Tauniño Jillandro G.

Neri Succession
1.) REMEDIOS NUGUID vs. FELIX NUGUID
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

Facts:

Rosario Nuguid, died, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents, and six (6) brothers and sisters.

Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid. Petitioner prayed that said
will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid,
entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct
ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

Issue:

Is the entire Will invalid?

Ruling:

YES. The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...

The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of
them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly
disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir —
nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is
complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal
institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such
institution of universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation.
Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute.

We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so
expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will —
void because of preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent.
There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and
separate from the nullified institution of heir.

Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will
before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The
entire will is null.

In Relation to the law on Succession:

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 The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line her parents. And the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament;
tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
Such preterition in the words of Manresa “anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este
ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-sentence will here institutes
petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this
posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited.” Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his
share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. ” In Manresa’s own words: “La privacion expresa de la legitima
constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion.” Sanchez Roman emphasizes the
distinction by stating that disinheritance “es siempre voluntaria“; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be
“involuntaria“. Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself.
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix’s parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether.
Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, “shall annul the institution of heir”. This annulment is in toto,
unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective
disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also “annul the institution of heirs”, put only
“insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited”, which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. In
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing
more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

2.) IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,

DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, EXECUTOR AND LUCYCHRISTENSEN, HEIR OF THE
DECEASED, EXECUTOR AND HEIR-APPELLEES, vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-
appellant. No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.

Facts:

Edward E Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for 9 years. In 1913,
he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. In his will, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of
Helen Christensen Garcia. Counsel for the acknowledged natural daughter Helen claims that under Article 16, par. 2 of
the Civil Code, California law should be should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law
of the domicile. On the other hand, the counsel for Maria Lucy contends that the national law of the deceased must apply,
illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law .

Issue:

Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the successional
rights oh his heirs.
Held:

The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict
rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule says: “If there is no
law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is
governed by the law of his domicile.” Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the
Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both
country back and forth.

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 The court refers to Art. 16 (2) providing that intestate and testamentary successions with respect to order of
succession and amt. of successional right is regulated by the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON. California Probate
Code provides that a testator may dispose of his property in the form and manner he desires. Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California provides that if no law on the contrary, the place where the personal property is situated is deemed to follow the
person of its owner and is governed by the LAW OF HIS DOMICILE.

These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may be applied where the question of validity of the
testamentary provision in question is referred back to the decedent’s domicile – the Philippines. S.C. noted
the California law provides 2 sets of laws for its citizens: One for residents therein as provided by the CA Probate Code
and another for citizens domiciled in other countries as provided by Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California. The conflicts
of law rule in CA (Art. 946) authorize the return of question of law to the testator’s domicile. The court must apply its own
rule in the Philippines as directed in the conflicts of law rule in CA, otherwise the case/issue will not be resolved if the
issue is referred back and forth between 2 states. The SC reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case back
to it for decision with an instruction that partition be made applying the Philippine law .

3.) Solano vs. CA, Bienvenido/Emeteria Garcia GR L 41971

November 29, 1983

Facts:

Around 1969, Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia (GARCIAS) claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr.
Meliton SOLANO, filed an action for recognition against him. Well, in his Answer, SOLANO denied paternity. Then a
year after, during the pendency of the case, SOLANO died.

LEGITIMATE CHILD CLAIMING SOLE HEIRSHIP

SONIA Ana Solano (petitioner herein) was ordered substituted for the DECEDENT as the only surviving
heir mentioned in his Last Will and Testament probated. So SONIA entered her formal appearance as a "substitute
defendant" claiming she was the sole heir of her father, Dr. SOLANO, and asked the court that she be allowed to assume
her duties as executrix of the probated Will with the least interference from the GARCIAS who were "mere pretenders to
be illegitimate children of SOLANO".

ILLEGIT CHILDREN IMPUGNS LEGIT CHILD'S CLAIM

GARCIAS filed their REPLY impugning the recognition of SONIA as an acknowledged natural child with the
prayer that she be declared instead, like them, as an adulterous child of the DECEDENT.

Issue:

Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the institution of sole heir from decedent’s will.

Held:

That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Meliton’s will, and as a result, Sonia’s institution
as sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art. 854

In Relation to the law on Succession:

“The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir, but the devises
and legacies shall be valid. The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his property which the
testator had the right to such so that it should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the property that the testator could

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freely dispose of Sonia’s share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of the estate and Garcias 1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of will
should not be invalidated all together. Preterition of illegitimate children should annul the institution of the heir “only
insofar as the legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired”.

4.) In re will of Dolores Coronel, deceased. LORENZO PECSON, applicant an appellee, vs. AGUSTIN
CORONEL ET AL., opponents and appellants. [No. 20374. October 11, 1923]

Facts:

On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the last will and testament of Dolores
Coronel (testatrix) who named as her sole heir Lorenzo Pecson, the husband of her niece. The relatives of testatrix by
consanguinity questioned the genuineness of the will on the following grounds: First, that it was improbable and
exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her estate by excluding her blood relatives; and second, that if such
will was not expressed in fact, it was due to extraneous illegal influence. Dolores Coronel, a resident of Pampanga executed
her last will and testament whereby having no forced heirs, willed to her nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, who is married to her
niece Angela Coronel, her properties, both movable and immovable, in consideration of the good services he has rendered
to the former. Further, Dolores also appointed Lorenzo Pecson executor of all that is willed and ordained in her will,
without bond and in his default, she appointed as substitute executor her grandson Victor Pecson. As the testatrix does not
know how to write her name, she requested Vicente J. Francisco to sign her name under her express direction in the
presence of the witnesses and the witnesses do the same. The petitioner for the probate of the will is Lorenzo Pecson, and
the opponents are Eriberto Coronel et al, blood relatives of the testatrix who contend that it was not, nor could it be, the
will of the testatrix, because it is not natural nor usual that she should completely exclude her blood relatives from her vast
estate.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an undue influence in appointing Lorenzo Pecson and not the blood relatives as the
beneficiary of the estate of the testatrix.

Held:

There was no undue influence in appointing Lorenzo Pecson as the beneficiary of the estate of the testatrix. The
liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the
Philippines since 1889. It is so provided in the first paragraph of Article 763 (now Art. 842). As to Lorenzo Pecson, we do
not find in the record sufficient proof to believe that he should have tried, through fraud or any undue influence, to frustrate
the alleged intention of the testatrix to leave her estate to her blood relatives. Further, the preference given to Lorenzo
Pecson is not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or a whim of the moment. The proof adduced by this appellee, although
contradicted, shows by a preponderance of evidence that besides the services which the opponents admit had been rendered
by him to Dolores Coronel since the year 1914, he had also rendered services prior to that time and was the administrator
and manager of the affairs of said Dolores in the last years of her life.

5.) NERI v. AKUTIN GR No.L-47799 May 21, 1943

Facts:

This is a case where the testator AgripinoNeri in his will left all his property by universal title to the children by
his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The
omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had already given each of the
children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which
registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the respondents
were indebted to their father.

Issue:

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 Whether or not the will shall be cancelled in view of the omission of heirs. Whether or not there was disinheritance.

Held:
Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground that testator left all
his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, without expressly disinheriting the children by his
first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given to
the children by his second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the
institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of preterition which annuls the
institution of heirs.

Topic/Doctrine: Institution of Heirs

6.) Cayetano v. Leonidas G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984

Facts:

Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita Paguia, Remedios
Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir is Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit
of Adjudication, adjudicating unto himself the entire estate of Adoracion. Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for
reprobate of a will, alleging among others that Adoracion was an American citizen and that the will was executed in teh
US. Adoracion died in Manila while temporarily residing in Malate. While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died
and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix. Hence, this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the will was valid. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings

Held:

As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The
intrinsic validity normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However,
where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the
court should meet the issues. In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the
law which governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent. It is a settled rule
that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the national law of the decedent must apply.

As to the issue of jurisdiction:

The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she had an estate
since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident of Cavite. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction.

Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 3-Forms of Wills

GENERAL RULE: Limited jurisdiction of the probate court
EXCEPTION: Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before
it is probated, the court should meet the issues.

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 7.) ACAIN vs IAC G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987

Facts:

Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his late Uncle, Nemesio
Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters were instituted as
heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, alegally adopted
daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1)Constantine Acain
has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2)he Is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted
daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently,
Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongson’s petition
and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acain’s motion for
reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.

Held:

Article 854 of the Civil Code:

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prefudice to
the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply ass he does not ascend or
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the
legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D.No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter
and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and
preterited in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence,this is a clear case of preterition of the
legally adopted child.

The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the
testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs
without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

Topic/Doctrine: Preterition

COMPARATIVE

1.) ESCUIN v ESCUIN 11 PHIL 332 September 24, 1908

Facts:

On the 19th of January, 1899, Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos executed a will before a notary public of
Sevilla, Spain, stating therein that he was a native of Cavite, the son Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, the latter

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being deceased; that he was married about six months previously to Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, and that he had no
lawful descendants; the testator, however, stated in clause three of his will, that in case he has a duly registered successor,
his child would be his sole and universal heir; but that if, as would probably be the case, there should be no such heir, then
in clause four he named his said father Francisco Escuin, and his wife Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon and his universal heirs,
they to divide the estate in equal shares between them.- The testator died on the 20th of January, 1899- Upon the will
having been admitted to probate, commissioners were appointed to consider claims against the estate- On the 10th and
12th of July 1907, the attorney for the widow, Ponce de Leon, and the attorneys who represented the guardian to the minor,
Emilio Escuin y Batac, appealed to the Court of First Instance from the findings of the aforesaid commissioners.- It appears
in the proposed partition that, according to the opinion of the administrator by whom it was signed in the result of the
proceedings, the property left by the testator, in accordance with the accounts passed upon by the court, amounted to
P8,268.02- From said sum the following must be deducted the credit alluded to be admitted by the commissioners, 10%
remuneration due to the administrator, all legal expenses paid and approved. Deducting the abovementioned amounts,
there remains a balance of P5,014.81.

The partition and adjudication was proceeded with of the sum of P5,014.81 into three shares of P1,671.60 to each
one of the parties in interest, that is, the natural son, Emilio Escuin y Batac, in full control as general heir; the widow,
Teresa Ponce de Leon, as legatee of one-half of the two-thirds of the funds of free disposition; and the said widow the
usufruct of the other half of the aforesaid two-thirds of free disposition, the bare ownership of the last third held in usufruct
by the widow being adjudicated to Francisco Escuin, as legatee taking into account the provisions of article 817 of the Civil
Code upon making the division.- The representative of the minor natural child of the testator objected in writing to the
partition proposed by the administrator, and for the reasons he set forth asked that the same be disapproved, and that in
lieu thereof the entire estate be adjudicated to Emilio Escuin y Batac, the said minor.- It was also presented that in a certified
proceeding, plaintiff asked on the 12th of January, 1905, that an allowance be granted to him for subsistence for account
of the estate of the late testator, Emilio Escuin de los Santos, and that the same be paid him monthly in advance; that
judgment be entered declaring that the minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is a natural child of the testator; that the said minor,
as the only natural son of the same is his general heir; that it be held that the said testator had died without either lawful
ascendants or descendants; that the designation of heirs made under his above-mentioned will be declared null and void;
and that the defendants be sentenced to pay the costs in case they did not conform to the complaint, with any further
remedy that the court might consider just and equitable.- The administrator, Ricardo Summers, in answer to the complaint
denied all and every one of the facts alleged in all and every one of its paragraphs.- The court below found that Escuin y
Batac was the recognized natural child of the late Emilio Escuin de los Santos, had by Julia Batac; that the testator was
also the natural son of the defendant Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, and was recognized by his father; and
that the plaintiff minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is one of the heirs of the late testator.- By an order of the lower court, the
judge expressed an opinion that a natural child is only entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary property, the clause in the
will being annulled only in so far as the amount to be divided should be reduced, taking into account the share due to the
natural son and the right of the father and the widow of the testator, each to one-half of the remainder of the property of
the estate.

Issue:

1. WON there was preterition

2. WON the testator could be considered to have died intestate

Held:

1. YES There is preterition to 1/3 of the estate, which amount constitutes the legal portion of a natural child; and
for the reason that minor was ignored in the will, the designation of heirs made therein was, as a matter of fact annulled by
force of law, insofar as the legal portion of the said minor was thereby impaired. Legacies, and betterments shall be valid,
insofar as they are not illegal, for the reason that a testator cannot deprive the heirs of their legal portions, express in the
cases expressly indicated by law.

2. NO. Notwithstanding the fact that the said designation of heirs was annulled and that the law recognizes the
title of the minor, Escuin y Batac, to one-third of the property of his natural father, as his lawful and general heir, it is not
proper to assert that the late Emilio Escuin de los Santos died intestate in order to establish the conclusion that his said
natural recognized child is entitled to succeed to the entire estate under the provisions of article 939 of the Civil Code,
inasmuch in accordance with the law a citizen may die partly testate and partly intestate (art. 764, Civil Code). It is clear
and unquestionable that it was the wish of the testator to favor his natural father and his wife with certain portions of his

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property which, under the law, he had the right to dispose of by will, as he has done, provided the legal portion of his
general heir was not thereby impaired, the two former persons being considered as legatees under the will.

2.) Lajom vs. Leuterio G.R. No. L-13557 April 25, 1960

Facts:

Maximo Viola died on September 3, 1933. Judicial proceedings of his testate estate were instituted in the Court of
First Instance. An agreement of partition and distribution was executed by and between Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and
Silvio Viola, legitimate children of Maximo Viola and Juana Toura, whereby the properties left by their father, Maximo
Viola, were divided among themselves. Donato Lajom filed a complaint praying, among other things, that he be declared
a natural child of Maximo Viola, impliedly recognized and acknowledged in accordance with the laws in force prior to the
Civil Code, thereby being a co-heir of Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola; that the agreement of partition and
distribution executed in 1935 by these three legitimate children of Maximo Viola be declared null and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is a victim of preterition.

Held:

It is alleged that petitioner having been the victim of preterition, the institution of heirs made by the deceased Dr.
Maximo Viola became ineffective, and that Civil Case No. 8077 was thereby converted into an intestate proceedings for
the settlement of his estate. This contention is clearly untenable. There might have been merit therein if we were dealing
with a special proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of a deceased person, which, in consequence of said
preterition, would thereby acquire the character of a proceeding for the settlement of an intestate estate, with jurisdiction
over any and all properties of the deceased. But, Civil Case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil action, and the authority of the
court having jurisdiction over the same is limited to the properties described in the pleadings, which admittedly do not
include the aforementioned rice land.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:

In the case of Lajom, it has been declared that since it is an ordinary civil action the authority of the court having
jurisdiction over the same is limited to the properties described in the pleadings, which admittedly do not include the
aforementioned rice land does not make the Civil Case No. 8077 converted into an intestate proceedings for the settlement
of the testator’s estate. Had it been a special proceeding, then a contrary scenario would probably ensue. In saying this the
institution of heirs made by the deceased Viola is effective and does not convert is into intestate proceedings. Corollary, in
the case of Escuin, as has been seen, the testator wish to dispose his property in his will, designating as heirs his natural
father, Francisco Escuin, and his wife, Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, all together ignoring his recognized natural child who
is general heir. In view thereof, and for the reason that he exceeded his rights, the said designation of heirs became void
and so far as it impaired the right of his general heir and deprived him of his legal portions; the will, however, is valid with
respect to the two-thirds of the property which the testator freely disposed of. To be clear, it is not proper to assert that the
late Emilio Escuin de los Santos died intestate since it is clear and unquestionable that it was the wish of the testator to
favor his natural father and his wife with certain portions of his property which, under the law, he had the right to dispose
of by will, as he has done, provided the legal portion of his general heir was not thereby impaired, the two former persons
being considered as legatees under the will.