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Running Head: Historical Epistemology or History of Epistemology?

Title: Historical Epistemology or History of Epistemology? The Case of the Relation

between Perception and Judgment
Thomas Sturm
tsturm@mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de

For Günther Patzig

Forthcoming in Erkenntnis.

NOTE: This version represents the pre-print version. This material is intended for purposes of
education, research, scholarly communication, or critical commentary, all in conformity with “fair
use” and the established practice of authors’ providing single preprints and offprints for
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Abstract. This essay aims to sharpen debates on the pros and cons of historical epistemology,

which is now understood as a novel approach to the study of knowledge, by comparing it with

the history of epistemology as traditionally pursued by philosophers. The many versions of

both approaches are not always easily discernable. Yet, a reasoned comparison of certain

versions can and should be made. In the first section of this article, I argue that the most

interesting difference involves neither the subject matter nor goal, but the methods used by

the two approaches. In the second section, I ask which of the two approaches or methods is

more promising given that both historical epistemologists and historians of epistemology

claim to contribute to epistemology simpliciter. Using traditional problems concerning the

epistemic role of perception, I argue that the historical epistemologies of Wartofsky and

Daston & Galison fail to show that studying practices of perception is philosophically

significant. Standard methods from the history of epistemology are more promising, as I show

by means of reconstructing arguments in a debate about the relation between perception and

judgment in psychological research on the famous moon illusion.

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Introduction

Historical epistemology (HE for short) is an approach to the study of (primarily scientific)

knowledge predominantly pursued by historians of science today.1 The history of

epistemology (HoE), in contrast, is a way of studying knowledge and theories thereof that

derives more from philosophical epistemology. In what follows, I shall compare HE and HoE,

identifying their advantages and disadvantages. Such a comparison may be viewed

suspiciously: Are there not too many different versions of both HE and HoE, such that one

version of HE might differ more from another one than from a particular version of HoE?

And is the distinction between HE and HoE not simply contingent on the disciplines to which

people belong, rather than on a well-justified distinction between two different forms of

inquiry into human knowledge (cf. Garber, 2005)? To some extent, such worries are not

unwarranted. However, while the differences in the programs and practices of HE and HoE

are not always easy to detect, some can be identified. We are dealing here with a spectrum

that has a gray section in the middle, but also clear black and white end points. Highlighting

the differences between HE and HoE is useful for better understanding both approaches and

for evaluating what speaks for and against them.

This paper attempts to achieve this in two main steps. First, I identify versions of HE

and HoE that are distinguishable and yet similar enough to allow for an interesting

comparison and evaluation. As I argue, the most interesting differences between these

versions of HE and HoE primarily involve neither subject matter nor goals, but method. These

versions both aim to critically reflect current agendas in epistemology, or even to contribute

to current epistemological issues, but differ in terms of tools. The question is, then, which

method is more promising (sections 1.1-1.3). In the second part, I turn to a thorny

epistemological problem that can be found in various forms throughout the history of

philosophy and science: How are perception and judgment related and what does their
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relation mean for the foundation of empirical knowledge (2.1)? I then discuss two versions of

an HE of perception, namely Wartofsky’s, and Daston & Galison’s. Neither of their

contributions enables us to better deal with epistemic problems of perception, nor how to state

those problems differently (2.2-2.5). Finally, and more constructively, I show how HoE fares

better. I shall use an age-old debate: How to explain the famous moon illusion? (2.6) In the

conclusion (3), I highlight limits of my arguments. While HoE is more promising than HE in

thinking about the epistemic problems of perception, and while there are probably many other

epistemological issues where similar arguments work, counterexamples are possible.

1. Historical Epistemology versus History of Epistemology

1.1 Historical epistemology and its philosophical ambitions

The terms ‘HE’ and ‘HoE’ are used in various ways. We may begin by looking at the

differences indicated by the adjectival construction ‘historical X’, and the composition of

substantives ‘history of X’. Terminological observations admittedly merely provide starting-

points. But they may help prevent certain confusions.

In his defense of naturalism in epistemology, Alvin Goldman (1986) uses the term

‘historical epistemology’ to designate ideas and works of epistemologists of the past. He

limits the term ‘history of epistemology’ to designating works by current philosophers and

historians about past epistemologists and their writings (Goldman, 2008). Thus, in Goldman’s

usage of ‘history of epistemology’, ‘history’ denotes not the object – the past – but beliefs or

claims about the past. That contains nothing illogical. Yet, it is odd that the expression

‘historical epistemology’ should refer most naturally to ideas and works of epistemologists of

the past. Rather, ‘historical’ is better used to qualify the term ‘epistemology’ in a certain way,

as in ‘naturalistic epistemology’. Such a construction thus denotes a certain approach, or

family of approaches, to epistemology. This is consistent with how those who coined the
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terminology used the expression ‘historical epistemology’ (or the French epistémologie

historique), and with the meaning intended by those who use it now (e.g., Lecourt, 1969;

Wartofsky, 1979; Daston, 1994; Galison, 2008; Renn, 1995a, b; Rheinberger, 2010). This is

also compatible with the more plausible of Goldman’s claims, namely that ‘history of

epistemology’ refers to the discipline that studies the works and ideas of past epistemologists.

(Of course, ‘HoE’ is also a suitable expression for that past itself, since ‘history’ is generally

ambiguous in this way. In this paper, however, I mostly don’t use ‘HoE’ in this sense,

though.)

What qualification, then, is indicated by the adjective ‘historical’ in ‘historical

epistemology’? It might specify the goal, the subject matter, or the method of such an

epistemology, or some or all of these. For instance, most adherents of what is dubbed

‘naturalistic epistemology’ stick to standard goals of epistemology, but alter the method. They

accept that a central aim of epistemology is to develop a theory of epistemic justification –

and a theory that does not only factually state what we take to be epistemic justification, but

that tells us which epistemic justifications to accept and which to reject. As is well known,

naturalists reject the armchair methods of conceptual analysis and thought experiment used by

many anti-naturalists in epistemology, arguing that any identification of the right standards

for justification cannot be achieved independent of empirical science (e.g. Goldman, 1986).

Perhaps the adjective ‘historical’ in ‘HE’ functions similarly. History would then help us to

accomplish some standard goal of epistemology.

The adjective ‘historical’, however, might have a different purpose. Compare ‘genetic’

in ‘genetic epistemology’ or ‘evolutionary’ in ‘evolutionary epistemology’. Very often, these

expressions do not simply stand for particular methods for attaining some standard goal of

epistemology. Genetic and evolutionary epistemologies are not theories of what knowledge is,

what its sources and limits are, what should count as epistemic justification or how we can
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improve our epistemic situation. Rather, they are empirical theories about stages and

mechanisms in the development of human cognitive abilities. Thus, the methods used by

these approaches differ from those widespread in philosophical epistemology and redefine the

goals and/or subject matter of epistemology.

The question, then, is whether HE and philosophical epistemology (be it naturalistic or

not) differ only in method, or also in their aims and/or their subject matter. Are we still

playing the same game or not? This is no easy matter, and it is certainly no longer merely a

terminological issue.

How do conceptions of HE look in this light? In this publication we have identified

three main versions of HE that study different subject matters (Feest & Sturm, 2011): (i)

epistemic concepts that guide and evaluate research (e.g. Wartofsky, 1979, 1987; Daston,

1994; Galison, 2008), such as ‘objectivity’ (Daston & Galison, 2007) or ‘observation’

(Daston & Lunbeck, 2011); (ii) the objects of scientific knowledge or, perhaps better, the

concepts scientists employ to refer to their research objects (Rheinberger, 2010), such as

‘protein’ (Rheinberger, 1997) or ‘heredity’ (Müller-Wille & Rheinberger, 2007, 2009); and

(iii) the structures of long-term scientific developments, such as the origins of mechanics or

the relativity revolution (e.g. Renn, 1995a, 1995b, 2004; Renn, Damerow & McLaughlin,

2004). While these versions of HE differ in subject matter, they exhibit important common

methodological features. For instance, all claim that one ought to study the local contexts of

science as well as draw comparisons across time and place – combining micro history and

macro history. Also, they all aim to study research practices that lead to the introduction or

change of concepts of objects, of epistemic concepts, and of shifts in the development of

scientific theories. These methodological assumptions are rarely if ever made by those who

pursue HoE – about which I shall have more to say in section 1.2.
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What about the goals of HE? Clearly the above-mentioned general topics of the three

versions of HE have counterparts in traditional epistemology and philosophy of science. First,

the study of epistemic concepts is described as a Kantian inquiry – by historical means – into

the “a priori forms of our perception and cognition” (Wartofsky, 1979, p. xxiii), the

conditions of the possibility of certain forms of knowledge and evidence (Daston, 1994, p.

282f.), or the “organizing concepts” or “categories of thought” such as “knowledge, belief,

evidence, good reason, objectivity, probability” (Hacking, 1999, p. 58). Second, studies by the

French philosopher-historians Bachelard and Canguilhem have exerted a strong influence on

historical epistemologies of the objects of scientific knowledge (Rheinberger, 2010). At the

same time, they also touch on debates concerning realism and anti-realism about theoretical

concepts in philosophy of science. Finally, the topic of long-term models of scientific

development can be traced to post-Kuhnian debates on the dynamics of research.

Thus, central versions of HE are motivated by, or try to contribute to, standard

philosophical topics and issues. Indeed, Hacking (1999, p. 58) says that his interest in the

“categories of thought … is not so different from theirs [Aristotle’s or Kant’s] although

widely different in manner of execution”; he aims to put historical material to “philosophical

purposes” and wants to “make use of the past for the present” (ibid., p. 55f.). But how? And

for which current philosophical debates? Hacking does not state that explicitly. Daston, again,

justly warning against committing the genetic fallacy, rejects the view that to historicize X is

to relativize it, and also notes “it is not enough to reveal the contingent or accidental character

of our current conceptual categories in order to abandon them. We must put something better

in their place.” (Daston, 1994, p. 284; cf. Daston & Galison, 2007, p. 376) More positively,

she thinks that history can provide us with “conceptual alternatives that may significantly

transform” current debates. For instance, historical analyses of scientific research practices

may show that factual statements are theory-laden in various ways, “from the relatively

innocuous selection of topics, in the sense of Max Weber, to the sinister extreme of ideology,
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in the sense of Karl Marx”. Likewise, HE may reveal that the language of the “neutrality” and

“contamination” of statements about facts discloses problematic epistemology, namely,

epistemology of the “given” (Daston, 1994, p. 284f.). Does it, however, take thorough inquiry

into the practices of early modern science to arrive at such results, interesting as they may be?

Investing in good old-fashioned armchair epistemology seems sufficient here – and a better

bargain. (Later on (sections 2.4-2.5), I shall argue against a more elaborate example given by

Daston and Galison for how HE might be philosophically useful.)

Of course, one might try to avoid competition between HE and philosophical

epistemology by arguing that HE confines itself to descriptive and explanatory purposes,

whereas philosophical epistemology involves normative or evaluative tasks. Some proponents

of HE indeed seem to change the game rather than compete with philosophical epistemology

or the philosophy of science. Rheinberger, for instance, writes:

“My use of the term epistemology requires a brief explanation. I do not use it as a

synonym for a theory of knowledge (Erkenntnis) that inquires into what it is that

makes knowledge (Wissen) scientific, as was characteristic of the classical tradition,

especially in English-speaking countries. Rather, the concept is used here, following

the French practice, for reflecting the historical conditions under which, and the means

with which, things are made into objects of knowledge. It focuses thus on the process

of generating knowledge and the ways in which it is initiated and maintained.”

(Rheinberger, 2010, p. 2f.)

Let us ignore both Rheinberger’s assumption that epistemology is an inquiry into “what

makes knowledge scientific” (a characterization many epistemologists would reject as being

too restrictive) and his limiting of epistemology to theories of objects of knowledge. What I
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wish to focus instead on is the claim that epistemology studies the “process of generating

knowledge”. This certainly makes it appear as if his project were purely

descriptive/explanatory and not normative. Renn (2008, p. viif.) likewise states that the “main

goal” of an HE of mechanics “is to explain the development and diffusion of mechanical

knowledge” or “to explain structural transformations of systems of knowledge” (see also

Renn, Damerow, & McLaughlin, 2004).

But things are not that easy. For starters, it is not clear whether all issues in

epistemology are normative – e.g. the task of defining the term ‘knowledge’. Nor are

questions such as: Do we possess any knowledge at all? Under what conditions is the

knowledge of objects possible? Such issues are at least not normative in the straightforward

sense as questions about standards of rationality or about proper methods of belief revision

are. Moreover, proponents of HE do not always evade competition with philosophical

projects. Thus Rheinberger (2010, p. 1) claims that HE overcomes the well-known distinction

between discovery and justification (without explaining how it is done), and insists on the

philosophical significance of HE (ibid., 2f. et passim). Renn, again, claims that HE can help

“overcome the problems of the traditional philosophy of science to establish universal norms

of scientific rationality” (Renn, 1995a, p. 2), that it can “reverse the trend of the philosophy of

science towards content-independent methodology … which began with Neo-Kantianism and

continued with analytical philosophy” (Renn, 1995b, p. 251), and that it may lead toward a

new synthesis of history and the philosophy of science. Due both to the inherent complexity

of epistemology as well as the ambiguities of the claims of HE proponents, we would need to

hear more about the ambitions of HE, and about how these relate to tasks and projects in

philosophical epistemology. But we don’t.

We arrive, then, at some preliminary results. On the one hand, if one assumes that

proponents of HE do not claim to contribute to genuine philosophical discussion, they fail to

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clearly demarcate their approach from philosophical epistemology. On the other hand, it looks

more as if historical epistemologists do claim to contribute to philosophical discussion, but

they fail to make clear how they do so. I shall next consider another historical undertaking,

namely HoE, which has also often stated its philosophical ambitions.

1.2 The ambitions of history of epistemology: Two questions and four possible answers

Not surprisingly, there also exists controversy over the subject matter, goals and methods of

HoE. Most important for the present discussion, views on whether or not the history of

philosophy is necessary or useful for philosophical thinking itself keep changing (Krüger,

1986; Mash, 1987; Sorell & Rogers, 2005). To create some clarity, let me distinguish between

two HoE-related questions.

First, should we study HoE systematically, with the intention, for instance, of judging

whether a claim made by Plato or Hume or Kant is (fairly) justified? Second, should we

assume that the problems of epistemology are perennial, and that trying to reconstruct and

evaluate Plato’s or Hume’s or Kant’s arguments is meaningful for current debates, too? These

questions are often conflated, but should be kept apart. One can discuss an assumption taken

from Plato’s Timaeus, rationally reconstructing2 and evaluating his arguments for it using all

the standard tools (e.g., examine the meanings of central terms, distinguish premises and

conclusions, analyze the logical form of the argument, consider its formal cogency as well as

the truth of its premises, and so on) without this evaluation in and of itself contributing to any

current discussion. The same holds for many other topics in HoE.

Now, in principle, four responses to the above two questions are possible: Yes&Yes,

Yes&No, No&Yes, and No&No. I shall briefly discuss these options.

As to the double denial (No&No), surely HoE may be understood as mere description.

One may simply desire to discover what Kant or Hume meant, what caused their beliefs, and
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so on, without bothering with whether they were right and wrong, or whether we might learn

from them for solving current problems. Such an approach evades anachronism and

presentism – at least literally, because we know that even when simply attempting to interpret

a past author correctly it is easy to import concepts and views that are our own and not the

author’s. One often reads, for example, that Descartes or Kant held this or that view on

consciousness which is relevant for our present-day debates; but that may be quite misleading

and distort Descartes’ or Kant’s statements (e.g. Kemmerling, 1996; Sturm & Wunderlich,

2010). What I wish to bring against the No&No response, however, are two other points.

First, a disregard of the method of rational reconstruction is not recommended for HoE.

Robert Nozick (1993, p. xi) has noted that while ‘philosophy’ means ‘love of wisdom’, what

philosophers really love is reasoning. To adequately understand a past philosopher’s claim, it

is poor procedure to ignore his arguments for that claim. Second, guidance by systematic

aspirations does not necessarily imply anachronistic treatment of the past. Such guidance may

even be necessary. For instance, a standard issue in HoE is whether a past thinker developed a

new claim or argument. This can only be answered adequately if one compares the relevant

claim or argument with those of that thinker’s predecessors and contemporaries, examining

their reasons in order to determine the precise meaning of their statements. This can require

extensive rational reconstruction of past debates (see Sturm, 2006, 2009).

The doubly affirmative respondents (Yes&Yes) say that we should reconstruct past

epistemological views not only with an eye towards their justification, but also assume

continuity between past and present epistemological aims, problems, and methods. This

stance treats classical authors like great contemporaries that help us avoid repeating mistakes

(e.g. Kenny, 2005) or that raise our own discussion to a higher level. Bennett (1966) treated

Kant in this way, as has Burnyeat (1990) Plato, and Williams (1978) Descartes. This approach

has come under attack even by some analytically trained philosophers who argue that the very

formulation of philosophical problems and methods often depends on the history of the
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sciences (e.g. Krüger, 1986; Hatfield, 1996, 2005) or, as in Garber’s (2005) “antiquarianism”,

on even broader intellectual and social contexts. The more contextualization we want, the

more difficult it may become to see how to differentiate between HoE and HE with its typical

call for rich contextualization. Where to draw the line here is difficult to determine. However,

I do think that some histories of epistemology succeed in delimiting their tasks such that they

avoid excessive contextualization and concentrate on epistemological issues. In any case,

insofar as these points are combined with the idea that one can try to reconstruct past views

with an eye towards their justification, these critics at least approximate the Yes&No position.

So what is preferable, the Yes&Yes or the Yes&No position? Both have advantages

and limits. The Yes&No respondents are at least right in emphasizing that not all

epistemological problems are perennial, many current ones have origins worth studying, and

that doing HoE in this way can help to reflect or reform today’s agendas in epistemology (e.g.

Stroud, 2011). As noted above, Daston holds a similar view on the function of HE – which is

another reason why we must discuss which tools or methods are better suited to address

epistemological questions. More on this later. For now I want to stress that I see no principled

reason for claiming that no philosophical problems and methods are (relatively) permanent. Is

it not striking how parts of ancient texts like Aristotle or Plato still speak immediately to us?

Insofar as this is the case, the double affirmative (Yes&Yes) can surely be right.

To sum up, I think one should never respond to both questions in the negative, should

sometimes respond to both in the affirmative, and should on on other occasions say Yes&No.

To complete the list, a No&Yes position would obviously be irrational: it makes no sense to

claim one can learn from a claim of a past thinker but deny the need to examine the meanings

of that claim and the rationale for it. We sometimes speak of Kant’s or Aristotle’s great

insights, but we cannot intuitively or immediately grasp those insights; we must reason our

way towards them.

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1.3 General remarks on the comparison of HE and HoE

I shall rest my case concerning these issues here. For the upcoming comparison

between HE and HoE, it matters more to highlight three points.

(1) Anyone endorsing the Yes&No view need not be worried by the objection, often

raised by historians of science, that philosophers assume their problems do not change over

time. A similar point may be made regarding, say, philosophical concepts, methods,

standards, or goals – an objection illustrated by Renn’s above-mentioned remark that analytic

philosophers seek universal (i.e. unchanging) norms for scientific rationality. For instance, a

defender of the Yes&No view can question whether it is advisable to reconstruct a past

thinker’s argument using logical or semantic tools that were not at that thinker’s disposal, and

instead examine how the argument looks in terms of the tools that were at his disposal. Even

when an interpreter finds the past logic flawed and claims that the argument can be rescued by

using a modern logic, that does not commit him to claiming that the more modern logic is

valid from here to eternity. The Yes&No view of HoE is compatible with a good dose of

historicity in epistemological problems, standards, and solutions.

(2) In addition, the Yes&No view comes in different varieties. At one end of the

spectrum we have epistemological problems as discussed by philosophers only; at the other

end we find connections to past science. To some extent, a tight dovetailing of epistemology

and science in HoE is desirable. Consider Galileo, Descartes, and Leibniz, or Hobbes and

Hume, or Helmholtz, Wundt and Frege: which elements from their works count as scientific

and which as philosophical? Any study of such authors and their inquiries must set its own

limits and sort relevant material from that which is irrelevant. Accordingly, Wolfgang Carl’s

(1994) work on Frege’s theory of sense and reference, Michael Friedman’s (1992) work on

Kant’s reflections on natural science, Gary Hatfield’s (1990, cf. 1996) work on the
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development of theories of spatial perception from Kant to Helmholtz, and Catherine

Wilson’s (1995) work on scientific instruments in the early modern era and their relevance for

philosophical debates over essences and realism all lie at different points along the spectrum.

But despite such difficulties, the Yes&No view of HoE makes a good competitor for HE –

and the more so when it brings into play relations between past epistemology and science.

(3) So, when I compare HE and HoE in this paper, I consider only versions of both

approaches that share a broad philosophical goal: those that ultimately hope to solve

epistemological problems, or at least to alter existing epistemological agendas. These

approaches, however, differ in method. HoE deals with epistemological questions by means

of the reconstruction and evaluation of past arguments as presented in classical philosophical

texts or in the more philosophical parts of scientific writings. This can be done for its own

sake (or for an improved understanding of past thinkers) but it also at least makes it possible

for us to compare them with current arguments – although such comparison often involves

bringing into play not only the historical arguments themselves but also the problems,

methods and broader goals behind them, given that these may have changed, too. In contrast,

HE focuses on epistemic aspects of past science, such as the emergence of new epistemic

concepts and objects, the varieties and competition of epistemic standards, the structure of

knowledge development but always does so by examining what the historical sources tell us

about the actual research practices of science. Certainly proponents of HE do not rationally

reconstruct past epistemological arguments in the way typical of HoE. Some defenders of HE

even reject philosophical tools such as logic or linguistic analysis (e.g., Renn, 1995b, p. 2).

If a goal is shared, then one can discuss which of the proposed methods is better suited

to achieving that goal. Of course, one might compare HE and HoE even if these approaches

differ in both methods and goals, by saying that goals, too, can be compared and criticized.

For example, if historical epistemologists should have no philosophical ambition after all, or
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should confine themselves to purely descriptive or explanatory goals of the history of science,

we might question such goals. It is, however, too demanding to do so here.

So, which of the methods better suits the shared goal? In the second half of this essay,

I shall present arguments that speak for those of HoE. One might try to develop a general

argument in favor of this claim; but presumably, this would not convince adherents of HE,

given their skepticism about such arguments. It is better to work with a striking example, a

specific epistemological topic where there exist contributions from practitioners of HE and

HoE. I’ve chosen a problem with an interesting and rich history in the history of philosophy

and the sciences: the relation between perception and judgment, and its role in

epistemological questions.

2. Perception and Judgment

2.1 How perception’s role in knowledge leads to epistemological problems

The concept of perception has a long history in theories regarding the justification of

empirical knowledge. To know about the world around us, we must perceive it. We expect

that perception can play such a role because it is passive: it gives us information about the

world whether we like it or not. However, familiar problems arise from this commonsense

assumption. Here are two:

The first problem derives from the existence of misleading perceptions, such as

hallucinations and illusions. How things are and how they appear to us might not be the same

– a point involved in puzzles, some of which have been discussed since ancient times (see

e.g. Burnyeat, 1979). A common suggestion is that we must, and can, check our perceptions

using certain fundamental judgments – particularly judgments about our perceptual relation to

reality. The second problem, however, threatens to undermine this solution. It pushes further

the claim that perception must be closely related to judgmental activities if it is to play an
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epistemic role: To empirically refute or justify a knowledge claim requires that the content of

one’s relevant perception share the judgmental content of the relevant knowledge claim.

Otherwise, we cannot view perceptions as being inferentially related to knowledge claims

(McDowell, 1994; cf. Schumacher, 2004b). My knowledge that there are more than three

persons in a certain room requires someone’s perception of them, that someone being me or a

reliable expert who transfers his knowledge to me. But it is also necessary that my perception

be structured in a certain way, namely in such a way that the perception can be used to justify

the knowledge claim. When concepts, judgments, or inferences enter, however, the perceptual

window to the world may become smudged or scratched. Also, if and insofar as judgments

fully permeate perceptions, it may be that we are not checking empirical claims by means of

perception but only reinforcing what we already believe. It would be nice if there were some

non-conceptual or non-judgmental content of perception after all. This, however, leads back

to the first problem.

In various ways, the two problems have been a longstanding source of perceptual

theory and epistemology. Descartes, Kant, Helmholtz, the Logical Empiricists, Popper,

Hanson, Kuhn, and many others give different answers to these two questions. Even when

terminology, basic assumptions, and goals differ somewhat, the differences between today’s

epistemology and that of the past are rather minor. How do proponents of HE deal with these

epistemological problems of perception? In the following, I shall discuss two major proposals.

2.2 Wartofsky: “Perception has a history”

In an essay written in 1973, Marx W. Wartofsky claimed that “perception has a history” and,

moreover, that “several traditional philosophical characterizations of epistemological

questions are wrong, and […] what is needed to replace them is an historical epistemology”

(Wartofsky, 1979, pp. 191 and 189).3 Two questions arise here: First, how is the claim that
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“perception has a history” related to the idea of an historical epistemology of perception?

Second, might an HE of perception solve, prevent, or help redefine central epistemological

problems about perception, such as those mentioned above?

As to the first question, Wartofsky has two suggestions: On the one hand, such an HE

could be a history of perception itself; on the other hand, it could be a history of theories of

perception. He prefers the first solution and considers the second option a “meta-theory” to

HE (Wartofsky, 1979, p. 198). One might think here of work in the history of perceptual

theory and its relation to epistemology (e.g., Hatfield, 1990, 2002; Schickore, 2006; Turner,

1994; Wade, 2005).

Wartofsky’s point is not that our perceptual abilities have a “natural” history to be

studied by biology, neurophysiology, or psychology (1979, 190-194; cf. Wartofsky, 1983a).

Rather, the history of “human perception begins to develop only” where its natural histories

end; it begins with human “praxis” or action. In other words, perception is historical because

it is causally influenced by actions and intentions.4 It is part of a complex “feedback loop” in

which it causally influences, and is causally influenced by, the two basic human activities of

communication and production, and the resulting artifacts and representations. Artifacts and

representations are tools for refined action, but only by going through a stage of refined

perception. Refined actions lead to more refined tools and representations, which lead to even

more refined actions, but only through a stage of even further refined perception… and so on.

Wartofsky (1979, p. 205f.) concludes, therefore, that there is no “perceptual neutrality”: “for

perceiving organisms, what is ‘there’ is always a product of their activity, and that cross-

section of the world which this activity encounters and transforms into an environment.” To

use one of his examples, when a hunter hears the crack of a branch, or sees a sudden flight of

birds, he “transforms that very sound and sight into an artifact – an instrument – of the hunt

itself” (ibid., p. 206). A second conclusion – not distinguished, but in fact different – of
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Wartofsky’s considerations is that not only are our perceptions caused by our intentions and

actions, but “nature itself” is caused in this way (ibid.). Influenced here by Kuhn, he claims

that the “plasticity of perception is evidenced, for me, by the fact that, as styles or canons of

representations change, historically, the world has seen changes as well” (ibid., p. 206).

2.3 Problems with Wartofsky’s views

Even if we dismiss the second, more problematic conclusion,5 Wartofsky’s argument for the

first conclusion – that perception has a history – is not convincing.

To begin, Wartofsky frequently wavers between saying that perception is causally

dependent on human action, and that it is a mode of human action.6 To begin, if Wartofsky

claims that perceptions are not identical with, but are caused by, actions, and therefore have a

history, then this is trivial. No one doubts that perceptions can be caused by actions and that

products of conscious human action have a history. If, on the other side, Wartofsky would

stick to the identity claim, then this is quite doubtful. To show how murky Wartofsky’s views

are, one must realize first that he also alternates between speaking of perception as perceptual

processes and as perceptual faculties.7 In which sense could perception be considered a form

of action? Obviously, faculties cannot properly be called actions, being processes of a certain

kind. Wartofsky must mean perceptual processes. But that is implausible as well. We are

given a few examples – a hunter perceiving a flight of birds, say – but no argument for why

all perceptual processes are actions. The examples are also highly debatable. When a hunter

hears a crack or sees birds fly up, his attention to the events, and therefore his consequent

perception, does not show that the perceptions themselves are actions. More specifically, the

contents of the hunter’s perceptions will still be something passive. There are strong limits to

the plasticity of perception, as is well known from perceptual illusion (Fodor 1984): When I

see a pencil bent in a glass of water, I can know that it is not actually bent, and I may even
 18

know why the illusion occurs (because of the refraction of light in water). Knowing that a

perception is illusory, or why it is so, normally does not eliminate the illusion. This “cognitive

impenetrability” of perceptual illusion shows that perceptual content is at some distance from

judgmental activity. Similarly, if the hunter realizes that he did not actually hear a flock of

birds but was perhaps a victim of some intricate illusion set up by Greenpeace activists, he

will nevertheless have had certain perceptions, quite independent of his intentions and actions.

And, most likely, even if the subject isn’t a hunter, he will still perceive something looking

like a flock of birds.

Furthermore, there is also the question of how an HE of perception would change the

agenda of traditional epistemological problems of perception. Of the problems described

earlier (section 2.1), Wartofsky seems to have something like the second one in mind. As he

says, perceptions can be influenced by conceptual activity, in which case they may vary

according to “alternative contexts, or situations, or cultures”, though not historically in his

own sense (e.g., 1979, p. 190). But he does not elucidate how, given his historicist view of

perception, one can overcome or transform the epistemological problems concerning

perception connected to this assumption. So much for Wartofsky.

2.4 Daston & Galison: Research practices shape which perceptions are epistemologically

relevant

In Daston and Galison’s (2007) illuminating history of the epistemic category of objectivity,

perception is also viewed as having a history and, indeed, plays a central role. Unlike

Wartofsky, Daston and Galison do not maintain that practices shape perception itself but that

they do shape views about what kinds of perception can ground claims to objective

knowledge. Moreover, they do not focus on practice in general, but on specific scientific
 19

practices that “establish the acceptable forms of knowledge generation” (Galison, 2008, p.

117). Discussing past epistemological doctrines, they write:

“… close consideration of these practices seldom enters into the ancient and still

continuing philosophical debate about the epistemological status of vision per se.

Whether vision is repudiated as a false guide, leading the unwary astray with the gleam

of mere appearances, or defended as the noblest or most intellectualized of the senses, it

is conceived abstractly in this debate, as the same faculty for Plato and George

Berkeley, René Descartes and Arthur Schopenhauer. Proponents and opponents treat

theories and valorizations of vision historically and with discerning attention to nuance,

but they rarely address the activity of seeing. … we have focused on practices of seeing,

rather than theories of vision. We nonetheless hold these practices as well as theories to

be of philosophical import. They dictate not just how the world looks but also what it is

– what scientific objects are and how they should be known” (Daston & Galison, 2007,

p. 368f.).

Here we have two important claims: (A) Daston and Galison want not to study the history of

perceptual theories but to focus on, say, “practices of seeing” instead of theories of vision and

(B) claim that these are nevertheless of “philosophical import” because these practices (in

conjunction with theories) “dictate not just how the world looks but also what it is – what

scientific objects are and how they should be known.”

Daston and Galison investigate the history of the ideals and practices of atlas-making

from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. They identify three epistemic ideals that

emerged successively and that shaped practices of scientific objectivity as illustrated by atlas

images (ibid., pp. 18, 42-50, 371): “truth-to-nature” (the researcher selects and synthesizes
 20

observable features in order to then visually represent the general essences of objects),

“mechanical objectivity” (the researcher tries to represent the individual particularities of

observed objects independent of any preconceptions, and typically uses mechanical devices to

achieve those representations), and finally “trained judgment” (the expert interprets certain

patterns of objects in order to group them as families). These ideals, so the argument goes,

lead to a difference in the training of perceptual powers in scientists. Moreover, they

determine (at least in part) what counts as empirical evidence. Certain kinds of perceptions

and the related empirical claims may be acceptable for one scientist but not for another.

Standards of evidence can vary with epistemic goals. In other words, we cannot take methods

for granted, but must evaluate them relative to certain research goals.

From a historical point of view, the interest in research practices provides a more

comprehensive picture of past science; it concretizes how scientists understood their goals and

methods; it helps check whether they could live up to ideals of evidence; and it reveals when

ideals were influenced by new instruments, or how instruments or images were adapted to

new ideas regarding empirical evidence. So, there is a good deal to be said in favor of claim

(A).

2.5 Problems with Daston & Galison’s views

Several problems must be noted, however, when it comes to (B), the assumption that a history

of the practices of perception is philosophically relevant. I see four. To reveal the first two, it

is necessary to break down the overly complex citation given for (B) into two different

versions.

(1) There is, first, the claim (B*) that “practices of seeing … dictate not just how the

world looks but also what it is – what scientific objects are and how they should be known”.

The last ten words of this statement can be read as referring to what scientists, based on their
 21

“practices of seeing” should believe about objects and how those objects should be known.

Since Daston and Galison maintain that their historical analysis of these practices is of

“philosophical import”, the statement cannot be merely an expression of what scientists

believe as a matter of fact about their practices, irrespective of whether these beliefs are right

or wrong. What might that import be? One cannot simply use historical evidence for certain

research practices and their development to contend that this evidence already shows what the

world actually (or at least on our best considered judgments) looks like or what objects it

contains. That would be committing a genetic fallacy, against which Daston (1994, p. 284)

justly warns.

(2) One might also simply concentrate on a certain part of the claim as follows: (B**)

“practices of seeing … dictate … what scientific objects are and how they should be known”.

Here the problem is that it is unclear how this is related to the further claim about the

historical variance of standards of evidence that is so important to Daston and Galison’s work.

One can accept that standards of evidence develop historically, namely relative to changing

epistemic ideals, without accepting that “practices of seeing” sufficiently determine what

counts as a scientific object and how it should be known. The careful reader of the long

passage quoted above may have noted that Daston and Galison do not maintain that practices

by themselves would “dictate … what scientific objects are and how they should be known”.

Rather, in the previous sentence the authors state that they take both “these practices as well

as theories to be of philosophical import”, followed by the claim that “They dictate not just

how the world looks but also what it is…”. And yet practices of perception do not even play a

necessary role in this. According to Daston and Galison’s own argument in favor of the

variance of standards, it is changes of epistemic ideals – truth-to-nature (get at the essences!),

mechanical objectivity (record all minute particulars!), and trained judgment (discover family

resemblances!) – that explain why standards of evidence change. Plausibly, practices follow.8
 22

(3) It is unclear how a history of practices of perception can help to solve standard

epistemological problems about perception and judgment (section 2.1). In various ways,

Daston and Galison identify versions of these problems: e.g., as the attempt of those who

subscribed to the ideal of mechanical objectivity to avoid distorting judgments even if in fact

they could not (2007, p. 320f.) or as a “worry about variable observers” (ibid., p. 369; cf. p.

278). But they do not pretend to solve these problems. Rather, they want to emphasize the

plurality and sometimes even the conflict of epistemic ideals or virtues: “a plurality of visions

of knowledge … is likely to be a permanent aspect of science” (ibid., p. 371; cf. e.g. pp. 33f.,

40, 370). Whether that is true or not, it does not help to solve any epistemological problems

with perception by analyzing research practices.

(4) Finally, if the variance of epistemic ideals does the main job in explaining why

standards of evidence have changed, then it seems reasonable to tell a different kind of story:

namely, one ought to look more closely at why scientists came to accept certain goals or

ideals, and how they developed views about scientific methods and standards from them. One

could – and probably should – reconstruct the fine-grained details of the epistemological

arguments and debates in which the scientists were involved. Of course, this would mean

using a standard method of HoE rather than of HE.

2.6 Perception and judgment in the Moon Illusion

Now I would like to further strengthen the view that the reconstruction of the reasoning, that

is, the precise arguments used in the debates among past authors, is better suited to address

ongoing epistemological debates than examining research practices and how they have led to

the emergence of certain epistemic concepts. I use a topic that remains linked to problems of

perception (section 2.1), but – in order to reach historical epistemologists as well – in the

context of the history of science: perceptual illusions. Much past research on these illusion
 23

was motivated not only by the wish to explain them but also to learn how to avoid drawing

misleading inferences from them (Schickore, 2006). We need to understand why a pencil

placed in water looks bent even though we know that it is straight, why visual sensations of

rapidly moving bright objects (lightning, comets, or the like) persist for some time after their

external causes are gone, and so on. Only when we know how such illusion is to be explained

can we know which perceptions are reliable. Moreover, by studying whether or not higher

order cognitive processes are involved in illusion, one can also learn whether these processes

are involved in perception in general.

One of the most familiar of all perceptual illusions has puzzled astronomers since

antiquity, and later also physiologists, opticians, and psychologists (Plug & Ross, 1989). The

horizon moon appears larger than the zenith moon, while its physical size, its distance from

the Earth, and even its visual angle to the retina (about 0.5°) remain unchanged. Several

competing explanations for this phenomenon exist, and sophisticated experiments in recent

decades have not helped to narrow down the number of theories (Hershenson, 1989; Ross &

Plug, 2002, p. 180). Among the still popular explanations of this illusion are two: the so-

called perceived-distance theories, and the angle-of-regard theories. The first – defended by

Al-Haythem, Descartes, and Robert Smith, among others – states that any object seen through

filled space (such as the moon across terrain at the horizon) appears larger than an object at

the same visual angle but seen through empty space (such as the zenith moon). The second

theory – held by Ptolemy, Berkeley, and others - claims that the zenith moon looks smaller

because the viewer lifts his head and eyes to an unusual position.

In the twentieth century, the angle-of-regard theory was experimentally defended by the

psychologists Edwin G. Boring and colleagues in the 1930s and 1940s (Boring, 1943; Holway

& Boring, 1940a, 1940b; Taylor & Boring, 1942). Against their views, Lloyd Kaufman and

Irvin Rock launched objections in the 1960s, defending the perceived-distance theory
 24

(Kaufman & Rock, 1962a, 1962b; Rock & Kaufman, 1962a). They used devices to measure

virtual “moons” and added or eliminated terrain between viewers and those “moons”. The

effect of terrain was established in both directions: Excluding terrain from horizon “moons”

eliminates the illusion while adding terrain to zenith “moons” creates the illusion. These data

remain uncontested to this day.

But the perceived-distance theory does face objections, one of which Boring was eager

to point out: If the mind, being presented with the retinal image of the horizon moon, takes

into account the seemingly greater distance to the horizon, and then computes from this the

size of the moon in this position, then people would not perceive the horizon moon as closer

than the zenith moon. But they do. Subjects frequently report that the horizon moon looks

closer - and the zenith moon looks farther away! More dramatically, they report that the

horizon moon appears to float somewhat in front of the horizon. This is called the

“secondary” aspect (Egan, 1998, p. 606) of the illusion: We are faced not only with a size

illusion (the “primary” aspect), but with a distance illusion as well. Researchers also speak of

a “size-distance paradox” of which the moon illusion is a primary example. The illusion is

even considered a Kuhnian anomaly for a basic law of perception, the size-distance-

invariance hypothesis (SDIH).9

Kaufman and Rock did not neglect the secondary aspect, but they denied that it refutes

their explanation. They distinguished between “levels” of perception (Rock & Kaufman,

1962b, p. 908): perception involves judgment, whereas mere registration does not. On the one

hand, the mind unconsciously “registers” a certain distance on the basis of a certain cue

(visible terrain). Then, by taking account of this registered distance, the mind is said to

achieve a representation of a certain apparent size of an object. On the other hand, the reports

on the apparent closeness of the horizon moon ought to be understood as statements about

consciously “perceived” distance, based on the registration of the moon as particularly large,
 25

and merely elicited by the experimenter’s question. This is why their explanation has been

described as the “further-larger-nearer theory” (Dees, 1966; Plug & Ross, 1994, p. 327).

Boring pointed out that reports about the closeness of the horizon moon can also be

viewed as expressions of a rule about perception, “Euclid’s law”: “a receding object appears

to shrink in size as its retinal image shrinks; and conversely, mutatis mutandis” (Boring 1962,

p. 905). This is incompatible with the SDIH. It cannot be the case that the SDIH and Euclid’s

law work at the same time on the same processes. Boring added, only half-jokingly, that

Kaufman and Rock had not gone far enough in using their distinction between registered

distance and perceived distance. He provided a reductio ad absurdum of their views:

“Under Emmert’s law the moon is thus, because of its remote registry, perceived as

large. Looking large, it seems, under Euclid’s principle, near. And might one not add

that, under Emmert’s law appearing near, it looks small? That would be the whole circle

of the logic of these two principles: the horizon moon, being far, is big; being big, is

near; being near, is small” (Boring, 1962, p. 905).10

Rock and Kaufman (1962b, p. 908f.) replied that their distinction was not ad hoc, but

supported by experiments (e.g., by relating it to the flat-sky illusion, which is independent of

the moon illusion). But instead of explaining why the horizon moon does not appear smaller

due to its apparent nearness, they just repeated that the distance perception is not a

phenomenal experience but only a judgment. They insisted that the apparent nearness of the

horizon moon is an experimental artifact.

Now, Kaufman and Rock used traditional epistemological vocabulary without

reflecting on its adequacy. Historical comparison helps here. Would Kant not have agreed

with Kaufman and Rock’s view that the secondary aspect of the illusion is not sensory but
 26

judgmental? He would not. In Kaufman and Rock’s reconstruction, subjects are said to judge

or perceive that the horizon moon appears nearer, not, of course, that it is objectively nearer.

When Kant applies his distinction between sensory representations and judgments – which he

does with reference to the example of the moon illusion (Kant, 1900ff., vol. VII, p. 146) – the

notion of judgment is used for what subjects state to objectively be the case. Kant uses the

perception-judgment distinction to defend the senses against the charge that they mislead us,

when in fact a careless use of the understanding is responsible for erroneous judgments. Thus

sensory representations as such need not involve any judgments. Of course, our judgments

may turn out to be false. For instance, we err if from our perceptions we infer that the moon is

actually bigger at the horizon than in the zenith. But we do not err when we simply apprehend

the horizon moon as being near, or when we report this perception. And although Kant does

not mention the secondary aspect of the illusion, his distinction allows him to view this aspect

as being as phenomenally real as the first one. Kaufman and Rock’s distinction does not.

This shift in the meaning of the perception-judgment distinction did not appear out of

nowhere. Since the nineteenth century, especially due to the influence of Helmholtz, the idea

of unconscious judgments and inferences embedded in perception itself became popular –

somewhat ironically, in reaction to a (mis)understanding of Kant’s distinction between

appearances and things-in-themselves (Schickore, 2006). Helmholtz used the notion of

unconscious judgments and inferences to explain the moon illusion as such, which is different

from Kant’s attempt to analyze the epistemological role of judgment in making empirical

knowledge-claims, namely their role in avoiding error. The notion of unconscious inferences

remains present in Rock’s theory of perception (Hatfield, 2002), but the epistemological aim

of avoiding error no longer grounds usage of the perception-judgment vocabulary in current

psychological research.11 However, given problems such as those raised by Boring, we should

be careful when transferring this vocabulary from one domain or agenda to another.
 27

What does all this mean for epistemological problems of perception? As to the first

epistemological problem – how things appear and how they really are might not be the same –

the rational reconstruction of the foregoing historical episode reveals that it is naïve to claim

that we should check perceptions by means of reliable judgments or theories about our

relation to reality. This does not mean, of course, that the moon illusion does not occur. But

we do not know why it occurs. As to the second problem – how to prevent perception from

being biased by conceptual or judgmental activities – the episode supports the view that we

can distinguish conceptual and non-conceptual content in perceptions. It is only when we take

an epistemological interest in perception that we must judge whether or not the perception

presents things as they are. Of course, there are other options for dealing with the problem,

such as denying that all conceptual activity involved in perception must lead to biases (e.g.

Schumacher, 2004a). But discussing these options would go too far here. It is interesting,

though, that the rational reconstruction of debates and arguments in past science invites us to

think about such options.

3. Conclusion

I have argued against the usefulness of HE, and in favor of HoE, for discussing

epistemological problems. HE suffers from ambiguous goals and fails to make clear how it

might improve or change epistemological debates.

To support HoE further, I have rationally reconstructed arguments from a short but

significant historical debate on research in perceptual illusion. It has become clear that our

understanding of the relation between perception and judgment has changed. But that

involves no historicity of perception as such. The story is not one of perception relative to

practices, but one of understandings of the concepts of perception and judgment relative to

problems and arguments that philosophers and scientists face. Also, I have shown how this
 28

historical debate can be related to familiar epistemological problems about perception. All

this becomes clear only if one invests a sufficient amount of rational reconstruction and

critical appraisal of past scientific and philosophical reasoning. It is perhaps obvious why

HoE does better than HE: some of its standard methods are not much different from those of

epistemology simpliciter.

Still, my conclusions limited. I did not show that studying research practices is never

epistemologically useful. For instance, when asking whether scientific standards are

realizable, or whether experiments lead to artifacts, understanding research practices can be

quite useful – but, again, only if their analysis is firmly embedded in the reconstruction of

arguments. Moreover, my conclusion is limited to one epistemological topic (though an

important one). But it should be clear how to develop analogous examples, and how

counterexamples would have to be presented to overcome or limit my doubts about HE. For

now, I continue to prefer the standard methods of HoE over those of HE.

Acknowledgements

I thank Alix Hui, John Carson, Uljana Feest, Kyle Stanford, Jens Timmermann, and two

anonymous referees for valuable comments and criticism. Cynthia Klohr made helpful

suggestions for wording the text. Special thanks go to Lorraine Daston, Hans-Jörg

Rheinberger and Jürgen Renn, whose work provoked me to think more clearly about the

relation between philosophy and the history of science. Completion of this essay was

supported by the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science (Berlin) and by the Spanish

Ministry for Science and Innovation, Reference number FFI 2008-01559/FISO.

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1
Exceptions being, e.g., the philosophers Marx Wartofsky and Ian Hacking (below more on both). The latter
prefers to describe his work not as belonging to historical epistemology but “historical meta-epistemology”,
arguing that the former notion refers more to historical accounts of the development of scientific knowledge
whereas his – and Daston’s – work is more about the historical development of epistemic concepts such as
‘objectivity’, ‘rationality’, or ‘knowledge’ (Hacking, 1999). Moreover, “historical meta-epistemology”
supposedly falls under “historical ontology” (Hacking, 2002, pp. 7-12). Things get complicated here, because at
least one other version of historical epistemology, namely that of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, is about what Hacking
calls “historical ontology”, or the history of objects of science. It suffices to note these terminological
juxtapositions; from now on, I shall ignore them (a few reasons for considering Hacking an historical
epistemologist can be found in Kusch, 2011).
2
Historians resent the term “rational reconstruction”, but they need not. As Kitcher (1993, p. 13) says,
“philosophically oriented history should not reconstruct in the sense of drawing lines that would have to be
altered in a more detailed presentation”. Admittedly, rationalizations often do not provide the true causes for the
adoption of a belief or the acceptance of a method. Whether Kant was truly awakened from his dogmatic
slumber by Hume’s reminder about causation is doubtful (Carl, 1989). And according to Schaffer (1994),
Kekule’s dream story of how he discovered the benzene ring was made up afterwards. But it still is possible that
rationalizations are sometimes correct explanations. Moreover, we should distinguish between reasons for the
acquisition of and reasons for sustaining a belief. Even when a belief has not been adopted for the reason the
philosopher or scientist officially states, it may well be sustained later on for that reason. Finally, rational
reconstructions are methodologically recommendable: When an author makes a certain claim only once, or
without any premises on which the claim is based, or without any inferences made from the claim, then the claim
should not be taken seriously. In contrast, claims involving many premises and consequences give good reason
to believe that the author meant them seriously. So we should look for these kinds of inferential items when
trying to identify an author’s beliefs.
3
The paper is related to others in his work (e.g., Wartofsky, 1976, 1983a, 1983b, 1987; cf. Gould, 2003, p. x;
Dolling, 2003), and is probably the first publication where HE was advanced in the English-speaking world.
Wartofsky (1928-1997), an editor for the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, organized various
events during the 1970s to promote his approach (see e.g., a session on “Historical Epistemology and Scientific
Practice”; Anonymous, 1975). Another paper, from 1977, reveals that Wartofsky was aware of Bachelard,
Foucault, and Lecourt. So, he might have taken the term ‘HE’ from that tradition (Wartofsky, 1979, p. 121) – but
he does not mention any doctrine he adopted from it.
4
Wartofsky’s approach does contain Marxist elements. For instance, he claims that “our modes of cognitive
practice change with changes in our modes of production, of social organization, of technology and technique”
(1979, p. xxii; cf. Gould, 2003, p. x). However, his arguments for the historicity of perception do not depend on
these elements.
5
This conclusion even questions some of his own statements, e.g.: “My own view ... is an explicitly realist view
of perception in ... that the ‘objects of perception’ are taken to be independent of perception, though they are
mediated by an activity of perception” (Wartofsky, 1979, p. 193).
6
For the claim that perception is to be explained or caused by actions: “... the forms or modes of perception, its
structures themselves, are historically variant; ... this variation is related to historical changes in the forms or
modes of human action” (Wartofsky 1979, 189). Or: “... in its very genesis, perception is linked to that practical
interaction with an external world” (ibid., 194). For the claim that perception is itself a kind of action: “...
perception is a highly evolved and specific mode of human action (or praxis)” (ibid., p. 189). “I take perception
to be a mode of outward motor action” (ibid., 194). “... perception is understood as a mode of human action; ... it
is therefore ... endowed with all the qualities of human action or praxis, namely: effectiveness in the world
(causal efficacy); intentionality (as it is involved in the conscious teleology of human action); and, necessarily, a
mode of physical or organic activity ... and exhibiting ... the specific features of reflexiveness or internal activity
characteristic of such other organic functions as digestion, emotion, or hormone balance” (ibid., p. 196).
7
For the faculty view: “I take human perception ... as the specifically human faculty which develops only after
biological evolution of our sensory system has been completed. That is to say, I take it as an historically evolved
faculty...” (Wartofsky, 1979, p. 189).
8
In conversation, Raine Daston has emphasized that much of her claims concern the emergence of epistemic
concepts: practices precede the “crystallization” of a concept like objectivity. One can grant this only to a certain
extent: (1) If one writes a history of the emergence of X one must already have a preliminary (if minimal)
understanding of X, since only then can one sort out historical material properly; also (2) for the material to be
sorted out properly, there had to be an at least implicit understanding on the side of the historical agents that
 35

what they were doing falls - in a minimal sense - under 'X'. Daston justly cautioned me that this is true for any
history whatsoever, even for biological accounts of species development. The further one goes back, the less the
ancestor resembles a current organism (or epistemic concept). Still, there must be continuities.
9
The SDIH describes the relation between the perceived size S of an object with a given visual angle α and the
perceived distance D between object and observer: S = tan α × D. This is a function based upon the physical
facts about the relation between the size of an object, its distance to a viewer and the visual angle of the object
on the retina, formed by the light traveling from the object to the viewer (Hershenson, 1989).
10
Emmert’s law (Emmert, 1881) states the same relation the SDIH but only for afterimages: Create an
afterimage on your retina by looking at some color stimulus for a sufficient time (30 or 60 seconds will do).
Next, look at a white wall at a greater distance. The afterimage appears “blown up”, depending on the distance to
the wall.
11
Even in recent papers: Kaufman & Rock, 1989; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2000; Kaufman et al., 2007.