp.
v. Caudillo, GR 45266, Nov.
24, 1988.
In all these incidents, the two accused were
always seen together. No iota of doubt
prevails that the same masked man during
the night of April 20, 1984, the person who
fired the armalite rifle was no other than
Galma Arcilla, the owner of the armalite
ballistically examined, a trained
sharpshooter being a member of the PC
Command, responsible for the commission
of the crime of murder charged.
The Court noted that the maximum
efficiency of the result when the volley of
fire coming from accused's armalite rifle
when fired was no doubt due to his
efficiency in handling guns, being properly
oriented in the use of his rifle as a PC
enlisted man, which accused himself
admitted in his testimonies. This is proven
by the fact that for his volley of fire made
during the commission of the crime, it
resulted to three deaths and four seriously
injured.
The ballistician, Vicente de Vera, Chief
Ballistician of the PC-INP, clearly testified
that the two bullet slugs subjected for
ballistic examination were indeed fired from
no other armalite rifle, except the M-16 rifle,
Caliber .223 with serial number 3265859,
the very weapon issued to Galma Arcilla, as
shown by the records of the PC and
specifically testified to by Sgt. Rodolfo
Madrilejos.
The gun was issued to Galma Arcilla as
testified to by Sgt. Despabiladeras and Sgt.
Madrilejos as supported by the records of
the office. From the time the gun in
question was placed in his custody for
purposes of the ballistic examination, the
same was well handled, kept and taken
care of until the result was released. He
took the gun and kept it without anybody
having access to it until it was delivered to
Col. Averilla.
Moreover, Sgt. Despabiladeras, custodian
of the rifle, testified that replacement of the
parts of the gun could not have been made
while the same was in his custody.
Furthermore, he testified clearly that the
specimens in question were taken care of
carefully until it was delivered to Col.
Averilla for ballistic examination.
It should be noted that there was no other
suspect to the supposed killing, thus there
was no evidence shown by the accused
that other persons were interested in the
suppression of evidence or passing the
buck to him as a scapegoat to the
perpetration of the heinous offense
charged.
Sgt. Rodolfo Madrilejos emphatically
declared that Armalite rifle M-16, Serial No.
3265859 is the very rifle as a whole issued
to the accused and the same parts are all
intact; that the gun was never fired after
retrieved and taken from Sgt. Lodor. And
furthermore, the ammunitions which the
accused alleged to have been kept in a
locker were never produced when
demanded; the pretext of an alleged
encounter that happened in Bantayan,
Tabaco, where these ammunitions were
used appears a hoax for said encounter
never existed as a fact for there were no
dissident harassments in the area in the
year 1984. All these facts weakened the
defense of the accused more specifically as
to its credibility.
On the date in question, April 20, 1984, the
accused Galma Arcilla, then a PC enlisted
man, was on leave as admitted by him. An
alibi was presented that he was in his
barangay, San Antonio, Santicon, Malilipot,
Albay, instead of Namanday, Bacacay,
Albay where the crime was committed. No
impossibility for him to go to Namanday
was shown on the records and more so
because alibi is a weak
offense.1âwphi1.nêt
Emphatic denial of accused Galma Arcilla
on his being at the place of the commission
of the offense at Namanday was made and
putting as alibi that he was at San Antonio,
Santicon, Malilipot, Albay, attending to his
sick wife. This fact was vouched and
testified to by his neighbor friends, Benito
Bobiles and Florentino Berchez, likewise
residents of San Antonio, Santicon,
Malilipot, Albay. The accused denied the
charge, claiming that on the 20th day of
April 1985, he was at his headquarters and
that specifically from 6:00 o'clock to 11:00
o'clock in the evening of said date, he was
hosting a drinking party at his house with
several friends, such that it would be
impossible for him to be at Namanday,
Bacacay, Albay. In fine, the defense is alibi,
not being at the place of the commission of
the offense but at such other place. He has
not shown proofs that it would be physically
impossible for him to be at the place of
Namanday where the offense was
committed. Namanday, Bacacay, Albay and
San Antonio, Santicon, Malilipot, Albay
could be traveled by a motorboat easily
within a few hours, if need be. His claim to
be at the headquarters on that date is
belied by the record for he left the camp on
April 17, 1985 and only to return to his
place of work at Cale, Tiwi, Albay, so that
on April 20, 1985, he was then set free to
go to any place of his own accord.
He alleged that he could not have inflicted
such heinous crime as charged because
there was no motive nor existing
misunderstanding between him and the
victims. The records as shown above
abound on the fact that an existing bad
blood harbored by the accused Galma
Arcilla against the family of the Abions were
clearly shown and proven by the evidence.
It was clearly shown during and
immediately before the commission of the
crime when the accused himself asked the
inmates on the boat, a "basnigan," that they
were looking for somebody else and
inquiring further as to who owns the
"basnigan" in question; that when he was
informed that it was owned by Jose Abion,
the outburst of bullets from the armalite of
the accused commenced inflicting deaths
(sic) and injuries upon the inmates whose
names were mentioned earlier in this
decision.
As to the firearm in question, he denied that
Armalite rifle M-16, Caliber .223 is not the
gun issued to him. He alleged that Armalite
Caliber 5.56 with a different serial number
was the very rifle under his custody. This
fact was belied by the testimony of the
issuing officer and by the records that what
was indeed issued to the accused Galma
Arcilla, in this respect, is the former
described gun, rather than Caliber 5.56.
It is amazing to note that the accused,
before leaving the camp on April 17, 1985,
entrusted the gun in question to Sgt. Nonito
Lodor, at the latter's house at Capantagan,
Cale, Tiwi, Albay, rather than at the
headquarters which is but a distance of
about a few meters, more or less, to his
place of work. The headquarters of the
255th PC Company where said rifle could
have been kept and/or entrusted would be
a safer place aside from it being secured
and in consonance with military
requirement. This was not well explained by
the accused why instead of leaving said
rifle at the proper office, the headquarters of
the 255th PC Company, the same was
entrusted to Sgt. Nonito Lodor, in the
latter's house.
Again, his leaving his armalite rifle to Sgt.
Nonito Lodor in the latter's house with a
distance of over five (5) kilometers from his
detachment office in Capantagan,
compared to the distance of the 255th PC
Command Headquarters in Cale, Tiwi,
Albay, of only over 100 meters is a matter
which the accused failed to explain to the
satisfaction of the Court. Military regulations
dictate that firearms as the gun in this
instance should be placed more safely with
the duly authorized enlisted men of the
command in taking custody of the rifles in
the headquarters, rather than entrusting it
to anyone to be kept in a private house, as
what the accused had done in this instance
when he allegedly left the gun in the house
of Sgt. Lodor.
It is perplexing to note that per accused
testimony, it was Sgt. Nonito Lodor himself
who informed him for the first time that
accused was a suspect in this crime and
that the armalite rifle issued to him was the
one involved during the shooting. If it is
true, as alleged by Galma Arcilla, that same
gun was deposited and was in the custody
of Sgt. Lodor, the latter would not confront
him as now testified to by accused.
On the 375 ammunitions borne out by the
records to have been issued to the
accused, the latter was only able to return
191 of said ammunitions; thus, 184 were
missing. He attributed the missing 184
ammunitions to an alleged encounter with
dissidents at Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay,
which was not borne out by the records of
his command, nor supported by witnesses
coming from the 255th PC Company as to
the existence of said encounter with the
dissidents. The accused at first, claimed
that the 184 missing ammunitions were said
to be left in a house and promised to return
the same, but he failed to do so.
The records also show that the said
ammunitions were left in a locker, supposed
to be returned to the issuing officer when
required, but said accused failed to account
for the same. Again, the version of the use
of the ammunitions with an encounter with
the dissidents is mysteriously put up. There
is thus, therefore, a suspicion logical
enough that the missing ammunitions were
indeed used in the commission of the crime
adverted to.
The accused further maintained that some
parts of the armalite rifle issued to him,
such as the stock group and the handguard
were replaced by other parts coming from a
different armalite for the purpose of
tampering the evidence leading to his
involvement in the crime at issue. But he
failed to show or present any person
interested for that matter. Moreover, the
same had been disproved by the officer
entrusted with the custody of the armalite
rifle, as well as its ammunitions when the
same were recalled for ballistic
examination.
The claim that the barrel receiver group of
the gun in question is replaced on the
pretext of an alleged hole on his gun issued
to him and a detachable red cloth attached
to the tip of said firearm are matters hard to
believe. Accused Galma could not pinpoint
to anyone else responsible for the
insertions and/or replacement of the stock
group of his gun to the barrel receiver of
another, if only to implicate him of the
crime.
This defense is elaborate, well
orchestrated scheme and
designed to exculpate an
accused which is deserving of
no credence, Pp. v.
Magdaraog, GR-40988, April
15, 1988.
Accused claimed that he could not commit
such crime of which he is being charged
because he is receiving sufficient salary as
a PC enlisted man of P2,000.00 or even
more per month, is beside the issue in this
case. The Court cannot agree with this
reasoning that because he is financially
well-off, he could not have committed the
crime of which he is present charged.
He was evasive to mention the fact having
gone to the place where the incident in
question happened, such as in Namanday,
Bacacay, Albay or Liguan, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay, thus, testifying in his defense that his
residence is in Sabang, Legazpi City,
which, upon his marriage, he transferred to
San Antonio Santicon, Malilipot, Albay; that
he had never gone to Liguan, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay, except once in 1982. This pretension
was disproved by abundant evidence on
the part of the prosecution that the accused
had been seen before, during and after the
incident in question at Liguan, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay with his co-accused and other
companions drinking liquor at the same
place. He even led a raiding party for the
purpose of serving a search warrant to the
family of Gracia Estevez Dagcel. In all
these pretentions, the Court ultimately
found that the accused had committed
abundant falsities in his claim to exculpate
himself as shown by his perjured
testimonies in Court under oath. It should
be relevant to note that the person who
actually was responsible in the firing was
one of the same build, height and physic as
Rustom Bermas, a man who was in
"maong" pants but with a vest and a mask
purposely made so as not to have himself
identified. The same incident was repeated
when the accused guided a raiding party for
the purpose of serving a search warrant
when he was again using the same mask
and vest for himself, but later on unveiled
himself to be identified as the present
Galma Arcilla in this case. The saying goes
that crime does not pay which, in this
instance, may be relevant and worthwhile
repeating with respect to the actuations of
the accused hereof.
He alleged that despite the party held in
San Antonio Santicon, Malilipot, Albay in
the afternoon of April 20, 1985 in memory
of the death anniversary of Benito Bobiles'
father who died many years ago and which
was being held at the latter's house,
accused transferred the venue of said party
from Benito's residence to his house, if only
to accommodate him. This is far from the
accepted norm prevailing in this locality as
the Court may judicially notice.
His pretentions not having gone to Liguan,
Rapu-Rapu for a long, long time, except
once in 1982 and no longer thereafter, his
denial of having any relative in said place,
his having not known the family of Rustom
Bermas, his co-accused, were all belied by
witnesses who testified to have seen him in
Liguan many times, as well as Solomon
Arcilla being a close relative of his in Liguan
and that most of the time, he was with
Rustom Bermas, his co-accused, before,
during and after the commission of the
crime in question.
Gracia Estevez Dagcel belied most of the
allegations of the accused as follows: On
the denial of Galma Arcilla having not gone
to Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, this witness
categorically declared that accused was
seen many times in 1989 in Liguan and that
he even went to her house where he was
served and entertained by this witness to
drink liquor together with his friends and
companions.
The accused denied having gone to Liguan
during the service of the search warrant.
However, this witness, Gracia Dagcel
testified that accused indeed was there that
the search warrant was served by him on a
Friday and again the following day, a
Saturday, a confrontation with accused was
made when she blamed him for the search
in this instance.
The accused was seen in Liguan on several
occasions with Ruben Ursabia conducting
the search of a gun allegedly owned by the
husband of Gracia. That on such occasion,
the accused was with other military men,
including Capt. Romeo Mapalo, conducting
the search, and Galma Arcilla was again
wearing his mask with a hood for purposes
of avoiding recognition for himself, but he
was recognized on that occasion.
Accused disclaiming any participation in the
search application and its issuance are
belied by abundant evidence, such as
exhibits "X" and "Y-1", his application for
the search warrant, Exhibit "Z", his affidavit
supporting the application, Exhibits "BB"
and "BB-1", the search warrant itself where
the accused was a witness, Exhibits "CC"
and "CC-1" to "CC-19", reflecting the
accused telling lies to the Court of his
alleged non-participation to the
proceedings, and Exhibits "DD", "DD-1" to
"DD-3", a group picture depicting accused,
Galma Arcilla, with other men in Liguan,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay.
Accused's pretentions in the sur-rebuttal by
presenting his witness in the person of the
Provincial Warden with whom he was
supposed to be in custody as a detention
prisoner were shown that Galma was
indeed allowed to leave his detention upon
the request of Capt. Mapalo for this
particular incident. Instances when
detention prisoners, as the accused herein,
 were allowed to leave detention, aside from
the orders of the Court, were on requests of
lawyers or military personnel for that matter.
Moreover, accused's denial to be present in
that dance at Namanday, Bacacay, Albay
on October 13, 1985, was belied by the fact
when he inflicted fistic blows upon Leopoldo
Abion, and consequently that incident led to
his being hit also by a piece of wood by
Daniel Abion, brother of Leopoldo.
In fine, all if not most of accused's
pretentions in his defense were shattered
by the foregoing elucidated facts as borne
out by the records either directly or
circumstantially the evidence abounds in
support of a proof beyond reasonable doubt
that the crime charged against Galma
Arcilla, has certainly been proven as above
discussed and shown. (Emphasis upplied)
In addition to the foregoing, it is interesting to note that
for all Arcilla's protestations that an M-16 Cal. 5.56
Armalite is different from an M-16 Cal. .223, the records
disclose that there is, in fact, no difference between the
two firearms. Particularly illuminating on this point is the
following testimony of Vicente De Vera, Chief Ballistician
of the PC Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon
City who declared that both .233 and 5.56 calibers refer
to the same rifle despite repeated attempts of defense
counsel to throw him off track:
ATTY. REOLO:
Q — According to the
evidence of the prosecution
which is a memorandum
receipt marked in evidence as
Exhibit "A" the firearm issued
to accused is 5.56 M-16
Armalite rifle with serial no.
3265859. My question is you
have not performed
microscopic examination and
comparison on the 5.56
caliber M-16 Armalite with
serial no. 3265859 because
what you have examined thru
(sic) your microscopic
examination for comparison is
.223 caliber M-16 Armalite
rifle with serial no. 3265859
as shown in your ballistic
report, is that correct?
A — That is not correct
because 5.56 M-16 is in
military parlance while .223
caliber is in commercial
parlance. In other words they
are the same.
Q — I am asking you whether
you performed microscopic
examination and comparison
on 5.56 M-16 Armalite rifle
and .223 caliber in your
ballistic report.
A — Anyway 5.56 is not the
subject matter in the case. I
need not to make the
necessary microscopic
examination.
Q — What I am objecting to
was the coming (sic) from
5.56 M-16 with the Serial No.
3265859. But you have not
mentioned in ballistic report
marked as Exhibit "K" that you
have performed [a
microscopic examination on
an] 5.56 caliber M-16 Armalite
rifle, is that correct?
A — That is not correct to
mention, that is [a]
redundancy.
Q — By the way, .223 caliber
is the same as that of 5.56
caliber M-16 and the .223 is
the commercial parlance. Will
you not agree with me [that]
there are several calibers like
5.56, 7.52 and .223 calibers?
A — I will not agree with you
Ma'am.
Q — You will not agree. But
there are different calibers of
an Armalite M-16 those which
I have mentioned, is it not?
A — 7.62 a different caliber.
Q — Is not that in a firearm or
sidearm there are different
calibers?
A — Yes, ma'am.
Q — We have the caliber .45,
.38, .22 so that on the said
firearm there is a difference in
the caliber?
A — Insofar as the caliber in
the firearm is concerned. M-
16 has only one caliber either
designated 5.56 caliber MM is
the European version. In other
words, .223 caliber and 5.56
MM are one at the same. 95
All these circumstances, evident from the recital of facts
heretofore given, clearly yield a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to herein accused-appellant Galma
Arcilla as the malefactor who fired the high-powered
automatic rifle at the victims. 96
Rustom Bermas, in professing his innocence, claims that:
1.] He has no motive to kill the victims because he has no
quarrel with the Abion Family; and 2.] Conspiracy was
not proven.
These claims are, likewise, bereft of merit.
Rustom Bernas' pretext that he has not ill motive to kill
the victims pales into insignificance vis-a-vis his positive
identification by prosecution witnesses Expedito
Bonaobra and Renato Abion. The trial court which had
the opportunity and directly hear the testimony of these
two (2) prosecution witnesses, gave credence to their
assertion that they saw Bermas paddling the sibid-
sibid which approach the prow of their basnigan. 97
Time and again, this Court has stated that "[t]he
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude. Findings of the trial
court on such matter are binding and conclusive on the
appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted." 98 Appellants have
shown no cogent reason to depart from this well-settled
doctrine and this Courts finds none.
Furthermore, it equally bears stressing that proof of ill-
motive to commit the crime becomes irrelevant with the
positive identification of the accused. Therefore,
attributing to accused Bermas the motive of the
vengeance is unnecessary where he was positively
identified as the one of the malefactors. 99 Motives
assumes significance only where there is no showing of
who the perpetrators of the crime were. 100 Verily —
Positive identification where the categorical
and consistent and without any showing of
ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matters prevails over a
denial which, if not substantiated by a clear
and convincing evidence is negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight
in law. They cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters. 101
Even , however, were this Court to delve into the motive
which may have actuated the accused-appellant to
commit such crimes, a circumspect scrutiny of the record
will readily disclose abundant proof that accused-
appellants had an axe to grind against the Abions despite
Bermas' pretensions to the contrary. The existence of
such a feud between the accused-appellants and the
Abions is underscored by the fact that Bermas together
with Jaime Vibal and Angel Dayto barged into Santiago
Abion's house where he pounded the table, hit the wall
and pointed his finger at Santiago uttering the threat
"Babalonan co an mga baraca pag oli co." 102 The threat
came to fruition several days later on that fateful night
when the victims were mercilessly strafed with an
Armalite rifle by Arcilla while they were on board
their basnigan.
In an attempt to undetermined the cause of the
prosecution and to exculpate himself, accused Bermas
further insist that "his paddling of the banca to and from
the scene of the incident is insufficient proof
conspiracy." 103
The paucity of the argument is at once evident. In
conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to
commit a crime is not necessary. 104 It may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a joint purpose and
designs, concerted action and community of
interest. 105 The records clearly bear out that with the
armed and hooded Arcilla on board, Bermas maneuvered
their sibid-sibid up close to the victims' basnigan. He
watched in stolid silence, nary raising a whimper of
protest even when Arcilla commenced firing at the
victims. After the carnage, he calmly paddled
the banca away from the crime scene. Given such
peculiar facts obtaining in this case, Bermas' paddling of
the sibiran to and from the scene of the crime, on the
contrary, underscores his community of designs, interest
and purpose in the perpetration of the felonies.
Apparent then from the foregoing facts is the unity of
purpose and designs in the execution of the unlawful
act. 106 Where, as in this case, conspiracy is shown, the
precise modality or extent of participation of each
accused becomes secondary and the act of one may be
imputed to all the conspirators. 107 In other words, a
person found in a conspiracy with the actual perpetrator
of the crime by performing specific acts with such
closeness and coordination as the one who executed the
criminal act is equally guilty as the latter 108 because in
the eyes of the law, each conspirator is a co-principal and
is equally guilty with the other members of the plot. 109
In their defense, both accused-appellant interposed alibi.
No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that
alibi is the weakest of all defense for it is easy to contrive
and difficult to disprove and for which reason it is
generally rejected. 110 Viewed against the factual
backdrop of the case, accused-appellants' defense of
alibi easily crumbles under the weight of the evidence
arrayed against them.
With regard to the offenses committed, accused-
appellants have been convicted of multiple murder with
multiple frustrated murder. As alleged in the Information,
the perpetration of the felonies was qualified by treachery
and evident premeditation.
For alevosia to qualify the crime to murder, it must be
shown that: a] the malefactor employed such means,
method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her
safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim;
and b] the said means, method and manner of execution
was deliberately adopted. 111 Treachery exists when any
of the crimes against persons is committed with the
employment of means, methods or forms that tend
directly and especially to insure its execution, such that
the offender faces no risk that may arise from the
defense which the offended party might make. 112 The
essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack
on an unsuspecting and unarmed victim who does not
give the slightest provocation. 113
In the case at bench, the concurrence of the foregoing
conditions are firmly anchored on the testimonial
declarations of the prosecution witnesses Expedito
Bonaobra and Renato Abion which are consistent with
the autopsy findings of Dr. Evelyn A. Amador on the
bodies of Arturo Abion, Catalino Bellen and Teodoro Cas
as well as the medical certificates issued by Dr. Cesar
Ong Chua who treated the injuries sustained by Jesus
Lotera, Antonio Abion, Expedito Benaobra and Renato
Abion.
It need not be overemphasized that the sudden and
unanticipated volley of gunfire from a high-powered
automatic rifle at the unsuspecting and unarmed victims
coupled with other means resorted to which tended
directly and especially to insure the success of the
assault 114 underscores the existence of treachery. To
reiterate, a deliberate, unexpected and sudden attack
under circumstances which render the hapless victim
unable and unprepared to defend himself or to afford him
any chance to escape by reason of the suddenness and
severity of the assault constitutes alevosia. 115
With regard to nighttime, it needs be stressed that the
mere fact that the mere fact that the offense was
committed at night will not suffice to sustain a finding a
noctrunity. 116 By and of itself, nighttime is not an
aggravating circumstances; it becomes so only when: 1.]
it is specially sought by the offender; 2.] it was taken
advantage of by him; or 3.] it facilitates the commission of
the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from
capture. 117 In the case at bench, other than the time of
the occurrence of the felony, nothing else suggests that it
was consciously resorted to by accused-appellants to
facilitate the commission of the crime or that it was
availed of for the purpose of impunity. 118
Indeed, the records show that the scene of the crime was
well illuminated by two (2) pressure gas lamps which
were on board the basnigan 119 and that Expedito
Bonaobra, in fact, even ordered Arturo Abion to remove
the shade (pantalla) of the gas lamp so that they could
recognize accused Bermas' companion. 120 Be that as it
may, nocturnity is absorbed in treachery and can not be
appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. 121 Likewise abuse of superior strength is
absorbed in treachery, hence, it can not be appreciated
as an independent aggravating circumstance when
treachery is already present. 122
The generic aggravating circumstance of disguise
(disfraz) must, however, be appreciated in case at bench.
There is disguise when some uses some device to
prevent recognition. 123 Where a malefactor wore a mask
to conceal his identity during the commission of the
crime, as is what happened in this case where accused
Arcilla wore a hood at that time he strafed the victims
with his Armalite rifle, disguise is present and considered
a generic aggravating circumstance. 124
While this Court is convinced that treachery attended the
commission of the felonies, evident premeditation has not
been proven. It has been stated time and again in a litany
of cases that for this circumstance to be appreciated, the
following elements must be clearly proved as the
commission of the crime itself, namely: a.] the time when
the offender decided to commit the crime; b.] an act
manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination to
commit it; and c.] a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act and for his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to
hearken to its warning. 125 In the case at bench, there has
been no showing that prior to the commission of the
offenses, the accused-appellants resolved to kill the
victims nor was there proof that their acts were the result
of a cold and dispassionate calculation of their part.
Absent such a showing, evident premeditation can not be
appreciated against them. 126
With regard to the number of crimes committed, the
Solicitor General contends that the trial court erred in
convicting the accused-appellants of the complex crime
of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder and
asserts that the killing of Catalino Bellen, Arturo Abion
and Teodoro Cas as well as the shooting of Antonio
Abion, Renato Abion, Jesus Loreta and Expedito
Bonaobra are distinct and several acts. Thus, accused-
appellants committed three (3) crimes of murder, three
(3) crimes of frustrated murder and one (1) attempted
murder in the case of Renato Abion.
We agree.
Dr. Cesar Ong Chua who treated the survivors of the
massacre declared that the nature and seriousness of
the injuries sustained by Renato Abion would not have
caused his death even without the medical attention. 127
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code which states that —
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes —
When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies or when an
offense is a necessary means of committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. (As
amended by Act. No. 4000)
The cases at bench clearly do not fall under the any of
the two instances of complex crimes. The evidence on
record, in fact, discloses the two (2) volleys were fired at
the victims. 128 It can not be said, therefore, that there
was a single act of firing a firearm although it is not
disputed that one high-powered automatic rifle used in
the crime. The recovery of two (2) slugs inside the fishing
boat 129 further confirms the fact that several shots were
fired. In People v. Vargas, Jr., 130 this Court held that:
Evidently, this is a case where several
persons were killed and others injured by
successive shots. In the case of People v.
Mones, 131 the Supreme Court found the
accused guilty of three distinct and
separate murders, each qualified by
 treachery, when said accused fired a series
of shots killing three persons attending a
school commencement exercise. Similarly,
in the case of People v. Desierto, C.A. 45
O.G. 4542, it was ruled that several shots
from a Thompson sub-machinegun causing
several deaths, although caused by a single
act of pressing the trigger, are considered
several acts. Although each burst of shot
was caused by one special mechanism the
person firing it only has to keep pressing
the trigger of the sub-machinegun, with his
finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it
is not the act of pressing the trigger which
should be considered as producing several
felonies, but the number of bullets which
actually produced them (L.B. Reyes, The
Revised Penal Code, pp. 559-560, Book I,
1971 Revised Ed.). . . Consequently, the
accused should be held responsible for
each of the resultant crimes instead of the
complex crime of double murder under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
At the time of the commission of the offenses in question,
the penalty of murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code was Reclusion Temporal in its maximum
period of death. No mitigating circumstance was proven,
and insofar as accused-appellant Galma Arcilla is
concerned, the aggravating circumstance of disguise
shall have to be appreciated against him. Accordingly,
the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law made
be imposed on accused-appellant Rustom Bermas, while
the maximum period thereof may be imposed on
accused-appellant Galma Arcilla pursuant to Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, for the killing of
Catalino Bellen, Arturo Abion and Teodoro Cas, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua — the medium of the
prescribed penalty — shall be imposed on Rustom
Bermas. The penalty of death would have been the
proper penalty of Galma Arcilla, but fortunately for him,
Section 19(1) of Article III of the Constitution prohibited
its imposition. Hence, only reclusion perpetua may be
imposed.
The penalty for frustrated murder was prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium pursuant
to Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, while the penalty
for attempted murder was prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor medium per Article 51. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to both the
frustrated and attempted murder cases. Counting one
degree lower from the penalties prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for frustrated murder, the minimum
term for the indeterminate sentence shall be within the
range of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period which has a period
ranging from four (4) years, two (2) moths and one (1)
day to ten (100 years 132 while for attempted murder, the
minimum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law
is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period which ranges from four
(4) moths and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months. 133
Considering the wide latitude of discretions given the
courts to fix the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence anywhere within the range provided by the
law 134 vis-a-vis the peculiar facts prevailing in the case at
bench, the penalty for each frustrated murder is set at
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one
(1) of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and for the
attempted murder, four (4) moths and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as maximum.
which would amount to Eighteen Thousand per annum.
Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy
Table of Mortality adopted in several cases, 140 the loss
of their earnings capacities should be computed using
the following formula:
gross less living
net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x
annual — expenses

We find the lower court's award of moral damages income (50% of gross
reasonable under the circumstances bearing in mind that
such damages, which include physical suffering and annual income)
mental anguish, may be recovered in criminal offenses
resulting in physical injuries or the victim's death, as in Catalino Bellen — x = 2(80-30) x
this case. 135 We, likewise, see no reason to disturb the [18,000.00-9,000.00]
trial court's award of damages for the loss of earning
capacity by the victims. The fact that the prosecution did 3
not present documentary evidence to support the claim
for damages for loss of earning capacity of the victims = 33.33 x 9,000.00
does not preclude recovery of the said damages. 136 The
testimonies of the deceased's wives as well as the = P299,970.00
surviving victims themselves sufficiently establishes the
bases for making such award. The life expectancies of Teodoro Cas — x = 2(80-37) x [18,000.00-
each deceased victim was, however, not correctly 9,000.00]
computed as they were arbitrarily based on sixty (60)
years. The records shows that at the time of his death, 3
Catalino Bellen was thirty (30) years old, 137 Teodoro Cas
was thirty-seven (37) 138 while Arturo Abion was forty-five = 28.67 x 9,000.00
(45). 139 In the absence of any clear showing as to how
much they were actually earnings, the trial court pegged = P258,030.00
their earning capacities at Fifty Pesos (P50.00) a day
 Arturo Abion — x = 2(80-45) x [18,000.00-
9,000.00]
3 murder for the shooting of Antonio Abion,
= 23.33 x 9,000.00
= P209,970.00
The awards made to the surviving victims namely,
Expedito Bonaobra who was forty-two (42) years
old, 141 Antonio Abion, who was thirteen (13), 142 Jesus
Lotera, twenty-four (24) 143 and Renato Abion, eighteen
(18), 144 are reasonable given the prevailing facts of the
case and will not be disturbed.
However, the civil indemnity awarded for the death of the
three victims should be increased to P50,000.00
consistent with the controlling case law. 145
WHEREFORE, with the modification that —
1.] The civil indemnity awarded to the heirs
of the victims be increased to P50,000.00
consistent with the current jurisprudence;
2.] The accused-appellant are hereby
sentenced to suffer: (a) the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua for each of the three
(3) crimes of murder for the killing of
Catalino Bellen, Arturo Abion and Teodoro
Cas; (b) Four (4) years, Two (2) Months
and One (1) Day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to Twelve (12) Years and One (1)
day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum,
for each of the three (3) crimes of frustrated
Jesus Lotera and Expedito Bonaobra; and
(c) Four (4) months and One (1) day
of Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to Six (6)
years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as
maximum, for attempted murder for the
shooting of Renato Abion;
3.] The award for loss of earning capacity of
the three deceased victims be reduced to
(a) P299,970.00 for Catalino Bellen; (b)
258,030.00 for Teodoro Cas; and
P209,970.00 for Arturo Abion;
the challenged judgments are hereby AFFIRMED
in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
Davide, Jr., C.J. Melo, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
G.R. L-No. 5292 August 28, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
THE MORO MANALINDE, defendant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.
Ramon Diokno for defendant.
TORRES, J.:
Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of
January, 1909, while Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was seated
on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in Cotabato,
Moro Province, he suddenly received a wound on the
head delivered from behind and inflicted with a kris.
Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the said store, who was
standing behind the counter, upon hearing the noise and
the cry of the wounded man, ran to his assistance and
found him lying on the ground. Meanwhile the aggressor,
the Moro Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named
Choa, who was passing along the street, and just as the
latter was putting down his load in front of the door of a
store and was about to enter, attacked him with the same
weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on
account of which he fell to the ground. The Moro, who
came from the rancheria of Dupit and had entered the
town carrying his weapon wrapped up in banana leaves,
in the meantime escaped by running away from the town.
Both wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard,
were taken to the hospital, where the former died within
an hour, the record not stating the result of the wound
inflicted on the Spaniard Juan Igual.
In view of the above a complaint was filed by the
provincial fiscal with the district court charging Manalinde
with the crime of murder, and proceedings having been
instituted, the trial judge, in view of the evidence
adduced, rendered judgment on the 5th of February of
said year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of
death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum
of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been
submitted to this court for review.
From the above facts fully substantiated in this case, it
appears beyond doubt that the crime of murder, defined
and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, was
committed on the person of the Chinaman Choa, in that
the deceased was unexpectedly and suddenly attacked,
receiving a deep cut on the left shoulder at the moment
when he had just put down the load that he was carrying
and was about to start for the door of the store in front of
which he stopped for the purpose of entering therein. As
a result of the tremendous wound inflicted upon him by
the heavy and unexpected blow, he was unable, not only
to defend himself, apart from the fact that he was
unarmed, but even to flee from the danger, and falling to
the ground, died in an hour's time. It is unquestionable
that by the means and form employed in the attack the
violent death of the said Chinaman was consummated
with deceit and treachery (alevosia), one of the five
qualifying circumstances enumerated in the aforesaid
article as calling for the greatest punishment.
When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and
confessed that he had perpetrated the crime herein
mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one
hundred days before and that he had come from his
home in Catumaldu by order of the Datto Rajamudah
Mupuck, who had directed him to go juramentado in
Cotabato in order to kill somebody, because the said
Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge against a
lieutenant and a sergeant, the said datto further stating
that if he, Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he
would give him a pretty woman on his return, but that in
case he was captured he was to say that he performed
the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and
Inug. In order to carry out his intention to kill two persons
in the town of Cotabato he provided himself with a kris,
which he concealed in banana leaves, and, traveling for a
day and a night from his home, upon reaching the town,
attacked from behind a Spaniard who was seated in front
of a store and, wounding him, immediately after attacked
a Chinaman, who was close by, just as the latter was
placing a tin that he was carrying on the ground and he
was about to enter a store near by, cutting him on the left
shoulder and fleeing at once; he further stated that he
had no quarrel with the assaulted persons.
From the statements made by the accused his culpability
as the sole-confessed and self-convicted author of the
crime in question has been unquestionably established,
nor can his allegation that he acted by order of Datto
Mupuck and that therefore he was not responsible
exculpate him, because it was not a matter of proper
obedience. The excuse that he went juramentado by
order of the said datto and on that account killed only two
persons, whereas if he had taken the oath of his own
volition he would have killed many more, because it is the
barbarous and savage custom of a juramentado to kill
anyone without any motive or reason whatever, can not
under any consideration be accepted or considered
under the laws of civilized nations; such exhibitions of
ferocity and savagery must be restrained, especially as
the very people who up to the present time have been
practicing such acts are well aware that the established
authorities in this country can never allow them to go
unpunished, and as has happened a number of times in
towns where juramentados are in the habit of appearing,
the punishment of the author has followed every crime so
committed.
In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of
aggravating circumstances 3 and 7 of article 10 of the
Penal Code should be taken into consideration in that
promise of reward and premeditation are present, which
in the present case are held to be generic, since the
crime has already been qualified as committed with the
treachery, because the accused confessed that he
voluntarily obeyed the order given him by Datto Mupuck
to go juramentado and kill some one in the town of
Cotabato, with the promise that if he escaped
punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty woman.
Upon complying with the order the accused undoubtedly
acted of his own volition and with the knowledge that he
would inflict irreparable injury on some of his fellow-
beings, depriving them of life without any reason
whatever, well knowing that he was about to commit a
most serious deed which the laws in force in this country
and the constituted authorities could by no means permit.
Datto Mupuck, who ordered and induced him to commit
the crimes, as well as the accused knew perfectly well
that he might be caught and punished in the act of
committing them.
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable
that the accused, upon accepting the order and
undertaking the journey in order to comply therewith,
deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully
meditated over the nature and the consequences of the
acts which, under orders received from the said datto, he
was about to carry out, and to that end provided himself
with a weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and
started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole
purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate persons
whom he did not know, and with whom he had never had
any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a
certain extent, might warrant his perverse deed. The fact
that the arrangement between the instigator and the tool
considered the killing of unknown persons, the first
encountered, does not bar the consideration of the
circumstance of premeditation. The nature and the
circumstances which characterize the crime, the
perversity of the culprit, and the material and moral injury
are the same, and the fact that the victim was not
predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the
crime. The person having been deprived of his life by
deeds executed with deliberate intent, the crime is
considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent
intention of the accused from the moment, before said
death, when he received the order until the crime was
committed in manifestly evident. Even though in a crime
committed upon offer of money, reward or promise,
premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being
inherent in the former, and there existing no
incompatibility between the two, premeditation can not
necessarily be considered as included merely because
an offer of money, reward or promise was made, for the
latter might have existed without the former, the one
being independent of the other. In the present case there
can be no doubt that after the crime was agreed upon by
means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his
subsequent conduct showed a persistency and firm intent
in his plan to carry out the crime which he intentionally
agreed to execute, it being immaterial whether Datto
Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once
Manalinde obeyed the inducement and voluntarily
executed it.
The facts in this case are quite different from those in the
proceedings instituted by the United States vs. Caranto
et al., wherein the decision on page 256 of Volume IV of
the Philippine Reports was rendered, as may be seen
from the mere perusal of the statement of facts. It is also
different from the case where a criminal who has made
up his mind to kill a certain individual kills a person other
than the object of his criminal intent. On going to
Cotabato the Moro Manalinde intended to and did kill the
first two persons he encountered, and the fact that the
victim was not predetermined does not alter the nature,
conditions, or circumstances of the crime, for the reason
that to cause the violent death of a human being without
any reasonable motive is always punishable with a more
or less grave penalty according to the nature of the
concurrent circumstances.
For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no
mitigating circumstance is present to neutralize the
effects of the aggravating ones, it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs
provided however, that the penalty imposed on the culprit
shall be executed in accordance with the provisions of
Acts. Nos. 451 and 1577, and that in the event of a
pardon being granted he shall likewise be sentenced to
suffer the accessory penalties imposed by article 53 of
the Penal Code. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-32914 August 30, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAUREANO SANGALANG, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant
Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Ma.
Rosario Quetulio Losa for plaintiff-appellee.
Narciso V. Cruz, Jr. for accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:p
This is a murder case. The testimonies of the two
prosecution eyewitnesses disclose that at around six
o'clock in the morning of June 9, 1968 Ricardo Cortez left
his nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso, Silang,
Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora
Sarno, his wife, was left inside the hut. While he was on
top of the tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley
of shots. He fell to the ground at the base of the coconut
tree.
His wife Flora heard three successive shot coming south
of the hut. She went outside the hut. From a distance of
about twenty-five meters, she saw five men, each armed
with a long firearm, firing at her husband. He was already
wounded and was lying on the ground at the foot of the
coconut tree. His assailants were about five meters away
from him.
She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five
armed men who were firing at her husband. She and her
brother Ricardo had known Sangalang since their
childhood. She also recognized Conrado Gonzales,
Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the
other malefactors.
Flora ran towards the place where her husband had
fallen. She shouted, "Bakit ninyo pinagbabaril ang aking
asawa". The five persons fired at her. She was then
about twenty meters away from them. She retreated to
the hut for cover. She heard some more shots. After the
lapse of about five minutes, Laureano Sangalang and his
companions left the place. When Flora returned to the
spot where her husband was prostrate, he was already
dead.
On the occasion already described, Ricardo Sarno,
twenty-seven years old, a brother of Flora, was inside his
own nipa hut which was about ten meters away from
Flora's hut. He was drinking coffee. His wife and children
were eating breakfast. He heard several shots. He came
out of his hut. He saw his brother-in-law being shot by
Laureano Sangalang, Eleuterio Cuyom, Perino Canuel,
Irineo Canuel and Conrado Gonzales. He saw Sangalang
using a Garand carbine in shooting his brother-in-law.
The latter fell from the top of the coconut tree after he
was shot (10 tsn). His sister Flora was trying to approach
her husband but she had to flee to her hut when
Sangalang and his companions fired at her. He wanted to
join her but he was likewise fired upon by the five men.
So, he retired and took refuge in his own hut.
Later, Sarno saw his sister Flora, sitting inside her hut.
He followed her after she left the hut and went to see her
dead husband, who was lying on the ground, face up, at
the base of the coconut tree. When he noticed that his
brother-in-law was already dead, he gathered his children
and brought them to Sitio Biga, which was more or less
thirty meters away from his hut in Sitio Adlas. Ricardo
reported the killing to the chief of police who went to the
scene of the crime with some policemen and
Constabularymen.
The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old
Cortez sustained twenty-three gunshot wounds on the
different parts of the body, fourteen of which were
entrance-wounds, and nine were exit-wounds (Exh. A
and B). He died due to the multiple gunshot wounds
(Exh. C).
On June 10, 1968 or on the day following the killing,
Flora and Ricardo were interrogated by the Silang police.
They executed sworn statements before the Municipal
Judge pointing to Laureano Sangalang, Conrado
Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio
Cuyom as the assassins of Ricardo Cortez. Flora said in
her statement that she knew those persons because from
time to time they used to pass by her place. They resided
at Barrio Capitula, Dasmariñas, which is near Barrio
Adlas. On the basis of those statements, the police filed
on June 10 in the Municipal Court a complaint for murder
against the five aforenamed persons. Sangalang was
arrested. He posted bail in the sum of P50,000 on June
13. He waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. The other accused have not been
apprehended. On August 8, 1968 the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information for murder against Sangalang.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Tagaytay
City Branch, rendered a judgment convicting Sangalang
of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay the heirs of Ricardo Cortez an
indemnity of twelve thousand pesos and to pay his widow
moral damages in the sum of ten thousand pesos
(Criminal Case No. TG-162). Sangalang appealed.
The appellant, a fifty-six-year old farmer, admitted that he
knew Cortez and that he knows his wife, Flora Sarno. He
pleaded an alibi. He declared that in the afternoon of
June 8, 1968 he and Crispulo Mendoza went to the
house of Julian Gatdula at Dapitan Street, Sampaloc,
Manila. He arrived at Gatdula's place at six o'clock. He
wanted to borrow money from Gatdula to defray the
matriculation fees of his children.
As Gatdula had no money at that time, he advised
Sangalang to wait until morning. He would try to raise the
sum of two hundred pesos which Sangalang desired to
borrow. Sangalang and Mendoza agreed. They allegedly
slept in Gatdula's house on the night of June 8th. The
next morning, they breakfasted in that house. At about
ten o'clock on June 9, Gatdula delivered the two hundred
pesos to Sangalang. He and Mendoza then went to the
Central Market in Manila and then to Quiapo. They
returned to Cavite and arrived at seven o'clock in the
evening of June 9 in Barrio Capdula. Gatdula and
Mendoza corroborated Sangalang's alibi.
In this appeal Sangalang insists on his alibi and impugns
the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses, Mrs.
Cortez and the victim's brother-in-law, Ricardo Sarno.
The basic issue is whether their eyewitness-testimony
that they saw appellant Sangalang as one of the five
armed persons, who riddled Cortez with fourteen gunshot
wounds of entry, is sufficient to overcome his alibi. In
essence, the case projects the ever recurring conflict in
criminal jurisprudence between positive identification and
alibi.
The trial court rejected appellant's alibi. It noted that
although his witnesses, Mendoza and Gatdula, learned of
his arrest, and Mendoza even visited him in the municipal
jail, Sangalang and his witnesses did not interpose the
defense of alibi when he was investigated by the police
and when he was summoned at the preliminary
investigation.
Sangalang points to certain discrepancies in the
declarations of Mrs. Cortez and her brother Ricardo
Sarno. Those inconsistencies, which are not glaring,
strengthen their credibility and show that their testimonies
were not coached nor rehearsed. The discrepancies may
be attributed to deficiencies in observation and
recollection, or misapprehension of the misleading and
confusing questions during cross-examination, or to the
defective translation of the questions and answers but
they do not necessarily indicate a wilful attempt to
commit falsehood (People vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 839;
People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54
SCRA 350).
The controlling fact is that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno clearly
and consistently testified that they saw Sangalang, a
person already well-known to them, among the five
armed persons who shot Ricardo Cortez. That
unwavering identification negates appellant's alibi.
The prosecution did not prove the motive for the killing.
On the other hand, Sangalang did not show that Mrs.
Cortez and Sarno were impelled by a malicious desire to
falsely incriminate him. .
Counsel de oficio meticulously examined the
contradictions and deficiencies in the evidence for the
prosecution. He made a spirited defense of the appellant.
However, his efforts failed to cast any reasonable doubt
on Sangalang's complicity in the killing.
The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top
of a coconut tree. He was unarmed and defenseless. He
was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any
immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack
shows that Sangalang and his companions employed a
mode of execution which insured the killing without any
risk to them arising from any defense which the victim
could have made. The qualifying circumstance of
treachery (alevosia), which was alleged in the
information, was duly established (See art. 14[16],
Revised Penal Code). Hence, the killing can be
categorized as murder (See People vs. Sedenio, 94 Phil.
1046). Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance
of band(U. S. vs. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident
premeditation, which was alleged in the information, was
not proven.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on Sangalang (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised
Penal Code).
Finding no error in its judgment, the same is affirmed with
costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo and Fernandez,
JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no take part.
G.R. No. 115431 April 18, 1996
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE TORREFIEL, accused-appellant.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
Accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel; Hilario Masgong alias
"Mark"; Casiano Masgong alias "Manny"; Saturnino
Suyod alias "Ka Eddie"; "Jerry Delicano alias "Ka Cocoy";
Luciano Solanoy, Jr., alias ''Ka Balot"; Noel Semira alias
"Ka Nido"; Ricky David alias "Ka Macky"; and Alex
Francisco alias "Ka Jing," were charged in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 for Murder and in Criminal
Case No. 2911 for Robbery before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan. These cases were, upon
agreement of the parties, jointly tried, since they arose
from the same incident and involved the same parties.
The trial proceeded as against the accused-appellant
Jose Torrefiel only, the rest of the accused having
remained at large.
After trial, the court a quo convicted accused-
appellant1 in each of the cases, the dispositive portions of
which are quoted hereinbelow:
In Criminal Case No. 2909 for Murder:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the
accused, Jose Torrefiel, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and hereby sentences the accused to a
penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17)
years, Four (4) months and One (1) day to
Eighteen (18) years and Eight (8) months.
The accused is hereby ordered also to
indemnify the family of the victim the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) by way of damages . . . . 2
In Criminal Case No. 2910 for Murder:
 WHEREFORE, this Court finds the
accused, Jose Torrefiel, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and hereby sentences the accused to a
penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17)
years, Four (4) months and One(l) day to
Eighteen (18) years and Eight (8) months.
The accused is hereby ordered also to
indemnify the family of the victim the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) by way of damages. . . .3
In Criminal Case No. 2911 for Robbery:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused
Jose Torrefiel guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery and
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty
of Twelve (12) years and One (1) day to
Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months. .
. .4
Accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel, appealed to the Court
of Appeals. After considering the evidence and the law
involved, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction in all the cases but refrained from entering
judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 for
murder, having ascertained that the proper imposable
penalty for each of said crimes is reclusion perpetua, and
instead, certified these two (2) cases to us for final
determination pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 124 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The facts as correctly summarized by the prosecution in
its Brief are as follows:5
On May 26, 1989 at about 5:00 o'clock in
the morning at Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay,
Aklan, Realidad Mangilog woke up early to
prepare their breakfast. Her husband
Leopoldo Mangilog and her son Reynaldo
were about to join her downstairs, when
someone knocked at the kitchen backdoor
(TSN, March 21, 1990, pp. 3-4).
It was Leonardo who opened the door.
When the door was opened appellant Jose
Torrefiel armed with a bolo and a hand gun
entered the house first followed by Masiano
Masgong, Hilario Masgong, Alex Francisco,
Saturnino Suyod and Noel alias "Nido" in
that order, who were all armed with long
firearms. (TSN, Ibid, p. 5).
The group greeted Leopoldo as "How are
you Tay?" to which the latter answered "as
usual." Leopoldo even served the
newcomers with coffee, but because the
coffee was not sufficient for them, Realidad
asked Hermogenes Calizo, who was then
the errand boy of the Mangilog (sic), to buy
coffee from the store. (TSN, Id. pp. 5-6).
The group of appellant Torrefiel did not
even touch or taste the coffee served them
by Leopoldo. Instead, appellant, Casiano
 Masgong and Satur Suyod aimed their
guns at Leopoldo and started shooting him
to death (TSN, Id. p. 6).6 Simultaneous to
the shooting of Leopoldo inside the house
by the group of appellant was the shooting
and stabbing of Reynaldo who was then
taking a bath inside the bathroom located
outside of the house by the other members
of the group who did not enter the
house..(TSN. Id. p. 7)
After the killing of Leopoldo and Reynaldo,
the accused ransacked the house and took
P500.00 cash, wrist watch, kitchen wares,
grocery items, chickens and guitar.
(TSN, Id. p. 10)
Before the accused left the house of the
victims, they even fired their guns at
random. They were blaming the victims to
be responsible to the incident why the
military was running after them. They were
also telling the people along the road that
the fish is okey and could be ready to be
butchered (Id., p. 11).
Accused-appellant invoked the defense of alibi, claiming
that at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of May 26, 1989,
he was at the house of Barangay Captain Benedicto
Puod in Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, which can
be reached in an hour and a half (1 1/2) from Barangay
Naligusan, Ibajay, Akalan, the scene of the incident. He
had gone on vacation to Barangay Agbalogo on May 22,
1989 and attended the fiesta on May 25, 1989. He had
remained in the said barangay since then upon the
advice of his wife not to return to Barangay Naligusan,
Ibajay, Aklan, appellant's place of residence, as the
situation there was somewhat hot.7 Benedicto Puod
confirmed appellant's claim as to his whereabouts in the
morning of May 26, 1989, recounting that he and
appellant were, indeed, together drinking alcoholic drinks
from 7:00 to 11:00 o'clock in the morning on the occasion
of the birthday of his child.8 In addition, Pedro Tosio as a
witness testified as to the presence of appellant at his
house in Barangay Agbalogo in the morning until about
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 25, 1989, the day of
the fiesta, declaring further that he also saw appellant
pass by his house on May 26, 1989.9
In his appeal, accused-appellant interposed the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME OF MURDER IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 2909.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME OF MURDER IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 2910.
 III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME OF ROBBERY IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 2911. 10
On the first and third assignment of errors, accused-
appellant maintains his defense of alibi, stressing that,
not being around at the time and place of the incident as
he was at Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, he could
not have murdered Leopoldo Mangilog and robbed the
Mangillogs of their personal belongings.
We are not persuaded.
It is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the
accused. 11 Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, the accused
must establish not only that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed but that it was also
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission. 12
That accused-appellant had been positively identified as
one of the culprits by prosecution witness Realidad
Mangilog cannot be doubted. The Mangilogs and the
accused-appellant had known each other for years as
neighbors. Accused-appellant whose parents reside in
Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, established
residence in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan when he
got married to a resident there. Since his house is only
about one hundred and fifty (150) meters away from that
of the Mangilogs, there were occasions when accused-
appellant would visit the Mangilogs, usually for coffee,
and that Leopoldo Mangilog would also go to the
accused-appellant's house. Indeed, eyewitness Realidad
Mangilog knows the accused-appellant so well that she
could not have been mistaken in identifying appellant as
one of those armed men responsible for the death of her
husband and son on that fateful morning of May 26,
1989. She testified thus:
Q. When your husband open (sic) the door,
was there somebody who got inside?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where were you at that time?
A. I am (sic) at that time at the door dividing
the sala and the dining room.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Were you able to recognized (sic) those
persons who entered your house?
A. I can recognized (sic) Jose Torrefiel
leading the group and Masiano Masgong
alias Manny, Alex Francisco followed by
Satur or Saturnino Suyod and the other one
was Noel Semira alias Nido. 13
Moreover, the two other prosecution witnesses, Coreto
Maguirang and Hermogenes Calizo, confirmed the
presence of accused-appellant in Barangay Naligusan,
Ibajay, Aklan at the time of the incident in question.
Maguirang testified that while he watched over his
carabao which was grazing on May 26, 1989 at around
5:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw the appellant and his
group as they passed by him from a distance of about ten
(10) meters heading towards the direction of the house of
Leopoldo Mangilog in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay,
Aklan. 14 He could not be mistaken as to appellant's
identity since he had on several occasions seen
appellant together with the same group of armed
men 15 Calizo, on the other hand, claimed that he had
seen appellant face to face in the men house of the
Mangilogs that same morning of May 26, 1989 shortly
before the subject incident occurred since at that time he
was living in said house. He only happened to be sent
out by Realidad Mangilog to buy coffee so he did not get
to see the actual killing of Leopoldo and Reynaldo
Mangilog. 16
It is significant to note that no improper motive can be
imputed to Realidad Mangilog as would make her testify
falsely against accused-appellant; hence her testimony is
worthy of full faith and credit. 17
Evidently complementing the positive identification of
accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
crimes charged is his failure to prove that it was
physically impossible for him to be at Barangay
Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan at the time of the incident,
assuming that his claim that he went to the house of
Barangay Captain Puod at 7:00 o'clock in the morning of
May 26, 1989 was true. As testified to by appellant
himself, it would take just one and a half (1 1/2) hours to
reach Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan from Barangay
Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan. Needless to state, it would not
at all be impossible for appellant to be at Barangay
Agbalogo at 7:00 o'clock in the morning or some two
hours after the crimes were committed at Barangay
Naligusan.
In his second assignment of error, accused-appellant
contends that he had nothing to do with the killing of the
victim Reynaldo Mangilog, obviously relying on the
testimony of Realidad Mangilog to the effect that
Reynaldo Mangilog was shot and stabbed to death by the
members of appellant's group who stationed themselves
outside the house.
This contention we also find untenable, conspiracy being
clearly manifest in this case as was correctly found by the
Court of Appeals. For collective responsibility to be
established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved
by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the
crime 18 as only rarely would such an agreement be
demonstrable since in the nature of things criminal
undertakings are rarely documented by agreement in
writing. 19 Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of
the accused immediately prior to, during and right after
the shooting of the victim which indicate their common
intention to commit the crime. 20
The record shows that: (1) all the accused which include
accused-appellant arrived together at the scene of the
killings, (2) they were all fully armed; (3) three of them
simultaneously shot to death Leopoldo Mangilog, while
an undetermined number shot and stabbed to death
Reynaldo Mangilog; (4) the attack on the two victims was
executed simultaneously; and (5) the accused's
statement to the effect that the victims were responsible
for the fact that the military men were running after them.
This tends to establish a motive on their pant to kill the
victims. All these indubitably indicate a concerted effort
on the part of the accused on a common design to kill the
victims.
Conspiracy having been adequately shown, all the
accused are answerable as co-principals regardless of
the degree of their participation. 21 In fact, it is not
necessary to ascertain the individual participation in the
final liquidation of the victims 22 or to ascertain the
precise modality or extent of participation of each
individual conspirator as the applicable rule is that the act
of one conspirator is the act of all of them. 23 It hardly
matters, therefore, that accused-appellant did not actually
participate in the killing of Reynaldo Mangilog or of
Leopoldo Mangilog.
As alleged in the informations and as correctly observed
by the Solicitor General, the killing of the victims was
qualified by treachery. Leopoldo Mangilog was shot while
he was serving the accused coffee or shortly thereafter.
Reynaldo Mangilog, on the other hand, was shot and
stabbed to death while he was taking a bath. It may be
added that the victims were naturally unarmed at that
time and their execution was done so early in the
morning, that is, when they had practically just
awakened. Under the circumstances, the victims were
clearly not in any position to defend themselves from the
sudden and unexpected attack of the accused. 24 These
circumstances are manifestly indicative of the presence
of the conditions under which treachery may be
appreciated, i.e., the employment of means of execution
that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate, and that said means of execution
was deliberately or consciously adopted. 25
The Court of Appeals appreciated abuse of superior
strength, aid of armed men and evident premeditation as
aggravating circumstances. These findings are factual
and the rule is that findings of the Court of Appeals upon
factual questions are conclusive and ought not to be
disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on
record, 26 and, in this case, there is no such showing.
However, we believe, and so hold, that treachery absorbs
the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and aid
of armed men, as it appears that the accused saw to it
that they were armed and far outnumbered the victims
precisely to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal
objective. 27
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the
prescribed penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. Since we find accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder qualified by treachery in Criminal Cases Nos.
2909 and 2910 and that the generic aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation was also
attendant, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed in each case, applying Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code and considering the proscription against the
imposition of the death penalty at the time the crimes
were committed.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the trial court are hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each case of murder (Criminal Cases Nos.
2909 and 2910)
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. ROLANDO ALFANTA y ALO, Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Before this Court, by way of automatic review, is the
decision, dated 29 July 1996, of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 82, convicting1 accused-appellant
Rolando Alfanta y Alo of rape with two aggravating
circumstances and sentencing him to suffer the extreme
penalty of death.
Rolando Alfanta was charged with the crime of rape in an
information that simply read:
That on or about the 26th day of August, 1995, in the City
of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon
the person of one NITA FERNANDEZ y JOSEFA against
her will and consent.2
When arraigned on 27 September 1995, accused-
appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the crime
charged. Trial thereupon ensued.
The evidence of the parties has been recited in good
detail by the trial court in its decision under review, thus:
The first prosecution witness was Dr. Noel Minay, Medico
Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation who
testified that on August 27, 1995 at around 5:45 in the
afternoon, he performed a physical examination and
medico genital examination on one Nita Fernandez for
alleged rape. Upon physical examination he found mark
swelling on the left lower jaw or on the mandibular area
left portion; and, upon examination of the hymen, he
found that the labia majora and minora gaping, similar to
the appearance of a woman who had just given birth; or a
normal appearance as a result of several sexual
intercourses that had been performed. He submitted a
report on his findings (Exhibit A).
The next witness was Nita Fernandez, the offended party
alleged in the information who testified that on August 26,
1995 at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, while asleep in
the residence of a friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio,
Makati city, a man whom she had not seen before
suddenly entered the house where she was sleeping,
pulled her, boxed her jaw and put his hand on her mouth,
and told her that if she will not obey him, he will kill her.
She resisted, but could not do anything. Thereafter, she
was forced to climb a fence. Because of fear, as the man
was holding a bolo, she followed. After climbing the
fence, the man instructed her to go to a vacant house.
She followed, as instructed. While at the vacant house,
she was told to undress, she did because of fear, as the
man was holding a bolo. Thereafter, the man embraced
and kissed her. Then she was told to lie down and told to
separate her legs. The man inserted his penis into her
vagina. After inserting the mans penis to her vagina, she
was told to lie face down. She complied, thereafter, the
man inserted his penis into her anus. After inserting the
mans penis into her anus, she was told to turn around
face up. All these acts of the man hurt her. After turning
around face up, the man inserted his fingers in and out
into her private part. After the man had finished inserting
his fingers in and out of her private part, she was told to
go near him and lie beside him, and not to dress up as he
was going to take a rest and at the same time telling her
not to tell what happened to others saying that lahat ng
nirape ko ay pinatay ko dahil sa ayokong may
magsumbong. All the time the man was inserting his
penis and fingers into her private part and into her anus,
she was shouting: tulungan po ninyo ako,' but nobody
responded. Noticing that the man was already sleeping,
she suddenly got the knife at waist of the man and stab
the man on his chest. The knife broke. She suddenly
grabbed the bolo and hack the man several times.
Thereafter, she put on her dress, got hold of the bolo and
ran to the signal office of soldiers. When she arrived at
the signal office of soldiers, she told the persons she met
that she killed a man. The bolo was taken from her by the
soldiers. With, soldiers, they went to the place where she
was raped. They found the man lying down still alive. The
man was brought to the hospital. The man turned out to
be accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo. Thereafter, she
executed an affidavit (Exh. C), narrating what happened
to her to the police; and was brought to the NBI Medico-
Legal Officer for examination.
On cross examination she testified that, from Valle
Verde, Pasig City, where she worked as housemaid, she
went to her friends house named Patrick because she
brought mongo and because she and Patricks wife Inday,
are friends, arriving in the house of Patrick at 6:30 in the
evening of August 26, 1995. She was not able to go back
to her place of work at Valle Verde, Pasig because it was
already late at night and was told to sleep at Patricks
house. Earlier that evening, at 9:00, she saw accused
passed by in front of the house. Aside from her two (2)
other persons slept in the house of Patrick, Inday and
son. She slept in the sala, while Inday and her son in a
room. The door of the house was closed, but was not
locked. In entering the house were she slept, one has to
reach the sala first. When awakened, she shouted, but
nobody heard her because they were sleeping and at the
same time the accused placed his hand on her mouth.
She was really afraid because she was boxed on her
chest and accused was holding a bolo. While outside the
house she was boxed. At the garage, which was not
lighted, she was told to undress. She followed, because
of fear. Accused also undressed himself. While accused
was on top of her, holding a bolo, she cried. Accused is
not her sweetheart. She even said, why will I hack him if
he is my sweetheart.
The last witness for prosecution was Lilia Hogar of the
Womens Desk Unit, Makati Police Station who testified
that she came into the possession of the bolo, Exh. D,
because Nita Fernandez was brought to Sub-Station A.
The bolo, which was brought by Nita Fernandez to the
Military Signal Village, was in turn given to the Central
Police Desk wherein she is the Investigator. After the
bolo was handed to her by the soldiers of the Signal
Village, she conducted an investigation. Based on her
investigation, she learned from Nita Fernandez that when
Nita Fernandez woke up at 12:00 midnight on August 26,
1995, Nita Fernandez saw a man standing beside her.
Nita was punched on the left portion of the face and
ordered her to go outside, instructed to climb over a
fence on the other side of the house. After climbing the
fence, Nita Fernandez was told to undress, was boxed on
her breast and was told to lie down in a vacant house
owned by Captain Pascua, where suspect raped Nita
Fernandez. On their way to the hospital on board the
Makati Police car, she asked accused why he rape Nita
Fernandez. Accused answered that Fernandez was not
telling the truth because they were sweethearts.
Defense presented the accused. Accused testified that
on August 26, 1995, while at AFOVAI Village,
Municipality of Makati, fixing the fence of the house of
General Renato Icarma together with many other
laborers, somebody told him that his wife was waiting for
him in the house of Captain Pascua. At 10:00 oclock that
evening, he went to the house of Captain Pascua; and
upon reaching the house, he knocked, and called Patrick
Augusto Ablon, the caretaker of Captain Pascua. Belinda
Ablon, the cousin of Patrick Augusto Ablon, opened the
door. After opening the door, Nita Fernandez, his live-in
partner for almost a year came out, in an angry mood,
because she has been waiting for him for long, and
asked him why he was late. He explained that he did not
expect her to come, as his understanding with Nita
Fernandez was, he will call her by phone or write her
before she comes. Then Nita Fernandez told him that
they talk outside as she was ashamed with the neighbor,
and they will disturb the child who was sleeping. After
half hour talking, he invited Nita to sleep. He and Nita
went to a vacant house, owned by a Colonel passing a
fence. When they arrived in the vacant house, it was
closed, so they slept in the terrace. He denied doing what
Nita Fernandez claimed he did. He claimed that, he was
surprised why Fernandez hacked him, for he knows of no
reason why Nita Fernandez will hack him. He believes
that Nita Fernandez concocted the story of rape because
of fear that he will file a case against Nita Fernandez for
hacking him.
On cross-examination, accused testified that, he has
been staying in the house of General Romeo Icarma (the
house where he and 15 other workers were constructing
a fence), since 1990. His livelihood was, as a Mason,
since 1993. In February 1995, the daughter of Nita
Fernandez named, Lucia who is married to Lito
introduced him to Nita. He and Nita became sweethearts
in February 1995. They have not live together because
Nita was working at Valle Verde. They only meet during
Nitas day off. He has been at Nitas place of work, but he
used to call then at her telephone numbers which are
6326062 and 6356060. They used to see each other at
Gen. Icarmas place where he lived. On August 26, 1995,
when the incident in questioned happened, Lucia and
Lito were no longer residing at Gen. Icarmas place
because they were told to leave in April 1993. On August
26, 1995, while in the squatters area, just 100 meters
away from the house of Gen. Icarma, Nita came, looking
for him. Because Nita does not know the workers in Gen.
Icarmas house, Nita left and went to the house of Captain
Pascua, just at the back of the house of Gen. Icarma.
While at the squatters area, Melchor Rudy Abella told
him that Nita was looking for him. He went to the house
of Captain Pascua. At Captain Pascuas place, he met
Nita. Present in the house of Captain Pascua were
Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin, Belinda, a cousin and a
small child who were all awake, except the child.
Although Ablon was very much willing to accommodate
him in Ablons house, he brought Nita to the house of the
Air Force Colonel because if it rains, there is a roof to
protect them and ashamed to stay at Ablons house. Even
Nita does not like to sleep in Ablons place, saying that
instead of sleeping at Ablons place, she prefers to go
back at Valle Verde. He did not allow Nita to go back at
Valle Verde because it was already late at night and if
anything happens to her, her daughter who knows his
relationship with Nita will blame him. He did not bring Nita
to Gen. Icarmas house because it is crowded and the
Colonels house is just 20 meters from Captain Pascuas
house. They went to the Colonels house, climbing the
fence. When they climbed the wall, he was carrying
banig, pillow and blanket, and did not notice that Nita was
carrying a knife. Nobody live in the Colonels house and
was closed. They slept in the terrace of the house on a
cement flooring. While he was sleeping Nita hacked him
with a kitchen knife. When hacked, he just said aray. The
bolo was not used in hacking him. After stabbing him,
Nita left and went to the Military Police leaving the
kitchen knife. When the Military Police arrived, he was no
longer at the Colonels house because he went to another
house, where he slept. After he was stabbed, he asked
the assistance of Ablon. Ablon was the one who called
for the Military Police. He did not leave the colonels
house. He just stayed in the premises. Despite his
wounds, he was able to sleep and woke up at 5:00 in the
morning. When asked why Nita stabbed him, he said that
it was because he hurt Nita by holding Nita's hand and
pushing her on her chest when Nita insisted in leaving for
Valle Verde; and because he hurt Nita, he did not file a
complaint against Nita for hacking him.3
In the decretal portion of the decision, the court a
quo has pronounced judgment, thus:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Rolando Alfanta
y Alo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape, penalized by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, with aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and ignominy, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
maximum penalty of death, and indemnify complainant
Nita Fernandez the sum of P50,000.00, plus the costs of
the suit.4
Now before the Court, accused-appellant seeks the
reversal of the conviction and the imposition of the death
penalty decreed by the trial court; he contends that -
I. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN FINDING AND Prosecutor Manola:
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE. Q Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell the Honorable Court
where you were on August 26, 1995 at around 12:00
II. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN TAKING INTO oclock midnight?
CONSIDERATION THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF NIGHTTIME AND IGNOMINY.5 A At Fort Bonifacio.

The case can be described as not really being too far Q What city or municipality?
from the typical rape cases that have been previously
reviewed by the Court. It is a case, like the instances A I do not know but it must be here sir.
before it, of two people, each testifying on the same
incident but making a clearly discordant testimony. Since Q Meaning Makati City?
only the participants could directly testify on the sexual
congress, here conceded to have taken place, extreme A Yes sir.
care is observed in evaluating the respective declarations
of the complainant and the accused. The doctrinally Q Why were you there on that date and time Mrs.
accepted rule is to accord great respect over the Witness?
assessment of the trial court on the credibility of the
witnesses and, in the usual words of similar import A I was sleeping in my friends residence.
employed by the Court, it would be best not to disturb the
findings of the court which has heard the evidence except Court:
only when a material or substantial fact has truly been
overlooked or misappreciated which if properly taken into Q What is the address of that friends residence at Fort
account can alter the outcome of the case.6 Regrettably Bonifacio?
for accused-appellant, no such exceptive instances of
possible oversight are perceived or evident in this case. A At AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati sir.

Complainant gave a thorough narrative account, so found Q Why were you there at that time?
to be credible by the trial court and by this Court as well,
of what had transpired during the late hour of the night in A Because I always go there and my sons residence is
question. beside the house of my friend sir.
Court: Proceed fiscal:
Pros. Manola:
Q Now, while you were there on that date and time at the
house of your friend in AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati
City do you recall of any unusual incident that happened?
A There was sir.
Q Will you kindly tell what that incident was?
A During that time while I was sleeping in the residence
of my friend suddenly there was a man who entered the
house where I was sleeping.
Q So when you saw that man entered the house what did
he do if any?
A I stood up because he was pulling me and then he put
his hand in my mouth sir.
Q What else happened after that?
A When I was resisting he boxed me and at that time he
was holding a bolo and he said if I will not obey him he
will be going to kill me sir.
Q After that what transpired next Mr. Witness?
A He forced me to climb the fence and then I saw he was
holding a bolo.
Q Did you climb over the fence?
A I climb sir because he forced me to climb the fence.
Q Were you able to go over the fence?
A When I was over the fence already he told me to go to
a vacant house.
Q How about the accused where was he when he
ordered you to climb over the fence?
A He was at my back and he told me to go first and then
he followed.
Q So after you went or cross over the fence what
happened next Madam witness?
A He told me to go to the vacant house and there he
himself told me to undress and I took off my clothes he
embraced me and kissed me sir.
Q Now when this man told you to go to the vacant house
did you obey him?
A I was told to go to the vacant house there he told me to
undress.
Q Did you obey him?
A He told me to undress and he was holding a bolo.
Court:
Q The question of the prosecutor to you was did you
obey the instruction of the accused for you to undress?
A Yes sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q Tell the Honorable Court why you do followed the
instruction of that Man to go to that vacant house and to
undress why did you follow this instruction?
A I was afraid that he might kill me sir.
Q Why do you say that he might kill you?
A He like to rape me sir.
Court:
Q You did not answer the question of the prosecutor why
were you afraid?
A Because he was holding a bolo and he was at the
same time boxing me sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q So what happened after according to you you were
instructed to undress?
A He embraced me and kissed me and told me to lie
down.
Q And did you lie down as instructed by this Man?
A He forced me to lie down and then he forced me to
separate my legs sir.
Q And what happened when you were forced to open
your legs?
A He told me not to shout because if I will shout he will
kill me and the he inserted his penis to my vagina sir.
Q After this Man inserted his penis in your vagina or
private part what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A He told me to lie front my face down and he inserted
his penis to my anus sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A Then he told me again to lie down and at the same
time he inserted his fingers to my private parts going it
and out sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A He lie down because he was already tired of molesting.
Q How about you what were you doing at that time when
the accused this person according to you lie down after
he put his fingers inside your private part?
A He asked me to go near him and lie down beside him.
Q Did you follow his instruction for you to lie near him?
A Yes sir because he was holding a bolo sir.
Q So what happened after you lie down beside this
person?
A He told me to put on my dress and at the same time he
also told me that he does not want me to tell it to
anybody because he have raped many.
Q Now if this person whom according to you raped you
inside the court room would you be able to recognize
him?
A Yes sir I could recognize him.
Q Will you kindly look around the court room if you could
recognize this person if he is inside?
Note: Witness pointed to a man who was pointed as the
man who raped him and when asked his name answered
as Rolando Alfanta.
Q Now after this person whom you just pointed to who
answered by the name of Rolando Alfanta uttered the
words lahat nang ni rape ko ay pinapatay ko dahil sa
ayokong may magsumbong what happened next Mrs.
Witness?
A I pleaded to him and he said not to put on my dress
because he is going to take a rest.
Q After that what happened next if any Mrs. Witness?
A I saw him that he was sleeping already and then I
suddenly got the knife and stab him in the chest sir.
Q After you stabbed him on his chest what happened
next Mrs. Witness?
A The knife broke and then I suddenly grabbed the bolo
and hack and hack him sir.
Q After you hacked this person who raped you what
happened next Mrs. Witness?
A I immediately put on my shirt and I got hold of the bolo
and I run to the signal where the soldiers were.
Q Did you reach this place signal where there are
soldiers according to you?
A Yes sir.
Q And what did you do when then when you arrived
there?
A I told him that I killed a person therein and give them
the bolo.
Q What happened after that when you informed the
solders at signal that according to you you have killed a
person what happened next?
A We went to the person who raped me sir.
Q And did you see him there?
A Yes sir.
Q Who were with you when you went back to the place
where you were allegedly raped?
A The soldiers sir.
Q Did you find this person who raped you?
A Yes sir.
Q What was he doing?
A He was lying down sir.
Q What happened after that?
A When we arrived there he was still alive and he was
brought to the hospital.
Q Who brought him to the hospital?
A The ambulance of the soldier.
Q Now do you remember having given a statement to the
Makati Police in connection with what you have just
narrated or told or testified to this afternoon?
A I could remember.
Q If that statement is shown to you would you be able to
recognize it?
A Yes sir.
Q Now showing you a statement attached to the records
of the prosecutors office consisting of two pages kindly
go over it and tell us if you recognize this statement?
A Yes sir I could recognize this.
Q Is that your statement
A Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q Now this bolo which according to you surrendered to
the soldier at the signal if you see this bolo again would
you be able to recognize it again?
A Yes sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
We would like to make reservation for this witness to
identify this bolo when this bolo is presented by the
policeman who is in custody of this bolo.
Court:
Q How about the knife which according to you was seen A He forced that to insert it.
by you at the waist line of the accused did you bring it
also? Q Forced it to where?

A I did not bring it sir because it was broken sir it was A He forced it to enter my vagina sir.
only the bolo that I brought.
Q Did you feel when the private part of the accused
Q Now while you were being raped did you shout for entered to your vagina?
help?
A Yes sir I feel it sir.
A Yes sir.
Q By the way do you know the accused prior to the date
Q How did you ask for help? that you were awakened?

A I asked for help but they were sleeping they did not A I do not know him.
hear me sir.
Q In short he is a complete stranger to you when he
Q The question to you was how did you ask for help? entered the room?

A I cried and I said tulungan po ninyo ako. A I saw him around 7:00 oclock in the evening that he
was passing thru the front of the house of my friends
Q Did anybody respond to your cries for help? where I was sleeping.

A None sir. Q At that time that you were awaken by the accused with
whom were you sleeping?
Q Now how did you feel while the accused was inserting
his private part to your private part? A Only me sir.

A It hurt sir my vagina and my anus, my mouth that he Prosecutor Manola:

boxed me sir.
Q Now you said that while you and the accused were
Q Now why did you say that the accused was able to lying down first you stab him with the knife how many
insert his penis into your vagina? times have you stabbed him with the knife?
A I was not able to count because I was afraid of him.
Q You said that after stabbing him with the knife which
you broke you got hold of the bolo you hacked him how
many times have you hacked him?
A I failed to count how many times. I hacked him
because I was afraid of him he might kill me.
Prosecutor Manola: That will be all for the witness.
Court: Cross-examination.
Atty. Manalo: With the permission of the Honorable
Court.
Court: Proceed.
Atty. Manalo:
Q Now who were with you at the time when you were
sleeping at the house of your friend at AFOVAI Fort
Bonifacio?
A One of their children so there were three and I was
one.
Q Were you sleeping in one room?
A I was sleeping in the sala sir.
Q Now before you sleep in that house at the sala did you
close the door of that house?
A It was closed but it was not locked.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q Now when why were you interested in sleeping in the
house of your friend when you could already at the house
of your employer?
A Because I was bringing mongo to my friend because I
am indebted to them sir.
Q Now why did you not return to your employer after
giving or handing that mongo to your friend?
A They told me to sleep there because it was already late
at night.
Q By the way what time did you go there?
A Around 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening.
Q And what time did you reach your friend at AFOVAI?
A 6:30 sir.
Q And Valle Verde is just in Pasig isnt?
A Yes sir.
Q It is near where you are employed and it will take you
one ride only to reach that place isnt?
A Three rides sir.
Q Now which is first to be reached from the front door of
the house where you were sleeping at the time the place
where you were sleeping or the place of the room where
the owner of the house were sleeping?
A First it is the sala where he passed.
Q Now you said that the door was not locked was there
any other improvised locked placed in that door like a
wood?
A They did not lock the door because they are in
confident.
Q Now what is the name of the owner of the house where
you slept at that time?
A Patrick sir.
Q And how are you related to Patrick?
A His wife is my friend sir.
Q What is the name of his wife?
A Inday sir.
Q Now when you were awaken while you were sleeping
in the sala of the house of your friend Inday did you not
shout when you saw a person pulling you holding a bolo?
A I shouted but they did not hear me because they were
sleeping and at the same time he placed his hands on
my mouth sir.
Q Now you said that you were boxed on the chest by the
accused how many times were you boxed by the
accused on the chest?
A I do not know how many times I was boxed sir because
I was really afraid of him.
Q But you were sure that you were boxed at the chest?
A Yes sir.
Note: Witness demonstrating with her hands first pointing
on her chest and also on her mouth.
Q Was it strong?
A Yes sir it was strong because the following day it has
marked.
Note: Witness holding on his left chin.
Q How about on the chest?
Note: Witness demonstrating it was pointed on her chest.
A It was not too strong sir.
Q Did you fall down on your knee when you were hit by
the blow?
A Yes sir. A Near sir.

Q Where? Q Did you see his private part when he undressed

himself?
A I fell on the ground down.
A Yes sir.
Q Where were you boxed by the accused?
Q How big?
A Outside sir of the house.
Prosecutor Manola: Immaterial your honor.
Q Now you said that you were ordered to undress and to
lie down on the ground is that correct? Atty. Manalo: To test the credibility, your honor.

A Yes sir. Court: Answer

Q And you followed him? A It was dark and I was able to see and I do not know
because I was afraid.
A He told me to undress in the garage and he also
undressed himself and because I was afraid because he Atty. Manalo:
was holding a bolo sir.
Q And then you lie down?
Q When he undressed himself was he still holding a
bolo? A He told me to lie down and he placed himself on top of
me.
A Yes sir one hand was holding the bolo the other one
hand he was undressing himself. Q Was he still holding the bolo?

Q Was it lighted the place? A Yes sir he was holding the bolo on his one hand.

A None sir. Q How did you see him?

Q How far were you when the accused was undressing

himself?
A When he was holding the bolo with his one hand while
I he was on top of me I cried and he was holding the
bolo.
Note: Witness demonstrating the accused holding the
bolo upward.
A When I cried he was on top of me sir.
Q What was he doing when he was on top of you?
A He was molesting me sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now what time did you see him passed by the house
of your friend according to you?
A 9:00 oclock in the evening sir.
Q Why were you sure that he was the one who passed
by the house of your friend?
A I saw him that he was passing.
Q Where were you at the time?
A I was seating by the window sir.7
The testimony of the complainant about the incident is
straightforward categorical, and relatively free from any
serious flaw. No compelling reason is advanced to
sufficiently persuade the Court to conclude that the trial
court has erred in giving due weight and credence to the
testimony of the complainant. Neither is evidence
adduced to show that the complainant has had any
ulterior motive to prevaricate and enmesh accused-
appellant in a fabricated charge. The Court repeats the
familiar doctrine that when a woman claims that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show such a fact so long as her testimony can meet the
test of credibility,8 for it is said that no woman in her right
mind will cry rape, allow examination of her private parts,
or subject herself and her family to the humiliation
concomitant to the prosecution of the case, unless the
story were true.9
Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant claimed that
he and the complainant had been lived-in partner for
almost a year, and that while they did sleep together on
26 August 1995 at the porch of the house of a certain Air
Force officer, accused-appellant denied any carnal
knowledge of the victim that evening. In his appeal brief,
accused-appellant sought to negate any possible or likely
use of violence or intimidation, considering that: (a) in the
house where the victim was sleeping on the night of 26
August 1995, there were at least three persons (the
caretaker of the house Patrick Augusto Ablon, his wife
Rubylin and the couples son) who could have responded
to any shout for help from the victim; (b) the door of the
house was purposely left unlocked in order to enable
accused-appellant to come into the house, and (c) when
the victim was made to climb a fence followed by the
accused, she could have escaped but did not.
The sweetheart theory of accused-appellant would
appear to be another worn out strategy, often resorted to
as a last ditch effort, to exculpate oneself from criminal
liability. No documentary evidence of any sort, like a
letter or a photograph or any piece of memento, was
presented to confirm a romantic liaison between
accused-appellant and the complainant. The latter
testified:
Q Is it not a fact that you and the accused were
sweethearts?
A No sir.
Q And that you went to that place AFOVAI just to meet
him in that place?
A No sir he is not my sweetheart. Why will I hack him if
he is my sweetheart?
Q You hacked him with the bolo because of you are too
much jealousy is concerned because your sweetheart
was then womanizing?
Prosecutor Manola: Misleading your honor.
Atty. Manalo: I am on cross-examination your Honor.
Court: Answer.
A Why will I get jealous I have nothing to do with him. I
do not know him sir.
Atty. Manalo:
Q Really?
A I do not know him. I really do not know him sir.10
It would be rather strange an occurrence for a love-
partner, if true, to stab her beloved for petty reasons. The
trial court was not out of line when it made this
evaluation; viz:
This Court cannot accept the claim of accused that he
and complainant Nita Fernandez were sweethearts, for
such a claim defies rationality, let alone common sense,
because if they were sweethearts, she will not hack him.
Not only that, the manner on which she stabbed and
hacked him, first with a knife, then with a bolo, shows a
complete anger to vindicate the outrage on her. If they
were sweethearts, she would not have acted in the
manner she did in stabbing and hacking him. At least, if
they have some relationship, she would not show anger
the way she did.11
Neither would the presence of at least three persons on
the night of 26 August 1995 in the house where victim
was sleeping necessarily disprove the sexual assault. It
was already close to midnight when the incident
occurred, and the other occupants of the house were by
then apparently all sound asleep. The evidence is to the
effect that accused-appellant immediately after getting
into the house hit her on the jaw, put his hand on her
mouth and threatened to kill her if she dared refuse to
yield to his demands. Understandably, the victim was
shocked, gripped by fear and then cowed into
submission. Intimidation should be viewed in the light of
the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of
the commission of the offense and not by any kind of
hard and fast rule. It would be unreasonable to expect
the victim to act with equanimity of disposition and to
have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat
made by accused-appellant.12
The claim that the unlocked door of the house was a sign
that the complainant wanted accused-appellant to have a
chance to see her during the late evening indeed should
deserve scant consideration. The so-called love angle
was properly ruled out by the trial court for lack of
concrete evidence to establish any such relationship.
Anent the failure of the complainant to escape when
accused-appellant ordered her to climb a fence, it should
be enough to state she did not appear to have had any
real opportunity to flee from the clutches of the intruder
who was, in fact, just behind her. After scaling the fence
and while inside the abandoned and enclosed house, she
could not have done any much better since she was all
the time within striking distance of the bolo-wielding
malefactor.
And now on the propriety of an appreciation of the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy.
Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning
at the end of dusk and ending at dawn.13 The law defines
nights as being from sunset to sunrise.14 By and of itself,
nighttime would not be an aggravating circumstance
unless it is specially sought by the offender, or it is
specially taken advantage of by him, or it facilitates the
commission of the crime by insuring the offenders
immunity from capture.15 As an ordinary aggravating
circumstance, nighttime can be so considered provided it
is duly proved although not alleged in the
information.16 The Court entertains no doubt that
appellant has specially taken advantage of the cover of
darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime without
being recognized. Accused-appellant has abducted his
victim, brought her to an abandoned and unlit house and
then unleashed his carnal desire on her, assured of the
stillness of a sleeping world.17 The Court has long held
that this aggravating circumstance can be considered
when an accused takes advantage of the silence and
darkness of the night to ensure impunity from his illegal
act.18
With respect to ignominy, the victim testified that after
appellant had inserted his penis into her vagina,
appellant ordered her to lie face down and while in that
position had his penis into her anus. Thereafter, he
ordered her to lie down again and this time he inserted
his finger inside her. The Solicitor General correctly
invoked the case of People v. Saylan,19 where this Court
said:
The trial court held that there was ignominy because the
appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male
superior, female inferior, but also the same position as
dogs do i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims
there was no ignominy because The studies of many
experts in the matter have shown that this position is not
novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by
couples in the act of copulation. (Brief, p. 24.) This may
well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting
partners but not otherwise.20
Article 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code
considers to be an aggravating circumstance any means
employed or circumstance brought about which add
ignominy to the natural effects of the act. The
circumstance, it is said,21 "pertains to the moral order
[and] adds disagree and obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime.
The crime of rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of
a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.22
In the case at bar, it remained uncontroverted that
accused-appellant was armed with a bolo to realize his
criminal objective. Nonetheless, the use of a deadly
weapon could not be considered as a qualifying
circumstance in the crime of rape23 for not having been
correspondingly alleged in the information as to make the
offense fall under the jurisprudentially referred qualified
rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. In
People v. Garcia,24 the Court declared:
One further observation. Article 335 originally provided
only for simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua,
but Republic Act No. 4111 introduced amendments
thereto by providing for qualified forms of rape
carrying the death penalty, that is, when committed
with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, when by reason or on the occasion of the rape
the victim becomes insane, or, under the same
circumstances, a homicide is committed. The homicide in
the last two instances in effect created a special complex
crime of rape with homicide. The first two attendant
circumstances are considered as equivalent to
qualifying circumstances since they increase the
penalties by degrees, and not merely as aggravating
circumstances which affect only the period of the
penalty but do not increase it to a higher degree. The
original provisions of Article 335 and the amendments of
Republic Act No. 4111 are still maintained.
xxx xxx xxx.
Now, it has long been the rule that qualifying
circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved,
they shall be considered only as aggravating
circumstances, (People v. Collado, 60 Phil. 610 [1934];
People v. Jovellano, et al., L-32421, March 27, 1974, 56
SCRA 156; People v. Fuertes, G.R. No. 104067, January
17, 1994, 229 SCRA 289; People v. Rodico, et al., G.R.
No. 107101, October 16, 1995, 249 SCRA 309.) since
the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded.
(U.S. v. Campo, 23 Phil. 368 [1912];
People v. Domondon, 60 Phil. 729 [1934]; People v. De
Guzman, G.R. No. 73464, August 1988, 164 SCRA 215.)
Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to
be informed of the charges against him and,
consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged
with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form
punishable with death, although the attendant
circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in
capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on
which he was arraigned.25
Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Thus, even if there were
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy in
attendance the appropriate penalty would still
be reclusion perpetua under the law. Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding
accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION by hereby lowering the penalty
therein imposed from death to reclusion perpetua. An
award of P50,000.00 for moral damages is likewise
ordered to be paid by accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta
to the victim Nita Hernandez in addition to the sum
of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delictu granted by
the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 105961 October 22, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PACIFICO SUMAOY, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and
RICHARD DOE, accused appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:p
This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao in Criminal Case No.
7245, finding accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy guilty
of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, Zandro Vargas, in the sum of P30,000.00 and
to pay the costs.
Accused-appellant was convicted for the killing on July 9,
1988 of Zandro Vargas, a boy 16 years of age, in Tagum,
Davao. Wilbert Vargas, the victim's brother, and Patricio
Jacobe, Jr. identified accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy
as the assailant, together with three others who have
remained unidentified and at large.
The prosecution presented four witnesses: Wilbert
Vargas, Patricio Jacobe, Jr., Enriqueta Vargas and Dr.
Jose Lopez.
Patricio Jacobe, Jr. testified that he worked as a pin boy
in a billiard hall on Roxas Street, Tagum, Davao. At 5:45
p.m. of July 9, 1988, he left the billiard hall to have some
beer at the Pacing's Carinderia on Sobrecary Street.
Afterward, he went back to the billiard hall, passing by
the J Spot Carinderia at the corner of Roxas and
Sobrecary Streets, where he saw the deceased Zandro
Vargas talking to accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy.
Three other men were with them but Jacobe did not
recognize the three.
Upon reaching the billiard hall, Patricio Jacobe, Jr. piled
some billiard balls, then went out and stood on the
sidewalk. He was startled by the sound of a gunshot.
When he turned to find out where the sound came from,
he saw Zandro Vargas running towards Roxas Street
with his right arm bleeding. Zandro Vargas tried to seek
refuge at the Try Me beauty parlor, but he was overtaken
by accused-appellant who dragged him towards a waiting
tricycle. Accused-appellant had a gun. The accused-
appellant and three other men then boarded the tricycle
taking Zandro Vargas with them. Jacobe Allegedly heard
one of accused-appellant's companion say that they were
taking Zandro to the hospital. Later that evening Jacobe
learned that Zandro was found dead in a kangkong field
near the Davao Visayan Village.
The other prosecution witness, Wilbert Vargas, is the
brother of the deceased. Wilbert testified that at 6:00
p.m., on July 9, 1988, while he was talking to a friend on
Roxas Street near the public market, he was told that his
brother Zandro was being beaten up in a carinderia at the
corner of Roxas and Sobrecary Streets. Wilbert
immediately proceeded to the J Spot Carinderia. He saw
accused-appellant aiming his gun at Zandro as the latter
was running away. Accused-appellant shot Zandro
Vargas, hitting the latter in the forearm, and causing him
to fall on his knees. Zandro Vargas was then dragged by
accused-appellant and three unidentified men towards a
tricycle. Wilbert Vargas saw his brother loaded onto the
tricycle "like a pig," with Zandro's feet hanging out.
Wilbert tried to come to the aid of his brother but
accused-appellant pointed his gun at him, causing him to
run home in fear.
Wilbert Vargas told his parents what had happened to his
brother. They searched for Zandro. They went to
Mangga, Davao and there learned from Jose Montilla,
the driver of the tricycle which accused-appellant
Sumaoy and his companions hailed, that Zandro had
been killed and that his body had been dumped in a
kangkong field in Visayan Village, Tagum, Davao. Wilbert
and his parents proceeded to the place indicated and
there found Zandro's dead body.
Wilbert Vargas identified Pacifico Sumaoy as one of the
assailants. Wilbert testified that he recognized Sumaoy
because the latter was assigned to the military
detachment in the Diwalwal mining area where Wilbert
used to work. Dr. Jose Lopez, Municipal Health Officer of
Tagum, who examined the body of Zandro Vargas,
issued a death certificate. Under questioning by the
prosecutor, Dr. Lopez testified as follows:
Q You said you placed your
findings in the certificate of
death, please read the
findings, Doctor.
A (Reading) — "I hereby
certify that I have this 10th
day of July 1988 performed
an autopsy upon the body of
the deceased Zandro Rinia
Vargas and that the cause of
death was as follows: Shock,
irreversible, due to gunshot
wounds located at (1) right
frontal into cranial cavity
exiting at right upper occipital;
(2) right eyebrow exiting at left
lower occipital; (3) left
temporal (no exit); (4) right
arm lateral going out at medial
and going into right axillary
into thoracic cavity (no exit)".
Q Will you explain your
findings to us, Doctor?
A There were four (4) gunshot
wounds found on the body of
the victim No. 1 was at the
right frontal (witness pointing
at his middle forehead) going
into the cranial cavity going
outside (witness pointing at
the back of his head); No. 2,
at the right eyebrow (witness
pointing at the middle of right
eyebrow) going out to the left
lower occipital (witness
pointing at the back of his
head, left side near the ear);
No. 3 wound is found at the
temporal without exit (witness
pointing at the left side of his
head, a little above the left
ear); and the No. 4 wound is
found at the right arm lateral
(witness pointing at his right-
upper arm, outside) going at
medial aspect then same
bullet passed into the axillary
region into the thoracic cavity,
no more exit, the right-upper
arm as entrance and exit
 inside of the right-upper arm
and then going into the right
chest (witness pointing at the
right side of his body just
about 3 inches below the
armpit). 2
Accused-appellant denies participation in the killing of
Zandro Vargas. He claims that the whole day of July 9,
1988 he was on duty as an enlisted personnel of the
1103rd Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) in Tagum,
Davao. Accused-appellant identified a document signed
by Technical Sergeant Ricardo Go called "Duty Detail"
showing that accused-appellant was on duty from 8:00
a.m. of July 9, 1988 to 8:00 a.m. of July 10, 1988.
Ricardo Go, Technical Sergeant, Philippine Constabulary
and Team Leader of the Criminal Investigation Service
Command, Tagum, Davao, and Patrolman Narciso
Vismanos, corroborated the accused-appellant's alibi.
On June 6, 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Tagum,
Davao rendered a decision finding accused-appellant
guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The trial court
noted that accused-appellant Sumaoy shot Zandro while
the latter was running away and held that the three bullet
wounds sustained by Zandro in the head showed that he
was shot while in a helpless and defenseless condition.
The trial court appreciated the ordinary aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of public position
against accused-appellant Sumaoy.
Accused-appellant Sumaoy has appealed from this
decision of the trial court. He contends that the
prosecution evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty necessary to support a judgment of conviction.
He points out that no proof was presented as to the type
of weapon used in the shooting of Zandro Vargas, and he
challenges the testimony and credibility of witnesses
Wilbert Vargas and Patricio Jacobe, Jr.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General, in
representation of the prosecution, argues that the
circumstances established by the prosecution, when
taken together, constitute an unbroken chain leading to
the inevitable conclusion that accused-appellant shot and
killed Zandro Vargas. While there is no direct evidence
showing that it was indeed accused-appellant who shot
Zandro in the head, the Solicitor General claims that the
testimonies of Wilbert Vargas and Patricio Jacobe that
Zandro was last seen alive with accused-appellant and
three other men clearly prove that no other person could
have shot and killed Zandro Vargas than accused-
appellant Pacifico Sumaoy.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the
circumstantial evidence in this case establishes beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellant shot and killed
Zandro Vargas. These circumstances, as pointed out by
the Solicitor General, are the following:
(a) Zandro was being mauled by appellant
and his companions (p. 5 TSN, June 28,
1990);
 (b) As Zandro was attempting to run,
appellant drew his pistol and shot Zandro
(pp. 5-6, Ibid);
(c) Zandro was hit on the arm (p. 6,
TSN, Ibid. and p. 8, TSN, July 13, 1990);
(d) Zandro fell on his knees (p. 6, TSN,
June 28, 1990);
(e) Zandro was dragged towards a
motorized pedicab by appellant (p. 6, TSN,
June 28, 1990 and p. 8, TSN, July 13,
1990);
(f) Zandro was loaded on the motorized
pedicab and appellant and his companions
boarded the same pedicab (pp. 6-7, TSN,
June 28, 1990 and pp. 8-10, TSN, July 13,
1990);
(g) Zandro was found dead (p. 11, TSN,
June 28, 1990).3
Together these circumstances constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and
reasonable conclusion — that the accused is guilty
of the killing of Zandro Vargas.
It was established by positive testimony that accused-
appellant Sumaoy shot the deceased in the arm and
thereafter took the victim with him to an undisclosed
location with the help of three other men. Only the
accused-appellant was seen with a firearm. Less than 24
hours later, the victim was found dead. Not only was
accused-appellant identified as the person with whom
Zandro Vargas was last seen alive, he was also
positively identified as the person who shot Zandro
Vargas in the arm. There is thus proof of aggression on
the part of the accused which, taken with the other
circumstances, shows he had the intent to inflict injury
upon the victim.
In the case of People v. Fulinara, 4 the accused were
convicted of kidnapping with murder based upon positive
testimony that the victim was last seen alive when he
was forcibly abducted by two armed men in army fatigues
who were later identified as the accused. After the victim
was abducted by the accused he was later found dead.
As in the case before us, there was no eyewitness at the
precise moment the victim was killed.
Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted
without the presentation of the gun in evidence. He
alleges that the prosecution's failure to match the slugs
recovered from the body of Zandro Vargas with accused-
appellant's own firearm precludes his conviction. This
contention has no merit. The presentation and
identification of the weapon used are not indispensable to
prove the guilt of the accused. 5 The time which elapsed
from the moment the victim was last seen alive and the
moment his body was found narrows the possibility that
another agent caused his death, 6 especially where an
aggression was established against the victim before he
disappeared with the accused.
The accused-appellant tries to discredit the testimonies
of the principal prosecution witnesses. He point out that
Patricio Jacobe, Jr. testified that Zandro was shot in the
right arm, while Wilbert Vargas said Zandro was shot in
the left. This is, however, an inconsistency concerning a
minor matter which does not impair credibility of the
witnesses. The inconsistency negates any suspicion that
the testimonies were perjured or rehearsed.7 Moreover,
findings of fact of trial courts, particularly with respect to
the credibility of witnesses who personally appeared and
testified before them, must be respected on appeal. 8
Accused-appellant's defense of alibi is of no moment. Not
only was accused-appellant positively identified as the
person who had shot and taken Zandro Vargas to an
undisclosed placed. It is also settled that for alibi to
prosper, it is not enough that accused-appellant prove
that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed. He must demonstrate that he could not have
been physically present at the place of the crime or in its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The
testimony of accused-appellant, T/Sgt. Go and Pat.
Narciso Vismanos failed to show that it was impossible
for the accused to be at the scene of the crime. The CIS
office was only one kilometer away from the scene of the
crime. In addition, Vismanos admitted that he was so
absorbed in his work that he did not really know whether
accused-appellant was in the office premises the entire
day of the latter's duty. 9
While the evidence in this case sufficiently establishes
the guilt of the accused-appellant for the killing of victim
Zandro Vargas, we think he cannot be held liable for
murder because of the absence of evidence as to the
manner of the actual killing. Where no particulars are
known as to the manner in which the aggression was
made or how the act which resulted in the death of the
victim began and developed, it cannot be established
from mere suppositions that the accused perpetrated the
killing with treachery. 10 The evidence shows that the
aggression against the victim began when he was still at
the J Spot Carinderia. As a matter of fact, according to
Patricio Jacobe, Jr., the deceased was trying to flee from
the accused-appellant when the latter shot him, thus
indicating that the victim had been forewarned of a
greater aggression against him. The assault on the victim
cannot be said to have been made in a sudden or
unexpected manner so as to justify a finding of
treachery. 11
The trial court also erred in finding the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of official position in
the commission of the offense. This circumstance
requires that the accused, as a public officer, used the
influence or reputation of his position for the purpose of
committing the crime. If the accused could have
perpetrated the crime without occupying his position,
then there is no abuse of public position. In the case
before us, no evidence was adduced to show that the
killing of Zandro Vargas was in any way facilitated by the
accused-appellant's public position. It was not even
shown whether the accused-appellant wore his uniform
or used his service firearm when he committed the
crime. 12
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
MODIFIED, finding accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy
guilty of homicide, and SENTENCING him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Zandro
Vargas in the increased sum of P50,000.00 and to pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-35500 October 27, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
JOSE RUBIO, defendant-appellant.
Guillermo B. Guevara for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Judge Moran presiding, denying
appellant's motion to declare null and void a search
warrant issued on December 26, 1930, and to have
returned to him the books of account, invoices, and
records which were seized by virtue of the warrant. The
case was originally assigned to a Division of Five and
was there decided, but subsequently, on representations
being made that the interpretation of an Act of Congress
was involved, the Division ordered its decision set aside
and the transfer of the case to the court in banc.
The Administrative Code, section 1434, grants police
power to internal revenue agents. Acting pursuant to this
authority, the chief secret service agent and a
supervising agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
gave testimony under oath before Judge Revilla, in which
they specified the premises situated at No. 129 Calle
Juan Luna, District of Binondo, City of Manila, occupied
by Jose Rubio, manager of the Simplex Trading
Corporation, which it was desired to search. The
witnesses, among other things, stated:
It has been reported to me by a person whom I
considered reliable that in said premises there are
fraudulent books, invoices and records.
I have watched personally the foregoing house for
several times in company of the complainant and I
can assert positively and with a probable case that
the prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and
records, exist and being conducted in the said
house, and the occupant of the same keeps in his
possession effects and devices to wit: Fraudulent
books of the Simplex Trading Corporation & to
subsidiary companies Paramount Trading
Corporation & New York Trading Corp.
Upon probable cause thus being shown, a search
warrant was issued in the usual from, reading as follows:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff, } You are therefore commanded to take with
VERSUS
JOSE RUBIO, Manager of the Simplex
Trading
Corporation, Paramount Corporation
and
New York Trading
Corporation, defendant.
} December, 1930.
The People of the Philippine Islands, to the
Internal
Revenue Agents of the City of Manila.
GREETING:
Proof by affidavit having this day been
made before me, E. P. Revilla, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, by the complainant on
oath of Juan Evaristo and Augusto Piccio of
the City of Manila, P. I., that the defendant
Jose Rubio keeps illegally and feloniously
fraudulent books, invoices and records, and
that he verily believes upon probable cause
that the said books, invoices and records,
at No. 129, Calle Juan Luna in the City of
Manila, P. I., and the said (personal)
property is now being used in the
commission of felony.
you the necessary and proper assistance
and to enter, in the day time or in the night
time, into the said dwelling house and there
diligently search for fraudulent books,
invoices and records, and that you seize
and bring them before this court, to be
disposed of according to law.
Given under my hand this 26th day of
(Sgd.) E. P. REVILLA
Judge, Court of First Instance
On the same day, internal revenue agents proceeded to
the place indicated in the warrant, searched the
premises, and took therefrom books, invoices, and
documents belonging to the Simplex Trading Corporation
of which Jose Rubio was the manager. Thereafter, as
indicated, a motion was presented on behalf of Rubio to
secure a pronouncement of nullity of the search warrant,
which motion, after receiving memoranda in support and
in opposition but without taking evidence, was denied.
The particular portions of the Act of Congress which are
relied upon are found in the Philippine Bill of Rights,
being paragraphs 3 and 11 of section 3 of the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly referred to as
the Philippine Autonomy Act. These portions of the
Organic Act Provide: "That the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated" (sec. 3, par. 11); and "That no person shall . . .
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself" (sec. 3, par. 3). The applicable statutory
provisions are sections 95, 96, 97, 98, and 99 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure reading as follows:
SEC. 95. A search warrant is an order in writing,
issued in the name of the People of the Philippine
Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the
peace, and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before the court.
SEC. 96. It may be issued upon either of the
following grounds:
1. When the property was stolen or
embezzled.
2. When it was used or when the intent
exists to use it as the means of committing
a felony.
SEC. 97. A search warrant shall not issue except
for probable cause and upon application
supported by oath particularly describing the place
to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized.
SEC. 98. The judge or justice must, before issuing
the warrant, examine on oath the complaint and
any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing.
SEC. 99. If the judge or justice is thereupon
satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application is based, or that there is probable
cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the
warrant, which must be substantially in the
following form:
The errors assigned on appeal, connecting up with the
order of the trial court, the statement of the case, and the
law as herein set forth, are the following:
1. The lower court erred in not holding that the
search warrant was illegal and void for failure to
observe the constitutional and statutory provisions
providing for its issue.
2. The lower court erred in holding that even if the
warrant were illegal and void appellant's books
and papers might be retained because they were
proper subjects for seizure under a search
warrant.
 3. The lower court erred in not holding that the
seizure of appellant's books and papers was made
solely for the purpose of using them as evidence
against him in a criminal prosecution and was,
therefore, unlawful.
The point made in the first error was not originally passed
upon the trial court, and is plainly without merit. The
requirements of the law were substantially, and even
literally, complied with in this case. Appellant's contention
that the search warrant was issued without the
complainants or any witnesses having been examined, is
untenable. The depositions speak for themselves. It is
also contended that the application and the warrant did
not particularly describe the things to be seized. The
verified statements of the two internal revenue agents
and the warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of
Manila all describe the property sought to be seized as
"fraudulent books, invoices and records". While it is true
that the property to be seized under a warrant must be
particularly described therein and no other property can
be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be
specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow. It has been held that, where, by the nature of the
goods to be seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be
given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue.
Appellant has not shown that the internal revenue agents
exceeded their powers under the warranty by seizing
property other than that described in the warrant
question. The list of books, invoices, and records seized
by said officers is the best evidence to show that they
strictly obeyed the command of their warrant by seizing
those things, and only those described in the search
warrant.
Under the second error, it is claimed that "the books,
invoices, and records seized are property which one may
lawfully possess; they were searched and seized solely
for the purpose of using them as evidence to prove an
offense supposed to have been committed by appellant
against the internal revenue customs laws, which search
and seizure for the purpose intended is prohibited by
law." Reliance is placed on the Philippine cases
of Regidor vs. Araullo ([1904], 5 Off. Gaz., 955); Uy
Kheytin vs. Villa-Real ([1920], 42 Phil., 886); and United
States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra ([1911], 20 Phil.,
467). An examination of the first two cited cases reveals
that the seizures made under the warrants issued therein
were irregular and manifestly in violation of law. In the
first case, for instance, the court observed:
A causal examination of the property mentioned in
the affidavit and the list of books, papers, and
documents actually seized by the said officers, as
represented by their signed statement, above
quoted, will show that the officers, in executing the
said search warrant, did not limit themselves, in
seizing property, to that which was described in
the affidavit or search warrant.
(Regidor vs. Araullo, supra.)
In the second case, the court said:
The important question that remains to be decided
is whether, under a search warrant for opium, the
 officers of the law were authorized to seize books,
personal letters, and other property having a
remote or no connection with opium. (Uy
Kheytin vs. Villa-Real, supra.)
Under these circumstances, it is evident that the seizures
made were in excess of the authority given to the seizing
officers. In the case at bar, however, it has been shown
that the internal revenue agents strictly obeyed the
command of their warrant by seizing no other property
than that described therein.
In the third case cited by the appellant, that of United
States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra, supra, the holding
was that no public officer has the right to enter the
premises of another for the purpose of search or seizure
against the will of the occupant and without the proper
search warrant. This case is entirely foreign to the point
under discussion, inasmuch as in the instant case a
search warrant was issued. From the above, it will be
seen that the three Philippine cases relied upon by the
appellant rest upon different facts from those in the case
at bar.
After the decision in Division had been promulgated, the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court of April 11,
1932, delivered in the case of United States of America
vs. Daniel M. Lefkowitz and Pauline Paris was received,
and it is now urged that this opinion is controlling. Of
course, if the opinion, on examination, be found to
support the views of the appellant, it would become our
duty, even as against any pride which one might have in
maintaining a position previously taken, to change front
to conform to the pronouncements of the higher court.
Turning to the opinion just mentioned, we find it said: "All
the searches and seizures were made without a search
warrant" — in contrast, the searches and seizures in the
case at bar were made with a search warrant. Further, it
was said: "The only question presented is whether the
searchers of the desks, cabinet and baskets and the
seizures of the things taken from them were reasonable
as an incident of the arrests" — an entirely different state
of facts from those before us. Again, it was said: "The
Fourth Amendment forbids every search that is
unreasonable and is construed liberally to safeguard the
right of privacy" — an admonition which should be
respected in this jurisdiction where constitutional rights
are as sacred as in the United States proper. Finally, a
contrast was suggested between the search of one's
house or place of business made contemporaneously
with his lawful arrest therein upon a valid warrant of
arrest and a search warrant, and it was said:
Respondents' papers were wanted by the officers
solely for use as evidence of crime of which
respondents were accused or suspected. They
could not lawfully be searched for and taken even
under a search warrant issued upon ample
evidence and precisely describing such things and
disclosing exactly where they were.
(Gouled vs. United States, 255 U. S., 298, 310.)
xxx xxx xxx
Here, the searches were exploratory and general
and made solely to find evidence of respondents'
 guilt of the alleged conspiracy or some other
crime. Though intended to be used to solicit orders
for liquor in violation of the Act, the papers and
other articles found and taken were in themselves
unoffending. The decisions of this court distinguish
searchers of one's house, office, papers or effects
merely to get evidence to convict him of crime
from searches as such as those made to find
stolen goods for return to the owner, to take
property that has been forfeited to the
Government, to discover property concealed to
avoid payment of the duties for which it is liable,
and from searches such as those made for the
seizure of counterfeit coins, burglars' tools,
gambling paraphernalia and illicit liquor in order to
prevent the commission of crime.
We note that the opinion in the Lefkowitz case relies on
previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
Gouled vs. United States ([1920], 255 U. S., 298), and
Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. United States ([1930], 282 U.
S., 344). In the first case, it was said:
. . . search warrants . . . may not be used as a
means of gaining access to a man's house or
office and papers solely for the purpose of making
search to secure evidence to be used against him
in a criminal or penal proceeding, but . . . they may
be resorted to only when a primary right to such
search and seizure may be found in the interest
which the public or the complaint may have in the
property to be seized, or in the right to the
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the
police power renders possession of the property
by the accused unlawful and provides that it may
be taken. (Boyd Case, 116, U. S., 623, 624, L. ed.,
748; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 524.)
There is no special sanctity in papers, as
distinguished from other forms of property, to
render them immune from search and seizure, if
only they fall within the scope of the principles of
the cases in which other property may be seized,
and if they be adequately described in the affidavit
and warrant. . . . we cannot doubt that contracts
may be so used as instruments or agencies for
perpetrating frauds upon the Government as to
give the public an interest in them which would
justify the search for and seizure of them, under a
properly issued search warrant, for the purpose of
preventing further frauds.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the contract with Steinthal, also a stranger to
the indictment. It is not difficult, as we have said,
to imagine how an executed written contract might
be an important agency or instrumentality in the
bribing of a public servant and perpetrating frauds
upon the Government so that it would have a
legitimate and important interest in seizing such a
paper in order prevent further frauds, . . . .
As to the second case, it rested on the proposition that a
general exploratory search of premises, the seizure of
papers therefrom, and their retention for use as evidence
in a criminal proceeding cannot be sustained where
made at a time when no crime was being committed and
under a false claim of possession of a search warrant, by
one making of an arrest of persons on the premises
under color of an invalid warrant, who required one of
them, by pretention of right and threat or force, to open a
desk and safe. It was further ruled that, there is no
formula for the determination of the reasonableness of a
search and seizure, but each case is to be decided on its
own facts and circumstances.
This brings us in logical order to the third error and the
point often made that the seizure of appellant's books,
invoices, and records was made solely for the purpose of
using them as evidence against him in a criminal
prosecution. The question, in its final analysis, is, were
appellant's books, invoices, and records seized solely for
use as evidence of a crime of which the appellant was
accused or suspected? — or were the books, invoices,
and records seized in order to prevent the further
perpetration of fraud? In the first place, it is to be
observed that the public has an interest in the proper
regulation of appellant's books. (Act No. 3292, section 4.)
In the second place, the books belonged to a corporation
of which the appellant was simply the manager. And in
the third place, the search warrant only issued on a
showing of probable cause — to adopt the language alike
of section 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the
search warrant — that "fraudulent books, invoices, and
records" were "now being used in the commission of a
felony."
Finally, while the assertion is oft-repeated that the books,
invoices, and records were taken solely for the purpose
of being used as evidence against Rubio, we find no
support for this contention in the record. In the trial court,
the assistant city fiscal said: "As we have stated above,
the search and seizure in this case were made under the
provisions of the internal-revenue laws and the authority
of a search warrant, and not for the purpose of obtaining
evidence, but with a view to seize the instruments used in
the violation of said laws committed by the defendant."
On appeal, the prosecution persistently maintains its
position that the seizure was made with the object of
preventing the use of the books of account, documents,
and papers in the commission of further offenses or fraud
or against the Government. Not a scintilla of evidence is
to be found in the record to prove that the Government
has used the books of account, documents, and papers
as evidence against the appellant, or that the
Government ever had the intention of so doing. All we
know is, that an information was filed against Rubio,
charging him with a violation of the Customs Law, and
that he compromised another case with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue on the payment of the sum of
P100,000. On this showing, we perforce cannot deduce
that the books of account, documents, and papers were
wanted solely for use as evidence of a crime.
A thorough reexamination of the case, in the light of the
arguments presented and the authorities cited, leads us
to the same conclusion as before, namely, that no
constitutional right of the appellant was violated; that the
letter of the law was followed, and that the order of the
trial judge was correct in all particulars. Wherefore, the
judgment will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.
Avanceña, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Hull, Vickers, Imperial
and Butte, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
Convinced that the decision in this case sets at naught
important constitutional principles, I dissent.
I am of the opinion that the warrant here in question is
null and void, because it was issued not only without
authority of law but in contravention of express
constitutional and statutory provisions. Section 3,
paragraph 11 of the Organic Act, provides "That the right
to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated"; and section 97 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, in turn, provides that "A
search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause
and upon application supported by oath particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized." These provisions of law are almost
an exact reproduction of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and they were undoubtedly
intended to afford the same protection to the people of
these Islands as the Fourth Amendment affords to the
people of the United States. We are thus fully justified in
relying on American authorities and cases for the
purpose of ascertaining the real intent, object and scope
of such provisions.
In the leading case of Boyd vs. United States (116 U. S.,
616, 625; 29 L. ed., 746, 749), the Supreme Court of the
United States, through Justice Bradley, dwelt at length on
the historical reasons for the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment and made, among others, the following
pertinent observations: "In order to ascertain the nature
of the proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment to
the Constitution under the terms "unreasonable searches
and seizures," it is only necessary to recall the
contemporary or then recent history of the controversies
on the subject, both in this country and in England. The
practice had obtained in the Colonies of issuing writs of
assistance to the revenue officers, empowering them, in
their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled
goods, which James Otis pronounced "the worst
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law,
that ever was found in an English law book"; since they
placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every
petty officer." This was in February, 1761, in Boston, and
the famous debate in which it occurred was perhaps the
most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance
of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country.
"Then and there," said John Adams, "then and there was
the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary
claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
Independence was born." And speaking of the
importance and scope of the protection intended to be
given by Fourth Amendment, the same court, in Weeks
vs. United States (232 U. S., 383, 329; 58 L. ed., 652,
655), said: "This protection reaches all alike, whether
accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force
and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our
federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The
tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful
seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often
obtained after subjecting accused persons to
unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by
the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts which are charged at all times
with the support of the Constitution and to which people
of all conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights."
The historical background of the provisions in our
Organic Act which recognizes "the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures" clearly
reveals that it was intended to protect the people against
abuses arising from the issuance of general warrants,
thus reaffirming the principle "that a man's house was his
castle and not to be invaded by any general authority to
search and seize his goods and papers." As stated by
Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, Vol. I, P. 611:
"The maxim that "every man's house is his castle," is
made a part of our constitutional law in the clauses
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and has
always been looked upon as of high value to the citizen."
To safeguard the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, we find not only in the Federal Constitution
but in every State constitution a provision to the effect
that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause and upon application supported by oath
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized. "The effect of the Fourth
Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and
Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the
exercise of such power and authority, and to forever
secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and
effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures
under the guise of law." (Weeks vs. United
States, supra.) In a recent case decided by the Supreme
Court vs. United States (75 L. ed., [Adv. Ops.], 191), it
was said: "The first clause of the Fourth Amendment
declares: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated." It is general and forbids every search that is
unreasonable; it protects all, those suspected or known
to be offenders as well as the innocent, and
unquestionably extends to the premises where the
search was made and the papers taken. (Gouled vs.
United States, 255 U. S., 298, 307; 65 L. ed., 647, 561;
41 S. Ct., 261.) The second clause declares, "and
warrants shall issue, but upon probable case, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." This prevents the issue of warrants on loose,
vague or doubtful bases of fact. It emphasizes the
purpose to protect against all general searches. Since
before the creation of our government, such searches
have been deemed obnoxious to fundamental principles
of liberty. They are denounced in the constitutions or
statutes of every state in the Union. (Angello vs. United
States, 269 U. S., 20, 33; 70 L. ed., 145, 149; 51 A. L. R.,
409; 46 S. Ct., 4.) The need of protection against them is
attested alike by history and present conditions. The
amendment is to be liberally construed and all owe the
duty of vigilance for its effective enforcement lest there
shall be impairment of the rights for the protection of
which it was adopted. (Boyd vs. United States, 116 U. S.,
616, 623; 29 L. ed., 746, 748; 6 S. Ct., 524; Weeks vs.
United States, 232 U. S., 389-392; 58 L. ed., 654, 655; L.
R. A., 1915B, 834; 34 S. Ct., 341; Ann. Cas. 1915C,
1177, supra.)"1awphil.net
Turning now to the case before us, in the search warrant
sufficient to satisfy the law? It seems clear to me that a
perusal of the warrant itself, of the application upon which
the same was issued and, of the sworn testimony given
in support of the application, requires a finding that the
warrant failed to comply with the requirements prescribed
by law as to (1) the existence of probable cause, and (2)
the description of the property or things to be seized.
It is a well established doctrine that if a warrant is sought
for the seizure or search of person or property, the
application must be based on a sworn statement of facts,
not surmises or beliefs. "No search warrant shall be
issued unless the judge has first been furnished with
facts under oath — not suspicions, beliefs, or surmises
— but facts which, when the law is properly applied to
them, tend to establish the necessary legal conclusion, or
facts which, when the law is properly applied to them,
tend to establish probable cause for believing that the
legal conclusion is right. The inviolability of the accused's
home is to be determined by the facts, not by rumor,
suspicion, or guesswork. If the facts afford the legal basis
for the search warrant, the accused must take the
consequences. But equally there must be consequences
for the accuser to face. If the sworn accusation is based
on fiction, the accuser must take the chance of
punishment for perjury. Hence the necessity of a sworn
statement of facts, because one cannot be convicted of
perjury for having a belief, though the belief be utterly
unfounded in fact and law." (Veeder vs. United States,
252 Fed., 414, 418.)
In United States vs. Borkowski (268 Fed., 408), the court
held that the finding of probable cause should be based,
not on the opinion or belief of a witness or witnesses, but
on facts set forth in the affidavit from which the existence
of probable caused may be fairly inferred. Otherwise the
conclusion would be that of the witness, and not of the
judicial officer in whom alone the Constitution has vested
the extraordinary power to issue search warrants, and
who is thus legally charged with the duty of preventing
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The reason for the doctrine is tersely stated by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Go-Bart Importing
Co. vs. United States, supra, thus: "This prevents the
issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of
fact. It emphasizes the purpose to protect against all
general searches. Since before the creation of our
government, such searches have been deemed
obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty. They are
denounced in the constitutions or statutes of every state
in the Union."
Let us now see the sworn statements supporting the
application for the search warrant in this case. Do they
state facts — rather than suspicions, beliefs, and
surmises? In the first statement we find the following
questions and answers:
Q. What is your name, residence and occupation?
— A. Juan Evaristo, chief secret service agent.
Augusto Piccio, supervising agent, Bureau of
Internal Revenue.
Q. Are you the applicant for this search warrant?
— A. Yes.
Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? —
A. I do not know. According to the best of
information the house is occupied by Mr. Jose
Rubio, manager of the Simplex Trading
Corporation and its subsidiary companies.
Q. What are your reasons for applying for this
search warrant? — A. It has been reported to me
by a person whom I considered reliable that in
said premises there are fraudulent books, invoices
and records.
In the second statement we also find the following
questions and answers:
Q. What is your name, residence and occupation?
— A. Juan Evaristo and Augusto Piccio, internal
revenue officers, Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Q. Are you the witness for this search warrant? —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the house situated at No. 129,
Calle Juan Luna, District of Binondo, City of
Manila? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know who occupies said house? — A.
Yes. According to the best of my information the
house is occupied by Mr. Jose Rubio.
Q. What do you know about that house? — A. I
have watched personally the foregoing house for
several times in company of the complainant and I
can assert positively and with a probable cause
that the prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and
records, exist and being conducted in the said
house, and the occupant of the same keeps in his
possession effects and devices to wit: fraudulent
books of the Simplex Trading Corporation and
subsidiary companies Paramount Trading
Corporation and New York Trading Corporation.
The same persons, Juan Evaristo and Augusto Piccio,
signed both statements.
It will be observed, in the first place, that the witnesses
could not even state positively who occupied the
premises or house to be searched. All that they affirmed
was "According to the best of information the house is
occupied by Mr. Jose Rubio." In the second place, the
only reasons given for the application for the search
warrant, are as follows: "It has been reported to me by a
person whom I considered reliable that in said premises
there are fraudulent books, invoices and records" and "I
have watched personally the foregoing house for several
times in company of the complainant and I can assert
positively and with a probable cause that the prohibited
fraudulent books, invoices and records, exist and being
conducted in the said house, and the occupant of the
same keeps in his possession effects and devices to wit:
fraudulent books of the Simplex Trading Corporation and
subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation
and New York Trading Corporation."
As I shall try to explain more fully later, the alleged
existence of "prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and
records" and the alleged possession by the appellant of
"fraudulent books of the Simplex Trading Corporation and
subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation
and New York Teding Corporation" furnished no definite
bases of which could justify the issue of a warrant upon
probable cause; and, as declared by the Supreme Court
of the United States, the requirement as to the existence
of probable cause for the issue of a search warrant
"prevents the issue of warrants on loose, vague or
doubtful bases of fact."
The other essential requisite for the issuance of a search
warrant, which is also lacking in the present case, is that
relating to the description of the thing or things to be
seized. The law provides in unmistakable language that
the application for a search warrant must particularly
describe the thing to be seized. The reason for this
requirement is explained by Cooley in his work already
cited as follows: "Search-warrants are always obnoxious
to very serious objections; and very great particularly is
justly required in these cases before the privacy of a
man's premises is allowed to be invaded by the minister
of the law. And therefore a designation of goods to be
searched for as "goods, wares, and merchandises,"
without more particular description, has been regarded
as insufficient, even in the case of goods supposed to be
smuggled, where there is usually greater difficulty in
giving description, and where, consequently, more
latitude should be permitted than in the case of property
stolen." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Vol. I, pp.
621, 622.)
Neither the phrase "fraudulent books of the Simplex
Trading Corporation and subsidiary companies
Paramount Trading Corporation and New York Trading
Corporation", found in the sworn statement, nor the
phrase "fraudulent books, invoices and records", found in
the search warrant, supplies the particularity of
description required by law. Such phrases do not even
express a conclusion of fact by which a warrant officer
may be guided in making the search and seizure, but
they do express a conclusion of law as to the full import
of which even lawyers may differ. In the last analysis,
therefore the warrant in this case authorized nothing less
than a general exploratory search, which is precisely
what the law condemns as "obnoxious to fundamental
principles of liberty". In Marron vs. United States (275 U.
S., 192, 196; 72 L. ed., 231, 237), the court said: "The
requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the
things to be seized makes general searches under them
impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant."
The constitutional rights of the appellant were also
violated when the books and papers in his possession
were searched for and seized to be used as evidence
against him. The record shows that the books and papers
so seized were made the basis for the institution of a
criminal action against the appellant. This is expressly
admitted in the order appealed from. The order, in fact,
says:
Aplicando los principios arriba mencionados al
caso presente, resulta, segun el parrafo 7 de la
mocion del acusado, que los documentos y
papeles secuestrados en poder de este fueron
entregados por los agentes de rentas internas al
Fiscal de la Ciudad, por lo que este instituye la
querella registrada como causa criminal No.
41563. En esa querella se alega que el acusado
Jose Rubio, valiendose de los mencionados
documentos y papeles, quiso defraudar al
Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas. De suerte que
estos documentos y papeles fueron usados como
instrumentos o agencias (instruments or agencies)
para la perpetracion de fraudes contra el
Gobierno. En tal caso, el publico tiene en esos
documentos y papeles un interes que justifica el
secuestro de los mismos, al objeto de evitar
fraudes ulteriores.
Se dira que la querella fiscal no es prueba de que
los documentos y papeles secuestrados en poder
del acusado se han usado realmente para los
fines que en la querella se describen. Pero el
Juzgado cree que la querella constituye prueba de
"causa probable" de que esos documentos y
papeles se han usado para tales fines.
Curiously enough, the order under review sought to
justify the search and seizure by the very fact that the
books and papers seized, were used as evidence against
the appellant. This clearly brings the case within the
principle laid down in Boyd vs. United States, supra,
followed in a long line of cases, both State and Federal,
and recently reaffirmed in United States vs. Lefkowitz (76
L. Ed. [Adv. Ops.], 563). The principle adverted to is that
which declares as illegal searches and seizures whether
made with or without a search warrant, when the purpose
of making search was solely to secure evidence to be
used, in a criminal or penal proceeding, against the
person in whose house or office the articles searched for
and seized were found. It is true that in the Lefkowitz
case the court found that "all the searches and seizures
were made without a search warrant", but it is also true
that the court positively declared that even if they were
made with a search warrant they would have been
equally held illegal. The searches and seizures were held
illegal not because they were made without a search
warrant, but because of the purpose for which they were
made. So the court said: "Respondents' papers were
wanted by the officers solely for use as evidence of crime
of which respondents were accused or suspected. They
could not lawfully be searched for and taken even under
a search warrant issued upon ample evidence and
precisely describing such things and disclosing exactly
where they were. (Gouled vs. United States, 255 U. S.,
298, 310; 65 L. ed., 647, 653; 41 S. Ct., 261.)" The court
further observed:
Here, the searches were exploratory and general
and made solely to find evidence of respondents'
guilt of the alleged conspiracy or some other
crime. Though intended to be used to solicit orders
for liquor in violation of the Act, the papers and
other articles found and taken were in themselves
unoffending. The decisions of this court distinguish
searches of one's house, office, papers or effects
merely to get evidence to convict him of crime
from searches such as those made to find stolen
goods for return to the owner, to take property that
has been forfeited to the Government, to discover
property concealed to avoid payment of duties for
which it is liable, and from searches such as those
made for the seizure of counterfeit coins burglar's
tools, gambling paraphernalia and illicit liquor in
order to prevent the commission of crime. (Boyd
vs. United States, 116 U. S., 616, et seq.; 29 L.
ed., 746; 6 S. Ct., 524; Weeks vs. United States,
232 U. S., 383, 395; 58 L. ed., 652, 656; L. R. A.,
1915B, 834; 34 S. Ct., 341; Ann. Cas., 1915C,
1177; Gouled vs. United States, supra [255 U. S.,
306; 65 L. ed., 651; 41 S. Ct., 262]; Carrol vs.
United States, 267 U. S., 132; 69 L. ed., 543; 39
A. L. R., 790; 45 S. Ct. 280, supra.)
In Entick vs. Carrington (19 How. St Tr., 1029),
Lord Gamden declared that one's papers are his
dearest property, showed that the law of England
did not authorize a search of private papers to
help forward conviction even in cases of most
atrocious crime and said (p. 1073): "Whether this
proceedeth from the gentleness of the law towards
criminals, or from a consideration that such a
power would be more pernicious to the innocent
than useful to the public, I will not say. It is very
certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse
himself; because the necessary means of
compelling self-accusation, falling upon the
innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel
and unjust; and it should seem, that search for
evidence is disallowed upon the same principle.
There too the innocent would be confounded with
the guilty."
The teachings of that great case were cherished
by our statement when the Constitution was
adopted. In Boyd vs. United States, supra (116 U.
S., 630; 29 L. ed., 751; 6 S. Ct., 524), this court
said: "The principles laid down in this opinion
(Entick vs. Carrington) affect the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security. . . . They apply
to all invasions on the part of the Government and
its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life. . . . Any forcible and
compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or
 of his private papers to be used as evidence to
convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods is within
the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into
each other." And this court has always construed
provisions of the Constitution having regard to the
principles upon which it was established. The
direct operation or literal meaning of the words
used do not measure the purpose or scope of its
provisions. (M'Culloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat.,
316, 406, 407, 421; 4 L. ed., 579, 601, 602, 605;
Boyd vs. United States, 116 U. S., 616; 29 L. ed.,
746; 6 S. Ct., 524, supra; Byars vs. United States,
273 U. S., 28; 71 L. ed., 520; 47 S. Ct., 248, ubi
supra.)
In Federal Trade Commission vs. American Tobacco
Company (264 U. S., 298, 305, 306), the Supreme Court
of the United States through Justice Holmes, declared
that the mere fact "of being organized as a corporation do
not make men's affairs public, as those of a railroad
company now may be. (Smith vs. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 245 U. S., 33, 43.) anyone who respects
the spirit as well as the letter of the Fourth Amendment
would be loath to believe that Congress intended to
authorize one of its subordinate agencies to sweep all
our traditions into the fire (Interstate Commerce
Commission vs. Brimson, 154 U. S., 447, 479), and to
direct fishing expeditions into private papers on the
possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime. We
do not discuss the question whether it could do so if it
tried, as nothing short of the most explicit language would
induce us to attribute to Congress that intent. The
interruption of business, the possible revelation of trade
secrets, and the expense that compliance with the
Commission's wholesale demand would cause are the
least considerations. It is contrary to the first principles of
justice to allow a search through all the respondents'
records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something
will turn up. The unwillingness of this court to sustain
such a claim is shown in Harriman vs. Interstate
Commerce Commission (211 U. S., 407), and as to
correspondence, even in the case of a common carrier,
in United States vs. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. (236
U. S., 318, 335). The question is a different one where
the State granting the charter gives its Commission
power to inspect."
The internal revenue agents concerned in this case have
shown commendable zeal in their efforts to protect the
revenues of the Government; but this same zeal, if
allowed to override constitutional limitations, would
become obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty".
And if we are to be saved from the sad experiences of
some countries which have constitutions only in name,
we must insist that governmental authority be exercised
within constitutional limits; for, after all, what matters is
not so much what the people write in their constitutions
as the spirit in which they observe their provisions.
The order appealed from should be reversed, the search
warrant issued in this case declared invalid, and the
books and papers seized thereunder ordered returned to
the appellant.
Villa-Real, J., concurring:
I concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice Abad Santos.
G.R. No. 124299 April 12, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CESAR LACANIETA alias "Boy Alog", JERRY
BALLENAS alias "Marlon Marquez" and Carlito
Gamad, accused, JERRY BALLENAS, accused-
appellant.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Consorcia Tayo (Consorcia) claims that her daughter, 19-
year-old WILMA TAYO (WILMA) was abducted at
gunpoint on March 20, 1987. WILMA was found dead the
next day, her body bore signs that she was first raped
then brutally stabbed ten times. Four persons were
suspected as perpetrators of the crime: JERRY
BALLENAS (BALLENAS) alias MARLON MARQUEZ,
CESAR LACANIETA (LACANIETA) alias BOY ALOG,
ALBERTO SALVADOR (SALVADOR) and CARLITO
GAMAD (GAMAD). SALVADOR was shot dead during
the police investigation and GAMAD was also shot dead
after the re-investigation conducted by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of San Jose, Antique.
Based on the records of this case, LACANIETA and
BALLENAS were already charged with murder at the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12 of San Jose, Antique.
Since BALLENAS had already been arraigned for
murder, an Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape
was filed on October 12, 1987 against BALLENAS and
LACANIETA before the same court. LACANIETA
thereafter posted bail, but he eventually absconded. The
Information was then amended on June 19, 1989 to read
as follows:
At the instance of the mother of the deceased
offended party, Wilma Tayo, who has subscribed
and sworn to a complaint attached to the records
of the above-entitled cases, the undersigned
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses JERRY
BALLENAS alias "MARLON MARQUEZ" of the
crime of forcible abduction with rape committed as
follows:
That on or about the 20th day of March, 1987 in
the Municipality of Sibalom, Province of Antique,
Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused together with Cesar Lacanieta
who is still at large and Alberto Salvador and
Carlito Gamad, both deceased, being then armed
with gun and knife and by means of force and
intimidation and with lewd designs, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously abduct and carry away Wilma
Tayo at a gun point (sic) to an uninhabited place
and while there, by means of force and
intimidation, have carnal knowledge of the said
Wilma Tayo against the latter's will.
 Contrary to the provisions of article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 342 of
the same Code.1
Trial fiscal Juan C. Mission, Jr. was of the opinion that
the proper charge against BALLENAS is forcible
abduction with rape "because an independent act of
forcible abduction preceded the rape and murder of the
deceased Wilma Tayo," and not the special complex
crime of rape with homicide.2
The arraignment of BALLENAS for forcible abduction
with rape came belatedly because it was only after the
case was already submitted for decision when the trial
court discovered that BALLENAS had not yet been
arraigned. Both the prosecution and defense then agreed
to arraign BALLENAS and to consider all the evidence
earlier presented as reproduced. BALLENAS was
accordingly arraigned on the Amended Information on
February 18, 1992; he pleaded not guilty. The evidence
for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of
Consorcia and Florencio Millones (Florencio) and
Exhibits "A", "B", "C", and "D" as documentary evidence,
while the defense presented BALLENAS as its lone
witness.
The version of the prosecution as summarized by the trial
court is as follows:
On March 20, 1987 about 7 o'clock in the evening,
the Wilma Tayo (sic) and her mother Mrs.
Consorcia Tayo were in their house at Sitio Bulho,
Cubay-Sermon, Sibalom, Antique. They were
about to eat supper when someone called to them
asking to light a cigarette. Wilma Tayo asked who
was calling and the answer was "I am Junior, let
me light my cigarette". Wiima Tayo opened the
door slightly and there stood accused Jerry
Ballenas alias Marlon Marquez. Accused did not
light his cigarette but instead blew the gas lamp
and put out the light. He held Wilma Tayo by the
wrist.
Accused Jerry Ballenas pointed a short firearm to
Wilma Tayo and Consorcia Tayo. Accused told
Wilma Tayo to accompany him to Maria Leong-on,
his girlfriend. Wilma Tayo refused as they were
about to eat supper. Consorcia Tayo also told her
daughter, Wilma Tayo not go out (sic) because it
was already dark. Accused Jerry Ballenas forced
Wilma Tayo to go out with him and struck the hand
of Consorcia Tayo and pointed the handgun at
her. Accused held Wilma Tayo tightly and took her
away.
Because of the abduction, Consorcia Tayo sought
the help of a neighbor, Andres Mallorca, whose
house is about 20 meters away from her house
but to no avail, Andres Mallorca shut the door on
her for fear of Jerry Ballenas as the letter is known
as a member of the dreaded Sparrow Unit of the
New People's Army.
The following morning, Consorcia Tayo reported
the abduction of Wilma Tayo to her son-in-law who
is a member of the Integrated National Police. She
 learned from Aurelio Gamad that her daughter
Wilma Tayo was already dead. The police then
proceeded to the scene of the incident.
At the time Wilma Tayo was abducted, she was 19
years old. She was single and a third year student
in the Polytechnic State College of Antique,
Sibalom, Antique.
Consorcia Tayo spent P30,000.00 for the funeral of
Wilma Tayo. Consorcia was shocked and she felt pain
with the death of her only daughter Wilma Tayo. To
Consorcia Tayo no amount of money could compensate
the death of her daughter Wilma Tayo whom they loved
so much.
BALLENAS disavows any participation in the abduction,
rape and killing of WILMA and offered this version, viz:
In the afternoon of March 20, 1987, at about past
4:00 p.m., he was in the house of CARLITO
GAMAD. When darkness came, CARLITO asked
him to accompany CEZAR LACANIETA (a
boarder of the GAMAD's), to the house of victim
WILMA TAYO. Victim was the girlfriend of
LACANIETA. On the way, LACANIETA told him of
his plan to elope with victim, and asked him to talk
to her. He proceeded to the house of victim, while
LACANIETA was left behind near the irrigation
canal. Upon reaching the house of victim, he
called out and the mother answered his call and
then victim came out of the house. He told victim
that LACANIETA had something to tell her and
that he was waiting for her at the irrigation canal.
Both of them proceeded to where LACANIETA
was waiting and after he led victim to LACANIETA,
he went home (T.S.N., pp. 7-10, August 9, 1990).3
On May 29, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12 of
San Jose, Antique rendered its Decision4 finding
BALLENAS guilty of forcible abduction with rape, the
judgment declares:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
Jerry Ballenas alias Marlon Marquez GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible
Abduction with Rape punished under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 342
and Article 48 of the same Code with reclusion
perpetua to death by reason of the use of a
firearm by accused Jerry Ballenas in the abduction
of Wilma Tayo. And applying Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty that should be
imposed should be the greater penalty of death
there being two aggravating circumstances but
because the present Constitution prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty accused Jerry
Ballenas is hereby sentenced to suffer a prison
term of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
and to suffer the accessory penalty provided for by
law and he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Wilma Tayo the sum of P50,000.00 and
to pay Consorcia Tayo, the sum of P30,000.00 for
the funeral expenses incurred by her for the
 funeral of the deceased Wilma Tayo and to pay
the cost.
SO ORDERED.5
In this appeal, BALLENAS questions the quoted decision
on these grounds:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE
HEIRS OF VICTIM IN THE AMOUNT OF
P50,000.00, THE SUM OF P30,000.00 FOR
FUNERAL EXPENSES AND TO PAY THE
COSTS. 6
This Court is convinced that the trial court did not err in
concluding that BALLENAS is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the forcible abduction and rape of WILMA. In
asserting his innocence, BALLENAS foists the defense of
alibi, a defense that has long been considered as
intrinsically the weakest of all defenses.7 Basic is the rule
that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the
identity of the accused has been sufficiently and
positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime
because alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses.8
In this case, Consorcia, the mother of WILMA, positively
identified BALLENAS as the person who went to her
house and abducted her daughter at gunpoint that fateful
night. Moreover, the testimony of Florencio fortifies the
theory of the prosecution that after the abduction of
WILMA, BALLENAS together with LACANIETA,
SALVADOR and GAMAD raped and stabbed WILMA.
According to Florencio, he was passing through the
street of Barangay Catmon, Sibalom, antique when he
saw "Boy Alog" (LACANIETA) lying on top of
WILMA.9 The hands of WILMA were then held down by
BALLENAS and SALVADOR. 10 Surprised by the
presence of Florencio, LACANIETA stood up and told the
former that they were just having a "happy-
happy". 11 Florencio then left and after reaching three
brazas, he hid to see what the group was up
to. 12 Florencio testified that he thereafter saw four men
take turns in ravishing and stabbing WILMA. 13 The
following testimony of Florencio establishes the
participation of BALLENAS in the crime charged:
Q: Mr. Millones, you said that you are a resident of
Barangay Catmon, Sibalom, Antique, how long
have you been a resident of that plade?
A: I was born there.
Q: Are you still a resident in that place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On March 20, 1987, were you still a resident of
that place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On that day, about 7:00 o'clock in the evening
can you recall where you were?
A: Yes, sir, I was walking on the street of
Barangay Catmon, Sibalom, Antique and it was
already past 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
Q: Where did you come from?
A: I came from Durog leading to Catmon.
Q: Where were you going then?
A: I was intending to go to the house of my
deceased mother whose wake falls on that night.
Q: While walking from Durog towards your house,
can you recall if you were able to observe any
unusual incident?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that about?
A: While I was in the street of Brgy. Catmon,
Sibalom Antique, I saw four persons, three are
squatting, while the other one is lying flat on his
stomach and I thought there (sic) were all drinking.
Q: As you pass by these four persons, did you
start any conversation with them?
A: While I was approaching them and when I
reach that place, the fellow who was lying flat on
his stomach, stood up and told me that they were
just having a happy happy so I will just pass by my
way.
Q: What else did you see when he stood up?
A: When he stood up, he told me I will proceed on
my way and I saw that the three persons were
holding a girl.
Q: You said they were holding a girl, do you know
that girl?
A: Yes, sir, Wilma Tayo, daughter of Consorcia
Tayo.
Q: Aside from Marlon, do you know that three
other persons?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who were they?
A: They were Alberto Salvador, Carlito Gamad,
Marlon and Boy Alog.
Q: And who was that person who was lying flat on
his stomach?
A: Boy Alog.
Q: If these three persons are inside the courtroom,
could you please point to them?
A: Only one is here inside the courtroom.
Q: And who was that?
A: Jerry Ballenas.
INTERPRETER:
At this juncture, the witness pointed to a man
seated inside the courtroom and when asked by
the Interpreter what his name is, identified himself
as Jerry Ballenas.
Q You said that three persons were holding on to
Wilma Tayo, will you please tell us who among
these three persons were holding Wilma Tayo and
on what part of the body?
A: Carlito Gamad was holding the hands of Wilma
Tayo and the hands of the girl are both stretched
above his head.
Q: How about the two other persons?
A: While Jerry Ballenas and Alberto Salvador, Jr.
were holding on each of the leg of the girl.
Q: How did these Jerry Ballenas and Alberto
Salvador, how were they holding the legs of Wilma
Tayo.
A: Wilma was lying flat on his (sic) back on the
street and each of these persons were holding on
each of the leg of Wilma Tayo.
Q: Are the legs of Wilma Tayo held fell (sic) to the
ground or raised up?
A: The legs are joined to the ground in V-position.
Q: Do you know if Wilma Tayo saw you pass by?
ATTY. ABIERA:
Incompetent, your Honor.
COURT:
Sustained.
FISCAL MISSION:
After you were told that they were just there for a
happy happy, what did you do?
A: I told them I will pass my way.
Q: After that, what did you do?
A: I walk farther and observe.
Q: How far did you walk and observe these
persons?
A: I walk from the place about three brazas so that
I could observe what they were doing.
Q: Will you please demonstrate to the court by
pointing inside the courtroom how far more or less
is three brazas?
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to the wall of the other
courtroom of Branch 11 which is more or less 8 to
9 brazas.
FISCAL MISSION:
Q: Now, upon reaching that place about 8 brazas
to make some observation, what did you do?
A: I hid and observe what they were doing.
Q: Did you observe anything else?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you observe?
A: I saw them. These four took turns in raping the
girl.
Q: Then what else did you see?
A: After raping Wilma Tayo, they also took turns in
stabbing her.
Q: How long did you observe the group?
A: I could not determine the length of time I stayed
in that place because I do not have a watch.
Q: After making such observation, what did you
do?
A: After I have witnessed that horrifying incident, I
just proceed to the house of my deceased
mother. 14
The autopsy report made by Dr. Julito V. Osunero, Chief
of the Ramon Maza Memorial District Hospital, Sibalom,
Antique confirms the testimony of Florencio. The report
contains these findings:
1. Stab wound, 1 inch long left side Neck, point of
entrance and point of exit, Right side neck thru
and thru.
2. Stab wound, 1 inch long left side Neck, point of
entrance and point of exit, Right side neck thru
and thru.
3. Stab wound, 1 inch long Left side neck and
point of exit Right side Neck thru and thru, cutting
carotid and jugular vessels.
4. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Epigastric Area
perforating Abdominal Cavity perforating Liver.
5. Stab wound, 1 inch diameter perforating
Abdominal Cavity perforating Stomach.
6. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Right anterior Chest
perforating thoracic Cavity penetrating Right Lung.
7. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Right Lumber Area
perforating Abdominal Cavity penetrating Kidney.
8. Stab wound, 1 inch long, Lumbar Area Right,
perforating Abdominal Cavity.
9. Stab wound, Inter-scapular, 1 inch long, muscle
depth.
10. Stab wound, Inter-scapular, 1 inch long,
muscle depth.
11. Contusion both thigh, 2 inches diameter, left
and 3 inches diameter, right.
12. Hymen Lacerations 3:00 o'clock and 9:00
o'clock, Fresh. 15
The cause of the death of WILMA is reported as due to
hemorrhage secondary to wounds on the neck, chest,
abdomen and back. 16
The trial court opined that the contusions on the thighs of
WILMA show that her legs were forcibly set apart to
facilitate the rape of WILMA. That WILMA was raped is
evidenced by hymenal lacerations, still found fresh on
March 21, 1987, the day the autopsy was conducted. We
agree with the trial court that based on the evidence, it
could readily be concluded that the perpetrators stabbed
WILMA several times after the commission of the rape. 17
In a desperate attempt to reverse the decision of the trial
court, BALLENAS impresses upon this Court his theory
that if he indeed committed the crime charged, he would
not have exposed himself to Consorcia at the time that
WILMA was abducted. 18 BALLENAS also points out that
his return to Catmon the following Monday after the death
of WILMA and on which date he was arrested, belies his
participation in the despicable crime. 19 BALLENAS
argues that if he was guilty of the crime, he would not
have returned to Catmon to face the possibility of being
arrested since the victim was with him on the night of
March 20, 1987. 20
We are not persuaded. A telling detail in this case is the
fact that the mother of the victim witnessed first hand the
abduction of her daughter at gunpoint. Consorcia has no
reason to wrongfully implicate BALLENAS. As the mother
of the deceased victim, Consorcia would want nothing
short of justice for her dead daughter. BALLENAS does
not deny the fact that he went to see WILMA to fetch her
that evening of March 20, 1987. In professing his
innocence, BALLENAS merely denies the allegations of
Consorcia that he took away WILMA at gunpoint and
offers the defense that he merely talked to WILMA to
convince her to meet with LACANIETA. Well-settled is
the rule that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which
must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability
to merit credence. 21 An affirmative testimony is far
stronger than negative testimony, especially so when it
comes from the mouth of a credible witness. 22 The fact
that BALLENAS exposed himself to Consorcia all the
more indicates his brazenness in abducting WILMA. The
return of BALLENAS to Catmon after the death of WILMA
cannot be also taken as a badge of his innocence. It is
the credible and unwavering testimony of Consorcia that
stands as solid proof of the guilt of
BALLENAS.1âwphi1.nêt
BALLENAS assails the testimony of Florencio on the
ground that it "abounds in inconsistencies" 23 and is not
credible. The alleged inconsistencies are however not
clearly established. Notably, Florencio unequivocally said
that he saw LACANIETA, BALLENAS, SALVADOR and
GAMAD rape and stab WILMA. We have no reason to
doubt the credibility of Florencio in light of the doctrine
that where there is no evidence to show any dubious
reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness
should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him
in a serious offense, the testimony deserves full faith and
credit. 24 The initial reluctance of Florencio to get involved
in this case is understandable and does not cast doubt
on his credibility as a witness. Whenever the issue boils
down to credibility, we have always maintained that the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. 25 Findings of
the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive
on the appellate court, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. 26
We therefore see no cogent reason to reverse the
judgment of the trial court convicting BALLENAS of the
crime of forcible abduction with rape. The trial court ruled
that there are two aggravating circumstances in this
case, nighttime 27 and that the wrong done in the
commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by
causing other wrong not necessary for its commission 28 .
We however digress from the finding of the trial court that
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and that the
wrong done in the commission of the crime was
deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not
necessary for its commission are present in the case at
bar.
Based on the records, BALLENAS abducted WILMA
around 7 o'clock in the evening of March 20, 1987 and
that BALLENAS blew off the lighted kerosene lamp
offered by WILMA to BALLENAS to light his
cigarette. 29 However, Consorcia testified that there was
some light coming from another kerosene lamp upstairs
that "reflected (sic) the door" and that Consorcia also had
a kerosene lamp with her that BALLENAS also put
off. 30 In the case of People vs. Pallarco, 31 the scene of
the crime was sufficiently illuminated by a kerosene lamp,
hence we ruled in that case that nocturnity cannot be
appreciated if it can be shown that the place was
adequately lighted. 32 The prosecution also failed to prove
that nighttime was specially sought by the accused or
taken advantage of by him or that nighttime facilitated the
commission of the crime, circumstances which must be
present before the aggravating circumstance of nighttime
can be appreciated. We also do not agree with the trial
court that the aggravating circumstance of cruelty
attended the commission of the crime charged. The
aggravating circumstance of cruelty is present when "the
wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately
augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its
commission". 33 There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys
and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and
gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the
consummation of the criminal act. 34 In People
vs. Ferrer 35 , the aggravating circumstance of cruelty was
not appreciated in the absence of positive proof that the
appellants inflicted the thirteen (13) wounds upon the
victim in such a way that he was made to agonize before
they rendered any of the blows which snuffed out his life.
In this case, WILMA sustained ten (10) stab wounds, but
these multiple wounds alone do not prove that the
accused deliberately inflicted the injuries to prolong
unnecessarily her physical suffering. Thus, the trial court
improperly considered the aggravating circumstance of
cruelty in the case at bar.
What is present in this case is the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling. Consorcia testified that her
house has a ladder that leads to the main door; that
BALLENAS was at the main door when he called
WILMA; and that when WILMA refused to go with
BALLENAS, it was there that BALLENAS forced WILMA
to go with him. 36 Without a doubt, WILMA was abducted
while she was still in her house. Thus, dwelling may be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance considering
that it is not necessary that the accused should have
entered the dwelling of the victim. 37
BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction
with rape punished under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 342 and 48 of the same
Code. The two elements of forcible abduction are (1) the
taking of a woman against her will and (2) with lewd
designs 38 . The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a
complex crime that occurs when there is carnal
knowledge with the abducted woman under the following
circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2)
when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve
years of age or is demented. 39 BALLENAS committed
the crime of forcible abduction with rape on March 20,
1987, before the passage of Republic Act 7659 or the
Heinous Crimes Law that took effect on December 31,
1993. At the time that BALLENAS committed the crime of
forcible abduction with rape, the penalty then applicable
was reclusion perpetua to death. The use by BALLENAS
of a firearm in committing the crime, a fact duly alleged in
the information and proven in court, should have
warranted the imposition of the death penalty. However,
since the crime took place prior to the implementation of
RA 7659, the trial court correctfully ruled that the penalty
that can be imposed on BALLENAS is reclusion
perpetua. Hence, despite the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty herein
of reclusion perpetua would not be affected. Under Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be applied regardless of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the
commission of a crime. 40
This Court is however constrained to disallow the amount
of P30,000.00 for the burial expenses incurred by
Consorcia. We can only give credit for actual damages
such as burial expenses if there are receipts that can
support the claim. 41 The records in the case at bench do
not substantiate the P30,000.00 burial expenses sought
by Consorcia, except for her lone assertion.
The P50,000.00 indemnity awarded by the trial court
must be modified. Instead of the sum of P50,000.00 as
indemnity, we award P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
considering that the crime was committed with the use of
a weapon as alleged in the information and proven in
court. In consonance with jurisprudence, the increase of
the civil indemnity to P75,000.00 is justified if the crime
was committed under circumstances that justify the
imposition of the death penalty. 42 In People
vs. Bañago 43 , the accused committed the crime of rape
with the use of a gun on October 15, 1993, before the
passage of RA 7659. This Court was thus precluded from
meting out the death penalty, but nevertheless the
accused was ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount
of P75,000.00. 44
In spite of the death of the victim in this case, we cannot
award the higher amount of P100,000.00, the civil
indemnity awarded in cases of rape with homicide. 45 The
information in the case at bar is merely for forcible
abduction with rape and not for rape with homicide.
Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are also
hereby granted to the heirs of the victim. The award of
moral damages may be made to the heirs of the victim in
a criminal proceeding without the need for pleading or
proof of the basis thereof. The fact that they suffered the
trauma of mental or physical and psychological sufferings
which constitute the bases for moral damages under the
Civil Code are too obvious to still require recital thereof at
trial. 46 Here, Consorcia testified as to the inconsolable
loss that she felt when her only daughter was abducted,
ravished and killed. 47
Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases
as part of the civil liability if the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. 48 Since dwelling
is appreciated in this case as an aggravating
circumstance under Article 14 (6) of the Revised Penal
Code, the award of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages is
therefore in order.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, San Jose, antique is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant Jerry
Ballenas alias Marlon Marquez is ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of actual
damages of P30,000.00 is deleted.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., abroad, on official business.
G.R. No. 77284 July 19, 1990
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BONIFACIO BALANSI alias "BAN-OS", defendant-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Balgos & Perez for defendant-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The accused-appellant stands charged with the murder
of Elpidio Dalsen on January 30, 1982 at Balinciagao,
Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao. The Information alleged that he,
armed with a Garand rifle, went inside the house of the
victim, then allegedly fast asleep, where he shot him
twice and killed him. Treachery was held to be present,
and so were evident premeditation and employment of
means to weaken the defense of the victim. 1
The accused-appellant was then the Barangay Captain of
Balinciagao Norte, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao, and a member
of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), while the
victim was the Provincial Development Officer of Kalinga-
Apayao. 2 The incident took place during a wedding
celebration at Balinciagao Sur, Pasil, at or about 5:30 or
6:00 o'clock in the afternoon. The prosecution presented
eight witnesses. The defense placed two on the stand.
The trial court found the accused guilty as charged and
sentenced him to die and to pay a total of P590,000.00 in
actual (P540,000.00 for loss of the victim's earning
capacity) and moral damages, plus costs. 3
It appears that the victim, a nephew of the appellant, was
then sleeping at the house of his parents located
opposite the house where the wedding celebration was
being held. At or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
Beatrice Canao, a Balinciagao resident, saw the
accused, her uncle, standing at the door of the house of
the victim's parents, also her relatives, armed with a gun.
She inquired what he was doing there and he allegedly
replied that he was waiting for the victim. She then
entered the premises to locate an old newspaper with
which to wrap food, a rice cake, when she saw the victim
asleep. When she left, she saw the accused at the
doorway. After disposing of her rice cake (which she
gave to a certain Fr. Medina), she heard two gunshots,
fired at an interval of two or three seconds, emanating
apparently from the house, to which she shortly rushed.
She allegedly met the accused at the steps leading to the
second floor, brandishing his rifle. 4
She allegedly shouted "putok, putok!" 5 She then reported
the matter to the police.
Yulo Asbok a fellow CHDF member of the accused and
likewise a Balinciagao resident, also heard two gunshots
ring that afternoon. He said that he was three meters
from the house where the gunshot sounds seemed to
have originated. He allegedly proceeded there but was
met by the accused at the steps. They allegedly grappled
for possession of the rifle, which, he alleged, was still
warm and reeked of gunpowder. He was able to wrest
possession, after which, the accused allegedly ran away
and fled to Pogon, also in Balinciagao. He later learned
that the victim had been shot and that he died at
Lubuagan Hospital. 6
Rosalina Dalsen, the victim's wife was enjoying the
wedding celebration when she heard two gunshots. She
made inquiries subsequently and was informed that the
victim was her husband. She claimed that she saw the
accused standing at the entrance of her parents- in-law's
house prior thereto. 7
Dr. Nicolas Balais, a dentist by profession, was also at
that celebration when he heard the shots. He then went
to the victim's parent's house where they, the shots, rang
out from. He did not allegedly have in mind that
somebody had actually been fired upon but thought that
may be there had been a burglary. He ascended the
steps of the house where the accused earlier met
Beatrice Candao and Yulo Asbok, and entered the
second floor. He saw the victim lying in his room, whom
he initially believed to be merely sleeping, but who was,
in fact, dead. 8
The prosecution also presented Simeon Valera, principal
of Pasil Central School, and Artemio Dalsen the victim's
brother, who sought to establish a motive for the killing of
the victim, a motive they imputed to the accused. Valera
testified that revenge was supposedly a tradition among
Kalingas (of which both the accused and victim were
members), which, however, could be prevented by
the dusa, meaning, apparently, intervention and
mediation by community elders. 9 Meanwhile, Dalsen
claimed that the accused had nursed along- standing
grudge against the victim, whom he accused of delaying
on alleged award for the construction of a bridge in
Balinciagao in 1979. 10
After the prosecution rested, the defense presented its
evidence. It presented two witnesses, the accused
himself and Masadao Jose, who lived in Samangana,
Balinciagao.
The accused claimed that he was also at the wedding
celebration on that fateful afternoon when he too heard
two gunshots break in the air. As a member of the CHDF,
he allegedly took it upon himself to investigate the matter.
He said that he went to the direction where the shots
came from and was on his way to the entrance of the
house when Yulo Asbok allegedly prevented him from
doing so, who grabbed the firearm he was carrying. He
did not allegedly know at that time that the victim had
been shot and allegedly learned of it only on the following
day. He admitted having ran away but allegedly because
he had been implicated. Four days later, he voluntarily
turned himself in to the police. Masadao Jose
corroborated his statement. 11
In returning a verdict of guilty, the trial judge observed:
"While there is no eye witness who testified to having
seen the accused Bonifacio Balansi shoot the victim, yet
all the circumstances pointed to him as the perpetrator of
the crime." 12
The circumstantial evidence referred to came primarily
from the lips of Yulo Asbok and Beatrice Candao as well
as the accused himself, who admitted having been at the
scene of the crime. Obviously, the judge did not lend
credence to the accused's defense.
The accused-appellant now contends that the judge
erred, first, in appreciating circumstantial evidence,
second, in appreciating treachery, and third, in rejecting
his defense of alibi.
We affirm, with modification, the decision appealed from.
While there was no eyewitness account, the web of
circumstantial evidence points to no other conclusion
than that the accused was guilty of shooting the victim,
Elpidio Dalsen to death in the afternoon of January 30,
1982. These circumstances are as follows: (1) He was
seen standing by the entrance of the house where the
victim had sojourned, armed with a long rifle, minutes
before gunshots were heard. Three witnesses saw him:
Beatrice Canao, Yulo Asbok, and Rosalina Dalsen. (2)
Moments later, two shots rang out, one after the other.
Four witnesses heard them: Canao, Asbok, Dalsen and
Nicolas Balais. (3) Thereafter, Canao saw him
descending from the steps of the house. Asbok also saw
him there, whom he wrestled for the possession of the
rifle. (4) He fled and hid for four days.
Under Rule 133, Section 5, of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when
sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if.
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 13
As we glean from the evidence, there is no one, other
than the accused-appellant, who could have perpetrated
the offense.
The accused-appellant, as we said, disagrees. He insists
that he was there, precisely, to investigate the matter,
and armed himself for the purpose, but was stopped by
Yulo Asbok. His protests notwithstanding, we too must
reject this defense. Two reasons persuade us. First, he
has not ascribed any motive to Yulo Asbok as to why he,
Asbok should testify falsely against him. Second, he
admits having fled immediately thereafter. If he were truly
innocent, he would not have done so. We have held time
and again that flight is a silent admission of guilt. 14 As
aptly put "The righteous is brave as a lion, but the wicked
man fleeth." 15
If he were moreover truly innocent, and that it was Yulo
Asbok who had something to do with the killing and who
had meanwhile tried to stop him from conducting an
inquiry, it would have been he, the accused, to be the
first to make a report to the authorities so that Asbok
could be brought to the bar of justice. If the latter did try
to prevent him from performing his duties, as he
claimed, 16 he should have gone to lengths to implicate
Asbok because that too was his duty.
We also reject his claims of inconsistency on the part of
the prosecution's witnesses, notably Asbok who stated
that he was the first to be in the victim's house after the
shooting (aside from the accused), in the face of Canao's
testimony that she also had been there. The Court is not
convinced that an inconsistency exists. For obviously,
Asbok had been mistaken. Canao had earlier been there.
The Court sees no need to make an inquiry on the
admissibility of testimonies attributing motive to the
accused-appellant. We are sufficiently persuaded that
even without any successful showing of a motive, the
circumstantial evidence on hand nevertheless suffices to
warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court, however, is not convinced that the accused-
appellant had committed murder arising from treachery,
evident premeditation, and means employed to weaken
the defense of the victim. As to treachery, jurisprudence
is ample that the manner of attack must be shown. While
there are testimonies to the effect that the victim was
"fast asleep", we can not safely presume that he was still
in that condition when the accused sprung his attack.
And since nobody saw the actual shooting, we can not
justifiably say that the victim was still actually still asleep
at that time. 17
Neither is evident premeditation a qualifying
circumstance. In appreciating evident premeditation, it is
necessary to show: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the offense; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination;
and (3) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and execution. 18 The prior determination
of the accused to do away with the victim has not been
sufficiently demonstrated by the prosecution.
That the accused also employed means to weaken the
victim's defenses is likewise missing in this case. As we
said, there was no actual eyewitness to the killing and
hence, we can not say for sure, based on the evidence
before us, that the appellant did employ means to
weaken the defense of the victim.
We, however, affirm the trial court insofar as it
appreciated dwelling. Although the victim was not shot in
his house (his parents owned it) it has been held that the
dwelling place need not be owned by the victim.19 In that
case, it was held:
La circunstancia agravante de morada,
aunque no fuese la casa propia de los
occisos, debe estimarse porque — segun el
 Tribunal Supremo de España — " no solo
por el respeto que el domicilio ajeno
merece, como especie de complements de
la personalidad, y por el que es debido al
hogar de la familia, sino por el no menor de
que es digna la residencia privada de
cualquier ciudadano, y por el mayor grado
de malicia que revela quien busca a su
victima alli en donde se encuentra con la
confianza y abandono propios del lugar
elegido para el descanso y las intimidades
de la vida: razon por la cual habla el Codigo
penal en el art. 10, no de domicillo en
sentido legal, sino de morada en su
acepcion real, que no es otra que la del
paraje en donde una persona hace
estancia de asiento. ... a titulo de nuesped,
o por otro cualquiera.i•t•c-aüsl (S. de 25 de
Junio de 1886, 2 Viada., 5 ed., 329.) 20
In the Basa case, the victims were killed while sleeping
as guests in the house of another. Dwelling there was
held to be aggravating.
According to earlier cases, including U.S. v.
Bredejo, 21 our ruling was that the dwelling place must be
owned by the offended party. In another decision, People
v. Celespara, 22 dwelling was not appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance in the absence of proof that the
victim owned the dwelling place where he was killed.
In People v. Guhiting, 23 morada was not likewise
considered for the same reasons.
However, more recent cases have since followed the
lead of Basa, notably People v. Galapia 24 and People v.
Sto. Tomas. 25
"Dwelling" is considered an aggravating circumstance
because primarily of the sanctity of privacy the law
accords to human abode. According to one commentator,
one's dwelling place is a "sanctuary worthy of
respect" 26 and that one who slanders another in the
latter's house is more guilty than if he who offends him
elsewhere. However, one does not lose his right of
privacy where he is offended in the house of another
because as his invited guest, he, the stranger, is
sheltered by the same roof and protected by the same
intimacy of life it affords. It may not be his house, but it is,
even for a brief moment, "home" to him. He is entitled to
respect even for that short moment.
It is with more reason in this case. The late Elpidio
Dalsen died in the house of his very parents. who raised
him until he could be on his own.
Under the circumstances, we affirm the lower court, but
only insofar as it held the accused-appellant responsible
for taking the life of Elpidio Dalsen. We hold him liable for
simple homicide aggravated by dwelling. Under the
Revised Penal Code, he must suffer reclusion
temporal in its maximum period, there being no mitigating
circumstances and one aggravating circumstance. 27
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The accused-
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal. The grant of damages is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 188979 September 5, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER PAREJA y VELASCO, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal from the June 15, 2009 decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02759.
TheCA affirmed the February 22, 2007 decision2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 209,
Mandaluyong City, finding appellant Christopher Pareja
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
THE CASE
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC
with the crime of rape under an Amended Information
that reads:
That on or about the 16th day of June 2003, in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and
have carnal knowledge of AAA,3 13 years of age, sister of
the common law spouse of accused, against her will and
consent, thus debasing and/or demeaning the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the victim thereby prejudicing her
normal development as a child.4
The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that at around
3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping beside her
two-year old nephew, BBB, on the floor of her sister’s
room, when the appellant hugged her and kissed her
nape and neck.5 AAA cried, but the appellant covered her
and BBB with a blanket.6 The appellant removed AAA’s
clothes, short pants, and underwear; he then took off his
short pants and briefs.7 The appellant went on top of
AAA, and held her hands. AAA resisted, but the appellant
parted her legs using his own legs, and then tried to
insert his penis into her vagina.8 The appellant stopped
when AAA’s cry got louder; AAA kicked the appellant’s
upper thigh as the latter was about to stand up. The
appellant put his clothes back on, and threatened to kill
AAA if she disclosed the incident to anyone. Immediately
after, the appellant left the room.9 AAA covered herself
with a blanket and cried.10
At around 6:00 a.m. of the same day, AAA’s brother,
CCC, went to her room and asked her why she was lying
on the floor and crying. AAA did not answer, and instead
hurled invectives at CCC.11 AAA went to the house of her
other brother, but the latter was not in his house. AAA
proceeded to the house of her older sister, DDD, at Block
19, Welfareville Compound, and narrated to her what had
happened. Afterwards, AAA and her two (2) siblings went
to the Women and Children’s Desk of the Mandaluyong
City Police Station and reported the incident.12
For his defense, the appellant declared on the witness
stand that he hauled "filling materials" at his house,
located at Block 38, Fabella Compound, on the evening
of June 15, 2003. At around 10:00 p.m., he went to his
room and slept.13 On the next day, the appellant,
accompanied by his mother and brother-in-law, went to
the municipal hall to ask for financial assistance for his
wife who was confined in the hospital. Upon arrival at the
hospital, the doctor told him that his wife needed blood.
Immediately after, the appellant and his companions
went to Pasig City to find blood donors.14
On the evening of June 16, 2003, and while the appellant
was folding the clothes of his son, two policemen entered
his house and informed him that a complaint for
attempted rape had been filed against him. The police
brought him to the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, forced him to admit the crime, mauled him, and
then placed him in a detention cell.15 The appellant added
that he filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against the police officers who beat him
up.16
The RTC convicted the appellant of rape in its decision of
February 22, 2007, under the following terms:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused CHRISTOPHER
PAREJA y VELASCO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences him as he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; and to indemnify the victim, AAA, the amount
of ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱ 50,000.00 as
civil indemnity.17
The CA, in its decision dated June 15, 2009, affirmed the
RTC decision. It explained that a slight penetration of the
labia by the male organ is sufficient to constitute rape,
and held that a slight penetration took place when the
appellant’s penis touched AAA’s vagina as he was trying
to insert it.
The appellate court further ruled that the presence of
people in the other room did not make it impossible for
the appellant to have raped the victim, because lust is no
respecter of time and place. It also held that the victim’s
lack of tenacity in resisting the appellant’s sexual
aggression did not amount to consent or voluntary
submission to the criminal act.18
In his brief,19 the appellant argued that the lower courts
erred in convicting him for the crime of rape, as the
prosecution failed to prove even the slightest penetration
of his penis into the victim’s vagina. He added that the
victim’s testimony was incredible and contrary to human
experience.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find that the prosecution failed to prove the
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
consummated rape. We convict him instead of attempted
rape, as the evidence on record shows the presence of
all the elements of this crime.
Carnal Knowledge Not Proven With
Moral Certainty
By definition, rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman with the use of force, threat or
intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she is under 12 years of
age or is demented.20 "Carnal knowledge is defined as
the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual
bodily connections with a woman."21 Carnal knowledge of
the victim by the accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, considering that it is the central
element in the crime of rape.22
In her testimony of February 9, 2004, AAA recounted the
alleged rape, as follows:
FISCAL TRONCO:
Q: You said that the three of you then was (sic)
sleeping on the floor, what is it that happened on that
particular day and time that is unusual?
A: It was like somebody was embracing me or hugging
me, ma’am.
Q: When you felt that some (sic) is embracing and
hugging you, what did you do?
A: I didn’t mind it because I thought that the person
beside me just moved and when he made the movement,
it’s like that I was embraced, ma’am.
Q: Whom are you referring to?
A: My brother-in-law, ma’am.
Q: And after that, what else happened, if any, AAA?
A: Before that happened, my nephew cried and so I
picked him up and put him on my chest and after a while,
I slept again and brought him down again and then
"dumapa po ako" and I felt that somebody was kissing
my nape, ma’am.
Q: Were you able to see who was that somebody
kissing your nape?
A: When I tried to evade, I looked on my side where the
room was not that dark that I could not see the person
and so, I saw that it was my brother-in-law, ma’am.
xxxx
Q: When you saw that it was your brother-in-law kissing
your nape while you were on a prone position, what else
happened, if any?
A: He kissed my neck, ma’am.
Q: What was your position while he was kissing your A: Yes, ma’am.
neck?
xxxx
A: I was on my side at that time and I was also crying,
ma’am. Q: Was he able to take off your clothes?

xxxx A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: Why were you crying at that time while he was
kissing your neck?
A: I was afraid of what will happen next, ma’am.
Q: Aside from that incident that he was kissing your
neck, was there any other previous incident that
happened?
Q: What particular clothing was he able to take off?
A: My short pants and underwear, ma’am.
Q: While he was taking off your short pants and your
underwear, what did you do, if any?
A: I tried to fight him off, ma’am.

A: Yes, ma’am. xxxx

xxxx Q: You said that he was trying to take off your clothes
and undergarments, what was your position at that time?
Q: What incident was that?
A: I was lying down, ma’am.
A: At that time, my brother-in-law covered me and my
nephew with a blanket and he tried to get my clothes off, Q: What about him?
ma’am.
A: He was on my lap, ma’am.
Q: When did this happen, AAA?
xxxx
A: Also on said date, ma’am.
Q: You said that you saw him take off his short pants?
Q: You said that he covered you and your nephew with
a blanket and then taking (sic) off your clothes? A: Yes, ma’am.
xxxx Q: Which part of your body was he able to touch his
sexual organ? (sic)
Q: Did he also take off his brief?
A: On my sexual organ, ma’am.
A: Yes, ma’am.
xxxx
xxxx
Q: You mentioned earlier that he was not able to
Q: And after that what happened, AAA? penetrate your private part, AAA?

A: After removing his undergarments, he suddenly A: Yes, ma’am.

brought his body on top of me and he held my hands. At
that time I was crying and still resisting and then he was
trying to get my legs apart. I was still resisting at that
time, and at some point in time I felt weak and he was
able to part my legs, ma’am.
Q: So, what happened after that?
A: I cried and then while I was resisting, I hit my wrist
on the wall and my wrist was "nagasgas," ma’am.

Q: Could you please tell us how did (sic) he able to part xxxx
your legs?
Q: And were you able to successfully resist?
A: He did that with his legs while he was holding my
hands, ma’am. A: Yes, ma’am, I was able to kicked (sic) his upper
thigh, ma’am.23 (italics supplied; emphasis ours)
Q: And when he was able to part your legs, what
happened next? From the foregoing, we find it clear that the appellant’s
penis did not penetrate, but merely ‘touched’
A: He tried to insert his sexual organ but he was not (i.e., "naidikit"), AAA’s private part. In fact, the
able to do so, ma’am. victim confirmed on cross-examination that the
appellant did not succeed in inserting his penis into
Q: How did you know that he was trying to insert his her vagina. Significantly, AAA’s Sinumpaang
sexual organ? Salaysay24 also disclosed that the appellant was holding
the victim’s hand when he was trying to insert his penis in
A: "Naidikit po niya sa ari ko." her vagina. This circumstance – coupled with the victim’s
declaration that she was resisting the appellant’s attempt
to insert his penis into her vagina – makes penile
penetration highly difficult, if not improbable. Significantly,
nothing in the records supports the CA’s conclusion that
the appellant’s penis penetrated, however slightly, the
victim’s female organ.
Did the touching by the appellant’s penis of the victim’s
private part amount to carnal knowledge such that the
appellant should be held guilty of consummated rape?
In People v. Campuhan,25 the Court laid down the
parameters of genital contact in rape cases, thus:
Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not
simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing
of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the
external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis,
as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing
proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into
the female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to
be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface,
to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of
penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion
that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the
pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the
female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area,
e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen,
the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the
rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and
is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the
labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ
composed of the outer convex surface and the inner
surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered
with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner
surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but
has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia
majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that
the labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the
surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the
surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis
of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either
labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted
rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.26 (italics supplied)
Simply put, "rape is consummated by the slightest penile
penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the
female organ."27 Without any showing of such
penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at most,
it can only be attempted rape [or] acts of
lasciviousness."28
As earlier discussed, the prosecution failed to present
sufficient and convincing evidence to establish the
required penile penetration. AAA’s testimony did not
establish that the appellant’s penis touched the labias or
slid into her private part. Aside from AAA’s testimony, no
other evidence on record, such as a medico-legal report,
could confirm whether there indeed had been
penetration, however slight, of the victim’s labias. In the
absence of testimonial or physical evidence to establish
penile penetration, the appellant cannot be convicted of
consummated rape.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states
that there is an attempt when the offender commenced
the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but
does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In People v. Publico,29 we ruled that when
the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled
with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is
committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely
acts of lasciviousness.
In the present case, the appellant commenced the
commission of rape by the following overt acts: kissing
AAA’s nape and neck; undressing her; removing his
clothes and briefs; lying on top of her; holding her hands
and parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her
vagina. The appellant, however, failed to perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape
by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous
desistance, i.e., the victim's loud cries and resistance.
The totality of the appellant’s acts demonstrated the
unmistakable objective to insert his penis into the victim’s
private parts.
A review of jurisprudence reveals that the Court has not
hesitated to strike down convictions for consummated
rape when the evidence failed to show that penetration,
however slight, of the victim’s vagina took place. In
People v. Bon,30 the Court found the appellant guilty of
attempted rape only, as there was no indication that the
appellant’s penis even touched the labia of the
pudendum of the victim. We further held that the
appellant could not be convicted of consummated rape
by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain.
The Court had a similar ruling in People v.
Miranda,31 where the accused tried to insert his penis into
the victim’s private parts, but was unsuccessful, so he
inserted his fingers instead. We convicted the accused of
attempted rape only due to lack of evidence to establish
that there was even a slight penile penetration. We
noted, however, that the appellant’s act of inserting his
fingers would have constituted rape through sexual
assault had the offense occurred after the effectivity of
the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
In People v. Alibuyog,32 the victim declared that the
accused placed his penis on her vagina; and claimed that
it touched her private parts. The Court set aside the
accused’s conviction for rape, and convicted him of
attempted rape only, because we found the victim’s
testimony too ambiguous to prove the vital element of
penile penetration. We added that the victim’s testimony
was "replete with repeated denial of penile insertion."33
Similarly, in People v. Quarre,34 the evidence for the
prosecution consisted only of the victim’s testimony that
the accused tried, but failed, to insert his penis into her
vagina, and she felt pain in the process. No medico-legal
examination report was presented in evidence.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the accused’s conviction
for rape, and found him guilty of attempted rape only.
In People v. Ocomen,35 the Court also set aside the
appellant’s conviction for rape because no proof was
adduced of even the slightest penetration of the female
organ, aside from a general statement of the victim that
she had been "raped."
People v. Monteron36 is another noteworthy case where
the Court set aside the appellant’s conviction for rape. In
this case, the victim testified that the accused placed his
penis on top of her vagina, and that she felt pain. In
finding the accused guilty of attempted rape only, we held
that there was no showing that the accused’s penis
entered the victim’s vagina. We added that the pain that
the victim felt might have been caused by the accused’s
failed attempts to insert his organ into her vagina.
In People v. Mariano,37 the accused tried to insert his
penis into the victim’s vagina, but failed to secure
penetration. The Court set aside the accused’s conviction
for three (3) counts of rape and found him guilty of
attempted rape only. We explained the necessity of
carefully ascertaining whether the penis of the accused in
reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to
accurately conclude that rape had been consummated.
In People v. Arce, Jr.,38 the Court found the accused
guilty of attempted rape only, because the victim did not
declare that there was the slightest penetration, which
was necessary to consummate rape. On the contrary,
she categorically stated that the accused was not able to
insert his penis into her private parts because she was
moving her hips away. We further ruled that the victim’s
attempt to demonstrate what she meant by "idinidikit ang
ari" was unavailing to prove that rape had been
consummated.
In People v. Francisco,39 the victim testified that the
accused "poked" her vagina. The Court set aside the
accused’s conviction for qualified rape, and convicted
him instead only of attempted rape after failing to discern
from the victim's testimony that the accused attained
some degree of penile penetration, which was necessary
to consummate rape.1âwphi1
In People v. Dimapilis,40 the Court refused to convict the
accused for consummated rape on the basis of the
victim's testimony that she felt the accused's penis
pressed against her vagina as he tried to insert it. We
explained that in order to constitute consummated rape,
there must be entry into the vagina of the victim, even if
only in the slightest degree.
Finally, in People v. Tolentino,41 the Court reversed the
accused’s conviction for rape and convicted him of
attempted rape only, as there was paucity of evidence
that the slightest penetration ever took place. We
reasoned out that the victim’s statements that the
accused was "trying to force his sex organ into mine" and
"binundol-undol ang kanyang ari" did not prove that the
accused’s penis reached the labia of the pudendum of
the victim’s vagina.
"In rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to
present its case with clarity and persuasion, to the end
that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion."42 We emphasize that a conviction cannot be
made to rest on possibilities; strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment. In the present case,
the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving
all the elements of consummated rape.
The Proper Penalty and Indemnities
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the
imposable penalty for attempted rape is two degrees
lower than the prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua
for consummated rape. Two degrees lower from
reclusion perpetua is prision mayor whose range is six
(6) years and one (1) day to 12 years. Without any
attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
of the penalty to be imposed upon the appellant is prision
mayor in its medium period, while the minimum shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is
prision correccional whose range is six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years, in any of its periods.
Accordingly, we sentence the appellant to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor,
as maximum.
In addition, we order the appellant to pay the victim ₱
30,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱ 25,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱ 10,000.00 as exemplary damages, in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence on attempted
rape cases.43
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 15, 2009
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
02759 is MODIFIED, as follows:
The appellant's conviction for the crime of rape
is VACATED, and
(1) we find appellant Christopher Pareja y
Velasco GUILTY of the crime of ATTEMPTED
RAPE;
(2) we SENTENCE him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six ( 6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as
maximum; and
(3) we ORDER him to PAY the victim the amounts
of ₱ 30,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱ 25,000.00 as
moral damages; and ₱ 10,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26170 December 6, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. TEODORO LUCHICO, Defendant-
Appellant.
M. H. de Joya for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Teodoro Luchico appeals to this court from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, convicting him of
the crime of rape, and sentencing him, without taking into
consideration any circumstance modifying his criminal
liability, to suffer fourteen years, eight months and one
day reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law,
and to pay the
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In support of his appeal the appellant assigns the
following supposed errors as committed by the trial court
in its judgment, to wit: (1) The trial court erred in giving
more weight to the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution than that given by the accused and appellant
and the other witnesses for the defense; (2) the lower
court erred in finding the herein accused and appellant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The prosecution attempted to prove the following
facts:chanrobles virtual law library
That at about 6 o'clock in the evening of March 3, 1923,
the offended party, Inocencia Salva, a girl of 13 years of
age, being in the kitchen of the house of the herein
accused, Teodoro Luchicho, as a servant of the latter,
preparing a decoction of senna leaves, her master
approached her and said: "Inocencia, do not make an
outcry when I am in the place where you are lying down;"
"Why?" asked the girl, and the accused replied: "Because
I love you very much." "That cannot be," answered
Inocencia, "because I look upon you as my father while I
am here." The accused then caught her by her face and
imprinted a kiss upon her left cheek. Inocencia Salva ran
to the parlor, secured a pen knife and opened it. Upon
seeing the knife in her hand, the accused snatched it and
went into the room where his wife, Catalina de Jesus,
was. The offended party went downstairs pursued by the
accused. Upon reaching the municipal president's
pharmacy, she saw Benito Bugnay seated at the gate of
a house and addressing him, inquired: "Listen, will you
permit me to step in here for a moment?" "Why, are you
tired? " asked the man. "Because Teodoro Luchico has
pursued me," replied the girl. The man further asked her:
"And now what do you want?" and the girl replied: "I want
to go to the municipal building to make a complaint
against Teodoro Luchico for what he did to me." "You
need not do anything more," answered the man, "the
president is over there on the opposite side and you can
go over there and present your complaint." She then
went to the pharmacy, which was on the opposite side,
and there she met the accused Teodoro Luchico who
called her: "Come here I want to treat your wounded
hand." She replied: "I don't want you to treat it; first of all I
want to complain of what you did to me." While she was
telling the president what had occurred, the accused
interrupted and said: "do not believe that, my friend,
because she is every young and had been ill with typhoid
fever." The municipal president paid no attention to her
and after having applied some medicine to her wound,
said to her: "You can go home." The accused told the girl
to come along with him and upon relying that she would
not, he said to her: "If you don't go with me I will break
your feet," and taking hold of her right arm, led her
towards his house. Upon passing by a place where the
houses are somewhat distant and upon reaching a
"camachile" tree, he threw her to the ground, caught hold
of her knees, covered her mouth and mounted her, and
taking out his genital organ, wet it with saliva and
introduced it, with difficulty and great suffering of the girl,
into her private parts, and although, on account of the
pain, she attempted to call for help, she could not do so
because her mouth was covered by the accused. After
consummating the carnal act the accused picked the girl
up in his arms and carried her to Placida Javier's house,
which was close by. This happened at about 7 o'clock at
night, and although it was moonlight the place was dark
as there was a pathway shaded by many trees. Upon
arriving at Placida Javier's house, the accused sent her
niece Maria to his house to get a chemise for Inocencia
because the one she was wearing was soiled with blood
which oozed from the girl's genital organ as a result of
rape. After the accused had changed her dress, he took
the stained one. Upon orders from the accused the girl
went from Placida Javier's house to the house of Isidro
Luchico, the accused brother, where she spent the night.
At dawn on the following day Inocencia Salva made an
effort to reach the accused's house under the pretext that
she was going to mass. Instead of going to mass she
went to the house of the ex-municipal president, Mr.
Arsenio Roldan, to present her complaint as the present
municipal president would not listen to her. After hearing
her story, Mr. Arsenio Roldan sent her to the house of
Lieutenant Selga of the Constabulary in Caloocan. When
Lieutenant Selga arrived at the barracks in the afternoon
of the same day, which was Sunday, he accompanied
her to the accused's house where she secured her blood-
stained dress and torn chemise from underneath
an aparador.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
On the morning of March 5, 1923, Dr. Emiliano Panis of
the Constabulary made a physical examination of the girl
and found an inflammation or congestion of the small and
large lips of the genital organ, an irritation of the vaginal
canal with small hemorrhages under the mucose
membrane and inflammation, pus and a bloody excretion
of a foul odor, and a disappearance of the hymen. The
inflammation or congestion was due to the introduction of
a hard body out of proportion with the girl's vaginal cavity,
which produced a traumatism in the vaginal canal. Dr.
Emiliano Panis also found a small wound about 2 or 3
inches long on the thumb of her left hand and another
superficial wound on the left
leg.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The defense attempted to prove that the offended party,
Inocencia Salva, had been ill with typhoid fever before
she entered the service of Teodoro Luchico in January,
1923, being brought by Natalia de Jesus for whom she
had been working before; and as a result of said illness
the girl's hair was short and she at times would cry
without any cause and would wonder about; that in
February of the same year, the girl had some difficulty in
micturating; that Dr. Lucio Santos was consulted and he
advised the use of a catheter the nurse, who was
attending the accused's wife, to look after her, and who
applied a rubber catheter once, and at another time a
metal catheter; that on March 3, 1923, Inocencia Salva
spoke to the herein accused and his wife Catalina de
Jesus asking permission to work in a candy factory in the
same municipality in company with some other women;
that as she was not permitted to leave, she became
angry and said she would go to another house so that
she might go with her companion; that Catalina de Jesus
then told her to wait until the following day inasmuch as
she wanted to communicate with Natalia de Jesus in
Manila to find out who would be responsible for her debt;
hat on the afternoon of the same day Inocencia Salva
said that she had found another employer and that she
wanted to go to the latter's house and requested that they
say nothing to Natalia de Jesus; that Catalina de Jesus
replied that she had to inform the said Natalia de Jesus;
that from then on the girl was angry and asked for her
penknife which was in the possession of her employers;
that the accused handed her the penknife; that while
talking with some people who were visiting him, Teodoro
Luchico heard some children, who were in the yard, say
that Inocencia Salva's hand was bleeding; that he asked
her how she had wounded her hand and she replied: "If
you advise Manila before I leave, I prefer to die;" that
after saying this the girl ran downstairs with the open
penknife in her hand; that while Teodor Luchico was
holding his little baby in his arms he requested some of
his visitors to pursue, the girl; that not having over taken
her, his wife told him to leave the baby, go to the
municipal president and ask the police to catch her; that it
was then between 5 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon, and
at the moment when the accused was leaving the
president's pharmacy with a policeman, he saw Inocencia
Salva running and pointed her out to the president,
saying: "There is the girl whom I intended to ask the
police to catch." The municipal president said to him:
"You had better call her; let us see if the girl will come; "
that the accused did so and when the girl approached
they saw that the front of her dress was stained with
blood; that the accused ordered the persons who were
there to search her in order to see if she still carried the
penknife; the girl replied that wasn't necessary because
she had lost it while running; that when the girl said she
had a wound in her thumb, the accused asked the
municipal president, who was a physician, to treat it; that
she did not want to let him treat it saying that she wanted
to die; as the municipal president was very busy, he told
the accused that he might take the girl, who was
disposed, to go with him; that while on the road to his
house, she asked permission of the accused to look for
her penknife and handkerchief which contained some
money; that upon arriving near Placida Javier's house
she complained of pain in her wound and the accuse
took her to said house where they bathed it in sublimate
and water; that between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening
the accused and the offended party left Placida Javier's
house and returned to the said accused's house, passing
through a vegetable garden; that when they arrived at the
accused's house the mother of the latter told her that she
should eat supper and sleep in the house of her other
son named Isidro Luchico, for fear that the accused's wife
might suffer a relapse; that at midnight Isidro Luchico
went to the accused's house to tell him that the girl had
disappeared; that the girl returned to the house very early
the following morning to change her dress and said that
she would go to mass; that she afterwards appeared
accompanied by Lieut. Selga and a sergeant of the
Constabulary that after the investigation of the accused
the Constabulary officers left taking the girl with them,
and in a few days presented a complaint against him for
rape; that on April 6, 1923, while the accused was going
on board a banca to return to his house he saw the girl,
who called to him; that he then brought the banca to the
river bank and asked her what she wanted; that she
replied that she tried to find him the day before in order to
ask him to accompany her to the house of the justice of
the peace, as she wished to withdraw her complaint; that
the accused asked her why and she answered that the
complaint did not state the truth and that one Bartolome
Sianjo had induced her to present it; that Bartolome
Sianjo was angry with the accused because the latter,
with other associates, had filed a complaint with a petition
for an attachment against him; that Attorney Roldan was
angry with the accused on account of politics; that when
they reached the house of the justice of the peace the girl
said that she wanted to be at peace with her master and
for that reason she wished to withdraw her complaint;
that the girl was later operated upon in the General
Hospital for bladder trouble; that when she had already
been discharged, they transferred her to San Lazaro
Hospital, because she was suffering from constitutional
hysteria, making her very impressionable and forgetful
and in a mental state bordering on
insanity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The accused, testifying as a witness in his own behalf,
denied everything that the offended party had testified to
against him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The offended party, upon cross-examination by the
attorney for the defense, testified that she had not been
induced by anyone to present the complaint against the
accused; that on April 6, 1923, the accused arrived in
a banca at Jose Dimla's house where she lived, and said:
"Inocencia, the judge orders me to take you to him,
because he wishes to know if you are agreeable to the
arrangement," that she replied: "I cannot go with you
because my master Jose is not here:" that the accused
then took hold of her hand and pushed her and she fell
on the floor near the wall; that she wept and intended to
scream, but the accused said to her: "Don't scream,
because if you do I will kill you; If you attempt to scream,
this will be your last day;" that he afterwards took hold of
her hand and carried her by force to his banca where he
made her lie down, covering her with a basket which he
carried; that when they reached the house of the justice
of the peace, Teodoro Luchico said to him; "Your Honor,
Inocencia is agreeable to the withdrawal of the
complaint;" that the justice of the peace asked her; "What
do you say Inocencia, are you agreeable to the
withdrawal of the complaint?" that she answered in the
negative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The result of the physical examination to which the
offended party submitted two days after the outrage,
which gave rise to the complaint presented to Lieutenant
Selga of the Constabulary against the herein accused,
leaves no room for doubt that she has been
raped.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
As will be seen, the evidence of the defense tends to
establish the theory that Inocencia Salva being
impressionable due to suffering from constitutional
hysteria, his enemies took advantage of the trouble she
had with her former masters and used her as an
instrument for their revenge, and to that end induced her
to file a complaint against the herein accused in order
that she might be able to leave their services without
having to pay her
debt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
While the evidence of the prosecution leaves much to be
desired and certain testimony of the witnesses for the
defense has not been contradicted, yet with all the
evidence of the defense it has not been able to destroy
the probatory value of the testimony of the offended
party, corroborated by her physical examination.
Admitting for the moment - although it was denied by the
offended party - that Bartolome Sianjo and Attorney
Arsenio Roldan did induce her to present the complaint
against the accused, it is not possible to believe that they
would go to the extreme of advising her to irritate her
genital organ until it bled to give her the appearance of
having been raped. It has not been proven that at the
time of presenting her complaint to Lieutenant Selga of
the Constabulary which was the day after the outrage,
any abnormal mental symptoms were noticed. While
eminent medical criminologists have verified from
experience that some hysterics, tormented by the genital
instinct, have filed a false accusations for crimes against
chastity, yet, not a single case has been found in which
the hysteric accuser has gone to the extreme of causing
herself traumatism and injuries in the sexual organ in
order to lend the appearance of truth to her false
accusation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
In view of the above, we think that the evidence of the
prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt
the guilt of the
accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The Attorney-General is of the opinion that in imposing
the penalty the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity
and abuse of confidence should be taken into
consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The crime of the rape committed by the accused upon
the offended party was the result of a succession of acts
which took place within the period of two hours,
commencing at 5 o'clock in the afternoon and ending at 7
o'clock in the evening, without a moment's interruption in
which it can be said that nighttime, being the most
favorable occasion for committing the crime, occurred to
the accused. In order that the aggravating circumstance
of nocturnity may be taken into consideration, it is
necessary that the same be sought and that it be taken
advantage of, which does not appear to be clearly proven
in the present case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In order to take into consideration the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of confidence, it is essential that
the confidence be a means of facilitating the commission
of a crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended
party's belief that the former would not abuse said
confidence. When the accused raped the offended party
she had already lost confidence in him from the moment
that he took the liberty of making an indecent proposal to
her and of offending her with a kiss, which compelled her
to arm herself with a penknife; and in the present case it
cannot be said that the fact of the accused being the
offended party's master facilitated the attainment of his
lustful purpose.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The crime of rape committed by the accused carries with
it the obligations to indemnify the offended party when
the latter is a widow or single, to acknowledge the
offspring if the character of its origin does not prevent it
and to support the same. In the present case, it is only
necessary to sentence the accused, by way of indemnity
to endow the offended party she being single. He cannot
be ordered to support and acknowledge the offspring
which she might have, because it has been proven that
she did not conceive, and even though she might have
conceived, the character of its origin would have
prevented it on account of the accused being
married.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In view of the foregoing and with the sole modification
that the accused is further sentenced to endow the
offended party in the sum of P500, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the
appellant. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand,
Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-57293 June 21, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JACKARIYA LUNGBOS alias "NASSER"; ROMEO
NARIDO y REMIGIO and Two Other JOHN
DOES, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for defendants-
appellants.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 4556 (317-III-80) of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Zamboanga
City, Jackariya Lungbos alias "Nasser" and three John
Does were charged with robbery in band with homicide
for the fatal shooting of Julian Legarde. One of the John
Does was later ascertained to be Romeo Narido y
Remigio, hence the following amended information was
filed:
That on or about the 12th day of July, 1980,
in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court , said accused Jackariya Lungbos
alias "Nasser," Romeo Narido y
Remigio and their two companions
Identified therein as John Does, armed
with.45 caliber pistols, thus forming
themselves a band, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting one another, taking advantage of
their superior strength and of the night to
better accomplish their purpose, by means
of force and intimidation of persons and
with intent of gain did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal, and carry away from the ANGELS"
GARDEN owned by one ANDRES
ENRIQUEZ y FERNANDEZ cash money in
the amount of EIGHT RED PESOS
(P800.00), a wallet containing also cash
money in the amount of P40.00 and wrist
watch worth P500.00 belonging to JULIAN
LEGARDE, all of which were taken without
the knowledge and against the will of the
owners thereof; that on the occasion of the
commission of the robbery above-
mentioned, the above-mentioned accused
by virtue of their conspiracy and in order to
enable them to take, steal and carry away
the articles above-described, with treachery
and evident premeditation and with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack and shoot
with the said weapons that they were then
armed with at the person of said JULIAN
LEGARDE, thereby inflicting upon the
latter's person mortal gunshot wound which
directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on October 2, 1980, Lungbos and
Narido pleaded not guilty. The two John Does remained
at large.
Trial commenced on December 18,1980, with the
presentation of two prosecution witnesses Shirley
Dayanan and Elizabeth Mahinay. Meanwhile, Narido
escaped from the Zamboanga City Jail in April 1981. He
was recaptured a month later. When presented in court
during the May 27,1981 hearing, Narido, through
counsel de oficio, asked that he be re-arraigned as he
was changing his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty."
At his re-arraignment, the amended information was
translated in chavacano, the dialect which he speaks and
understands. Thereafter, he voluntarily and
spontaneously pleaded guilty. As the information charged
a capital offense, the trial judge himself as well as the
defense counsel explained to him the meaning and effect
of his plea of guilty. Notwithstanding said explanation,
Narido openly admitted to the court that he committed the
crime charged and that he was truly repentant for it.
The court a quo rendered a partial decision on May
28,1981 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery in band with homicide and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. The
dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, after
finding the accused Romeo Narido y
Remegio GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged in the Amended
Information, this Court hereby sentences
him to suffer the maximum penalty of
DEATH with the recommendation to His
Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
through the Honorable Supreme Court to
grant appropriate commutation of his death
sentence to life imprisonment considering
the reasons heretofore stated; that, if
commutation is granted in the premises, for
him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Julian Legarde the sum of P12,000 as
damages, and the sum of P500.00 for the
value of the wrist watch taken from and
belonging to the deceased, to pay Andres
Enriquez y Fernandez the sum of P840.00
representing the unrecovered stolen cash
money from him; and to pay the costs,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Pursuant to Section 7 (last paragraph) in
relation to Section 9, Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Court, let the records of
the above entitled case, as far as the
accused Romeo Narido y Remegio is
concerned, be forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court for automatic review and
judgment as law and justice shall dictate,
within the reglementary period provided
therein. The immediate transcription of the
stenographic notes pertinent to the case of
the herein accused Romeo Narido y
Remigio, without unnecessary delay, is
hereby ordered for transmittal to the
Honorable Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, the above-entitled case against
the co-accused Jackariya Lungbos alias
"Nasser" who pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to
the offense charged is hereby ordered set
for trial on June 8, 1981 at 8:30 o'clock in
the morning.
On July 12, 1980 at about 7:30 in the evening, Narido
and Jackariya Lungbos alias "Nasser," with two
unidentified companions, entered the Sweet Angel
Gardens Restaurant in Sta. Cruz, Tetuan Highway,
Zamboanga City. They occupied table No. 21 and
ordered beer, cigarettes and some "pulutan." At about
10:00 P.M., Lungbos went out of the restaurant. After
closing the door, Narido proceeded to table No. 16 and
collared the customer Rolando Chiong who was seated
there. When the latter attempted to stand up, Narido shot
him with a pistol. His two companions proceeded to the
counter and poked a gun at the cashier, Elizabeth
Mahinay, and at Julian Legarde, father-in-law of the
restaurant owner, who was seated behind the counter.
They demanded money from Mahinay and Legarde.
They divested Legarde of his wrist watch and wallet
containing P40 and took the day's earnings of P800. A
burst of gunshots rang from the counter, then the
malefactors fled with their loot.
Chiong, Legarde and the restaurant's cook, Flaviano
Gonzales, were hit. Legarde was rushed to the Doctor's
Hospital where he succumbed to a gunshot wound in the
abdomen. Chiong and Gonzales were brought to the
Zamboanga General Hospital. They survived.
The decision of the trial court is before Us for mandatory
review.
Narido alleges that the court a quo erred:
1. In considering the aggravating
circumstance of "robbery in band" despite
the absence of proof that more than three
of the accused were armed;
2. In considering nocturnity as an
aggravating circumstance despite lack of
evidence that the accused purposely
sought it to commit the crime;
3. In holding that the appellant admitted the
crime charged in the amended information
without mental reservation, including the
aggravating circumstances alleged therein;
and
4. In imposing the supreme penalty of death
upon the appellant.
The first assignment of error is well-taken. There is a
band whenever more than three malefactors acted
together in the commission of the offense (Art. 14,
subpar. 6, Revised Penal Code). The crime was not
committed by a band because the prosecution failed to
establish that all four of the malefactors were armed.
Only Narido and the two John Does were armed.
Nowhere in the record can We find evidence that
Lungbos was also armed. Band is not aggravating when
only three malefactors are armed. (People vs. Maalihan,
130 SCRA 583).
The trial court properly considered nocturnity as an
aggravating circumstance, even if there was no direct
evidence showing that the conspirators sought the
nighttime to commit the robbery for it cannot be gainsaid
that nocturnity facilitated the successful commission of
the crime. The fact that they lingered in the restaurant
close to three hours before carrying out their plan to rob it
indicates that they waited for darkness to deepen to
better pursue their evil scheme and to ensure their
escape under cover of the night. Nocturnity, even though
not specially sought, if it facilitated the commission of the
crime and the accused took advantage thereof to commit
it, may be considered as an aggravating circumstance
(People vs. Galapia, 84 SCRA 530).
The trial court did not err in holding Narido bound by his
judicial confession of guilt under the amended
information. There is no higher evidence of guilt than the
accused's own confession. Unless nullified by evidence
of duress a voluntary plea of guilty is admissible as
evidence of guilt of a high quality (People vs. Zea, 130
SCRA 77).
The records of this case show that the trial on the merits
had commenced and the prosecution had already
presented evidence proving the appellant's guilt when he
manifested, through counsel, that he would change his
plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty. He was properly re-
arraigned and there were no abbreviated proceedings.
Full opportunity was given to him to present his evidence.
This Court ruled in People vs. Kayanan (83 SCRA 437)
that a plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial
had begun does not entitle the accused to have such
plea considered as a mitigating circumstance.
The last assignment of error has become moot in view of
the abolition of the death penalty under the 1987
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the judgment finding the accused Romeo
Narido y Remigio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide as defined and penalized
under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code is affirmed, except his penalty which is reduced
to reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided by
law, in consonance with Section 19 (1), Article III of the
1987 Constitution. He is further ordered:
1. To indemnify the heirs of the deceased Julian Legarde
in the amount of P30,000 plus the sum of P540
representing the value of the wrist watch and money that
he and his companions took from the deceased, and
2. To pay the restaurant-owner Andres Enriquez y
Fernandez the sum of P800 that was taken from the
restaurant's receipts.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109776 May 26, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff appellee,
vs.
ROQUE CABRESOS, accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Roque Cabresos was charged with the crime of rape
before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 26 of
Medina, Misamis Oriental, in an information which
alleged:
That on or about 29th day of June 1988 at
about 2:00 early dawn, more or less, at
Sitio Upper Anoling, Barangay Kabulakan,
Municipality of Balingoan, Province of
Misamis Oriental, Republic of the
 Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force and intimidation and with the use of a
knife, have sexual intercourse with the
offended party, Editha Pesidas, against her
will and without her consent.
The crime was committed with the
attendance of aggravating circumstance of
abuse of confidence and obvious
ungratefulness as accused was
accommodated to live with the
complainant's family.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 335,
paragraph 1, in relation to Article 14,
paragraph 4, all of the Revised Penal
Code. 1
At arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial,
he was found guilty and sentenced in a decision
rendered in November 19, 1992. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this
court finds Roque Cabresos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
the use of deadly weapon as defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code with aggravating circumstances
of abuse of confidence, obvious
ungratefulness, blood relationship and with
the use of deadly weapon; and, thereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment
under reclusion perpetua or thirty (30) years
imprisonment, with full credit of the entire
period of his detention from February 17,
1989 to the present or finality of this
judgment. Accused Roque C. Cabresos is
hereby declared as the father of the child
Anthea Q. Pesidas and he is ordered to
recognize and support said child in
accordance with the provisions of the
Family Code.
Accused Roque Cabresos is likewise
ordered to pay Editha Pesidas the sum of
P30,000.00 by way of moral damages and
P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages
and to pay the costs. 2
Roque Cabresos appeals from his conviction assigning
the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
I
The trial court gravely erred in giving full
credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witness which is highly
incredible, inconsistent and unreliable.
II
 The trial court gravely erred in not giving
credence to the defense interposed by
accused-appellant.
III
The trial court gravely erred in convicting
the accused-appellant despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.3
The trial court found that the evidence of the prosecution
showed the relevant facts to be the following:
Complainant Editha Pesidas testified that
she is 18 years old (at the time she
testified), but she was 16 years old when
she was raped by accused. She is single,
housekeeper and a resident of Kabulakan,
Balingoan, Misamis Oriental and has
studied up to second year high school. She
personally knows the accused Roque
Cabresos whom she considers as her uncle
because he is a cousin of her mother. She
identified the accused in the courtroom by
touching his shoulder.
Editha Pesidas declared that last June 28,
and June 29, 1988, her mother and father
were in Talisayan District Hospital. She was
left in the house together with her brother
and sister, who are 12 and 10 years old
respectively. She slept alone in her room,
while her brother and sister slept in the
adjoining room. Roque Cabresos lived with
them and in that particular night of June 29,
1988, Roque Cabresos slept in the sala.
Then, at dawn, which was 2:00 o'clock in
the morning, more or less, already June 29,
1988, she was awakened by accused
Roque Cabresos who pointed a sharp
pointed knife to her neck, squeezed her
mouth and boxed her abdomen that she
lost her strength.
There and then, Roque Cabresos took off
her panty by tearing it. Then, accused
placed himself on top of her and made a
push and pull movement (kiyo-kiyo).
Accused inserted his penis to her vagina
that she felt severe pain which lasted about
half an hour. The left hand of accused was
holding the knife and was always pointing
to her neck. She struggled, but accused is
bigger and stronger that she lost her
strength. Ultimately, accused succeeded in
raping her. Something sticky came out from
his penis; thereafter, Roque Cabresos
threatened her; that, she would be killed if
she would tell her parents. He uttered this
threat about five (5) times. Then, Roque
Cabresos left her room and returned to
sleep in the sala.
After three days from the commission of the
crime, her parents returned home from the
 hospital. She did not tell them about what
happened because Roque Cabresos
threatened to kill her.
Complainant testified that at the time
accused raped her, she was fertile. In the
succeeding months, she did not have
monthly menstruation. When her pregnancy
was noticeable, her parents inquired about
it, and she told them the truth. She told also
her grandfather Eufrocino Quejada some
time last February 1989. She was
accompanied to the house of a midwife for
examination. Thereafter, accompanied by
her parents and grandfather, they went to
the police station of Balingoan, Misamis
Oriental, and there, her affidavit was taken
on February 14, 1989 which she subscribed
on the following day before the
prosecutor. 4
Appellant Cabresos' version of the facts was summarized
by the trial court as follows:
On June 28, 1988 at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, accused appellant was at the
house of Mr. Trapal in Upper Lapinig,
Balingoan, Misamis Oriental together with
his companions, namely: Anastacio
Cabresos alias "Baloloy", Eddie Aragon,
Rene Magallon, Dobby Magallon and Oloy
Cabresos drinking one pocket size of
Tanduay rhum. While they were drinking,
they were conversing about their works,
especially the gathering of coconuts. After
staying there for an hour, they proceeded to
the municipal building of Balingoan,
Misamis Oriental. In the said store, they
again drank one pocket size of Tanduay
rhum. From the store of Beboy Pebular, at
about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the
same day, they went to the house of Alding
Itom. At Alding Itom's house, they
butchered a dog, cooked the meat and ate
the same as their sumsuman. After eating,
at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the
same day they proceeded to the house of
his uncle Anastacio Cabresos. When they
were already at the house of his uncle, they
once more drank another one pocket size
of Tanduay rhum. The accused went to
sleep at around 11:30 o'clock in the evening
of the same date at the latter's house and
woke up at about 5:00 o'clock in the
morning of the following day. That was
June 29, 1988. 5
We are once again faced with the task of deciding who
as between two (2) persons is worthy of belief and who is
not. Private complainant Editha Pesidas claims that she
was raped by the accused. The accused denies the
accusation and interposes the defense of alibi contending
that he could not have committed the rape because he
was somewhere else at the time the alleged rape
occurred. In support of his claim, Cabresos presented
witnesses who vouched that he was with them on the
night and hour in question, carousing on cheap rum and
on dog-meat with great abandon.
After much consideration and upon careful examination
of the record, we find no reason to overturn the findings
of the trial court.
The issue to be resolved is, of course, whether or not the
prosecution was able to establish from the testimony of
the complainant the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
We answer in the affirmative.
The question is essentially one of credibility and it is a
well-settled rule reiterated in a long and still growing line
of cases, that appellate courts will generally not disturb
the factual findings of the trial court since the latter are in
a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is
convincingly shown that the trial court had plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.6
In his appeal, appellant highlights certain points in
complainant's testimony which he contends constitute
inconsistencies or improbabilities which weaken the force
of her accusation. However, going over those same
points we come to a different conclusion.
On the night of the rape, the victim's parents were not at
home. They were at a hospital in Talisayan where the
victim's mother had to be brought7 and they returned
from the hospital only three (3) days later.8 Complainant
positively identified the accused as her assailant. There
was a kerosene vigil lamp in the altar which illuminated
her bedroom.9 Moreover, as found by the trial court, she
was familiar (with) the persona of the accused being a
relative who resided in their house.10
Complainant was only able to cry out for help once
because the accused threatened her with a knife which
he pointed at her neck;11 he also squeezed her mouth
and boxed her stomach, as a result of which her strength
and vitality fled her.12
The fact that her young brother (12 years of age) and
sister (10 years old) who were sleeping in an adjoining
room did not hear her outcry does not necessarily mean
that the rape never occurred.
Appellant stresses the fact that after the alleged rape, the
complainant testified that she continued going to school
and not once did she report the incident to her parents or
the police although she passed by the police station
everyday on her way to school.13 Furthermore, the
complainant did not report the outrage on her person to a
relative of hers who is a policewoman.14
We have previously held in earlier cases that delay in
prosecuting the rape is not an indication of fabricated
charges. 15 In at least one case, we observed that "if the
complainant did not become pregnant, she probably
would never have revealed that she was raped by her
uncle. Many victims of rape never complain or file
criminal charges against their rapists. They prefer to bear A: I did not say anything
the ignominy and pain rather than reveal their shame to because I was afraid of the
the world or risk the rapists' making good their threats to warning of Roque Cabresos.
kill or hurt their victims."16 This in fact was what
happened here where the victim reported the incident to xxx xxx xxx
her parents only eight (8) months after she had been
raped when her pregnancy became noticeable. Similarly, Q: What was the warning or
in the case of People v. Soterol,17 where the appellant threat of the accused during
had contended that complainant's 6-month delay in filing the incident?
the complaint and her silence after the alleged rape
render her charge incredible, we ruled that the A: He said that if I tell my
complainant's failure to report the rape incident earlier parents he would kill me.
had been fully and satisfactorily explained. There, the
complainant testified that she did not report the incident Q: How many times did he
immediately because she believed her uncle's threat to utter these words?
kill her.
A: Five times. 18
Editha's inaction for eight (8) months was sufficiently
explained by her in open court. Thus: xxx xxx xxx

(Direct Examination of Editha (Cross-examination of Editha

Pesidas) Pesidas)

Q: And when your father Q: When Roque Cabresos left

arrived in your house, did he
know about the incident?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
your house, and your parents
(were) already there, of
course, your fear no longer
existed because your parents
were already there?
A: I was still afraid of him.

xxx xxx xxx

A: I was still afraid for he
might come back. 19
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did it not occur to your
mind to tell your parents that
you were already pregnant?
A: No, because of fear and
shame.
Q: Did it not occur to your
mind that your parents would
eventually discover you were
pregnant and it was better to
tell them earlier so that if there
is a person answerable for
that they would run after him?
A: No, because of my fear.
Q: Did it not occur to your
mind that your fear of being
discovered will be useless
because eventually your
parents will discover it?
A: No, because of my fear
and shame.
Q: Did it not occur to your
mind your shame will be
useless because eventually
your parents will know of your
pregnancy?
A: No.
Q: Why?
A: Because of my fear. 20
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
While a mature woman would probably have acted
differently, we are unable to conclude that Editha's
continued fear of her violator and her failure to inform her
parents of the rape meant that it had not occurred at all.
Appellant Cabresos also assails the findings of the trial
court concerning the delayed delivery of the child as not
supported by evidence. The trial court found that the
complainant Editha Pesidas "gave birth within 300 days
or 10 months allowable in medical science from
conception or fertilization, implantation, gestation and to
birth of the child," 21 as a result of the sexual assault
inflicted upon her by appellant. The trial court said on this
point:
. . . this court has taken note of the
testimony of Editha Pesidas; that the onset
of her monthly menstruation was June 9,
1988 and ended after five days. So, it must
be June 14, 1988. Medical science has
shown that from the first day of
menstruation, the first ten days thereafter is
considered a safe period, meaning the
woman is not fertile. This corresponds to
June 10 to 19, 1988. Then, the period from
the 11th day to 20th day from the first day
of menstruation is fertility period where the
ovum in matured and any time may be
fertilized by a sperm. In the case of Editha
Pesidas, [the] fertility period corresponds
from June 20 to June 29, 1988, that is why,
Editha Pesidas said that from the day she
was raped, she did not have any monthly
menstruation thereafter, except a little blood
spotting on July 20, 1988.
Medical science has taught us the basics of
fertilization, conception, gestation and
delivery of a child. First, the basics: a baby
is formed when the sperm cell from the man
meets (or fertilizes) the woman's egg or
ovum. An ovum, which is released by the
woman's ovary only once in about 28 days,
has a maximum life of 24 to 72 hours (3
days only). The sperm cell, on the other
hand, may live for up to 6 days under very
hospitable conditions, but usually lives for
only about 24 hours. When the ovum is not
fertilized, it dies, and the absence of
fertilization is normally indicated by the
arrival of menstruation. On the other hand
when the ovum is fertilized, it attaches itself
on the inner wall of the womb. This is
sometimes known as implantation of
fertilized ovum. The inner wall does not
shed off, so menstruation does not occur
during the entire period of pregnancy.
Somewhere in July 20, 1988 is the
attachment of the fertilized ovum in the
womb of Editha Pesidas. It is the date of
the implantation of said fertilized ovum.
That is why on said date, she had little
blood spotting which is not considered as
menstruation. Counting therefrom, the birth
of Anthea Q. Pesidas on May 1, 1988, the
child's coming to this world was within the
300 days or ten months, allowable in
medical science from conception or
fertilization, plantation, gestation, and to
birth of the child. 22
In computing the duration of pregnancy, "we should note
that time is computed from the date of three different
occurrences in the life of the mother: one is the first day
of the last menstrual period, one is the time of
intercourse, and one is the time of the fertilization of the
ovum . . . . . "23 We find that the trial judge's computation
in this case of the duration of complainant's pregnancy
counted from the time of the fertilization of the ovum, is
medically accepted and recognized.
Moreover, from complainant's testimony, the
uncontroverted fact is that the complainant gave birth to a
baby girl 307 days or 10 months after the date of her
alleged rape. While the ordinary period of gestation is Q: And ordinarily hiking we
approximately 9 calendar months or 280 days, calculated can negotiate three kilometers
from the first day of the last menstrual period, 24 there is in less than one hour?
nevertheless an abundance of medical authorities
recording exceptions to this general rule.25 In fact, it has A: Yes, sir. 29
been held that length of pregnancy varies from 220 to
330 days from date of fruitful coitus.26 Thus, the 280-day xxx xxx xxx
rule is not a hard and fast one.27
(Cross-examination of
On the other hand, as against the complainant's positive Anastacio Cabresos)
identification, the accused-appellant offers the defense of
alibi. However, we have many times held that alibi is a Q: A healthy person like the
weak defense and cannot prevail over the complainant's accused can reach Barangay
positive and clear identification of the accused as the Kabulakan which is three
perpetrator of the crime. 28 Moreover, the defense of alibi kilometers only one
in this case must be rejected because aside from a clear hour because he is healthy?
and positive identification made by the complainant, the
possibility of the accused having gone to the scene of the A: Of course, if he is healthy.
crime at the time of its commission was not at all remote.
Note the following statements of defense witnesses: Q: Or maybe less than an
hour?
(Cross-examination of Rene
Magallon) A: Depending upon his speed
in walking.30
Q: And this place of Balodoy
to Kabulakan, Balingoan, xxx xxx xxx
Misamis Oriental is how many
kilometers, according to your (Cross-examination of
own estimate? accused Roque Cabresos)

A: Three kilometers. Q: Anastacio Cabresos alias

Baludo is living in what place?
A: At Upper Lapinig.
Q: What is the distance from
Upper Lapinig to Kabulakan,
particularly the place of
Pesidas?
A: Three kilometer, more or
less.
Q: By ordinary hiking you can
negotiate three kilometers
with an hour hike?
A: It depends how you walk.
Q: But natural walking?
A: More than an hour, more or
less.31
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You mean, by ordinary
hike, you can negotiate one
kilometer by one hour?
A: Less than (an) hour.
Q: Even in thirty minutes?
A: Yes sir. 32
xxx xxx xxx
The settled rule is that, for alibi to be given credence, "an
accused must not only prove satisfactorily that he was at
another place at the time the crime happened; but more
importantly, that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission."33
Of equal significance is the fact that the accused had the
opportunity to commit the crime considering that none of
his witnesses actually saw him at the hour in question
because they were all already asleep at that time.
(Direct Examination of Rene
Magallon)
Q: What time did Roque
Cabresos go to sleep on June
29, 1988?
A: 1:20 in the morning
Q: About you, what time did
you go to sleep?
A: 2:00 o'clock. 34
xxx xxx xxx
(Cross-examination of
Anastacio Cabresos)
Q: So that at 9:00 o'clock you
were already lying down and
at 10:00 o'clock you were
already sound asleep?
A: About that hour.
A: I woke up at 4:30.
Q: It was only at 4:30 when
you passed by the room
where the accused (was)
sleeping?

Q: And you woke up the next A: Yes, sir.

morning at about 4:40?
Q: At 12:00 midnight you did
A: 4:30 dawn. not wake up?

Q: And the accused who was A: No, sir

sleeping in your house was
not sleeping with you in the Q: You did not wake up at
same room that night? 1:00 o'clock?

A: He slept in another room. A: I woke up to urinate in my

bedpan.
Q: So that you cannot
determine if Roque Cabresos Q: At 2:00 o'clock did you
was still in his room because wake up?
you could not see him?
A: No, sir.
A: My house has three rooms
and the room where they Q: It was only 4:30 when you
were sleeping I could pass by woke up again?
it.
A: Yes, sir.35
Q: But you had no time to
pass by the room where they xxx xxx xxx
were sleeping because you
were sleeping at that time? (Emphasis supplied)
Although we affirm the findings of the lower court with
regard to the guilt of the accused and its appreciation of
the aggravating circumstances of use of a deadly
weapon, 36 abuse of confidence and obvious
ungratefulness,37 we must take exception to its
appreciation of blood relationship as an aggravating
circumstance in this case. We have held in earlier
cases38 that the relationship between uncle and niece is
not covered by any of the relationships mentioned in
Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless, the
penalty imposed by the trial court need not be disturbed
considering the presence of other aggravating
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding
appellant Roque Cabresos guilty of rape and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua and declaring him as the father
of the child Anthea Q. Pesidas, ordering him to recognize
and support said child, is hereby AFFIRMED. The award
to the complainant of civil indemnity in the total amount of
P50,000.00 (P30,000.00 as moral damages and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages) is likewise
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-23914 July 29, 1925
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. FLAVIANO AGUINALDO, Defendant-Appellant.
Vicente Ampil for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Manila, Flaviano
Aguinaldo was charged with the crime of robbery in an
information which alleged:
That on or about March 22, 1923, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the above named accused scaled and
entered house No. 21 of Brixton Hill Street of said city,
which is the residence of one E.C. Walters, and taking
advantage of the darkness of the night deliberately
sought for the purpose, did steal and take away with
intent of gain several pieces of jewelry of the total value
of one thousand two hundred and one pesos (P1,201),
Philippine currency, belonging to said E. C. Walters to
the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid
sum which is equivalent to
6,005 pesetas.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
That the accused is a habitual recidivist under the
provisions of Act No. 3062 of the Philippine Legislature
for having already been previously convicted thrice of
robbery and twice of theft by virtue of final judgments
rendered by competent courts, having committed the
crime of which he is now accused after evading service
of the sentence rendered against him on February 14,
1919, and while he was a fugitive from justice. Contrary
to law.
The learned trial judge found the accused guilty of the
crime described in the information. The attorney de
oficio for the appellant expresses the opinion that the
guilt of the accused has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Attorney-General reaches the
same conclusion. The evidence is overwhelmingly
demonstrative of the culpability of the
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The only matter remaining is to fix upon a correct penalty.
On this point, a difference of views has arisen between
the trial judge, counsel de oficio, and the Attorney-
General.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The first paragraph of article 508 of the Penal Code, in
relation with No. 2 of the same article, cannot be applied
since it is neither alleged nor proved that the accused
was an "armed person" when he committed the robbery,
or that he broke any wall, roof, or floor or forced any door
or window of the house robbed. The facts rather fall
under case No. 1 of article 508, in connection with the
paragraph next following case No. 5 of the same article.
In other words, the robber entered the house through an
opening not intended for entrance or egress, that is, by
"scaling." As it is not shown that the malefactor carried a
weapon and as the value of the property taken exceeds
1250 pesetas a penalty next lower in degree should be
imposed. Said penalty is presidio correccional in its
medium degree to presidio mayor in its minimum degree
for the principal of the consummated crime. There are
present two aggravating circumstances, namely, that the
crime was committed in the nighttime and that the
accused is a recidivist. The maximum of the maximum
penalty provided by law, or eight years
imprisonment presidio mayor should therefore be
imposed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
It was alleged in the information that the accused was a
habitual delinquent. This allegation was demonstrated at
the trial. The new law covering such a situation is Act No.
3062, entitled "An Act to provide additional penalties for
habitual delinquents." It reads:
Any person who has twice or oftener been convicted of
the crime of theft or robbery and who commits either of
said crimes within five years next following the day on
which he compelled service of his last sentence, shall be
deemed a habitual delinquent and shall suffer the penalty
provided by law for the last crime committed and an
additional penalty equivalent to one-half of the penalty
imposed therefor, and the penalty herein provided shall
be imposed upon such habitual delinquent every time
thereafter he shall commit either of said misdemeanors
prior to the expiration of ten years from and after the date
on which he completed serving his last sentence.
The penalties provided by the Penal Code for the crime
of theft or robbery as the case may be, must first be
applied without reference to the Habitual Delinquency
Law. In the exact words of the law, the habitual
delinquent "shall suffer the penalty provided by law for
the last crime committed. A determination of the penalty
is arrived at independently of the provisions of the
Habitual Delinquency Law even to the extent of
considering recidivism either as a qualifying or an
aggravating circumstance. Then to this penalty is added
one-half of the penalty imposed so as to carry out the
purposes of the
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The Legislature has required the courts to take into
consideration the persistence of the defendant in his
criminal course. The prime idea of a Habitual
Delinquency Law is to confine the offender for a longer
period of time than the ordinary criminal is confined for
the protection of society. This intention of the Legislature
must be enforced. (People vs. Clemente, No.
22880. a )chanrobles virtual law library
One-half of the penalty imposed in this instance is four
years of presidio mayor. Adding this additional penalty to
the regular penalty, a total of twelve years imprisonment
results.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The judgment appealed from is modified and in lieu of
fifteen years imprisonment presidio mayor, the defendant
and appellant is sentenced to twelve years
imprisonment presidio mayor, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, to return to Mrs. E.C. Walters
the articles named in the information or to reimburse her
for their value in the amount of P680 and to pay the costs
of both instances. So ordered.
Avance�a, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, and
Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-35775 June 29, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIOSDADO EGOT, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Salvador B. Britanico for accused-appellant.
ABAD SANTOS, J:
Automatic review of the decision rendered by the defunct
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur in Criminal
Case No. 72 because of the imposition of the death
penalty.
In an information dated July 15, 1970, DIOSDADO EGOT
was accused of rape said to have been committed as
follows:
That on February 4, 1970, at about 5700
o'clock in the afternoon, in the cemetery of
barrio Pangi, municipality of Ipil, province of
Zamboanga del Sur, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd designs, in order to
 facilitate the commission of the crime, did,
then and there wilfully and feloniously bring
one Liberty Siodora, an eleven year old girl
to the cemetery an isolated place, with the
pretext that they will look for his lost horse,
upon reaching the cemetery, with his bolo
intimidated the young girl and by force have
carnal knowledge with her against her will.
(Expediente, p. 1.)
EGOT pleaded "not guilty" when he was arraigned and
after trial the court rendered the following sentence:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds the
accused DIOSDADO EGOT guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE
penalized under Article 333 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and pursuant to
said article, sentences him to suffer the
supreme penalty of DEATH, and to pay to
the offended party Liberty Siodora the SUM
OF EIGHT THOUSAND (P8,000.00)
PESOS as moral damages, All Costs
against the accused. (Id., pp. 62-63.)
In imposing the death penalty the trial court said:
Under Article 33 of the Revised Penal Code
the crime of rape committed either by force
or intimidation or even without such force or
intimidation, where the woman raped is
below 12 years old, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment)
and where the rape was committed with the
use of deadly weapon, as in this case,
since there is evidence that the accused
Egot used a sharp-pointed bolo in the
commission of the offense, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death. Considering
that the offense was attended with the
aggravating circumstance of uninhabited
place as it was committed in a cemetery
which is uninhabited and isolated and far
from the road and grassy, the penalty
imposable on the accused is the supreme
penalty of death. (Id., p. 62.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
February 4, 1970, at barrio of Pangi,
Municipality of Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur,
Pelagia Siodora left her house and went to
her neighbor's farm (p. 28, tsn., February
22, 1972), leaving her daughter Liberty who
was eleven years old (Exhibits C, C-1 and
C-3; p. 79, tsn., March 28, 1972) and her
other younger children (p. 28, tsn.,
February 22, 1972). Before she left her
house that afternoon, she saw appellant
Diosdado Egot riding on horseback and
alighting at the house of his aunt (Candida
Ramos), whose house is about ten meters
from her house (pp. 28-30, tsn., February
22, 1972).
At about 5:00 o'clock of the same afternoon
appellant went to the house of Pelagia
Siodora who was no longer there at that
time. He talked to complainant Liberty
asking her to "accompany me look for my
horse, if we find it I will give you biscuit" (p.
75, tsn., March 23, 1972). Liberty
unsuspectingly agreed to accompany
appellant ostensibly to look for his horse.
Upon reaching the cemetery, which was
about one hundred fathoms from Liberty's
house (p. 31, tsn., February 22, 1972),
appellant pointed a bolo at her (p. 72, tsn.,
March 23, 1972) and told her to lie down (p.
71, tsn., March 23,
1972).lwphl@itç Appellant then remove her
panty and after opening the front part of his
pants let his penis come out (p. 72, tsn.,
March 23, 1972). Then appellant went on
top of her and inserted his penis into
Liberty's vagina and had sexual intercourse
(p. 74, tsn., March 23, 1972).
medical certificate (p. 32, tsn., February 22,
1972). She submitted her daughter for
physical examination to Dr. Henry de Villa,
Rural Health Officer of Ipil, Zamboanga del
Sur (p. 34, tsn., February 22, 1972), who
issued a medical certificate (Exhibit A)
which reads:
I. General data: Liberty
Siodora, 11 years old, female
child, residing at Pangi,
Zamboanga del Sur;
II. Time and place of
commission of offense: About
5:00 P.M., February 4, 1970,
at Pangi, Ipil, Zbga. Sur;
III. Time and place of
examination: About 11:00
A.M. Feb. 7, 1970 at Ipil,
Zamboanga Sur;

After the incident Liberty wen home and IV. Findings:

reported the matter to her mother (p. 67,
tsn., March 23, 1972). The following day the 1. Laceration,
mother reported the incident to the police one cm.,
(p. 33, tsn., February 22, 1972). She could fourchette
not report the incident on the same date to posterior;
the police as it was already nighttime and
barrio Pangi is about three kilometers from 2. Hymen —
the town proper (p. 73, tsn., February 22, lacerated at
1972). The police told her to secure a 10:00, 2:00, and
 6:00 o'clock;
admits one
finger; Urethral
opening irritated,
Abrasion deltoid
area, left.
V. Conclusion —
The findings are compatible
with history of the victim.
(Brief, pp. 1-4.)
EGOT denied the rape. He interposed the defense of
alibi. He said that he could not have raped Liberty as
alleged because at that time he was in the cornfield of
Pelagia Siodora, Liberty's mother, together with his aunt
Candida Ramos; they were there to retrieve his horse
which strayed after it got freed from its tether
In this review, the appellant is represented by counsel de
oficio, Atty. Salvador B. Britanico, who made the
following assignment of errors:
A. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF
RAPE; and,
B. THAT, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT
THE EVIDENCE ARE ADEQUATE TO
SUPPORT THE CONVICT PETITION OF
THE HEREIN ACCUSED, THE TRIAL
COURT ER RED IN IMPOSING THE
DEATH PENALTY. THE APPROPRIATE
PENALTY SHOULD HAVE
BEEN RECLUSION PERPETUA. (Brief, p.
1.)
According to the trial court, "At the time of the sexual
intercourse Liberty was only 11 years and 7 months old,
having been born on July 4, 1958." (Expediente, p. 53.)
The trial court relied on the testimony of Pelagia Siodora
that Liberty was born on July 4, 1958. (TSN, Feb. 22,
1972, p. 27.) It also relied on Exhibit C, the supposed
birth certificate of Liberty where her date of birth is given
as July 4, 1958. (Expediente, p. 33.)
The appellant questions the authenticity of Exhibit C; it "is
being disputed by the defense on the ground that she
could not have been born on that date considering that
the Birth Certificate (Exhibit "C") was filed and registered
on April 14, 1958 (Exhibit I or three (3) months before the
alleged birth." (Brief, p. 3.)
Indeed, Exhibit C is of doubtful authenticity. For aside
from the circumstance cited by the appellant, Exhibit C
does not have the Signature of the Local Civil Registrar.
But the testimony of Pelagia Siodora in respect of the
date when her daughter Liberty was born has not been
substantially impugned. Liberty must be deemed to have
been below 12 years old on February 4, 1970. Moreover,
Liberty's age becomes unimportant in the light, of the
allegation in the information that the appellant used a
bolo to intimidate her to submit to his carnal desire.
The first assignment of error questions the appreciation
of the evidence by the trial court. To be sure this raises a
problem albeit no insurmountable. "The difficulty,
recognized and acknowledged, in the decision-making
process where the prosecution is for rape, arises from
the fact that usually only the participants can testify as to
the alleged sexual abuse. The accused may deny such
an occurrence, put up the defense that he was
somewhere else, or allege the consent on the part of the
complainant. The court then is left with no choice but to
exert the utmost effort to determine the likelihood that a
sexual act did take place and under what circumstances.
Such choice is not always easy." (People vs. Imbo G.R.
No. L-36759, Aug. 31,1982,116 SCRA 355,357.)
The appellant questions the credibility of Liberty Siodora.
He claims that she was not a reliable witness "because of
her proven retarded mentality." (Brief, p. 8.) He quotes
from the decision which states: "The Court which had the
opportunity to observe the offended party Liberty
Siodora, had noticed her stunted growth and somewhat
retarded personality and mentality. " (Expediente, pp. 56-
57.) But the appellant ignores completely the other
statements of the trial court that: "According to the
prosecution's evidence, as a consequence of the rape
committed by accused Egot on the person of Liberty, she
became somewhat mentally deranged and from the time
of the incident up to the present, she silvers and gets
scared whenever she sees the accused Egot or a male
person. ... But at the trial, she positively demonstrated in
open court how the accused Egot raped her on that
unfortunate afternoon of February 4, 1970, stating that he
(Egot) told her to he down t in armed with a sharp-
pointed bolo, went on top of her and forced his penis into
her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her. She
positively Identified accused Egot in open court as the
man who ravished her." (Id, pp. 56-57.)
Liberty's tender age lends credibility to her testimony. For
as this Court' said: "Moreover, if there is anything
apparent from our past decisions on rape cases, with the
offended parties being young and immature girls from the
ages of twelve to sixteen, it is that there is considerable
receptivity on the part of this Tribunal to lend credence to
their version of what transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability but also the shame and
embarrassment to which such a gruelling experience as
a court trial, where they are called upon to bare what
perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy did expose them
to. This is not to say that an uncritical acceptance should
be the rule. It is only to emphasize that skepticism should
be kept under control." (People vs. Molina, G.R. No.
L30191, Oct. 27, 1973, 53 SCRA 495, 500-501.)
There is circumstantial evidence to support the testimony
of Liberty that she was raped by the appellant: when
Liberty rename home and was asked by her mother why
she was crying she replied that she had been raped by
Egot at the cemetery; and then there was the physical
examination conducted by Dr. Henry de Villa which
showed that Liberty's sexual organ had lacerations,
irritation and abrasion.
The appellant's alibi must fail because of the positive
Identification made by Liberty that he was life culprit and
also because it was not physically impossible for him to
be at the cemetery when the rape was committed.
The second assignment of error assumes the guilt of the
appellant but seeks to mitigate his liability.
The appellant claims that the use of a bolo had not been
legally established; hence the aggravating circumstance
of use of a deadly weapon cannot be considered. Suffice
it to say that Liberty categorically stated that E got "used
his bolo." (TSN, March 23, 1972, p. 72.)
The appellant also claims that the aggravating
circumstance of despoblado was not present. He asserts:
By the very evidence of the prosecution, the
cemetery was merely 100 meters away
from the house of Siodoras, that is, within
the hearing distance when one shouts for
assistance. This is therefore not an
uninhabited place in the contemplation of
law (People vs. Laoto, et al. 52 Phil. 401).
As one authority puts it, "An uninhabited
place is one where there are no houses at
all a place at a considerable distance from
town, or where the houses are scattered at
a great distance from each other" (Reyes,
Ibid, page 318). In this case, the houses of
the Siodoras and the Ramoses are merely
10 meters apart from one another and only
100 meters away from the cemetery. What
the Supreme Court considered as
uninhabited is a place about a kilometer
from the nearest house or other inhabited
place (People vs. Aguinaldo, 55 Phil.
610; People vs. Mendoza, et al., 100 Phil.
818).lwphl@itç The cemetery of Barrio
Pangi, Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur was
therefore not an uninhabited place. (Brief,
pp. 13-14.)
Pelagia did not say that her house is only 100 meters
from the cemetery. What she said was that the cemetery
is about "100 fathoms more or less from our house."
(TSN, Feb. 22, 1972, p. 31.) A fathom is equal to 6 feet
so that 100 fathoms is equal to 600 feet which is equal to
200 yards or 180 meters. A distance of 200 yards to the
nearest house is sufficient to make the scene of the
crime uninhabited. (See People vs. Pulido, 85 Phil. 695
[1905]).
The appellant likewise claims despoblado "is not present
even if the crime was committed in an uninhabited place,
if the offended party was casually encountered by the
accused and the latter did not take advantage of the
place or it can not be shown that it facilitated the
commission of the crime (People vs. Luneta, et al., 79
Phil. 815, cited in Reyes, Ibid, page 320)." (Brief, pp. 14-
15). He forgets that he did not meet Liberty at the
cemetery; he purposely brought her there to facilitate the
commission of the crime.
There is no evidence that the appellant surrendered
voluntarily. In fact, according to his own testimony, the
police went to his house and they brought him to the
municipal jail. Neither can it be conceded that he should
be accorded the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender because "while the case was already pending
in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur,
notwithstanding that he had all the opportunity to do so
while in the house of provincial guard Minsay." (Brief, p.
17.) Suffice it to say that such a claim has no legal or
jurisprudential basis.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby
modified in the sense that for lack of the necessary
number of votes DIOSDADO EGOT is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death
and moral damages to paid to Liberty Siodora shall be in
the amount of P20,000.00. Cost against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-66848 December 20, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN LEE y AMOSO, QUIRINO VIRAY, JR. y
COLLADO, and JUAN LAROSA y
GONZALES, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Blesila O. Quintillan for defendants-appellants.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an Information filed with the then Criminal Circuit Court
of Manila on 8 July 1981, accused Ruben Lee y Amoso,
Quirino Viray, Jr. y Collado, and Juan Larosa y Gonzales,
were charged with the crime of Robbery in Band with
Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries, committed as
follows:
That on or about June 22, 1981, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together with one GERONIMO
GERDAD (deceased) and others whose
whereabouts and identities are still unknown, and
helping one another, all armed with unknown
caliber firearms and bladed weapons, by
employment of craft, that is, pretending to be
bonifide (sic) passengers of a jeepney, bearing
plate No. 632 CS, PUJ, driven by BERNABE
POYUAON, and at nighttime purposely sought to
better accomplish their objectives, with intent of
(sic) gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation upon persons, to wit: by then and
there simultaneously announcing it was a hold-up
and pointing their respective weapons, guns and
knives, to the driver and other passengers of the
said jeepney, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob, and carry
away the following, to wit:
From:
RODRIGO CONDE — One (1) wallet, black,
valued
— at P35.00 with 1 -dollar bill;
BERNABE POYUAON — Cash money of P50.00;
ANNABELE JAVIER — Wallet, wristwatch and
necklace valued not less than
P5.00;
WONG NGAW Seiko Wallet, valued at
P25.00; with SSS ID card and
other papers and cash money
of P200.00 and
PERPETUO AQUINO — Cash Money of Pl0.00.
or all in the total amount of P325.00, more or less,
belonging to the aforesaid driver and passengers
of the said jeepney, against their will, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owners, in the
aforesaid amount of P325.00, more or less,
Philippine Currency; that by reason or on the
occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose
of enabling the said accused to take, rob, and
carry away the said amount, in pursuance of their
conspiracy, the said accused with intent to kill,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked,
assaulted and used personal violence upon the
passengers of the said jeepney, by then and there
taking possession of the steering wheel and
driving the vehicle away, firing shots at the crew of
the mobile patrol car who (sic) gave chase of the
said accused, and hitting, as a consequence, the
following hold-up victims, to wit: LEOPOLDO
ESPELLEGO, who sustained mortal gunshot
wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death thereafter; GINA SALVADOR,
who sustained a gunshot wound at the back,
thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries
which required and will require medical attendance
for a period of more than thirty days and
incapacitated and will incapacitate the said Gina
Salvador from performing her customary labor
during the said period of time; and WONG NGAW
and PERPETUO AQUINO, both of whom
sustained physical injuries which have (sic)
required medical attendance for a period of not
less than one day but not more than nine days and
incapacitated the said Wong Ngaw and Perpetuo
Aquino from performing their customary labor
during the same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-49 (81).
Each of the accused entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment on 7 September
1981. 2
At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Gina
Salvador and Rodrigo Conde, two (2) of the jeepney passengers; Pfc. Florentino
Bagallon, the investigating policeman; and Drs. Marcial C. Cenido and Narciso
Adraneda, Jr., the examining physicians. The defense presented the three (3)
accused. Thereafter, on 26 August 1983, the trial court (now Branch XLVI, Regional
Trial Court of Manila) promulgated its decision 3
finding the accused
guilty of the crime charged and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads in full as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused,
Ruben Lee y Amoso, Quirino Viray, Jr. y Collado
and Juan Larosa y Gonzales, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery in band
with homicide and multiple physical injuries which
is aggravated further by craft and nighttime and
hereby sentences them to suffer the Penalty of
DEATH; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of
the deceased Leopoldo Espellego the sum of
P12,000.00 for the death of the latter, and to the
robbery victims, the following sums: Rodrigo
Conde, P35.00; Wong Ngaw, P225.00; and
Perpetuo Aquino, P10.00 all of which were not
recovered. They are also ordered to pay their
proportionate shares of the costs of suit.
The .45 caliber paltik, Exhibit W, and the .32
caliber Sentinel revolver, Exhibit W-1, which bears
Serial No. P 5803, are hereby confiscated in favor
of the government and the Clerk of Court is hereby
directed to cause delivery of the same to the
Firearms and Explosives Section, Philippine
Constabulary, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Atty. Fernando Mangubat is hereby awarded the
sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees.
Pursuant to the governing law then in force, 4 the case
was elevated to this Court for automatic review.
The conviction is based on the following findings of fact
of the trial court:
June 22, 1981, at about 2:30 o'clock a.m., a
passenger jeepney with Plate No. 632 CS, PUJ,
driven by Bernabe Poyuaon, was on its way from
Rizal Avenue, Manila to Baclaran, Metro Manila. In
the jeepney as passengers while it was already
nearing the Philippine General Hospital along Taft
Avenue were some 13 persons who were seated
as follows: On the left seat (which is directly
behind the driver) were a male passenger
immediately behind the driver, Leopoldo
Espellego, Annabele Javier, Gina Salvador, and a
male passenger who was seated just at the
entrance of the jeepney, in that order. On the right
seat beginning from the entrance of the jeepney
were a male passenger, Maria Lourdes Javier,
Rodrigo Conde, Perpetuo Aquino and Wong
Ngaw, also in that order. Beside the driver were
two male passengers.
xxx xxx xxx
The jeepney was travelling southward along Taft
Avenue when the passenger seated last on the left
seated near the entrance of the jeepney and who
turned out to be the accused, Ruben Lee, drew
out a gun and first poked it at Gina Salvador who
was to his left and then waived (sic) said gun at
the other passengers, at the same time
announcing a hold-up as follows: "Mga putang ina
ninyo, huag kayong sisigaw, hold-up ito" (Sons of
bitches, don't shout. This is a hold-up).
Simultaneously, the passenger seated in front of
Ruben Lee who turned out to be Quirino Viray, Jr.
drew out a knife and poked it at Maria Lourdes
Javier who was to his right; the passenger seated
just behind the driver who turned out to be
Geronimo Gerdad drew out a gun and pointed it at
the driver; and the passenger seated further from
the driver drew out and poked a knife at the driver.
The announcement of the hold-up frightened the
passengers and Ruben Lee ordered them to hand
over their wallets, watches and other valuables.
He ordered Geronimo Gerdad to collect the things
of the passengers near him. Gina Salvador gave
the following to Ruben Lee: her Seiko 5 Men's
watch worth P500.00; her Chinese gold necklace
worth P200.00; cash amounting to P800.00; and
her handbag worth P15.00. From Rodrigo Conde
was taken a wallet worth P35.00 and containing
one Australian dollar, From the others, including
that of the driver, were taken cash which were
(sic) handed over to Geronimo Gerdad.
When approaching Pedro Gil Street, Ruben Lee
ordered the driver to turn right towards Roxas
Boulevard and upon reaching Mabini Street, the
jeepney was noticed by the crew of Police Mobile
Patrol Car No. 221 as Pedro Gil is a one-way
street Patrol Car No. 221 tailed the jeepney and
signalled it to a stop. Upon orders of Ruben Lee,
the jeepney driver stepped down to talk nicely to
the policemen (who stopped their car about seven
meters behind) by telling the latter that they
entered the street by accident. At the same time,
Ruben Lee warned the passengers to keep quiet,
otherwise he will shoot them.
Once the jeepney driver left to talk to the
policemen, Ruben Lee also stepped down, placed
his gun on his seat and ordered Quirino Viray, Jr.
to take hold of it, and proceeded to the driver's
seat, started the jeepney and drove off towards
Roxas Boulevard, turned left and sped towards
Baclaran. Mobile Patrol Car No. 221 (with the
jeepney driver on board) followed suit with its
sirens blowing and at the same time alerting other
patrol cars through its radio. The jeepney, with
Ruben Lee on the wheels, turned left towards the
airport and on reaching a dark roard, turned back.
At this juncture, Ruben Lee ordered one of the
passengers thrown out in order to distract the
attention of the pursuers. So that the passenger
beside him was thrown out. However, said
passenger was not hurt; instead he ran away after
hitting (sic) ground. With the mobile patrol car in
pursuit, the jeepney sped back to Roxas
Boulevard and towards the Luneta with the
holduppers taking potshots at the pursuers. And
because the passengers heard shots coming from
behind, they were either down on the floor or were
stooping from their seats, for fear that the
policemen might shot (sic) directly at them. The
 jeepney finally stopped at Marvex Drive in
Balintawak, Quezon City. The hold-uppers jumped
out of the jeepney and engaged the pursuing
policemen in a shoot out. Ruben Lee pointed a
gun at Gina Salvador's back and fired. When the
firing subsided, one of the hold-uppers, Geronimo
Gerdad, was found seriously wounded and a .22
caliber revolver (Exhibit W-1) was found near his
body. One of the passenger victims, Leopoldo
Espellego, was seriously wounded while three
others were wounded, namely: Gina Salvador who
suffered a gunshot wound; Wong Ngaw, with
lacerations and abrasions (see Exhibit F); and
Perpetuo Aquino, with a lacerated wound (See
Exhibit G). One patrol car brought Gerdad and
Espellego to the Chinese Memorial Hospital where
both were pronounced dead on arrival. Gina
Salvador, Wong Ngaw and Perpetuo Aquino were
brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital
where they were treated. 5
Through their counsel de oficio appointed by this Court, accused-appellants filed their
Brief 6 on 22 March 1985.
The People, through the Solicitor General, filed the
Appellee's Brief 7 on 12 September 1985.
Pursuant to Section 19(l), Article III of the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines which
provides that any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, this Court, in a letter to
the accused dated 20 April 1988, asked them whether
they still wished to continue with their case considering
that the death penalty is no longer imposable and their
death sentences had been automatically commuted
to reclusion perpetua. 8
In their letter to this Court dated 2 May 1988, accused Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray
manifested their willingness to accept the sentence of Reclusion
Perpetua. 9
Accused Juan Larosa, however, in a letter to this
Court dated 29 April 1988, manifested that he wanted to
continue with his appeal. 10
In view of the foregoing, this Court promulgated on 25 May 1988 the following
resolution:
G.R. No. 66848 (People vs. Ruben Lee, et. al.)—Considering the pleadings
filed in this case, the Court Resolved to NOTE: (a) the letter of compliance
filed by accused-appellants Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray signed in the
presence of witnesses, dated May 2, 1 988, stating that they are willing to
accept the sentence of reclusion perpetua in consonance with the provision
of Section 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution; and (b) the letter of
compliance filed by accused-appellant Juan Larosa dated April 29, 1988
stating that he wants to continue his case as an appealed case.
Said resolution became final on 17 June 1988 and Entry of Judgment was
correspondingly made.
This review should then be limited to the case of accused Juan Larosa.
In the Appellant's Brief, accused Juan Larosa assigns the following errors: 11
 sitting on the front seat of the jeep. On direct
examination, he testified as follows:
I

Fiscal Belmonte:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED LAROSA IS
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT Q When you boarded the jeep, were there
WHEN HE WAS NOT PROPERLY AND CREDIBLY IDENTIFIED AS passengers?
PARTICIPANT (SIC) IN THE CRIME;

A Yes, Sir.
II

Q When you boarded the jeep, were these three

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSE already there?
OF ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED;

A Yes, Sir.
III

Q What happened next?

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER BY
A When the jeep reached at the PGH, the three
ACCUSED.
drew guns, Sir.
We shall take them up in the order they are presented.
Q Did thev say anything?
A. In support of the first assigned error, Larosa claims that the two (2) alleged
A Yes, Sir, they said, this is a hold-up.
eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution, namely, Gina Salvador and Rodrigo
Conde, were not able to identify him.
Court:

Q Who among the three drew a gun?

Indeed, as correctly pointed out by Larosa, Gina failed to mention him. While she was
A Ruben Lee, Your Honor.
very specific as to the role and participation of accused Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray,
she candidly admitted that she "could no longer recall the hold-upper who was sitted
Q Who else?
(sic) in front (sic) of the jeep." 12
However, prosecution witness
Conde positively identified Larosa as the holdupper A The other one sitting near the driver, Sir.
Fiscal Belmonte:

Q Is that other one in this Courtroom? A Larosa, Sir. 14

A Yes, Sir.

Court: On cross-examination, this witness immediately aborted the defense counsel's

attempt to show that the light of the jeep was put off, hence, it was impossible for him
to see the holduppers clearly. Thus:
Q Point to him?

A Larosa, Your Honor. 13

Atty. Mangubat:
xxx xxx xxx
Q By the way when these holduper (sic) announced that it was hold-up, did
Fiscal Belmonte: they order the driver to put out the light?

Q Do you know if there was any passenger of that jeep fell (sic) down?

A Yes, Sir. A No, Sir. 15

Q Where was that passenger sitted (sic) at the time that he was fell (sic)
down?
xxx xxx xxx
A We were on our way to MIA when that passenger fell down, Sir.

Q Why did he fall down?

A Because he was pushed by one of the holduper (sic), Sir.
Q Do you know who was that holduper?
Subsequent attempts on the part of the cross-examiner to discredit Conde proved
futile. His testimony was given full faith and credit by the trial court and We find no
reason to overturn such a finding. Well-entrenched is the rule that appellate courts will
generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter are in a better
position to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is found that the trial
courts have plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. 16
Equally settled is the rule that conviction may be based on the lone testimony of an
eyewitness, when the testimony is credible. 17
B. In respect to his second assigned error, Larosa would have Us believe that at 2:00
a.m. of 22 June 1981, he was at his house sleeping with his family. 18
However,
accused relies merely on his own testimony and his alibi
is not corroborated by anybody else.
We have ruled time and again that alibi is a weak
defense for it is easy to concoct and fabricate. 19 Alibi
cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the
positive identification by credible witnesses that the
accused perpetrated the crime. 20 In the case at bar, We
find no reason to depart from this doctrine for the
prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the
accused Larosa.
C. In his last assigned error, Larosa claims that he
voluntarily submitted to the custody of the police and
offered no resistance when the police accosted him. We
agree with the Appellee that this contention has no basis.
Before Larosa and the other holduppers could even be
apprehended, they engaged the pursuing police
authorities in a shootout and only gave up upon realizing
that they were already surrounded by residents
and tanod members in the vicinity. 21
For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and should show the intent of
the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either: (1) because he
acknowledges his guilt, or (2) because he wishes to save them the trouble and
expense necessarily included for his search and capture. 22
In the absence
of these two (2) reasons, and in the event that the only
reason for accused's supposed surrender is to insure his
safety, his arrest being inevitable, the surrender is not
spontaneous and hence, not voluntary. 23
The trial court correctly appreciated against the accused the generic aggravating
circumstances of band and craft. Nighttime, however, was erroneously taken against
him.
A crime is committed by a band whenever more than three (3) armed malefactors
shall have acted together in the commission of an offense. 24
In the case at
bar, commission by a band was properly appreciated as
it has been shown that when the holdup was staged,
Ruben Lee, Quirino Viray, Geronimo Gerdad (deceased),
and accused Larosa were all armed with guns and
knives.
Craft is likewise present herein since the accused and his
cohorts pretended to be bona fide passengers of the jeep
in order not to arouse suspicion. However, once inside
the jeep, they robbed the driver and the other
passengers. 25
As to nighttime, there is no showing that it was purposely
sought for or taken advantage of to facilitate the
commission of the offense or for the purpose of
impunity. 26 There's no proof that they waited for the night
to commit the crime. Besides, as testified to by Rodrigo
Conde, the light of the jeep was not put off. Obviously,
they did not seek the darkness of the night and were not
afraid of the light.
The robbery and the resulting deaths of Leopoldo
Espellego and Geronimo Gerdad (holdupper) and
physical injuries of Gina Salvador, Wong Ngaw, and
Perpetuo Aquino are included in one (1) special complex
crime of robbery with homicide and physical injuries,
defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, it being evident that the deaths and injuries
occurred by reason of or on occasion of the
robbery. 27 The penalty provided for therein is reclusion
perpetua to death. Considering the presence of the
aggravating circumstances of band and craft or disguise,
the greater penalty, which is death, shall be
applied. 28 However, in view of the provisions of the 1987
Constitution abolishing the death penalty, 29 accused
Larosa is entitled to the reduced penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Finally, conformably with the new policy of this
Court, 30 the civil indemnity of P12,000.00 is increased to
P50,000.00. However, considering that the judgment
against Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray, the other convicted
holduppers herein, had become final and executory as of
7 June 1988, they are solidarily liable with Juan Larosa
up to the amount of P12,000.00 only. Anything in excess
of said amount is the sole liability of accused Larosa.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal
Case No. CCC-VI-49 (81) finding the accused, Juan
Larosa and his co-accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
Physical Injuries, as defined and penalized under Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED in
all respects, except as above modified. As modified, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, and the civil indemnity for the death of
Leopoldo Espellego is hereby increased to P50,000.00,
the first P12,000.00 of which the accused Juan Larosa
shall be jointly and severally liable with his co-accused,
and for the remaining P38,000.00 he shall be solely
liable.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.
[G.R. Nos. 89418-19. November 21, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
RODOLFO ASPILI, ERNESTO MAGBANUA,
EDUARDO MENDOZA, RODOLFO SALES, ROBERT
AGUIRRE and PACIFICO REBUTIDO, Accused-
Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Enrique A. Javier, Sr. counsel de oficio for Accused-
Appellants.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIMES; SPECIAL
COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
AGGRAVATED WITH RAPE, COMMITTED IN THE
CASE AT BAR; PENALTY THEREOF; SAID CRIME
NOW DESIGNATED AS PIRACY IN PHILIPPINE
WATERS. — The Court finds, at the outset, that the trial
judge erred in designating the offense committed by the
appellants as rape with homicide aggravated by robbery
in band. For one, neither in law nor in jurisprudence is
there an aggravating circumstance as robbery in band.
More importantly, the evidence shows that what was
committed is the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide aggravated by rape. The overwhelming
evidence reveals that the original design of the
malefactors was to commit robbery in order to facilitate
their escape from the penal colony. Their original intent
did not comprehend the commission of rape. Hence, the
crime of rape cannot be regarded as the principal
offense. In this case, since it attended the commission of
robbery with homicide, the rape is deemed to aggravate
the crime but damages or indemnification for the victim
may be awarded. (See People v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136
[1958]; People v. Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979]). Instead
of ignominy, it is the rape itself that aggravates the crime
(People v. Mongado, 28 SCRA 642 [1969]). With respect
to the deaths of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque, the
appellants are clearly liable therefor since, as held by this
Court in People v. Mangulabnan, (99 Phil. 992 [1956]) it
is immaterial that the death of a person supervened by
mere accident, provided that the homicide is produced by
reason or on occasion of the robbery. Since rape and
homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, the
offense committed by the appellants is the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, aggravated by
rape, punishable under Paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). It does not matter if the
technical name assigned to the offense is rape with
homicide and with robbery in band, for the real nature of
the crime charged is determined not by the title of the
complaint, nor by the specification of the provision of the
law alleged to have been violated, but by the facts recited
in the complaint or information. (See People v. Oliviera,
67 Phil. 427 [1939]) As the acts constituting robbery with
homicide were clearly set forth in the complaint and
proven during trial, then the appellants may be held liable
for such crime, regardless of the erroneous designation
of the offense. In passing, it may be mentioned that the
crimes committed by appellants are now denominated as
piracy in Philippine waters, punishable under Presidential
Decree No. 532. We find it unnecessary to retroactively
apply the provisions thereof in favor of the appellants
because the acts committed by them are likewise
punishable therein by reclusion perpetua.
2. ID.; AGGRAVATIG CIRCUMSTANCES; RECIDIVISM,
IN BAND AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH,
ALSO ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR;
NOCTURNITY AND CRAFT, NOT CONSIDERED. —
We find no merit in the appellants’ contention that the
lower court erred in considering recidivism as an
aggravating circumstance. All the appellants are
recidivists. They were serving sentence at the Sta. Lucia
Penal Colony by virtue of a final judgment of conviction
when they committed the above-mentioned offenses.
Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza
and Pacifico Rebutido have previously been convicted of
the crimes of frustrated homicide, serious physical
injuries, theft, and murder and trespass to dwelling,
respectively. Both Rodolfo Sales and Roberto Aguirre
have previously been convicted of robbery in band. We
likewise uphold the trial court’s finding that the crime was
aggravated because it was committed by a band. All the
six appellants were armed when they boarded the vessel
and perpetrated their dastardly acts. There is also abuse
of superior strength, since most of the victims were
women and children ranging from 2 to 9 years old.
However, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity
and craft should not have been considered by the lower
court. There was no showing that the appellants
purposely sought the cover of night when they committed
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Neither did the appellants employ craft, since they had
already boarded the vessel when they pretended to buy
Tanduay Rum in exchange for the dried fish and chicken
they were carrying. Even without such pretense, they
could nonetheless have carried out their unlawful
scheme.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS; REQUIREMETS AND RESTRICTIONS
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF RIGHT
TO COUNSEL HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT AND
DO NOT APPLY TO CONFESSIONS TAKEN BEFORE
JANUARY 17, 1973. — The interlocking extrajudicial
confessions executed by the appellants are admissible
even if they were not informed of their right to counsel.
These confessions were all taken in January 1970, long
before the 1973 Constitution took effect. Article III
Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, for the first time,
concretized the present right of persons under custodial
investigation to counsel, how to be informed of such right
and the effect of non-compliance. The requirements and
restrictions surrounding this constitutional guarantee,
however, have no retroactive effect and do not apply to
confessions taken before January 17, 1973, the date of
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. (See Magtoto v.
Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 [1975])
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellants seek a reversal of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan, 4th Judicial
Region, Branch 48, finding them guilty of the crime of
rape with homicide, with the aggravating circumstances
of robbery in band, taking advantage of nighttime,
recidivism, abuse of superior strength and craft.
The facts for the prosecution are summarized by the
Solicitor General, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On December 28, 1969, the M/L Elsa left Puerto
Princesa City for Dumaran, Palawan. On board were
Catalino Nadayao, the patron of the vessel; Pepito
Severino and two other crew members; and thirteen (13)
passengers among whom were Narcisa Batayola, Daisy
Gonzales, Josie Gonzales, Yolanda Arque, Wenifredo
Magallanes, a certain Bunag and several children
ranging from two (2) to nine (9) years of age. All in all, 17
persons were on board M/L Elsa with some cargoes
consisting of liquor like tanduay, beer, coke, etc. The
vessel left Puerto Princesa at 3:00 o’clock in the morning,
navigating towards the lighthouse but due to big waves
and strong winds, the launch was forced to seek shelter
at Balon, Sta. Lucia, Puerto Princesa City, arriving
thereat about 6 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning where they
were stranded because of the bad weather and the
damaged rudder of the launch (TSN, 2-18-70, pp. 169-
176).
While at the aforementioned place, near the site of the
Sta. Lucia Penal Colony, in the afternoon between one
and three o’clock, two persons went aboard the M/L Elsa.
They were identified by Josie Gonzales as Pacifico
Rebutido and Rodolfo Aspili, and after Pepito Severino
handed to them the liquor they left the launch (TSN, 8-
26-70, pp. 437-442).
It was later established that said two accused together
with the other four, namely: Ernesto Magbanua, Rodolfo
Sales, Roberto Aguirre and Eduardo Mendoza, all
convicts — colonists of Sta. Lucia Penal Colony, had
been drinking liquor (tanduay) since the morning of
December 28, 1969 even as they hatched the plan to
escape from the Penal Colony with the use of M/L Elsa.
The buying of the tanduay served also the purpose of
acquainting the herein accused that the crew and
passengers of M/L Elsa were innocent, peaceful and
unarmed (TSN, 11-26-40, pp. 307-312).
Between 7 and 8 o’clock in the evening of the same day,
the six accused carried out their agreed plan to escape
and, fully armed with pistols and boloes, they boarded
the launch bringing with them chicken and dried fish.
Upon boarding the launch, they placed themselves in
strategic positions. Magbanua talked to the patron of the
launch who ordered the engine operator, Pepito
Severino, to fetch four bottles of tanduay. While in the act
of handing the tanduay to Magbanua, the latter suddenly
thrust his bolo at Severino’s abdomen, at the same time
pointing a pistol at him shouting ‘walang kikilos’ (nobody
moves). This prompted Severino to jump into the sea,
after seeing also the rest of the accused draw their bolos.
Witnessing all these hostile acts and having evaded a
stab by Rodolfo Sales who nevertheless chased him,
Catalino Nadayao was constrained to jump overboard.
Some passengers and the rest of the crew who were
frightened by the shouting of Magbanua and the ensuing
commotion likewise jumped into the sea (TSN 2-20-70,
pp. 183-193; 3-17-70, pp. 196-197). Among the
passengers who jumped overboard were Daisy Gonzales
and Yolanda Arque.
Only five persons were left in the launch who did not
jump overboard. Josie Gonzales tried to jump overboard
but Ernesto Magbanua, one of the accused, prevented
her by holding both arms. Magbanua pulled and dragged
her. Josie struggled to free herself but to no avail.
Magbanua succeeded in dragging her over the cargoes
where he pinned her down. While in that lying position he
forcibly raped her for about five to ten minutes. At that
time, Magbanua was pointing a gun at Josie’s head. After
Magbanua was through, Rodolfo Sales approached her,
took off his pants and laid on top of her for about 3 to 5
minutes. At the time Sales was raping Josie, Magbanua
was still holding her and pointing a gun at her. After
Sales, Pacifico Rebutido approached her and likewise
raped her. Josie tried to evade but she was already weak
and only felt pain (TSN, 8-26-70, pp. 458-463; 8-27-90,
pp. 1-23).
On the other hand, Narcisa Batayola likewise attempted
to jump but Magbanua also held her at the back portion
of her dress and told her to return to the place where she
and the other children were originally hiding. She saw the
accused ransacking the cargoes and taking the contents
thereof. Moments later, Roberto Aguirre then with a pistol
held Narcisa on the shoulders while Eduardo Mendoza
held her legs and wrestled her down. Aguirre had sexual
intercourse with her followed by Mendoza. Thereafter,
Rodolfo Aspili brought her out toward a sawali and right
there and then made her lay down in a slanting position.
When Aspili was having sexual intercourse with her,
nobody was holding her but she could no longer resist as
she was already exhausted and weak (TSN, 11-16-70,
pp. 147-167).
Subsequently, the six accused left the launch and
boarded their banca. Thereafter, Josie and Narcisa
together with the children jumped into the water and
swam to the bakawan to hide. They were rescued by the
‘Baracuda Launch.’ In the process, the dead bodies of
Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque were found.
Necropsy examination on the cadavers of Daisy and
Yolanda showed that both died of suffocation by
drowning as blood was coming out from their nose,
mouth and opening of both ears due to rapture of
tempanic membrane (TSN, 2-17-70, pp. 109-124).
Dr. Dueñas, the examining physician, likewise found that
Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola both had
undergone sexual penetration recently.
Subsequently, both Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola
filed separate complaints charging the herein, six
accused with the crimes of Rape with Homicide and
Robbery in Band." (Brief for the plaintiff-appellee, pp, 2-8,
Rollo, p. 334)
On the basis of the above-mentioned alleged acts
committed by the accused, the following criminal cases
were filed:cralawnad
1. Criminal Case No. 3
for
Rape with Homicide and with Robbery in Band
COMPLAINT
"The undersigned complainants, after having been duly
sworn to oath in accordance with law, accuse RODOLFO
ASPILI, ERNESTO MAGBANUA, EDUARDO
MENDOZA, RODOLFO SALES, ROBERTO AGUIRRE
and PACIFICO REBUTIDO, of the crime of RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE AND WITH ROBBERY IN BAND, committed
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘That on or about the 28th day of December, 1969, in
Sitio Balon, Sta. Lucia Sub-Colony, Municipality of Puerto
Princesa, Province of Palawan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused who are all serving sentence by virtue of a final
judgment in the Iwahig Penal Colony, Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, conspiring and confederating together and
helping one another, forcibly boarded the motor launch
named ‘M/L ELSA’ which was then at anchor seeking
shelter in the vicinity due to bad weather and while on
board the said vessel the accused Ernesto Magbanua,
Rodolfo Sales, and Pacifico Rebutido, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with deliberate
intent and lewd designs and by means of force, violence
and intimidations using guns and boloes for the purpose,
had sexual intercourse one after the other with the herein
complainant JOSIE GONZALES, a minor 13 years of
age, against her will, she being one of the 17 passengers
aboard the said vessel while the rest of the accused were
either having carnal knowledge with another victim
NARCISA BATAYOLA, likewise a minor 15 years of age,
by means of force and intimidation and against her will;
while the others were ransacking the baggages of the
passengers and on the occasion of such acts of the
accused, panic took place aboard the said vessel thus
forcing the other passengers to jump overboard for fear
of bodily harm, and as a consequence thereof, DAISY
GONZALES age 15, and YOLANDA ARQUE, age 9, both
passengers of the said vessel were drowned; and further
on the occasion thereof, all the accused took and carried
away, unlawfully and feloniously and against the will of
the owners thereof, cash amount of money, personal
belongings and cargoes aboard the vessel amounting to
no less than TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency.’"
CONTRARY TO LAW and with the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, by an armed band, in an
uninhabited place, recidivism and or reiteration, with
evident premeditation, superior strength and with the use
of craft, fraud or disguise, and penalized under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 4111 in relation to Article 160 of the same
Code." chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
SGD. PABLO GONZALES SGD. JOSIE GONZALES
Father-Complainant Complainant
(Rollo, pp. 15-16)
2. Criminal Case No. 4
for
Rape with Homicide and with Robbery in Band
COMPLAINT
"That on or about the 28th day of December, 1969, in
Sitio Balon, Sta. Lucia Sub-Colony, Municipality of Puerto
Princesa, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused who are all serving sentence by virtue of a final
judgment in the Iwahig Penal Colony, Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, conspiring, confederating together and helping
one another, forcibly boarded the motor launch named
‘M/L ELSA’ which was then at anchor seeking shelter in
the vicinity due to bad weather and while on board the
said vessel, the accused Roberto Aguirre, Eduardo
Mendoza and Rodolfo Aspili, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with deliberate intent and
lewd designs and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, using guns and boloes for the purpose had
sexual intercourse, one after the other, with herein
complainant, Narcisa Batayola, a minor 15 years of age,
against her will, she being one of the 17 passengers
aboard the same vessel while the rest of the accused
were either having carnal knowledge with another victim,
Josie Gonzales, likewise a minor 13 years of age, by
means of force and intimidation and against her will;
while the others were ransacking the baggages of the
passengers and on the occasion of such acts of the
accused, panic took place aboard the said vessel, thus
forcing the other passengers to jump over board for fear
of bodily harm, and as a consequence thereof, Daisy
Gonzales age 15 and Yolanda Arque, age 9, both
passengers of the said vessel were drowned; and further
on the occasion thereof, all the accused took and carried
away unlawfully and feloniously and against the will of
the owners thereof, cash amount of money, personal
belongings and cargoes of the vessel amounting to no
less than P2,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"Contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstances
of night time, by an armed band in an uninhabited place,
recidivism and/or reiteration, with evident premeditation,
superior strength and with the use of craft, fraud or
disguise, and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4111 in relation to
Art. 160 of the same Code.
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Philippines, January 7, 1970
(SGD.) CRISTITO ARQUE (SGD.) NARCISA
BATAYOLA Y ARQUE Guardian-Uncle-Complainant
Complainant"
(Rollo, pp. 179-180)
The facts for the defense are summarized by their
counsel as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The true facts of the cases are those testified to by
Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza, Roberto Aguirre,
Rodolfo Sales and Manolo Espino stated briefly
hereunder as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
At about 9:00 o’clock in the morning of December 28,
1969, Ernesto Magbanua and Roberto Aguirre left their
nipa hut at Santa Lucia Penal Colony and went to the
Prison Brigade of the said colony to get their dirty
clothes. At the brigade they met three (3) private
persons, passengers or crews of Motor Launch ‘Elsa’.
They were eating ‘Camote Cassava’ with the Capataz of
the colony on duty, a certain person called Rudy.
From the brigade, Magbanua and Aguirre proceeded to
the hut of Pacifico Rebutido. There they saw Pacifico
Rebutido, Rodolfo Aspili, Rodolfo Sales and Eduardo
Mendoza drinking tanduay which were brought to
Rebutido’s hut by the three (3) private persons from the
Motor Launch ‘Elsa’.
At about 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same date,
Ernesto Magbanua and his companions returned to the
colony brigade for the usual daily checking and counting
of prisoners. After the checking-up, the group returned to
the nipa hut of Pacifico Rebutido and there planned to
escape from the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony situated in
Puerto Princesa, Palawan. They agreed to hire the Motor
Launch ‘Elsa’ anchored about ten (10) arms length from
the wharf of Sta. Lucia Penal Colony in Balon, Puerto
Princesa, Palawan with money, chickens and dried fish.
At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of that date the
group, defendants-appellants herein, went to the Motor
Launch ‘Elsa’ using the banca of the colony and bringing
with them money, chickens and dried fish. Ernesto
Magbanua boarded the launch ahead of the rest, talked
to the patron of the launch to bring them to liberty and
offered money, chickens and dried fish for their fares. His
companions likewise boarded the motor launch, Rebutido
being the last to board the same at the time when the
patron of the launch was still thinking and considering the
offer of Magbanua. But when Rebutido reached the deck
of the launch, he stepped on a loose board and fell inside
the engine room. The impact of his fall was so loud that
the patron jumped overboard into the sea shouting to his
crews and passengers to likewise jump into the sea. Only
two women, a man and small children remained in the
launch. Magbanua told the remaining persons on board
the launch not to jump overboard because they did not
have bad intentions.
Magbanua and his companions then searched for those
who jumped into the sea for anyone who may not know
how to swim in order to save him. And they found a small
boy about nine (9) years of age struggling to swim. They
saved him by using a pole and pulling him towards the
launch. When asked why he jumped overboard, the boy
said that he jumped because he heard the Captain of the
launch shouting to them to jump into the sea.
When the herein appellants found no more persons on
the sea around the launch, Rodolfo Aspili and Eduardo
Mendoza went down to the engine room with one male
passenger of the launch and tried to start the engine. It
was at that moment when Magbanua who remained on
the deck saw Josie Gonzales at the prow of the launch.
He asked her to accomodate him for a sexual
intercourse, but Josie pointed him instead to Narcisa
Batayola saying that Batayola is the one having
experience on the matter. When told that he (Magbanua)
did not like Batayola, Josie agreed to a sexual
intercourse if Magbanua will not harm her. She
undressed herself when told to undress. Then Magbanua
opened the zipper of his pants and let Josie hold his
penis. While Josie was holding his penis, Magbanua
made her lie down. He inserted his penis inside the
vagina of Josie who complained of pains. It took
Magbanua about five (5) minutes to insert only two
inches of his penis inside the vagina of Josie Gonzales.
At that same moment, Rodolfo Sales and Pacifico
Rebutido pulled Magbanua up from Josie Gonzales
reminding Magbanua that their agreement was only to
escape and what he was doing to Josie Gonzales was
not part of their agreement.
At about the same time that Magbanua was having
sexual intercourse with Josie Gonzales, Roberto Aguirre
was also having sexual intercourse with Narcisa
Batayola. Before the intercourse, Aguirre saw Batayola
about to jump into the sea. He prevented her from
jumping overboard by holding her. Then he went around
the deck of the launch to see if there were still persons
swimming on the water, leaving Batayola at the prow of
the launch. Seeing none, he returned to Batayola and
asked her to have sexual intercourse with him. At first
Batayola refused. But later she undressed herself when
told to undress. Aguirre made her lie down and he
inserted his penis inside the vagina of Narcisa Batayola
without any difficulty. He made two successive sexual
intercourse with Narcisa Batayola, after which they both
dressed up. They were in that situation when Rodolfo
Sales and Pacifico Rebotido arrived, pulled Aguirre away
and they boarded their banca because they saw
someone flashlighting the premises at the shore.
Magbanua also called Aspili and Eduardo Mendoza at
the engine room and they likewise boarded their banca
and proceeded to the mangrove swamp to escape. On
the way, they noticed that Aspili was left behind."
(Appellant’s Brief, pp. 3-6)
The two cases were consolidated and, after hearing, the
lower court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty
of the crime of rape with homicide. The dispositive
portion of the decision is set forth
below:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, haloed by the illuminating light of all
aforegoing facts, laws, jurisprudence and arguments, this
Court finds all the herein accused, namely: Rodolfo
Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza, Jr.,
Rodolfo Sales, Roberto Aguirre and Pacifico Rebutido
guilty of the crimes of Rape with Homicide, with the
aggravating circumstances of Robbery in Band, taking
advantage of nighttime, recidivism, abuse of superior
strength and craft, in the above-entitled Criminal Case
No. 3, beyond reasonable doubt, and sentences all of
them to Reclusion Perpetua, and all, likewise, guilty of
the same but separate crime with all the same
aforementioned aggravating circumstances, in the above-
entitled Criminal Case No. 4, beyond reasonable doubt
and imposes upon all of them, another separate penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua, both penalties to be served
successively, with all its accessory penalties too in both
cases, further, all same six (6) herein accused are
sentenced and ordered to pay actual damages jointly and
solidarily as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. P265.00 — to Josie Gonzales;
2. 24.00 — to Narcisa Batayola;
3. 36.00 — to Pepito Severino and
4. P1,675.00 — to Catalino Nadayao, for and the other
passengers, named by him to have suffered losses, in an
amount corresponding to each, respectively,
and furthermore, the same six (6) aforenamed accused
are sentenced and ordered to pay, jointly and solidarily,
moral damages, in the amount of P25,000.00 to each of
Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola, their heirs and
assigns respectively, as moral damages, and ultimately
to indemnify in the same manner, the parents, their heirs
and assigns of deceased Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda
Arque, the amount of P30,000.00 for each and every
death of the said two (2) deceased, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in all the aforecited
civil liabilities. It is further directed that an alias warrant of
arrest be issued against Rodolfo Sales and Pacifico
Rebutido and not to be returned until they were in the
custody of the law." (Rollo, pp. 290-291)
We agree with the trial court that the prosecution
correctly presented the facts of the case.
The appellants raise the following assignments of
errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I wielded their weapons, some of the appellants
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS HEREIN ARE RAPE WITH HOMICIDE
WITH THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
ROBBERY IN BAND, NIGHTTIME, SUPERIOR
STRENGTH, RECIDIVISM, AND CRAFT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS HEREIN CONSPIRED
TO COMMIT THE OFFENSES OF RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE AND CONVICTING ALL OF THEM OF THE
SAID CRIMES." (Rollo, pp. 326-327)
The Court finds, at the outset, that the trial judge erred in
designating the offense committed by the appellants as
rape with homicide aggravated by robbery in band. For
one, neither in law nor in jurisprudence is there an
aggravating circumstance as robbery in band. More
importantly, the evidence shows that what was
committed is the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide aggravated by rape.
The records disclose that the appellants took control of
the vessel M/L Elsa by threatening the crew and
passengers with their boloes and pistols. (TSN, pp. 452-
459, August 26, 1970; pp. 137-148, November 16, 1970)
Narcisa Batayola, a prosecution witness, testified that
after the commotion that ensued when appellants
immediately started ransacking the cargoes and taking
the contents thereof (TSN, p. 148, November 16, 1970)
These acts of the appellants therefore manifest an
unlawful intent to gain, through violence and intimidation
of persons, by taking the vessel and personal property of
the crew and passengers, which comprises the crime of
robbery.
The overwhelming evidence reveals that the original
design of the malefactors was to commit robbery in order
to facilitate their escape from the penal colony. Their
original intent did not comprehend the commission of
rape. Hence, the crime of rape cannot be regarded as the
principal offense. In this case, since it attended the
commission of robbery with homicide, the rape is
deemed to aggravate the crime but damages or
indemnification for the victim may be awarded. (See
People v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136 [1958]; People v.
Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979]). Instead of ignominy, it is
the rape itself that aggravates the crime (People v.
Mongado, 28 SCRA 642 [1969]).
With respect to the deaths of Daisy Gonzales and
Yolanda Arque, the appellants are clearly liable therefor
since, as held by this Court in People v. Mangulabnan,
(99 Phil. 992 [1956]) it is immaterial that the death of a
person supervened by mere accident, provided that the
homicide is produced by reason or on occasion of the
robbery.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Since rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of
robbery, the offense committed by the appellants is the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
aggravated by rape, punishable under Paragraph 1 of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). It does not
matter if the technical name assigned to the offense is
rape with homicide and with robbery in band, for the real
nature of the crime charged is determined not by the title
of the complaint, nor by the specification of the provision
of the law alleged to have been violated, but by the facts
recited in the complaint or information. (See People v.
Oliviera, 67 Phil. 427 [1939]) As the acts constituting
robbery with homicide were clearly set forth in the
complaint and proven during trial, then the appellants
may be held liable for such crime, regardless of the
erroneous designation of the offense.
With the foregoing pronouncements, the Court no longer
deems it necessary to deal with the appellants’ argument
in their first assignment of error that assuming arguendo
that they are guilty of committing rape, the crimes of rape
and homicide should be viewed as separate and distinct
offenses. We have already ruled that the crime
committed is the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, the rape being considered merely as an
aggravating circumstance.
We find no merit in the appellants’ contention that the
lower court erred in considering recidivism as an
aggravating circumstance. All the appellants are
recidivists. They were serving sentence at the Sta. Lucia
Penal Colony by virtue of a final judgment of conviction
when they committed the above-mentioned offenses.
Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza
and Pacifico Rebutido have previously been convicted of
the crimes of frustrated homicide, serious physical
injuries, theft, and murder and trespass to dwelling,
respectively. Both Rodolfo Sales and Roberto Aguirre
have previously been convicted of robbery in band.
We likewise uphold the trial court’s finding that the crime
was aggravated because it was committed by a band. All
the six appellants were armed when they boarded the
vessel and perpetrated their dastardly acts. There is also
abuse of superior strength, since most of the victims
were women and children ranging from 2 to 9 years
old.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
However, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity
and craft should not have been considered by the lower
court. There was no showing that the appellants
purposely sought the cover of night when they committed
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Neither did the appellants employ craft, since they had
already boarded the vessel when they pretended to buy
Tanduay Rum in exchange for the dried fish and chicken
they were carrying. Even without such pretense, they
could nonetheless have carried out their unlawful
scheme.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the
appellants’ contention that there was no conspiracy in the
commission of rape becomes immaterial in view of the
fact that all of them directly participated in its
commission. Appellants Magbanua, Sales and Rebutido
took turns in raping Josie Gonzales, while appellants
Aguirre, Mendoza and Aspili ravished Narcisa Batayola.
The Court accords more weight and credence to the
testimonies of complainants Gonzales and Batayola.
These two girls, 13 and 15 years old respectively, would
not subject themselves to the rigors of a public trial if they
were not motivated by an honest desire to punish their
assailants. Moreover, their narrations were corroborated
by the testimony of Dr. Juanito Duenas who physically
examined Gonzales and Batayola and found that both
indeed had just undergone sexual penetration.
The interlocking extrajudicial confessions executed by
the appellants are admissible even if they were not
informed of their right to counsel. These confessions
were all taken in January 1970, long before the 1973
Constitution took effect. Article III Section 20 of the 1973
Constitution, for the first time, concretized the present
right of persons under custodial investigation to counsel,
how to be informed of such right and the effect of non-
compliance. The requirements and restrictions
surrounding this constitutional guarantee, however, have
no retroactive effect and do not apply to confessions
taken before January 17, 1973, the date of effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution. (See Magtoto v. Manguera, 63
SCRA 4 [1975])
At any rate, even without considering these extrajudicial
confessions, the Court is convinced that the guilt of
appellants has been incontrovertibly established beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
The Court, however, finds that the trial judge erred in
imposing upon the appellants two separate penalties
of reclusion perpetua, both penalties to be served
successively. The basis for this imposition by the lower
court is its finding that the appellants are guilty of two
crimes of rape with homicide, one for the rape of Josie
Gonzales and the other for the rape of Narcisa Batayola.
We have already pronounced, though, that the rape
committed is merely an aggravating circumstance. Since
the appellants are found guilty of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape,
recidivism, in band and abuse of superior strength, then,
applying Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, only one penalty of reclusion perpetua should
have been imposed.cralawnad
In passing, it may be mentioned that the crimes
committed by appellants are now denominated as piracy
in Philippine waters, punishable under Presidential
Decree No. 532. We find it unnecessary to retroactively
apply the provisions thereof in favor of the appellants
because the acts committed by them are likewise
punishable therein by reclusion perpetua.
Considering the perversity accompanying the crime, the
heinous nature not only of the offense but its manner of
commission, and the refusal of the accused to learn from
their earlier convictions, the Court strongly feels that the
sentences herein imposed must be fully served. Any
official who goes over any applications for pardon or
parole is urged to read the records of the case before
acting on the applications.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3 and 4 is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The
appellants are found guilty of the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide with the aggravating
circumstances of rape, recidivism, in band and abuse of
superior strength and are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of actual
damages is hereby affirmed. The awards representing
indemnity for the deaths are increased to P50,000.00 for
each victim while the moral damages for the rapes are
increased to P30,000.00 for each victim.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J. and Bidin, J., concur.
G.R. No. L-34785 July 30, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
RENATO BARRIOS Y ALMOGUERA and RICO
NAZARIO Y IBAÑ;EZ, accused.
Renato L. Ramos, for accused Renato Barrios.
Cristobal A. Cantor (Counsel de Oficio) for accused Rico
Nazario.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor
General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor Carlos N.
Orrega for appellee.
FERNANDEZ, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
This is an automatic review of the amended decision
dated January 13, 1972 of the Circuit Criminal Court of
Manila in CCC-VI-733 (71) entitled "The People of the
Philippines versus Renato Barrios and Rico Nazario"
finding the two accused guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide and sentencing each one of them to death and
to jointly and severally pay the heirs of the victim Teodoro
Castillo y Molina the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of
said victim and the sums of P10,000.00 as moral
damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P7.00
representing the amount taken from the deceased and to did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
pay the costs. 1 feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault
and use personal violence upon the said
The two accused, Renato Barrios y Almoguera and Rico Teodoro Castillo y Molina, by then and
Nazario v Ibañ;ez were charged in September 1971 with there stabbing him with a bladed
the crime of robbery with homicide in the instrument, thereby inflicting upon him
following. têñ.£îhqw⣠physical injuries which were the direct
cause of his death thereafter.
INFORMATION
Contrary to law. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The undersigned accuses Renato Barrios y
Almoguera and Rico Nazario y Ibañ;ez of (
the crime of robbery with homicide, S
committed as follows: G
D
That on or about August 28, 1971, in the .
City of Manila, Philippines, the said )
accused, conspiring and confederating with R
one another whose Identity and O
whereabouts are still unknown and helping D
one another. did then and there wilfully, O
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of L
force and violence, and with intent to gain, F
take away from Teodoro Castillo y Molina, a O
taxi driver, the latter's earnings of C
undetermined amount, to the damage and .
prejudice of the said Teodoro Castillo y C
Molina in the said undetermined amount; A
that on the occasion of the said robbery and S
for the purpose of enabling them to take, A
steal and carry away the aforesaid earning S
of Teodoro Castillo y Molina, the herein A
accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, s

I hereby certify that an ex-parte
investigation in this case has been
conducted by me in accordance with law;
that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the offense charged has been
committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
Manila, Sept. 13, 1971. 2
The facts, as found by the trial court, are:
A careful study of the evidence presented,
shows the fact that victim Teodoro Castillo
y Molina, a taxi driver, was killed and
robbed of his earnings has never been
disputed. The only issue in this case,
therefore, is the criminal participation of the
accused.
s The corroborating statements of both
i accused (Exhibit "F", statement of Nazario
s and Exhibit "G", statement of Barrios)
t indubitably show that said accused,
a together with one Arthur, who is still at
n large, conspired, confederated with and
t helped one another in killing and robbing
F the victim. Nazario admitted in his
i statement (Exhibit "F") that he invited
s Barrios to stage a hold-up in Perlita Street.
c Thereupon, a taxi passed by and he
a stopped it. They boarded the same and he
l sat in the front seat while Barrios and Arthur
sat at the back with Arthur immediately
behind the driver of the taxi. Thereafter,
Barrios poked the balisong on the taxi
driver. Then they pulled said taxi driver to
the rear seat in order to frisk him but the
driver shouted for help. Fearing that they
might be heard and the driver would create
a scandal, Barrios immediately stabbed the
driver 3 times. Thereafter, he and his
companions filed. Nazario further declared
that Barrios also stabbed the taxi driver
because he fought back.
Barrios likewise admitted in his statement (Exhibit "G")
that they actually stopped the taxi at the corner of Perlita
and Estrada Streets and got the money of the driver but
the driver fought back and for which reason he stabbed
him with a kitchen knife. After that, he and his two
companions fled. He cannot remember the number of
times he stabbed the taxi driver because he was then
drunk. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The fact that both accused confessed to the
truth is strongly .shown by the corroborating
testimony of Generoso Quimpo, Jr., who
Testified in a spontaneous, categorical,
logical and straightforward manner with
marked fluency and ease that between 2:00
and 2:30 a.m. of August 28, 1971, while he
was still half-awake, he heard a commotion
consisting of a sound of a sound of a car, a
radio and the struggle of some men. He
even heard a shout "iwanan mo na iyan"
and the slamming of tile door of the taxi. He
looked out of the window and saw a taxi at
standstill, around 9 to 10 meters away, but
with the engine on. Inside the taxi, he saw
two men at the rear seat struggling. Then
the driver (he said he is the driver because
he was the one who shouted
"magnanakaw") came out and started
running towards Perlita Street shouting
"magnanakaw, magnanakaw" The man who
was inside, at the rear of the taxi, also went
out and ran on the opposite direction
towards Estrada. In other words, the
testimony of Quimpo, Jr. that he saw two
men struggling in the rear seat of the taxi,
one of whom he believes to be the taxi
driver because he was the one shouting
"magnanakaw," corroborates the admission
of Nazario that they pulled the taxi driver
from the front to the rear seat in order to
frisk him of his money (Exhibit "F", answer
to question No. 6): the testimony of
Quimpo, Jr. that the taxi driver went out of
his Taxi and shouted corroborates also a
portion of the answer of Nazario to question
No. 6 (Exhibit "F") that the taxi driver got out
of his taxi and shouted; and the testimony
of Quimpo, Jr. that he saw two men
struggling at the back of the taxi also
corroborates the statements of Nazario and
Barrios that Barrios stabbed the taxi driver
because the latter fought back. The
crediblity of Quimpo, Jr. Cannot be doubted
for in the absence of evidence showing
improper motive actuating the principal
prosecution witnesses tends to sustain the
conclusion that no such improper motive
existed and their testimonies are worthy of
full faith and credit (People versus Amiscua,
L-31238, February 27, 1971). 3
The two accused maintained that they were maltreated
into giving their statements admitting their participation in
the commission of the crime charged in the information.
This ,contention has no merit.
The statements in question were subscribed and sworn
to before Assistant Fiscal Avelino Concepcion of Manila.
There is no showing that the two accused refused or
even hesitated to sign and swear to said statements.
They did not complain to his fiscal that they were
maltreated by the police officers. these circumstances,
the statements are considered to have been voluntarily
given. 4
The assertion of the accused Rico Nazario that he did not
to the fiscal before whom he subscribed and swore to,
the statement because he was afraid of the police
officers is not Considering the gravity of the offense, it. is
logical to ;assume that the fiscal examined thoroughly the
two accused on the voluntariness of their statements. if
the two accuses were really maltreated they should have
complained because he probable penalty of death for the
crime charged is more awesome than the feared reprisal
of the police. Moreover, there is no evidence of the
alleged maltreatment other than the bare assertion of the
accused.
The statements of the two accused contain details of
which could only have been furnished by them. The
allegation of Nazario that they drink first beer or liquor in
the railroad track in Perlita Street; that he was the one
who sat in front of the taxicab while the other accused sat
on the rear seat: that Barrios was the one who poked a
knife at the taxi driver: that the driver was pulled to the
rear seat of the taxicab so that he could be frisked of his
money: that the driver shouted "saklolo, tulungan ninyo
ako"; and that the driver was stabbed because he fought
back are details that could not have been concocted by
the police investigators,
The accused, Renato Barrios, narrated in his statement
that the driver fought back when the former took his
money; that q-aid accused stabbed the driver with a
kitchen knife; that before the robbery, he and the other
accused first drank liquor by the bridge going to the
railroad track; that he knows Col. Quimpo who lives at
the corner of Estrada and Perlita Streets; that it is true
that he went to Col. Quimpo three (3) days after the
incident and asked what said accused should do as he is
one of those being suspected in the killing and robbing of
the driver as reported in a newspaper; and that he read in
the Daily Star that he is a suspect and Col. Quimpo is a
witness. These details could not having been known to
the police investigators.
It is a settled rule that where the statement of the
accused mentions details which only the declarant could
have furnished and could not have been concocted by
the investigator, the confession is considered to have
been voluntarily given. 5
Moreover, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
presumption is that the police officers who investigated
the accused performed their official duties regularly. 6
The defense interposed by the accused that on August
28, 1971 they were narrating stories in the house at 2473
Perlita Street, the residence of Renato Barrios, is not
credible, Alibi is a defense that can very easily be
concocted. For this reason, alibi to be sustained as a
defense must be supported by strong evidence. The
evidence of the accused in support of their alibi is weak.
It is strange that the accused and their companions
should be conversing up to 2:30 o'clock in the morning.
This is contrary to the ordinary course of things. Besides,
Virginia Siscon, a witness of the accused, declared that
she conversed with the accused and other persons only
up to 10:00 o'clock in the evening of that date. The place
where the accused and other persons allegedly told
stories was at 2473 Perlita Street which was near the
scene of the crime. The crime was committed on the
same street. There was every possibility for the two
accused to have been present at the scene of the crime
although earlier that evening they were conversing with
other people in the house at 2473 Perlita Street.
It has been held that for alibi to prosper, the evidence
must show that the accused was so far away that he
could not have been physically present at the place of the
crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. 7
The evidence of the prosecution has established beyond
reasonable doubt that the two accused committed the
crime charged in the information.
The trial court imposed the death penalty on both
accused because of the finding that the commission of
the crime was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of craft and abuse of superior strength
without any mitigating circumstance. The evidence of the
prosecution has not established the aggravating
circumstances of craft and abuse of superior strength.
Craft is a circumstance characterized by trickery or
cunning resorted to by the accused to carry out his
design.
The trial court found that craft was present because the
two accused stopped the taxicab by pretending to be
passengers. There is no evidence that the two accused
pretended to be passengers. In fact, it is not clear how
the taxicab was stopped. The only eyewitness for the
prosecution, Generoso M. Quimpo, Jr., declared that
between 2:00 and 2:30 o'clock in the morning of August
28, 1971, he was half-awake when there occurred a
commotion outside his house consisting of a sound of a
car, radio and the struggling of some men; that upon
looking out of the window, he saw a taxicab at a standstill
about 9 or 10 feet away from the window; that he was in
the second floor of the house; that the engine of the car
was running; that before looking outside, the witness
heard a man shouting "Iwanan mo na yan."; that when he
heard the slamming of the door of the taxicab and he
peeped out immediately, he saw the taxicab already
parked outside; that he saw two men struggling inside the
taxicab at the rear seat; that the taxi driver came out and
ran towards Perlita Street shouting "magnanakaw,
magnanakaw.": that a few seconds after the taxi driver
had run out, the man inside the taxicab at the rear also
ran towards the opposite direction going to Estrada
Street; and that the two persons struggling at the rear of
the taxicab were the taxi driver and a man.
It is clear from the foregoing testimony that when
Generoso M. Quimpo, Jr. looked out of the window from
his house, the taxicab was already at a standstill and that
only two men were struggling at the rear seat of the
taxicab, the driver of the taxicab and one man. This
testimony of the prosecution witness also rules out the
existence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. Only one man was struggling with 'The
taxi driver at the rear seat of the taxicab and the witness
saw only one man coming out of the rear of the taxicab
running towards the opposite direction going to Estrada
Street.
It is settled that an aggravating circumstance should be
proven as fully as the crime itself in order to aggravate
the, penalty. 8
In view of the foregoing, the trial court erred in imposing
the penalty of death. The crime was committed without
the presence of any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the decision under automatic- review is
hereby affirmed, with the sole modification that the
penalty imposed on the two accused is reclusion
perpetua, with costs against said accused.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Aquino, J., concur in the result.
G.R. No. 65833 May 6, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO, JR., accused-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the judgment * of the
Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch XXII,
Laoang, Northern Samar, in Criminal Case No. 1566,
finding the accused EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO,
JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
In the early evening of May 25, 1983, Reynaldo Aducal,
who was buying fish in the public market, Poblacion
Laoang, Northern Samar, was fatally stabbed. Right after
the stabbing, the assailant was apprehended by Pfc.
Wenefredo Laguitan whose commendable act thwarted
the assailant's escape.
For the killing of Reynaldo Aducal, accused Eugenio
Lagarto y Getalado, Jr. was charged in an amended
information with the crime of Murder as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of May, 1983, at
about 6:00 o'clock in the evening more or less,
inside the public market Bgy. Little Venice,
Municipality of Laoang, Province of Northern
Samar, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused
 with deliberate intent to kill with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
one REYNALDO ADUCAL y LURA with the use of
a Batangas fan knife or Balisong which the above-
named accused had provided himself for the
purpose, thereby inflicting upon said victim fatal
wounds on his chest, which wounds caused the
instantaneous death of the victim.
Accused is a recidivist, having been previously
convicted by final judgment of another came
embraced IN THE SAME TITLE OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, THAT OF MURDER IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1473.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(Record, "Amended Information", p. 35)
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of guilty.
The records disclose that the trial court had asked
appellant whether or not he understood the
consequences of his plea. Following the rulings of this
Court, however, the trial court still directed the
prosecution to present its evidence for the purpose of
establishing with certainty the guilt and the degree of
culpability of the accused.
Two witnesses were presented by the prosecution: they
were Zosimo Aducal, father of the victim, and Pfc.
Wenefredo Laguitan.
1. Zasimo Aducal testified that in the evening of
May 25, 1983 while he was attending to his farm,
three (3) kilometers away from the poblacion of
Little Venice, Laoang, Northern Samar, his
grandson Artemio Aducal, son of Reynaldo,
informed him that Reynaldo Aducal had been
stabbed dead; he was not able to see his
deceased son that night because he could not see
his way during night time; it was only in the
following morning when he saw his deceased son
with two stab wounds on the right and left breast.
(TSN, October 18, 1983, pp. 14-20).
2. Pfc. Wenefredo Laguitan testified that on May
25, 1983, around 6:00 in the evening, while he and
Pat. Manuel Sevillana were passing the market
place, his attention was called by a certain
Armando Baluyot to a commotion; he observed
that the people were scampering for safety and a
man was escaping; when somebody shouted that
the man was the assailant, he immediately
followed the man and apprehended him right then
and there; at the police headquarters the man
admitted to him that he had long planned to kill the
victim and that, the plotter was Eugenio Lagarto,
Jr., herein appellant. (TSN, October 18, 1983, pp.
22-28,).
The prosecution likewise presented the following
evidence:
(a) Case Record of Criminal Case No. 1473
entitled "People vs. Eugenio Lagarto, Jr." showing
that appellant had been convicted by final
judgment of homicide. (Exhibit "A" to "A-1 a");
(b) Death Certificate of deceased Reynaldo
Aducal (Exhibit "B");
(c) Fan knife (Exhibit "D");
(d) Extra-judicial confession of appellant (Exhibit
"C" to "C-4"), which discloses the following:
07. Question: Do you know Reynaldo
Aducal personally?
Answer: Not so much, sir, but he was the
one who stabbed my brother Pablito last
1980.
08. Question: What was the result when
Reynaldo Aducal stabbed your brother
Pablito?
Answer: As a result, my brother Pablito was
hospitalized.
09. Question: Why did you stab to death
Reynaldo Aducal?
Answer: I stabbed him to death sir, as a
revenge or retaliation for his stabbing of my
brother Pablito.
10. Question: According to what you have
said Reynaldo Aducal had stabbed your
brother Pablito in 1980. Do you mean to
say that since 1980 up to May 25, 1983 you
had been planning to avenge your brother
by killing Reynaldo?
Answer: Yes, sir.
(p. 2, Exhibit "C")
Based on the appellant's plea of guilty and the evidence
adduced, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court accepts his plea and
declares accused, Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime of Murder defined and penalized in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the
information, appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty which
is offset by the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation, the Court hereby sentences
said accused to suffer the extreme penalty of
DEATH with all the accessories provided for in Art.
40 of the Revised Penal Code.
 The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Reynaldo Aducal in the amount of
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 20)
The imposition of the supreme penalty of death warrants
an automatic review by this Court. However, the penalty
of Death had been changed to reclusion perpetua in
accordance with the provision of Section 19(l), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution.
The counsel de oficio recommends that the sentence be
modified, contending that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION AGAINST THE ACCUSED.
II. THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN
APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY AGAINST
THE ACCUSED; AND
III. CONSEQUENTLY, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO
SUFFER THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH."
(Brief for Accused-Appellant, p. 4; Rollo, p.
1 1 8)
It is a well-established rule that a plea of guilty,
besides being a mitigating circumstance, is a
judicial confession of guilt—an admission of all the
material facts alleged in the information, including
the aggravating circumstances. (People vs. Ariola,
100 SCRA, 523) To be considered a true plea of
guilty, it must be made by the accused freely,
voluntarily and with full knowledge of the
consequences and meaning of his act. It must be
made unconditionally. (People vs. Comendador,
100 SCRA 155).
In the case at bar, the trial court exerted its utmost
effort to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that the
accused understood, the meaning and importance
of his plea. Thus,
Q Do you realize the import and
consequences of your having entered the
plea of guilty?
A Yes, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, the Court would repeat to you that
you have entered the plea of guilty to a
most grievous offense?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q For having entered a plea of guilty to the
present crime of murder for the killing of
 Reynaldo Aducal you are therefore
submitting the case without presenting your
own evidence, do you realize that?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And despite this advise and admonition
to you by the court, do you still insist on
entering a plea of guilty to the crime as
charged?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q The Court will advise you that in this kind
of offense which is a crime of murder there
is only one possible penalty and the court
has no other recourse but to impose it, that
of death, do you realize that?
A Yes, your Honor.
(Translated in the dialect known to the accused)
(TSN, October 11, 1983, pp. 2-4).
The trial court was not remiss in its obligation to warn the
accused of the important consequences of his plea. The
possibility that death might be imposed should have
warned the accused to protect his interest: even an
ordinary unlettered man fears death. And despite the
thought of losing his life, the accused pleaded guilty. We
are convinced that the guilt of the accused has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt in the light of
overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution,
fully corroborated and substantiated by the plea of guilty
of the accused.
The only issue before Us is whether or not the trial court
correctly appreciated the existence of recidivism and the
qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery.
Section 5, Rule 118 of the old Rules of Court provides
that "Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or
information, if the trial court accepts the plea and has
discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may
hear witnesses to determine what punishment shall be
imposed." (emphasis supplied). The trial court in a
criminal case may sentence a defendant who pleads
guilty to the offense charged in the information, without
the necessity of taking testimony. (US vs. Talbanos, 6
Phil. 541). Yet, it is advisable for the trial court to call
witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the
degree of culpability of the defendant. (People vs.
Comendador, supra) The present Revised Rules of
Court, however, decrees that where the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, it is now mandatory for the
court to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused and his precise degree of culpability, with the
accused being likewise entitled to present evidence to
prove, inter alia, mitigating circumstances (See People
vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401; Section 3, Rule 116 of Rules
of Court).
In the case at bar, the trial court directed the prosecution
to present evidence for the purpose of establishing the
guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant.
We find, as the trial court found, that the accused is a
recidivist. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial
for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by
final judgment of another crime embraced in the same
title of the Revised Penal Code. Herein accused had
been convicted of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case
No. 1473 before the trial of the present Criminal Case
No. 1566. The former counsel de oficio of herein accused
alleged that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 1473 was
rendered on September 15, 1983, hence when the
accused was arraigned on October 11, 1983 for Criminal
Case No. 1566 he was not a recidivist.
The former counsel de oficio is of the opinion that "the
time of trial" is to be reckoned with the date of the
arraignment. The phrase "at the time of his trial" should
not be restrictively construed as to mean the date of
arraignment.
We declared in People vs. Enriquez, 90 Phil. 428, that
the phrase "at the time of his trial for an offense" is
employed in its general sense, including the rendering of
the judgment. In US vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 23, We held
that the phrase "at the trial" is meant to include
everything that is done in the course of the trial, from
arraignment until after sentence is announced by the
judge in open court. In the case at bar, the accused was
convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 on
September 15, 1983. There being no appeal, the
judgment therein became final on October 11, 1983. The
second conviction was rendered on October 26, 1983 for
Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the accused is a
recidivist: the accused had been convicted by final
judgment at the time of the rendition of the judgment for
the second offense.
We find no merit in the finding of the trial court that
evident premeditation and treachery existed in the
commission of the crime. It is a rule that a plea of guilty
cannot be held to include evident premeditation and
treachery where the evidence adduced does not
adequately disclose the existence of these qualifying
circumstances (People vs. Gravino, 122 SCRA 123).
Evident premeditation requires proof of the following
requisites: (a) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he
had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse
of time between the determination and the execution of
the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will. (People vs. Cafe, 166 SCRA 704;
People vs. Montejo, 167 SCRA 506).
The statement of the accused, that he had long planned
to kill Reynaldo Aducal in retaliation for the act of
Reynaldo Aducal in stabbing his brother, does not
adequately prove the existence of evident premeditation.
It is necessary to establish that the accused meditated on
his intention between the time it was conceived and the
time the crime was actually perpetrated. Defendant's
proposition was nothing but an expression of his own
determination to commit the crime which is entirely
different from premeditation. (People vs. Carillo 77 Phil.
572). In People vs. Alde, 64 SCRA 224, We ruled that
there is no evident premeditation where the only
evidence to support it is the statement of the accused
that he planned to kill the victim in 1964 when actual
stabbing was 1969.
To show premeditation, it is required that the criminal
intent be evidenced by notorious acts evincing the
determination to commit the same. (People vs. Guiyab,
139 SCRA 446). It must be evident and not merely
suspected (People vs. Iturriaga, 88 Phil. 534) or merely
thought of or contemplated mentally, without externalized
acts. The finding of the trial court, that the accused had
clandestinely concealed the knife in his body away from
the searching eye of the prison guards which showed the
deliberate intent of the accused, is not borne out by the
records. Perusal of the records does not show that the
accused deliberately planned the killing through external
acts. The finding of facts by the trial court should not be
based on mere assumptions; there must be proof that
such facts exist.
In order that treachery may be appreciated, it is
necessary to prove the manner in which the victim was
attacked.1âwphi1 Treachery can in no way be presumed
but must be fully proved. Where there are merely
indications that the attack was sudden and unexpected,
but there are no precise data on this point, the
circumstance of treachery can not be taken into account.
(People vs. Ariola, supra)
In the case at bar, there is no evidence to show that the
mode of attack was consciously adopted as to insure the
perpetration of the crime and safety from the defense that
the victim might put up. There is an absence of evidence
to show the means employed by assailant and the mode
of attack. Treachery may not be simply deduced from
assumptions; it must be as clearly proved as the crime
itself in order to qualify the crime into murder.
WHEREFORE, the that court's judgment is MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO
is hereby CONVICTED of homicide; appreciating in his
favor the mitigating circumstance of spontaneous plea of
guilty which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism, the Court hereby sentences said accused to
an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay
the heirs of Reynaldo Aducal an indemnity of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00). Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 93436 March 24, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MELCHOR REAL y BARTOLAY, accused-appellant.
QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 44, Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case
No. 1606 finding appellant guilty of murder.
We affirm with modification, the appealed decision.
I Upon being arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.
The information against appellant reads as follows:
That on or about March 11, 1978, in the
morning thereof, at the Poblacion of the
Municipality of Aroroy, Province of
Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction
of this Court, the said accused with intent to
kill, evident premeditation and treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and criminally attack, assault
and hack with a sharp bolo one Edgardo
Corpus y Rapsing, hitting the latter on the
nape, causing an injury which caused the
death of the said Edgardo Corpus y
Rapsing several days thereafter.
That the accused is a recidivist having been
convicted by the Municipal Court of Aroroy,
in the following cases:
Crime Date of Conviction
1. Ill treatment by Deed —
July 6, 1965
2. Grave Threats —
November 25, 1968
(Rollo, p. 14).
After trial, the court convicted appellant and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 and costs.
Hence, this appeal.
II
At about 9:00 A.M. on March 17, 1978, in the public
market of Aroroy, Masbate, appellant and Edgardo
Corpus, both vendors, engaged in a heated argument
over the right to use the market table to display their fish.
Moreno de la Rosa, the Municipal Mayor, who happened
to be at the public market, tried to pacify them, saying
that they were arguing over trivial matters.
The two protagonists momentarily kept their peace but
after awhile Corpus raised his voice again and said
something to appellant. The latter, in a soft voice, uttered
"SOBRA NA INA NA IMO PAGDAOGDAOG" (You are
being too oppressive).
When Corpus kept on walking to and fro near the Q. In what part of his body
disputed fish table, appellant started to sharpen his bolo was he hit?
while murmuring to himself. Once Corpus turned around
with his back towards appellant, the latter hacked him on A. At the right neck.
the nape. The blow caused Corpus to collapse. He was
rushed to a medical clinic. When asked by his wife as to Q. Did you admit to the
who hacked him, he answered "Melchor Real." authorities that it was you who
hacked Edgardo Corpus?
A police investigator went to the clinic to take the dying
declaration of Corpus, who said that it was appellant who A. Yes, sir.
stabbed him. Corpus died two days later.
On cross-examination, he again admitted his guilt.
Appellant admitted hacking Corpus but claimed that he
did so out of humiliation and anger when the victim threw Q. And when this Edgardo
his fish in the presence of so many people. Corpus turn (sic) his
back, you immediately hacked
He testified as follows: him on his neck?

Q. When Edgardo Corpus A. Yes, sir ( TSN, July 9,

was lambasting you in the
presence of the public, what
did you do, how did you feel?
A. I got angry.
Q. And what did you do?
A. So I hacked him.
1986, pp. 6-8; Emphasis
supplied).
III
Before us, appellant argues that the crime committed
was only homicide and not murder and that he is entitled
to two mitigating circumstances: namely, passion and
obfuscation and vindication of a grave offense.

Q. Was he hit? We agree with appellant that the offense committed was
homicide. He is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as to
A. Yes, Sir. whether he acted with alevosia when he attacked the
victim. As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant,
whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such
mode of attack was cooly and deliberately adopted by
him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance
to either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply,
however, where the attack was not preconceived and
deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the sudden
infuriation on the part of the accused because of the
provocative act of the victim (People v. Aguiluz, 207
SCRA 187 [1992]). This is more so, where the assault
upon the victim was preceded by a heated exchange of
words between him and the accused (People v. Rillorta,
180 SCRA 102 [1989]). In the case at bench, the assault
came in the course of an altercation and after appellant
had sharpened his bolo in full view of the victim.
Appellant's act of sharpening his bolo can be interpreted
as an attempt to frighten the victim so the latter would
leave him alone. It was simply foolhardy for the victim to
continue walking to and fro near appellant in a taunting
manner while the latter was sharpening his bolo.
The suddenness of the attack does not, by itself, suffice
to support a finding of alevosia where the decision to
attack was made peremptorily and the victim's helpless
position was accidental (People v. Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245
[1974]).
Appellant also claims that he is entitled to two mitigating
circumstances: namely, vindication of a grave offense
and passion and obfuscation. The peculiarity of these two
mitigating circumstances is that they cannot be applied at
the same time if they arise from the same facts or motive.
If appellant attacked his victim in the proximate
vindication of a grave offense, he cannot successfully
claim in the same breath that he was also blinded by
passion and obfuscation. At most, only one of two
circumstances could be considered in favor of appellant
(People v. Yaon, Court of Appeals, 43 O.G. 4142 cited in
I Reyes, Revised Penal Code [1981]).
The act of the victim in berating and humiliating appellant
was enough to produce passion and obfuscation,
considering that the incident happened in a market place
within full view and within hearing distance of many
people.
The trial court held, and the Solicitor General agreed, that
the attendant aggravating circumstance
was reiteracion and not reincidencia as alleged in the
information. The trial court and the Solicitor General are
in error.
According to the information charging appellant of murder
and the evidence, the accused was previously convicted
of ill-treatment by deed on July 6, 1965 and grave threats
on November 25, 1968.
In recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have
been previously convicted by final judgment of another
crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal
Code (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[g]). In reiteracion, the
offender shall have been punished previously for an
offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater
penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a
lighter penalty (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[10]). Unlike
in reincidencia, the offender in reiteracion commits a
crime different in kind from that for which he was
previously tried and convicted (Guevarra, Penal Sciences
and Philippine Criminal Law 129 [1974]).
Appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by
deed (Revised Penal Code, Art. 266, Title Eight) and
grave threats (Revised Penal Code, Art. 282, Title Nine).
He was convicted of homicide in the instant criminal case
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 249, Title Eight). Inasmuch as
homicide and ill-treatment by deed fall under Title Eight,
the aggravating circumstance to be appreciated against
him is recidivism under Article 14[g] rather
than reiteracion under Article 14(10) of the Revised Penal
Code.
There is no reiteracion because that circumstance
requires that the previous offenses should not be
embraced in the same title of the Code. While grave
threats fall in title (Title Nine) different from homicide
(Title Eight), still reiteracion cannot be appreciated
because such aggravating circumstance requires that if
there is only one prior offense, that offense must be
punishable by an equal or greater penalty than the one
for which the accused has been convicted. Likewise, the
prosecution has to prove that the offender has been
punished for the previous offense. There is no evidence
presented by the prosecution to that effect.
Appellant is convicted of homicide, appreciating in his
favor the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, which is offset by the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is
convicted of the crime of homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) YEARS of prision
mayor as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and
FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victim is
increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-9791 October 3, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. VICENTE
F. SOTELO, Defendant-Appellant.
J. C. Hixson for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 5th day of January, 1914, the prosecuting
attorney of the city of Manila presented a complaint
against the said defendant, charging him with the crime
of estafa. The complaint alleged: "That on or about
January 2, 1914, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said Vicente F. Sotelo, having received from one
Manuel Araneta for safe-keeping, on commission or for
administration, a plain gold ring set with three diamonds,
valued at P250, the property of the said Manuel Araneta,
for the purpose of selling it and delivering the proceeds
thereby derived to the said Manuel Araneta within a
period of two hours or of returning the said ring to the
latter in case he should be unable to sell it, said accused,
Vicente F. Sotelo,did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
and criminally misapply, misappropriate, and covert the
said ring or its value in the sum of P250, Philippine
currency, to his own benefit, to the damage and prejudice
of the said Manuel Araneta in the sum of P250,
equivalent to 1,250 pesetas; that the accused is a
recidivist; all contrary to law."chanrobles virtual law library
Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arrested,
arraigned, tried, found guilty, and sentenced, by the
Honorable Richard Campbell, judge, to be imprisoned for
a period of four months and one day of arresto mayor,
and to pay the costs. From that sentence the defendant
appealed to this court and made the following
assignments of error: "First. The trial court erred in
finding that Manuel Araneta or Alejandra Dormir testified
that Manuel Araneta delivered the ring to the defendant,
upon an agreement that the defendant should sell the
same for not less than P250. Second. The trial court
erred in finding that the defendant was guilty, beyond a
reasonable doubt."chanrobles virtual law library
With reference to the first assignment of error, the lower
court said: "He [Manuel Araneta] states positively that he
delivered the ring to the defendant, with the distinct
understanding that the latter should sell it and return with
the money to him, the agreement being that he should
sell it for not less than P250."chanrobles virtual law
library
An examination of the record, however, shows that
Manuel Araneta testified with reference to the price for
which the defendant was to sell the ring, as follows: "On
the morning of the 2nd day of January (1914) this year, I
met Mr. Sotelo, the accused in this case. He asked me
where I was going and I told him I was going to sell a
diamond ring. I asked him if he could find a purchaser for
me, because, I told him, the best offer I had received was
P120. About 12:30 that same day Mr. Sotelo appeared at
my house; at that time we were eating; my brother-in-law,
my sister, and the owner of the ring (Alejandra Dormir)
were there eating. He stated he had at last found a
purchaser who was willing to pay P180 or P190, I do not
remember exactly, for the ring; that at 1.30 he would
return and bring with him the proceeds of the sale of the
ring. Then I told the owner of the ring to turn it over to Mr.
Sotelo for its sale, stating at the same time that I knew
Mr. Sotelo. Then, as 2 and 3 o'clock passed without the
defendant appearing in the house, and because I
assumed the responsibility for the ring - because I had
assured the owner of it of my confidence in Mr. Sotelo - I
started to find Mr. Sotelo."chanrobles virtual law library
In answer to the question "Why did you [Manuel Araneta]
tell Sotelo to find a purchaser for you?" - he said: "In
order to find out whether there was some one who would
offer more than P120 for the ring, because the owner
wanted P180 or more."chanrobles virtual law library
The foregoing is all the testimony found in the record
concerning the price at which the defendant was to sell
the ring.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Alejandro Dormir, the owner of the ring, testified that she
had paid P250 for it, but there is nothing in the record
which justifies the finding of the lower court that the
defendant agreed to take the ring and to sell it for not
less than P250. While the finding of the lower court as to
the amount for which the defendant agreed to sell the
ring is not in accordance with the evidence, it was not a
finding which in any way exculpates the defendant,
provided the record shows that he did receive from the
owner the ring in question, under an agreement to sell it
at some price and to return the money which he should
receive to the
owner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
With reference to the second assignment of error, the
lower court said, in his summary of the proof: "The
testimony of Manuel Araneta is to the effect that the ring
in question is the property of one Alejandra Dormir, who
delivered it to him (Manuel Araneta) to sell; that he in turn
delivered it to the defendant herein, Vicente Sotelo, after
some conversation in which Sotelo said he could find a
customer for it, and an agreement was made whereby
Sotelo should return during the day and deliver the
proceeds of the sale to the said Manuel Araneta. This
testimony is corroborated by the woman, Alejandra
Dormir, the owner of the ring in question. She testified
that being in need of money, she turned the ring in
question over to Manuel Araneta, who was a friend of her
family, in order that he might sell it and deliver the
proceeds of the sale to her.
The accused does not deny that the ring was delivered to
him, nor that he pawned the ring in the pawnshop of one
Guillermo Ruiz, at 1810 Calle Azcarraga. He states,
however, that it was pawned with the knowledge and
consent of Manuel Araneta, who told him (the accused)
that he was in need of P20, and asked him if he would
not take the ring and pawn it for him and bring the
money; that, later, after he had pawned the ring for P20,
and had given the money to Manuel Araneta, the latter
asked him to obtain for him P50 additional on the ring,
which the accused did, delivering to Araneta the second
time the sum of P49,40, 60 centavos being deducted by
the pawnbroker as interest; whereupon, says the
accused, Manuel Araneta gave him the sum of P4.40 as
his commission on the
transaction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The court is of the opinion that the evidence
demonstrates the guilt of the accused, beyond a
reasonable doubt. He has a bad reputation, having been
convicted of theft in 1902, and sentenced to three years
six months and twenty-one days. Moreover, it is the
opinion of the court that the declaration of the accused,
with respect to the consent of Araneta in the pawning of
the ring is false and, therefore, can not be taken into
consideration as a defense in this case.
With reference to the second assignment of error, the
guilt or innocence of the accused depends wholly upon
the proof - a question of fact only. The prosecution
alleged and tried to prove that the accused was given the
ring for the purpose of selling it a price not less than
P180 or P190. and to return the money or purchase price
to the owner within a period of about one hour. The
accused admits that he received the ring at the time and
place when and where the owner alleges that he gave it
to him. He denies, however, that he received the rings for
the purpose of selling it on commission. He alleges that
he received it for the purpose of pawning it. He admits
that he pawned it, at first for P20, but took no pawn ticket
at that time, and that the P20 were delivered to the owner
(or Manuel Araneta) and that later he returned to the
same pawn-broker and received the further sum of P50
(P49.40), which was also delivered to the owner (or
Manuel Araneta). He alleges that when he received the
P50 (P49.40) he took a pawn broker's ticket for the
same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
We have, then, the only difference between the
prosecution and the accused a question of fact, whether
or not the ring was delivered to the accused to be sold or
to be pawned. If it was delivered to the accused to be
pawned, and he did pawn it, in accordance with his
instructions, and did return the money to the owner, then,
in that case, there is no breach of trust and he is not
guilty of the crime charged. If, upon the other hand, the
ring was delivered to the accused to be sold, and he
neither sold the ring nor returned it to its owner, then he
is guilty as charged in the complaint. The lower court,
after a careful analysis of the proof adduced during the
trial of the cause, reached the conclusion that the
evidence showed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
ring was delivered to the accused to be sold and that he
neither returned the ring nor its purchase price to the
owner. chanrobles virtual law library
There were but four witnesses examined during the trial
of the cause, two for the prosecution and two for the
defense. The first witness for the prosecution was
Manuel Araneta. He testified that had known the
defendant for about two years; that at the request of
Alejandra Dormir he delivered the ring in question to the
defendant to be sold; that he told the defendant that he
had received an offer of P120 for the ring; that the
defendant represented that he had a purchaser who was
willing to pay P180 or P190 for the ring; that the ring was
given to the accused to be sold at that price (P180 or
P190); that the defendant promised to return with the
purchase price within about an hour; that the ring was
given to the defendant at about 12.30 noon p.m.; that he
(Manuel Araneta) waited until between 3 and 4 o'clock
p.m. for the return of the defendant; that the defendant
did not return up to that time nor at any other time, with
the ring; that between 3 and 4 o'clock he (Manuel
Araneta) went to the office of the prosecuting attorney of
the city of Manila, and made a complaint against the said
defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
He further testified that the ring had been pawned several
times and that the owner had redeemed it from a
pawnbroker on the morning of the day (January 2, 1914)
on which it had been delivered to the
defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Alejandra Dormir, the other witness presented for the
prosecution, testified that she was the owner of the ring;
that she had paid P250 for it; that the ring had been
pawned; that she had redeemed it on the same day that
it was delivered to the defendant, because she wanted to
sell it; that she wanted to sell and asked him whether or
not he could sell it; that Mr. Araneta and told he knew a
man who wanted to buy a ring; that the defendant arrived
at the house where she was in company with Mr. Araneta
and others, while they were eating; that the ring was
upon her finger at that time; that the ring was taken off of
her finger and delivered to the defendant; that she did not
authorize the defendant to pawn the
ring.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The defendant testified in his own behalf and said that at
about 8 o'clock or 8.30 on the morning of January 2,
1914, he was driving in a carromata from his house in
Rizal avenue; that as he was passing near the house of
Mr. Araneta he saw his and bade him good morning; that
Mr. Araneta asked him whether he knew any person who
wanted to buy a ring and he showed him the ring on his
finger; that he told Mr. Araneta that he was not devoting
himself to such small things, but that, notwithstanding
that fact, he knew a person, one Vicenta Zialcita, who
was engaged in the business of selling and buying
jewelry; that Mr. Araneta asked him to accompany him to
this woman's house; that he refused, saying that he was
very busy but would come back about twelve o'clock that
same day to accompany him; that he did return to the
house of Mr. Araneta at about 12 o'clock that same day;
that when he came to the house of Mr. Araneta he saw
that the people of the house were eating their meal; that
Mr. Araneta invited him into the house; that once insides
of the house, I asked him whether he was really to go to
the house of Vicenta Zialcita, but he said no; Mr. Araneta
then asked me if I had P20, because he was in need of
the money; that Mr. Araneta then asked him if he could
not pawn the ring, and I told him that I would see what I
could do and he then gave the ring to me; that he went to
the house of Juan Bebing, who was then appraiser of the
pawnshop of Guillermo Ruiz; that he told Juan Bebing
that he wanted to pawn the ring for P20, because a friend
of his was in need of that money; that he was going to
redeem it to-morrow because it was going to be sold; that
he received the P20; that no pawn ticket was issued for
it; that he returned to Rizal Avenue and left the carromata
at the corner and from there walked to the house of Mr.
Araneta asked him if he could not get P50 more on the
ring; that he said he was not sure; that it was then 12
o'clock and that he was hungry; that, notwithstanding
that, he told him (Araneta) that he would come back
between 2 and 3 o'clock; that after giving MR. Araneta
the P20 he returned at about 2.30 in pawnshop and saw
Mr. Bebing and his (Mr. Bebing's) wife needed P20 for
market purposes, and he (Bebing) had pawned the ring
for the same amount; that he told him (Bebing) that the
owner of the ring wanted another P50; that he (Bebing)
said that it was all right; that we could fix it up by putting
on the ticket P70, with 3 per cent interest on the P20; that
Bebing made out a ticket for P70, deducting sixty
centavos, and that he (Bebing) gave him P49.40; that he
also saw in the report which is sent by the pawnshops to
the police where his name appeared as Vicente Sotelo
and that he changed the name with his own hands and
made it Vicente F. Sotelo; that later he took Mr. Cruz to
the house of Manuel Araneta and delivered the P49.40 to
Manuel Araneta; that Manuel Araneta gave him P4.40 as
his commission.
The said Hipolito Cruz testified in part confirmed the
declarations of the accused. His testimony is of little
value, however, upon the particular question presented,
for the reason that he was not present at either of the
times the accused alleges that he received the two sums
of money from the pawnbroker and neither was he
present at the time the accused alleges he delivered the
money to Manuel
Araneta.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
An examination of the declaration of the accused shows
that he admitted that he took the ring and that he knew a
person, Vicenta Zialcita, who was engaged in the
business of selling and buying jewelry. He does not,
however, at any time in his declaration, attempt to show
that he took the ring to the said Vicenta Zialcita, for the
purpose of attempting to sell it to her. Another peculiar
facts also appears in his declaration. It id the fact that the
said Juan Bebing, who was supposed to have been the
appraiser of the pawnshop of Guillermo Ruiz, did not
place the ring with Ruiz, but pawned it himself, whether
to some other pawnbroker or not, does not appear.
Bebing was not called as a witness. His declaration might
have thrown some light upon the conduct of the
defendant. The prosecution alleges that the ring was
delivered to the defendant to be sold by him. The
defendant admits, while alleging that it was given to him
to pawn, that he told the owner that he knew a person
(Vicenta Zialcita) who wanted to buy a ring. The
defendant says that he offered to accompany the owner
to said person (Vicenta Zialcita). If the ring was given to
him to pawn, why did he offer to take the owner to a
person who desired to buy it? That fact seems to
contradict his statement that he received the ring only for
the purpose of pawning
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We think the proof shows, beyond a reasonable doubt,
not only by the witnesses for the prosecution but also by
the admissions of the defendant, the following
facts:chanrobles virtual law library
That on the 2nd day of January, 1914, at about 12.30
p.m., the owner of the ring delivered it to the defendant,
to be sold by him, at a practice not less than P180 or
P190, under the obligation to return the same, of the
purchase price, within about one hour thereafter; that the
defendant did not return either the ring or the purchase
price within said time nor at any other time; that his
failure to return either the ring or the purchase price has
resulted in great prejudice and damage to the
owner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
This court has held in numerous cases that such facts
show clearly that the defendant is guilty of the crime of
estafa and should be punished under paragraph 5 of
article 535, in relation with paragraph 2 of article 534 of
the Penal Code. (U. S. De Guzman, 1 Phil. Rep., 138; U.
S. vs. Zamora, 2 Phil. Rep., 582 U. S. Anacleto, 3 Phil.,
Rep., 172; U. S. vs. Singuimuto, 3 Phil., 176; U. S. vs.
Ner, 4 Phil. Rep., 131; U. S. vs. Ongtengco, 4 Phil. Rep.,
144; U. S. vs. Aquino, 4 Phil., Rep., 402; U. S. vs. Berry,
5 Phil., Rep., 370; U. S. vs. Leaño, 6 Phil. Rep., 368; U.
S. vs. Solis, 7 Phil. Rep., 195; U. S. vs. Goyenechea, 8
Phil. Rep., 117; U. S. vs. Celis, 8 Phil. Rep., 378; U.
S. vs. Rodriquez, 9 Phil., Rep., 153; U. S. vs. Da Silva,
10 Phil. Rep., 39; U.S. vs. Leyva, 10 Phil. Rep., 43; U.
S. vs. Meñez, 11 Phil. Rep., 430; U. S vs. Alabanza, 11
Phil. Rep., 475; U. S. vs. Perello, G. R. No. 5133 1; U.
S. vs. Melad, 27 Phil. Rep., 488.)chanrobles virtual law
library
In the crime of estafa, as well as that of larceny, the
punishment depends upon the amount or the value of the
article misappropriated or stolen. In the present case the
owner asserted that she paid P250 for the ring. There is
no proof to the contrary. She offered to sell it, in the
present case, for P180 or P190. The ring may have been
worth P250 at the time she purchased it. The value which
she placed upon it at the time she gave it to the
defendant, we think should be considered its value at that
time, in the absence of other evidence, for the purpose of
fixing the
punishment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The appellant makes an effort to show, inasmuch as Mr.
Araneta, who gave the ring to him, was not its owner, that
he was not guilty of the crime of estafa, even though he
misappropriated it. The crime of estafa is committed,
although the victim was not the owner of the property, but
the holder or broker simply, when it appears that the real
owner was prejudiced by the disappearance of the
property. The fact is more particularly true when the
person committing the illegal act knew that the property
did not belong to the holder but to some other person. U.
S. vs. Almazan, 20 Phil. Rep., 225.) In the present case
the proof shows that while the ring was delivered to him
by Manuel Araneta, he knew that the owner was
Alejandra Dormir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The record does not show whether or not the ring was
returned to its owner, in accordance with the provisions
of article 120 of the Penal Code. It is a general principle
that no man can be divested of his property without his
own consent or voluntary act. In the case of Varela vs.
Finnick (9 Phil. Rep., 482) this court said, speaking
through Mr. Justice Torres: "Whoever may have been
deprived of his property in consequence of a crime, is
entitled to the recovery thereof, even if such property is in
the possession of a third party who acquired it by legal
means other than those expressly stated in article 464 of
the Civil Code."chanrobles virtual law library
The only exception made by article 464 of the Civil Code
seems to be where the property has been pledged in a
"monte de pieded" established under authority of the
government. In such a case the owner cannot recover
the property without previously refunding to said
institution the amount of the pledge and the interest due.
(Varela vs. Matute, 9 Phil. Rep., 479; U. S. vs. Meñez, 11
Phil. Rep., 430; U. S. vs. Perello, R. G. No. 5133;
Arenas vs. Raymundo, 19 Phil. Rep., 46; Reyes vs. Ruiz,
27 Phil. Rep., 458.)chanrobles virtual law library
Whoever claims to have acquired title to property, real or
personal, through some agent or person not the real
owner, must be prepared to show that the person of
whom he purchased such property had authority to
transfer the same. (Manning vs. Keenan, 73 N.Y., 45;
Meiggs vs. Meiggs, 15 Hun, N.Y., 453; McGoldrick vs.
Willits, 52 N.Y., 612; Succession of Boisblanc, 32 La.
Ann., 109; Loomis vs. Barker, 69 Ill., 360; Berthholf vs.
Quinlan, 68 Ill., 297; Thompson vs. Barnum, 49 Iowa,
392; Bercich vs. Marye, 9 Nevada, 312; Voss vs.
Robertson, 46 Ala., 483; Wheeler & Wilson vs. Givan, 65
Mo., 89; Switzer vs. Wilvers, 24 Kansas, 383; 36 Am.
Rep., 259.)chanrobles virtual law library
To the foregoing general rule, that no man can be
divested of his property without his own consent or
voluntary act, there seem to be two owner has entrusted
or delivered to an agent, money or negotiable promissory
notes have been delivered or transferred to some third
innocent party.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
This exception is apparently based upon the exigencies
of commerce and trade. Money bears no earmarks of
peculiar ownership ownership. Its primary purpose is to
pass from hand to hand as a medium of exchange,
without other evidence of its title. Negotiable promissory
notes, so far as it is possible, are intended to represent
money, and, like it, to be a means of commercial
intercourse, unfettered by any qualifications or conditions
not appearing on its face. (Banco Español-Filipino vs.
Tan-Tangco, 13 Phil. Rep., 628; Daniel on Negotiable
Instruments, sections 769, 862; McMabon vs. Sloan, 12
Pa. St., 229; 51 Am. Dec., 601.)chanrobles virtual law
library
It is a fundamental principle of our law of personal
property that no man can be divested of it without his
own consent; consequently, even an honest purchase,
under a defective title, cannot resist the claim of the true
owner. The maxim that "No man can transfer to another a
better title than he has himself" obtains in the civil as well
as the common law. (Pothier, Trite du Contrat de Vente,
1 N., 7; Ersk. Inst., 418.) And hence it is now recognized
everywhere in the United States, as well as in civilized
Europe, that a sale "ex vi termini" imports nothing more
than that a bona fide purchaser succeeds only to the
rights of the vendor. (2 Kent's Commentaries, 324;
Saltus vs. Everett, 20 Wend., N.Y., 267; 32 Am. Dec.,
541; Gibson vs. Miller, 29 Mich., 355; Lancaster National
Bank vs. Taylor, 100 Mass., 18; 97 Am. Dec., 70.).
Second. Another exception to the general rule is based
upon the doctrine of estoppel. An illustration of this
second exception would be where an man voluntarily
placed property in the possession of one whose ordinary
business it is to sell similar property as an agent for the
owners, In such a case it is warrantable inference, in the
absence of anything to indicate a contrary intent, that he
intends the property to be sold. For example, where the
owner sends his goods to an auction room, where goods
of a like kind are constantly being sold, he would be
estopped from recovering them in case they were
actually sold. (Pickering vs. Busk, 15 East., 38.) In all
such cases, however, under this exception, there must
be some act or conduct on the part of the real owner,
whereby the party selling is clothed with the apparent
ownership or authority to sell, which the real owner will
not be heard to deny or question, to the prejudice of an
innocent third party, dealing on the faith of such
appearance. If the rule were otherwise, people would not
be secure in sending their watches or jewelry to a jewelry
establishment to be repaired, or clothing to a clothing
establishment to be made into garments. (Wilkinson vs.
King, 2 Campbell, 335; Pickering vs. Busk, 15 East., 38;
Levi vs. Booth, 58 Md., 305; 42 Am. Rep.,
332.)chanrobles virtual law library
During the trial proof was presented to show that the
defendant, in the year 1902, had been sentenced to be
imprisoned for a period of three years six months and
twenty-one days, for the crime of larceny, and that he
had been conditionally pardoned by the then Governor-
General, Mr. Taft, on the 27th day of July, 1903. That
proof was presented for the purpose of fixing the penalty
to be imposed upon the defendant. In view of the pardon,
may the fact that the defendant was sentenced be
considered as a circumstance, for the purpose of
increasing the penalty, in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph 17 of article 10, of the Penal Code? Article
130 of the Penal Code provides that criminal liability is
extinguished in several different ways: "( a) By the death
of the offender; ( b) by service of the sentence; ( c) by
amnesty; ( d) by pardon; ( e) by pardon of the offended
party (repealed by section 2 of Act No. 1773); ( f) by
prescription of the crime; ( g) by prescription of the
penalty."chanrobles virtual law library
In reading said article 130, we find in paragraph 3 that
the liability which is extinguished by amnesty, completely
extinguishes the penalty and all its effects, while
extinguishment by pardon, during the period which the
sentence would have lasted, except for the pardon, does
not altogether extinguish the penalty. There is a condition
imposed by law, to the effect that the pardoned person
shall not live in the place of residence of the offended
party, without the latter's consent, and that a violation of
that provision would work a revocation of the pardon.
While we have been unable to find any decisions of the
supreme court of Spain upon the question which we are
discussing, we find that Viada (vol. 1, p. 315) says: "A
pardon should not be an impediment to the consideration
of recidivation as an aggravating circumstance, for,
according to article 130, paragraph 4, of the code, a
pardon only produces the extinction of the penalty, but
not of its effects."chanrobles virtual law library
After due consideration of the provisions of article 130,
together with the views of Viada, we are inclined to the
view that the pardon does not operate to defeat the
consideration of the former conviction as an aggravating
circumstance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The lower court imposed the penalty in the medium
degree. Considering the aggravating circumstance of
recidivation, the penalty should be imposed in the
maximum degree. Therefore, the sentence of the lower
court is hereby modified, and the defendant is hereby
sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of six months
and one day of prision correccional and to pay the
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Carson and Moreland, JJ., dissent.
G.R. No. 89075 October 15, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO GEROLAGA, EFREN ATIVO and
REMEDIOS RUADO, accused-appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
In this Decision, this Court emphasizes the need
to review the facts and details of appealed cases
with meticulous, laser-like precision. While, as a
rule, the findings of fact of trial courts are accorded
great respect by appellate tribunals, still, the latter
must wade through the mass of evidence in order
to ensure that the trial court did not overlook or
misapprehend little details that could spell the
innocence of the accused, or at least mitigate their
guilt. This is but consistent with the doctrine that
all doubts must be resolved in their favor. Indeed,
it is far better to set free a thousand guilty persons
than to unjustly punish an innocent one.
Realizing that this direct appeal did not have the
benefit of the usual "filtering" layer of the Court of
Appeals and noting that the assailed judgment of
conviction for murder was based purely on
circumstantial evidence as well as on an
uncounselled confession of guilt, we pored over
the evidence, particularly the voluminous
transcripts of stenographic notes, and came to the
ineludible conclusion that indeed the court a
quo overlooked and/or misapprehended some
crucial bits of evidence and circumstances which
when properly considered led to the acquittal of
two of the appellants, and the conviction of the
third for the less damning crime of homicide
instead of murder.
The Antecedents
The twists and turns of this case are absorbing
enough to the mistaken as the plot of a storybook
thriller or a movie script. They are not. Rather,
they are the flesh and blood drama of real life.
For the bizarre fatal stabbing of Antonio Sy on
March 21, 1987, appellant Remedios Ruado-Sy,
the deceased's sister-in-law, along with her former
employee, Roberto Gerolaga and her houseboy,
Efren Ativo were charged with murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Information1 lodged with the Regional Trial Court
of Masbate, Masbate on June 15, 1987 and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 5247 reads as
follows:
 That on or about March 21, 1987, in the
morning thereof, at the poblacion of the
municipality of Aroroy, Province of
Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction
of this court, the above-named accused
conspiring and helping one another, with
intent to kill, evident premeditation,
treachery and in consideration of a price or
reward, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one Antonio Sy y Tan with a
double bladed dagger, hitting the latter on
the chest, abdomen and other parts of the
body, thereby inflicting wounds which
directly caused his instantaneous death.
Contrary to law.
All the accused pleaded "not guilty" during the
arraignment on August 4, 1987. The prosecution
presented seven (7) witnesses:
(1) Dr. Emilio Quemi — who testified and
submitted a post-mortem examination (Exh. "A")
and certificate of death (Exh. "C"), which showed
that the victim sustained seven (7) wounds, five
(5) of them fatal, to wit:2
1. Stab wound penetrating, measuring
about 3 inches wide located at the
epigastric region.
2. Stab wound, penetrating the abdominal
cavity, measuring about 1 1/2 inches,
located at the left abdominal wall, a little
above and lateral to the navel.
3. Stab wound, measuring about 2 inches
wide, penetrating located at level of left
costal arch, at its lateral side.
4. Stab wound, measuring about two
inches, penetrating the thoracic cavity,
located just below the right clavicle.
5. Stab wound, about one inch wide,
penetrating, located at little anterior to the
right axillary fossa.
6. Incised wound, measuring about 1/3 inch
wide located at the left side of the thoracic
vertebrae at the level of the 6th.
7. Incised wounds, located at the palmar
surface of the fingers of the right and left
hand.
(2) Pfc. Estercacias (sometimes spelled
"Estercasio") Pimentel, Jr., who was the first police
officer to arrive at the scene of the crime.
(3) Police Sgt. Felix Alonzo
(4) Pat. Tagumpay Mendoza
(5) Mrs. Conchita Sy Chua, younger sister of the
victim
(6) Mrs. Benedicta Castillo Sy, and
(7) P/Sgt. Edgardo Tugbo.
On the other hand, testimonial evidence for the
defense was given by six (6) persons:
(1) Pfc. Pimentel who was called back to the stand
(2) Accused Roberto Gerolaga
(3) Co-accused Efren Ativo
(4) Co-accused Remedios Ruado-Sy
(5) M/Sgt. Noli Cabug, and
(6) Emilio Sy, the victim's brother and husband of
the accused Remedios R. Sy.
On December 28, 1988, the trial court3 rendered a
Decision finding the three defendants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
and imposing on each of them the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and the payment in
solidum of an indemnity in the amount of
P30,000.00 to the heirs of Antonio Sy without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The Facts
Thirty-one-year-old Antonio Sy was the youngest
brother of Emilio, Arturo, Jose, Teddy, Anita,
Teresita, Norma, Lourdes and Conchita
Sy.4 Antonio was married to Benedicta Castillo.
Childless, the couple lived apart from each other.
Benedicta stayed in Cabangcalan, Aroroy,
Masbate where she was assigned as a teacher
while Antonio lived with his eldest brother, Emilio
and the latter's wife, Remedios Ruado, who was
also called Remy. While Benedicta claimed that
Antonio was a businessman engaged in buying
and selling men's and ladies' wear for which he
earned a net income of around P3,000 a
month,5 his brother Emilio and the latter's wife
Remy swore that Antonio was jobless and that he
was dependent on them and given an allowance
of P25.00 a day. Antonio had an insatiable hunger
for vices — gambling, illegal drugs, women.
Hence, his allowance was always insufficient for
his needs.6
At around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of March 4,
1987, as Remy was arranging her merchandise in
her store on the ground floor of her residence in
Aroroy, Masbate, a boy around fifteen years of
age approached her, handed her a letter and then
hurriedly left. As translated by the court
stenographer, the letter in Masbateño reads:7
 REMY: H
(MEL) 4
,
WE WILL ASK HELP 1 FROM YOU WORTH
P3,000 PESOS WE 9 WILL EXPECT IN
TWO DAYS. 8
7
I AM ONLY ASKING C YOU NO ONE MUST
KNOW OR INFORM O ANYBODY FOR IF IT
HAPPENS MANYMLIVES WILL BE LOST?
ESPECIALLY THE M MILITARY. THEY WILL
BE PITIFUL? AND A WE WILL GET YOU IF
YOU FAIL? THEN N YOU PLACE THE
MONEY IN ENVELOPE D IN YOUR
GARBAGE CAN E AT 9:00 AT NIGHT ON
SATURDAY. R
N
THANKS P
GOD BLESS YOU A = ALL
H
DON'T BE AFRAID E (YOU) WILL NOT BE
HURT IF YOU FOLLOW L THE ORDER?8
E
N
After reading the letter, Remy gave it to her
husband. Emilio decidedL that (a) it should be
presented secretly to theI authorities for entry in
P house should be
the police blotter, (b) their
guarded, and (c) the amountA of P3,000 should be
given to anyone who could N apprehend Helen
Lepanto.9 T
O
Accordingly, the couple called the police. When
Pfc. Estercasio Pimentel, Jr. arrived, he was
shown the letter. In the presence of Emilio, Remy
asked Pfc. Pimentel's help in having their house
guarded and placing their premises under
surveillance. She also asked him "to apprehend
and identify" Helen Lepanto and to bring the letter
to the municipal building in order that it could be
officially recorded in the blotter.
Fear gripped the couple. Emilio asked Remy to tell
their houseboy, Efren Ativo, to be vigilant
especially at night and to arm himself with a 2" x 2"
piece of wood as a club or weapon. The couple
closed their store at 6:00 p.m. instead of the usual
8:00 p.m. Upon her husband's prodding, Remy set
aside P3,000 in one-hundred-peso bills. 10
Following the instructions in the aforesaid letter,
Emilio instructed Remy to place the P3,000, which
was in an envelope, inside the garbage can at
about 6:30 p.m. on March 6, 1987. Emilio told one
of their sales-girls to inform Pfc. Pimentel that the
money had been placed in the garbage can and
that he should guard it. However, the following
day, Pfc. Pimentel returned the money to them
with the information that nobody went near the
garbage can that night. Emilio then told Remy to
verify this information with the station commander.
The latter confirmed that their surveillance yielded
negative results. When Emilio was informed of
this, he asked Remy to go back to the station
commander and to retrieve the letter in order that
it could be machine-copied in Masbate.
Thus, Remy got back the letter on March 9, 1987,
and proceeded to Masbate to have the letter
machine-copied. She returned to Aroroy at around
11:00 p.m. The following day, she met Sgt. Noly
Cabug, a member of the 270th Philippine
Constabulary Command in Aroroy,11 who assured
her that he would uncover the identity of Helen
Lepanto. However, in spite of two days' sleuthing,
the intelligence personnel could not produce any
result from their
surveillance.12
While the Sy couple was officially informed that
the police had no leads, the latter in fact harbored
some suspicions. In the evening of March 6, 1987,
Pfc. Pimentel and Pat. Cadiz kept watch in the
house across from the Sy residence while
Patrolmen Maglente and Tugbo secretly stationed
themselves at a street corner near the Sy
residence. At around 9:00 o'clock that evening,
Pfc. Pimentel saw Antonio Sy coming from the
house of Benny Tuason. Just before entering the
Sy residence, Antonio approached the garbage
can and looked at it for about five to ten seconds.
He peered at the garbage can for two more times
— at 9:30 p.m. and then at around 10:00 p.m.
when the electric light was switched off. The police
stopped their surveillance at 2:00 a.m. but Antonio
Sy did not return to the garbage can for the fourth
time.13
When Pfc. Pimentel reported this to his chief on
March 7, 1987, the latter concluded that Antonio
Sy must have been "Commander Helen Lepanto."
But Pfc. Pimentel himself did not share the same
belief otherwise he would have apprehended
Antonio Sy the moment he went near the trash
can. That same day, when Pfc. Pimentel returned
the P3,000.00 to Remy, he did not reveal to her
the conversation he had with his chief.14
At 8:00 o'clock in the morning of March 15, 1987,
another boy approached Remy in her store. The
child conveyed the message that she was to
prepare the amount to P3,000 which "they" had
not taken on the 6th of March, and to drop the
money on the 20th. The boy hastily left after
warning Remy not to inform the authorities about
this new arrangement. As before, Remy related to
her husband what had transpired. Emilio asked
her to follow the new orders, but he insisted that,
instead of placing the money in the garbage can,
she should give it to their houseboy, accused
Efren Ativo, because he "slept in the kitchen".
Emilio added that anyone who could "identify or
apprehend" Helen Lepanto should be given the
money as a reward.15
At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that
same day, accused Roberto Gerolaga entered the
store to buy a t-shirt and some "spare parts."
Having been Gerolaga's former employer, Remy
felt free to tell him that she had received a "threat."
She begged him to help "apprehend or identify"
Helen Lepanto.
Gerolaga told Remy that she was asking
something dangerous because Lepanto might be
a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit. However, she
managed to convince Gerolaga to help watch over
their house. She intimated to him that whoever
could "apprehend or identify" Helen Lepanto, be
he a PC soldier, a policeman or a civilian, would
be given a P3,000 reward. Remy further informed
Gerolaga that the money would be placed in the
garbage can on the 20th of March and hence,
whoever would pick up the envelope in the said
container could be Helen Lepanto or his/her
companions.16
Gerolaga, a 25-year-old minibus conductor who
was also known as Edgar,17 testified that at
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 20,
1987, he went for a walk at the pier, drank beer for
about an hour at a little store and then went to a
street corner near the Sy residence. Because he
saw no one approach the garbage can, Gerolaga
went back to the pier where there was a dance.
He left the dance at midnight and went back to the
bus terminal. Thence, he returned to the corner to
watch the Sy house.
It was then that he saw someone approach the
garbage can. The man had a flashlight which he
beamed at the container. Then, as the stranger
entered the gate of the Sy residence, Gerolaga
followed silently. The person went to the well,
fetched water and washed his feet. From a
distance of about three (3) meters, Gerolaga
greeted him, "Good evening, Commander Helen
Lepanto." Surprised, the man turned his head and
exclaimed, "Why do you know me?" Gerolaga
retorted that he knew him very well — that he was
Antonio Sy. Immediately, Antonio pulled out a
double-bladed knife and tried to stab Gerolaga but
the latter evaded the thrust. He caught Antonio's
hand and held him in a bear hug. Antonio kept on
shouting, "I will really kill you, I will really kill you."
Sensing that Antonio was strong, Gerolaga
shouted for help. He twisted Antonio's hands and
pushed the one holding the weapon upon
Antonio's chest several times. When Gerolaga felt
Antonio weakening, he released him, and the
latter fell on the ground face down.
Gerolaga pulled out the bladed weapon and
walked towards the gate. It was there that he met
Efren Ativo. The latter angrily demanded to know
what he was doing inside the premises. Gerolaga
told him that he had already "identified" Helen
Lepanto. Gerolaga asked Ativo for the P3,000, but
Ativo was incredulous. So Gerolaga led Ativo to
the well near which Antonio lay dead. It was only
then that Ativo went inside the house, took the
money and handed it to Gerolaga.
Gerolaga went to the bus terminal where he took
off his bloodied shirt and pants and placed them
together with the weapon in a plastic bag. At 2:00
a.m., he boarded the San Agustin minibus which
promptly departed. Arriving in Luy-a, Gerolaga
entrusted the plastic bag to a co-worker, Rafael
Francisco, who alighted there, with instructions
that the clothing in the bag should be washed by
Francisco's mother.18
After Gerolaga left, Ativo, still trembling, closed the
gate. At 5:00 o'clock that morning, he knocked "at
the stairs near the door" of Remy's room. He
informed her, her husband and his sister Norma,
that Antonio Sy was dead. Emilio instructed
everyone not to touch the body until the authorities
arrived. Ativo summoned Pfc. Pimentel but did not
tell him about Gerolaga's participation.19
The police officer found the body of Antonio
sprawled on the floor. The victim, lying about a
meter away from the well, was still holding a
flashlight in one hand. Pfc. Pimentel examined the
body to determine the number of wounds it
sustained. Ten (10) meters from the body, he
found a scabbard.
The body of the victim was in a state of rigor
mortis and inside a coffin when Dr. Emilio Quemi,
medical specialist at the provincial health office,
arrived to conduct the post-mortem
examination.20 In his report,21 Dr. Quemi indicated
that Antonio Sy sustained five (5) stab wounds in
the epigastric region, above the navel, at the
lateral side of the costal arch, below the right
clavicle and the right axillary fossa, and incised
wounds at the left side of the thoracic vertebrae
and at the "palmar surface of the fingers of the
right and left hand(s)." He established the cause of
death as "shock due to massive external
hemorrhage, caused by multiple wounds."
On March 23, 1987, the Aroroy police received
information that Gerolaga had been looking for
Antonio Sy at around 11:00 o'clock "on the night of
March 21 (sic)."22 The police searched for
Gerolaga and learned that he had hied off to
Barangay Luy-a. Upon reaching that place at 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon, the police were told that
Gerolaga had proceeded to Crossing, Mandaon,
where he was finally apprehended by Pat.
Maglente.
At the police station, the authorities learned from
Gerolaga that the double-bladed weapon used in
the assault was in the possession of Juanita
Amaro, mother of Rafael Francisco. Juanita
Amaro subsequently turned over the 8-inch long
weapon as well as the pants and shirt of Gerolaga
to Pat. Edgardo Tugbo and Pat. Mendoza.23
Gerolaga was investigated by Sgt. Felix Alonzo.
He readily admitted killing Antonio Sy, and also
implicated Mrs. Remedios Ruado-Sy, saying that
she gave him through Efren Ativo the P3,000 after
he killed Antonio Sy. However, Gerolaga
surrendered only P60024 to Sgt. Alonzo as the rest
of the money had been spent.25
Before taking Gerolaga's statement,26 Sgt. Alonzo
informed him of his constitutional rights to counsel
and against self-incrimination. However, Gerolaga
told him that he did not as yet need a lawyer. The
statement he made was signed in the presence of
his mother Encarnacion Letada Gerolaga and his
cousin Ermila Gerolaga Manlangit, who affixed
their thumbmark and signature, respectively, on
the certification appended to the statement.27
Also on March 23, 1987, at around 8:00 o'clock in
the morning, a fifteen-year-old boy approached
Remy in her store. They boy told her that their
"head" had ordered that Remy should write a letter
to her in-laws "admitting the killing" of Antonio Sy.
Remy protested, telling the boy that it was her
husband's idea that the P3,000 be given to
whoever could "apprehend and identify" Helen
Lepanto, but the boy left immediately. Distraught,
Remy told her husband about the boy's message.
Enraged, Emilio asked whether she caused the
killing of his brother. Remy denied the accusation
and reminded Emilio of their agreement to "find
ways to identify" Helen Lepanto and to give the
P3,000 to whoever could identify him.
Emilio ordered her to prepare the letter and to
follow the instructions of the NPA as it was the
only way by which their entire family could be
spared. Remy went upstairs, prepared the letter
and showed it to her husband. The boy came for
the letter at 4:00 p.m. of the same day.
At 5:30 p.m., the boy was back. He told Remy that
their head was "not convinced" by her short letter
and that she should make it longer. She should
also include the letter of Helen Lepanto and "state
what had happened in our family." The boy
warned her once again that she should not report
to the authorities and that, should be refuse to
follow their instructions, "they" would "get" her and
her family.
Again Remy relayed the instructions to her
husband. Emilio, expressing pity for her, told her
to follow the NPA instructions, reiterating that this
was the only way to save the family. She went
upstairs and prepared the letter on three sheets of
yellow pad paper written back-to-back.28 As
translated by the court interpreter, it reads:
March 24, 1987
Dear Teresing, Tuache, Ting, Long,
I write you this letter, because I want you to
know the truth of Tony's death. You know,
on March 4, Tony sent me a letter. Here
you may read, because he planned to kill
me. Good, he was able to tell that to my
"Comadre" that during the Juniors Ball of
Chong (daughter of Remy) he would stab
me. If luck was against me I should have
been the object of your vigil instead of him.
I have been asking help from "Sto. Niño" to
save me because I have still many
obligations yet to my children. I prayed to
God that if I am wrong, He should punish
me, but if he is wrong, he should be
punished instead.
You know this fellow was used to
"Barkadas", gambling, disco and he had
also a girlfriend in Joan's. He was always
worried on how to acquire a large amount
of money because of his vices, such was
the reason why I prepared myself to kill or
be killed, I told him that if my life was what
he was after, it was up to him to find out
who would reach the base first(.) I told your
"Manoy" to settle this case before we repent
it. Well in the afternoon of that day Tony
and Baby had an altercation in connection
with the construction of his house because
he did not agree to give 1 meter allowance
to his elder brother's piece of lot. But I told
them, "It's up to you." Then Baby said,
"Mama, get Tony because this is again a
big problem. Manoy, I have prayed to all the
Gods in order that Tony should reform, but
there was no good result." I told Norma, you
have given him P50,00. He would go to the
disco house, he might be stabbed there
thus all his problems will be finished. The
thorns in your heart will also be pulled. So,
God heard our prayer. He met an
adversary.
The truth is that last March 4, Tony wrote
me a letter, that a person who was working
under me before, would come here to buy
spare parts. I did not know why I was able
to tell Edgar that I had a problem because I
received a letter from the NPA Commander,
Helen Lepanto. I let him read the letter.
"Sus, Manay Remy, this letter is asking for
the amount of P3,000.00, I'm going to put
that person down." "Yes", I answered,
"because anyway I am going to be killed is
a matter of who will be the first (sic). "My
bayaw" was the one who sent this to me,"
said I. "Sus, its difficult, because he is like a
snake, a dangerous one. What do you say?
Aba, Manay Remy, what a pity on you! You
are like a cock who is induced to fight but
has no chance to win." So, he sided with
me and killed Tony. When he came from
the disco house, I handed to him the reward
of P3,000.0 in order that he would not be
angry with me. So, it appears that I am the
mastermind, but it was only a matter of who
got ahead if it was a game.
You know, Tony had many plans. He
wanted to kill Baby. He wanted to kill
Doctor, because according to him, he is the
one keeping the papers. Baby, he said, is
tight handed when it comes to money. He
got angry with me, because when I gave
him his P20.00 allowance, he wanted
P50.00 and later on P100.00. I told him,
"Tony, Baby might be angry with me,
because you are given the amount more
than you are allowed," The following
morning, I gave him P300.00 and I said,
"This is the last time that I will give you. You
ask from my other in-laws (brother and
sisters of Tony). As for me, I don't like to
give you anymore." Aba, by March 4, there
was a letter that I would be kidnapped and
somebody was told that I would be killed
before the end of March. I was determined
then to kill or be killed for your own good,
for my children's good, and mine. I have
many problems yet for my children, that is
why I choose to finish him for he had no
problems yet but make trouble to me and to
all of us. It is said that Teresing's worries
may last until her death. So, all of us have
threats. We are all in a pitiful situation.
T
h
Understand me. I'm writing youathis so that
you will know. n
k
s
 R
e
m
y
T
.
R
u
a
d
o

Even if your younger brother was like a

snake in your family, I did not do anything
because he is your blood, I am a different
person. Ruado, you know. But when it
come to service I did my best. I sent for
Teresing in order to explain to each an(d)
every one of you, but you did not like
because you are only thinking of what I
have done. You know, what Tony said, that
he would kill me before the end of March.
We competed only as to who would reach
the base first.
Here is his letter on March 4.
Remy:
Mil:
We are asking from you as a help for us the
amount of P3,000.00. You send it within
two days.
I want you not to reveal this to anybody or
else many lives will
N be lost especially the
military. It would be
P a pity to them and we
will get you if youAcan not produce this.
Then you put theCmoney inside an envelope
and placed it in aotrash container, at 9:00
o'clock on Saturdaym night.
Salamat,
Don't be afraid. You will not be hurt if you
follow my order.
This is the letter that was sent in duplicate.
I have no ill-feeling if you want me to be
imprisoned (sic). Just okey. If you accuse
me, just okey also. I'll face you in the
government in whatever action you may
take against me. I'm alone, but I think God
will not forsake me. But I tell you that I am
like this, because I have given you too
much pity. In truth, Tony has brothers and
sisters, but you did not do anything to
correct his mistake, grave or not. Like when
he held up your elder brother. You kept that
in secret for he is your blood your surname
and you will be putG in shame. Now, it's too
late to repent, because
o he was able to meet
somebody to stopd his wrong deeds.
b
I enclosed you inl my two arms. Even if you
will not be asked,esomething is loosen in
your hearts, beginning
s now. I know that you
have an ill-feelings against me, but if it were
in your place, youy would find out a remedy.
o
God will judge usuall and God knows how
much I loved Tony. a Even when Pa had a
letter and telegraml not to allow him in the
l
house, I still admitted him, because I took
pity on him. But at. the end, I was still bad.
Well, my brothers and sisters I hope you
understood me already. We just played
chess and I won. To all of you, forgive me.
Okey, if you don't want to see me, God is
responsible to all of you.

After reading the letter, Emilio asked Remy to give
it to his younger sisters. Remy prepared an
envelope and was about to deliver it to her sisters-
in-law when, at 9:00 a.m., another unnamed boy
came back, asking for the letter. He returned it to
Remy at 10:00 a.m. with the information that his
chief considered the letter to be "alright". Emilio
then ordered their daughter Haydee to deliver the
letter to his sisters.30
In the afternoon of March 24, 1987, as Remy and
others were going over the personal belongings of
Antonio Sy which, in accordance with Chinese
traditions and belief, should be burned during his
burial, they found a wallet. Inside it was a letter to
a Miss Mecenario which was written in the same
handwriting as the letter sent to Remy by "Helen
Lepanto". From Gerolaga's revelation and this
letter, Remy concluded that Helen Lepanto was
none other than Antonio Sy.31
As earlier stated,tthe trial court convicted the
defendants-appellants
e of murder. It discredited
Gerolaga's claim rof self-defense, hold that Antonio
Sy "was found dead- by the police authorities
sprawled face upward
i a meter from the well
n in his right hand."32 To the trial
holding a flashlight
court, such fact belied
- Gerolaga's claim of self-
defense becausel Antonio Sy could not have pulled
the dagger from its
a scabbard with his right hand
holding the flashlight.
w The scabbard was found ten
(10) meters away2 from the body of the victim and
9 waist or near his body, which
not tucked into his
would have been the case if the weapon indeed
belonged to the victim. Moreover, the court opined
that Antonio Sy, a Chinese businessman, could
not have kept a "locally made dagger and
scabbard."
The trial court also faulted Gerolaga for not
surrendering to the authorities immediately.
Furthermore, his plea of self-defense "does not
square with the commission of the crime induced
by reward or prize."33
In holding that the three defendants conspired in
the killing of Antonio Sy, the trial court indicted
Remy for providing the monetary reward which
Ativo delivered to Gerolaga, the actual assailant.
The trial court was convinced of Remy's culpability
by the tenor of the letter she wrote admitting
participation in the crime. As to Ativo, the court a
quo emphasized his failure to report the incident
immediately to his employers and to the police
authorities.
The defendants filed a motion for new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence.34 They
wanted to present on the witness stand one
Frankie Escarlan, Jr. who allegedly witnessed the
killing of Antonio Sy. On May 19, 1989, the trial
court denied the motion on the ground that the
claimed newly discovered evidence would be
merely corroborative of Gerolaga's self-
defense.35 Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issues
In their well-presented and convincing brief
consisting of 166 pages, appellants specified the
following alleged errors of the trial court:36
(1) The trial court erred by, in, and for,
rejecting the valid and clearly tenable claim
of self-defense, and thus, and with patent
partiality, it erroneously rendered its
judgment convicting all of the accused in
this case, despite the insufficiency of the
evidence for the purpose;
(2) The trial court erred by, in, and for,
finding and ruling that conspiracy obtains in
this case, without clear and sufficient
factual and legal basis, and thus, with
manifest bias and in grave error, it held all
of the accused criminally liable as co-
principals; on the contrary, upon the entire
and purely admissible evidence, the
applicable laws and jurisprudence on the
matter, conspiracy does not lie in the case
at bar;
(3) The trial court erred by, in, and for, not
finding and ruling that each, and all of the
accused acted without freedom, then being
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear
of an equal or greater injury, in their case,
respectively, or probable death;
(4) The trial court erred by, in, and for, not
finding and ruling that accused Efren Ativo,
more so, Remedios Ruado-Sy, acted in
obedience to lawful orders for some lawful
purpose in this case at bar;
(5) The trial court erred, consequently, in its
decision by, in, and for, having convicted all
the accused for murder through conspiracy,
or by, in, and for, not having acquitted all of
the accused herein, upon the ground of
reasonable doubt, it having failed or refused
to consider exclusively, only the purely
admissible factual and more credible
circumstantial evidence obtaining in this
case, and to observe with liberality,
consistent with the proper dispensation of
criminal or penal justice, the law,
jurisprudence, and the fundamental
 precepts, as are applicable to, or in the
case at bar.
In fine, the issues could be condensed into three :
(1) Is Gerolaga's theory of self-defense sufficient,
credible and valid?
(2) If not, was the crime committed murder or
homicide? More specifically, were evident
premeditation, treachery and/or price and reward
amply proven by the prosecution?
(3) Are appellants Remedios Ruado-Sy and Efren
Ativo, who were unquestionably absent from the
crime scene, equally as guilty as appellant
Roberto Gerolaga who while admitting the killing
of the victim proffers self-defense as a justifying
circumstances?
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Gerolaga's Theory of Self-Defense
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the
prosecution did not (could not?) present any
eyewitnesses to the crime. The circumstances
prior to and those obtaining during the actual
commission of the felony were established mostly
by the defense. This happened because of
appellants' theory that the killing was justified by
self-defense. As such, the resolution of this case
hinges to a large extent on the credibility of the
appellant's witnesses. However, while the
determination of the issue of credibility has always
depended on trial courts and appellate courts are,
as a rule, bound by such findings, we realize that
in the present case, the conviction of the accused
was based on pure circumstantial evidence and on
an uncounselled confession of guilt. On account
thereof, we were constrained to pore over the
evidence, and arrived at the conclusion that the
trial court misapprehended critical bits of evidence
and circumstances which when considered
correctly leads to a modification of the judgment of
conviction. We thus emphasize the need for all
courts to scrutinize every bit of evidence with
meticulous care and analyze each case with
deliberate precision and thoroughness to spare
the innocent and/or mitigate the penalty of the
guilty.
With the foregoing caveat, we shall first pass upon
appellant Gerolaga's theory of self-defense. When
such defense is invoked, the burden of evidence
shifts to the accused. He must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of
the prosecution's. Even if the latter were weak, it
could not be disbelieved after his open admission
of responsibility for the killing.3 7
In the present case, it was duly proven that
Gerolaga was unarmed when he entered the Sy
residence to confront the victim.38 It was also
clearly established, through Emilio Sy, that
Antonio owned the double-bladed knife, its
scabbard and the flashlight found at the crime
scene.39 Because Gerolaga surprised Antonio by
disclosing the latter's sobriquet as he was washing
his feet, and because such disclosure came from
an intruder in the Sy residence, it is indeed not
improbable that Antonio initially attacked
Gerolaga.
However, to appreciate self-defense in favor of an
accused, the following requisites must be
concurrently and clearly proven: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.40 In this case, even if the first and third
requisites were to be appreciated in favor of
appellant Gerolaga, the second requisite had not
been met. There was no reasonable necessity to
inflict upon Antonio Sy numerous wounds, five of
them fatal.41 Because Gerolaga himself was
unscathed, the wounds sustained by Antonio Sy
certainly negates the former's claim of self-
defense.42 Moreover, the justifying circumstance of
self-defense may not survive in the face of
Gerolaga's flight from the crime scene, his
concealment of the weapon and his failure to
inform the authorities of the incident.43
Second Issue: Murder or Homicide?
The sole key to appellant Gerolaga's exoneration
having been disposed off, appellants' exact
criminal responsibility must now be determined.
As defined by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
murder is the crime committed by a person who
kills another "in consideration of a price, reward, or
promise." Said qualifying circumstance of price or
reward equally affects both the offeror and the
offeree44 — the former becomes a principal by
inducement and the latter, a principal by direct
participation.
In this case, the prosecution attempted to
establish that Gerolaga killed Antonio Sy for the
reward. In his brief, the Solicitor General even
quoted the following portion of Gerolaga's
testimony to support the theory:
Q And when you said that you
are going to help, the help
that you are going to do is to
kill Helen Lepanto?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it was also your desire
to kill Commander Helen
Lepanto because you will
received (sic) the Three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos,
is it not?
 A Yes, sir.45 reward of P3,000, appellant Gerolaga demurred
as follows:
However, that portion of Gerolaga's testimony
should have been considered in the context of his Q When you entered the gate
entire testimony as well as all the pieces of following that person, you
evidence presented at the trial, in the same were thinking that the person
manner that it should have been considered under you were following was
the basic principle in criminal law that all doubts Commander Helen Lepanto?
shall be resolved in favor of the accused. Is that what you want the
Gerolaga knew the purpose for which Remy and Court to understand?
her husband offered the P3,000.00 reward. Thus,
after testifying that he expressed to Remy his A Yes, sir.
fears about looking for and identifying NPA
Commander Helen Lepanto as the latter might be Q And in following him with
a member of the dreaded Sparrow Unit, Gerolaga the intention of killing, you
said: want to tell us that you do not
have any weapon?
Q So what did Remedios
Ruado say if she said A I have no intention to kill
anything? him. What I have in mind is to
recognize him and identify
A Mrs. Ruado answered that him and to report to the
she must be helped policemen.
because this amount asked
by NPA will be given to ATTY. BRAVO (continuing)
whoever who (sic) can
apprehend that Helen Q You mean you were not
Lepanto. (Emphasis afraid to follow up (sic)
supplied)46 Commander Helen Lepanto
whom you believe to be a
Pressed by the prosecution to admit that he member of the NPA when
"desired" to kill Commander Helen Lepanto for the your intention is to kill him and
that Helen Lepanto is armed?
 A What I wanted during that
night is that to identify and
recognize him because I had
knew (sic) him I will (sic) not
do harm to him because we
were friends.4 7 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Appellant Gerolaga then proceeded to narrate that
it was only when "Commander Helen Lepanto"
spoke that, by his voice, he recognized the
stranger to be Antonio Sy, his friend. But because
Antonio Sy immediately lunged at him with a knife,
appellant Gerolaga responded accordingly.
We are thus faced with a situation where self-
defense is discredited because of the number of
wounds inflicted upon the victim. However, there
are several circumstances, proven by the defense
and unrebutted by the prosecution, indicating that
Gerolaga intended only to identify and recognize,
and not to kill, the victim. These circumstances
include appellant Gerolaga's entering the Sy
residence unarmed and the reflex action of
Antonio Sy in lunging at the appellant on account
of his unexpected detection and identification. In
such a situation, the law tilts the scales of justice
in favor of the perpetrator of the
offense.48 Consequently, because appellant
Gerolaga had been impelled by the prospect of a
monetary reward merely for identifying the source
of the Sy couple's woes, he may not, in the same
breath, be deemed as having intended to kill
Antonio Sy for a price. He killed Antonio Sy in
reaction — albeit extreme — to the violent attack
launched by the deceased. The qualifying
circumstance of price or reward in regard
appellant Gerolaga may not, therefore, be counted
against him.
In view of the absence of proof beyond reasonable
doubt showing the evident premeditation and
treachery alleged in the Information but
considering his owning up to the killing of the
victim, appellant Gerolaga may be held liable only
for the crime of homicide, not for murder as
charged.
The qualifying circumstance of price or reward
may not likewise be appreciated against
appellants Ruado-Sy and Ativo. Both testified that
the money was meant to encourage people to
"identify and apprehend" Commander Helen
Lepanto. Even Emilio Sy, who was allowed to
testify after his defendant wife had granted
permission,49 swore that his wife did not entertain
any idea of killing Commander Helen Lepanto.
She asked only for the latter's "identification and
apprehension."50 Such fact was buttressed by Pfc.
Pimentel who, after the police had formed the
surveillance team, returned to Remy to ask what
police services she needed. He testified as to the
conversation that transpired:
Q What did Mrs. Ruado
answer to that?
 A Mrs. Ruado said that she
will cooperate and she told us
that whoever among us could
apprehend Lepanto that
Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos she (sic) asked will be
given to us as a consideration
for our services.51
Money offered or paid by anyone as a "sort of an
expression of . . . appreciation of sympathy or aid
(gratification)," may not be considered as a
recompense for participation in a crime.52 In the
face of the prosecution's relentless effort to
discredit her testimony during the trial, appellant
Ruado-Sy tenaciously stuck to her repeated
statement that, in line with her husband's idea, she
intended the P3,000.00 to be a reward for
whoever could "identify and apprehend"
Commander Helen Lepanto. That no criminal
intent may be ascribed to her in setting aside the
P3,000.00 as reward is supported by the fact that
appellant Ruado-Sy immediately referred the letter
of Commander Helen Lepanto to the police
authorities and even offered them the same
amount as a recompense for the identification and
apprehension of the author of the letter.
Third Issue: Culpability of Ruado-Sy and Ativo
Neither may appellants Ruado-Sy and Ativo be
held criminally liable on the basis of appellant
Gerolaga's sworn statement implicating his co-
accused in the crime, as it was executed without
the assistance of counsel. The right to counsel has
been constitutionalized to curb duress and other
undue influence in extracting confessions from a
suspect in a crime.53 In accordance with the
provisions of Sec. 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, a
waiver of the right to counsel must be in writing
and executed in the presence of
counsel. 54 Indeed, any waiver of the right to
counsel without the assistance of counsel has no
evidentiary value.55 Hence, appellant Gerolaga's
waiver of the same right, even if executed in the
presence of his mother and cousin, is void and
has no legal effect.
The trial court's reliance on appellant Ruado-Sy's
letter of March 24, 1987 as a basis for her
conviction is misplaced. A reading of the letter be-
speaks of no more than the rambling thoughts of a
clearly apprehensive wife. That she admitted she
was ready to "kill and be killed" may not be
considered as an accurate gauge of the existence
of any criminal intent on her part. The letter was
written under understandably overpowering
anxiety and apprehension on account of her
possible liability for the death of Antonio Sy, her in-
laws' anger at her and her fear of reprisal from
them, and her failure to neutralize the NPA threat.
Also, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General,56 it was written three days after the crime
had been committed when appellant Ruado-Sy
already had more than an inkling as to the true
identity of Commander Helen Lepanto.
Furthermore, her claim that it was returned to her
in order that she could lengthen the letter is
buttressed by its format. Appellant Ruado-Sy's
signature appears in the middle of the letter and,
in accordance with the directive given her through
the boy-messenger, she incorporated the contents
of the March 4, 1987 letter of Commander Helen
Lepanto.
It is immaterial that the order to write the letter was
coursed through a boy in his mid-teens. Under the
circumstances, appellant Ruado-Sy could not be
expected to (and would have been foolhardy to)
subdue the boy or to cause his apprehension. We
take judicial notice of that fact that in rural areas,
gullible young people are conscripted in the
commission of crimes by lawless elements who,
taking advantage of the fear generated by the
"swift justice" allegedly rendered by members of
the New People's Army upon those who refuse to
do its bidding, use the name of said organization
to attain their malevolent purposes, even if they
may not really be members thereof. While it has
not been clearly established that Antonio Sy was
indeed a member of the NPA, or that he was
merely out to collect more money from his own
relatives, appellant Ruado-Sy's actions
subsequent to her receipt of the letter from
"Commander Helen Lepanto" showed that she
was in fact in the grip of fear and a sense of
helplessness throughout that time, and therefore,
we can only conclude that in all probability, she
was psychologically and mentally unbalanced, and
not in complete control of her free will, when she
wrote the letter of March 24, 1987.
Anent appellant Ativo, it is not uncommon for
houseboys like him to follow their master's orders
unquestioningly and quite literally. No criminal
intent was proven or could be attributed to him for
his act of delivering the "reward" to appellant
Gerolaga. His failure to report immediately the
death of Antonio Sy to his own employers and to
the police is explained by the fact that after he
discovered that Antonio Sy was killed and
Gerolaga demanded the amount of P3,000 from
him, he, too, was consumed by fear that Gerolaga
might kill him.57
If at all, appellants Ruado-Sy and Ativo may be
held criminally liable only under the conspiracy
theory where the act of one may be imputed to all
the conspirators.58 Conspiracy, considering the
secrecy by which it is usually hatched, may be
established by a chain of circumstances
only.59 However, like the physical acts constituting
the crime itself, it must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.60
In the present case, the prosecution attempted to
establish conspiracy by showing that the "reward"
of P3,000 was financed by appellant Ruado-Sy
and that appellant Ativo delivered the amount to
the killer. However, considering the unrebutted
testimony of appellant Ruado-Sy that, with the
approval of her husband, she set aside the P3,000
as a reward for the identification and apprehension
of Commander Lepanto and the fact that Ativo
merely obeyed the order of his employers to
deliver the amount to whoever could identify and
apprehend said NPA commander, no criminal
intent to kill Antonio Sy could be attributed to him.
Moreover, as earlier discussed, it was not
indubitably proven that appellant Gerolaga
intended to kill Commander Lepanto and/or
Antonio Sy for a price. Hence, no community of
criminal design may be attributed to them. As
"there is not other evidence to prove conspiracy
except the affidavit of confession" (which is
inadmissible in evidence), even the Solicitor
General admitted that the "lower court erred" in
finding the existence of conspiracy.
In view of the foregoing, appellant Gerolaga's
criminal liability is individual and separate. He shall
be liable only for homicide, not murder, as no
qualifying circumstances have been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Because no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances attended the killing,
he shall be meted the medium period of the
penalty of reclusion temporal.61 By the application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he shall suffer
ten (10) years of prision mayor medium as
minimum penalty to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum penalty. Pursuant to current
jurisprudence, he shall indemnify the heirs of
Antonio Sy in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50.00).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partially GRANTED.
Appellants Remedios Ruado-Sy and Efren Ativo
are hereby ACQUITTED and are hereby ordered
RELEASED immediately, unless they are being
detained for some other legal cause. Appellant
Roberto Gerolaga is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide for
which he is hereby IMPOSED the indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal and ORDERED to indemnify
the heirs of the victim, Antonio Sy, in the amount
of P50,000.00. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 113793 August 11, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN GANZAGAN, JR. Y MADAYAG, accused-
appellant.
PUNO, J.:
In order for conviction to lie, all the elements of the crime
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. In the
case of murder, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to
muster the evidence required by the Constitution to show
not only that the unlawful killing was perpetrated by the
accused, but also that any of the attendant
circumstances that qualify it to murder exists. If it cannot
be proven with moral certainty that at least one of the
qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code is present, the prosecution fails in
its task, and the accused must be freed from liability for
murder.
The case at bench commenced upon the filing on June
13, 1988 of an Information before the Regional Trial
Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,1 charging appellant
JUAN MADAYAG GANZAGAN, JR.2 of murdering
SERVILLANO VILLANUEVA MANUEL, JR., as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of April 1988, in the
evening, at Barangay Bayaoas, Municipality of
Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being then armed with
a single bladed bolo, called "Panabas", measuring
about 26 inches including its handle, with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack
one Servillano Manuel, Jr. y Villanueva, inflicting
upon him the following injuries, to wit:
Significant External Findings:
— Abrasion, both knees; abrasion,
right shoulder, lateral aspect;
abrasion, right forefinger and middle
finger; abrasion, chin, right half;
abrasion with ecchysmosis, right
temple near right eye;
— Gaping wound, neck, left half,
middle half, with exposed and
severed muscles, veins and arteries,
measuring 11 cms. x 4 cms.;
— Incised wound, forehead, right
half, above right eyebrow with
exposed bone, measuring 6 cms. x 2
cms.;
— Incised wound, forehead, middle,
measuring 5 cms. x 1 cm., with
exposed wound;
— Incised wound, forehead, left half,
with exposed bone, measuring 5
cms. x 1 cm.;
— Gaping wounds (5) nape and
back of skull, beginning from back of
head going down to nape;
Wound no. 1: measures 6 1/2 cms. x
1 cm.;
no. 2: measures 7 1/2 cms. x 1 1/2
cms.;
no. 3: measures 3 cms. x 1 1/2 cms.;
 no. 4: 12 cms. x 1 1/2 cms.;
no. 5: 6 cms. x 1 1/12 cms.
Significant Internal Findings:
— Neck, left half, lateral aspect;
severed jugular vein and carotid
artery;
— Fracture, linear, right frontal bone,
6 cms. long;
— Fracture, linear, middle half of
frontal bone, 2 cms. long;
— Fracture, linear, left half of frontal
bone, 5 cms. long;
which caused the death of Servillano Manuel, Jr.,
y Villanueva as a consequence, to the damage
and prejudice of his heirs.
Appellant was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the
charge leveled against him. Trial ensued.
The records show that appellant and Servillano Manuel,
Jr. lived in the same neighborhood in Sitio Las Vegas,
Barangay Bayaoas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.3 During his
lifetime, Servillano worked as a kristo, or cockpit bet
caller, and as a collector in carnival shows.4 Before his
arrest, appellant was working part-time as a laborer.5
The prosecution produced an eyewitness in the person of
ELINO MANUEL,6 Servillano's younger brother. Elino
narrated that sometime after five o'clock in the afternoon
(5:00 p.m.) of April 1, 1988, appellant came to their
house looking for Servillano.7 Failing to find him there,
appellant boxed the door of the Manuel residence twice
and left in a huff. "Hutdon mong tanan, patyon mong
tanan," he uttered in Visayan as he left.8 Chills ran down
Elino's spine. In his mind, he translated appellant's threat:
"I will kill you all!"9
Fearing for his brother's life, Elino rustled to the corner of
Las Vegas Road and Sison Street, where he expected
Servillano to pass on his way home from the poblacion.
Unfortunately, he was wrong, for Servillano opted to take
an alternate route back to their house.10
After waiting in vain at the corner for about an hour, Elino
headed home. On his way, he caught sight of appellant
hacking Servillano with a bolo about fifteen (15) meters
from where he was. Servillano was then stooped forward
and away from appellant, with his head down and
backside pointed upward.11 Immobilized by shock, Elino
witnessed appellant strike Servillano four times, and then
throw aside the bloodied bolo he used. Appellant
escaped on-board a tricycle, together with his brother-in-
law, Ernesto Adame.12
Servillano's body was autopsied on the morning of April
2, 1988, by rural health unit physician DR. RAMON
GONZALES, JR.,13 who found the cause of death to be
"irreversible shock due to arterial hemorrhage caused by
the hacking wound, neck."14 His findings were reduced to
a written report,15 the contents of which are quoted in and
incorporated into the Information filed against appellant.
The defense did not challenge the result of the autopsy
conducted on Servillano's body, and did not question the
medical findings as to the cause of death. Appellant, in
fact, admitted that he inflicted the fatal hacked wounds on
Servillano. However, appellant sought shelter behind the
doctrine of self-defense. He and his wife, MARILOU
GANZAGAN,16 related a completely different version of
what transpired on the day Servillano died.
The Ganzagans testified that at around five o'clock in the
afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of April 1, 1988, they were at home.
Marilou was then downstairs, preparing some bilo-bilo,
while appellant was on the upper level of the house,
watching over their two-month-old infant
daughter.17 Suddenly, Servillano Manuel, Jr., who was
visibly upset, barged into their house, looking for
appellant.18 He left hurriedly without waiting for appellant
to come down.19
Not long after, Servillano returned to the Ganzagan
residence.20 This time, he was armed with a bolo, with
which he stuck the house near the kitchen.21 Appellant
confronted Servillano who cursed22 and abruptly
assaulted the former with the bolo. He delivered an
overhead hacking blow23 to appellant, who stepped back
and parried the same with his right arm. The tip of the
bolo hit the appendage and produced a three-centimeter
nick on it.24 Marilou rushed out of their house onto the
street, screaming for help. None came to her aid, as
everyone was attending a procession along the
Urdaneta-Asingan provincial road.25 When she returned
to their house, neither appellant nor Servillano was
there.26 She did not think to look for the two, and merely
remained inside their house.27
Meanwhile, after a brief tussle with Servillano, appellant
was able to wrest the bolo away from him. With bolo in
hand, appellant ran to the middle of the street.28 He
stopped when he remembered his baby, who was left
alone
in their house.29 For the next five minutes, appellant
stood transfixed on the road.30 The impasse was broken
by Servillano who renewed his attack.31 In trying to grab
the bolo back from appellant, Servillano stumbled and fell
forward, face down and with his backside pointing up.32 It
was then that appellant hacked Servillano several
times.33
Appellant fled from the scene of the crime. He went into
hiding,34 and a week passed after the incident before his
wife saw him again.35 Much later, during the pendency of
the trial against him, appellant jumped bail.36
In rebuttal, the prosecution submitted in evidence a
certification of the death of the Ganzagan's four-month-
old son, Michael, on January 15, 1988, barely two-and-a-
half (21/2) months before Servillano's killing.
At the close of trial, the court a quo decided against
appellant. It held:
The killing was qualified by evident premeditation
and treachery because when (appellant) went to
 the house of the victim armed with a bolo looking
for the latter who was not around, he had already
the intention to kill him and said intention to kill
was never abandoned as he waited for the arrival
of the victim whom he saw along the road. There
was treachery as the accused hacked the victim
by the neck several times and the sudden and
frontal attack on the forehead, thus causing his
bones on the forehead to be exposed as shown in
the medical certificate . . . The exposure of the
bones would only show that the hacking was
therefore so strong enough as to insure his
premeditated intention to kill the victim.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
discussion, this Court believes that the
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the
(appellant) beyond reasonable doubt. Pursuant to
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the court
hereby finds the (appellant) Juan Ganzagan, Jr.,
guilty of the crime of Murder and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
considering the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
(Art. III, Section 19[1]), and with all the accessory
penalties provided by law; and to pay the civil
liability of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased
and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
with costs.
SO ORDERED. (Citations omitted)37
Appellant now sets forth the following assigned errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
UPHOLDING SELF-DEFENSE AS A
GROUND FOR ACQUITTAL OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT IS AT ALL GUILTY, THE
TRIAL COURT NEVERTHELESS ERRED
IN CONVICTING HIM FOR MURDER
INSTEAD OF ONLY HOMICIDE
CONSIDERING THAT NEITHER THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY NOR PREMEDITATION
WAS DULY ESTABLISHED.38
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant is not
guilty of murder.
Appellant reiterates his reliance on the doctrine of
self-defense to justify the killing of Servillano. He
argues that he was able to prove all the elements
of defense of self, namely: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
We are not persuaded.
There are strong reasons to doubt the defense
version of the facts that led to the killing of
Servillano. The account of the Ganzagan spouses
is inconsistent with the common experience and
observation of mankind.39 Especially difficult to
accept are the following assertions:
1. On the fateful afternoon of April 1, 1988,
appellant was preparing bilo-bilo on the
second floor of their house because he was
looking after their two-month-old infant
daughter. This is highly peculiar, since
according to the records of their parish
church (Exh. "F", Original Records, p. 227),
their four-month-old infant son, Michael
died barely two-and-a-half-months prior to
Servillano's killing;
2. While appellant and Servillano were
grappling for possession of the latter's bolo,
Marilou ran out to seek help. She said that
she only ran to a distance of fifty (50) to one
hundred (100) meters from their house, but
it took her thirty (30) minutes to return home
(TSN of November 22, 1993, pp. 5, 9, 10);
3. None heeded Marilou's call for help
because everyone else in their entire
neighborhood was attending a procession
on the main road (Ibid., at p. 5);
4. When Marilou returned home and found
neither her husband (appellant) nor
Servillano there, she did not — either out of
worry or curiosity — even try to find out
what had happened to them (Id., at pp. 5,
12);
5. After he succeeded in taking the bolo
away from Servillano, appellant ran out of
their house to the middle of the road, where
he stopped and stood doing nothing for five
minutes. On cross-examination, he claimed
that he stopped because he remembered
that their infant daughter was left alone in
their house. But, he did not attempt to
return to their home anyway;
6. It took Servillano five minutes to reach
appellant, who was standing fifteen (15)
meters from where they had previously
been wrestling, because he (Servillano)
was drunk (TSN of November 23, 1983, p.
20); and
7. When Servillano finally caught up with
appellant, he did not attack the former
immediately although he thought that
Servillano was again armed with a weapon.
Instead, he waited until Servillano stumbled
face down while trying to wrest the bolo
away from him (appellant).
Furthermore, appellant's self-contradictions and
vacillations in his testimony are patent and
numerous. These were exposed in his cross-
examination, where he was confronted and asked
to explain several of his contradictory
statements, viz.:
FISCAL VENIEGAS:
Q On April 1, 1988 at about
5:00 o'clock, Servillano
Manuel was drunk and he
came to you in your house
and extorted money from you,
is that correct?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q As he used to do in the past
every time he is drunk?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he was asking money
from you?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did he try to ask you
for liquor money? Will you
quote what he said?
A He told me, "Will you give
me money because I got short
in the other side and I need
some more money."
Q Is that (during) the first time
that he came or on the
second time when he returned
to your house?
A The first time, sir.
Q The first time, when you
were upstairs making bilo-
bilo?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he was talking to you?
A He talked with my wife, sir.
Q So, it was not you from
whom he was asking money,
but it was your wife?
A Yes, sir.
Q But you said the first time
that he came, you testified
that he was asking for your
name and later he was asking
for you from your wife.
A Yes, sir.
Q Then he left. and later on,
after about 30 minutes, he
came back?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
Q And you went down
because as you were
upstairs, you went down and
asked him why he was asking
you. Correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Servillano Manuel
without saying a word hacked
you immediately. Is that
correct, according to your
testimony?
A Yes, sir.
Q Then you wrestled and
wrested the bolo from him and
you ran to the street. Is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in your earlier
testimony, there is no point in
time when you talked to him
and (when he) asked you for
wine money. Is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx
Q When Servillano Manuel
returned to your house as you
said, did he also ask where
you were from your wife?
A Not anymore because he
immediately hacked the post
in the doorway.
Q And at that time, you got
irked and you went
downstairs?
A I went down. He was the
one who got mad. I just went
down the stairs.
Q What did he tell you when
he came back if any?
A He said, "vulva of your
mother!"
Q Because you asked him
why he was looking for you,
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he answered,
"Okinnam!" (vulva of your
mother)?
A Yes, sir.
Q In direct examination, you
said that when Servillano
returned after half an hour
after the first time that he
came to your house, you went
down your house, asking him
why he hacked the post and
you said he did not answer
and immediately hacked with
a bolo on your right hand. Do
you remember having said
that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why did you say that he
answered you "vulva of your
mother"? Are you changing
your previous testimony?
A Immediately before he
hacked me, he said "vulva of
your mother!"
Q In other words, your
previous testimony that he did
not say anything before he
hacked you is not correct?
A That is true.
Q But you did not tell the
Court that he said "vulva of
your mother!"
A He said that.
Q But you did not mention to
the Court in the first time.
A Because I am nervous.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, in your direct
testimony, you said that after
wresting the bolo from
Servillano, you ran towards
the road and you stood there
for five (5) minutes after which
Servillano Manuel came to
you and attacked you. Do you
remember having stated that?
A That is why I paused for five
(5) minutes in the road,
because I thought of my baby
in the house whom I wanted
to protect because he might
harm the baby instead.
Q But you also left your wife
in the kitchen with your baby
upstairs, correct?
A She was not there anymore
because as soon as we
fought with Servillano Manuel,
my wife became hysterical
and she ran away.
Q When you were on the
road, you thought of your
baby as you said. That is why
you stayed there for five (5)
minutes?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then it was at that time
that Servillano Manuel
appeared and tried to kill you
as the intention as you said
was to kill you.
A Yes, sir.
Q But he was already
unarmed because you had
already wrested the bolo from
him?
A Yes sir, because during that
time, I thought that he still had
some arms with him because
it was quite dark already.
COURT:
Q When you were standing
there at the road, Servillano
approached you?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q When he approached you,
why did you say that
Servillano has intention to kill
you?
A When Servillano Manuel
came and approached me, he
was so mad. I thought he was
armed and it was quite dark
then, so I decided to hack
him.
Q When you decided to hack
him, what did you use? The
bolo you wrested from him?
A Yes, Ma'am.
 Q Did he grapple for the
possession of the bolo from
you in the road?
A He tried to wrest the bolo
from me while we were in the
road.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you demonstrate how
he grappled the bolo again?
A While I was holding the bolo
downward and I was standing
by the road, Servillano
Manuel came and lunged
forward to get the bolo from
my hand, and in that instance,
he stumbled to the ground.
Q Will you demonstrate how
Servillano stumbled?
A As he lunged forward to get
the bolo from my hand, I
moved my hand which held
the bolo away from him. So,
he fell to the ground, face
down.
Q With the buttocks up?
A (The witness demonstrated
how Servillano Manuel fell to
the ground, face down with
his buttocks up.)
FISCAL VENIEGAS:
Q And Servillano Manuel was
in that position when you
hacked him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell the Court in
the first blow when you
hacked him, where did you
hack him? What part of his
body?
A His face and his arm.
Q You mean that in that
position with face on the
ground, you hacked his face
and his hand?
A When Servillano came
towards me he tried to wrestle
the bolo away from me. That
is why I lunged the bolo to his
face. That is why his face and
arm were hit.
 Q At the same time, the face
was hit?
A I cannot recall.
Q So, it is not true that when
he came at you after you were
standing there for five (5)
minutes and you concluded
his intention to kill you when
he wrested the bolo, that he
fell to the ground as you said?
A The first time he tried to
wrestle the bolo from me, I
immediately hacked him on
the back and the second time,
he tried to wrestle (was when
he fell down).
Q But in the demonstration,
you demonstrated only one
attempt on his part to wrestle
the bolo from you. Is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx40
In any event, even granting the defense's factual
assertions, we are still unimpressed by appellant's
theory of self-defense.
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that
the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies
squarely on the shoulders of the prosecution.
Conviction must rest, not on the weakness of the
defense, but on the strength of the
prosecution.41 In cases, however, where the
accused admits committing the crime but invokes
self-defense to escape liability, the rule is reversed
and the burden of proof shifted to the accused to
prove the elements of his defense. As held in the
case of People v. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653 (1993):
By invoking self-defense, the appellant
admitted killing the four (4) victims. The
burden is, therefore, upon him to prove the
existence, by clear and convincing
evidence, of its essential requisites . . .;
otherwise stated, the onus probandi was
thus shifted to him . . . . He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution . . . for
even if the latter were weak, it could not be
disbelieved after he himself admitted the
killing . . . (Citations omitted)
Thus, in claiming self-defense, appellant needs to
convincingly establish that: (1) Servillano acted
with unlawful aggression towards him; (2) the
means he employed to repel such aggression was
reasonable; and (3) he did not sufficiently provoke
Servillano towards aggression. If appellant fails to
discharge this burden of proof, his conviction shall
of necessity follow, on the basis of his admission
to the killing.
Unlawful aggression, which is an indispensable
element of self-defense,42 is an assault or attack,
or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate
manner, which places the accused's life in actual
peril.43 It is an offensive act positively strong and
determinative of the aggressor's intent to cause
harm or injury.44 It presupposes a material attack
which is impending or at the point of happening,
and not merely an intimidating attitude or stance.
In the case at bench, appellant testified that after
the initial bolo attack on him, he was able to take
possession of the weapon and run away from
Servillano. At that point, the unlawful aggression
against him effectively ceased. When hostilities
resumed five minutes later, appellant was the
armed protagonist, and Servillano's act of trying to
wrest the bolo back from him cannot be
considered as unlawful aggression. Appellant no
longer faced any imminent or immediate danger to
his life and limb from his opponent.
There was no unlawful aggression by Servillano.
Appellant had nothing to repel. Therefore, he
cannot successfully posit the view that he was
merely defending himself when he killed
Servillano.
Parenthetically, appellant's claim of self-defense is
further belied by the physical evidence in the case,
specifically the number, location and severity of
the hacked wounds found on Servillano. Dr.
Gonzales found five (5) gaping wounds on
Servillano's neck, running from the back of the
head to the nape which exposed and severed the
muscles, veins and arteries in the neck area.
These indicate clearly that appellant's act was no
longer one of self-preservation, "but a determined
effort to kill his victim."45
Appellant next postulates that even if self-defense
were unavailable to him, he should only have been
found guilty of committing homicide, and not
murder. He claims that neither treachery nor
evident premeditation, which are alleged in the
Information, are present in the case at bench.
We are convinced.
The circumstances that qualify murder must be
proven as indubitably as the killing itself. The
presence of treachery46 and evident
premeditation47 must not be deduced from mere
presumption or sheer speculation. Unfortunately in
the case at bench, that is exactly what the trial
court did in concluding that both qualifying
circumstances are present.
Article 14 (16) of the Revised Penal Code defines
treachery thus:
There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the
 person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specifically to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party
might make. (Emphasis ours.)
Its essence lies in the adoption of ways that
minimize or neutralize any resistance which may
be put up by the offended party.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to
present any witness to testify as to the manner by
which Servillano was attacked by appellant. Their
sole eyewitness, Elino Manuel, only saw the actual
hacking of the victim by appellant, and not the
events that led to it. The records provide no basis
for the trial court's finding of treachery. As we held
in the case of People v. Bachar, 170 SCRA 700
(1989)48:
. . . Not a single eyewitness to the stabbing
incident had been presented by the
prosecution. Thus, the record is totally
bereft of any evidence as to the means or
method resorted to by appellant in attacking
the victim. It is needless to add that
treachery cannot be deduced from mere
presumption, much less from sheer
speculation. The same degree of proof to
dispel reasonable doubt is required before
any conclusion may be reached respecting
the attendance of aleviosa.
Evident premeditation suggests the deliberate
hatching of a plan to execute a crime. Its elements
are: (1) a previous decision by the accused to
commit the crime; (2) an overt act/acts manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the
decision to commit the crime and its actual
execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect
upon the consequences of his acts.
Time and again, we have held that evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify a
killing to murder in the absence of direct evidence
of the planning and preparation to kill when the
plan was conceived.49 In the case at bench, the
prosecution failed to prove with any certainty that
appellant had planned and prepared to kill
Servillano previous to the fatal hacking. The
records are bereft of any indication of such a plot.
Furthermore, the findings of the court a quo that
appellant was already armed with a bolo when he
went to the Manuel residence looking for
Servillano and that he waited in ambush for the
latter, are totally unfounded. These were never
mentioned in the testimony of prosecution
eyewitness Elino Manuel.
Absent the qualifying circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation, the crime committed by
appellant is not murder, but homicide, as defined
and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the conviction of appellant
JUAN MADAYAG GANZAGAN, JR. by the
Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
Branch 48 in Criminal Case No. U-4850 is
AFFIRMED, but he is found GUILTY of the lesser
crime of HOMICIDE. The appealed Decision,
dated December 6, 1993, is MODIFIED so that
appellant shall instead suffer the penalty of from
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Mendoza and Francisco,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 84714 October 5, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JANUARIO DELA CRUZ y HURADO, accused-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo C. Tarongoy for accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The accused contests the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, 1 finding him guilty of murder and sentencing him
to suffer reclusion perpetua plus actual damages.
The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following:
On August 3, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in
the evening, Reynaldo Pascasio, a tricycle
driver, was on his motorized tricycle parked
infront of the "Big Foot" Bar located at East
Dirita, San Antonio, Zambales, near the
crossroad of the National Highway and the
road leading to the U.S. Naval
Communication Station at San Miguel, San
Antonio, Zambales. While there, accused
Januario dela Cruz, who crossed the road,
approached him and told him "Maykadtoy ta
adda ibelleng" which in English is "Come
here, we shall throw something".
Responding, he went with the accused
Januario dela Cruz infront of the gate of the
Guerrero Compound where the latter's
companions were. From where Reynaldo
Pascasio was parked infront of the "Big
Foot" Bar, the accused companions were
about eight (8) meters away across the
street. Then, three (3) male persons, as
well as accused Januario dela Cruz
boarded the tricycle. The three (3)
companion's of Januario dela Cruz rode
inside the sidecar of the tricycle, while
accused Januario dela Cruz rode in tandem
with Reynaldo Pascasio on the motorcycle
of the tricycle. Of his four (4) passengers
only accused Januario dela Cruz was
known to Reynaldo Pascasio, having
known him for the past three (3) years.
After boarding the tricycle the persons
inside the sidecar told Reynaldo Pascasio
to bring them to the terminal at Olongapo
City. However he was later told to proceed
to San Narciso Zambales (p. 21, t.s.n.,
November 17, 1987). While on the way to
San Narciso, Zambales, near the
Elementary School of Barangay Beddeng,
San Narciso Zambales, Reynaldo Pascasio
heard the shout in the vernacular "Array"
and blood spurted from the sidecar and
landed on his forearm, as well as on the
steering bar of his motorcycle (p.30, Ibid).
Upon hearing this, Reynaldo Pascasio
stopped his tricycle and one of the
passengers in the sidecar, who was
bloodied, was brought out from the tricycle
by the other two (2) passengers in the
sidecar. Once on the ground, the two(2)
passengers mauled the bloodied
passenger. Later, they threw him by the
roadside. While this was going on, accused
Januario dela Cruz was standing behind
Reynaldo Pascasio. Afterwards, the
accused Januario dela Cruz and the two (2)
unidentified persons boarded the tricycle
and Januario dela Cruz directed Reynaldo
Pascasio to bring them to his (Januario dela
Cruz') place (p. 26, Ibid), leaving behind the
bloodied person, whom the two (2)
unidentified companions of Januario dela
Cruz threw away by the roadside, infront of
the Beddeng Elementary School.
In going to the house of accused Januario
dela Cruz, accused Januario dela Cruz
directed Reynaldo Pascasio to pass
through the alley behind the Mini Mart,
instead of passing through the checkpoint
at the road leading to the U.S. Naval
Communication Station, and exited into the
road going to the Base (p. 28, t.s.n.,
November 17, 1987). Upon arrival at the
house of accused Januario dela Cruz, the
two (2) unidentified passengers alighted
from the tricycle and accused Januario dela
Cruz washed away the blood from the
steering bar and inside the sidecar with
water in a pail, using a rag, which be got
from his neighbor (p. 30, Ibid). And while
accused Januario dela Cruz was washing
the tricycle, the two (2) persons went
behind the house of accused Januario dela
Cruz where the wound of one of them was
treated by them (p. 33, t.s.n., supra).
Later, after washing the tricycle, accused
Januario dela Cruz gave Reynaldo
Pascasio the amount of P7.00 and the latter
went home. Because he was afraid, he did
not report the incident to the police.
However, five (5) days later, he was
arrested by the police and was investigated.
He gave his statement to the police
narrating the incident that occurred in the
evening of August 3, 1987 (Exhibit "C").
And it was after his arrest that he learned
from the father of the slain man that the
latter's name was Jerry Pamoleras.
The following morning at 6:00 o'clock on
August 4, 1987, Barangay Captain Ricardo
Abinsay of Barangay Beddeng, San
Narciso, Zambales reported to the Station
Commander of the police station of San
Narciso, Zambales his discovery of the
dead body. In turn, the Station Commander,
P/Lt. Manuel Tejada, dispatched Pat.
Arsenio Agawin and Pat. Salvador Wagma
to the place where the body was found.
Taking the mini-bus, the two (2) peace
officers arrived at the scene infront of the
Beddeng-Mabangcal Elementary School at
Barangay Beddeng, San Narciso,
Zambales at about 6:30 a.m. where they
came upon P/Lt. Amado Fariñas viewing
the dead body of a person, who was
wearing a red undershirt (sando and a
white pant bloodied, and lying flat on his
stomach on the ground. Lt. Fariñas then
gave the wallet, which he took from the
pocket of the dead person's pants, to Pat.
Agawin, which contained an I.D. with a
name "Jerry Reyes" (p. 7, t.s.n., January
12, 1988). Thereafter, the body was
transported to the police station of San
Narciso, Zambales. On the same date in
the morning, Dr. Jaime Braga, the Rural
Health Physician of the San Narciso Rural
Health Unit performed a post-mortem
examination of the cadaver found infront of
Beddeng-Mabangcal Elementary School
and found the following:
lacerated wound proximal 3rd
arm posterior aspect (L)
— Incised wound palmar
surface (L)
— Stab wound 2 cm length
neck lateral (R)
— Stab wound 2 cm length
medical scapular (R)
— Stab wound 2 cm length
vertebral area posterior
— Lacerated wound 3 cm
knee (L)
which injuries caused the cardiorespiratory
arrest, and consequently, caused the death
of said person, identified through his wallet
as "Jerry Reyes" (Exhibit "B"). Dr. Braga
issued a death certificate (Exhibit "A").
In the meantime, Rodolfo Pamoleras, who
last saw his son at his house in Olongapo
City on August 3, 1987 was informed by his
wife that his father who lives at Iba,
Zambales, has told her that their son had
been missing for three (3) days already.
But, somehow, on August 6, 1987, by a
stroke of Fate, Rodolfo Pamoleras' brother-
in-law, a tricycle driver, was told by a
woman traveller from San Narciso,
Zambales that a dead body was found in
San Narciso (p. 20, Ibid). Reacting to this
information, he and his wife went to San
Narciso at about 7:00 p.m. on August 6,
1987 (p. 20, Ibid) and talked to the Chief of
Police (Station Commander) of the San
Narciso INP. Because the cadaver of their
son was already buried, they and the police
chief were able to identify the deceased as
their son, through the latter's picture they
brought (Exhibit "E-1") and the wallet, which
contained an ID card showing the name
"Jerry Reyes". The deceased was using the
family name of his mother, "Reyes",
because Pamoleras is long and cannot be
contained in the identification card.
Upon learning that their son was already
buried, Rodolfo Pamoleras, Sr. talked to his
wife and they agreed that the body of their
son should be exhumed to determine if it
was really their son's body that was buried
by the police. So, on August 7, 1987,
witnessed by the policemen of San Narciso,
Zambales, the security men of the Martin
Funeral Parlor, Rodolfo Pamoleras, Sr.
exhumed the body of his son, Rodolfo
Pamoleras Jr. alias "Jerry R. Reyes". When
the coffin was opened, he identified the
body as that of his son through the growth
at the tip of the ear, the rotten front teeth,
the Red T-shirt his son was wearing when
he saw him for the last time and the shoes
his son was wearing, which belonged to
him. He also identified the body in the coffin
because of the similarity of his and that of
his son's facial features. Then, a
photograph of the dead body of his son
inside the coffin was taken (Exhibit "E").
Because the sister of Rodolfo Pamoleras'
wife was buried at Subic, Zambales, and
his wife wanted their son buried there, the
remains of his son was re-buried at Subic,
Zambales. For the burial services, he spent
P3,000.00 (Exhibit "C") and P3,000.00 for
expenses in the exhumation and for the
nine (9) days prayer which are not
supported by receipts. 2
The version of the accused, on the other hand, is as
follows:
On the other hand, as claimed by accused
Januario dela Cruz, he knows prosecution
witness Reynaldo Pascasio and are friends
(p. 8, t.s.n., April 5, 1988) and Reynaldo
Pascasio drives a tricycle whose route is
from the town proper of San Antonio,
Zambales to the gate of the U.S. Naval
Communications Facility at San Miguel,
San Antonio, Zambales; that at about 10:00
o'clock in the evening on August 3, 1987,
he was standing infront of his cousin's store
located at the intersection of the National
Highway and the road leading to the U.S.
Naval Communication Facility, known
locally as "crossing". He was there because
he paid his indebtedness.
While standing infront of his cousin's store
at West Dirita a man, who came from the
direction of the Holiday Inn (p. 14, Ibid)
approached him and offered him a bottle of
beer, he was holding, but, he refused. He
then asked for his name and the man gave
his name as Doming Lachingco. Thereafter,
Doming Lachingco asked him if he knew
somebody who could bring someone to San
Narciso. And he replied he knew a driver
named Reynaldo Pascasio, whose tricycle
was parked across the street infront of the
"Big Foot" Bar and he called Reynaldo
Pascasio, telling him he had a passenger
(pp. 10-11, t.s.n., April 5, 1988). After
calling Reynaldo Pascasio, the latter and
Doming Lachingco talked to each other.
Afterwards, Reynaldo Pascasio asked him
to accompany him in bringing his
passengers to San Narciso and he
acceded. When Doming Lachingco talked
to him, he was alone and did not know he
had companions. But, when Doming
Lachingco boarded the tricycle, two (2)
others also boarded the tricycle (p.
24, Ibid). Of the three (3) passengers, two
were tall. Doming Lachingco was the tallest,
while the third passenger was the smallest.
The latter wore short pants and a red T-
shirt.
On the way to San Narciso, Zambales, a
commotion among passengers ensued
inside the sidecar of the tricycle. Reynaldo
Pascasio, the driver, then stopped his
tricycle and the three (3) passengers,
including Doming Lachingco inside the
sidecar alighted. Then, the three (3)
passengers had a free-for-all fight on the
ground. He noticed that Doming Lachingco
was already bloodied but the deceased was
not yet bloodied. Then, all of a sudden, he
saw Doming Lachingco holding a glittering
object, swinging it towards the shortest man
in the group and the latter fell on the right
side of the road just infront of the Beddeng-
Mabangcal Elementary School about four
(4) meters from the tricycle. He then told
the tricycle driver, Reynaldo Pascasio, to
leave the passengers. And, the tricycle
driver maneuvered his tricycle in order to
leave his passengers in the sidecar, but
Doming Lachingco and his companion held
the baggage rack (parilla) of the tricycle and
boarded the tricycle.
After coming from San Narciso, Reynaldo
Pascasio drove the tricycle to his (Januario
dela Cruz) house at West Dirita, which is
about one (1) kilometer from the National
Highway, because Reynaldo Pascasio told
him, after coming from San Narciso, that he
would bring him home. And, instead of
passing through the access road leading to
the U.S. Naval Communication Facility and
the checkpoint, they passed behind the
Mini-Mart and exited into the road going to
the Base. Upon arrival infront of the house
of accused Januario dela Cruz, Doming
Lachingco asked Januario dela Cruz if he
could wash his hands at his gate. And after
Doming Lachingco and his companion had
finished washing the tricycle of Reynaldo
Pascasio, they left (p. 21, t.s.n., April 5,
1988). Then, he went inside his house; that
he did not voluntarily wash the blood from
the sidecar of the tricycle of Reynaldo
Pascasio and he was threatened with death
by Doming Lachingco if he would report the
incident. That was why he did not report the
incident (p. 12, t.s.n., April 5, 1988).
To corroborate the claim of Januario dela
Cruz that he did not wash the tricycle of
Reynaldo Pascasio, Mercy de Guzman, a
neighbor of accused Januario dela Cruz at
Purok 5, West Dirita San Antonio,
Zambales, declared that between 10:00
and 11:00 o'clock in the evening on August
3, 1987, she was then at the balcony of her
house having some fresh air when accused
Januario dela Cruz alighted from a tricycle.
After alighting therefrom, she saw him go
inside his house. 3
In returning its verdict, the lower court relied on the
testimony of Reynaldo Pascasio, who drove the tricycle
in which the stabbing occurred, who narrated in detail the
tragic trip from East Dirita San Antonio, Zambales to San
Narciso, Zambales, and who implicated dela Cruz as one
of the men who went on that journey.
Dela Cruz assigns a lone error committed supposedly by
the trial court, that is, that it was mistaken in holding him
liable as a co-conspirator in the killing of Rodolfo
Pamoleras, Jr.
As the trial court noted, there is no dispute as to
the corpus delicti. Neither is it questioned that Januario
dela Cruz did not personally inflict any injury on the
deceased, other than the fact that at the time the latter
died, he was in the scene of the crime. What is apparent
is that it was either Doming Lachingco 4 (who has since
remained at large and hence, beyond judicial
jurisdiction), or the "Doe" accused, who actually knifed
the victim. The issue then is whether or not dela Cruz
may be held responsible on the theory of conspiracy.
The issue hangs on credibility of witnesses, and in this
connection, this Court has time and time again held that
"credibility" is the sole province of the trial court. 5
Apart from that, the records themselves amply show that
Januario dela Cruz was indeed, a co-conspirator in the
murder of Rodolfo Pamolares.
Reynaldo Pascasio's testimony was candid and
straightforward, and more importantly, dela Cruz has
shown no improper motive on Pascasio's part that may
have led him (Pascasio) to lie on the stand.
Dela Cruz's version that he had all along been but a
chance passenger in Pascasio's tricycle and that he had
merely accompanied Lachingco, et al., and that on their
way, a free-for-all had broken out leading to the fatal
stabbing, is hardly believable. First, according to him,
Lachingco was a total stranger who had merely asked
him a favor (to look for a ride to San Narciso). If this were
so, there was no need to go with him on that ride. As
common experience suggests, one does not simply hang
around with perfect strangers. Second, he did nothing
after Lachingco had disposed of the victim's remains (laid
by the roadside), and subsequently, after they had all
gone home. His own evidence does not indicate that he
had indeed, thereafter sought to alert the authorities
about the murder he had witnessed, or at the very least,
have Pascasio come forward to acquit him. His behavior
certainly does not speak his innocence.
On the testimony alone of Reynaldo Pascasio, this Court
is convinced that Januario dela Cruz was a co-
conspirator in the murder of Rodolfo Pamoleras, Jr., and
must be held as a co-principal along with the actual
killers. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. 6 While proof of the
agreement need not rest on direct evidence, the
agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the
parties, disclosing a common understanding among them
with respect to the commission of the
offense. 7 Pascasio's recital that dela Cruz was one of
Lachingco's gang, one of whom thrust a fatal stab wound
on the deceased and threw his cadaver by the roadside,
after which dela Cruz instructed him, Pascasio, to take
another route, and that he, dela Cruz, later washed the
dead's blood off the vehicle, are an eloquent testimony of
a conspiracy in the murder of Rodolfo Pamolares, Jr. It is
also proof of treachery, in which the malefactors, without
warning and with no risk to themselves, did away with
Pamolares. On this score, however, this Court can not
appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying
circumstance, because in evident premeditation, the time
intervening between the plan to slay the victim and the
actual slaying must be shown. 8 As to "use of motor
vehicle," the evidence indeed shows that dela Cruz, et al.
had deliberately availed themselves of a tricycle in order
to consummate their dastardly act and to use it as cover
to facilitate it. 9
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Paras, J., is on leave.
G. R. L-37400 April 15,1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee.
vs.
SABANGAN CABATO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reubin L. Maraon for accused-appellant.
CORTES, J.:
Accused-appellant Sabangan Cabato appeals from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Zamboanga del Norte finding him guilty of
the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE in Criminal
Case No. 307.
The facts of the case are as follows:
In an INFORMATION dated February 12,1971, the
Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Norte accused
Sabangan Cabato of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
committed as follows:
That in the evening on or about the 25th
day of January, 1971, ... the said accused
SABANGAN CABATO, conspiring,
confederating and working together with
two (2) other DOES who are stin at large,
all armed with firearms and stones and with
intent of illicit gain by means of force,
violence and intimidation against persons,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the dwelling house of one
VICTOR GUINIT and once inside attack,
hold tight and squeeze the mouth of Id
Victor Guinit, and hug his wife Herminia
Ames Guinit, and then rob them of cash
money (coins) in the amount of P300.00; ...
that in pursuance to (sic) their evil motives,
during and on the occasion of said robbery,
the above-named accused taking
advantage of their superior strength and of
the darkness of the night to better
accomplish their purpose and with intent to
kill by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, did there and then willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, strike with
stones for several times said HERMINIA
AM-ES GUINIT thereby inflicting upon her
several abrasions and contusions... which
caused her death on the spot;. .
xxx xxx xxx
CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident
 premeditation, dwelling, superior strength,
and without respect due to ages of the
victims (spouses) and due to the sex of
Herminia Ames Guinit [Rollo, pp. 9-101.
Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel,
pleaded NOT GUILTY.
During the hearings in the Trial Court, the prosecution,
relying heavily on the eyewitness account of Victor
Guinit, established that:
xxx xxx xxx
Offended party Victor Guinit, 69 years old,
widower, testified that he knows accused
Sabangan Cabato personally; that witness
pointed to accused in open court, that on
January 25, 1971, his wife was his only
companion in their house; that at around
7:30 p.m., three persons came to their
house while they were taking supper; that
his wife brought food to their dog; that they
have two lamps in the house, one lamp
near the bed, and another lamp brought by
his wife; that the two persons [who] hugged
him covered his mouth; that the robber hit
his mouth with a stone causing s tooth to
fell out (sic); that one of the robbers
grappled with his wife, and the mask
covering the face fell out (sic) and his wife
recognized accused Sabangan Cabato; that
his wife shouted. 'Sabangan, do not kill us,
we will give you the money,- that the
accused was at a distance of three meters
from him; that accused Sabangan Cabato
said: "Get your money; that she (deceased)
said: "Victor, we will give the money in the
piggy bank"; that his wife went down; that
later the deceased said: "Victor I do not
know where you put the money; that the
robbers untied him and he went downstairs;
that he got the money and gave the same
to one of the bandits; that one of the
bandits said, let us go upstairs, and got
(sic) the paper bills, we want P3,000.00;
that the money given to the bandits were
their saving (sic) for five years consisting of
coins which were proceeds from the sale of
the bananas; that the deceased and
accused Cabato went to the kitchen; that
they told the bandits that we do not have
paper bills an of the bandits struck d that
they do not have P3,000.00; that one of the
bandits struck him with a pistol while the
other boxed him that one of the bandits
struck the back of his head with a stone and
his teeth fell out that the accused and his
companions left the house; that he noticed
that wife was already dead; that he gave
the stones to the police (Exh. C, C-1, C-2);
that after the bandits left, he untied himself,
that he called for held but nobody came;
that he went to his two married sons who
were living uphill; that the land owned by
them is two hectares; that the two bandits
 wore masks. [CFI Decision, pp. 5-6,]
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, the accused vehemently denied his
alleged participation in the gruesome crime and testified
to the effect that:
xxx xxx xxx
...he [Cabato] knew offended party Victor
Guinit and his wife since he was young; that
the home of the Guinit is one kilometer
away from his house; that he visited them
before as a neighbor; that the Guinit has
(sic) children named Felix and Isco who are
living at tambalang ; that he never
committed the crime of robbery with
homicide attributed to him; that on January
25, 1971, he was gathering corn in their
farm in the interior at Balatan, Salug
together with his father-in-law; that he left
Tambalang bound for Balatan at 6:00 A.M.,
the same day; that he gathered corn and
returned to Tambalang at 5:00 P.M. and
then pastured his carabao and stayed in his
house the whole night; that on January 25,
1971, in the evening, he did not know of
any robbery; that on January 26, 1971, he
was informed by their neighbors of the
robbery; that he was Hold that the victims
were the Guinits; that as a moslem he did
not go to the Guinit to give alms as they are
prohibited; that be met the son of Guinit
named Felix Guinit in the house of Isco;
that he went Isco Guinit to find out if the
report of the robbery of the parents of Isco
is true; that Isco Guinit told him that the
robbers were not Identified; that the amount
taken was P80.00; that on January 29th, he
was arested at the market of
Tambalang;...[CFI Decision, pp. 12-13].
xxx xxx xxx
Faced with the issue of whether or not the accused was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime-barged, the
Trial Court had to first settle the question concerning the
positive Identification of Sabangan Cabato as one of the
robbers who killed the deceased Herminia Ames Guinit.
Weighing and evaluating the evidence on record, the
Trial Court rendered the following decision:
xxx xxx xxx
There exists no doubt that accused Sabangan Cabato
was clearly Identified as one of the participants in the
gruesome crime that took place in the residence of Victor
Guinit on January 25, 1971. By his own admission,
accused Sabangan Cabato is well-known to the Guinit
family for their houses are only one kilometer apart.
Accused Cabato visited the house of the deceased at
least two times. Besides, during the incident in question,
there were two kerosene lamps in the house of Victor
Guinit which illuminated their home such that the
solicitors were clearly seen. Another factor that clinched
the Identification of the accused, Sabangan Cabato, is
the fact that when the deceased, Herminia Guinit
grappled with the accused Cabato, the mask woman by
the accused Cabato fell so much so that the deceased
exclaimed, "Sabangan do not kill us, we will give you the
money.
According to the evidence, accused Sabangan Cabato
brought the deceased to the kitchen in order to compel
her to divulge the whereabouts of the P3,000.00 paper
bills. But the deceased denied they had any other money
except the coins inside the bamboo tube in the
approximate sum of P300.00, which led the accused,
Cabato, to strike the deceased with the stone in the head
which caused cerebral hemorrhage (Exh. A) leading to
her death.
From the findings of the Sanitary Inspector who
examined the injury suffered by deceased Herminia
Guinit, the cerebral hemorrhage was caused by hitting
the head with a hard object presumably a stone (Exh. C,
C-1, C-2) which were (sic) found in the kitchen near the
dead body.
The contention of the defense that Victor Guinit was
unable to Identify any of the perpetrators for the police
blotter (Exh. 1) is devoid of merit.
According to Patrolman Mananguil and Llenes, they were
informed by Victor Guinit on January 28,1971, that
accused Cabato was one of the robbers who perpetrated
the crime. The investigation was conducted in the Office
of the Chief of Police and on the 29th day of January,
1971, accused Cabato was brought for Identification in
the Municipal Building of Salug. Although accused
Cabato was together with-any persons, Victor Guinit
pinpointed him as one of the robbers.
The accused defense is alibi, claiming that he was in
Barrio Balakan, in the house of his in-laws gathering
corn. But his testimony must be rejected for lack of
sufficient corroboration. Outside of his lone testimony, no
other witness was presented to substantiate his alibi.
[CFI Decision, pp. 15-17.] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Maintaining his innocence, accused appeals the decision
assetting that his guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. His Identification by the prosecution
witness Victor Guinit allegedly lacked definiteness and
concreteness not to mention that it was tainted with
serious inconsistencies [Brief for the Accused, p. 1].
These alleged. inconsistencies painstakingly narated by
accused.-appellant cannot overturn the finding of guilt by
the Trial Court.
Accused-appellant alleged that Victor Guinit, in his cross-
examination, declared that he recognized the accused
when the place of cloth which covered the latter's mouth
fell down as a result of the grappling by the deceased
[TSN, June 8, 1972, p. 2]1. But in his examination in
chief, he testified that he recognized the, accused as
early as when the robbers were still at the recognized the
accused as early as when the robbers were still at the
door [TSN, Jure 8, 1972, p, 14]. This is allegedly
incredible because when the robbers were at the door,
they still had their marks on Brief for Accused, p, 4].
A close perusal of the direct examination of Victor Guinit
would show that the Identification of Cabato was indeed
made when the latter's mask fell down.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, what did you do when
you noticed that after your
wife opened the door,
Sabangan Cabato bumped
your wife with two (2) other
persons?
A The two (2) other persons
passed towards me and
hugged me; one of them
covered my mouth with his
palm and I was hit by a
piece[of stone] on my nape
and one of my teeth fell down.
Q Now what about this
Sabangan Cabato, what did
he do?
A He grappled with my wife.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And what happened while
[he was.] grappling with your -
wife?
A During the course of the
grappling, my wife happened
to scratch Sabangan Cabato's
face and the piece of cloth
used as mask fell
Q Now, how far were you
from your wife and Sabangan
Cabato, while the two (2)
were grappling each other?
A About three (3) meters.
Q Now, from that distance,
were you able to recognize
and Identify the person
grappling with your wife?
A Yes.
Q How were you able to
recognize him?
A Because his mask fell
down. [TSN, June 8, 1971,
pp. 14-15.]
Accused-appellant further pointed out that Guinit, in his
cross-examination, testified that he was unconscious for
20 minutes after he was struck with a stone by one of the
robbers [TSN, June 8, 1972, P. 24). Accused alleged that
if Guinit was unconscious, it was physically impossible for
him to see what happened in the kitchen between the
deceased and the accused nor to see the falling down of
the mask.
However, the Identification of the accused was made by
Victor Guinit even before the former proceeded to the
kitchen with the deceased. The sequence of events as
culled from the records would reveal that when the
deceased was opening the door to feed the dog, three
masked men bumped her on their way into the house.
Once inside, two of the masked men hugged Victor
Guinit while the third grappled with Herminia. During the
course of the grappling, the wife happened to scratch the
face of the masked man as a result of which the mask
fen down. This was when the Identity of the accused was
revealed to the couple with the wife exclaiming,
"Sabangan, do not kill us. We will give you the money."
[TSN, June 8,1972, p. 15.] At that precise time, Guinit
was only three meters away from his wife. Afterwards,
Guinit proceeded to where the money was hidden then
he went back into the house to hand over the money. Not
being satisfied, the robbers demanded for paper bills
which the couple denied possessing. This was when the
two robbers whose Identities were not revealed, beat
Guinit while Cabato went to the kitchen with Herminia.
The other inconsistencies alleged by the accused to
buttress his appeal centered on minor details.
Conceding that there may have been inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution, these far from being
badges of fraud and fabrication, can justifiably be
considered as a manifestation of good faith and a
confirmation of the fact that the witness was not a
rehearsed witness. It is a truism that the most candid
witness oftentimes makes mistakes but such honest
lapses do not necesssarily impair his intrinsic credibility.
[People v. Alcantara, L-26967, 33 SCRA 812; People v.
Canada, G. R. No. 63728, Sept. 15, 1986, 144 SCRA
121]. Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses due
only to inaccurate expressions or honest mistake or
observations are not fatal. [People v. Demalate, L-38960,
March 30, 1982, 113 SCRA 353; People vs. Delavin,
G.R. Nos. 73762-63, Feb. 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 257].
When they lie.
Further, there was not even an iota of evidence
presented by the accused-appellant ascribing to
prosecution witness Guinit any motive or intent to
implicate the former as the person who killed his wife.
The testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense,
in fact would picture the Guinits and the Cabatos as
neighbors on good terms. As the accused himself
narrated, the Guinits were neighbors whom he used to
visit since he was young. In this light, Guinit's testimony
becomes more credible. As was held in one recent case:
xxx xxx xxx
We have no doubt about the credibility of
Rolando Blanco [the witness"). ... The
recorda do not show any improper motive
 on his part to falsely implicate the
appellants in this diabolic crime. In fact,
Antonio Guilbao is his first cousin. They
were, all positively identified by Blanco.
[People v. Ladrera, G.R. 55339, May 21,
1987, 150 SCRA 113, 123-124.]
Accused's admissions would negate any improper motive
for Guinit to testify falsely against him. In this
Summing up, the alleged inconsistencies brought forth by
the accused boil down to the question of the eyewitness'
credibility.
Time and again, it has been held that the Supreme Court
respects the trial court's findings on credibility of
witnesses [People v. Palon, L-33271, Feb. 20,1984,120
SCRA 529; People v. Dava Nos. L-41642-41645, May
15, 1987, 149 SCRA 582]. The appellate court will not
disturb the factual findings of the lower court for the latter
is in a better position to gauge the credibility of
eyewitnesses. [People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 65152, Aug.
30,1984,131 SCRA 501] "The matter of assigning value
to declarations at the witness stand is best and most
completely performed by a trial judge who, unlike
appellate magistrates can weigh such testimony in the
light of the defendant's demeanor, conduct and attitude at
the time and is thereby placed in a more competent
position to discriminate between the true and the false"
[People v. Bermudez, L-30931, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA
629, People v. Laganzon, L-47118, May 21, 1974, 129
SCRA 333, 347].
In this case, the decision of the trial court clearly outlined
the evidence for both prosecution and defense. The trial
judge had observed the demeanor of both prosecution
and defense witnesses on the witness stand and found
nothing amiss with the credibility of the prosecution
witness.
Accused interposed alibi as his defense claiming that he
was in Balakan gathering corn with his wife and in-law
[TSN, Dec. 13,1972, PP. 10-11].
Considering however that the Identification of the
accused was positively established, accused's defense of
alibi becomes weak.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses by an accused
especially if there is direct testimony of an eyewitness
Identifying the accused as the culprit. [U.S. v. Garcia, 9
Phil. 434 (1907); People v. Coronado, G.R. No. 68932,
Oct. 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 250; People v. Inot, 36790,
May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 322]. It is rarely given
credence because it is easily fabricated [People v.
Millarpe G.R. No. 69281, Feb. 25,1985,134 SCRA 555;
People v. Petil, G.R. No. 70223, Mar. 31, 1987,149
SCRA 92]. Uncorroborated alibi, as in this case, is not
credible against positive Identification (People v. Jones,
G.R. No. 61165, June 24,1985, 134 SCRA 166; People
v. Canturia, G.R. No. 67598, Oct. 11, 1985,139 SCRA
280]. Alibi does not deserve much credit as it was
established only by the accused himself without any
corroboration from his wife or in-law.
xxx xxx xxx
 Absence of such corroboration, in the light
of the categorical statement of one of the
victims, . . . , that he saw [accused] stab
Luisita Apostol because there was a lighted
post at the place of the incident ... is fatal to
the defense. [People v. dela Cruz, G.R.
Nos. 71044-45, Mar. 16,1987, 148 SCRA
582, 589].
xxx xxx xxx
The Court now addresses itself to the aggravating
circumstances alleged by the plaintiff-appellee to have
attended the commission of the crime.
The prosecution argues that since "the attack was by a
robust man of 29 years with a huge stone against an
ageing defenseless woman" (Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee,
p. 15], abuse of supe prior strength should aggravate the
crime.
The records of the case are bereft of any information with
respect to the physical conditions of both the accused
and the victims. Thus, abuse of superior strength cannot
be considered. This aggravating circumstance depends
on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is
considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of
forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a
situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or
taken advantage of by him in the commission of the
crime. To take advantage of superior strength means to
purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the
means of the defense available to the person attacked
[People v. Cabiling, L-38091 Dec. 17, 1976, 74 SCRA
285, 303].
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that there
was indeed a notorious inequality between the ages,
sizes and strength of the antagonists and that these
notorious advantages were purposely souhgt for or used
by the accused to achieve his ends.
However, the Court considers dwelling as an aggravating
circumstance since it has been proven that, indeed
robbery with homicide was committed inside the house of
the offended parties. Dwelling is aggravating in robbery
with violence or intimidation because this class of robbery
can be committed without the necessity of trespassing
the sanctity of the offended party's house [People v.
Mercado, L-39511, April 28,1980, 97 SCRA 232; People
v. Dajaresco, L-32701, June 19, 1984, 129 SCRA 576;
People's vs. Gapasin, G.R. No. 52017, Oct. 27, 1986,
145 SCRA 178].
Likewise, the Court considers disguise as another
aggravating circumstance. The accused, together with
two others, wore masks to cover their faces. There could
have been no other purpose for this but to conceal their
Identities particularly for Cabato who was very much
known to the offended parties. The fact that the mask
subsequently fell down thus paving the way for Cabato's
Identification will not render this aggravating
circumstance inapplicable. In a recent case, the Court
held 'that Darwin Veloso and his five (5) companions
wore masks [which eventually fell down] to conceal their
Identities during the commission of the crime constitutes
disguise" [People v. Veloso, L-32900, Feb. 25, 1982, 112
SCRA 173, 182].
Robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code is punishable with reclusion perpetua to
death. However, in view of Sec. 19 (1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution the supreme penalty of death can no longer
be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby
AFFIRMED insofar as the judgment sentenced the
accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA but is MODIFIED insofar as the civil
indemnity is concerned which is hereby increased to
P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112015 May 26, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENATO DAEN, JR., a.k.a. "NONOY
DAING," accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Renato Daen, Jr., Raul Henson, Roland Henson,
Francisco Suyat, Noning Suyat and Nonoy Onse were
charged with the murder of Mario Ponce, Jr. in an
Information which read as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of September,
1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery, abuse of superior strength and
evident premeditation, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon
the person of MARIO PONCE, JR y LAZO,
by then and there, stabbing the latter on the
different parts of his body with the use of
bladed weapons, thereby inflicting upon
said MARIO PONCE JR y LAZO, serious
and mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his untimely death,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the said victim, in such amount as maybe
awarded to them under the provisions of
the Civil Code.1
Only Renato Daen, Jr. and Raul Henson were tried, as
the rest of the group charged remained at large. After the
prosecution had rested its case, counsel for accused
Raul Henson filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which the trial
court granted in an order dated 8 February 1993
dismissing the Information as against Raul Henson, In
due time, the trial court found the remaining accused
Renato Daen Jr. guilty of the crime charged, sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the
heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 as actual
damages plus P100,000.00 as moral damages.2
From the evidence submitted to it, the trial court found
that in the afternoon of 9 September 1990, the victim
Mario Ponce, Jr. complained to Virgilio Yap, Barangay
Captain of Escopa I, Project 4, Quezon City, that his
(Mario's) rooster had been stolen. Ponce pointed to
"Nonoy Daing," Nonoy Onse, Francisco Suyat and
Noning Suyat as the persons who had probably taken his
rooster. These four (4) persons were then attending a
birthday party.
The four (4) pointed out by Pence were called by
Barangay Captain Yap for a conference. At this meeting,
which was held near Ponce's residence, Ponce was
unable to pinpoint who among the group of four (4) had
actually taken his rooster. No one in the group admitted
having taken the bird. The meeting ended at around 5:00
p.m.
The group of Renato Daen returned to the place where
the party (basically a drinking session) was going on, a
place about ten (l0) houses away from the residence of
Mario Ponce. The trial court summarized the succeeding
events in the following manner.
At around 9:00 in the evening, Nonoy and
Noning Suyat left the party uttering: "Bakit
sa akin ibinibintang ang nawawalang
manok?" "Nakakainis yung taong yon." This
was the version of accused Nonoy Daing
whose real name is Renato Daing [should
be Daen].
According, however, to Lamberto Vergara,
not an accused here but also in the
aforementioned group of male persons, the
accused Noning Suyat and Nonoy Onse
were the ones who left the drinking session
at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening.
As the two [did not return] for quite a while,
their friends, namely, accused Renato
[Daen] and Ronald Henson followed them
to the house of Mario Ponce. They were in
turn followed by Lamberto Vergara and
Roberto Nabual to the same place, that is,
in front of the 2-storey residence where
Mario Ponce lives.
There an altercation ensued and someone
in the group of those who went to the
Ponce house from their drinking session at
the birthday party stabbed Mario Pence.
Mario sustained two frontal stab wounds at
the right costal region. The neighbors
helped in bringing Mario to the hospital in a
tricycle but he expired early next morning.3
According to the Medico Legal Report submitted by the
prosecution, the victim, Mario Ponce, Jr., sustained two
(2) frontal stab wounds at the right costal region..4
The trial court was thus presented with the problem of
determining who, among the several persons temporarily
congregated in front of the house of Mario Ponce, Jr.,
had in fact stabbed Ponce to death.
The prosecution presented Remily Ponce, sister of the
deceased victim, and she testified that she was at the
balcony of their house with her cousin Bernardino Lazo
when she saw the group of Renato Daen having a
heated argument with her brother right in front of their
house and just below the balcony. The argument erupted
into a commotion, but she did not see who had stabbed
her brother.
Prosecution witness Bernardino Lazo, a cousin of the
victim, was more specific. Lazo testified that he was at
the balcony of the second floor of their house and saw
the whole incident. He declared that he saw Noning
Suyat and Mario Ponce talking and drinking with each
other just outside the Ponce house, when Ronald
Henson soon followed by other members of Renato
Daen's group, arrived. A commotion ensued soon after
the group's arrival. Renato Daen and five (5) other
persons surrounded the victim and someone held the
latter's hands. Renato Daen then stabbed Mario Ponce
twice with his left hand. Witness Lazo also testified that
among the group, he saw two (2) persons armed with
knives, to wit: Renato Daen and Nonoy Onse.
Renato Daen denied that he had stabbed the victim.
Daen claimed that Noning Suyat, and not he (Renato
Daen) had knifed the victim in the stomach. The
testimony of the defense witnesses was summed up by
the trial court in its decision:
According to herein accused Renato
"Nonoy" Daing [should be Daen], he, Nonoy
Onse and Ronald Henson followed Nonoy
[should be Noning] Suyat to the house of
Mario Ponce. There they saw Suyat and
Mario arguing. Mario then pushed Suyat so
violently that Suyat fell to the ground. Suyat
drew his knife and lunged at Mario's
stomach, After that, Suyat told the three
(Daing, Henson and Onse) not to tell
anyone and threatened them if they do not
follow his advice.
Mr. Lamberto Vergara, another defense
witness, testified that [Noning] Suyat
together with Nonoy Onse left the party that
night. When they did not return, Renato
[Daen] and Ronald Henson were asked by
the celebrant to follow the two. Vergara
followed suit.
Mr. Vergara saw Suyat and Mario talking
while Henson was standing nearby and
[Daen] and Onse were conversing with
each other. Then at a certain point of their
conversation Mario said to Ronald Henson:
"Putang ina mo." Ronald went towards
Mario but Suyat stopped Ronald Henson. It
was then that Mario pushed Suyat who fell
down and hit a wall. When Suyat stood up
he pulled out a knife and stabbed Mario.
According to Mr. Vergara, the victim was
stabbed only once but Suyat only. He saw
this when he turned his head as he was
then leaving the place when Mario said:
"Putang ina mo."
According to Mr. Nabual, accused Renato
[Daen] was also shocked by the incident so
he had to help [Daen] home after the body
of Mario was taken by a tricycle to the
hospital.5
Renato Daen, Jr. is now before this Court appealing his
conviction, claiming that the court a quo had erred:

A third defense witness Robert Nabual, (1) in convicting

testified that it was Suyat, Ronald Henson [him] of the
and Nonoy Daing who returned to the crime of murder
house of Mario Ponce from where the on the sole
birthday party was being held. He followed basis of the
the trio. When Mr. Nabual arrived at Mario biased
Ponce's house he saw [Noning] Suyat and testimony of
Mario Ponce having an argument. Then prosecution
Mario pushed [Noning] Suyat who fell on witness
the ground. [Noning] then stood up and Bernardino
stabbed Mario. Nonoy Daing was there Lazo, cousin of
during that whole time at a store buying the deceased
cigarette. Mario Ponce,
Jr.; and
After [Noning] Suyat has stabbed Mario,
Rodel Henson also stabbed Mario who fell (2) in convicting
down. Thereafter, according to Mr. Nabual, [him] of the
Suyat and Henson ran away. These two crime of murder
accused like their co-accused, with the because neither
exception of Raul Henson (a brother of treachery nor
Rodel) and Renato [Daen] having remained evident
at-large to date. premeditation
had attended
the killing,
 contrary to the
conclusion of
the trial court.
In respect of the first supposed error, we note that the
trial court had explicitly appraised the conflicting
testimony of the prosecution and defense witnesses and
had carefully concluded that prosecution witness Mr.
Bernardino Lazo was more credible than the defense
witnesses:
After a considerable thought and reflection
on the conflicting evidence the court is of
the opinion that the testimony of Mr.
Bernardino Lazo is more credible than that
of Renato [Daen], Lamberto Vergara, and
Renato Nabual.
First. The testimonies of the three defense
witnesses are contradictory to each other
on the vital fact of who returned to the
house of Mario Ponce to confront him.
Accused [Daen] said that it was Suyat
alone who left the party. It was only much
later when he, Ronald Henson and Onse
followed Suyat.
But according to Mr. Vergara, it was Suyat
and Onse who left the party and it was only
much later, on request of the celebrant, that
[Daen] and Henson followed suit.
But then, according to Mr. Nabual, it was
Suyat, Henson, and [Daen] who left the
party and then Mr. Nabual followed them to
the Ponce house.
Second. According to [Daen], Suyat
stabbed Mario only once. He saw no one
else who stabbed Mario. This was also the
testimony of Vergara.
Yet, the medical findings show that Mario
was stabbed twice.
Mr. Nabual testified that it was Suyat and
Ronald Henson who stabbed Mario once
each and then the duo ran away.
There is here again a contradiction about a
vital portion of the incident at bar among the
defense witnesses.
Third. According to Mr. Nabual, there were
two persons who stabbed Mario, namely,
Suyat followed by Ronald Henson. But
according to Mr. Vergara and accused
[Daen] it was only Suyat who stabbed
Mario. This is once more a major
contradiction.
From the foregoing major inconsistencies of
the defense witnesses thus easily gleans a
great motive to move [Daen] away from the
case.
 Yet, it is quite clear that [Daen] was one of
those who, after drinking a good amount of
wine had returned to the house of Mario
with several others evidently to confront
Mario for suspecting their group of stealing
his rooster. The excuse offered that [Daen]
merely wanted to fetch Suyat back to the
party is a limp one. For, admittedly [Daen]
never even bothered to bring Suyat back to
the party as, according to [Daen], he merely
watched from a store while Mario and Suyat
were arguing. And this excuse is even
unbelievable because [Daen] admitted on
cross that he was just right beside Mario's
side.
The testimony of Lazo, although a cousin of
the victim is the more credible one. It was
delivered frankly and naturally. Mr. Lazo's
lack of ulterior motive is disclosed quite
clearly by the fact that he frankly relieved
accused Raul Henson of any criminal
responsibility although Raul is a brother of
accused Ronald Henson who according to
defense witness Nabual stabbed Mario.6
The defense has presented to this Court neither factual
circumstance nor argument which would compel it to
overturn the conclusions reached above by the trial court.
This Court has ruled often enough that blood relationship
of a witness to the victim does not by itself impair the
credibility of the former.7 The circumstance that
Bernardino Lazo was a cousin of the unfortunate Mario
Ponce does not ipso facto make Lazo a biased witness
whose testimony must be discarded. To warrant rejection
of the testimony of a relative; it must be clearly shown
that, independently of the relationship, the testimony was
inherently improbable or defective or that improper or evil
motives had moved the witness falsely to incriminate the
appellant.8 Appellant Renato Daen did not do so.
Instead, appellant Renato Daen pointed to certain
claimed inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution
witness Bernardino Lazo which, the defense contended,
rendered Lazo's testimony of doubtful veracity. Firstly,
Lazo testified that he was alone on the balcony of his
home when he witnessed the stabbing of Mario Ponce,
while Remily Ponce had testified that she was also on the
same balcony with Lazo at that time. Secondly, Lazo
stated that when he spoke to the victim, the latter was
already unable to talk. On cross-examination, however,
Lazo said that the victim was able to say "Nasaksak ako."
Further, appellant contended that Lazo, who had testified
that he had witnessed the whole incident, did not know in
what specific part of the body Ponce had sustained the
stab wounds.
We have examined the record of this case, and we
consider that the inconsistencies alleged by the defense
in respect of the testimony of Bernardino Lazo, are more
apparent than real. Further, to the extent that
inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to the
Court to relate to details of peripheral significance which
do not negate or dissolve the positive identification by
Lazo of Renato Daen as the perpetrator of the crime.
Thus, while witness Lazo had stated that he was alone
on the balcony when he observed the commotion and the
stabbing below, and while witness Remily Ponce had
declared that she was with her cousin Lazo on the
balcony at that time, neither statement put in question the
presence of eyewitness Bernardino Lazo at the critical
time and place. Both witnesses agreed and in fact
confirmed that Lazo was indeed on the balcony of the
Ponce house at the time of the stabbing. At most, the
presence of Remily Ponce might perhaps have been
questioned by appellant Daen; but this would not offer
any real comfort to appellant since Remily could not and
did not testify as to the identity of the attacker who had
stabbed her brother.
In respect of the second supposed inconsistency,
Bernardino Lazo had testified that immediately after
being stabbed, Mario Ponce went up to the house and
told his stunned presence relatives that he had been
stabbed. When, however, Lazo spoke to the victim, Mario
was no longer able to respond.9 Remily Ponce
corroborated Lazo's testimony on this point. Remily
stated that after the commotion in front of their house had
erupted, her brother struggled upstairs, told their family
that he had been stabbed, and then collapsed on the
floor. 10
The failure of Lazo specifically to state in what particular
part of the body Mario Ponce had been stabbed by
appellant Daen, did not render Lazo's testimony either
incredible or doubtful. Time and again this Court has
acknowledged that different human minds react
differently when confronted with a sudden and shocking
event. A witness may sometimes ignore certain details
which at the time appeared to him as insignificant but
which, to another person under the same circumstances,
would seem noteworthy.
The stabbing to death of Mario Ponce had occurred on 9
September 1990, about two (2) years before the trial of
the case began in 1992. Considering the lapse of time
between the occurrence of the incident and the hearings
on the criminal case, one can hardly fault the witnesses if
they are unable to narrate the details of the occurrence
with absolute accuracy and completeness. A witness is
not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect
recollection down to insignificant and minute
details. 11 In People v. Santito, Jr., 12 the Court had noted
that:
Testimonial discrepancies could be caused
by the natural fickleness of memory which
tend to strengthen, rather than weaken,
credibility as they erase any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony. It would have been
more suspicious if the witness had been
able to pinpoint with clarity or describe with
precision the exact sequence of events.
The most candid witness oftentimes makes
mistakes but such honest lapses do not
necessarily impair his intrinsic credibility. 13
The Court, however, is unable to accept the trial court's
holding that the killing was attended by treachery.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance is properly found
when two (2) conditions concur: (1) the employment of
means; methods, or manner of execution which would
ensure the offender's safety from defensive or retaliatory
acts on the part of the offended party, that is, that the
latter had no opportunity to defend himself or react
against the offender; and (2) that such means, methods,
or manner of execution had been deliberately or
consciously chosen. 14 In the case at bar, the prosecution
did not, to the mind of the Court, establish the presence
of the second condition. Although the testimony of
prosecution witness Lazo tended to show that the victim
had been surrounded by appellant Renato Daen and five
(5) others, one of whom had pinned down the victim's
hands, there was no showing that such manner of
execution had been deliberately chosen, designed and
brought about. Neither can it be contended that the
attack upon Mario Ponce was sudden and unexpected,
without the slightest provocation on his part. The
evidence showed that the stabbing incident had been
immediately preceded by confrontation between the
victim on the one hand and the appellant's group on the
other, and that the victim had in fact suddenly shoved
back one of the group with such force that the latter fell to
the ground. It appears to the Court that, all the
circumstances considered, the stabbing was probably the
result more of a sudden impulse of the moment
generated by the altercation during the confrontation,
than the outcome of conscious design or choice on the
part of appellant Daen and his group. We believe that the
prosecution failed to establish with moral certainty the
presence of treachery in this case. The well-settled rule is
that any circumstance which would qualify a killing to
murder must be proved as indubitably as the killing
itself. 15
Although the Information had charged evident
premeditation on the part of the accused, the trial court
did not find the presence of that circumstance. Indeed,
the elements of this modifying circumstance were clearly
wanting in the instant case.
Nevertheless, we find that the qualifying circumstance of
taking advantage of superior strength, as alleged in the
Information, attended the killing of Ponce. Where it is
shown that the attack had not been made with alevosia,
the number of appellant's group and the concertedness
of their acts vis-a-vis a defenseless person may
constitute abuse of superior force. 16 In the present case,
appellant Daen undeniably took advantage of the
presence of members of his group, which presence
facilitated the stabbing of Mario Ponce. Appellant's group
numbered more than five (5) male persons, two (2) of
whom were armed with bladed weapons: the victim Mario
Ponce was unarmed, surrounded by this group and his
hand were held on to by at least one member of the
same group as Daen lunged at him with a knife. The
slaying of Mario Ponce must still be characterized as
murder.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal, 17 murder is
punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death. There being no generic aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, that penalty in its medium
period, that is, reclusion perpetua is properly imposable.
Turning to the civil aspect of the crime, the indemnity for
death to which the heirs of Mario Ponce, Jr. are entitled,
should be raised to P50,000.00 in consonance with
recent jurisprudence of the Court. The award by the trial
court of P30,000.00 as actual damages should, upon the
other hand, be reduced to P3,500.00 which is the only
amount that was evidenced by a receipt. 18 The award of
moral damages is subsumed in the civil indemnity for
death; to the extent, however, that the award exceeds
P50,000.00, it is bereft of sufficient factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding
Renato Daen, Jr. guilty of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant is ordered to
pay the heirs of Mario Ponce the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity for death; and another amount of
P3,500.00 in concept of actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 135065 August 8, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENNY CABANGCALA y ABRASIA, RENATO
CABANGCALA y ABRASIA alias "RENE", and
DANILO CABANGCALA y ABRASIA alias
"DANNY", accused-appellants.
MELO, J.:
Before this Court on automatic review is the judgment
rendered by Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court of the
First Judicial Region stationed in Tayug, Pangasinan,
sentencing to death two of herein accused-appellants, as
well as the appeal of the third accused-appellant who
was still a minor at the time of the commission of the
crime of murder.
The Information charged as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of February, 1997, in
the evening, at Brgy. Pangangaan, municipality of
Umingan, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed
with a bamboo, and with the use of superior
strength and evident premeditation, and taking
advantage of nighttime, conspiring, confederating
and helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, strike, maul,
box and hit one DIONISIO PASCUAL, inflicting
upon the latter mortal wound on his head and
different parts of his body which caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of DIONISIO PASCUAL.
CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.
(Record, p. 1.)
The antecedent facts are summarized as
Counterstatement of the Facts in the People's Brief in this
wise:
On February 7, 1997, at around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, Rovellano Abrasia, fifteen years old,
testified that he and his first degree cousins, the
Cabangcala brothers, Benny, Rene and Danny
(appellants herein), had just finished cutting cogon
in the mountains of Barangay Ricos, Umingan,
Pangasinan. He [Rovellano] accompanied Danny
to the barber shop of Merced Abrasia in Barangay
Pangangaan of the same municipality (pp. 2-6 & 8,
tsn., Aug. 14, 1997; pp. 2-3, tsn., Sept. 5, 1997)
While having his haircut, Danny saw the victim
Dionisio "Isio" Pascual drinking gin with Anciong
Abrasia and Quisot Camacho in front of the house
of Corazon Morante (pp. 4-6, tsn., Aug. 14, 1997).
Thereupon, Danny pointed to the victim and told
Rovellano "that man is Isio Pascual" (pp. 7-
8, Ibid.).
Later, Rovellano and Danny went to the latter's
house, some 100 meters from Morante's place,
where they drank gin together with Benny and
Rene (pp. 13-14, tsn., Sept. 1, 1997; pp. 5 to 5-A,
tsn., Sept. 3, 1997). There, Rovellano overheard
the Cabangcala brothers talking about the victim
(p. 14, tsn., Sept. 1, 1997). Rovellano recalled that
a week before, Mario Cabangcala, appellant's
younger brother, told him that he had a quarrel
with the victim's son (p. 13, tsn., Sept. 2, 1997). At
around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, that same
day, Benny announced a plan to kill the victim (p.
20, ibid.) The four continued drinking until 10:00
o'clock in the evening during which period Danny
would occasionally go out to verify if the victim
was still at Morante's place (pp. 2, 6 to 8, tsn.,
Sept. 3, 1997). Danny reported to the group that
the victim was still there lying down while his
drinking buddies Anciong and Quisot had already
gone home (pp. 5 to 7, ibid.).
The Cabangcala brothers then proceeded to
execute their plan and, together with Rovellano,
waited for the victim at a place halfway within the
100 meter distance between the house of Morante
and the Cabangcalas, along a footpath where the
expected victim would use in going home (p.
8, id.). When the group spotted the victim, the
latter was bidding goodbye to Morante saying,
"Mare, I will go home now" (p. 7, id..) Immediately,
Benny and Danny went downhill to cut a piece of
bamboo about one (1) meter long (p. 9, id.).
As the victim was approaching, Rovellano ran and
hid behind a "buri palm" (p. 14, tsn. Sept. 5, 1997).
The Cabangcala brothers positioned themselves
under a bamboo groove around five (5) meters
away from Rovellano (p. 10, tsn. Sept. 3, 1997; p.
14, tsn. Sept. 5, 1997.)
The victim stopped on the rice paddy about four
[4] meters from Rovellano (pp. 13 to 14, tsn. Sept.
5, 1997). Rovellano. noticed that the victim had a
companion whom he did not recognize but who
immediately fled perhaps sensing danger from the
encounter (pp. 9 to 10, & 14, tsn. Sept. 3, 1997).
Benny approached the victim and struck him twice
with the bamboo hitting the latter on the left cheek
and the neck (p. 15, tsn. Aug. 14, 1997). The
victim fell, after which Danny and Rene joined
Benny in mauling the victim (pp. 15 to 16, ibid.).
The victim pleaded for his life saying "Please have
mercy on me. Don't kill me" (p. 17, tsn. Aug. 14,
1997). But the mauling continued. At one point
Danny uttered "Nagado nga ammomon. No saan
nga diay anak mo nga pinangpakpak na kaniak
saanak nga agibales"; meaning "Nonsense, had
not your son clubbed me I would not avenge"
(ibid.).
When the victim was rendered unconscious, Rene
carried him towards the field east of Danny's
house (pp. 17 & 19, tsn. id.). There, the victim was
mauled further with the piece of bamboo carried
by Benny (p. 5, tsn. Sept. 5, 1997). Thereafter,
Rovellano accompanied Danny in getting a sled
where they loaded the victim and brought him to
the mountain of Barangay Ricos (p. 19, tsn. Aug.
14, 1997). Using shovels, the Cabangcala
brothers dug a pit where they dumped the victim
and covered it with soil (pp. 20 to 21, ibid.).
Thereafter, they all went home (p. 21, id.).
On March 14, 1997, the victim's brother,
Fulgencio, and daughter Jennifer, went to the
Umingan Police Station and reported to the police
that the victim had been missing since February 7,
1997 (p. 3-4, tsn. Oct. 6, 1997). SPO1 Jeremias
Fernandez conducted an investigation in Luna
Este but failed to obtain favorable results (p.
5, id.).
However, ten (10) days thereafter, on March 24,
1997 Fulgencio returned to the station with a
certain Danilo Abrasia who disclosed that he saw
the victim sometime in February 1997 in Barangay
Pangangaan being mauled by the Cabangcala
brothers (id.). Hence, SPO1 Fernandez went to
Barangay Pangangaan where a secret informant
told him that a certain Rovellano Abrasia had
knowledge about the missing person (p. 6, id.).
SPO1 Fernandez found Rovellano that night at a
certain bakery in the poblacion of Tayug,
Pangasinan (id.). When confronted by the police,
Rovellano admitted that he was with the
Cabangcala brothers when the latter killed the
victim in Barangay Pangangaan (pp. 6-7, id.). The
police, thereafter, invited Rovellano to the police
station where he executed his statement at around
4:00 o'clock in the morning the following day,
March 25, 1997 (pp. 7 to 8, id.; Exh. A., pp. 11-12,
Record).
On March 25, 1997, upon being told by Rovellano
of the exact place where the victim was buried,
SPO1 Fernandez proceeded there together with
Rovellano, Fulgencio Pascual, some members of
the Umingan Police, and Barangay officials of the
mountainous area of Barangay Ricos and reached
the place at around 11:00 o'clock in the morning
(pp. 8-9, tsn. Oct. 6, 1997). A cadaver was
exhumed with the face still complete which
Fulgencio identified as that of his brother Dionisio
(p. 9, id., see also pictures in pp. 41, 42 & 43,
Record). The cadaver was thereafter brought to
the municipal hall and thereafter to the cemetery
for autopsy (p. 10, id.).
Immediately, SPO1 Fernandez went to the house
of Benny Cabangcala with the Barangay Captain
of Barangay Pangangaan (pp. 20 & 21, id.) SPO1
Fernandez saw the three (3) appellants in the
house of Benny about to leave because there
were (3) traveling bags and said appellants were
selling a carabao to a buyer from Barangay Prado
(p. 22, id.). With the coordination of the said
barangay captain, SPO1 Fernandez was able to
invite the Cabangcala brothers to the police station
to shed light on the killing of Dionisio Pascual (p.
20, id.).
The next day, on March 26, 1997, SPO1
Fernandez prepared a Special Report on his
investigation (Exh. E, p. 14, Record). At around
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, Dr.
Thelma Busto, Rural Health Physician of
Umingan, Pangasinan, examined the cadaver and
prepared the following post-mortem findings:
Post-Mortem Findings:
1. Head — multiple fracture of the skull
2. Other parts of the body was in state of
decomposition.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cerebral Hemorrhage sec. to fracture of the
skull.
(Exhibit C, p. 16, Record)
Dr. Busto noted that when the cadaver was bought
to her the skin was still intact although it was soft,
tearing and moist. However, the face was still
recognizable (p. 5, tsn. Oct 1, 1997). She
prepared a schematic diagram showing multiple
fractures with skull, 10 at the back, 4 to 5 at the
frontal crown, and 2 on each parietal area (pp. 5-
7, id.; Exh. D, p. 15, Record).
The victim's family thereafter took care of his
funeral and burial (pp. 3 to 6, tsn. Sept. 26, 1997;
p. 26, tsn. Sept. 16, 1997).
Jennifer Pascual Espiritu, one of the victim's
daughters, recalled that the last time she saw her
father alive was on February 7, 1997. The day
before it, on February 6, 1997, the victim came to
her house in Barangay Luna Este and went fishing
with her neighbor. At night, the victim slept in her
house (p. 25, tsn. Sept. 16, 1997). In the morning
of February 7, she saw the victim going home to
 Barangay L Paz taking the route of Barangay
Pangangaan (pp. 25 to 26, id.). When she saw her
father again was on March 26, 1997, his remains
were already in a coffin (p. 26, id)
Dionisio Pascual, Jr. never saw his father again
after he left their place on January 8, 1997 (p. 12
to 13, tsn. Oct. 10, 1997). He had to leave for
Manila and stay there for about four (4) months
because he knew that the Cabangcala brothers
planned to kill him (p. 12, id.) on account of his
violent encounters with them on December 25,
1996 during the wedding party of a certain
Josephine Cabanting in Barangay Luna Este
where Dionisio, Jr. had boxed Mario Cabangcala,
appellants' younger brother because the latter
tried to hit him with a bottle of "beer grande" when
he refused to buy beer for them (pp. 4 to 6, id.).
Dionisio, Jr. felt very strongly that the he was the
reason why the Cabangcala brothers killed his
father.
(Rollo, pp. 149-157.)
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the trial court
rendered the judgment of conviction, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, guilt having been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court hereby convicts the
herein accused of the crime of evidently
premeditated MURDER defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, with the
circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
nighttime aggravating the offense.
Accordingly, and pursuant to Article 63 of the
same code, the Court hereby sentences the
accused BENNY CABANGCALA and RENATO
CABANGCALA to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
In regard to the accused DANILO CABANGCALA
alias "Danny," the Court applies section 22 of
Republic Act 7659 and Article 68, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of from 12
years of prision mayor maximum as MINIMUM to
17 years and one day of reclusion temporal
maximum as MAXIMUM.
The subject accused are further hereby ordered to
SOLIDARILY indemnify the heirs of deceased
DIONISIO PASCUAL for damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 for his death, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Record, pp. 225.)
In the automatic review of this case, appellants assign
the following errors:
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE PERSON EXHUMED
 ON MARCH 26, 1997 (sic), IS THAT OF
DIONISIO PASCUAL.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDIT TO THE BELATED TESTIMONY OF
DANILO ABRASIA THAT WITNESS SAW THE
INCIDENT.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY OF ROVELLANO
ABRASIA.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT
ACCEPTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI
ADVANCED BY THE ACCUSED.
The Court affirms the conviction of all three accused-
appellants.
Firstly, accused-appellants heavily bank on the possibility
that the body exhumed by the police authorities upon
information disclosed by Rovellano Abrasia on March 25,
1997, is not that of Dionisio Pascual, whereby in the
absence of the corpus delicti they cannot be convicted of
the crime charged. To cast reasonable doubt, accused-
appellants quote prosecution witness Dr. Busto's
statement that "when a person was buried on February 7
and exhumed on March 25, the body would be so
decomposed that it would be hard to identify the person"
(Appellants' Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 91).
We are not persuaded for the foregoing statement was
obviously taken out of context. Dr. Busto was stating a
general proposition that if a cadaver had been buried for
45 days, it would normally be in such a state of
decomposition making identification difficult. More so,
according to Dr. Busto, if the ground on which the
cadaver is buried is wet. The specific finding for this
particular cadaver, however, is that although the cadaver
when brought to her was in an advanced state of
decomposition, its face was still "recognizable" because
the "skin was still intact" (p. 5, tsn. Oct. 1, 1997). One day
before Dr. Busto saw the cadaver, right at the site where
the remains of Dionisio Pascual were exhumed,
Fulgencio Pascual (brother of Dionisio), and Victoria
Abrasia (a cousin of Dionisio) positively identified it to be
that of Dionisio Pascual.
TESTIMONY OF FULGENCIO PASCUAL:
Q. And then after digging what was
discovered, if there was any?
A. I saw the cadaver of my brother first the
face, sir.
Q. How do you know that was the cadaver of
your brother?
A: I know him sir because the face was not
yet to decomposed. I could still recognize his face.
Q. What were the physical features you
observed wherein you are now concluding that he
was your brother?
 A. We have a resemblance with my brother
the only difference is he was taller and thinner
than me, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Aside from you who else, if any, identified
the body right at the place of the exhumation?
A. My cousin, sir
Q. Who?
A. Victoria Abrasia, sir.
Q. He (sic) was with you?
A. Yes, sir, were only two at that time.
(pp. 11 & 12, tsn. Sept. 23, 1997)
Moreover, the body exhumed on March 25, 1997 was
given due funeral services. As Dionisio's daughter,
Jennifer, averred, she saw her father already in a coffin
on March 26, 1997. We agree with the trial court's
observation that "nobody mourns the death of a
stranger." It is hard for this Court to conceive of the
possibility that the family of Dionisio would grieve before
the remains of a stranger, much less spend money for
funeral services and burial of somebody other than their
own deceased. This, coupled with the fact that the
location of the exhumation site was pointed to by no less
than an eyewitness to the crime and the burial, the Court
is convinced that the body recovered on March 25, 1997
is truly that of Dionisio Pascual.
Secondly, accused-appellants find fault in witness Danilo
Abrasia's delay in reporting the incident to the authorities.
This, according to them, should have been enough basis
for the court to disregard his testimony. Besides, they
claim, Danilo did not actually witness the commission of
the crime but only learned about it through Rovellano
Abrasia.
We find this contention lacking in merit, as well.
Delay of a witness in revealing to the authorities what he
knows about a crime does not render his testimony false,
for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of
most people and their abhorrence to get involved in a
criminal case. But more than this, there is always the
inherent fear of reprisal (People vs. Basilan, 174 SCRA
115 [1989]). We have ruled on several occasions that
"the delay of several months in reporting the incident to
the police does not affect the witness' credibility, the
reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information in a
criminal case being of common knowledge (People vs.
Sampaga, 202 SCRA 157 [1991]).
Accused-appellants also imply there is no basis for
Danilo to be fearful of reprisal because accused-
appellants allegedly did not see him during the
commission of the crime. In People vs. Dulay (217 SCRA
103 [1993]) we ruled:
 We cannot sustain this contention because We find these circumstances insufficient to discredit
whether or not the witnesses feared him only the Rovellano's testimony. These were all aptly explained by
witnesses can tell. Fear arises in the subject not in the fact that Rovellano was himself related to the
the object of the fear. It is defined as an Cabangcala brothers, accused-appellants in this case.
unpleasant emotional state characterized by We do not find it odd that he could have actually tagged
anticipation of pain or great distress. It is a along with them during all that time that accused-
reaction to an external danger, which is perceived appellants were plotting the crime up to the time of the
to cause him harm. actual commission of the murder. It is also in accord with
natural experience for Rovellano to distance himself from
(p. 117) his cousins right after the commission of the crime for
fear of being implicated. This will not be taken as flight
similar to that of an accused avoiding appropriate
We cannot discount the possibility that fear develops in
charges and possibly, a conviction.
the mind of the witness despite the absence of threat
from the accused. Besides, reprisal from the accused
It must likewise be noted that his testimony is not the sole
may come about not only before the witness reports the
basis for the conviction of the three accused-appellants.
crime, but it may also develop after the crime is reported.
The major points in his narration were corroborated by
This is the reason for enactment of the law on witness
other evidence tending to bolster his credibility.
protection. In this light therefore, the fact that accused-
appellants did not see Danilo Abrasia witness the crime
Besides —
has no real significance insofar as the said eyewitness'
fear is concerned.
As to the credibility of witnesses it is well
established that the findings of fact of the trial
Thirdly, accused-appellants contend that the testimony of
court thereon should not be disturbed on appeal
Rovellano Abrasia is contrary to natural experience
said court being in a better position to decide the
because even as he appeared to be a participant in the
question, from having itself heard and observed
crime, having been present from the planning stage up to
the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand,
the consummation of the crime, although his cooperation
unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of
and assistance were not required by the three accused-
substance and value which, if considered, could
appellants who were all brothers. They also cite the fact
affect the result of the case.
that Rovellano left Barangay Pangangaan immediately
after the alleged commission of the crime, an indication,
(People vs. Perez, 265 SCRA 506, 516 [1996])
according to them, that he was himself guilty.
In the present case, we find no cogent reason to depart
from this settled rule.
Finally, we find unpersuasive accused-appellants'
insistence that the trial court erred in not giving credence
to their defense of alibi.
Two eyewitnesses have positively identified the three
accused appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. Alibi
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
appellant by the prosecution witnesses. (People vs.
Gabatin, 203 SCRA 225 [1991]; People vs. Tinampay,
207 SCRA 425 [1992]). No jurisprudence in criminal
cases is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, for which reason it should be rejected when
the accused is sufficiently and positively identified by
credible eyewitnesses to the crime (People vs.
Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464 [1998]). As we have already
ruled, no circumstances are present in the case at hand,
which would render Danilo's and Rovellano Abrasia's
eyewitness accounts incredible.
Additionally, the distance between accused-appellants'
houses where they claim to have stayed when the crime
was being perpetrated, does not preclude the possibility
that they could also have been at the scene of the crime.
They were actually only within fifty meters from the scene
of the crime. It is equally settled that:
The requisite elements for alibi to be appreciated
are: (a) to prove his presence in another place at
the time of the perpetration of the offense; and (b)
to demonstrate that it would thus be physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime
(People vs. Magpantay, 284 SCRA 96 [1998]).
We, however, cannot affirm the trial court's appreciation
of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and nighttime.
Regarding abuse of superior strength as aggravating
circumstance, what should be considered is not that
there were three, four or more assailants as against one
victim, but whether the aggressors took advantage of
their combined strength in order to consummate the
offense (People vs. Platilla, 304 SCRA 339 [1999]). In the
present case, accused-appellants were priorly unarmed,
and it was only when they were about to commit the
crime, while waiting for the victim to pass by the bamboo
groove that they thought of getting some implement, a
crude bamboo pole which they cut right there and then.
We further note that only Benny approached the victim,
striking him with the said piece of bamboo. Only after the
victim fell, having been struck twice by Benny, did the two
brothers joined in mauling the victim to death. Obviously,
the three accused-appellants did not purposely take
advantage of their superior strength.
Now, as regards the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime, it may also be noted that indeed, the plan to kill
the victim was hatched as early as 5 o'clock in the
afternoon, but accused-appellants did not execute the
plan until 10 o'clock that evening. It may be stressed,
however, that for nighttime to be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance, the court must be convinced
that the cover of darkness was purposely sought for the
purpose of ensuring the consummation of the crime.
In People vs. Bitoon (309 SCRA 209 [1999]), we ruled:
Nighttime could not be appreciated where, as in
this case, no evidence was presented showing
that nocturnity was specially sought by accused or
taken advantage of by him to facilitate the
commission of the crime or to ensure his immunity
from capture.
(p. 221.)
There is no evidence in the present case that accused-
appellants intentionally sought the advantage of
nocturnity to facilitate the commission of the crime or to
ensure immunity from capture. They simply waited for the
victim to finish his drinking spree with his companions,
which happened to be at around 10 o'clock in the
evening, and it was when the victim was on his way
home, that the accused-appellants attacked him.
There being no aggravating circumstances to be
appreciated against accused-appellants, the death
penalty imposed by the trial court upon accused-
appellants Benny and Renato Cabangcala for the crime
of murder cannot be affirmed. Accused-appellants Benny
and Renato Cabangcala are, therefore, sentenced to the
prison term of reclusion perpetua.
years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Applying the
indeterminate sentence law, the imposable penalty for
the crime of murder in his case where there is neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, should be 6
years and 1 day of prision mayor in its minimum period,
as minimum up to 14 years and 3 months of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, as maximum.
With regard to civil damages, Dionisio Pascual's heirs
should be awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity (People
vs. Basco, 318 SCRA 615 [1999]). Moral damages,
which include physical suffering and mental anguish may
be recovered in criminal cases resulting in physical
injuries or victim's death, as in this case (People vs.
Bromo, 318 SCRA 760 [1999]), which, under prevailing
jurisprudence is fixed at P50,000.00 (People vs. Panida,
310 SCRA 66 [1999]).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-
appellants' conviction of the crime of murder is
AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as to the imposable
penalty, as above indicated. Accused-appellants are
further ordered to solidarily pay the heirs of Dionisio
Pascual the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages, with costs in all
instances.
SO ORDERED.

As for Danilo Cabangcala, who was a minor when the G.R. No. 95262 January 4, 1994
crime was committed, the correct penalty should be one
degree lower which is prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its medium period (10
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMMANUEL DESALISA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Roberto R. Barrales for accused-appellant.
NOCON, J.:
Circumstantial evidence has adequately established the
identity of the killer in this case, destroyed the
presumption of innocence in his favor and fulfilled the test
of moral certainty sufficient to convict. Hanged by means
of a rope, the victim, accused-appellant's legal wife, and
the approximately five month old fetus in her womb died
as a consequence. Unfounded infidelity of the victim
moved accused-appellant to perpetrate the highly
condemnable deed. As one proverb goes, "A tranquil
mind gives life to the body but jealousy rots the bones."
Accused-appellant Emmanuel Desalisa, a twenty four
year old farmer, was charged with the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion in Criminal Case No.
1017 before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Fifth
Judicial Region, Branch 52. The information filed in said
case reads, as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of October,
1983, in the (sic) sitio Pinaductan, barangay
San Juan, municipality of Bacon, province
of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused moved by hatred and jealousy with
evident premeditation, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill armed with a sharp pointed
instrument, assault, attack, and inflict
physical injuries on the vagina of one
Norma Desalisa y Dioneda with whom he
was united in lawful wedlock and who was
pregnant for about five (5) months, and
thereafter with the use of rope hang her to a
jackfruit tree causing her death and that of
her fetus, to the damage and prejudice of
her legal heirs.
That in the commission of the offense there
exist the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and uninhabited place which
facilitated the commission of the offense,
and evident premeditation.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered the plea of
not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On July
10, 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, with the circumstancial (sic)
evidence pointing to the guilt of the
accused, the Court finds accused
Emmanuel Desalisa guilty beyond
 reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of
Parricide, and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT (sic) and
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Norma Desalisa y Dioneda, the amount of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, as
burial expenses and Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos as damages.
SO ORDERED.2
Hence, the present appeal.
The antecedent facts of this case, as culled from the
records are, as follows:
Accused-appellant lived with his eighteen year old legal
wife, Norma Desalisa, and two year old daughter in a
small nipa house on a hill at Pinaductan, San Juan,
Bacon, Sorsogon. There are two other houses in the
neighborhood which are 150 meters away: the house of
his parents-in-law and the house of Carlito Dichoso.
These cannot, however, be seen from the couple's house
because of the many fruit trees and shrubs prevalent in
the area.
According to Paulina Dioneda, mother of Norma, on
October 9, 1983, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning,
she was informed by the mother of accused-appellant
that accused-appellant and Norma had an altercation. He
slapped and boxed her on the stomach. At about 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Norma
complained to her that accused-appellant manhandled
her by slapping and boxing her on the stomach when she
told him not to go out of the house and get drunk
because during that time their child was sick; also,
accused-appellant was jealous of a man. Even before
October 9, 1983, Norma used to tell her that she was
being manhandled by accused-appellant.3
Vicente Dioneda, father of Norma, testified that on
October 9, 1983, at around 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, accused-appellant went to their house and left
his child. On the following morning, between 6:00 and
7:00 o'clock, he went to the house of accused-appellant
and Norma. When he arrived there, he noticed that the
plates were scattered on the floor; the kettle with rice that
was not eaten was also on the floor; and the rope which
was used to tie the other end of their hammock was
missing. He went out of the house. He saw the couple's
pig and observed that it was hungry. He thought of
feeding it with coconut meat so he climbed a coconut tree
which was nearby. While on the third step of the trunk, he
saw the back of the body of Norma. He went down the
tree and called her. Inasmuch as she did not answer him,
he approached her and touched her back. However, her
body swayed. It was only then when he realized that she
was hanging from a branch of the jackfruit tree. Her neck
was tied with the missing rope of their hammock. Her
bloody feet were approximately four inches above the
ground. Her dress was wet. He informed his wife
immediately about the matter. He and his wife proceeded
to the house of Carlito Dichoso and requested the latter
to fetch the authorities. Accused-appellant often
manhandled his daughter because he suspected her of
having a paramour and that the baby in her womb was
not his. The last time he saw Norma alive was on
October 9, 1983, at around 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon when she went to their house. He corroborated
the previous narration of Paulina Dioneda on this aspect.
He saw accused-appellant at the municipal building of
Bacon on October 10, 1983. He asked accused-appellant
why he killed Norma. Accused-appellant did not answer
him but just stooped down. 4
Carlito Dichoso, neighbor of accused-appellant, testified
that at about 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock in the evening of
October 9, 1983, accused-appellant went to his house. It
was raining during that time. Accused-appellant borrowed
a flashlight because he will be looking for his wife. After
two and a half hours, accused-appellant returned to
Carlito's house. He sat on a bench. Carlito asked him
whether or not he found his wife but he did not answer.
Carlito told him to look for his wife in the house of his in-
laws because she might be there. Again, he did not
answer. Carlito also told him to look for his wife in the
nearby hut because perhaps the heavy downpour
prevented her from proceeding home. Accused-appellant
remained sitting on the bench, leaning on the post. He
uttered the following words: "My wife is continuously
possessed by devils." Carlito's wife then advised
accused-appellant: "You must be patient with your wife
because she is pregnant." Accused-appellant did not
answer her. She then prepared a mat and a pillow for
accused-appellant but the latter preferred to remain
sitting on the bench. During the time that it was raining
hard, or about 3:30 o'clock in the morning of the following
day, accused-appellant was frightened because he fell
down from the bench. He sat again on the bench and
Carlito noticed that he did not sleep anymore. At around
5:00 o'clock of the same morning, accused-appellant
opened the door and said: "If there is something that
happened, Manoy Carlito, what would I do?" Carlito was
not able to ask him where he was going because he
already went down. At around 7:30 o'clock of the same
morning, Carlito was informed by Vicente and Paulina
Dioneda that Norma is dead. Accused-appellant and his
wife used to quarrel because of jealousy. 5
Corporal Crisonogo Gillego, chief investigator and
government prosecutor of the Bacon Integrated National
Police, testified that he was ordered by their station
commander to investigate the case of a woman who was
hanged at San Juan, Bacon, Sorsogon. He was
accompanied by two members of the Bacon INP and
some barangay officials of San Juan. He saw the woman
hanging from a jackfruit tree branch, whom he later came
to know as Norma Desalisa. A rope was tied around her
neck. Her feet were twelve inches above the ground.
There were blood stains on the back of her dress and on
her panty. He suspected that it was not a suicide case
because he noticed that the hair of Norma was entangled
with the knot of the rope. He opined that if a person is
about to commit suicide, he has to prepare the knot first
in order to place it around his neck and then jump. Before
Norma was untied, pictures were taken of her. He also
investigated the house of the couple and found that the
rope that was used in hanging Norma was the same as
the rope tied to one end of their hammock. Some things
inside the house were not in proper places. He saw
accused-appellant at the house of the barangay captain.
He asked him how the incident happened but he did not
answer. He asked him if he suspected somebody as the 3. Ligature mark
paramour of his wife. Accused-appellant answered that a on the anterior
person whose surname is Ariate is courting his wife. He neck extending
asked accused-appellant whether or not they always to the
quarrel. Accused-appellant answered that they quarrel submandibular
sometimes. He noticed that accused-appellant was area & infra-
trembling while he was asking those questions. He asked auricular area;
him why he was not in his house. He answered that he
was afraid the relatives of his wife might retaliate. 4. Tongue bitten right.
Accused-appellant was informed by his mother about the
death of his wife. 6 Abdomen:

Dr. Amelia Escarcha, resident physician of the Sorsogon 5. Abdomen

Provincial Hospital, conducted an autopsy on the body of enlarged, at
Norma and submitted the following report: about 5 months
size with fetal
PHYSICAL FINDINGS: parts on
abdominal
External Findings: palpation.

Head & Neck: — Genitalia:

1. Rope 6. Scanty pubic

embedded hair
around the neck
with knot 7. Parous
directing to the vagina
right lateral of
the neck; 8. Hematoma
with contusion
2. Contusion, 3 cm., post- both labia
auricular area; right;
 9. Punctured On the other hand, accused-appellant professes his
wound 1 cm. innocence of the crime charged against him. He
long & 2 cm. speculates that his parents-in-law are harboring ill-
depth, perineum feelings against him since his wife died. His relationship
with slight blood with his wife has deteriorated as early as June 24, 1983,
clot, non- when she told him upon coming home: "You nearly came
perforating. upon the man." From that time on, they had no peace at
home and often quarrelled. He did not consider her
Internal Examination: — anymore as his wife. But he suspects nobody of having
killed his wife, for he was of the impression that she
1. Cervix soft, probably committed suicide by hanging herself as
closed, no previously, she wanted to hang herself but was stopped
vaginal by her uncle, "Tio Awe." His version of the incident is, as
discharge follows: In the afternoon of October 9, 1983, his wife was
in their house. When he arrived in the evening of that
2. Uterus — day, he and his wife had an altercation because she
pregnant to suspected him of having an affair with the daughter of
about 4-5 Manoy Carlito. She told him to leave otherwise, she will
months in size. leave. So, he left and visited his farm. Upon returning at
around 6:00 o'clock in the evening he found his wife gone
Internal findings: and their daughter crying alone. He carried her and
proceeded to the house of his parents-in-law to inquire
1. Lung — both whether or not his wife is there. Not finding her, he left
lungs collapsed the child in their care and proceeded to the house of
colored grayish. Carlito. He likewise did not find her there. He then
borrowed Carlito's flashlight to look for her. At that time,
2. Heart —- he was armed with a sharp bladed instrument. He looked
normal in size. for her in the huts near their farm but she was not there.
When it started to rain, he returned to the house of
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxation Carlito to check whether or not his wife is already there,
secondary to hanging.7 only to find out that it was not so. Since it was raining
hard, he stayed in the house of Carlito up to around 5:30
o'clock in the morning of the following day, when he went
home hoping to find his wife there. Still, there was no
trace of his wife. Searching around the premises, he saw
his wife hanging from a branch of the jackfruit tree. He
was shocked and taken aback because he did not think
that his wife would do such a thing. He knew that she
was dead because she was not moving. But the first
thing he did was to go to the house of his parents and
informed them about the incident instead of running to
her and cutting her down. His mother went immediately
to the police station, while he went to Dominador Baluyot,
one of the peace and order officers to inform him about
the incident.8
Juan Don, a councilor, and Dominador Baluyot, a laborer,
testified that there was no eyewitness to the incident,
They opined, however, that accused-appellant did not kill
Norma.
In this appeal, accused-appellant imputes error on the
part of the trial court for finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt despite evidence to the contrary.
Accused-appellant asseverates that the trial court erred
in arriving at the conclusion that he was motivated by
jealousy in killing his wife. Not only is this not true but on
the contrary, it was the victim who was jealous. She
previously tried to commit suicide but was fortunately
prevented from doing so by the timely intervention of her
"Tio Awe". In fact, he spent the night in the house of
Carlito Dichoso which he would not have done if he were
guilty. His first impulse, if he had killed his wife, is to go
into hiding to avoid arrest.
The Office of the Solicitor General supports the
conviction of accused-appellant. The injuries sustained
by his wife belie his assertion that she committed suicide
by hanging herself. His defense of denial is one of the
weakest defenses. The presence of motive and the
attendant circumstances, correctly led the trial court to
believe that he killed his wife.
We uphold the conviction of accused-appellant.
The quantum of proof necessary to establish accused-
appellant's guilt, albeit based on circumstantial evidence,
is sufficient. There is more than one circumstance. The
facts from which the inference are derived are proven.
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.9 Thus, we
quote as our own the ratiocination of the trial court:
MOTIVE:
There is not (sic) question (that) there was
a serious quarrel between accused
Emmanuel Desalisa and his young wife
deceased Norma Desalisa. The accused
admitted the existence of the quarrel to
P/Cpl. Gillego, as was testified to by the
mother-in-law of the accused Paulina
Dioneda and admitted by the accused when
he testified for and in his own behalf. . . .
Likewise, accused admitted (that) one
Aryate was courting Norma and that when
the matter was brought out to him, the
accused was trembling and very pale.
Paulina Dioneda testified, which was
unrebutted nor denied by the accused, that
on October 9, 1983, at about 10:00 o'clock
in the morning, her daughter (deceased)
Norma accompanied by her mother-in-law
(mother of the accused) told her she had an
altercation with her husband accused
Emmanuel. Norma was, according to her,
slapped, boxed and manhandled by the
accused. . . .
When the accused testified for and in his
own behalf, he admitted that on October 9,
1983, or immediately prior to Norma's
hideous hanging, Norma refused to allow
him to enter the house or she will be the
one to leave the house. A statement
coming from a wife when told to a husband
cannot be mistaken to anything less than a
very serious quarrel.
The quarrel between accused Emmanuel
and deceased Norma prior to and
immediately before the fatal hanging when
considered with the kind of quarrel the
couple were having, an affair with another
man, culminating to his doubt having
fathered the child Norma was carrying at
the time was doubtful (sic). Jealousy (sic) is
a motive as old as time.
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT THE CRIME:
The accused has the opportunity to commit
the crime. The house where accused
Emmanuel and Norma live as pictured by
both the witnesses for the prosecution and
the defense is up a hill and isolated. The
whole neighborhood consists of only three
(3) houses. While it is true (that) from any of
the three (3) houses, one cannot see the
other because of the fruit trees and shrubs
that abound, their distance from each other
is only 150 meters. No one, definitely no
one can go up the hill to visit or whatever
without being known to the neighbor. With
such an arrangement, no one can go up the
hill to the house of the accused Emmanuel
and Norma without their neighbors, who are
related to them, being aware of. Nowhere in
the whole evidence, where neither Norma's
family nor accused Emmanuel Desalisa's
family, directly or indirectly, even suspected
any stranger for having committed the
crime. The accused himself blamed that
(sic) his wife Norma for having taken her
own life. He never pointed his accusing
finger to anybody.
As early as 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
October 9, 1983, accused Emmanuel was
with Norma and their child in their house up
the hill at Pinaductan, San Juan, Bacon.
They were all alone in that isolated house
when he was not allowed, with threatening
voice, entry in his own house, or his wife
will leave the house. What can be more
humiliating to a man aside from a wife
being unfaithful to be refused entry to one's
very home? A man maybe able to swallow
defeat to a woman's affection, even lose the
love of a wife, but to be scorned and
refused entry to one's house by the very
woman who was unfaithful to his love, is
something a man cannot take sitting down,
as the accused did take with his own hand
the life of his young wife Norma.
The intensity of the hatred of the man who
committed the dastardly act of hanging
Norma by the neck tied to the branch of a
jackfruit tree is shown by the injury suffered
by the deceased. The injury on the head,
the entangled hair of the deceased to the
noose of the rope, the proximity (six inches)
of the noose that holds and encircles the
neck of the deceased to that of the branch
of the jackfruit tree, the contusion in the
labia minora and punctured wound suffered
by the deceased in her genital area, could
have only be done by a man whose
manhood was trampled upon, as accused
Emmanuel Desalisa in his jealousy was
prone to believe, and in his blind jealousy
not only snuffed the life of his wife by
hanging but also tortured and humiliated
the deceased by abusing and inflicting
injury to her private parts as a last act of
insult to humiliate her womanhood, as he
was insulted and humiliated to (sic) what he
believe (sic) his unfaithful wife has
committed against his honor.
Another point that is pointed, is, when the
accused was at the house of his neighbor,
his Manoy Carlito Dichoso, after having left
said house to look for his wife, he was
asked by Carlito if he found his wife. The
accused did not answer the query. He just
sat on the bench and said, "his wife Norma
is possessed by devils." When Carlito's wife
who was then present told him to be patient
with his wife because she is pregnant,
again, the accused, did not answer. When
the accused was at the police headquarters
of Bacon, and in the presence of many, was
accused (sic) by his father-in-law Vicente
Dioneda, why he killed his daughter Norma.
Again, the accused did not answer. That
when P/Cpl. Gillego was able to extract
from him the information that one Ariate
was courting Norma, the accused was
trembling and very pale. These are
actuations and circumstances pointing to a
man bothered by a guilty conscience. 10
The uncorroborated assertions of accused-appellant that
it was the victim who was jealous of him and that she has
tried to commit suicide previously are nothing but self-
serving statements which cannot outweigh the
prosecution's overwhelming evidence to the contrary. 11
There is ample evidence to support the finding that the
hanging of the victim was homicidal 12 and not suicidal,
as claimed by accused-appellant. A day after the
incident, Vicente Dioneda found scattered plates and
kettle with untouched rice on the floor of the house of
accused-appellant 13 while Cpl. Gillego found that some
things in the house were not in proper places. 14 These
are indicia or previous struggle. There were blood stains
on the victim's dress, 15 panty, 16 and feet. 17 On her
genitalia, the doctor found a punctured wound, 1 cm. long
and 2 cm. deep, with slight blood clot which could have
been caused by any pointed object, sharp bolo or sharp
pointed instrument. 18 Accused-appellant admitted during
the cross-examination that he was armed with a sharp
bladed instrument while he was looking for his
wife. 19 The doctor also found hematoma with contusion
on both labia of her genitalia, which could have been
caused by a fist blow. 20 According to the doctor, these
injuries could not have been self-inflicted. 21
Although accused-appellant spent the night in the house
of Carlito Dichoso and did not flee, this circumstance
standing alone is no brief on his innocence. There is no
case law holding that non-flight is conclusive proof of
innocence. 22
What strikes the attention of this Court further is the
testimony of accused-appellant that when he saw his wife
hanging from a branch of the jackfruit tree, he went to the
house of his parents and informed them about the
incident, 23 instead of bringing her down and determining
if she was still alive, and if so, to rush her to any doctor,
clinic or hospital. He didn't even bother to let his parents-
in-law know of what happened to their daughter because
according to him, he was confused. 24
We find it hard to believe in his excuse, considering that
the house of his parents-in-law, is only 150 meters away
from his house. 25 Furthermore, it goes without saying
that his parents-in-law are the more concerned persons
than his parents with respect to the misfortune that befell
their daughter. Or, he could have proceeded to the house
of Carlito Dichoso, which is likewise only 150 meters
away from his house. We view the course of action that
he took as akin to seeking sanctuary in the protective
arms of his parents.
The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
can not be appreciated against accused-appellant absent
any proof as to how and when the plan to kill was
hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried
out. 26 Neither may be the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime be appreciated against him because there is no
proof that it was purposely sought or taken advantage of,
or that it facilitated the commission of the crime. 27
However, the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited
place is present. The uninhabitedness of a place is
determined not by the distance of the nearest house to
the scene of the crime but whether or not in the place of
commission, there was reasonable possibility of the
victim receiving some help. Considering that the killing
was done during nighttime and many fruit trees and
shrubs obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby,
there was no reasonable possibility for the victim to
receive any assistance. 28 At any rate, in the imposition of
the proper penalty we shall disregard the presence of this
aggravating circumstance, which we shall explain later.
We note that the trial court convicted accused-appellant
of the crime of parricide only. This is an error. The
evidence on record has shown beyond reasonable doubt
that accused-appellant has committed the complex crime
of parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion was
caused by the same violence that caused the death of
the victim. It is unintentional because accused-appellant
must have merely intended to kill the victim but not
necessarily to cause an abortion. 29
In case of complex crimes, the penalty for the more
serious crime in its maximum period shall be
imposed. 30 The maximum period of the penalty for
parricide, the more serious crime, is death. 31 However,
by reason of Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution which proscribes the imposition of the death
penalty, the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua. 32 Being a single indivisible penalty, reclusion
perpetua is imposed regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. 33
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
modified. Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The civil indemnity for the death of
the victim is increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-6344 March 21, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
W.L. Wright for appellants.
Acting Attorney Harvey for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal by Manuel Rodriguez, Cipriano Galvez,
Raymundo Revilla, Dorotea Rojas, Feliciano Pantanilla,
Roman Villaister, Pedro Villanueva, Nicomedes Abella
Sabino Raymundo, Geronimo Guijon, Martin Sauler,
Eusebio Bustamante, Victoriano Calipusan and Valentin
Multialto from a judgment o the Court of First Instance of
the Moro Province, Hon Herbert D. Gale presiding,
convicting them of the crime of murder and sentencing
them each to death.
From the proofs presented by the Government, it
appears that the appellants, with nine other, being
members of the second company of the Constabulary
stationed at Davao, mutinied on the 6th day of June,
1909, attempting, during the course of such mutiny, to kill
one of their superior officers, Lieutenant Goicuria; that
immediately after such revolt the mutinees, having taken
arms and ammunition from the depositary, left the vicinity
of Davao and marched toward the mountains of Lipada;
that on the 8th day of June, 1909, said mutineers
returned to Davao for the purpose of attacking the town;
that the inhabitants thereof, having received previous
notice of the proposed attack, prepared themselves to
meet it; that J. L. Burchfield, P. C. Libby, A. M.
Templeton, and Roy Libby, armed with rifles, having
been detailed by those commanding the defense of the
town, on the afternoon of the day referred to, advanced
to the cemetery within the limits of the town, forming an
outpost for the purpose of awaiting the coming of the
mutineers; that about 4.15 o'clock they sighted the
mutineers; that immediately thereafter they heard a shot,
followed by others, which came from near the cemetery,
where the mutineers had halted and dismounted; that
after a few shots had been exchanged Roy Libby was
struck with a ball and killed; that the outpost retreated to
the convent and took refuge therein; that the mutineers
advanced against the town, attacking it at various points
and especially the convent, where a portion of the
residents of the town had gathered, including the women
and children, or the purpose of defending themselves;
that no other person except Roy Libby was killed,
although several others were more or less severely
wounded.
What with the confession of some of the accused, the
testimony of others, and the evidence presented by the
witnesses for the prosecution, there remains so little a
question of fact in this case that it is substantially
unworthy of discussion. That the appellants with others
revolted against their superior officers on the 6th of June;
that they returned to Davao on the 8th and attacked it
viciously and persistently, killing one of its defenders and
wounding several others; and that they all took a direct
and active part therein, is not only absolutely undoubted
from the testimony of the prosecution but is substantially
admitted by all of the defendants in the case. Some of
the appellants sought to defend themselves upon the
ground that they had been forced, by threats and
intimidation, to take part in the mutiny and the attack
upon Davao by other members o the mutineer band. The
evidence in no way justifies this defense and it is utterly
impossible under any construction of the evidence to
sustain it. All of the appellants, however, agree in
presenting the defense that they entered the town of
Davao on the 8th of June, not for the purpose of
attacking it for the purpose of surrendering to their
superior officers and the governor of the district. Not only
it is impossible from the testimony of the prosecution to
arrive at such a conclusion o fact, but it is almost as
nearly impossible to arrive at such a conclusion from the
evidence presented by the appellants themselves. No
defense upon the facts worthy of the name has been
presented.
As to whether or not there was present premeditacion
conocida, qualifying the crime as murder, a simple
reading of the proofs presented by the Government is
sufficient to demonstrate that beyond question or doubt.
It appears that all of the appellants, on or about the 8th
day of June, at about 11 o'clock in the forenoon, went to
the house of Cenon Rasay, some distance from Davao,
in order to obtain information as to whether or not
reinforcements had been landed at Davao. On being
informed that, to the knowledge of the persons
questioned, none had been landed, they asked the elder
Rasay to permit them to leave at his house the three
woman that accompanied them, as they were going to
march on Davao and attack it. The appellant Rodriguez
also requested that, in case he should be killed in the
attack, he, Rasay, should treat one of the women, who
was the wife of Rodriguez, as his servant. Having left the
women in the house of Cenon, they took up the march to
Davao. On arriving near the river Bagoo, they were
overtaken by Ignacio Rasay, a kinsman of Cenon Rasay,
and suspecting that he was going to Davao for the
purpose of warning the town against the meditated
attack, they halted him and told him that, if he should give
any warning of their approach, they would cause damage
to his family. He having assured them that such was not
his purpose, they permitted him to proceed. The
appellants continued on their way and arriving at the
cemetery near Davao heard a shot, which they claim
came from those who had seen sent out to watch for their
approach. On seeing this advance guard, the accused
dismounted from their horses and began to fire forming in
a skirmish line and advancing steadily. Overwhelmed by
the number of the attacking party, the outpost retreated
toward the village, pursued by the appellant. There
followed an attack upon the town, more or less general,
of the kind and character generally to be expected from
such a body of men. The attacks was, in a large
measure, unsuccessful and the mutineers withdrew when
they saw the futility of further fighting.
The learned trial court found premeditacion conocida as
the element qualifying the crime as murder. The learned
counsel for the appellants excepts to this finding and
asserts that, inasmuch as the appellants did not know
even of the existence of the deceased, Roy Libby, at the
time of his death, much less that he was at the time in the
village they attacked and one of the outpost of four, his
death could not possibly have been premeditated. He
argues that, in order that the killing be premeditated, the
accused must have resolved to kill the premeditated
person. We do not stop to discuss this question at length
for the reason that it has already been determined by this
court adversely to the learned counsel's contention. In
the case of the United States vs. The Moro Manalinde,
"the accused made up his mind to kill two undetermined
persons, the first whom he should meet on the way, in
compliance with the inducement of a third person." In its
decision the court said:
As to the other circumstance it is also
unquestionable that the accused upon accepting
the order and undertaking the journey in order to
comply therewith, deliberately considered and
carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the
nature and the consequences of the acts which,
under orders received from the said Datto, he was
about to carry out, and to that end provided
himself with a weapon, concealing it by wrapping it
up, and started on a journey of a day and a night
for the sole purpose of taking the life of two
unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and
with whom he had never had any trouble; nor did
there exist any reason which, to a certain extent,
might warrant his perverse deed. The fact that the
arrangement between the instigator and the tool
considered the killing of unknown persons, the first
encountered, does not bar the consideration of the
circumstance of premeditation. The nature of the
circumstances which characterize the crime, the
perversity of the culprit, and the material and
moral injury are the same, and the fact that the
victim was not predetermined does not affect nor
alter the nature of the crime. The person having
been deprived of his life by deeds executed with
deliberate intent, the crime is considered a
premeditated one, as the firm and persistent
intention of the accused from the moment, before
said death, when he received the order until the
crime was committed upon the offer of money,
reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes
present, the latter not being inherent in the former,
and there existing no incompatibility between the
two, premeditation can not necessarily be
considered as included merely because an offer
money, reward or promise was made, for the latter
might have existed without the former, the one
being independent of the other. In the present
case there can be no doubt that after the crime
was agreed upon by means of a promise of
reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct
showed a persistently and firm intent in his plan to
carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed
to execute, it being immaterial whether Datto
Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once
Manalinde obeyed the inducement and voluntarily
executed it. (U.S. vs The Moro Manalinde, 14 Phil.
Rep., 77.)
The trial court found that the crime charged was
committed with the aggravating circumstances following:
8. When craft, fraud or disguise is employed.
9. When advantage is taken of superior strength or
means are employed to weaken the defense.
10. When the act is committed with abuse of confidence.
11. When advantage is taken is taken by the culprit of his
public position.
13. When the crime is committed on the occasion of a
fire, shipwreck or other calamity or misfortune.
15. When it is committed at night, or in an uninhabited
place, or by a gang.
16. When the crime is committed in contempt with insult
to the public authorities.
As to number 8:
We do not believe that this circumstance was present.
This circumstance is characterized by the intellectual or
mental rather than the physical means to which the
criminal resorts to carry out his design. This paragraph
was intended to cover, for example, the case where a
thief falsely represents that he is the lover of the servant
of a house in order to gain entrance and rob the owner
(astucia); or where (fraude) A simulates the handwriting
of B, who is a friend of C, inviting the latter, without the
knowledge of B, by means of a note written in such
simulated hand, to meet B at a designated place, in order
to give A, who lies in wait at the place appointed, an
opportunity to kill C; or where (disfraz) one uses a
disguise to prevent being recognized; and cases of that
class and nature.
We are unable to find from the facts proved any element
which warrants the conclusions of the learned trial court
as to the presence of this circumstance in the
commission of the crime of which the appellants were
found guilty. They boldly marched from the mountains of
Lipada to Davao, partly, at least, in the daytime, with the
purpose of attacking the town, which purpose they
communicated to at least three person, one of whom was
permitted to precede them to the town. they advanced
against the town at about 4.15 in the afternoon without
any effort at concealment. They were in no way
disguised, but, on the contrary, each wore the greater
portion of the Constabulary uniform in which he was clad
at the time of the mutiny. While it appears that some of
them had cloths wrapped about their heads, it does not
appear that this was done as a disguise, but was
following rather the custom of the country in which they
had been reared. We find in all the case nothing of craft,
fraud or disguise.
As to number 9:
The circumstance depends upon the relative strength of
the one attacking and the one attacked. It can hardly be
said that advantage is taken of superior strength or
means are employed to weaken the defense when
twenty-three men, in the daytime, openly and without
stratagem of any kind, attack a town of the size of Davao.
the results of the attack clearly show that the strength of
the attacking party was not sufficient to accomplish the
purpose in view. They demonstrate, under the
circumstance, that no means were employed to weaken
the defense, outside of such as are inherent in the
situation when one body of men attacks another with
deadly weapons.
As to number 10:
For the existence of this circumstance it is necessary that
there exist a relation of trust or confidence between the
person committing the crime and the one against whom it
is committed and that the former make use of such
relation to commit the crime. For example, where one
commits a robbery in a house in which, as a friend of the
owner, he is at the time a guest. No relation of this nature
existed between the appellants and the citizens of Davao
or the deceased. The evidence fails to disclose a single
fact upon which the existence of this relation can be
based.
As to number 11:
In order that this aggravating circumstance exist it is
necessary that the person committing the crime be a
public official and that he use the influence, prestige or
ascendency which such office gives him as the means by
which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter
is presented in the inquiry, "Did the accused abuse his
office in order to commit the crime?" We do not believe
that the facts of this case warrant the finding of the trial
court in this particular. (Supreme court of Spain,
decisions of 4th March, 1872; 18th December, 1871.)
As to number 13:
The reason for the existence of this circumstance is
found in the debased form of criminality met in one who,
in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to
the afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking advantage
of their misfortune to despoil them.
As is readily seen from the facts, no such condition as is
described in this paragraph existed in Davao on the
occasion of the attack.
As to number 15:
The second paragraph of this subdivision reads:
The court shall take this circumstance into
consideration according to the nature and
characteristics of the crime.
In this case, under all the circumstances, including those
presented in the discussion relating to paragraph 9, the
fact that there were more than three armed persons in
the attacking party is not sufficient to call for the
application of the provisions of this paragraph.
As to number 16:
The supreme court of Spain has held "that the
circumstance of contempt of or insult to public authority,
provided for in paragraph 16 of the Penal Code, can exist
only when such authority is engaged in the exercise of its
functions and he who is thus engaged in the exercise of
said functions is not the person against whom the crime
is committed in which that circumstance appears;" the
court further saying that such aggravating circumstance
was not present in the case before it "because D. Jose
Torres, although he was municipal judge, was the object
of the murder involved in that case."
In the case at bar, if the crime was committed with
contempt of and insult to the public authorities, those
authorities must have been the public authorities of
Davao. But the persons exercising that authority were the
very persons against whom, among others, the crime
charged in this action was being committed.
After diligent investigation and extended consideration,
we have been unable to find that any aggravating
circumstances attended the commission of this crime.
There being present no aggravating circumstances and
there existing no extenuating circumstances, the penalty
imposed must be in its medium degree.
The judgment of the court below is hereby modified and
the appellants are each sentenced to cadena perpetua,
to the accessories provided by law, to pay, jointly and
severally, to the heirs of the deceased Roy Libby the sun
of P1,000 and to pay the costs of the trial.
So modified, the judgment is affirmed, with costs against
the appellants.
G.R. No. 93021 May 8, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIANO UMBRERO, ALFREDO COSTALES alias
PIDO, JIMMY AGLUBA and LEON
CERIA, accused. MARIANO UMBRERO, ALFREDO
COSTALES @ Pido, and JIMMY AGLUBA, accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Alfredo J. Donato for accused-appellants.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Aparri, Branch 8, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, the Court finds the accused
Mariano Umbrero, Jaime (Jimmy) Agluba and
Alfredo Costales alias Pido, guilty of the crime of
MURDER as defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code and therefore
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay jointly and
severally an indemnity of THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS to the heirs of Alfonso Urbi;
and each of them to pay 1/7 of the costs. (Rollo, p.
31)
The information filed against the accused reads:
That on or about November 29, 1980, in the
Municipality of Lallo, province of Cagayan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, Mariano Umbrero, Alfredo
Costales alias Pido, Jimmy Agluba and Leon
Ceria, together with Eugenio Rigon alias Inyong,
Bartolome Tangonan and Danny Costales who are
still at-large and not yet arrested, armed with guns,
conspiring together and helping one another, with
intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one,
Alfonso Urbi, inflicting upon the latter wounds on
his body which caused his death.
That the offense was committed with the following
aggravating circumstances, to wit: (a) that it was
committed with abuse of superior strength, and (b)
that it was committed by a band. (Records, p. 33)
The accused Mariano Umbrero, Alfredo Costales, Jimmy
Agluba and Leon Ceria pleaded not guilty on
arraignment. The other accused, Eugenio Rigon,
Bartolome Tangonan, and Danny Costales were not
arraigned as they were still at large.
The prosecution evidence upon which the trial court
based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Angelina Urbi Ragsac, daughter of the victim
Alfonso Urbi testified: She was at home in Sta.
Teresa at about 2:00 in the afternoon of November
29, 1980 when several armed men came, two (2)
of whom shot her father under the house, accused
Alfredo Costales and Danny Costales. She was
not able to recognize the other armed men. She
was two (2) meters from her father when he was
shot. Of the two accused mentioned, she only
identified in Court accused Alfredo Costales.
Danny Costales was not present. He was the one
who shot her father. He followed her father when
he ran outside the house but the companions of
Alfredo Costales followed and killed him. Alfredo
Costales and Danny Costales shot her father with
short firearms. Their companions had long
firearms. All the accused ran after killing her
father. She and her mother did not do anything
because they were afraid; however, they went to
get the body of her father later on. He sustained
five (5) gunshot wounds on his breast and
stomach. She reported the killing of her father to
barangay captain Felix Villamin. Thereafter she
executed an affidavit marked as Exhibits "E" and
"E-1" which were admitted by the defense as part
of the record. Mariano Umbrero was among the
armed men who came to their house in the
afternoon of November 29, 1980. She knows him
personally.
On cross-examination defense counsel Atty.
Alfredo J. Donato made reference to question No.
5 and the corresponding answer, in the affidavit of
the witness (Exhibits "E" & "E-1 ") to be marked as
Exhibit "I " for the defense. She admitted that the
first one to shoot her father was Danny Costales of
Jurisdiccion, Camalaniugan known and called
Dominador who executed an affidavit. She knew
that Alfredo Costales was apprehended. As to
Danny Costales, she does not know whether or
not he was apprehended. In 1980 their place was
infested with NPA and she believed that Danny
Costales and his companions were members of
the NPA. She does not know of any motive of the
armed men in killing her father. She, her father
and mother and her children were then eating on
the ground floor of their house when the armed
men arrived. Her father stood up when Danny
Costales asked for water to drink. Her father went
to the door to see him and his companions. It was
there where Danny Costales shot him.
On August 5, 1985 the prosecution presented
Eugenia Urbi, surviving spouse of the victim
Alfonso Urbi. Her testimony is hereby reproduced
substantially: In the afternoon of November 29,
1980, at about 2:00 o'clock, she and her deceased
husband were in the house of their daughter
Angelina Urbi Ragsac in Sta. Teresa, Lallo. To
their surprise, armed men came to ask for water.
When her husband went to them to give water he
was shot by Johnny Costales. Mariano Umbrero,
Jimmy Agluba and Pido Costales were his
companions. She identified in Court Pido Costales
who gave his name as Alfredo Costales, Mariano
Umbrero and Jaime Agluba. Johnny Costales was
not in Court. She knows Leon Ceria he being her
barriomate. She saw him the following day after
the killing of her husband when he passed by their
house. She did not see Leon Ceria with the group
of armed men who went to their house. She was
about a meter from her husband when he was
shot by Johnny Costales in the presence of his
companions. Johnny and Danny Costales was
admitted as one and the same person. At the time
Danny Costales shot her husband, some of his
companions were near him and some were a little
bit far. Those who were near him were the
accused Pido Costales, Mariano Umbrero and
Jimmy Agluba. They were all armed. Danny
Costales and his companions left after shooting
her husband. Thereafter the killing of her husband
was reported to barangay captain Felix Villamin
who instructed Juan Urbi to get the body of her
husband. She could not be compensated for the
killing of her husband. She was investigated, and
in connection therewith she executed an affidavit
(Exhibits "F" and "F-1").
On cross-examination, she testified that Danny
Costales shot her husband three (3) times. She
clarified that when they were eating, Danny
Costales and his companions suddenly arrived.
They asked for water. Her husband stood up and
went to see them. That was the time when Danny
Costales shot her husband for the first time. Her
husband ran outside, followed by Danny Costales
and shot him again. Danny Costales and his
companions then left. She did not go immediately
to the place of her husband because she was
afraid. At the time Danny Costales shot her
husband, accused Alfredo Costales, Jaime Agluba
and Mariano Umbrero were holding their firearms
at their sides. They drew their guns when her
husband ran outside the house; however, they did
not prevent her husband from running outside the
house. She could not tell as to whether or not
Mariano Umbrero, Jimmy Agluba and Alfredo
Costales fired their guns.
Exhibit "B", sworn statement of Eugenia Urbi, was
also adopted as Exhibit "4" for the defense, to
show that the victim sustained five (5) gunshot
wounds, the entrance of which were 0.5 cm.
showing that the fatal weapon was fired by one
person.
On August 28, 1985 the prosecution presented
Martin Pagaduan, also a resident of Sta. Teresa,
Lallo, Cagayan. He was in his ricefield north of the
house of Alfonso Urbi on the day he was shot to
death. He saw more than ten (10) armed men
passed by going westward. Not long thereafter, he
heard gun reports from the house of Alfonso Urbi
which is less than fifty (50) meters from his
ricefield. The armed men returned and proceeded
eastward. They took his brother Juan Pagaduan.
He was able to identify Mariano Umbrero, Jimmy
Agluba, Pido Costales, Inyong Rigon, Florante
Tabunal and Romy Arellano who were with the
group of armed men he saw. When he heard gun
reports he saw the armed men surrounding the
house of Alfonso Urbi. The persons in the house
cried loudly. He went to hide because he was
afraid. When the armed men were already gone,
he went to the house of Alfonso Urbi. He saw him
already dead in his yard. He sustained gunshot
wounds. He identified in Court accused Mariano
Umbrero, Jimmy Agluba and Alfredo Costales.
They were all holding firearms when they passed
by. He was confronted with his affidavit taken
during the investigation conducted by the
Integrated National Police of Lallo which was
marked as Exhibits "G" and "G-1 ".
On cross-examination he admitted that he was
examined during the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Lallo.
His signature appearing therein was marked as
Exhibit "2" and the signature of Judge Pascual as
Exhibit "2-B". The question of the Court: "How did
you know that there were ten (10) heavily armed
men who were present in the house of Alfonso
Urbi on November 29, 1980 at around 2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon when he was gunned down by
these heavily armed persons? Ans. I was around
forty (40) meters away from these heavily armed
persons preparing my harrow when I was attracted
by the presence of those armed persons when
one of them by the name of Doming Arellano shot
the late Alfonso Urbi with an armalite was marked
as Exhibit "2-D". (Rollo, p. 22-24)
The case as against Leon Ceria was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
As for Mariano Umbrero, Alfredo Costales and Jimmy
Agluba, their version is summarized as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Mariano Umbrero corroborated his witness
Alejandrino Umangay, that they they left Sta.
Teresa and Rosario, respectively because the
soldiers ordered them to evacuate; they and other
residents of the barangay were suspected as
members of the NPA. On November 29, 1980,
Alejandrino Umangay went to collect from Mariano
Umbrero an indebtedness of P200.00. To pay the
same Mariano Umbrero sought to mill his palay in
Bical, Lallo, a distance of three kilometers in the
ricemill of Gregorio Cabulay. As they were putting
in a sack the palay, two men arrived Ka Al the
leader of the NPA and Danny Costales. They
invited Mariano Umbrero to the house of Alfonso
Urbi. Mariano Umbrero excused himself for they
were going to mill his palay, and they told him to
follow. At 4:00 o'clock their palay was milled and
Mariano Umbrero started for his house at 5:00
o'clock. Mariano Umbrero denied having been with
Danny Costales, when he shot to death Alfonso
Urbi.
The accused Alfredo Costales corroborated the
testimony of his wife Maria Umoso, that on
November 29, 1980 when Alfonso Urbi was killed
he was not in Sta. Teresa, Lallo, for he was in
Aparri, Cagayan on the burial of Benilda Espino,
their granddaughter who died on November 23,
1980 (Exh. 4, Death Certificate) who was buried
on November 28, 1980 in the afternoon, and went
back to Sta. Teresa at 5:00 o'clock and arrived at
9:00 o'clock in the evening. In 1980, the soldiers
ordered them to evacuate Sta. Teresa due to the
presence of the NPA. Alfredo Costales denied
having been with Danny Costales (no relation)
when he killed Alfonso Urbi on November 29,
1980, at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. (pp.
7, 8 Decision)
The accused Jaime Agluba, corroborated the
testimony of his wife Laureta Agluba, who testified
that in 1980 soldiers ordered residents of Sta.
Teresa to evacuate due to the presence of NPA.
On November 29, 1980, were not in Sta. Teresa
but they were in Newagac, Gattaran, a distance of
about 50 kilometers. (should be 15 kilometers,
TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 10-11) As is their
usual work the accused Jaime Agluba, during
farming time always went to help his sister Estrella
Villamin, married to Rufino Villamin. They left Sta.
Teresa on November 23, 1980 and continued
living in Newagac, until their return to Sta. Teresa,
Lallo, on December 2, 1980. Jaime Agluba denied
having been with Danny Costales when he killed
Alfonso Urbi on November 29,1980." (Appellant's
Brief, pp. 3-4)
xxx xxx xxx
The appellants raise the following assignment of errors,
to wit:
I
THAT THE HON. LOWER COURT ERRED IN
NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION AS
AGAINST THE ACCUSED MARIANO UMBRERO,
THERE BEING NO CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN THE
MUNICIPAL COURT OR WAS THERE A
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN THE OFFICE
OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, THUS
DENYING HIM THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS.
II
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING ALL THE ACCUSED
TO RECLUSION PERPETUA AND THE
PAYMENT OF P30,000.00 INDEMNITY. (Rollo, p.
50)
In the first assigned, error, Mariano Umbrero alleges that
he was denied his right to due process. He states that
there was no preliminary investigation conducted as his
name not included in the criminal complaint filed with the
municipal court which conducted the preliminary
investigation.
The allegation is unmeritorious.
We agree with the Solicitor General that:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [A]lthough appellant Umbrero was not named
in the complaint filed by the police with the
municipal trial court for the purpose of conducting
a preliminary investigation, the municipal judge
upon being informed that Mariano Umbrero was
one of the perpetrators of the killing of Alfonso
Urbi, issued a warrant of arrest and later ordered
suspect Umbrero to file his counter-affidavit. The
record shows that appellant Umbrero was given
the opportunity to answer the charges against him
during the preliminary investigation. (Appellee's
Brief, pp. 6-7)
Moreover, it has been held in Parades v.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 89989, January 28, 1991),
reiterating this Court's ruling in People v. Casiano (1
SCRA 478, [1961]), that:
The absence of a preliminary investigation does
not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor
does it impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective. If there was no
preliminary investigation and the defendant, before
entering his plea, calls the attention of the court to
the absence of a preliminary investigation, the
court, instead of dismissing the information, should
conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to
conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court
so that the preliminary investigation may be
conducted. (pp. 7-8)
The appellant never asked for or called the attention of
the court before entering his plea, as to the absence of a
preliminary investigation. His right to preliminary
investigation, then is deemed waived as he failed to
invoke such right prior to or, at least, at the time of the
entry of his plea in the court of first instance. (People v.
Casiano, p. 483, supra) The entry of their plea
constituted a waiver of their right to preliminary
investigation and any irregularity that attended it.
(See People v. La Caste, 37 SCRA 767, 773 [1971])
Jurisdiction was acquired by the Court over the person of
Mariano Umbrero as the accused appeared at the
arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
(See Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1, 5 [1988])
In the second assigned error, the appellants contend that
there was no conspiracy, thus, they should all be
adjudged as innocent. They asserted that mere presence
at the scene of the crime does not by itself indicate the
existence of conspiracy. There must be proof of their
participation in the crime.
This contention must fail.
It is well-settled rule that conspiracy need not be proved
by direct evidence but can be inferred from the acts of
the accused. (People v. Alitao, G.R. No. 74736, February
18, 1991) The appellants' actuations immediately prior to,
during, and right after the shooting of Alfonso Urbi
indicate their common intention to commit the crime. The
appellants were not merely present at the scene of the
crime. The prosecution witnesses positively identified the
appellants as among the armed men who arrived at the
scene of the crime, shot Alfonso Urbi, and left together
after apparently accomplishing their purpose. (TSN, April
10, 1985, pp. 2, 7; TSN, August 5, 1985, pp. 2, 6; TSN,
August 28,1985, pp. 2-3)
The trial court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
It will be recalled that accused Mariano Umbrero,
Jaime Agluba and Alfredo Costales, alias Pido and
others were all armed when they went together to
the house of the victim Alfonso Urbi. They were
close to Danny Costales when he (Danny) asked
for water which was not their common purpose.
Alfonso Urbi got near to see them. Suddenly he
was shot by Danny Costales. He ran outside the
house but was overtaken by Danny Costales who
pumped more shots on him all located on the vital
parts of the body, causing his instantaneous
death. They all left together upon accomplishing
their purpose. The accused were all holding their
firearms on their sides, while others stood guard
and surrounded the house. The acts performed by
all the accused before, during and after the
perpetration of the crime are indicative of a
previous criminal design and unity of common
purpose. (Rollo, p. 30)
The appellants although not active participants in the
killing itself, made no effort to prevent it. In fact, the
appellants even drew the guns that were tucked on their
waists when Alfonso Urbi, after being shot for the first
time, tried to run outside of his house. (TSN, August
5,1985, pp. 18-19)
Conspiracy having been established, the appellants as
co-conspirators are all guilty on the principle that the act
of one is the act of all. (People v. de Guzman, 162 SCRA
145,153 [1988])
The defense of alibi of the appellants is without merit.
The appellants were positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses as the witnesses were only a few
meters away from the crime scene. (TSN, April 10, 1985,
p. 3; TSN August 5, 1985, p. 5).
The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses of the
appellants (People v. Kyamko, G.R. No. 95263,
December 18, 1990). There is nothing in the records
which would show a motive or reason on the part of the
witnesses to falsely implicate the accused. Identification,
then, should be given full credit. As there is no showing
that the prosecution witnesses were moved by improper
motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved,
their testimony therefore, is entitled to full faith and credit.
(People v. Doctolero, G.R. No. L-34386, February
7,1991)
In the instant case, the appellants failed to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that they were at some
other place and for such a period of time as to negate
their presence at the time when and the place where the
crime was committed. (See People v. Solis, G.R. No.
93629, March 18, 1991 citing People v. Riego, G.R. No.
90256, September 12, 1990)
The persons that the appellants presented to corroborate
their alibis were their relatives.
Alfredo Costales and Jaime Agluba could have presented
other people, aside from their wives, to corroborate their
testimony that they were at some place other than the
scene of the crime. But even the testimony of Jaime
Agluba's wife did not clearly show that Jaime Agluba was
not in Sta. Teresa as she stated that during their stay in
Newagac her husband would go to the field and it was
only the wife's belief that her husband was in the field in
the afternoon of November 29, 1980. (TSN, January 17,
1989, pp. 16-17) As regards Mariano Umbrero, he could
have presented Gregorio Cabulay (TSN, April 21, 1986,
p. 27) aside from Alejandrino Umangay to support his
statement. Umangay's corroboration is not that credible
as Umbrero and Umangay had known each other ever
since they were still little boys (TSN, April 21, 1986, p.
31) and Umbrero's relative is Umangay's niece. (TSN,
April 21, 1986, p. 32) It has been ruled that the defense
of alibi is weak if it is established mainly by the accused
themselves and their relatives and not by credible
persons (See People v. Flores, G. R. No. 71980, March
18, 1991).
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in the
case at bar.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods,
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. (People v. Cempron, G.R. No. 66324, July 6,
1990; People v. Manzanares, 177 SCRA 427, 434,
[1989])
The shooting of Alfonso Urbi was sudden and
unexpected.1awp++i1 The victim was unarmed, unable
to defend himself. He was an unsuspecting victim as the
assailants just asked for a drink of water. (TSN, April 10,
1985, p. 20; TSN, August 5,1985, p. 2) He was totally
unprepared to be able to defend himself.
On the other hand, evident premeditation was not clearly
established, contrary to the findings of the trial court.
Although conspiracy existed, it was merely inferred from
the acts of the accused in the perpetration of the crime,
the requisites necessary to appreciate evident
premeditation have not been met in this case.
(See People v. Repe, 175 SCRA 422, 435 [1989]) The
prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the
time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had
clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (c)
the lapse of sufficient length of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act. (People v. Iligan, G. R. No.
75369, November 26, 1990; People v. Montejo, 167
SCRA 506, 513 [1988])
Aid of armed men should also not be appreciated in this
case, considering that the assailant as well as the
appellants were in conspiracy. (See People v. Candado,
84 SCRA 508, 524 [1978]; People v. Piring, 63 Phil. 546,
553 [1936])
The fact that Judge Tumacder did not preside at the trial
of this case in its entirety, having taken over only when
the second defense witness was to be presented, did not
detract from his appreciation of the prosecution evidence.
The full record was available to him. (See People v.
Abaya, 185 SCRA 419, 424 [1990])
In view of the foregoing, the appellants were correctly
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, but
without the attendant circumstances of evident
premeditation and aid of armed men. The penalty to be
imposed is reclusion perpetua. The indemnity to the heirs
of the deceased is raised to FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with the aforesaid MODIFICATION.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-32752-3 January 31, 1977
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIGUEL BALUYOT y DULAY, PABLO PINCA y
NARCA and ANTONIO BALINJARI y NAVAL, alias
TONY BALUYOT, defendants-appellants.
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., Counsel de oficio for appellants.
Acting Solicitor General Hector C. Fule, Assistant
Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor Reynato
S. Puno for appellee.
MAKASIAR, J:
This is an automatic review of the decision rendered on
October 7, 1970 by the Circuit Criminal Court of the Fifth
Judicial District holding sessions in Malolos Bulacan
(Judge Abelardo M. Dayrit, presiding), convicting the
defendants Miguel Baluyot y Dulay, Pablo Pinca y Narca
and Antonio Balinjari y Naval, alias Tony Baluyot, of the
crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing each and
all of them to death, with the other accessories of the law;
to proportionately indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P12,000.00; to correspondingly pay the said
heirs by way of moral and exemplary damages in the
amount of P20,000.00, proportionately; and similarly, to
proportionately pay the costs of these proceedings."
The information under which the aforenamed defendants
were charged reads as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses
Miguel Baluyot y Dulay Pablo Pinca y
Narca and Antonio Balinjari y Naval, alias
Tony Baluyot of the crime of robbery with
homicide, penalized under the provisions of
Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, Committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August
1970, in the Municipality of Malolos,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused Miguel Baluyot y Dulay, Pablo
Pinca y Narca and Antonio Balinjari y
Naval, alias Tony Baluyot, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of
gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, take and rob money from
Gerry Sureta alias Marcelino Carceles y
Abasola, then driving a taxi marked
AIRLANE with plate No. 14-97, 40-TX 870
(TX-9340 s/69), to the damage and
prejudice of the said Gerry Sureta alias
Marcelino Carceles y Abasola; that
simultaneously, on the occasion of or
during the commission of robbery, to enable
them to take, steal and carry away the said
money, the said accused, in furtherance of
their conspiracy, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation and
armed with a deadly weapon (dagger) fan-
nife did attack, assault and stab the said
Gerry Sureta alias Marcelino Carceles y
Abasola, hitting him in the neck, thereby
inflicting serious wounds (stab wounds
which directly caused the death of said
Gerry Sureta alias Marcelino Carceles y
Abasola.
That in the commission of this crime, the
following aggravating circumstances were
present, to wit: (1) nighttime, (.2) craft and 3
abuse of superior strength."
Upon arraignment on September 28, 1970, all the
accused, assisted by attorney de oficio, Atty. Oscar
Torres, pleaded not guilty to the information. The
following day — September 29 —when the case was
called for trial, the prosecution started presenting its
evidence. The accused were assisted by the same
attorney de officio, Atty. Oscar Torres, who manifested
that he was appearing as counsel for the accused in that
day's trial only. The prosecution thereupon called, as its
first witness, Dr. Ricardo V. Evangelists, a medicolegal
officer of the Provincial Hospital of Malolos, Bulacan.
Among other things, Dr. Evangelista Identified the post-
mortem findings on the deceased Marcelino Carceles y
Abasola alias Gerry Surete (Exh. A, p. 4 t.s.n.,
September 29, 1970-Bacani) and the diagram he
prepared in connection with the said post-mortem
findings (Exh A- 1, Idem.).
Trial was continued the following day, September 30,
1970. The accused were this time assisted by another
counsel de oficio, Atty. Godofredo Linsangan. At this
hearing, the prosecution called on its second witness,
one Democrito Mendoza. a corporal of the police force of
Malolos, Bulacan. Among other things, Corporal
Mendoza Identified the first accused Miguel Baluyot and
the statement given by the latter to the police (Exh. B, p.
2, t.s.n., Sept. 30, 1970, Idem.). The same witness also
Identified the third accused Antonio Balinjari y Naval,
alias Tony Baluyot, and the statement given by said
accused to the police (Exh. C. p. 3, t.s.n., Idem.). The last
witness presented by the prosecution on this day was
Guillermo R. Cruz, patrolman of the Malolos Police
Force. Among other things, this witness Identified the
second accused Pablo Pinca y Narca and the statement
given the police (Exh. D, p. 9 t.s.n., Idem).
Thereafter. the continuation of the trial was reset for
October 7, 1970. At this hearing, the accused were
assisted by another counsel de oficio, Atty. Eduardo
Villafuerte, who was appointed by the trial court after the
accused informed it that. they had no lawyer. Then the
trial court asked the new counsel de oficio what his
pleasure was, and the latter requested that he be given a
few minutes within which to confer with the accused. The
trial court gave him twenty (20) minutes within which to
"consumate" his conference. Accordingly, when the
session was resumed, Atty. Villafuerte manifested that
"after conferring with the accused, they intimated . . . their
desire to withdraw their former plea of not guilty and to
substitute in lieu thereof the plea of guilty to the offense
charged."
Without inquiring from the prosecution what its stand was
on the motion of counsel for the accused, the trial court,
addressing itself to all the accused said:
COURT
You have heard the manifestations of
counsel. To you now affirm the truthfulness
and correctness of the manifestation Of
counsel to the effect that you now desire to
withdraw your former plea of not guilty and
to substitute the same with that of guilty to
the offense charged?
Q — Miguel Baluyot y Dulay?
A — Yes, your Honor.
Q — Pablo Pinca y Narca
A — Yes, your Honor.
Q — Antonio Balinjari y
Naval?
A — Yes, your Honor.
 Q — Are you now ready to
hear your sentence?
A — Yes, your Honor.
Alright (pp. 2-3, t.s.n., October
7, 1970, Placido).
Then and there, and without much ado, the trial court
dictated in open court its decision under review, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations. the
Court declares the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the information (Art. 294, Par.
(1), Revised Penal Code) and in view of the
attendance of the lone mitigating
circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty to
the offense charged and the presence of
three (311, generic aggravating
circumstances one of which was
necessarily offset by the lone mitigating
circumstance of the said voluntary plea of
Guilty, as prescribed in Art. 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Court is
constrained to impose upon each of the
accused the DEATH PENALTY, with the
other accessories of the law; to
proportionately indemnify the heirs by the
victim in the amount of P12,000.00; to
correspondingly pay the said heirs by way
of moral and exemplary damages in the
amount of P20,000.00, proportionately; and
similarly, to proportionately pay the costs of
these proceedings ...
Before this COURT, the accused are represented by duly
designated counsel de oficio, Atty. Feliciano Belmonte,
Jr. In the brief he filed on December 6, 1972, counsel
assigned only one error, to wit: "The trial court erred in
convicting the accused appellants and imposing the
supreme penalty on the basis alone of their plea of guilty
to the information and the aggravating circumstances
alleged therein without the court ascertaining whether or
not there was evidence to support the existence of such
aggravating circumstances", and prayed for "the remand
of the case for further trial in the lower court."
On March 28, 1973, Acting Solicitor General Hector G.
Fule, Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin and
Solicitor Reynato S. Puno, filed a manifestation, which
has been considered as appellee's brief, virtually joining
the cause of the defendants-appellants by enumerating in
one page a long chain of cases previously decided by
this COURT, and praying that the decision under review
be vacated and the case remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings.
WE have painstakingly reviewed the record of this case
and WE find both the lone error assigned by appellants
and the manifestation of the Solicitor General well-taken.
Hence, WE set aside the decision of the trial court.
To start with, the court a quo did not even ascertain for
itself whether the accused completely understood the
precise nature of the charge and the meaning of the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, craft and abuse
of superior strength as having attended the commission
of the crime, so as to obviate any doubt as to the
possibility that they have misunderstood the nature and
gravity of the charge to which they were pleading guilty.
The trial court did not conduct a dialogue with the
accused on their educational attainment, especially
considering that a cursory perusal of their signatures on
the statements they gave to the Malolos Police Force
(Exhs. A, B and C) tends to show that they have very
little or scanty education. Moreover, from the transcript,
WE have noted that after the arraignment, trial was held
on three dates and on each day the accused were
assisted by three (3) different counsel de oficio. In the
hearing of October 7, 1970 — the day the decision under
review was rendered — the counsel de oficio who
assisted the accused was designated by the trial court
only after the case was called for trial, i.e., after the
accused had informed the trial court that they did not
have a lawyer. Under these circumstances, it is not
unreasonable to assume that said counsel de oficio
proceeded to trial without first fully investigating the facts
of the case and that his interview with the accused, even
if it lasted for twenty (20) minutes as the record
insinuates, was not, and could not have been sufficient to
enable him to acquire a fairly good grasp, much less a
comprehensive knowledge, of the relevant facts of the
case. Incidentally, under the Rules of this Court,
whenever an attorney de officio is employed or assigned
by the court to defend the accused at the trial, he shall be
given a reasonable time to consult with the accused and
prepare his defense before proceeding further in the
case, which shall not be less than two (2) days in case of
trial (See. 5, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Court) . The
record, incidentally, does not show the existence of a
"good cause" to justify the trial court in shortening the trial
fixed by the Rules.
The court a quo cannot plead ignorance of the prevailing
injunction directed towards trial judges to exercise
patience and circumspection in explaining to the accused
not only the nature and meaning of the accusation and
the full import of their plea of guilty but also the meaning
— in layman's language — of the aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the
crime, because not very long before the rendition of the
decision under review, this COURT in three (3) cases
(People vs. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798, August 30, 1968;
People vs. Arpa, 27 SCRA, 1037, April 25, 1969; and
People vs. Solacito, 29 SCRA 61, August 25, 1969) had
already enunciated its long-settled rule on the matter. As
a matter of fact, in the Arpa case, WE had occasion to
reiterate the said rule of practice, recommended since
the early cases of US vs. Talbanos (6 Phil. 541, 543, Oct.
29, 1906) and US vs. Rota (9 Phil. 426, Dec. 21, 1907),
and thereafter set out in See. 5, Rule 118 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides:
Plea of guilty — Determination of
punishment. — Where the defendant
pleads guilty to a complaint or information,
if the court accepts the plea and has
discretion as to the punishment for the
 offense, it may hear witnesses to determine
what punishment shall be imposed.
Furthermore, the court a quo did not even consult the
testimonies of the three State witnesses — namely, the
doctor and the police officers who took down the
statements of the accused — who testified during the first
and second hearings, at least with the end in view of
ascertaining the degree of the penalty that should be
imposed after accepting the plea of guilty of the accused.
What the court a quo did was only to ask the accused
whether they were ready to receive their sentence after
they had affirmed the "truthfulness and correctness" of
their counsel's manifestation on their change of plea. In
short, the court a quo did not even inform the accused
that their plea of guilty might mean death for all of them.
WE deeply lament this attitude of the court a quo. Be that
as it may, however, WE only hope that hereafter trial
courts would strictly comply with the rigid standard set in
the following cases after Apduhan, Arpa and Solacito, all
of which have invariably, consistently and firmly
established and stressed the duty of trial courts before
accepting the plea of guilty of an accused to a capital
offense. These cases are:
1. The case of People vs. Englatera (34 SCRA, 2456,
July 31, 1970), where WE found it proper to invite the
attention of the Court of a quo and of all trial courts in
general to what WE said in Apduhan and Solacito cases
on the matter of what the trial court should do upon
arraignment of a defendant charged with a capital
offense, before he is allowed to enter a plea of guilty;
2. The case of People vs. Estebia (40 SCRA, 90, July 29,
1971), where, in addition to reiterating what WE said in
the Englatera case, WE also stressed on the need for
care and prudence before accepting the plea of guilty of
an accused especially in capital offenses;
3. The case of People vs. Flores (140 SCRA, 230, July
30, 1971), Where this COURT, speaking through then
Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal, said:
The norm that should be allowed where a
plea of guilty is entered the defendant,
especially in cases where the capital
penalty may be imposed, is that the court
should he sure that defendant fully
understood the nature of the charges prefer
red against him and the of the punishment
provided by law before it is imposed.
4. The case of People vs. Simeon (47 SCRA, 129,
September 28, 1972), where WE made reference to
numerous other cases, such as US vs. Talbanos, supra
US vs. Rota, et al., supra; Us VS. Agcaoili (31 Phil. 91,
March 31, 1915); People vs. Bulalake (106 Phil, 767,
December 28 1959); and People vs. Arpa, supra, not to
mention the 1971 and 1972 cases of People vs. Estebia,
supra, and People vs. Estebia (L-34811, August 22,
1972);
5. The case of People vs. Ibañez (61 SCRA 468, 473
December 20,1974), where this COURT, speaking again
through then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal, said:
The trial court disregarded our injunction
in People vs. Apduhan (24 SCRA, 817) to
all trial judges to 'refrain from accepting with
alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while
justice demands a speedy administration,
judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous
in seeing to it that when an accused pleads
guilty he understands fully the meaning of
his plea and the import of an inevitable
conviction. In People v. Lacson (55 SCRA,
589), this Court had occasion to reiterate
the rule that in capital offenses the taking of
testimony, notwithstanding the plea of
guilty, is the proper and prudent course to
follow to establish tile guilt and precise
degree of culpability of the accused not only
to satisfy the trial judge but to aid the
Supreme Court in determining whether
accused really and truly understood and
comprehended the meaning, full
significance and consequences of his plea.'
What this Court said in People vs. Busa (51
SCRA 317) is particularly apropos: 'In sum
and substance, it will not suffice, under the
law providing for compulsory review of
death sentences by t his Court, that the
accused's plea of guilty is admitted and, on
the basis thereof. that judgment is
summarily rendered. The essence of
judicial review in capital offenses is that
while society allows violent retribution for
heinous crimes committed against it, it
always must make certain that blood of the
innocent is not spilled, or that the guilty are
not made to suffer more than their just
measure of punishment and retribution.
Thus, a judgment meting out penalty of
death is valid only if it is susceptible of a fair
and reasonable examination by this Court.
6. The case of People vs. Domingo (68 SCRA, 50, 54,
November 13, 1975), where, aside from reiterating the
rule on the duty of trial courts to exercise solicitous care
before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty,
especially in capital offenses, WE also said that trial
judges should give ample opportunity to the counsel de
oficio to examine not only the records of the case but
also the scene of the crime as well as to confer with the
accused lengthily so that he can properly' intelligently and
fully represent and defend the interests of the accused;
and
7. The latest case of People vs. Hondolero (G.R. No. L-
40633 August 25, 1976), where WE reiterated the rule
long established since the Talbanos, Rota and Agcaoili
cases, supra, that since there is no law prohibiting the
taking of testimony after a plea of guilty, where a grave
offense is charged, this Court has deemed such taking of
testimony the prudent and proper course to follow for the
purpose of establishing not only the guilt but as well as
the precise degree of culpability of the defendant."
WE hasten to add what WE said in People vs. Ricalde
(L34673, January 30, 1973), which is somehow Identical
in most, if not all, respects to the case at bar. In that
case, this COURT, speaking through Chief Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro, sounded once more its concern over the
failure of trial courts to comply strictly with the procedural
paths WE have adverted to as early as the Talbanos
case. Said this COURT:
Our previous decisions have repeatedly
warned against the danger of the plea of
guilty being improvidently entered in capital
cases. WE have uniformly stressed the
importance of the trial court's receiving
evidence notwithstanding the plea of guilty
in order that no reasonable doubt may
remain as to the guilt and the degree of
culpability of the accused. We have time
and time again reminded judges that they
are duty bound to be extra solicitous in
seeing to it that when an accused pleads
guilty he understands fully the meaning of'
his plea and the import of inevitable
conviction (US vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305;
People vs. Bulalake, 106 Phil. 767; People
vs. Arpa, 27 SCRA, 1037).
In the case at bar, We are not satisfied that
the trial judge has properly discharged this
basic duty enjoined of him.
As pointed out by both the counsel for the
appellant and the Solicitor General, the trial
judge limited himself to asking two brief
questions from the appellant: whether the
appellant was aware of tile consequences
of his change of plea from not guilty to that
of guilty, and whether the appellant knew
that notwithstanding such plea of guilty the
only possible penalty was that of death. The
record is completely bereft of any indication
that the Court diligently ascertained for itself
whether the appellant completely
understood the full meaning, significance
and implications of his plea of guilty. The
court likewise failed to inform the appellant
of the aggravating circumstances alleged in
the amended information and their effect on
his plea. Again, the court failed to ask the
appellant whether he was invoking
mitigating circumstances in his favor.
Finally, the court did not make any inquiry,
which inquiry was obviously called for, why
the appellant had a sudden change of plea
after he had previously pleaded not guilty to
the charge against him. In sum, the trial
court failed to take the necessary
precautions to forestall the entry by the
appellant of an improvident plea of guilty
before passing judgment upon him.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO
OF OCTOBER 7, 1970, FINDING THE ACCUSED
GUILTY OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE AND
SENTENCING EACH AND ALL OF THEM TO THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH IS HEREBY SET
ASIDE AND THE CASE REPRIMANDED TO IT FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN CONFORMITY WITH
THIS DECISION. WITHOUT PRONOUNCEMENT AS
TO COSTS.
Teehankee (Chairman), Muñoz Palma, Concepcion Jr.
and Martin, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-32914 August 30, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAUREANO SANGALANG, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant
Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Ma.
Rosario Quetulio Losa for plaintiff-appellee.
Narciso V. Cruz, Jr. for accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:p
This is a murder case. The testimonies of the two
prosecution eyewitnesses disclose that at around six
o'clock in the morning of June 9, 1968 Ricardo Cortez left
his nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso, Silang,
Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora
Sarno, his wife, was left inside the hut. While he was on
top of the tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley
of shots. He fell to the ground at the base of the coconut
tree.
His wife Flora heard three successive shot coming south
of the hut. She went outside the hut. From a distance of
about twenty-five meters, she saw five men, each armed
with a long firearm, firing at her husband. He was already
wounded and was lying on the ground at the foot of the
coconut tree. His assailants were about five meters away
from him.
She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five
armed men who were firing at her husband. She and her
brother Ricardo had known Sangalang since their
childhood. She also recognized Conrado Gonzales,
Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the
other malefactors.
Flora ran towards the place where her husband had
fallen. She shouted, "Bakit ninyo pinagbabaril ang aking
asawa". The five persons fired at her. She was then
about twenty meters away from them. She retreated to
the hut for cover. She heard some more shots. After the
lapse of about five minutes, Laureano Sangalang and his
companions left the place. When Flora returned to the
spot where her husband was prostrate, he was already
dead.
On the occasion already described, Ricardo Sarno,
twenty-seven years old, a brother of Flora, was inside his
own nipa hut which was about ten meters away from
Flora's hut. He was drinking coffee. His wife and children
were eating breakfast. He heard several shots. He came
out of his hut. He saw his brother-in-law being shot by
Laureano Sangalang, Eleuterio Cuyom, Perino Canuel,
Irineo Canuel and Conrado Gonzales. He saw Sangalang
using a Garand carbine in shooting his brother-in-law.
The latter fell from the top of the coconut tree after he
was shot (10 tsn). His sister Flora was trying to approach
her husband but she had to flee to her hut when
Sangalang and his companions fired at her. He wanted to
join her but he was likewise fired upon by the five men.
So, he retired and took refuge in his own hut.
Later, Sarno saw his sister Flora, sitting inside her hut.
He followed her after she left the hut and went to see her
dead husband, who was lying on the ground, face up, at
the base of the coconut tree. When he noticed that his
brother-in-law was already dead, he gathered his children
and brought them to Sitio Biga, which was more or less
thirty meters away from his hut in Sitio Adlas. Ricardo
reported the killing to the chief of police who went to the
scene of the crime with some policemen and
Constabularymen.
The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old
Cortez sustained twenty-three gunshot wounds on the
different parts of the body, fourteen of which were
entrance-wounds, and nine were exit-wounds (Exh. A
and B). He died due to the multiple gunshot wounds
(Exh. C).
On June 10, 1968 or on the day following the killing,
Flora and Ricardo were interrogated by the Silang police.
They executed sworn statements before the Municipal
Judge pointing to Laureano Sangalang, Conrado
Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio
Cuyom as the assassins of Ricardo Cortez. Flora said in
her statement that she knew those persons because from
time to time they used to pass by her place. They resided
at Barrio Capitula, Dasmariñas, which is near Barrio
Adlas. On the basis of those statements, the police filed
on June 10 in the Municipal Court a complaint for murder
against the five aforenamed persons. Sangalang was
arrested. He posted bail in the sum of P50,000 on June
13. He waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. The other accused have not been
apprehended. On August 8, 1968 the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information for murder against Sangalang.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Tagaytay
City Branch, rendered a judgment convicting Sangalang
of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay the heirs of Ricardo Cortez an
indemnity of twelve thousand pesos and to pay his widow
moral damages in the sum of ten thousand pesos
(Criminal Case No. TG-162). Sangalang appealed.
The appellant, a fifty-six-year old farmer, admitted that he
knew Cortez and that he knows his wife, Flora Sarno. He
pleaded an alibi. He declared that in the afternoon of
June 8, 1968 he and Crispulo Mendoza went to the
house of Julian Gatdula at Dapitan Street, Sampaloc,
Manila. He arrived at Gatdula's place at six o'clock. He
wanted to borrow money from Gatdula to defray the
matriculation fees of his children.
As Gatdula had no money at that time, he advised
Sangalang to wait until morning. He would try to raise the
sum of two hundred pesos which Sangalang desired to
borrow. Sangalang and Mendoza agreed. They allegedly
slept in Gatdula's house on the night of June 8th. The
next morning, they breakfasted in that house. At about
ten o'clock on June 9, Gatdula delivered the two hundred
pesos to Sangalang. He and Mendoza then went to the
Central Market in Manila and then to Quiapo. They
returned to Cavite and arrived at seven o'clock in the
evening of June 9 in Barrio Capdula. Gatdula and
Mendoza corroborated Sangalang's alibi.
In this appeal Sangalang insists on his alibi and impugns
the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses, Mrs.
Cortez and the victim's brother-in-law, Ricardo Sarno.
The basic issue is whether their eyewitness-testimony
that they saw appellant Sangalang as one of the five
armed persons, who riddled Cortez with fourteen gunshot
wounds of entry, is sufficient to overcome his alibi. In
essence, the case projects the ever recurring conflict in
criminal jurisprudence between positive identification and
alibi.
The trial court rejected appellant's alibi. It noted that
although his witnesses, Mendoza and Gatdula, learned of
his arrest, and Mendoza even visited him in the municipal
jail, Sangalang and his witnesses did not interpose the
defense of alibi when he was investigated by the police
and when he was summoned at the preliminary
investigation.
Sangalang points to certain discrepancies in the
declarations of Mrs. Cortez and her brother Ricardo
Sarno. Those inconsistencies, which are not glaring,
strengthen their credibility and show that their testimonies
were not coached nor rehearsed. The discrepancies may
be attributed to deficiencies in observation and
recollection, or misapprehension of the misleading and
confusing questions during cross-examination, or to the
defective translation of the questions and answers but
they do not necessarily indicate a wilful attempt to
commit falsehood (People vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 839;
People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54
SCRA 350).
The controlling fact is that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno clearly
and consistently testified that they saw Sangalang, a
person already well-known to them, among the five
armed persons who shot Ricardo Cortez. That
unwavering identification negates appellant's alibi.
The prosecution did not prove the motive for the killing.
On the other hand, Sangalang did not show that Mrs.
Cortez and Sarno were impelled by a malicious desire to
falsely incriminate him. .
Counsel de oficio meticulously examined the
contradictions and deficiencies in the evidence for the
prosecution. He made a spirited defense of the appellant.
However, his efforts failed to cast any reasonable doubt
on Sangalang's complicity in the killing.
The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top
of a coconut tree. He was unarmed and defenseless. He
was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any
immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack
shows that Sangalang and his companions employed a
mode of execution which insured the killing without any
risk to them arising from any defense which the victim
could have made. The qualifying circumstance of
treachery (alevosia), which was alleged in the
information, was duly established (See art. 14[16],
Revised Penal Code). Hence, the killing can be
categorized as murder (See People vs. Sedenio, 94 Phil.
1046). Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance
of band(U. S. vs. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident
premeditation, which was alleged in the information, was
not proven.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on Sangalang (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised
Penal Code).
Finding no error in its judgment, the same is affirmed with
costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo and Fernandez,
JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no take part.
[G.R. No. 109660. July 1, 1997.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. *
ROMEO NELL alias "Omeng," DANNY ANGELES
alias "Danny Fake" and JOHN DOE, Accused,
ROMEO NELL alias "Omeng," Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused.
SYNOPSIS
This is an appeal from the December 11, 1992 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172 in
Criminal Case Nos. 10341-90 convicting herein appellant
Romeo Nell of murder qualified by evident premeditation.
In convicting the accused, the lower court held that the
evidence of the prosecution was more credible than that
of the Appellant.
The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal is partly
meritorious. This Court does not agree with appellant’s
claim of self-defense, but found out that the prosecution
likewise failed to prove and establish evident
premeditation beyond reasonable doubt. The records
supported the trial court’s finding of the lack of credibility
of appellant’s version of the incident and assigning value
and weight to the prosecution’s testimony. In this light,
the lower court’s conviction of Murder was modified to
Homicide without any generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES;
SELF-DEFENSE; BURDEN OF PROOF SHIFTED
UPON THE ACCUSED TO SHOW THAT HIS ACT WAS
JUSTIFIED. — By interposing self-defense, appellant
shifted the burden of proof, thereby obligating himself to
show that his act was justified and that he incurred no
criminal liability therefor. Consequently, he must establish
clearly and convincingly all the elements of self-defense,
relying mainly on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of the prosecution’s; for even if the
latter was weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open
admission of the killing.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY;
CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESSES; TRIAL COURT’S
ASSESSMENT THEREOF ENTITLED TO GREAT
WEIGHT. — The time-tested doctrine is that a trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great weight — even conclusive and binding
on this Court, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight
of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.
Credibility is a matter that peculiarly falls within the
province of the trial court as it had the opportunity to
watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of the
witnesses at the time of their testimony. Thus, assigning
value and weight to each testimony is within its
jurisdiction.
3. ID.; ID.; NON-FLIGHT; NOT AN INDICATION OF
INNOCENCE. — Flight, in jurisprudence, is a strong
indication of guilt, although its converse does not
necessarily imply innocence.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES;
SELF-DEFENSE; ELEMENTS. — An accused must also
establish by clear and convincing evidence the requisites
of self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Self-defense, by its very nature, requires the attendance
of unlawful aggression initiated by the victim. Unlawful
aggression is an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in
an imminent and immediate manner which places the
accused’s life in actual peril. It must be such that it puts in
real danger the life or personal safety of the person
defending himself. It cannot be merely an imagined threat
or a threatening or intimidating attitude. In self-defense,
there should also be reasonable necessity for the action
taken as well as the means used. The latter requires a
consideration of (1) whether the aggressor was armed,
(2) the nature and quality of the weapon used, and (3)
the physical conditions and sizes of both aggressor and
the person defending himself.
5. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION; ELEMENTS. — Evident
premeditation indicates a stubborn adherence to a
decision to commit a felony. It requires a showing of: (1)
a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime;
(2) overt act(s) manifestly indicating that the accused
clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time
between the decision to commit the crime and its actual
execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon
the consequences of his acts. Evident premeditation
connotes a deliberate adherence to a plan to commit a
crime. Mere lapse of time is not equivalent to evident
premeditation. Time and again, we have held that evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to
murder in the absence of evidence, not only of sufficient
lapse of time, but also of the planning and preparation to
kill when the plan was conceived. The prosecution
evidence simply showed that after the fight was broken
up, appellant returned to kill the victim. From said
circumstances, we cannot deduce with certainty that
appellant clung to a decision to kill the victim.
6. ID.; ID.; SUPERIOR STRENGTH; CONSTRUED. —
Superior strength is not appreciated by the mere fact of
superiority in the number of malefactors, but rather by the
deliberate employment of excessive force which is out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After an accused has openly admitted the killing, the
gravamen of the prosecution’s case cannot be
disbelieved anymore. Thus, the accused must prove all
the elements of self-defense clearly and convincingly. He
must rely on the strength of his own evidence, and not on
the weakness of the prosecution’s.
This is an appeal from the December 11, 1992 Decision
1 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172,
in Criminal Case No. 10341-V-90 convicting Appellant
Romeo Nell of murder.
Together with Danny Angeles, alias "Danny Fake," and
one John Doe, appellant was charged with murder in an
Information dated June 11, 1990 which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 24th day of March 1990, in the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, armed with a bladed instrument
and with intent to kill one Reynaldo Laureano y Nuque,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault
and stab with the said bladed instrument they were then
provided the said Reynaldo Laureano y Nuque, hitting
the latter on his body, thereby causing him serious
physical injuries which directly caused his death." 2
Only appellant was arrested while the two other accused
remained at large. During his arraignment on May 13,
1992, he pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds
the accused guilty of the crime of Murder as principal,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Reynaldo Laureano in
the sum of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED." 3
The Facts

Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution actually presented two versions of the
incident: one by Rosini Espejo-Cenon and another by
Benjamin Laureano. Although both versions undoubtedly
pointed to appellant as the assailant, they materially
differed as to the participation of the other accused and
the events which led to the fatal stabbing of the
deceased.
Prosecution Witness Rosini Cenon’s testimony was
summarized by the trial court as follows: 4
". . . On March 24, 1990 at about 10:00 p.m. she was
washing clothes in front of their house. From across the
street, at a distance of 6 meters she saw the accused
Romeo Nell alias Omeng, pointing to him in Court,
stabbed (sic) Reynaldo Laureano. Romeo Nell was with
Danilo Angeles alias Danny Fake. The victim when
stabbed was just resting by sitting in front of an already
closed store. Romeo made a thrust at Reynaldo with a
‘panaksak’ but Reynaldo was able to run away. Romeo
followed him. Some liquor drinkers noticed Reynaldo
being chased so they threw bottles at Romeo who was
hit at the nape and stumbled. Danny Fake tried to help
Romeo. Before Romeo was able to stand up, Danny
Fake was able to pull Reynaldo and immersed him in a
canal. Then Romeo who was already up stabbed
Reynaldo upon orders of Danny Fake. Reynaldo was hit
on the chest by Romeo who even repeatedly moved the
bladed weapon inside the body to and fro. After Reynaldo
was stabbed and they saw he was no longer moving,
Danny Fake kicked Romeo saying ‘Putang ina mo ano pa
ang hinihintay mo, sumibat ka na’. Romeo then ran
together with another man who was half naked from
waist up. Danny Fake then shouted, ‘bakit hindi tulungan
ito ng mga bumato sa kanya’ while holding a veinte
nueve knife. Then Danny Fake left. Somebody went
down and helped Reynaldo. She (witness) shouted
‘tulungan ninyo si Rey.’ He was brought to the hospital
but he died. She saw all the incident because of the light
from the stores which were still open then."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In contrast, Prosecution Witness Benjamin Laureano, the
victim’s brother, described the events differently. His
testimony was presented in the appealed Decision as
follows: 5
". . . On March 24, 1990 . . . (a)t about 10:30 p.m. of said
date he was fetching water at Abalos St., about 20
meters away from their residence. He was told by among
(sic) those fetching water with him that there was trouble
going on at the corner of Abalos St. and Concepcion St.
which is about 20 meters away. He went there to look,
with Boyet Manansala. Upon reaching the place he saw
his brother Reynaldo and Romeo quarreling. He pointed
to the accused Romeo in Court. He had known Romeo
before the incident because he used to borrow tools from
their neighbors. He saw Romeo and Reynaldo struggle
with each other and then Romeo ran out (sic) of the
corner towards the market. After the accused ran away
his brother Reynaldo chased him. He asked his brother
Reynaldo to go home because Reynaldo was not able to
run far and was not able to catch the accused. His
brother and he (sic) went home. His brother again went
down the house and drunk beer in a store in front of their
house. He was with Junior Cenon. Romeo Nell arrived.
He saw Romeo because he (witness) was then lifting the
container of water for their house. Romeo chased his
brother with a bladed weapon. When he caught up with
him they struggled with each other first. His brother was
hit and knelt in the canal. Romeo Nell stabbed him and
kicked him. His brother was hit on the chest once.
Romeo Nell ran away. He saw all this from a distance of
8 meters. He went upstairs to ask help from his brothers.
When they all went down Romeo Nell was no longer
there. They brought Reynaldo out of the canal to the
Santisimo Rosario Hospital. He was dead on arrival. He
gave a statement to the police (Exh. B, B-1).cralawnad
On cross examination, Benjamin Laureano testified as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x the one used by his (sic) brother."cralaw virtua1aw library
When he saw his brother being stabbed he could not go
near because Romeo had a companion and a look out.
x x x"
Dr. Prospero Cabanayan conducted the autopsy on the
victim. He testified that the victim died of severe
hemorrhage due to an eleven-inch stab wound below the
right collarbone, penetrating the big blood vessels direct
to the heart, and two puncture wounds located at the
chest almost near the armpit. 6 The stab wound could
have been caused by a sharp, single-bladed instrument
while the puncture wounds, by a pointed instrument. 7
From the location of the wounds, he opined that it was
possible that the victim was lying down, facing the
assailant who was standing. 8
The prosecution presented Francisca Sagnip, the sister
of the victim, as rebuttal witness. She testified that: 9
"On March 26, 1990 at about 8:00 A.M., [s]he was at the
police station to present the kitchen knife which she
found at the canal at Abalos St., Marulas, Valenzuela.
She found it on March 26, 1990 at about 7:30 A.M. She
identified the kitchen knife (Exh. H).
On cross examination she testified that she was not
present when her brother was stabbed. It was after the
report was made to the police that the latter went to the
scene and investigated. They found no kitchen knife. She
was alone when she found the knife. She believes it was
Evidence for the Defense
Appellant justifies his act by invoking self-defense. His
testimony is synthesized in the Appellant’s Brief: 10
". . . [O]n March 24, 1990 while plying his tricycle he saw
Reynaldo Laureano at about 5:00 to 6:00 p.m. He let his
two passengers alight. Reynaldo approached him for
beer money and he told him he will give him later. He just
started plying his tricycle. Reynaldo got angry saying
‘hindi puede’. Reynaldo said he needed to drink and if he
will not give, something bad will happen to him. Reynaldo
said ‘Ako ang may hawak ng Abalos St.’ and Reynaldo
boxed him as he said these. He fought back. While they
were boxing each other, Reynaldo’s brother Benjamin
and a certain Junior arrived. He ran because Benjamin
had a knife. The three gave chase. They failed to catch
him. He went home. He left his tricycle on the road. After
one hour, he tried to retrieve it but did not pass Abalos
St. He was able to retrieve his tricycle and went home.
He rested for 4 hours before plying his tricycle. That was
about 10:00 p.m. He met for the second time Reynaldo
Laureano because he passed by Abalos St. He saw
Benjamin, Junior, and Reynaldo Laureano drinking beer,
sitted (sic) on a bench on the side of the street near the
house of Reynaldo Laureano. Upon his return trip, the
three blocked his way. He was forced to stop. They were
again asking for money particularly Reynaldo while the
two were just standing by. He requested that he be
allowed not to give because his trip was destroyed and
that he has his family to feed. Reynaldo approached him
to box him. He jumped towards his tricycle to get his
screw driver to defend himself because one of them
already pulled out a knife while Junior was holding a
bottle of beer and hit him on the head. Junior is the
brother in law of Rosini Espejo. After he was hit with a
bottle of beer, his vision became dark and he started
stabbing Reynaldo. Benjamin and Junior ran away when
they saw Reynaldo was hit. He boarded his tricycle and
went home. He stabbed Reynaldo even if it was Junior
who hit him with a bottle of beer because Reynaldo was
poised to box him. When he started stabbing, he hit
Reynaldo. He did not tell this to the police. He was afraid
he would be incarcerated. He was thinking of his children
as his wife is abroad. The incident happened on March
24, 1990. He was arrested on April 27, 1992. He did not
hide but just continued plying his tricycle. The father,
brother and sister of Reynaldo were often his
passengers. The reason why they did not cause his
arrest is because people there knew that the deceased is
a trouble maker and a ‘salot’ in their place. The testimony
of Espejo which gave a different version that he had a
companion is not true. She just testified that way
because her brother in law is involved in the case. He
had a screw driver because he uses it as a tool for
adjustment of the contact point of his tricycle. . . . (TSN,
November 4, 1992, pp. 3-19)."cralaw virtua1aw library
Ruling of the Trial Court
In rejecting the claim of self-defense, the trial court held
that the evidence of the prosecution was more credible
than that of the appellant. Prosecution Witnesses
Benjamin Laureano and Rosini Cenon gave two versions
of the facts, but the trial court accepted Benjamin’s
testimony rather than Rosini Cenon’s because the former
gave his statement to the police immediately after the
stabbing incident at ten minutes past one o’clock early
morning of March 25, 1990. Rosini’s statement, on the
other hand, was executed two days later, on March 27,
1990, after her brother-in-law Junior Cenon was
implicated in the stabbing by Appellant.
Unlike Benjamin’s story, appellant’s version was not only
uncorroborated; it was also incredible. The trial court
opined that, even if the victim was a drug user and a
troublemaker, appellant’s actions were not justified.
The lower court also held that the killing was qualified by
evident premeditation. It found that the appellant and the
victim had a quarrel that ended when the former ran
away from the latter. Later on, appellant returned and
stabbed the victim.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant claims self-defense. He ascribes the following
errors to the trial court: 11
"I
The trial court erred in categorizing the crime committed
as murder instead of homicide.
II
The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-
appellant on the ground of self-defense under paragraph
1 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. We do not agree with
appellant’s claim of self-defense, but we find that the
prosecution has not established evident premeditation
beyond reasonable doubt. We shall now discuss the
errors assigned by the appellant in inverse order.
Assessment of Appellant’s Credibility by the Trial Court
By interposing self-defense, appellant shifted the burden
of proof, thereby obligating himself to show that his act
was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability
therefor. 12 Consequently, he must establish clearly and
convincingly all the elements of self-defense, relying
mainly on the strength of his own evidence and not on
the weakness of the prosecution’s; for even if the latter
was weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open
admission of the killing.
The trial court, however, did not find appellant’s
uncorroborated testimony credible. The time-tested
doctrine is that a trial court’s assessment of the credibility
of a witness 13 is entitled to great weight — even
conclusive and binding on this Court, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence. Credibility is a matter that peculiarly
falls within the province of the trial court as it had the
opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and
behavior of the witnesses at the time of their testimony.
14 Thus, assigning value and weight to each testimony is
within its jurisdiction. 15
The trial court’s assessment of the credibility — or the
lack of it — of appellant and his version of the incident
appears supported by the records. Five crucial points are
worth noting.
The first point is the matter of the weapon used.
Appellant claimed that he used a six-inch screwdriver to
stab the victim. 16 The medico-legal officer described the
two instruments which could have inflicted such wounds
as a single-bladed weapon and an instrument with a
sharp point. 17 A screwdriver fits neither of the two
descriptions. Based on appellant’s description, it was as
an old screwdriver with a blunt end and rounded on the
side. 18 He did not even present in evidence this alleged
implement to show that it fitted either of the two
descriptions.
Second, appellant would like us to believe that it was
Benjamin who wielded a knife — one of the weapons
that, according to the medico-legal officer, could have
caused the wounds of the deceased. He thus wants to
imply that it was Benjamin who fatally stabbed his
brother. This allegation is not only illogical; it runs counter
to the established fact that the quarrel was between the
victim and the appellant, not Benjamin. Appellant has not
shown any plausible reason, argument or evidence why
Benjamin should kill his own brother.
Third is appellant’s choice of victim. He testified that he
was hit on the head with a beer bottle by one Junior
Cenon. Why then did he attack the victim who, according
to him, was only poised to box him. Clearly, it was Junior
who had hit him and was probably holding a bottle of
beer, broken by then. The more imminent threat against
his life was posed by the armed Junior, not the unarmed
victim.
The fourth point is the matter of flight. Although he
claimed that he did not go into hiding after the incident,
he also admitted that he fled from the scene of the crime
in his tricycle. 19 Flight, in jurisprudence, is a strong
indication of guilt, 20 although its converse does not
necessarily imply innocence. 21 That he feared being
imprisoned as he had children to take care of does not
exempt him from these legal precepts. He even
intentionally failed to report the incident to the police,
negating his claim of self-defense. 22
The fifth point is the failure of the defense to raise the
extortion theory and Benjamin’s complicity therein during
the latter’s testimony. The failure to raise a theory that
would have gravely impaired Benjamin’s credibility
creates a very serious doubt on the veracity of
appellant’s present allegations.
Thus, we cannot blame the trial court for not putting
much faith in appellant’s testimony. Evidence, to be
believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself. 23
Failure to Prove Requisites of Self-Defense
An accused must also establish by clear and convincing
evidence 24 the requisites of self-defense, namely: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. 25 These, appellant
failed to prove.
Self-defense, by its very nature, requires the attendance
of unlawful aggression initiated by the victim. 26 Unlawful
aggression is an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in
an imminent and immediate manner which places the
accused’s life in actual peril. 27 It must be such that it
puts in real danger the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself. 28 It cannot be merely an
imagined threat or a threatening or intimidating attitude.
29
In this case, unlawful aggression was not established by
the defense. Appellant merely proved that the victim,
Benjamin and Junior Cenon were extorting beer money
from him. The manner of extortion described by
appellant, however, does not show how appellant’s life or
limb was placed in any peril as to justify his killing of
Reynaldo.
Even if we consider that a threat to his life or limb could
have been imminent because Benjamin held a knife, still
appellant did not state that the latter threatened him with
the deadly weapon. In fact, Benjamin did not threaten
him at all. Appellant admitted that after his head was hit
with a bottle of beer, his vision dimmed and he started
stabbing the victim who was allegedly approaching and
about to box him. Based on said testimony, we fail to see
any peril to appellant’s life or limb that could have
justified his having killed the victim.
In self-defense, there should also be reasonable
necessity for the action taken as well as the means used.
The latter requires a consideration of (1) whether the
aggressor was armed, (2) the nature and quality of the
weapon used, and (3) the physical conditions and sizes
of both aggressor and the person defending himself. 30
Appellant was armed while his three alleged assailants
were not competently shown to have been armed. His
claim is that Benjamin had a knife and that Junior Cenon
and the victim held a bottle of beer each. But allegation is
not evidence and, in the absence of the latter, we cannot
agree with appellant that his alleged aggressors were
similarly armed. Therefore, the reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel the "aggression"
from the victim and his companions was not proven in
this case.
Clearly, the justifying circumstance of self-defense
cannot be sustained. Appellant failed to prove unlawful
aggression by the victim or to demonstrate the
reasonable necessity of the means he employed to
defend himself. 31
Evidence of Premeditation, Treachery
and Abuse of Superior Strength
However, the trial court erred in appreciating evident
premeditation based solely on the fact that appellant
returned to the crime scene four hours after his first
quarrel with the victim. Evident premeditation indicates a
stubborn adherence to a decision to commit a felony. It
requires a showing of: (1) a previous decision by the
accused to commit the crime; (2) overt act(s) manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination;
and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit
the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow the
accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. 32
Evident premeditation connotes a deliberate adherence
to a plan to commit a crime.

Returning to the scene of an earlier fight about four hours
later does not establish these elements. Mere lapse of
time is not equivalent to evident premeditation. 33 Time
and again, we have held that evident premeditation
cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to murder in the
absence of evidence, not only of sufficient lapse of time,
but also of the planning and preparation to kill when the
plan was conceived. 34 The prosecution evidence simply
showed that after the fight was broken up, appellant
returned to kill the victim. From said circumstances, we
cannot deduce with certainty that appellant clung to a
decision to kill the victim.
Treachery and abuse of superior strength were not
discussed in the trial court’s Decision. Since they were
alleged in the Information, the Court pored over the
records to find any evidentiary support therefor. However,
we are also unable to appreciate treachery from the
prosecution’s narration of events. Benjamin was bringing
several containers of water into their house when the
incident occurred. Thus, because his attention was
focused elsewhere prior to his brother’s stabbing, he was
not in a position to say that appellant attacked his brother
suddenly and without warning. He did see, however, that
appellant chased his brother with a bladed weapon and
that they struggled with each other first before appellant
stabbed his brother. In effect, he admitted that when
appellant attacked the victim, the latter was not without a
chance to defend himself. The prosecution failed to
establish that the appellant employed means, methods or
forms which tended directly and specially to insure the
commission of the killing without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.
35
The record is also bereft of proof that appellant and his
companions took advantage of their collective strength to
overwhelm their victim. 36 Superior strength is not
appreciated by the mere fact of superiority in the number
of malefactors, but rather by the deliberate employment
of excessive force which is out of proportion to the means
of defense available to the person attacked. 37 Note also
must be made of the fact that the victim was not
alone.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In sum, appellant’s testimony suffers seriously from want
of credibility. Even if we ascribe credibility to appellant’s
testimony, however, we still cannot accept his plea of
self-defense, for he failed to prove all the requisites
thereof. While the appellant failed to prove self-defense,
the prosecution likewise failed to show any qualifying
circumstance. In this light, appellant should be convicted
only of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code without any generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby
MODIFIED. Appellant is CONVICTED of homicide, not
murder, and is SENTENCED to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum and fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. The trial court’s disposition
requiring the appellant "to indemnify the heirs of
Reynaldo Laureano in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay
the costs" is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J., did not take part in deliberation, was on
sick leave.
G.R. No. 128114 October 25, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGER CANDO Y PAGDANGANAN, ARNEL VARGAS
Y MAGTANGOB, AND WILBERTO RAPCING Y
BROÑOLA, accused-appellants.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 95-
142748, convicting appellants of the crime of robbery
with homicide, sentencing them to death, ordering them
solidarily to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount
of P50,000.00, and to return the personal belongings
taken from the victim and other offended parties. In a
related case, Criminal Case No. 95-142749, appellants
were acquitted of the charge of carnapping.
Appellants Cando and Rapcing, aged 40 and 28
respectively, were employed as candlemakers at the
Rosarian Candle Factory located in Paco, Manila.
Appellant Vargas, aged 20, was employed as a delivery
boy. The victim, Luis D. Remoriata, was the caretaker
("katiwala") in said factory.
The facts based on the records are as follows:
In the afternoon of May 13, 1995, Vargas, Rapcing and
one Nonoy Sayson were having a drinking session at a
canteen in front of the factory. At around 9:30 P.M.,
Cando joined the group. Upon the prompting of Vargas,
Cando went to the factory to get his salary. Cando came
back angry because he was unable to get his salary from
the secretary, nor was he able to get a loan of P100.00
from the caretaker. Apparently, Cando already had
previous misunderstandings with the caretaker, so this
time, he threatened to kill the caretaker. The group
continued their drinking session.1
At around 11:00 P.M., Vargas, Rapcing, and Cando,
armed with two knives and carrying a shoulder bag,
climbed the fence of the factory. They walked on the
galvanized iron roof towards the other building. One by
one, they slipped through a narrow window at the side of
the building. The trio proceeded to the victim's room,
which was lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Cando picked a
piece of lead pipe and told Vargas to pull open the door
where the victim's mosquito net was attached. When
Vargas pulled open the door, the mosquito net snapped
and Cando struck the victim on the head with the lead
pipe. The victim awakened and Cando demanded money
from him. When the victim replied that he had no money,
Cando struck him again with the lead pipe. Blood oozed
from the victim's head. Cando asked the victim if he
recognized him. The victim weakly replied "Yes, You are
Roger (Cando)." Thereafter, Cando repeatedly hit him
with the lead pipe until he became unconscious. Cando
placed the victim's radio cassette in his bag. He went
upstairs to get more items and the keys of the Cimarron
van. Thereafter, the trio went downstairs to where the
van was parked. Vargas, the only one who knew how to
drive, sat on the driver's seat. Cando and Rapcing
opened the gate, then pushed the van outside. Once they
were out of hearing range, Vargas gunned the motor and
the two clambered into the van. Cando sat on the
passenger side while Rapcing sat at the back. Cando
prevailed upon the group to proceed to Quiapo to visit his
girlfriend, but they could not locate her so they just drove
around until daybreak. When they reached Hemady
Street in Quezon City, they abandoned the van. The trio
boarded a jeep going to Taft Avenue and went their
separate ways.2 It was then already early morning of May
14, 1995.
At around 6:00 A.M., Mrs. Norma Chu, the factory owner,
discovered the dead body of Luis Remoriata. The factory
van was also missing. A hysterical Mrs. Chu called the
Barangay Captain, who in turn reported the incident to
the police. Upon investigation, the police found a
bakawan firewood stained with blood some ten meters
away from the victim's body. The police also called a
funeral parlor to get the body of the victim.3
In the meantime, the van was discovered by Barangay
Kagawad Mejia, who called up the telephone number
posted at the side of the van. The owner, Mrs. Chu,
arrived with three NBI Agents who took pictures of the
van and lifted fingerprints from it.4
The very next day, May 15, 1995, Mrs. Chu lodged a
complaint5 with the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). Based on her complaint, the NBI dispatched a
team of agents to the crime scene. The NBI recovered a
bloodstained steel pipe behind the door of the room.
Upon learning from Mrs. Chu that appellants Cando and
Vargas had previous skirmishes with the victim, on May
16, 1995, the NBI agents picked up Vargas from the
factory and brought him to their office for questioning.6
Vargas readily admitted his participation and pinpointed
appellants Cando and Rapcing as his co-perpetrators. He
likewise executed an extrajudicial admission7 and waiver
of his rights under Articles 124 and 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.8
Acting on the lead, the NBI agents picked appellant
Cando at his house in Libis St., Caloocan City. Appellant
Cando invoked his right to remain silent.9 He executed a
waiver of rights under Articles 124 and 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.10
Thereafter, appellant Rapcing was also arrested at his
house in Cristobal St., Looban, Paco, Manila.11 Rapcing
admitted complicity in the crime, and executed an
extrajudicial admission12 corroborating the story of
Vargas. He also executed a waiver of his rights under
Articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code.13
During custodial investigation, the three were assisted by
Atty. Isidro T. Gamutan, a lawyer who happened to be at
the NBI because he was following up a case.
On May 17, 1995, appellant Vargas executed a second
extrajudicial admission14 stating that Cando gave him the
bag containing the stolen items for safekeeping and that
he brought the bag to his sister-in-law's house in
Kahilum, San Andres Bukid, Manila. He accompanied the
NBI agents to the house and gave them the bag which
bore Cando's name.15
On May 23, 1995, appellants were charged with the
crime of Robbery with Homicide under the following
Information:16
"The undersigned accuses ROGER CANDO y
PAGDANGANAN, ARNEL VARGAS y
MAGTANGOB and WILFREDO RAPCING y
BROÑOLA of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
committed as follows;
That on or about May 13, 1995, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring
and confederating together and helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by hitting
one LUIS D. REMORIATA with steel pipe and
wood on the head several times and at the same
time forcibly taking away from him the following, to
wit:
One (1) Brown wallet valued at P 120.00
containing cash money of 1,000.00
Cash money in the amount of 10,000.00
Three (3) wrist watches, all 1,000.00
valued
One (1) Radio cassette (STD) 1,200.00
Assorted clothing, not less than 500.00
or in the total amount of P13,820.00 belonging to
said Luis D. Remoriata and under his personal
care, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the aforesaid amount of P13,820.00,
Philippine Currency; that on the occasion of the
said robbery and by reason thereof, the herein
accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the said LUIS D. REMORIATA, and
as a result thereof, he sustained physical injuries
which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death.
Contrary to law.
ALEJAN
DRO G.
BIJASA
 Asst. City
Prosecut
or"
On August 29, 1995, upon arraignment, appellants
entered their respective pleas of not guilty.17 Joint trial
ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1)
Norma C. Chu, the factory owner; (2) NBI Agents Serafin
Gil, Mario Garcia, Gregorio Tomagan; (3) NBI
Photographer Cecilio Datinguinoo; (4) NBI Fingerprint
Examiner Elter Yano; (5) Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-
legal officer; (6) Atty. Isidro Gamutan, counsel of
appellants during custodial investigation; (7) Barangay
Kagawad Alejandro Mejia.
Mrs. Norma Chu testified that when she discovered the
body of the victim, the quarters was in disarray, and the
victim's clothes and radio were missing. Later, her
husband and son informed her that their wallets which
they placed on top of the TV in the sala upstairs, and two
other wristwatches were missing. She also identified the
van which was recovered from Hemady St. in Quezon
City as the one belonging to the factory.18
Serafin Gil testified that he took down the statement of
Mrs. Chu and supervised the custodial investigation of
appellants.19 Mario Garcia took down the statements of
Vargas and Rapcing.20 Gregorio Tomagan testified that
he was present during the taking of the two statements of
appellant Vargas dated May 16 and 17, 1995.21 Cecilio
Datinguinoo testified that he took pictures of the van
while the NBI agents were lifting fingerprints from the
van.22 Elter Yano testified that he managed to lift six (6)
fingerprints from the cimarron van, tagged as "Q-1" to "Q-
6". He testified that "Q-1" which was lifted from the air
freshener found in the van was identical to the left index
fingerprint of appellant Vargas (Exh. "DD"). Likewise, "Q-
2" which was lifted from the victim's stereo cassette was
identical to the right ring fingerprint of Cando (Exh. "EE").
The other prints were unidentifiable.23
Dr. Manuel Lagonera testified that the cause of death
was "blunt head injuries" and that the victim sustained
the following injuries:24
"1. Triangular lacerated wound, with contusions at
the periphery, measuring 3x2. 8x2.5 cms, right
forehead.
2. Deep lacerated wound, right forehead, above
the right eyebrow, measuring 7x1.9 cms.
3. Lacerated wound, right zygomatic region,
measuring 4.2x1.5 cms.
4. Deep lacerated wound, left frontal region,
measuring 7x2.5cms.
5. Lacerated wound, left fronto-temporal region,
measuring 2.5x2 cms.
6. Deep lacerated wound, angle of the mouth,
right, measuring 4.5x2 cms.
 7. Hematoma, both upper eyelids.
8. Deep lacerated wound, vertex, measuring 9x3
cms.
9. Lacerated wound, left occipital region,
measuring 7x3 cms.
10. V-shaped lacerated wound, right external ear,
measuring 3x2.5 cms.
11. Abrasion, right anterior shoulder, measuring
4x1.8 cms.
12. Semi-circular contusion, right supra-clavicular
region, measuring 3.5x3.2 cms.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. There was extensive sub-aponeurotic
hematoma with multiple fractures of the cranial
vault. Epidural hematoma over the left parietal
lobe of the brain with massive sub-arachnoid
hemorrhage.
2. Right anterior and middle cranial fossae were
fractured.
3. The stomach was empty."
Atty. Isidro T. Gamutan testified that he happened to be
at the NBI when the three accused were scheduled for
custodial investigation. The Chief of the Anti-Carnapping
Unit requested him to give legal assistance to the three
accused. He asked the accused why they were being
investigated, and explained to them their rights. When he
was satisfied that the accused understood their rights, he
assisted them in executing their extrajudicial
statements.25
Alejandro Mejia, Barangay Kagawad at Barangay
Kristong Hari, Quezon City testified that he found the
abandoned van with a flat tire. He contacted the owner
through the telephone number printed on the side of the
van. The owner arrived with three NBI agents who
examined the van.26
For the defense, appellants testified. Appellant Cando
stated that he finished Grade III, cannot read, but can
write his name. He denied any participation in the killing,
but claimed that Vargas and Rapcing knew about the
incident. He said that on May 13, 1995, he reported for
work at the factory at 2:00 P.M. until 10:00 P.M. He went
home in Libis St. Caloocan City, where he slept until
around 11:00 A.M. the following day. He denied joining
the drinking session. On May 14, 1995, he reported for
work at around 12:00 NN until 2:00 P.M.. He identified as
his the bag containing the stolen items. He further
identified the contents of the bags, the air freshener
which was taken from the van, the two wristwatches
belonging to the son and daughter of Mrs. Chu. He
admitted that he and the other two appellants offered to
pay to the widow of the victim damages for his death.27
Appellant Vargas, for his part, admitted participation in
the killing, but claimed that he was forced by Cando at
knife point to participate. He further claimed that it was
only Cando who killed the victim by hitting him with an
iron bar. He admitted, however, that he agreed to drive
the Cimarron because he wanted to practice driving.28
Appellant Rapcing recanted his extrajudicial admission.
He denied any knowledge or participation in the killing
since he was stone drunk ("lasing na lasing"). He claimed
that he just slept inside a Tamaraw pick-up parked
outside the factory. Further, he claimed that the finding of
guilt is inconsistent with the fact that he never went into
hiding after the alleged incident.29
On December 27, 1996, the trial court rendered its
decision30 convicting the three (3) appellants of Robbery
with Homicide with the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and treachery, and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of death. Appellants were
acquitted of the charge of carnapping.
Hence, the present automatic review. In their
consolidated brief,31 appellants raise the lone assignment
of error that —
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND TREACHERY
ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.
In praying for the reduction of the sentence from death
to reclusion perpetua, appellants contend that the
prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation, as
there was no time for cool reflection since their minds
were hazy with the influence of liquor. Appellants further
dispute the existence of treachery since the killing of
Remoriata was merely "on the spur of the moment."
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that
evident premeditation clearly attended the commission of
the crime but said aggravating circumstance, being
inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide, should not
be appreciated separately.32 Treachery qualified the
killing since the victim was sleeping at the time he was
attacked. In addition, the generic aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and dwelling should be
appreciated.
The principal issue for resolution is whether the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation attended the commission of the offense?
Secondarily, we must also determine whether all the
elements of robbery with homicide were proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods,
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.33 The conditions which must concur before
treachery can be appreciated are: (a) the employment of
means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) that
said means of execution be deliberately and consciously
adopted.34 The essence of treachery lies in the adoption
of ways that minimize or neutralize any resistance which
may be put up by the offended party.35 The killing of the
sleeping victim herein was attended by treachery since
he was in no position to flee or defend himself.36
The presence of treachery, though, should not result in
qualifying the offense to murder, for the correct rule is
that when it obtains in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded
as a generic aggravating circumstance, robbery with
homicide being a case of a composite crime with its own
definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal
Code.37
For evident premeditation to exist, the prosecution must
prove with clear and convincing evidence the following
elements: (1) the time when the offenders decided to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and execution to
allow them to reflect upon the consequences of their act
and allow their conscience to overcome the resolution of
their will.38 Evident premeditation is inherent in crimes
against property, but it may be considered in robbery with
homicide if there is premeditation to kill besides
stealing.39 The prosecution clearly proved the intention to
rob and to disable the victim, but not the intention to kill
him. As Vargas testified, the victim was still alive when
they left him rolling on the floor.40 Thus, evident
premeditation can not be appreciated where the
prosecution failed to establish that the accused killed the
victim pursuant to a preconceived plan.41
The alternative circumstance of intoxication, however,
should be considered as mitigating, it having been
sufficiently shown that (1) at the time of the commission
of the criminal act, they have taken such quantity of
alcoholic drinks as to blur their reason and deprive them
of certain degree of control, and (b) that such intoxication
is not habitual, or subsequent to the plan to commit the
felony.42
As to the crime committed, the prosecution amply
established the following elements of robbery with
homicide: (a) the taking of personal property is
perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against
a person, (b) the property taken belongs to another, (c)
the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus
lucrandi, and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by
reason thereof, the crime of homicide, in its generic
sense, is committed. 43 It matters not that the victim was
killed prior to the taking of the personal properties of the
victim and the other occupants of the house. What is
essential in robbery with homicide is that there be a
"direct relation, and intimate connection between robbery
and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent
to the former or whether both crimes be committed at the
same time. 44 The rule is well-established that whenever
homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on
the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as
principals of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide although they did not actually take part in the
homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored
to prevent the homicide. 45 While Cando was bashing
the head of the victim, and placing the personal items in
his bag, nary a peep could be heard from Vargas and
Rapcing. Their act of simply watching Cando shows their
moral assent and complete acquiescence to the
commission of the crime.
Appellant Vargas claims that he was threatened at knife
point to join appellant Cando in the commission of the
crime. He is in effect invoking the exempting
circumstance of compulsion of an irresistible force under
Article 12, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code. We have
held that the compulsion must be of such a character as
to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-
defense. 46 Vargas had several opportunities to prevent
the killing and to escape, but he chose to remain with his
co-conspirators, and even willingly drove the get-away
vehicle.
As to appellant Rapcing, the fact that he did not go into
hiding after the alleged incident does not make him an
innocent man. We have long ruled that flight is an
indicium of guilt, but non-flight is not necessarily an
indicium of innocence.47
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for
robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death.
There being one mitigating circumstance of intoxication,
and one aggravating circumstance of treachery, the
penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.48 The
existence of one aggravating circumstance merits the
award of exemplary damages under Art. 2230 of the New
Civil Code.
We likewise order that the personal properties which are
in custodia legis be returned to the offended parties.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 95-142748 is
hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellants ROGER
CANDO Y PAGDANGANAN, ARNEL VARGAS Y
MAGTANGOB, and WILBERTO RAPCING Y BROÑOLA
are hereby found guilty of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and ordered solidarily to pay the heirs
of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to return to the
owners thereof the cash and the vehicle and other effects
taken by the appellants, as well as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinion
VITUG, J.:
It does seem that the prosecution has been able to
establish the guilt of accused-appellants on their
involvement in the crime charged. But I find myself
unable to subscribe to the idea of having treachery taken
as a generic aggravating circumstance in the crime of
robbery with homicide. While I am not unaware of the
past pronouncements which supports this conclusion, I
believe it to be high time, however, for the Court to
reexamine the doctrine. Robbery with homicide is a
special complex crime where homicide is committed "by
reason or on occasion" of robbery. In the same way that
alevosia will not result in qualifying the offense to murder,
where the original and real intent of the accused is
robbery, so, also, must treachery be ignored in
aggravating this special crime. Robbery with homicide is
an offense against property under Title Ten, Book Two,
of the Revised Penal Code, and treachery is an
aggravating circumstance obviously applicable only to
crimes against persons under Title Eight, Book Two, of
the same Code.
G.R. No. 118079 December 24, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO ESTANISLAO, ROGELIO ESTANISLAO,
and FELINO ESTANISLAO [Deceased], accused-
appellants.
PADILLA, J.:p
On 3 July 1990, the 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
of Camarines Sur charged Armando, Rogelio and Felino
all surnamed Estanislao, with the murder of one Sergio
Montejo, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about January 19, 1990, in the
late afternoon, at Poblacion, Municipality of
Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and stab Sergio Montejo with a sharp
bladed instrument, hitting the latter on his
left chest that caused his instantaneous
death.
That as a consequence of the death of said
Sergio Montejo, his heirs sustained
damages which will be proved later in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
When arraigned, all accused pleaded not guilty. 2
On 22 May 1992, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the criminal aspect of the case against
accused Feline Estanislao due to his death on 9 October
1990. 3
On 21 March 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29
of Libmanan, Camarines Sur rendered a decision 4 of
conviction, the dispositive part of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, there
being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, accused Armando Estanislao
and Rogelio Estanislao are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessory
penalties and for them, including the estate
of the deceased accused Feline Estanislao,
to pay jointly and severally an indemnity to
the heirs of Sergio Montejo in the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
ONLY and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
A motion for reconsideration of the judgment finding the
accused-appellants guilty of murder was denied on 6
September 1994 6 and a Notice of Appeal was
seasonably filed with, and given due course by the trial
court. 7
The evidence for the prosecution based mainly on the
testimony of Fe Peñaredondo tends to prove that on 19
January 1990 at around five o'clock in the afternoon while
she (Peñaredondo) was at the eatery owned by a certain
Jun Badilla and while Badilla, another unnamed person
and the victim Sergio Montejo were drinking beer, the
accused Rogelio Estanislao arrived.
When the victim Montejo stood up from the drinking
session to relieve himself, accused Rogelio Estanislao
suddenly uttered, "Tara Sergio!" after which Rogelio
suddenly stabbed the victim Sergio Montejo and
thereafter fled. Peñaredondo likewise testified that she
saw Armando and Felino Estanislao, whom she had
earlier seen within the vicinity of the store, approach the
victim immediately after the stabbing, carrying wooden
sticks locally called
" palomaria". When the two (2) found out that the victim
had fallen down with a stab wound, they then also fled.
Araceli Montejo, the victim's wife, testified that the
relationship between the Estanislaos and the Montejos
had turned sour since 18 November 1989 when her
husband (the victim) had advised the Estanislaos to
vacate the property of the Montejos that they were
occupying since the Montejos were going to use the
property. She testified that on 11 January 1990, only a
week before the stabbing incident, her husband and
Armando Estanislao had a fist fight where the latter was
aided by the two (2) other accused, Felino and Rogelio
Estanislao. The fight was broken up by the timely arrival
of police officers which prevented the accused from
further attacking the victim Sergio Montejo. The victim's
widow likewise testified that Rogelio Estanislao
threatened to kill her husband while she was trying to
stop the fight. 8
The defense on the other hand had a completely different
version of the incident.
Accused-appellant Rogelio Estanislao while admitting
that he was holding the bladed weapon that killed the
victim interposed the defense that the latter was
accidentally hit when he (Rogelio) was trying to parry an
attack on himself.
Rogelio testified that at around five o'clock in the WHEN IT RELIED UPON THE LONE,
afternoon of 19 January 1990 at Barangay Poblacion, UNCORROBORATED AND INADEQUATE
Libmanan, Camarines Sur, he passed by an eatery TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
(carinderia) where the owner, a certain Jun Badilla, one WITNESS FE PEÑAREDONDO IN
Gerry Balces and the victim Sergio Montejo were having CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT
a drinking spree. As he passed by, he heard the victim ROGELIO ESTANISLAO EMPLOYED
say in the native dialect, "Here he comes, attack him TREACHERY IN ATTACKING THE
now!". It was then that Montejo and Balces threw beer VICTIM.
bottles at him and Montejo pulled out a fan knife
(balisong) saying "I will finish you!". Jun Badilla likewise II
attacked him with a bolo. Rogelio then stated that he was
able to grab hold of a small wooden table locally known WHEN IT RELIED UPON THE DUBIOUS
as "papag" which he used to parry the attacks of the two TESTIMONY OF OFFENDED PARTY
(2) assailants. He declared that the victim was hit by the ARACELI MONTEJO IN CONCLUDING
bolo of Jun Badilla when he parried the latter's attack and THAT THERE EXISTED EVIDENT
the bolo accidentally hit the victim. Defense witness PREMEDITATION THAT QUALIFIED THE
Dionisio Munda corroborated Rogelio's version of the OFFENSE TO MURDER.
incident.
III
Accused-appellant Armando Estanislao relied on his
defense of alibi. He testified that on the date and time of WHEN IT INFERRED THE EXISTENCE
the incident, he was at the house of a certain Leonor OF CONSPIRACY AMONG THE
Amores working as a hired laborer. ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FROM MERE
RELATIONSHIP AND SPECULATION.
Amores confirmed Armando's alibi but admitted that the
distance from her house to the crime scene can be IV
negotiated in five (5) minutes on foot or two (2) minutes
by trimobile. WHEN IT DISREGARDED APPELLANT
ROGELIO ESTANISLAO'S CLAIM OF
Accused-appellants assign the following errors to the trial SELF-DEFENSE EVEN WHEN HIS
court: TESTIMONY WAS NEVER REBUTTED
AND THEREFORE TACITLY ADMITTED
I BY THE PROSECUTION.
 V The settled rule is that appellate courts will generally not
WHEN IT CONVICTED THE ACCUSED
OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AS
CHARGED. 9
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erroneously
relied on the testimony of Fe Peñaredondo which was not
only uncorroborated but also based on assumptions and
contained accounts of events which were improbable.
It is argued that the prosecution should have presented
the persons allegedly drinking with the victim at the time
of the incident.
Accused-appellants likewise contend that witness
Peñaredondo only assumed that the reason the victim
stood up was to relieve himself, which assumption lacked
any basis.
Appellants also maintain that it is improbable for accused
Felino and Armando Estanislao to loiter near the scene of
the incident as early as 4:30 in the afternoon of 19
January 1990 since the former was an infirm and ailing
man who died during the trial of the case while the latter
walks with a limp and there would have been a danger of
their being violently accosted by the victim and his
drinking companions.
Appellants then assail the finding of the trial court that
treachery and evident premeditation accompanied the
killing.
disturb the findings of the trial court on the issue of
credibility of witnesses, considering that it is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during trial.10
In the present case, there is no showing that the trial
court overlooked certain facts which could have
materially affected its appreciation of the testimony of
prosecution witness Fe Peñaredondo. Her testimony was
clear, unequivocal and consistent. The issues raised by
appellants regarding assumptions and improbabilities
pertain to matters which are extraneous to her
straightforward narration of how accused-appellant
Rogelio Estanislao suddenly stabbed the victim Sergio
Montejo, after which he immediately fled.
Accused-appellant Rogelio Estanislao for his defense
contends that he was holding a wooden table (papag)
and a knife he had grabbed possession of from one of
the victim's drinking buddies. He maintains that the victim
Montejo was accidentally stabbed when he was parrying
the attacks against him.
Appellant Rogelio's defense that the victim was
accidentally stabbed is defeated and negated by his own
testimony.
On direct examination, Rogelio Estanislao first testified
that the victim attacked him with a knife while Jun Badilla
attacked him with a bolo he had pulled from his
scabbard. He was then able to get hold of a wooden
table to defend himself. While parrying the attacks
against him, the victim (Montejo) was hit by the bolo of
Badilla which he had blocked with the "papag". 11
Later however, Rogelio stated that he was not sure if it
was the bolo of Badilla or the knife which the victim had
earlier attacked him with, but which the latter dropped
and which he picked up and was then holding together
with the "papag", which struck the fatal wound on Sergio
Montejo. He also stated that the victim was attacking him
with a lead pipe while Badilla was attacking him with his
bolo. 12
On cross-examination, Rogelio had yet another version
of the incident. He stated that Badilla was not yet holding
a bolo when Sergio attacked him with a knife. Rogelio
narrated that Sergio first dropped the knife before Badilla
got a bolo from the stall and attacked him.13
The differences in the three (3) versions of the incident
are irreconcilable and unexplained. Thus, against the
uncontested and consistent testimony of the prosecution
witnesses, his defense must fail.
Moreover, if it were indeed true that it was the victim's
(Montejo) group that first attacked Rogelio Estanislao, it
is not explained why the latter did not file criminal
charges against his alleged attackers.
The presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery
has been adequately shown. The attack on Montejo
although preceded by a warning ("Tara Sergio!) was
undoubtedly sudden and unexpected and prevented the
unsuspecting victim, who had just stood up, from
defending himself.
Evident premeditation on the other hand was not
substantially shown.
The requisites of evident premeditation are: 1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime must
be adequately shown; 2) an act to show that the offender
clung to his determination and 3) a sufficient lapse of
time between the determination and the execution to
allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of
his act. 14
Not all of said requisites have been adcquately shown in
this case.
On the criminal liability of Armando Estanislao, the trial
court based his conviction on the inference that there
was conspiracy between the father (Felino), whose
criminal liability was extinguished by his death during trial
of the case, and the two (2) sons, Rogelio and Armando.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the joint and
simultaneous acts of several accused aimed at a
common purpose. 15
We are not convinced that conspiracy between Rogelio
and the two (2) other accused can be logically inferred
from the acts of the latter.
It is undisputed that Armando and Felino Estanislao did
not commit any positive act to show unity of purpose with
Rogelio. Their mere presence in the crime scene, absent
other proof to support the allegation of conspiracy,
cannot be considered an indication of their being
conspirators. l6 Nor can relationship with Rogelio and
their carrying wooden sticks be considered as badges of
conspiracy The doubt in this case should be resolved in
favor of the accused-appellants.
Finally, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender cannot be appreciated in favor of accused-
appellant Rogelio Estanislao The trial court correctly held
that Rogelio's surrender after a warrant of arrest had
been issued and almost two (2) months after the incident
was not spontaneous and therefore deserves no
consideration.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision
appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Armando Estanislao is hereby
ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt;
2. The liability of the estate of Feline Estanislao for the
death of the victim is SET ASIDE for being without basis;
3. Accused-appellant Rogelio Estanislao is declared
guilty of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs
of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., is on leave.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1255. August 17, 1903. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v.
FELIPE ABAIGAR, Defendant-Appellant.
Fermin Mariano for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Araneta for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; ALEVOSIA. — When it
appears that the deceased was killed while bound, and
therefore unable to defend himself, the crime is murder
because of the concurrence of the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia.
2. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES;
PREMEDITATION. — Where the determination to kill is
followed immediately by the execution of the crime it is
error to apply the circumstance of deliberate
premeditation in aggravation of the penalty.
3. ID., ID.; IGNOMINY. — The fact that the deceased
was killed in the presence of his wife does not constitute
the circumstance of ignominy which consists in adding
 disgrace and ignominy to the material injury caused by
the crime.
4. ID., ID., AID OF ARMED MEN. — The casual
presence of armed men near the place where the crime
was committed does not constitute an aggravating
circumstance when it appears that the accused did not
avail himself of their aid or rely upon it.
DECISION
MAPA, J. :
The testimony of the witnesses and the confession of the
accused himself show unquestionably that the latter
stabbed Constantino Nabaonag to death while he was
bound, and therefore unable to defend himself against
the aggression. This circumstance constitutes alevosia,
and the offense is therefore properly classified as
murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal
Code. It follows, therefore, that the judgment of the court
below now before us in consultation is correct, in so far
as it finds the defendant guilty of the crime of murder.
This judgment condemns the accused to the penalty of
death, the court considering that the crime was
committed with the aggravating circumstances of
deliberate premeditation, the employment of means
tending to add ignominy to the necessary effects of the
act, and the commission of the crime with the assistance
of armed men.
The opinion of the court in this regard does not meet with
our approval. There was no premeditation, because an
examination of the record shows that the purpose of
killing Constantino arose suddenly in the mind of the
defendant, and was instantaneously carried into effect,
upon information that the deceased had spoken ill of the
defendant.
The accused says: "As soon as I heard of this I became
furiously enraged; I seized my dagger and killed him at
once." This part of the defendant’s testimony was not
disproven in the course of the trial. The determination to
kill was, then, followed immediately by the execution of
the crime; and consequently between the determination
to commit the act and its actual commission there was no
opportunity for the cold, meditative, and persistent
reflection which constitutes premeditation, which is
essentially different from a simple determination of the
will, which is always presumed in the commission of
every offense.
The circumstance of ignominy was not present because
no means were employed nor did any circumstances
surround the act tending to make the effects of the crime
more humiliating. Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining
to the moral order, which adds disagree and obloquy to
the material injury caused by the crime. The fact that the
deceased was killed in the presence of his wife certainly
could not have such a signification, and this is the
circumstance which the court below had in view when
declaring that this circumstance had concurred.

Furthermore, the evidence shows that the crime was not
committed with the assistance of armed men. The
testimony of the accused, corroborated by that of the
witness for the prosecution, Francisco Abadiano, is that
the crime was committed by the defendant alone, without
assistance from any one. It is true that in the house near
the place where the crime was committed there were ten
men armed with daggers, according to the statements of
the witness referred to, and five without arms, according
to the accused, but as these men took no part, directly or
indirectly, in the commission of the crime, and it does not
appear that they heard the conversation which caused
the sudden determination on the part of the accused to
will the deceased, and still less that they had in any way
participated in this determination, we can not, within the
law, find that this circumstance concurred in the
commission of the crime prosecuted for the purpose of
augmenting the criminal responsibility of the accused.
The mere casual presence of armed men, more or less
numerous, near the place of the occurrence does not
constitute an aggravating circumstance when it appears
that the defendant did not avail himself in any way of their
aid, and did not knowingly count upon their assistance in
the commission of the crime.
In the present case, there being no circumstance tending
to modify the guilt of the defendant, the penalty is that
prescribed by article 403 of the Penal Code in its medium
grade, to wit, the penalty of life imprisonment, and not the
penalty of death imposed by the court.
For the reasons stated we reverse the judgment in so far
as it condemns the defendant to death, and impose upon
the latter the penalty of life imprisonment, and condemn
him to the payment of an indemnification of 1,000
Mexican pesos to the heirs of the deceased, together
with the costs of this instance.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Willard and
McDonough, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-36941 June 29, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL SAYLAN alias PAEL, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Federico Y. Alikpala, Jr., for accused-appellant.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental in Criminal
Case No. 52-M which imposed the death penalty.
RAFAEL SAYLAN was accused of the crime of rape in
the sworn complaint of Eutropia Agno said to have been
committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of January,
1972, at more or less 7:00 o'clock in the
 evening, at Sitio Craser, Malinao, Jingo
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, with deliberate intent to have
sexual intercourse, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally with the
use of a dagger, force and intimidate
Eutropia Agno y Arcay, to remove her
pantie and to lay down on the ground and
with the use of a dagger, force and
intimidation succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with Eutropia Agno y Arcay, a
woman of good reputation and against her
will. That the commission of the foregoing
offense was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of: abuse of superior
strength, nighttime, uninhabited place,
ignominy and reiteracion. (Expediente, p.
27.)
The accused entered a plea of "not guilty" and after trial
the court rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape, penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 4111, and the commission
of the offense having been attended by
three aggravating without any mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences him to
suffer the supreme penalty of death, to
indemnify the offended party in the amount
of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), and to
pay the costs. In view of the fact that the
offended party is a married woman, aside
from the fact that she has not become
pregnant as a result of the commission of
the rape, the Court makes no
pronouncement as to acknowledgment and
support of offspring. (Id., p. 64.)
The factual version of the prosecution is summarized in
the People's brief as follows:
The complaining witness, Eutropia A. Agno,
a married woman and a resident of Barrio
Malinao, Gingoog City, was a classroom
teacher of the Malinao Elementary School
(pp. 2, 3, tsn., Feb. 22, 1973).
In the afternoon of January 23, 1971,
Eutropia went to the public market in
Gingoog City to buy foodstuffs for her family
and thereafter, she proceeded to the store
of her mother to fetch her five-year old
daughter Nilsonita (p. 4, tsn., Id.). On their
way home, Eutropia and Nilsonita boarded
a passenger jeepney and while inside the
vehicle she (Eutropia) noticed that the other
passengers were Rudy Gonzales, a grade I
pupil of the Malinao Elementary School, the
appellant, Rafael Saylan, and a couple
whom she did not know (pp, 5, 6, tsn., Id.).
The jeepney went only as far as Malinas
citrus farm because the road to Barrio
Malinao was not passable by vehicles (p. 5,
tsn., Id.). It was almost 6:30 o'clock in the
evening when the jeepney arrived at the
Malinas citrus farm and so all the
passengers alighted and had to walk all the
way to Barrio Malinao which was about
three and a half kilometers away (p. 5,
tsn., Id.). After walking some distance and
upon reaching a junction, the couple
separated from the group and took the road
leading to their house while Eutropia's
group took the opposite road (p. 9, tsn.,
Id.).lwphl@itç The appellant, however,
joined the group of Eutropia and when they
reached the place where the road was
plain, appellant who was then walking side
by side with Eutropia suddenly pulled out a
dagger about eight inches long and pointing
it at the latter said, "Do not shout, Nang, I
will kill you!" (pp. 11, 12, tsn., Id.). At this
juncture, appellant placed his right arm
around the neck of Eutropia with the dagger
pointed at her left breast (p. 12, tsn., Id.),
after which he dragged Eutropia at some
distance. When they reached the junction of
the trail for men and a trail for carabaos, he
ordered everybody to stop and told the
children (Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales) to
stay behind and threatened to kill them if
they persisted in following them (pp. 17, 18,
tsn., Id.). Thereafter, appellant again
dragged Eutropia by her hand and brought
her towards a creek near a coconut tree
which was about five meters away from
where Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales were
(pp. 14, 15, 16, tsn., Id.).lwphl@itç The
appellant then ordered Eutropia to remove
her panty which she refused at first, but
appellant threatened to kill her, so she
removed her panty after which appellant
ordered her to lie down (pp. 18, 19,
tsn., Id.). Subsequently, appellant placed
himself on top of the victim and inserted his
penis into her vagina and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her by
moving his buttocks up and down (pp.
20,21, tsn., Id.).
After the first sexual act, appellant ordered
Eutropia to standup which the latter
helplessly and grudgingly followed (p. 23,
tsn., Id.). Appellant again inserted his penis
into her vagina and then performed a push
and puli movement (pp. 23, 24, 25, tsn.,
Id.). Not satisfied with the second
intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to
lie down again preparatory to a third
intercourse (p. 26, tsn., Id.). Appellant again
performed the sexual act with her (pp. 26,
27, tsn., Id.).
After the third intercourse, appellant
ordered Eutropia to stand up and then he
bent her body downwards with her hands
and knees resting on the ground (p. 28,
tsn., Id.). When the latter was already in this
position, appellant then placed himself
behind her, inserted his penis into her
vagina and executed a push and puli
movement in the dog's way of sexual
intercourse (pp. 27, 28, tsn., Id.)
After performing this uncommon way of
sexual intercourse, appellant ordered
Eutropia to he down again which the latter
reluctantly obeyed because appellant's
dagger was always pointed at her and
thereafter he had carnal knowledge of her
for the fifth time (pp. 29, 30, tsn., Id.).
After the fifth intercourse, and after
satisfying his sexual lust, appellant asked
Eutropia if she will tell her husband what he
did to her and the latter answered, "I will not
tell" (p. 31, tsn., Id.). But she only said this
so that appellant would let her go home (p.
33, tsn., Id.).
Afterwards, Eutropia and appellant returned
to the place where the children were left
and upon arriving thereat, they found
Nilsonita (Eutropia's daughter) asleep with
Rudy seated dozing beside her (pp. 32, 33,
tsn., Id.). Nilsonita who was sleeping was
carried by the appellant and then they all
proceeded to Malinao (pp. 33, 34, tsn., Id.).
After walking some distance, Eutropia saw
the house of her friend "Ben" and upon
approaching the said house, she shouted,
"Ben, Ben, please give me hot water" (p.
34, tsn., Id.). Upon hearing her voice, Ben,
who was still awake at the time, opened the
door of his house and allowed Eutropia to
come up (p. 34, tsn., Id.). Eutropia
immediately went upstairs and went straight
to the room of Ben as she was feeling very
bad (p. 34, tsn., Id.). Appellant, who was
then carrying Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales,
were also allowed to go upstairs (p. 35,
tsn., Id.). Meanwhile, Eutropia requested
Ben to fetch her husband (p. 35, tsn., Id.).
When Eutropia woke up between 9:00 and
10:00 o'clock that evening, her husband
was already there (p. 36, tsn., Id.). She then
asked him whether the appellant was stin
around, and in reply, he told her that
appellant had already left (p. 37, tsn., Id.).
Eutropia then told her husband that she
was raped by the appellant (p. 37, tsn., Id.).
Upon learning of the dastardly act
committed by the appellant, he advised his
wife to submit herself to a medical
examination (p. 37, tsn., Id.).
The following morning, the offended party
was brought to the office of the City Health
Department of Gingoog City where she was
examined by Dr. Ireneo O. Pascual who
after conducting a thorough physical
examination, issued a medical certificate
with the following findings, to wit:
(1) Multiparous.
(2) Presence of viscid whitish
secretions at vaginal fornix
(3) Microscopic examination
of secretions reveals epithelial
cells, but no spermatozoa
Identified.
(pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Feb. 24, 1973; Exh.
"A").
Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil of the
Malinao Elementary School and one of the
witnesses for the prosecution, testified that
he met Mrs. Eutropia Agno in the afternoon
of January 23, 1972 at the public market of
Gingoog City buying foodstuffs for her
family (pp. 2, 3, tsn., Feb. 26, 1973). On
their way back to Barrio Malinao, they
boarded a passenger jeepney and while he
was inside the vehicle, he noticed that the
other passengers aside from Mrs. Agno,
her daughter, and himself were the
appellant and a couple whose names he
did not know ( p. 4, tsn., Id.). The jeepney,
however, could only travel up to the
Marinas Citrus farm and so they had to
walk all the way to Barrio Malinao (p. 4,
tsn., Id.) After was some distance and upon
reaching a trail for carabaos, the appellant
suddenly pulled a dagger and placed his
arms around the neck of Mrs. Agno and
then dragged her towards the carabao trail
(pp. 4, 5, tsn., Id.). Meanwhile, he and
Nilsonita were left behind and they fell
asleep because it took a long time for the
appellant and Mrs. Agno to come back for
them (p. 5, tsn., Id.). When Mrs. Agno and
the appellant returned, he was already
awake while Nilsonita was still asleep and
so appellant had to carry her in going home
to Man (p. 6, tsn., Id.).lwphl@itç After was
some distance, Mrs. Agno saw the house of
Mang Ben and because she was feeling
bad, they all went to the house of Mang
Ben where Mrs. Agno spent the night (p. 7,
tsn., Id.). Afterwards, he and the appellant
left the house of Mang Ben and then they
proceeded to his house at Malinao where
both of them slept (pp. 7, 21, tsn., Id.). (At
pp. 2-8.)
The accused did not deny having had sexual intercourse
with Mrs. Agno; in fact he admitted that he copulated with
her for three successive times in the early evening of
January 23, 1972, but he claimed that it was with her
consent. Accordingly, he now claims that:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE HAD BEEN COMMITTED
 AGAINST THE WILL AND CONSENT OF
THE COMPLAINANT.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
FINDING THAT AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES HAD ACCOMPANIED
THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.
(Brief, p. 5.)
The appeal must fail for the reasons stated hereunder.
This is a typical rape case. Only the participants could
directly testify on the alleged sexual abuse and the
accused alleges consent on the part of the complainant.
The question of credibility arises and under the
circumstances We have to rely heavily on the
determination made by the trial judge who observed the
demeanor of the witnesses while before Us is only the
cold transcript of what they said.
We accept the conclusions and findings of fact of the trial
court that the complainant was in fact raped by the
appellant. There is no fact or circumstance in the record
which will justify a different action.
The claim of the appellant that the sexual intercourse
was mutually agreed is utterly incredible. If it were true
that Mrs. Agno consented to have coitus with the
appellant, her conduct thereafter defies understanding
because it is contrary to reason and it has not been
shown that Mrs. Agno, a school teacher, was bereft of
common sense. For if it was true that the sexual act was
indeed mutually desired and performed why did she
complain not only to her husband but also to the
authorities? An affair such as that claimed by the
appellant is carried out in a discreet manier. On the other
hand, the version of the complainant has indicia of
credibility. For her version bared her shame to a small
community and her exposure was necessary only
because she had to reveal the truth. No, We simply
cannot believe the appellant's version.
We have said above that the findings and conclusions of
the trial court are entitled to great respect. In finding the
appellant guilty, this is what the court a quo said in part:
The testimony of the accused is incredible.
When he told his love to the offended party
for the first time, they were only two in the
latter's house. He had more time with her
then. She refuse him because she is
married. He tried for the second time. He
was again refused because she is married.
It is unthinkable and highly improbable that
on the evening of January 23, 1972, after
only three minutes, the offended party
would rush to accept his love and go to the
extent of thanking him for his considering
her daughter as his own, unless she was
coerced, threatened, forced and
intimidated.
It is highly improbable for a school teacher
with several children to exchange her
husband only 40 years old and with a good
means of livelihood for one whom she does
 not know and whom she has observed as
doing nothing except to play basketball. It is
subversive of the traits, character and
nature of Filipino women to say that the
offended party, a school teacher and a girl
scout accepted the love of a man who is
good for nothing and surrendered her whole
body and virtue to him after an accidental
courtship of only three minutes. The
offended party is an unsophisticated and
conservative woman, fixing her hair the old
fashion way. She does not apply make-up
on her face, and her dress is up to her
knees. This makes the pretensions of the
accused all the more incredible.
(Expediente, p. 59.)
The complaint alleges the following aggravating
circumstances: abuse of superior strength,
nocturnity, despoblado, ignominy, and reiteracion.
The trial court disregarded superiority because it "is
inherent in the crime of rape or is absorbed in the
element of force." It also did not consider nocturnity
"there being no evidence that the accused purposely
sought it to facilitate the commission of this rape." (Id, p.
63.)
Despoblado was present according to the trial court
because: "The accused dragged the offended party, at
the point of a dagger, to the carabao trail, about 10
meters from the junction, but 40 to 50 meters below to
better attain his purpose without interference, and to
better secure himself from detection and punishment
(U.S. vs. Vitug, 17 Phil. 1). Even the junction where the
two children were left is already 400 meters from the
nearest house. While there maybe occasional passersby,
this does not destroy its being an uninhabited place.
(People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 87)." (Id, p. 62.) We hold
that the trial court for the reasons stated correctly held
that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place.
The trial court held that there was ignominy because the
appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male
supenor female inferior, but also "The same position as
dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims
there was no ignominy because "The studies of many
experts in the matter have shown that this 'position' is not
novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by
couples in the act of copulation. (Brief, p. 24.) This may
well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting
partners but not otherwise.
The trial court also held that "there is no reiteracion
because one of the offenses, namely Robbery in Band,
for which the accused has been penal was committed
after the commission of this rape case, and the penalty
imposed on the other offense of Frustrated Homicide, is
lighter than the penalty for rape." (Id, P. 63.)
Although not alleged in the complaint, the trial court
stated that the offense was aggravated by disregard of
rank because it was a fact knowm to the appellant that
Mrs. Agno was a school teacher. The appellant claims
that this circumstance cannot be assigned to him
because there was no deliberate intent to offend or insult
the rank of Mrs. Agno. The Solicitor General agrees with
the appellant for the same reason.
The judgment of the trial court is in accordance with the
facts and the law but it cannot be affirmed completely
because of the lack of the necessary number of votes.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is modified in
the sense that the appellant shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua instead of death and the indemnity
to be paid to the offended party is increased to
P20,000.00. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Guerrero, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
[G.R. No. L-18054. March 18, 1922. ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. ARSENIO SUNGA Y REYES (alias)
ARSENIO LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Francisco Sevilla for Appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. QUALIFIED THEFT; UNLAWFUL ENTRY. — The act
of entering through the window, which is not the proper
entrance to the house, for the purpose of taking away
certain valuable articles constitutes unlawful entry, which
if alleged in the complaint would make the crime robbery,
but when, as in the present case, no such allegation was
made, said circumstance should be taken into account as
an aggravating circumstance (circumstance No. 21,
article 10 of the Penal Code), with the result that, in the
absence of any extenuating circumstance, the penalty
must be raised to the maximum degree.
2. SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT. — The penalty of
subsidiary imprisonment imposed upon the accused is
not authorized by the law, as the principal penalty in this
case is of an affective, and not correctional, nature. (Art.
25 and 51 of the Penal Code.)
DECISION
ROMUALDEZ, J. :
The herein accused is Arsenio Sunga y Reyes (alias)
Arsenio Lopez who was prosecuted for, and convicted of,
the crime of qualified theft in that with intent of gain he
had taken away, without the consent of the owner,
certain pieces of jewelry and other valuables worth in all
P3,277, equivalent to 16,385 pesetas. The penalty
imposed upon the accused was ten years of presidio
mayor, with the accessories prescribed by law, to
indemnify the offended party in the sum aforesaid, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.
The theft was considered as qualified theft on account of
the proven and undenied fact that the appellant is
fourteen times a recidivist.
Counsel for defense in this instance does not assign any
error to the judgment appealed from, which he fields in
accordance with the facts and the law of the case.
However, the prosecution, maintaining that the defendant
should be punished in accordance with paragraph 1 of
article 518 of the Penal Code in relation with paragraph 3
of article 520 of the same Code, recommends that in the
absence of any modifying circumstance, the appellant
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty prescribed in
article 520, in the medium degree, that is to say, seven
years, four months and one day of presidio mayor.
An examination of the record shows without a shadow of
doubt the guilt of the accused. His alibi is absolutely
worthless as a defense.
The only matter that under the facts of the case concerns
us is the determination of the penalty that should be
imposed. We are in accord with the prosecution as to the
legal provisions applicable to the case. However, we find
that the accused entered the inhabited house through a
window, which was not the proper entrance to the house,
and therefore, there is present in this case the
circumstance of scaling a house which, had it been
alleged in the complaint, would have made the crime
robbery (article 508 of the Penal Code, second
paragraph before the last), but as this circumstance was
not alleged, it must be considered as an aggravating
circumstance (No. 21, article 10, Penal Code), with the
result that, in the absence of any extenuating
circumstance, as in the present case, the penalty must
be raised to the maximum degree.
On the other hand the subsidiary imprisonment imposed
upon the accused is not permitted by the law because
the principal penalty is not correctional, but affective, in
nature. (Arts. 25 and 51 of the Penal Code.)
The judgment appealed from is modified and the
appellant is sentenced to undergo ten years of presidio
mayor, to return to the owner the articles stolen,
described in the complaint, or their value of P3,277, to
the accessories prescribed in article 57 of the Penal
Code, and to the payment of the costs of both instances.
So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and
Johns, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 83696 : December 21, 1990.]
192 SCRA 621
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. DANTE BARTULAY Accused-Appellant.
 DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
Subject of this appeal is the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 49, Puerto Princesa City, in Criminal Case
No. 3042 entitled "People vs. Dante Bartulay" convicting
appellant Dante Bartulay of the crime of robbery with
homicide under an amended information which reads:
"The undersigned accuses ROSALIO LAGUARDIA alias
"ROLLY", DANTE BARTULAY alias "TOTOY",
BALTAZAR BERAN alias "BOY BUNGAL", as principals,
and RAYMUNDO BARTULAY alias "MANDING", as
accessory, of the crime of "ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARM WITH ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE,"
committed as follows:
'That on or about the 6th day of September, 1979, and for
sometime prior thereto, in Puerto Princesa City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Rosalio Laguardia, Dante Bartulay and
Baltazar Beran, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually, helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession,
custody and control the following firearm(s), to wit: One (1)
.380 cal., automatic pistol and One (1) 22 cal. revolver with
Serial No. 64618, without having the necessary license
and/or permit from the proper authorities; that while in
possession of aforedescribed firearms at the
aforementioned place and date, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with intent of gain and without the
consent and against the will of the owners, by means of
force, violence and intimidation and with the use of
aforementioned firearms and motor vehicle, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away from one MIGUEL 'MIKE' CHUA the amount of
P50,000.00 cash, more or less, and P37,000.00 in checks,
more or less and a panel truck worth P100,000.00 in the
total value of P187,000.00 more or less, belonging to said
MIGUEL 'MIKE' CHUA and the FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION, to the damage and prejudice of the
latters (sic) in the aforesaid amount; that on the occasion
of said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to
take said amount and panel truck the said accused, in
pursuance of their conspiracy, with treachery, evident
premeditation, taking advantage of nighttime, with the use
of a motor vehicle and with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack and
shoot one MIGUEL 'MIKE' CHUA, thereby inflicting upon
the latter mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death; that accused
Raymundo Bartulay, having full knowledge of the
commission of the aforementioned robbery with homicide
and without having participated therein either as principal
or accomplice, take part subsequent to its commission by
then and there profiting himself and/or assisting the
abovenamed principal accused to profit by the effects of
the crime and also by concealing and hiding the cash
money and checks taken from said Miguel 'Mike' Chua in
order to prevent its discovery by the authorities.'
"CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, use of
a motor vehicle and nighttime." (pp. 1-2, Original Records)
Since appellant evaded arrest, his co-conspirators Rosalio
Laguardia and Baltazar Beran, were convicted ahead of
him and are now serving sentence at the National
Penitentiary Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. On April 28, 1985,
appellant was arrested at Agno St., Tatalon, Quezon City
by elements of the Manila Police Force (pp. 6-7; 293, Ibid).
At the arraignment, appellant with the assistance of Attys.
Gregorio Austria and Ma. Buen Consejo, pleaded GUILTY
to the crime of robbery; NOT GUILTY to homicide; hence,
a conditional plea of NOT GUILTY was entered into the
records (p. 28, Ibid).
The facts as gleaned from the records are as follows:
Benjamin Caca, driver of Fortune Tobacco Corporation
and principal witness for the prosecution, testified that: On
September 6, 1979, at about 10:00 in the evening, the
victim, Miguel `Mike' Chua, salesman of the Fortune
Tobacco Corporation, was driving a panel truck, together
with him, helper Edgardo Aniar and friend Frank Morante,
passing along kilometer 36 southroad, a zigzag road
inside the Iwahig Penal Colony, on their way to Puerto
Princesa City. The group had come from Brooke's Point,
Palawan where they delivered cigarettes and collected
payments for previous sales amounting to more or less
P100,000.00. At a distance of five (5) meters, from the
approaching truck, appellant Dante Bartulay and Baltazar
Beran, co-accused, motioned to Mike Chua to stop. When
the truck stopped at the middle of the road, co-accused
Beran approached the victim at the pretext of borrowing a
screw driver. The victim told Beran to wait as he will park
the truck on the side of the road. At this point, appellant
and Beran pulled out their guns and announced a holdup.
They ordered the four persons to alight from the truck.
Beran directed him, Edgardo Aniar and Frank Morante to
stay at the right side of the road some five (5) meters away
from the truck while appellant separately led the victim
about two meters away from them on the same side of the
road. The four of them were ordered to lie down facing the
ground. Appellant with one foot, stepped on the shoulder
of the victim while pointing a gun at him. Beran then
divested him and Frank Morante of their watches and
wallets while appellant took Chua's watch and wallet.
Appellant asked the victim where his collection was. The
latter told appellant that the money is placed at the back of
the driver's seat. Appellant then ordered Beran to get the
money. The latter did and gave the money contained in a
paper bag to appellant. Thereafter, Beran demanded the
keys of the truck from the victim, who gave them to
appellant, who in turn gave them to Beran. Beran then
ordered the companions of the victim to go inside the panel
truck. Some twenty five (25) seconds after they were
locked up inside the truck, two successive shots were
fired. The truck then started to move and while in motion,
he opened the secret exit door of the panel and was able
to jump out, rolling on the ground until he reached the
canal. He was able to hitch a ride up to Narra, Palawan
where he reported the incident to the police authorities
(Hearing of Sept. 13, 1985; T.S.N., pp. 5-20). The next
day, September 7, 1979, the cadaver of Miguel Chua was
examined by Dr. Rufino Ynzon, the City Health Officer of
Puerto Princesa City. His findings were contained in a
necropsy report as follows::-cralaw
"POSTMORTEM-FINDINGS
"1. Wound, gunshot, (entrance) roughly circular hole, 8-9
mm. in diameter, surrounded by a contuso-abraded collar,
located at the occipital region, 3 inches above from the
occipital protroberance.
"2. (a) Wound, gunshot (exit) hole which is irregular in
shape, about 1 inch long, located at the left frontal bone, 2
1/2 inches above left superior orbital ridge.
(b) Wound, gunshot (exit) hole which is irregular in shape,
about 3/4 inch, long, 1 1/2 inches above wound of exit-(a).
"3. Wound, punctured-lacerated, about 1/3 inch in
diameter, located at the left inferior orbital ridge.
"4. Contusion with hematoma, located at the left superior
orbital portion.
"5. Contusion with hematoma, located at the right superior
orbital portion.
"6. Abrasions, located at the left arm, medial third, anterior
portion.
"7. Abrasions, located at the left elbow, posterior portion.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
HEMORRHAGE, MASSIVE, INTRA-EXTRA CRANIAL,
SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND." (Exhibit "B",
Folder of Exhibits).
Appellant took the PAL second flight in Puerto Princesa to
Manila in the morning of September 7, 1979 (T.S.N., p.
127; Hearing of July 21, 1986; Ibid., p. 198, Hearing of
October 30, 1987).
M/Sgt. Eugenio Enriquez, head of the Intelligence and
Operations of the Palawan Constabulary Command,
stated that the police authorities were able to investigate
Anthony Pediapco who informed them of the presence of
one "Boy Bungal" at the scene of the crime as he even
borrowed some tools from him that night. After
ascertaining that "Boy Bungal" was Baltazar Beran, police
authorities traced his whereabouts and arrested him on
September 8, 1979. Recovered from him was P4,500.00
which he admitted was part of his share from the booty
(Exhibits "F" and "F-1", "G" and "G-1" and "H" and "H-1"
Folder of Exhibits). Beran executed a confession before
the police authorities on the day he was arrested (Exhibits
"P" and "Q", Ibid.) and another statement on September 9,
1979 (Exhibit "Q", Ibid). Based on said confessions, the
police authorities were able to recover from the roof of the
kitchen of one Rosalio Laguardia, the revolver he used
during the holdup, the motorcycle owned by Laguardia,
which was used as a getaway vehicle, and some part of
the share of appellant from the loot entrusted by him to his
brother Raymundo Bartulay who, upon investigation by the
police, voluntarily informed them of the place where it was
hidden (Exhibits "I"-"N", Ibid.; T.S.N., pp. 55-76, Hearing
of Sept. 24, 1985; Ibid., pp. 86-98, Hearing of Feb. 14,
1985).chanrobles virtual law library
At the trial, appellant admitted that he and Beran only
agreed to stage a holdup. He portrayed himself as the one
who guarded the companions of Miguel Chua and that he
was instructed by Beran to get the money from behind the
driver's seat. He stated that upon finding the bag
containing the money, he heard two successive shots; he
even resented why Baltazar Beran had to kill Miguel Chua
as they merely planned to rob him; he was responsible in
saving the lives of the three passengers by pleading to
Baltazar Beran to spare them (T.S.N., pp. 178, 184,
Hearing of Oct. 29, 1987).
On March 8, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision
convicting appellant of the crime of robbery with homicide,
the dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, the Court find (sic) and so founds (sic)
Dante Bartulay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized
under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
principal by direct participation, hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all
accessories provided for by law, to indemnify the heirs of
Miguel Chua the amount of Seven Hundred Twenty
Thousand (P720,000.00) Pesos for the expected
earnings, Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos for moral
damages and Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos for
exemplary damages and to pay the costs." (p. 55, Rollo).
In seeking the reversal of his conviction, appellant claims
that the trial court erred: (1) in its findings that he was the
one who shot Miguel Chua; (2) in finding him guilty of the
complex crime of robbery with homicide despite lack of
evidence; and (3) in failing to appreciate that he
endeavored and in fact was successful in preventing
Baltazar Beran from killing the three companions of Miguel
Chua. Appellant admits participation in the commission of
robbery but vehemently and specifically denies any
participation in the killing of Miguel Chua (pp. 63-64,
Rollo).
The evidence indubitably shows that appellant and co-
accused Beran agreed to commit robbery at Km. 36,
Zigzag Road, Iwahig Penal Colony, Puerto Princesa City,
two (2) weeks prior to the incident. On September 6, 1979,
both appellant and Beran succeeded in robbing Miguel
Chua of P87,000.00 and the victim was shot to death 25
seconds subsequent to his three companions' entry into
the van. There was no eyewitness to the killing of the said
victim. Neither was there a showing that appellant
endeavored to prevent the killing of Chua. A conspiracy in
the statutory language exists when two or more persons
avow to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it (People v. Taaca, G.R. No.
35652, September 29, 1989).
Appellant tries to exculpate himself of criminal liability by
pointing to co-accused Beran as the one who fired the
shots and killed Chua. When the conspiracy to commit the
crime of robbery was conclusively shown by the concerted
acts of the accused and homicide was committed as a
consequence thereof, all those who participated are liable
as principals in the robbery with homicide, although they
did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it appears
that they attempted to prevent the killing. The question as
to who actually robbed or who actually killed is of no
moment since all of them would be held accountable for
the crime of robbery with homicide (People v. Salvador,
G.R. No. 77964, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 574 [1988]).
(Emphasis supplied).:- nad
Moreover, the following actuations of appellant after the
shots were fired clearly show that he is a co-conspirator:
(a) immediately after the firing of the shots, he followed the
truck driven by Baltazar Beran in the motorcycle; (b) when
they reached Montible, Baltazar Beran abandoned the
truck, rode in the motorcycle with appellant and proceeded
to the house of appellant's brother in Puerto Princesa City
where they divided the loot (T.S.N., pp. 184, 196-199,
Hearing of Oct. 30, 1987). Where conspiracy has been
established, a showing as to who inflicted the fatal blow is
not required. (People v. Alvarez, G.R. No. 70446, January
31, 1989, 169 SCRA 730).
Finally, appellant admitted that when he heard the news
that he was being hunted by police authorities in
connection with the crime, he immediately bought a plane
ticket at the PAL office in Puerto Princesa City and took
the second flight to Manila in the morning of September 7,
1979. His sudden departure is indicative of guilt. The guilty
flee when no man pursueth but the innocent are as bold
as a lion (People v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 72883, December
20, 1989).
As correctly found by the trial court, the use of motor
vehicle by the appellant and his co-conspirator aggravated
the commission of the offense since the vehicle was used
to facilitate their escape from the scene of the crime.
The penalty of robbery with homicide prescribed in Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since only one aggravating circumstance attended
the commission of the offense, the greater penalty that is
death shall be applied pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, this penalty cannot be imposed
presently in view of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the
trial court upon the appellant.
The trial court correctly convicted accused of robbery with
homicide only despite the fact that the amended
information charged all the four accused namely, Rosalio
Laguardia, Dante Bartulay and Baltazar Beran of the crime
of illegal possession of firearm with robbery with homicide.
The information alleges that the four accused by
conspiring and confederating together, unlawfully have in
their possession one .380 cal. automatic pistol and one 22
cal. revolver with Serial No. 64618 without the necessary
license or permit from the proper authorities and that while
in the possession of said firearms, the four accused, by
conspiring together, committed robbery with homicide.
The information herein is violative of Section 13 Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that a
complaint or information must charge but one offense
except in certain cases. The four accused are charged with
two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and
robbery with homicide. When each one of two offenses
committed is punishable by two different laws, they cannot
be charged in one information as a complex crime but
must be regarded as two separate and distinct offenses,
each one to be the subject of separate informations. When
duplicity of offenses exists in an information the accused
must present his objection by filing a motion to quash the
information on the ground of duplicity of offenses. If the
accused fails to object and goes to trial under the
information which contains a description of more than one
offense, the general rule is he thereby waives the objection
and may be found guilty of and should be sentenced for,
as many offenses as are charged in the information and
proved during trial (People v. Medina 59 Phil. 134; People
v. Miana 50 Phil. 771). This rule however shall apply only
if the accused is formally arraigned and required to plead
on all the offenses as are charged in the information.
Otherwise, the accused cannot be convicted of the
offenses with respect to which he was not properly
arraigned.
In the case at bar, the accused was not formally arraigned
as to the offense of illegal possession of firearm. The
information wrongly complexed the robbery with homicide
with the special offense of illegal possession of firearm. In
effect, the accused is charged with two distinct offenses.
He should therefore be arraigned and required to plead to
the two offenses. Records show that during the
arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty to robbery and
not guilty to homicide. Hence, the trial court entered a
conditional plea of not guilty for him to the offense of
robbery with homicide, without requiring the accused to
enter his plea to the illegal possession of firearms (p. 28,
Records). And in the rendition of judgment, the trial court
convicted him only of robbery with homicide as there was
no proper arraignment of the accused concerning the
other offense. In one case, this Court held that where the
defendant is charged with three separate offenses, and he
pleaded guilty to the two offenses without pleading to the
third offense charged, the court cannot render judgment of
conviction on the third offense without requiring him to
plead (US v. Sobreviñas 35 Phil. 32). This is based on the
principle that a defendant is legally placed on trial only
when issue upon the information which charges such an
offense has been joined after arraignment by his plea of
not guilty thereto (People v. Ylagan 58 Phil. 851).
We shall sustain the monetary award, consisting of loss of
earnings, made by the trial court in favor of the heirs of the
victim as this matter was not raised in issue in this appeal.
Further, this Court grants the amount of P50,000.00 as
death indemnity to be paid by the appellant to the heirs of
the victim, in accordance with the new policy of this Court
laid down in the Resolution of this Court en banc dated
August 30, 1990 and in People v. Daniel Sison, G.R.
86455, September 14, 1990, in addition to the moral and
exemplary damages awarded by the trial court.:-cralaw
ACCORDINGLY, except for the above mentioned
modification, the decision appealed from convicting the
accused appellant of the crime of robbery with homicide
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I agree entirely with the findings and basic conclusions of
the ponencia of Mr. Justice Medialdea. I write this separate
opinion merely with reference to the disquisition therein
(actually obiter dictum since it has no bearing on the
affirmance, with modification, of the petitioner's conviction)
relative to the duplicitous character of the information filed
by the fiscal against the appellant, which charged him not
only with robbery with homicide for which he was properly
convicted by the Trial Court — but also with illegal
possession of firearm. I want to prevent the discussion on
the point from engendering the belief that this Court is here
laying down the proposition that where an indictment is
indeed duplicitous because charging more than one crime,
it is the Trial Court's affirmative obligation to inform the
accused of this defect and require him to plead separately
to each of said offenses.
The provisions of the Rules of Court in force at the time
material to this inquiry 1 required that an accused must be
arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information has been filed or assigned for trial (unless the
cause shall have been transferred elsewhere for trial). The
arraignment is made in open court by the judge or clerk by
— appears to be ruled out as far as the judge is concerned,
1) reading the complaint or information to the defendant, 2
2) delivering to him a copy thereof, including a list of
witnesses, and
3) asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty as
charged.
At the arraignment, the accused must be personally
present if the charge is for an offense within the jurisdiction
of the Court of First instance (now Regional Trial Court)
and if for a light offense triable by the justice of the peace
or any other inferior courts of similar jurisdiction, he may
appear by attorney. 3
Now, at any time before being arraigned, or entering his
plea on arraignment, the accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of several specified
grounds, 4 one of which is, "That more than one offense is
charged except in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses." 5 If
the accused does not move to quash on this ground, he
shall be deemed to have waived it. 6
It is the Court's duty to assure that the accused is fully
informed of the charges against him. This is why the
information is read to him, and he is also given a copy of
the complaint or information. His knowledge of all the facts
set out in the indictment, as well as of the circumstance
that those facts constitute several offenses, is thus made
reasonably certain, specially since the law requires that he
be assisted by counsel on arraignment. 7 No obligation is
expressly or implicitly imposed on the judge to point out
the duplicitousness (or other defect) of an indictment on
which an accused is being arraigned. In truth, that function
since it is on the accused that the law reposes the
obligation to move to quash on the ground of duplicity (or
otherwise), under sanction of waiver and loss of said
ground of objection.
These principles should not be deemed to have been
altered by the Court's Decision in this case.
In the case at bar, there are positive indications that the
accused did not completely understand the charges
against him; and these justified a finding that his
arraignment was not adequate. When arraigned, "the
accused pleaded guilty to robbery and not guilty to
homicide," as the decision states; but he made no
reference whatever to the offense of illegal possession of
firearm, also set out in the information. It thus appears that
the accused understood that he was being accused only
of robbery and homicide, and had no inkling that another
offense was being ascribed to him, too. These
circumstances, in the ponente's view, warranted a
conclusion similar to that reached in the early case of U.S.
v. Sobreviñas, 35 Phil. 32, where the proceedings were
declared by this Court to be fatally defective and irregular
upon the following facts set out in the syllabus, viz:
"The accused, while on the witness stand testifying in his
own behalf, broke down and admitted his guilt of the
offense with which he was charged in the information upon
which he had been brought to trial (Case No. 1290). At the
same time he admitted his guilt of . . . (two) offenses
charged in . . . (another information [Case No. 1290]) upon
which, however, he had not been brought to trial. The trial
court entered judgments convicting and sentencing the
accused of the offenses charged in each of these
informations, without further proceedings, without bringing
the accused to trial, without formal arraignment and
without giving the accused an opportunity to enter any of
the pleas authorized in General Orders No. 58."
Upon said facts, this Court disposed as follows:
"The judgments entered in the court below convicting and
sentencing the defendant and appellant in the cases now
under consideration, Nos. 11544 and 11545 of the general
register of this court, should, for the reasons stated, be
reversed, with the costs in both instances de oficio, and
the records should be remanded to the court wherein they
originated, reserving to the officers of that court the right
to bring these cases on again for trial or to dismiss the
informations as in their discretion the interests of justice
may require. So ordered.": nad
G.R. No. 94308 June 16, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN E. ILAOA and ROGELIO E. ILAOA, accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff- appellee.
Buen Zamar for accused- appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Pfc. Reynaldo P. Angeles was dispatched in the early
morning of 5 November 1987 to Tinio St., Sta. Maria
Phase I, Balibago, Angeles City, where the decapitated
body of a man, later identified through his voter’s
identification card as Nestor de Loyola, was found in a
grassy portion thereof. Apart from the decapitation, the
deceased bore forty-three (43) stab wounds in the chest
as well as slight burns all over the body. The head was
found some two (2) feet away from the corpse.
Five persons, Ruben E. Ilaoa, Rogelio E. Ilaoa, Rodel E.
Ilaoa, Julius Eliginio and Edwin Tapang, were charged for
the gruesome murder of Nestor de Loyola. However, only
the brothers Ruben and Rogelio stood trial since the
other accused escaped and were never apprehended.
On 15 June 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City found Ruben and Rogelio guilty of murder with the
attendant circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse
of superior strength and cruelty, and imposed upon them
the penalty of "life imprisonment." 1 The conviction was
based on the following circumstantial evidence:
One. The deceased Nestor de Loyola was seen at about
eleven o’clock in the evening of 4 November 1987, in a
drinking session with his compadre Ruben Ilaoa together
with Julius Eliginio, Edwin Tapang and a certain "Nang
Kwang" outside Ruben’s apartment. 2
Two. The drunken voices of Ruben and Nestor engaged
in an apparent argument were later on heard. 3 Nestor
was then seen being kicked and mauled by Ruben and
his brother Rodel, Julius Eliginio and Edwin
Tapang. 4 Nestor was crying all the while, "Pare, aray,
aray!" Afterwards, Nestor, who appeared drunk, was
seen being "dragged" 5 into Ruben Ilaoa’s apartment.
Nestor was heard saying, "Pare, bakit ninyo ako
ginaganito, hirap na hirap na ako!" 6
Three. Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio borrowed Alex
Villamil’s tricycle at about two o’clock the following
morning allegedly for the purpose of bringing to the
hospital a neighbor who was about to give birth. Ruben
was seen driving the tricycle alone, with a sack which
looked as though it contained a human body, placed in
the sidecar. The tricycle was returned an hour later to
Alex who noticed bloodstains on the floor. The latter
thought that they were those of the pregnant woman.
Four. Blood was found on Ruben’s shirt when he was
asked to lift it during the investigation by the
police. 7 Moreover, Ruben’s hair near his right forehead
was found partly burned and his shoes were splattered
with blood. 8 Susan Ocampo, Ruben’s live-in partner, was
likewise seen in the early morning of 5 November 1987
sweeping what appeared to be blood at the entrance of
their apartment. 9
In this appeal, brothers Ruben and Rogelio Ilaoa argue
for their acquittal. They contend that the circumstantial
evidence relied upon by the trial court for their conviction
failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically, they assail the finding of evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and cruelty as
totally unwarranted.
We affirm Ruben Ilaoa’s guilt having been satisfactorily
established by the evidence on hand, albeit
circumstantial. However, we reverse the conviction of
Rogelio as we find it patently baseless.
In finding Rogelio guilty of murder, the court a quo relied
solely on the testimony that he helped his brother Ruben
drag Nestor de Loyola inside Ruben’s apartment where
the deceased was last seen alive. Apart from such
testimony, however, there is nothing else to link Rogelio
to the killing.
To warrant a conviction on the basis of circumstantial
evidence, three requisites must concur: (a) there must be
more than one circumstance; (b) the circumstances from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 10 In
the case at bench, it does not require much analysis to
conclude that the circumstance relied upon to establish
Rogelio Ilaoa’s guilt, i.e., the alleged dragging of the
deceased to his brother’s apartment, is totally inadequate
for a conviction, having miserably failed to meet the
criteria. This is especially so where the veracity of such
circumstance is even open to question. While Antonio
Ramos and Abdulia Logan testified that Rogelio Ilaoa
helped his brother drag the deceased to his apartment,
Eustancia Bie who claimed to have witnessed the same
incident positively testified that it was Ruben Ilaoa and
Julius Eliginio who did so. 11 Rogelio Ilaoa was not
mentioned. Not having been adequately established, in
addition to being uncorroborated, such circumstance
alone cannot be the basis of Rogelio’s conviction.
Ruben’s case, however, is a totally different matter.
Unlike that of his brother, Ruben Ilaoa’s fate was most
definitely assured by the unbroken chain of
circumstances which culminated in the discovery of
Nestor de Loyola’s decapitated body in the early morning
of 5 November 1987.
As found by the trial court, in the late evening of 4
November 1987, appellant Ruben Ilaoa was engaged in
a drinking session with the deceased Nestor de Loyola
together with several others. Ruben was heard arguing
with Nestor. A few moments later, Ruben mauled and
kicked the deceased with the help of their drinking
companions just outside Ruben’s apartment. As the
deceased cried "Aray! Aray!" and "Pare, bakit n’yo ako
ginaganito? Hirap na hirap na ako!" appellant dragged
the deceased with the help of Julius Eliginio to the
apartment from where a man’s cries were continued to
be heard later. To further seal the case against him,
Ruben borrowed Alex Villamil’s tricycle at two o’clock in
the morning of 5 November 1987 on the pretext that a
neighbor was about to give birth and had to be rushed to
the hospital. However, he was seen driving the tricycle
alone with a sack placed in the sidecar. The sack looked
as if it contained a human body. 12 Then, an hour later, or
at three o’clock in the morning, the tricycle was returned
with bloodstains on the floor.
For his defense, appellant Ruben Ilaoa does not dispute
the testimony of an eyewitness that he was driving the
tricycle at past two o’clock in the morning with the sack in
the sidecar. However, he claims that the sack
contained buntot ng pusa, a local term for marijuana, not
a human body, which he delivered to a designated place
in Fields Avenue as a favor to his compadre Nestor de
Loyola whom he could not refuse. Moreover, it was the
vomit discharged by his drinking companions that was
being swept clean by his girlfriend at the entrance of their
apartment in the early morning of 5 November 1987, not
blood as the witnesses asseverated.
We find the version of the prosecution more persuasive
than the defense. The fact that appellant quarreled with
the deceased, then mauled and pulled him to the
apartment where the latter was last seen alive, in addition
to borrowing a tricycle which was found with bloodstains
when returned, sufficiently point to Ruben as the culprit
responsible for the crime. The fact that the deceased was
his compadre, hence, presumably would have no motive
to kill the latter, is not enough to exculpate appellant. It is
a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been
killed or assaulted for no apparent reason at all, 13 and
that friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the
commission of a crime. 14
If we are to believe appellant Ruben, we will not be able
to account for the blood found on the floor of the tricycle
after it was brought back to the owner. Ruben himself
could not explain away such testimony for he belied the
excuse that the tricycle was needed to rush a pregnant
woman to the hospital, which was the explanation he
gave to Alex Villamil when he borrowed it. We cannot
even consider that the story about the blood on the
tricycle was simply concocted by Alex Villamil to
incriminate Ruben because the latter was his friend, as
Ruben himself has admitted. 15 In fact he could think of
no reason for Alex Villamil to testify falsely against him. 16
Despite the foregoing, however, we hold appellant liable
only for homicide, not murder, on the ground that the
qualifying circumstances alleged in the information,
namely, abuse of superior strength, cruelty and evident
premeditation, were not sufficiently proved to be
appreciated against appellant.
Abuse of superior strength cannot be considered
because there was no evidence whatsoever that
appellant was physically superior to the deceased and
that the former took advantage of such superior physical
strength to overcome the latter’s resistance to
consummate the offense. 17 The fact that Nestor de
Loyola’s decapitated body bearing forty-three (43) stab
wounds, twenty-four (24) of which were fatal, 18 was
found dumped in the street is not sufficient for a finding of
cruelty where there is no showing that appellant Ruben
Ilaoa, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused Nestor de
Loyola to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him
unnecessary physical and moral pain. 19 Number of
wounds alone is not the criterion for the appreciation of
cruelty as an aggravating circumstance. 20 Neither can it
be inferred from the mere fact that the victim’s dead body
was dismembered. 21 Evident premeditation cannot
likewise be considered. There is nothing in the records to
show that appellant, prior to the night in question,
resolved to kill Nestor de Loyola, nor is there proof to
show that such killing was the result of meditation,
calculation or resolution on his part. On the contrary, the
evidence tends to show that the series of circumstances
which culminated in the killing constitutes an unbroken
chain of events with no interval of time separating them
for calculation and meditation. Absent any qualifying
circumstance, Ruben Ilaoa should only be held liable for
homicide.
The penalty prescribed for homicide in Art. 249 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum
shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months, while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, in
any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
In line with present jurisprudence, the civil indemnity fixed
by the court a quo for the death of Nestor de Loyola is
increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the judgment finding accused RUBEN E.
ILAOA guilty beyond reasonable doubt is AFFIRMED but
only for homicide, instead of murder. Consequently, he is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8)
years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, four
(4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum. In addition, accused-
appellant RUBEN E. ILAOA is ordered to pay the heirs of
Nestor de Loyola P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and, as
fixed by the court a quo, P46,765.00 as actual damages,
P10,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation, and P10,000.00 for moral damages.
Accused-appellant ROGELIO E. ILAOA, however, is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged for obvious
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Amadeo D. Seno for accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, convicting him of
qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition
in Criminal Case No. 4007 and of murder in Criminal
Case No. 4012 and imposing upon him the penalty of
death in both cases.
On 18 December 1984, appellant was charged with
violation of Section 1, paragraph (2), of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of December
1984, in the City of Tagbilaran Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, while
acting under the influence of drugs and
without any license or permit from the
proper authorities, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have ill
his possession, custody and control an
unlicensed firearm, a SMITH & WESSON
Airweight caliber .38 revolver with Serial
Number 359323 with Five (5) spent shells
and Five (5) live ammunitions and without
any justifiable cause and with intent to kill,
used the said firearm and ammunitions to
shoot one Francis Ernest Escano III hitting
and inflicting upon the latter the following
gunshot wounds or injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT
WOUNDS — Head & Chest
(through and through);
Head Entrance — 1.4 x 2.2
cm., Left Fronto-Temporal
Area; Port — 1.3 x 0.3 cm.;
Right Cheek. 3.5 cm. above
the right external meatus;
Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm.
— Right Infrascapular Area at
the level of the 7th Intercostal
 Rib (Back); Exist — 0.3 cm.
dia; above the right nipple;
Y-shape laceration, check at
the right angle of the mouth,
Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly
caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of
Section 1, paragraph 2 of the Presidential
Decree No. 1866. 1
On 11 January 1985, an amended information 2 for
murder was also filed against appellant reading as
follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of
December, 1984 in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any justifiable cause and
with intent to kill, evident pre-meditation
treachery, while acting under the influence
of drugs, with cruelty and deliberately
augmenting the suffering of the victim, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shot one
Francis Ernest Escano with the use of an
unlicensed SMITH & WESSON Airweight
caliber .38 revolver with Serial Number
359323 hitting and inflicting upon the latter
the following gunshot wounds or injuries, to
wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT
WOUNDS — Head and Chest
(Through & Through);
Head Entrance — 14 x 2.2
cm., Left Fronto-temporal
Area; Port — l.3 x 0.3 cm.,
Right Cheek, 3.5 cm., above
the right external meatus;
Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm.
— right Infrascapular Area at
the level of the 7th Inter-
Costal Rib (back); exit — 0.3
cm. dia; above the right nipple
Y-shape laceration, cheek at
the angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8.
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly
caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the deceased
namely: Judge & Mrs. Francisco Rey H.
Escano, in the amount to be proved during
the trial of the case.
 Acts committed contrary to the provisions of
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Section 17 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 179, with the qualifying aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation,
treachery and acting under the influence of
dangerous drugs and cruelty.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. The
two (2) criminal cases were consolidated upon motion of
the prosecution and tried jointly. On 31 July 1986, the
trial court rendered a decision 3 convicting appellant
under both informations. The dispositive portion of the
decision read as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises
considered, decision is hereby rendered in
Criminal Case No. 4007 finding the
accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions
qualified with Murder under Section 1,
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 and hereby sentences said
Renato Tac-an y Hipos to suffer the penalty
of DEATH. Further, decision is also
rendered in Criminal Case No. 4012 finding
the same accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Batas Pambansa
Blg. 179 and P.D. 1866. Appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation (treachery used to qualify the
crime to murder) and the special
aggravating circumstances of acting while
under the influence of dangerous drugs and
with the use of an unlicensed firearm and
with insult to a person in authority and there
being no mitigating circumstance to offset
them, and sentences the said Renato Tac-
an y Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
The accused is likewise ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Francis
Ernest Escano in the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00); to pay
actual compensatory damages in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHT
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TEN
PESOS (P108,310.00); to pay moral
damages to Judge Francisco Escano, Jr.,
the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P100,000.00) and to Mrs. Lydia
Escano the sum of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) for the
mental anguish and suffering each
experienced because of the death of
Francis Ernest. All such amount shall earn
legal interest from the time this decision
shall become final and executory until fully
satisfied. The accused shall also pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Immediately after promulgation of the decision, appellant
signified his intention to appeal to this Court, although the
same was subject to automatic review by this Court.
In his brief, appellant assigned the following as errors
allegedly committed by the trial court:
I. The lower court erred in believing the
prosecution's version of the case instead of
according full faith and credence to the
defendant's version.
II. The trial court erred in not holding that
Renato Tac-an was justified in shooting the
deceased.
III. The trial court erred in not holding that in
(sic) the least the defendant acted in
incomplete self-defense in shooting the
deceased.
IV. The trial court erred in not holding that
P.D. 1866 is inapplicable to the defendant
inasmuch as said decree was enforceable
only during the existence of the Martial Law
Regime.
V. The trial court erred in not holding that
the defendant was placed twice in jeopardy
for having been prosecuted for violation of
P.D. 1866 despite his being prosecuted for
murder in an information which alleges that
the accused used an unlicensed firearm in
killing the deceased.
VI. The trial court erred in not adjudging the
defendant innocent of murder.
From the record, the facts may be collated and
summarized as follows:
Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen (18) years and
seven (7) months of age, and the deceased Francis
Ernest Escano III, fifteen (15) years old, were classmates
in the third year of high school of the Divine Word
College in Tagbilaran City. They were close friends,
being not only classmates but also members of the same
gang, the Bronx gang. Renato had been to the house
where Francis and his parents lived, on one or two
occasions. On those occasions, Francis' mother noticed
that Renato had a handgun with him. Francis was then
advised by his mother to distance himself from Renato. 4
Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang. The relationship
between Renato and Francis turned sour. Sometime in
September 1984, Renato and Francis quarrelled with
each other, on which occasion Francis bodily lifted Arnold
Romelde from the ground. Arnold was friend and
companion to Renato. The quarrel resulted in Renato
and Francis being brought to the high school principal's
office. The strained relationship between the two (2)
erstwhile friends was aggravated in late November 1984
when Francis teamed that Renato, together with other
members of the Bronx gang, was looking for him,
apparently with the intention of beating him up. Further
deterioration of their relationship occurred sometime in
the first week of December 1984, when graffiti appeared
on the wall of the third year high school classroom and
on the armrest of a chair in that classroom, deprecating
the Bronx gang and describing Renato as
"bayot" (homosexual) 5 Renato attributed the graffiti to
Francis.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 December
1984, Renato entered Room 15 of the high school
building to attend his English III class. Renato placed his
scrapbook prepared for their Mathematics class on his
chair, and approached the teacher, Mrs. Liliosa Baluma,
to raise a question. Upon returning to his chair, he found
Francis sitting there, on the scrapbook. Renato was
angered by what he saw and promptly kicked the chair
on which Francis was seated. Francis, however,
explained that he had not intentionally sat down on
Renato's scrapbook. A fistfight would have ensued but
some classmates and two (2) teachers, Mrs. Baluma and
Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, intervened and prevented them
from assaulting each other. After the two (2) had quieted
down and apparently shaken hands at the instance of
Mrs. Baluma, the latter resumed her English III class.
Francis sat on the last row to the extreme right of the
teacher while Renato was seated on the same last row at
the extreme left of the teacher. While the English III class
was still going on, Renato slipped out of the classroom
and went home to get a gun. He was back at the
classroom approximately fifteen (15) minutes later. 6
The Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas
scheduled for 3:00 p.m. had just started in Room 15
when Renato suddenly burst into the room, shut the door
and with both hands raised, holding a revolver, shouted
"Where is Francis?" Upon sighting Francis seated behind
and to the light of student Ruel Ungab, Renato fired at
Francis, hitting a notebook, a geometry book and the
armrest of Ruel's chair. Francis and Ruel jumped up and
with several of their classmates rushed forward towards
the teacher's platform to seek protection from their
teacher. Renato fired a second time, this time hitting the
blackboard in front of the class. Francis and the other
students rushed back towards the rear of the room.
Renato walked towards the center of the classroom and
fired a third time at Francis, hitting the concrete wall of
the classroom. Francis and a number of his classmates
rushed towards the door, the only door to and from Room
15. Renato proceeded to the teacher, s platform nearest
the door and for the fourth time fired at Francis as the
latter was rushing towards the door. This time, Francis
was hit on the head and he fell on the back of Ruel and
both fell to the floor. Ruel was pulled out of the room by a
friend; Francis remained sprawled on the floor bleeding
profusely. 7
Renato then went out of Room 15, and paced between
Rooms 14 and 15. A teacher, Mr. Pablo Baluma,
apparently unaware that it was Renato who had gunned
down Francis, approached Renato and asked him to help
Francis as the latter was still alive inside the room.
Renato thereupon re-entered Room 15, closed the door
behind him, saying: "So, he is still alive. Where is his
chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the
classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis
and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back
below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest
just above the right nipple. 8
Renato then left with two (2) remaining students and
locked Francis alone inside Room 15. Renato proceeded
to the ground floor and entered the faculty room. There,
he found some teachers and students and ordered them
to lock the door and close the windows, in effect holding
them as hostages. He also reloaded his gun with five (5)
bullets. After some time, a team of Philippine
Constabulary troopers led by Capt. Larino Lazo arrived
and surrounded the faculty room. With a hand-held public
address device, Capt. Lazo called upon Renato to
surrender himself Renato did not respond to this call.
Renato's brother approached Capt. Lazo and volunteered
to persuade his brother to give up. Renato's father who,
by this time had also arrived, pleaded with Renato to
surrender himself Renato then turned over his gun to his
brother through an opening in the balustrade of the
faculty room. Capt. Lazo took the gun from Renato's
brother, went to the door of the faculty room, entered and
placed Renato under arrest. 9
Meantime, as soon as Renato left Room 15, some
teachers and students came to rescue Francis but could
not open the door which Renato had locked behind him.
One of the students entered the room by climbing up the
second floor on the outside and through the window and
opened the door from the inside. The teachers and
students brought Francis down to the ground floor from
whence the PC soldiers rushed him to the Celestino
Gallares Memorial Hospital. 10 Francis died before
reaching the hospital.
Capt. Lazo brought Renato to the PC Headquarters at
Camp Dagohoy, Tagbilaran City. The officer deposited
the revolver recovered from Renato which was an
Airweight Smith and Wesson .38 caliber revolver, with
Serial No. 359323, as well as the five (5) live bullets
removed from the said revolver, and the five (5) empty
cartridges which Renato had turned over to him. Ballistic
examination conducted by Supervising Ballistician,
Artemio Panganiban, National Bureau of Investigation,
Cebu, showed that the empty cartridge cases had been
fired from the revolver recovered from Renato. 11
Appellant at the outset assails the trial court for having
believed the prosecution's version of the facts instead of
the version offered by the appellant. The trial court took
into account, inter alia, the positive and direct testimony
of:
1. Mrs. Liliosa Baluma who testified as to,
among other things, the events which took
place inside her English III classroom
immediately before the shooting;
2. Ruel Ungab — a fifteen (15) year old
classmate of Renato and Francis, who had
fallen on the floor with Francis when the
latter was finally hit by Renato;
3. Damaso Pasilbas — the Mathematics
teacher who was holding his class when
Renato had burst into Room 15 and started
firing at Francis; and
 4. Napoleon Jumauan — another sixteen
(16) year old, classmate of Renato and
Francis who was inside the classroom
when Renato had started firing at Francis
and who was only about a foot away from
the head of Francis when Renato, having
re-entered Room 15, had fired at Francis as
the latter was sprawled on the floor of the
classroom.
After careful examination of the record, we find no reason
to disagree with the conclusion of the trial court that
Renato had indeed shot and killed Francis under the
circumstances and in the manner described by these
witnesses.
1. The claim of self-defense.
Renato claimed that he was acting in self-defense, or at
least in incomplete self-defense, when he shot Francis.
For a claim of self-defense to be sustained, the claimant
must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
following requisites existed:
a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim;
b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed by the accused to repel the
aggression; and
c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the accused. 12
Testifying in his own behalf, Renato said that a few
minutes before the end of Mrs. Baluma's English III class,
Francis had approached him:
(Atty. Seno, Defense Counsel)
Q: How did it happened (sic)
that you had a conversation
with Francis?
(Renato)
A: While the class was going
on, Mrs. Baluma was writing
on the blackboard.
Q: Then what happened?
A: While our teacher was
writing on the blackboard
Francis suddenly got near me.
Q: And what happened when
Francis approached you?
A: He said, 'So you are brave
now you had a (sic) guts to
fight against me.'
Q: And what else did he say?
 A: He said, 'Go home, get
your firearm because I will go
home to get a gun.'
Q: Was that all that he told
you?
A: He further said, 'You go
home get your firearm, if you
won't go home and get a gun,
I will go to your place and kill
you including your parents,
brothers and sisters.'
Q: And after that where did
Francis go?
A: Before the bell rang he
went ahead. 13
(Emphasis supplied)
We note at the outset that there was no evidence before
the Court, except Renato's own testimony, that Francis
had uttered the above statements attributed to him by
Renato. Although there had been about twenty-five (25)
other students, and the teacher, in the classroom at the
time, no corroborating testimony was offered by the
defense. In the second place, assuming
(arguendo merely) that Francis had indeed made those
statements, such utterances cannot be regarded as the
unlawful aggression which is the first and most
fundamental requirement of self-defense. Allegedly
uttered in a high school classroom by an obviously
unarmed Francis, such statements could not reasonably
inspire the "well grounded and reasonable belief" claimed
by Renato that "he was in imminent danger of death or
bodily harm." 14 Unlawful aggression refers to an attack
that has actually broken out or materialized or at the very
least is clearly imminent: it cannot consist in oral threats
or a merely threatening stance or posture. 15 Further as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, Francis was
obviously without a firearm or other weapon when
Renato returned and burst into Room 15 demanding to
know where Francis was and forthwith firing at him
repeatedly, without the slightest regard for the safety of
his other classmates and of the teacher. There being no
unlawful aggression, there simply could not be self-
defense whether complete or incomplete, 16 and there is
accordingly no need to refer to the other requirements of
lawful self-defense.
2. The claim that P.D. No. 1866 is
inapplicable.
As pointed out at the outset, appellant was charged with
unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm, a Smith
and Wesson Airweight.38 caliber revolver with five (5)
spent bullets and five (5) live ones and with having used
such firearm and ammunition to shoot to death Francis
Ernest Escano III, in violation of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 provides, in relevant part,
that:
 Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments
Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition.
— The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any firearms, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
death shall be imposed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Appellant urges that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable to him
"considering that the reason for its [P.D. No. 1866]
issuance no longer exists." He argues that P.D. No. 1866
was enforceable only during the existence of martial law,
and that when martial law was "lifted in 1979," the reason
for the "existence" of P.D. No. 1866 faded away, with the
result that the "original law on firearms, that is, Section
2692 of the [Revised] Administrative Code, together with
its pre-martial law amendments, came into effect again
thereby replacing P.D. No. 1866." 17
There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which was
promulgated on 29 June 1983) which suggests that it
was intended to remain in effect only for the duration of
the martial law imposed upon the country by former
President Marcos. Neither does the statute contain any
provision that so prescribes its lapsing into non-
enforceability upon the termination of the state or period
of martial law. On the contrary, P.D. No. 1866 by its own
terms purported to "consolidate, codify and integrate" all
prior laws and decrees penalizing illegal possession and
manufacture of firearms, ammunition and explosives in
order "to harmonize their provisions as well as to update
and revise certain provisions and prior statutes "in order
to more effectively deter violators of the law on firearms,
ammunitions and explosives." 18 Appellant's contention is
thus without basis in fact.
3. The claim of double jeopardy.
It is also contended by appellant that because he had
already been charged with illegal possession of a firearm
and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007, aggravated
by the use of such unlicensed firearm to commit a
homicide or murder, he was unconstitutionally placed in
jeopardy of punishment for the second time when he was
charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 with murder "with the
use of an unlicensed [firearm]," in violation of Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 17 of
B.P. Blg. 179.
It is elementary that the constitutional right against
double jeopardy protects one against a second or later
prosecution for the same offense, and that when the
subsequent information charges another and different
offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts,
there is no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar,
it appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of
an unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute,
while the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was
that of murder punished under the Revised Penal Code.
It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in
themselves are quite different one from the other, such
that in principle, the subsequent filing of Criminal Case
No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having placed
appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.
We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 4007
after charging appellant with unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearm and ammunition, went on to state that
said firearm and ammunition had been used to shoot to
death Francis Ernest Escaño III. We note also that the
amended information in Criminal Case No. 4012 after
charging appellant with the unlawful killing of Francis
Ernest Escaño III, stated that the killing had been done
with the use of an unlicensed firearm. We believe these
additional allegations in the two (2) informations
did not have the effect of charging appellant with having
committed the same offense more than once.
However, in sentencing Renato to suffer the penalty of
death for the crime of murder, the trial court did take into
account as a "special aggravating circumstance" the fact
that the killing of Francis had been done "with the use of
an unlicensed firearm." In so doing, we believe and so
hold, the trial court committed error. There is no law
which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an
aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder. Under
an information charging homicide or murder, the fact that
the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be
used to increase the penalty for the second offense of
homicide or murder to death (or reclusion perpetua under
the 1987 Constitution). The essential point is that the
unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used
in destroying human life or committing some other crime,
is not included in the inventory of aggravating
circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code. 19
In contrast, under an information for unlawful
possession (or manufacture, dealing in, acquisition or
disposition) of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. No. 1866
authorizes the increase of the imposable penalty for
unlawful possession or manufacture, etc. of the
unlicensed firearm where such firearm was used to
destroy human life. Although the circumstance that
human life was destroyed with the use of the unlicensed
firearm is not an aggravating circumstance under Article
14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be taken into
account to increase the penalty to death (reclusion
perpetua, under the 1987 Constitution) because of the
explicit provisions of P.D. No. 1866. As noted earlier, the
unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm or
ammunition is an offense punished under a special law
and not under the Revised Penal Code.
4. The claim that there was no treachery.
Appellant contends that there was no treachery present
because before any shot was fired, Renato had shouted
"where is Francis?" Appellant in effect suggests his
opening statement was a warning to Francis and that the
first three (3) shots he had fired at Francis were merely
warning shots. Moreover, building upon his own
testimony about the alleged threat that Francis had
uttered before he (Renato) left his English III class to go
home and get a gun, appellant argues that Francis must
have anticipated his return and thus had sufficient time to
prepare for the coming of the appellant. 20 Appellant's
contention, while ingenious, must be rejected. The trial
court made a finding of treachery taking explicit account
of the following factors:
1. Room 15 of the Divine Word College
High School Department Tagbilaran City, is
situated in the second floor of the building.
It is a corner room and it has only one (1)
door which is the only means of entry and
exit;
2. At the time of the attack, the deceased
was seated on his chair inside his
classroom and was writing on the armrest
of his chair and also talking to Ruel Ungab
and while their teacher, Mr. Damaso
Pasilbas was checking the attendance. The
deceased was not aware of any impending
assault neither did he have any means to
defend himself;
3. The accused used an airweight Smith &
Wesson .38 caliber revolver in shooting to
death the defenseless and helpless Francis
Ernest Escaño;
4. The attack was so sudden and so
unexpected. the accused consciously
conceived that mode of attack;
5. The accused fired at Francis again and
again and did not give him a chance to
defend himself. After the deceased was hit
on the head and fell to the floor while he
was already sprawled and completely
defenseless the accused fired at him again
and the deceased was hit on the chest;
6. The deceased was not armed. He was
totally defenseless. He was absolutely not
aware of any coming attack. 21
The Court also pointed out that Renato must have known
that Francis while inside Room 15 had no means of
escape there being only one (1) door and Room 15 being
on the second floor of the building. Renato in effect
blocked the only exit open to Francis as he stood on the
teacher's platform closest to the door and fired as Francis
and Ruel sought to dash through the door. Renato's
question "where is Francis?" cannot reasonably be
regarded as an effort to warn Francis for he shot at
Francis the instant he sighted the latter, seated and
talking to Ruel Ungab. That Renato fired three (3) shots
before hitting Francis with the fourth shot, can only be
ascribed to the indifferent markmanship of Renato and to
the fact that Francis and the other students were
scurrying from one part of the room to the other in an
effort to evade the shots fired by Renato. The cumulative
effect of the circumstances underscored by the trial court
was that the attack upon Francis had been carried out in
a manner which disabled Francis from defending himself
or retaliating against Renato. Finally, the circumstance
that Renato, having been informed that Francis was still
alive, re-entered Room 15 and fired again at Francis who
lay on the floor and bathed with his own blood,
manifested Renato's conscious choice of means of
execution which directly and especially ensured the
death of his victim without risk to himself. 22 We are
compelled to agree with the trial court that treachery was
here present and that, therefore, the killing of Francis
Ernest Escaño III was murder.
5. The claim that there was no evident
premeditation.
The trial court also found the presence of evident
premeditation and appreciated the same as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Here, it is the urging of the
appellant that the requisites of evident premeditation had
not been sufficiently shown. In order that evident
premeditation may be taken into account, there must be
proof of (a) the time when the offender formed his intent
to commit the crime; (b) an action manifestly indicating
that the offender had clung to his determination to
commit the crime; and (c) of the passage of a sufficient
interval of time between the determination of the offender
to commit the crime and the actual execution thereof, to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act. 23 The defense pointed out that barely fifteen (15)
minutes had elapsed from the time Renato left his
English III class and the time he returned with a gun.
While there was testimony to the fact that before that
fatal day of 14 December 1984, anger and resentment
had welled up between Francis and Renato, there was
no evidence adequately showing when Renato had
formed the intention and determination to take the life of
Francis. Accordingly, we must discard evident
premeditation as an aggravating circumstance.
6. The claim that the killing was not done
under the influence of a dangerous drug.
Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179 which was promulgated on 2
March 1982 provides as follows:
SEC. 17. The provisions of any law to the
contrary notwithstanding, when a crime is
committed by an offender who is under the
influence of dangerous drugs, such state
shall be considered as a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the definition
of a crime and the application of the penalty
provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court found that Francis was killed by Renato
while the later was under the influence of a dangerous
drug, specifically marijuana, and took that into account as
a "special aggravating circumstance". No medical
evidence had been submitted by the prosecution to show
that Renato had smoked marijuana before gunning down
Francis. Fourteen (14) days had elapsed after December
14, 1984 before Renato was medically examined for
possible traces of marijuana; the results of the
examination were negative. Defense witness Dr. Rogelio
Ascona testified that in order to have a medically valid
basis for determining the presence of marijuana in the
human system, the patient must be examined within
twenty-four (24) hours from the time he is supposed to
have smoked marijuana. 24 The prosecution had
presented Orlando Balaba, a student at the Divine Word
College, High School Department, who testified that he
found Renato and one Jaime Racho inside the men's
room of the High School Department sucking smoke from
a hand-rolled thing that look like a cigarette, that he had
asked Renato what that was and that Renato had
replied damo (marijuana). 25 While the testimony of
Orlando Balaba was corroborated by two (2) other
prosecution witnesses, we believe that Orlando Balaba's
testimony was incompetent to show that what Renato
and Jaime Racho were smoking inside the men's room
was indeed marijuana. It was pointed out by apellant that
Orlando Balaba had never smoked nor smelled
marijuana.
In the absence of medical evidence, the Court took into
account certain detailed factors as circumstantial
evidence supporting the testimony of Orlando Balaba.
These circumstances were:
The circumstance of place where the killing
was committed, the circumstance of the
manner of the attack, the circumstance of
holding hostage some teachers and
students inside the faculty room, the
circumstance of terrifying an entire school,
the circumstance that sitting on a
scrapbook is too insignificant as to arouse
passion strong enough to motivate a killing,
are circumstantial evidences that gave the
court no room for doubt that prosecution
witnesses Orlando Balaba, Benjamin
Amper and Allan de la Serna truthfully told
the court that they saw the accused
smoking marijuana inside the comfort room
at 1:45 in the afternoon of December 14,
1984. ... . 26
The above circumstances pointed to by the trial court
may be indicative of passionate anger on the part of
Renato; we do not believe that they necessarily show
that Renato had smoked marijuana before entering his
English III class. In the absence of competent medical or
other direct evidence of ingestion of a dangerous drug,
courts may be wary and critical of indirect evidence,
considering the severe consequences for the accused of
a finding that he had acted while under the influence of a
prohibited drug. The Court considers that the evidence
presented on this point was simply inadequate to support
the ruling of the trial court that Renato had shot and killed
Francis while under the influence of a prohibited drug.
7. The claim that appellant had voluntarily
surrendered.
Appellant contends that he had voluntarily surrendered
and that the trial court should have considered that
mitigating circumstance in his favor. The trial court did
not, and we consider that it correctly refused to do so.
Firstly, Renato surrendered his gun, not himself, 27 by
handing over the weapon through the balustrade of the
faculty room. Secondly, he surrendered the gun to his
brother, who was not in any case a person in authority
nor an agent of a person in authority. 28 Thirdly, Renato
did not surrender himself he was arrested by Capt. Lazo.
The fact that he did not resist arrest, did not constitute
voluntary surrender. 29 Finally, if it be assumed that
Renato had surrendered himself, such surrender cannot
be regarded as voluntary and spontaneous. Renato was
holed up in the faculty room, in effect holding some
teachers and students as hostages. The faculty room
was surrounded by Philippine Constabulary soldiers and
there was no escape open to him. He was not entitled to
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
8. Whether or not the crime was committed
in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities.
The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis
had been done "in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities:
Under Republic Act 1978, as amended, a
teacher of a public or private school is
considered a person in authority. The fact
that Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, the teacher in
mathematics, was already checking the
attendance did not deter the accused from
pursuing his evil act, The accused ignored
his teacher's presence and pleas. Not yet
satisfied with the crime and terror he had
done to Francis and the entire school, the
accused entered the faculty room and held
hostage the teachers and students who
were inside that room. To the court, this act
of the accused was an insult to his teachers
and to the school, an act of callus disregard
of other's feelings and safety and
completely reprehensible. 30
We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence
of a generic aggravating circumstance. Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
1978 and Presidential Decree No. 299, provides as
follows:
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of
persons in authority. — Who shall be
deemed as such. — In applying the
provisions of the preceding and other
articles of this Code, any person directly
vested with jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of some court or
government corporation, board, or
commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barrio captain and a barangay
chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority.
A person who by direct provision of law or
by election or by appointment by competent
authority, is charged with the maintenance
of public order and the protection and
security of life and property, such as a
barrio councilman, barrio policeman and
barangay leader and any person who
comes to the aid of persons in authority,
 shall be deemed an agent of a person in
authority.
In applying the provisions of Articles 148
and 151 of this Code, teachers,
professors and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized
private schools, colleges and universities,
and lawyers in the actual performance of
their professional duties or on the occasion
of such performance, shall be deemed
persons in authority. (As amended by P.D.
No. 299, September 19, 1973 and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).
Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will
show that while a teacher or professor of a public or
recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in
authority," such teacher or professor is so deemed only
for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault
upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and
disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of
such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked
contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not
identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for
the application of which any person "directly vested with
jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority."
Because a penal statute is not to be given a longer reach
and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary
meaning of the ordinary words used by such statute, to
the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a
teacher or professor of a public or recognized private
school may be regarded as a "public authority" within the
meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code, 31 the provision the trial court applied in the
case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 31
July 1986 is hereby MODIFIED in the following manner
and to the following extent only:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4007, appellant
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua;
2. In Criminal Case No. 4012 — (a) the
aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and of having acted with
contempt of or insult to the public
authorities shall be DELETED and not
taken into account; and (b) the special
aggravating circumstances of acting while
under the influence of dangerous drugs and
with the use of an unlicensed firearm shall
similarly be DELETED and not taken into
account. There being no generic
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances
present, the appellant shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua shall be
served successively in accordance with the provisions of
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. As so modified, the
decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.