Jurisdiction b) The Motion to Declare Defendant in Default should be granted.

Q: Give examples of civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary The Supreme Court has held that the pendency of certiorari proceedings does not excuse the
estimation. defendant from filing an answer unless he has obtained a restraining order or injunction suspending
proceedings in the case. (China Bank vs. Oliver, 390 SCRA 263 [2002])
Answer: IRR CARDS
Injunction Here, the RTC did not issue any injunction or restraining order nor did Brent file an answer within
Rescission or annulment of contract Reformation of contract the reglementary period. Hence, it is proper for Brent to be declared in default.
Citizen Suit
Action for abatement of nuisance Action for revival of judgment
Declaratory Relief Q: Olivia entrusted the owner’s duplicate certificate of title No. 105602 over her lot to his broker
Specific Performance Xander so as to subdivide the lot. Xander subdivided the lot into several titles. Xander forged the
signature of Olivia in a deed of sale and sold one of the lots covered by a title to Bea. Bea then sold the
Q: Can a suit for injunction be aptly filed with the Supreme Court to stop the President lot to Chad. A new certificate of title No. 137466 was issued in the name of Chad.
of the Philippines from entering into a peace agreement with the National Democratic Front? (03 Bar
Q11) Olivia filed with the RTC an action for cancellation of the title of Chad. The complaint alleged
that the land was bought by Chad for P15,000.00.
A: No. An action for injunction is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, the
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the same, exclusive original jurisdiction being vested in the RTC. Judgment was rendered in favor of Olivia. On appeal Chad moved to set aside the judgment on
the ground that the same was a real action and since the value of the land was only P15,000.00, then the
Ultimate Objective Test RTC did not have jurisdiction. May the RTC’s judgment be set aside for lack of jurisdiction?

Q: Andre filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila an action for specific performance
against Brent, a resident of Quezon City, to compel the latter to execute a deed of conveyance covering a
parcel of land situated in Quezon City having an assessed value of P19,000.00. Brent received the
summons and a copy of the Complaint on January 2, 2003. On Jan. 10, 2003, Brent filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction contending that the subject matter of the suit
was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court issued an Order denying the motion. In due time, Brent
filed with the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Certiorari praying that the said Order be set aside
because the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
Suggested answer:
Yes. An action for cancellation of TCT is a real action where the court has to determine which of
two titles over the same lot is valid. In such a case, jurisdiction depends upon assessed value. Since the
complaint did not allege the assessed value, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction may
be raised at any stage even on appeal. (Padlan vs. Dinglasan, March 20, 2013)

On February 13, 2003, Andre filed with the MeTC a motion to declare Brent in default. The
motion was opposed by Brent on the ground that his Petition for Certiorari was still pending.

a) Was the denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint correct?

b) Resolve the Motion to Declare the Defendant in Default.

Answers:

a) The denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was correct.

The Supreme Court has held that even if the action is one for specific performance but the ultimate
objective of the plaintiff is to obtain title to real property, the action is a real action and not one
incapable of pecuniary estimation. (Ruby Shelters Builders vs. Formaran, G.R. No. 175914, February 10,
2009; Gochan vs. Gochan, 423 Phil. 491 [2001]).
Here, the ultimate objective of Andre was to obtain title to the land. Hence the action is a real one
and since the assessed value does not exceed P20,000, the MeTC has jurisdiction.
Q: Plaintiff filed with the MTC a case for unlawful detainer against the Defendant. The Plaintiff
averred that he had bought the property from the seller but had found that the Defendant staying
thereon, that he allowed Defendant to stay provided that Defendant will immediately vacate the land
upon Plaintiff’s prior notice that he will be needing the land, and that Defendant refused to vacate
despite notice to do so. The MTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
stating that the proof showed that the issue of possession cannot be properly determined without
setting the issue of ownership.
On appeal by the Plaintiff, the RTC agreed with the MTC that jurisdiction lies with the RTC. The
RTC then took cognizance of the case and rendered a decision in favor of the Plaintiff ordering the
Defendant to vacate the premises. On appeal by Defendant, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
Decision. The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for Plaintiff’s failure to
allege the assessed value of the subject property and, as a consequence, the assailed RTC Decision is null
and void. Was the CA decision correct?
Suggested answer:
No. In real actions there is a need to allege the assessed value of the real property subject of
the action, or the interest therein, for purposes of determining which court (MTC or RTC) has jurisdiction
over the action. However, it must be clarified that this requirement applies only if these courts are in the
exercise of their original jurisdiction.
Here, the RTC was exercising its appellate, not original, jurisdiction when it took cognizance of
Plaintiff’s appeal and Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 does not provide any amount or value of the subject
property which would limit the RTC’s exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by first level
court. Clearly then, in the instant case, contrary to the ruling of the CA, the assessed value of the
disputed lot is immaterial for purposes of the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction. Indeed, all cases decided by
the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved. Hence, the CA erred in
nullifying the RTC decision for lack of jurisdiction. (Arrienda vs. Kalaw, April 6, 2016)
Rule 1 - General Provisions
Q: The Respondent offered to buy a parcel of land from the National Tobacco Administration. The
deed of sale was signed by Respondent and he paid the 20% down payment but the Petitioners, officers
of the NTA, refused to implement the sale. Respondent thus filed against Petitioners a Petition for
Mandamus with Damages. In the body of the petition, the amount of the moral and exemplary damages
and the attorney’s fees were mentioned but they were not mentioned at all in the prayer. The
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss for failure to pay the docket fees on the moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. The Respondent then filed an amended petition specifying the amount of
the damages and fees in the prayer and also asking that the deed of sale executed by NTA in favor of
Stanford East Realty Corporation be declared void and a TCT in favor of Petitioner be issued. The trial
court, over the Petitioners’ objections, admitted the amended petition stating that the Respondent had
already paid the docket fee. Did the trial court act properly in admitting the amended petition?
Suggested answer:
No. The trial court should have dismissed the petition pursuant to the ruling in Manchester
Development Corporation vs. CA, 149 SCRA 562, which had been rendered as far back as 1987 and which
states that the amount of damages claimed should be specified in the body and in the prayer. It is
unfortunate that up to this date, this ruling had been ignored. The trial court had no power to admit the
amended petition since it had no jurisdiction over the original petition. What is more the amended
petition seeks to recover interest over real property at bottom and hence the Respondent should have
specified the assessed value, or if none, the estimated value thereof, to serve as a basis for the
computation of the docket fee. Evidently, there was an intent to evade payment of the correct docket
fees. The amended petition should be expunged and the civil case dismissed. (Siapno vs. Manalo, G.R.
No. 132260, August 30, 2005)
Rule 2 - Cause of Action
Q: What is a cause of action?
Suggested answer:
It is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. (S2 R2). The facts which
give rise to a right of action.
 Q: Define the following terms:
Q: Reviera Golf Club Inc. (RGC) and CCA Holdings (CCA) entered into a 5-year Management and 1) Right of action,
Royalty Agreement whereby RGC agreed to pay CCA monthly management and royalty fees for operating 2) Relief,
and managing the Riviera Golf Club. Just three years into the contract, RGC preterminated the same on 3) Remedy, and
the ground of financial difficulties and alleged violations by CCA of the agreement. CCA filed with the RTC 4) Subject matter.
of Makati City, a complaint for collection of the unpaid management and royalty fees for services
rendered against RGC. The parties entered into a compromise agreement which became the basis of a
compromise judgment by the court. The compromise agreement contained a “non-waiver” clause
wherein the compromise agreement shall not be considered as a waiver of and is without prejudice to
CCA’s cause of action arising from the pre-termination of the Management and Royalty Agreement.
1) Right of action. The remedial right or right to relief granted by law to a party to institute an action
Subsequently, CCA filed a second complaint against RGC for the expected business profits it against a person who has violated his right; the legal right to sue.
should have derived from the unexpired two-year term of the agreement but did not because of the 2) Relief. The redress or other measure which a plaintiff prays the court to order or adjudicate in his
pretermination of the agreement. RGC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. CCA favor.
opposed the motion on the grounds that: (a) the two cases involve different causes of action, and (b) the 3) Remedy. The form or type of action which the plaintiff may avail of in order to obtain relief from the
parties had stipulated in the “non-waiver” clause that the compromise agreement was without prejudice court.
to CCA’s cause of action arising from the pretermination of the Management and Royalty Agreement. 4) Subject matter. The thing, act, contract, or property which is directly involved in the action,
Should the motion to dismiss be granted? concerning which the wrong has been done.

Suggested answer: Joinder of causes of action

Yes.
a) Both the first and the second cases involve the same cause of action, that is, the breach by RGC
of the Management and Royalty Agreement. CCA confuses the reliefs sought (collection of the
unpaid management and royalty fees, and the claim for the expected profits for the unexpired
two-year term) with the cause of action. A cause of action may give rise to several reliefs, but
only one action can be filed. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split
up or divided into two or more different actions. Here the single cause of action gave rise to
two reliefs which should have been sought by CCA in the first complaint. Hence, CCA was
splitting its cause of action when it brought the second complaint.
Q: Petitioner’s bus sideswiped a car owned by G. The cost of repair was P450,000.00. The insurer
paid G P60,000 and so the balance of P390,000 was shouldered by G. The insurer and G filed a single
complaint before the RTC of Las Pinas City against Petitioner wherein the insurer claimed for P60,000
and G claimed for P390,000. The Petitioner filed an answer wherein he contends that the RTC of Las
Pinas does not have jurisdiction since the separate claims of the insurer and G fall below the
jurisdictional amount and joinder of the causes of action was not proper. Does the Las Pinas RTC have
jurisdiction?

b) The stipulation is void for it in effect allows the plaintiff CCA to split its cause of action. The
provision on res judicata and against splitting of cause of action are based on public policy.
Hence the stipulation is repugnant to public policy and is thus void and unenforceable. (Reviera
Golf Club, Inc. vs. CCA Holdings, B.V., June 17, 2015)
Suggested answer:
Yes. The joinder of causes of action by the Plaintiffs was proper since the two cases arose from
a single transaction, that is, Petitioner’s bus hitting the rear side of the car and there is also a common
question of fact: whether or not the bus driver was negligent. Hence, we apply the totality rule and thus
the Las Pinas RTC would have jurisdiction since the aggregate amount is Php450,000.00 (Pantranco North
Express, Inc. vs. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005)

Rule 3 - Parties to Civil Action
Q: Respondents filed a complaint for nullification of sale and damages against the Petitioner. The
Respondents alleged that they are the grandchildren and successors-in-interest of Udiaan and that an
impostor sold Udiaan’s land to the Petitioner. The RTC rendered summary judgment dismissing the
complaint since the Respondents being the grandchildren are not the real-parties-in-interest as they
have no successional rights. On appeal, the CA upheld the RTC’s findings that the Respondents are not
real parties-in-interest but it also nullified the deed of sale to Petitioner on the ground that Udiaan’s
signature was forged.
a) Are the Respondent’s real parties-in-interest?
b) Was it proper for the CA to render judgment nullifying the deed of sale?
Answers
a) No, the respondents are not real parties-in-interest. As grandchildren, they have no
successional rights to the estate of Udiaan unless by virtue of the right of representation. Since
the repsondents did not show that their mother predeceased Udiaan, they have no
successional rights.
b) No. Having established that respondents are not the real parties in interest to the instant suit,
the proper course of action was for the CA to merely affirm the RTC’s dismissal of their
complaint. It therefore erred in proceeding to resolve the other substantive issues of the case
and granting one of the principal reliefs sought by respondents, which is the declaration of the
nullity of the questioned deed of absolute sale. (Ang vs. Pacunio, July 8, 2015)
Rule 4 - Venue
Q: Amando brings an action in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila against Bernardo for the
annulment of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of real property with an assessed value of P50,000 located
in Laguna. The complaint alleged prematurity of the sale for the reason that the mortgage was not yet
due. Bernardo timely moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the action should have been brought
in the RTC of Laguna. Decide with reasons. (2000 Bar Q18a)
Suggested answer:
Insofar as the motion to dismiss is based on improper venue- since it argued that the action
should have been brought in Laguna – the same should be granted.
The action for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of property is a real action since
there has been a foreclosure sale and thus the action affects title to the real property mortgaged. (Chua
vs. Total Office Products & Services, September 30, 2005). Hence, the venue lies in Laguna, the place
where the real property is situated. [It should be filed with the RTC of Laguna, since the assessed value
exceeds P20,000.00].
DISCUSS pp 191-192
What is the venue of real actions?
What is the venue of personal actions?
Q: BPI Family Bank filed with the RTC of Makati an action to recover deficiency against the real
estate mortgagors after the extrajudicial foreclosure sale had resulted in a deficiency. The realty
mortgaged was located in Manila while BPI FB has its main office in Makati. The mortgagors filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action, res judicata, and waiver. The RTC
denied the motion to dismiss. The mortgagors filed a motion for reconsideration wherein they reiterated
the previous grounds and added the ground of improper venue, contending that the action for deficiency
was a real action which should have been brought in Manila. The motion for reconsideration was
denied. The mortgagors went up to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. The CA granted the
petition and ordered the dismissal of the action on the ground of improper venue, holding it was a real
action which should have been filed in Manila. Was the CA’s decision correct?
Suggested answer:
No, the CA’s decision was not correct.
First, an action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage is a personal action since it does not affect title to or possession of real property or any
interest therein. Hence, the action was properly brought in Makati where the mortgagee has its main
office.
Second, even assuming that there was improper venue, the ground was waived by the
mortgagors since they did not timely raise it in their motion to dismiss. Here, the ground for improper
venue was raised belatedly in the motion for reconsideration, not in the motion dismiss. Hence the
objection was waived pursuant to S2, R9. (BPI Family Bank vs. Yujuico, July 22, 2015)
Rule 5- Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts
Q: In an ejectment case, the court dismissed the complaint for failure of the plaintiff to appear
during the preliminary conference. The Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order.
The Defendant contends that the dismissal had become final and executory since the motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and hence does not suspend the reglementary period to appeal.
Is the Defendant’s contention correct?
Suggested answer:
 No. The motion for reconsideration prohibited under Section 19(C) of the Rule on Summary
Procedure is that which seeks reconsideration of a judgment rendered by the Court after trial on the
merits. The dismissal order is not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. (Lucas vs. Fabros, 324
SCRA 1).
Rule 6 - Pleadings
Q: Plaintiff filed suit for nullification of a promissory note against the Defendant on the ground of
usurious and unconscionable interest rates. The Defendant counterclaimed for the payment of the
P1,000,000 loan with interest. He however did not pay the docket fees. Should the counterclaim be
dismissed for failure to pay docket fees?
Suggested answer:
No. The counterclaim for the payment of the loan with interest is compulsory since it arises out
of or is connected to the loan transaction subject of the complaint. The grant of the counterclaim would
necessarily negate or defeat the suit for nullification. Being compulsory, there is no need to pay the filing
fees thereon. (Tan vs. Kaakbay Finance Corp., G.R. No. 146595, June 20, 2003); Alba vs. Malapajo,
January 13, 2016)
Q: Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure against
the Petitioners who are the mortgagors. After the foreclosure sale, Shell filed an action for the deficiency
against the Petitioners with the RTC of Manila. Petitioners in the meantime commenced an action to
annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale with the RTC of Makati City. The Manila RTC ruled in favor of
Shell. This judgment became final and executory. Subsequently, the Makati RTC ruled in favor of the
Petitioners and annulled the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The Makati RTC ruled that no auction sale was
actually conducted. Shell filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the Makati case should have
been dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The motion was denied and Shell appealed to the CA.
Should the Makati case have been dismissed?
Suggested answer:
Yes. The Makati case should have been earlier disallowed to proceed on the ground of litis
pendentia, or, once the decision in the Manila case became final, should have been dismissed on the
ground of being barred by res judicata. Petitioner’s claim for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure
case should have been set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case. (Mendiola vs. Court of
Appeals, July 18, 2012)
Q: Jim filed a complaint in the RTC of Quezon City for the collection of P300,000.00. The
defendant, Jim, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
over the action since the claimed amount of P300,000.00 is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Before the court could resolve the motion, Bong, without leave
of court, amended his complaint to allege a new cause of action consisting in the inclusion of an
additional amount of P300,000.00, thereby increasing his total claim to P600,000.000. Bong thereafter
filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss claiming that the RTC had jurisdiction over his action. Is Jim’s
opposition to the motion to dismiss sustainable?
ANSWER: Yes, Jim’s opposition to the motion to dismiss is sustainable. The motion to dismiss should be
denied. Basic is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. Under the Rules, a pleader
may amend his pleading as a matter of right before the other party has served his responsive pleading.
(Sec. 2, Rule 10, Rules of Court) The court, in allowing the amendment, would not be acting without
jurisdiction because allowing an amendment as a matter of right does not require the exercise of
discretion. The court therefore would not be "acting" and thus, could not have acted without jurisdiction.
It would have been different had the amendments been made after a responsive pleading had been
served. The court then would have been exercising its discretion in allowing or disallowing the
amendment. It cannot do so however, because it would be then acting on an amendment of a complaint
over which it has no jurisdiction. (Soledad v. Mamangun, G.R. No. L-17983, May 30, 1963; Gumabay v.
Baralin, G.R. No. L-30683, May 31, 1977; Prudence Realty v. CA, G.R. No. 110274, March 21, 1994)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
The motion to dismiss should be granted. Jurisdiction must be conferred by the contents of the
original complaint. Amendments are not proper and should be denied where the court has no
jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on
the court. (Rosario v. Carandang, G.R. No. L-7076, April 28, 1955) While a plaintiff is entitled to amend
the complaint before a responsive pleading is served (Sec. 2, Rule 10, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
Remington Industrial Sales Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002), still, a
complaint cannot be amended to confer jurisdiction on a court where there was none to begin with.
Q: Describe briefly at least four (4) modes of discovery under the Rules of Court.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Five modes of discovery under the Rules of Court are:
1. DEPOSITION. By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The defendant may file a motion to dismiss the complaint because of the refusal
property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the of the plaintiff to obey the order of the court for the production and inspection of the promissory note.
testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by [Rule 29 Sec. 3(c)].
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. (Sec. 1, Rule 23, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.)
2. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES. Under the same conditions specified in section 1 of Rule 23, any party
shall file and serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories regarding material and relevant facts
to be answered by the party served. (Sec. 1, Rule 25, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.)
Q: What is the "most important witness" rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pretrial and Use
3. ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY. At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve of Deposition-Discovery Measures?
upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material
and relevant document or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact. (Sec. 1, Rule 26, RoC)
4. PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS OR THINGS. Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefore, a court may order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or Answer:
photographing of any designated documents, etc. or order any party to permit entry upon designated
land or property for inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated The “most important witness” rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pretrial and Use of
relevant object or operation thereon. (Sec. 1, Rule 27, 1997 Rule 27 Rules of Civil Procedure.) Deposition-Discovery Measures provides that the judge shall, during the pretrial conference, determine
5.PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION OF PERSONS. Rule 28 the most important witnesses to be heard and limit the number of witnesses.
Q: In an admiralty case filed by Andrea against Y Shipping Lines (whose principal offices are in Manila) in
the RTC of Davao City, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum directing Jason, the president of the
shipping company, to appear and testify at the trial and to bring with him several documents. Jason
refused to comply with the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that he resides more than 100
kilometers from Davao City, which the Court found justifiable. How can Andrea take the testimony of
Jason and present the documents as exhibits other than through the subpoena from the RTC?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Andrea can take the testimony of Jason and present the documents as exhibits by taking his
deposition through oral examination or written interrogatories. (Rule 24; new Rule 23) He may also file a Q: What is the "one-day examination of witness" rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pretrial and Use
motion for the production or inspection of documents. (Rule 27). of Deposition-Discovery Measures?
Jason can refuse to comply with the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that he resides more
than 50 (now 100) kilometers from the place where he is to testify, (Sec. 9 of former Rule 23; Sec. 10 of ANSWER:
new Rule 21).
The witness can also refuse to comply with the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that the The “one-day examination of a witness” rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pretrial and
documents are not relevant and there was no tender of fees for one day's attendance and the Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures provides that a witness has to be fully examined in one day only,
kilometrage allowed by the rules. subject to the court’s discretion to extend the direct and/or cross-examination for justifiable reasons.

Q: The plaintiff sued the defendant in the RTC to collect on a promissory note, the terms of which were
stated in the complaint and a photocopy attached to the complaint as an annex. Before answering, the
defendant filed a motion for an order directing the plaintiff to produce the original of the note so that
the defendant could inspect it and verify his signature and the handwritten entries of the dates and
amounts. The judge granted the defendant’s motion for production and inspection of the original of the
promissory note, but the plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s order. How should the defendant
plead to the alleged execution of the note?
ANSWER:
The defendant is not required to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
promissory note, because of the non-compliance by the plaintiff with the order for production and
inspection of the original thereof. (Rule 8, sec. 8).
Q: Linda, as mother and in her capacity as legal guardian of her legitimate minor son, Habeas,
brought action for support against Albert, as father of Habeas and Linda’s lawfully wedded husband.
Albert filed his answer denying his paternity with counterclaim for damages. Subsequently, Linda filed a
manifestation in court that in view of the denial made by Albert, it would be futile to pursue the case
against Albert. Linda agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint, subject to the condition that
Albert will withdraw his counterclaim for damages. Linda and Albert filed a joint motion to dismiss. The
court dismissed the case with prejudice. Later on, minor son Habeas, represented by Linda, filed another
complaint for support against Albert. Albert filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
(A) Is res judicata a valid ground for dismissal of the second complaint?
(B) What are the essential requisite of res judicata?
ANSWER: (A) No, res judicata is not a defense in an action for support even if the first case was
dismissed with prejudice on a joint motion to dismiss. The plaintiff’s mother agreed to the dismissal of
the complaint for support in view of the defendant’s answer denying his paternity with a counterclaim
for damages. This was in the nature of a compromise of the right of support which is prohibited by law.
(Art, 2035, Civil Code; De Asis v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 176 [1999]).
(b) The Essential Requisites of Res Judicata are: 1 the judgment or order rendered must be final; 2 the
court rendering the same must have jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; 3 it must be a
judgment or order on the merits; and 4. there must be between the two cases identity of parties,
identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. (San Diego v. Cardona, 70 Phil, 281 [1940]
Q: Continental Chemical Corporation (CCC) filed a complaint for a sum of money against Barstow
Trading Corporation (BTC) for the latter’s failure to pay for its purchases of industrial chemicals. In its
answer, BTC contended that it refused to pay because CCC misrepresented that the products it sold
belonged to a new line, when in fact they were identical with CCC’s existing products. To substantiate its
defense, BTC filed a motion to compel CCC to give a detailed list of the products’ ingredients and
chemical components, relying on the right to avail of the modes of discovery allowed under Rule 27. CCC
objected, invoking confidentiality of the information sought by BTC. Resolve BTC’s motion with reasons.
ANSWER:
I will deny the motion. The ingredients and chemical components of CCC‟s products are trade
secrets within the contemplation of the law. Trade secrets may not be the subject of compulsory
disclosure by reason of their confidential and privileged character. Otherwise, CCC would eventually be
exposed to unwarranted business competition with others who may imitate and market the same kinds
of products in violation of CCC‟s proprietary rights. Being privileged, the detailed list of ingredients and
chemical components may not be the subject of mode of discovery under Rule 27, Section 1 which
expressly makes privileged information an exception from its coverage (Air Philippines Corporation vs.
Pennswell, Inc., 540 SCRA 215 [2007]).
Q: What are the instances of dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff?
Suggested Answer:
1)The plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint,
2) To prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or
3) To comply with these Rules or any order of the court.
Q: On March 4, 2007, Liza filed a complaint against Nyoy in the RTC of Quezon City. Nyoy received
the summons on March 10, 2007. For some reason, Liza had a change of heart and filed a motion to
dismiss the action on March 14, 2007. On the same day, and without being served with a copy of
Liza’s motion to dismiss, Nyoy filed and served to Liza his verified answer to the complaint with
counterclaim. The Court granted Liza’s motion. On April 3, 2007, Nyoy filed a motion to declare Liza in
default for her failure to file an answer on his counterclaim. Liza argued that she was justified in not filing
an answer because the case was already dismissed by the court, including the counterclaim. Was Nyoy’s
counterclaim dismissed when Liza’s complaint was dismissed upon her own motion?
Answer: No. Nyoy’s counterclaim was not dismissed. The dismissal of the action on her motion shall be
limited to the complaint (Section 2, Rule 17). The counterclaim is not dismissed, whether it is compulsory
or a permissive counterclaim.
If a counterclaim has already been pleaded by the defendant prior to the service upon him of
the plaintiff‘s motion to dismiss, and the court grants said motion to dismiss, the dismissal ― shall be
limited to the complaint‖ (Sec. 2, Rule 17) . The phraseology of the provision is clear: the counterclaim is
not dismissed, whether it is a compulsory or a permissive counterclaim because the rule makes no
distinction. The defendant if he so desires may prosecute his counterclaim either in a separate action or
in the same action. Should he choose to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action, he must
notify the court of his preference within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the plaintiff‘s motion to
dismiss. Should he opt to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action, the court should render the
corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint.
Q: Agatha filed a complaint against Yana in the RTC in Iligan City to collect Php350,000.00, an
amount representing the unpaid balance on the price of the car Yana had bought from Agatha. A couple
of weeks later and before she was served with the answer of Yana, Agatha filed a notice of dismissal. The
RTC issued an order confirming the dismissal.
Three months later, Agatha filed another complaint against Yana based on the same cause of
action in the same court. Again, for reasons personal to her, Agatha decided to have the complaint
dismissed without prejudice by filing a notice of dismissal prior to the service of the answer of Yana.
Hence, the case was dismissed. A month later, Agatha refiled the complaint against Yana in the same
RTC. May Yana successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint? Explain your
answer.
Answer: Yes. Yana may successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint.
Under the Two-Dismissal Rule, the notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits
provided it is filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or
including the same claim. (S1, Rule 17)
Here, the first dismissal by the plaintiff was in a competent court as the RTC in Iligan City has
jurisdiction over the action. Hence, Agathat’s third complaint is barred by the Two-Dismissal Rule.
The two-dismissal rule applies when the plaintiff has (a) twice dismissed actions, (b) based on or
including the same claim, (c) in a court of competent jurisdiction. The second notice of dismissal will bar
the refiling of the action because it will operate as an adjudication of the claim upon the merits. In other
words, the claim may only be filed twice, the first being the claim embodied in the original complaint.
Since as a rule, the dismissal is without prejudice, the same claim may be filed. If the refiled claim or
complaint is dismissed again through a second notice of dismissal, that second notice triggers the
application of the two-dismissal rule and the dismissal is to be deemed one with prejudice because it is
considered as an adjudication upon the merits.
Q: Lilio filed a complaint in the Municipal Trial Court of Lanuza for the recovery of a sum of money
against Juan. The latter filed his answer to the complaint serving a copy thereof on Lilio. After the filing
of the answer of Juan, whose duty is to have the case set for pre-trial? Why?
Suggested Answer: After the filing of the answer of Juan, the plaintiff has the duty to promptly move ex
parte that the case be set for pre-trial. The reason is that it is the plaintiff who knows when the last
pleading has been filed and it is the plaintiff who has the duty to prosecute (Rule 18, Section 1)
Q: Warren, the defendant in a case, failed to attend the pre-trial conference despite
proper notice. The plaintiff’s counsel moved in open court that Warren be declared in default due to his
failure to attend the pre-trial, which the court granted. Was the Court correct is declaring Warren in
default?
Suggested Answer:
On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to attend the pretrial
conference does not result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
defendant is only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary period. On the
other hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pretrial conference, the plaintiff can present his evidence ex
parte. There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend the pre-trial
conference set on February 4, 2005 despite proper notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their
nonattendance was due to the fault of their counsel as he forgot to update his calendar. This excuse
smacks of carelessness, and indifference to the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be considered as a
justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result of their inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador could no longer
present any evidence in their favor. (Sps. Salvador v. S ps. Rabaja, GR No. 199990, 02/04/2015)
Q: Rolly filed a petition for declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Carmina because of the
alleged psychological incapacity of the latter. After trial, the court rendered judgment dismissing the
petition on the ground that Rolly failed to prove the psychological incapacity of his wife. The judgment
having become final, Rolly filed another petition for declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Carmina,
this time on the ground that his marriage to the latter had been celebrated without a license. Carmina
moved to dismiss the second petition on the ground that the same is barred by the judgment in the first?
Resolve the motion.
Suggested Answer: No, the second action is not barred by the judgment in the first because they are
different causes of action. The first is for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, while the second is for declaration of nullity of marriage
in view of the absence of a basic requirement, which is a marriage license. They are different causes of
action because the evidence required to prove them,are not the same (Pagsisihan vs. Court of Appeals,
95 SCRA 540[1980])
Q: What are the grounds upon which a motion to dismiss may be filed?
Under Sec. 1, Rule 16, a motion to dismiss may be filed on any of the following grounds:
a. The court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
b. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
c. The venue is improperly laid;
d. The plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
e. There is another action pending between the same parties and for the same cause ( litis pendentia );
f. The cause of action is barred by a prior judgment ( res judicata ) or by the statute of limitations
(prescription);
g. The pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
h. The claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff‘s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or
otherwise extinguished;
i. The claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of
frauds; and
j. A condition precedent for filing the action has not been complied with. 1. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies 2. Compliance with earnest efforts between or among members of the family 3.
Barangay conciliation
Q: Within the period for filing a responsive pleading, the defendant filed a motion for bill of particulars
that he set for hearing on a certain date. The judge granted the motion and ordered the plaintiff to file
and serve the bill of particulars, which the plaintiff failed to comply. On this ground, the judge dismissed
the case. Was the dismissal of the case in order?
Answer: Yes, the judge may dismiss the case for failure of the plaintiff to comply with its order (Rule 17,
Section 3) or order the striking out of the pleading and may issue any other order at its discretion (Rule
12, Section 4).
Q: What is demurrer to evidence?
Suggested Answer:
Demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant after the plaintiff had
rested his case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It may be filed after the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence. It is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of
an action similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.
Q: Distinguish motion to dismiss from demurrer to evidence.
Distinctions:
(a) A motion to dismiss is usually filed before the service and filing of the answer; a demurrer to evidence
is made after the plaintiff rests his case;
(b) A motion to dismiss is anchored on many grounds; a demurrer is anchored on one ground—plaintiff
has no right to relief; and
(c) If a motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant may file his responsive pleading; in a demurrer, the
defendant may present his evidence.
Q: Kristina, the wife, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Pasig
City. James, the husband, filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Pasay City praying for
custody over their minor child. Kristina filed a motion to dismiss the James’ petition on the ground of the
pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which she filed before the RTC of Pasig
City. If you were the judge of RTC of Pasay City, how will you resolve the motion?
Answer:
The husband‘s motion to dismiss his wife‘s petition for habeas corpus should be granted
because the case for nullity of marriage constitutes litis pendencia. The custody over the minor child and
the action for nullity of the marriage are not separate causes of action. Judgment on the issue of custody
in the nullity of marriage case before the RTC of Pasig City, regardless of which party would prevail,
would constitute res judicata on the habeas corpus case before the RTC of Pasay City since the former
has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. The evidence to support the petition for nullity
necessarily involves evidence of fitness to take custody of the child, as the court in the nullity of
proceedings has a duty under the Family Code to protect the best interest of the child (Yu vs. Yu, GR No.
164915, 03/102006; Sec. 1[e], Rule 16) and Sec. 2, Rule 102).
Q: Summons was issued by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Iligan City and actually
received on time by the defendant from his wife at their residence. The sheriff’s return of proof of
service filed with the court, in sum, states that the summons, with attached copy of the complaints, was
served on defendant at his residence thru his wife, a person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over his person as
there was no valid service of summons on him because the sheriff‘s return on proof of service did not
show that the sheriff first made a genuine attempt to serve the summons on defendant personally
before serving it thru his wife. Was there a valid service of summons? What is the purpose of summons?
Explain.
Answer: The motion to dismiss is not meritorious because the defendant actually received the
summons on time from his wife. Service on the wife was sufficient. It is the duty of the court to look in
the sufficiency of the service. The sheriff‘s negligence is not stating in his return that he first made a
genuine effort to serve the summons on the defendant, should not prejudice the plaintiff (Mapa v. CA,
214 SCRA 417 [1992]). The purpose of the summons is to inform the defendant on the complaint filed
against him and to enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over his person. It may be served by the
sheriff or his deputy or any person authorized by the court.
Q: Gina Guerrero filed with the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, a complaint for
sum of money amounting to P1 million against Carla Corro. The complaint alleges, among others, that
Carla borrowed from Gina the said amount as evidenced by a promissory note signed by Carla and her
husband, jointly and severally. Carla was served with summons which was received by Linda, her
secretary. However, Carla failed to file an answer to the complaint within the 15-day reglementary
period. Hence, Gina filed with the court a motion to declare Carla in default and to allow her to present
evidence ex parte. Five days thereafter, Carla filed her verified answer to the complaint, denying under
oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note and contending that she has fully paid
her loan with interest at 12% per annum.
a) Was the summons validly served on Carla?
b) If you were the judge, would you grant Gina‘s motion to declare Carla in default?
SUGGESTED Answers:
a) The summons was not validly served on Carla because it was served on her secretary and the
requirements for substituted service have not been followed, such as a showing that efforts have been
exerted to serve the same on Carla and such attempt has failed despite due diligence (Manotoc v. CA ,
GR No. 130974, 08/16/2006).
b) If I were the judge, I would not grant Gina‘s motion to declare Carla in default because summons was
not properly served and, anyway, a verified answer to the complaint had already been filed. Moreover,
it is better to decide a case on the merits rather than on technicality.
Q: Yani filed an action for partition and accounting in the Regional Trial Court of Manila against her
sister Mary Rose, who is a resident of Singapore and is not found in the Philippines. Upon motion, the
court ordered the publication of the summons for three weeks in a local tabloid, Bandera. Linda, an OFW
vacationing in the Philippines, saw the summons in Bandera and brought a copy of the tabloid when she
returned to Singapore. Linda showed the tabloid and the page containing the summons to Mary Rose,
who said, “Yes, I know, my kumare Anita scanned and e-mailed that page of Bandera to me!” Was there
a valid service of summons? Did the court acquire jurisdiction over Mary Rose?
Answer: Yes. Partition is an action quasi in rem. Summons by publication is proper when the defendant
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, provided that a copy of the summons and order of
the court are sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant (Sec. 15, Rule 14).
Publication of the notice in Bulgar, a newspaper of general circulation, satisfies the requirements of
summons by publication.
Q: The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment against ST, copy of which was received by his
counsel on February 28, 2000. On March 10, 2000, ST, through counsel, filed for a motion for
reconsideration of the decision with notice to the Clerk of Court submitting the Motion for
Reconsideration of the court. On March 18, 2000, realizing that the motion lacked a notice of
hearing, ST‘s counsel filed a supplemental pleading. Was the Motion for Reconsideration filed within the
reglementary period?
Answer: No, because the last day for filing a motion for reconsideration was March 15 if February had 28
days or March 16 if February had 29 days.
Although the original Motion for Reconsideration was defective because it lacked a notice of
hearing, the defect was cured on time by its filing on March 15 of a supplemental pleading, provided the
motion was set for hearing and served the adverse party at least three (3) days before the date of
hearing (Rule 15, Section 4)
Q: The plaintiff sued the defendant in the RTC for damages allegedly caused by the latter‘s
encroachment on the plaintiff‘s lot. In his answer, the defendant denied the plaintiff‘s claim and alleged
that it was the plaintiff who in fact had encroached on his (defendant‘s) land. Accordingly, the defendant
counterclaimed against the plaintiff for damages resulting from the alleged encroachment on his lot. The
plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for extension of time to answer the defendant‘s counterclaim, but the
court denied the motion on the ground that it should have been set for hearing. On the defendant‘s
motion, therefore, the court declared the plaintiff in default on the counterclaim. Was the plaintiff
validly declared in default? Why?
Answer: No, the plaintiff was not validly declared in default. A motion for extension of time to file an
answer may be filed ex parte and need not be set for hearing. (Amante v. Suñga, 64 SCRA 192 [1975]).
Q: The defendant was declared in default in the RTC for his failure to file an answer to a complaint
for a sum of money. On the basis of the plaintiff’s ex parte presentation of evidence, judgment by default
was rendered against the defendant. The default judgment was served on the defendant on October 1,
2001. On October 10, 2001, he filed a verified motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the
judgment. In his motion, the defendant alleged that, immediately upon receipt of the summons, he saw
the plaintiff and confronted him with his receipt evidencing his payment and that the plaintiff assured
him that he would instruct his lawyer to withdraw the complaint. The trial court denied the defendant’s
motion because it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit. The defendant filed a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 challenging the denial order.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion or act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in denying
the defendant’s motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the default judgment?
X
Abraham filed a complaint for damages in the amount of P750,000.00 against Salvador in the RTC
in Quezon City for the latter's alleged breach of their contract of services. Salvador promptly filed his
answer, and included a counterclaim for P250,000.00 arising from the allegedly baseless and malicious
claims of Abraham that compelled him to litigate and to engage the services of counsel, and thus caused
him to suffer mental anguish.
Noting that the amount of the counterclaim was below the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
RTC, Abraham filed a motion to dismiss vis-a-vis the counterclaim on that ground.
Should the counterclaim of Salvador be dismissed? Explain your answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the counterclaim of Salvador should not be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
In an original action before the RTC, the RTC has jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim
regardless of its amount. [See S7 R6]
Here Salvador’s counterclaim for damages arising from the alleged malicious and baseless claims
of Abraham is a compulsory counterclaim as it arises from Abraham’s complaint. Hence the RTC has
jurisdiction over Salvador’s counterclaim even if it did not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P400,000.
 XII
On the basis of an alleged promissory note executed by Harold in favor of Ramon, the latter filed a
complaint for P950,000.00 against the former in the RTC of Davao City. In an unverified answer, Harold
specifically denied the genuineness of the promissory note.
During the trial, Harold sought to offer the testimonies of the following: (1) the testimony of an
NBI handwriting expert to prove the forgery of his signature; and (2) the testimony of a credible witness
to prove that if ever Harold had executed the note in favor of Ramon, the same was not supported by a
consideration.
May Ramon validly object to the proposed testimonies? Give a brief explanation of your answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Ramon may validly object to the proposed testimony of an NBI handwriting expert to prove
forgery.
Under S8 R8, the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document is deemed admitted
by the adverse party if he fails to specifically deny such genuineness and due execution.
Here the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note, which is an actionable
document, was impliedly admitted by Harold when he failed to deny the same under oath, his answer
being unverified. Hence Harold is precluded from setting up the defense of forgery and thus Ramon may
object to the proposed testimony seeking to prove forgery.
2) Ramon may not validly object to the proposed testimony showing that the note was not
supported by a consideration.
The Supreme Court has held that an implied admission under S8 R8 does not preclude the adverse
party from introducing evidence that the actionable document was not supported by a
consideration. The reason is that such evidence is not inconsistent with the implied admission of
genuineness and due execution. [Acabal v. Acabal, 31 March 2005]
The fact that the defense of lack of consideration is inconsistent with Harold’s defense of forgery
is also not objectionable.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may set forth two or more statements of defense
alternatively or hypothetically. [S2 R8]
XIII
Circe filed with the RTC a complaint for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage against siblings
Scylla and Charybdis, co-owners of the property and cosignatories to the mortgage deed. The siblings
permanently reside in Athens, Greece. Circe tipped off Sheriff Pluto that Scylla is on a balikbayan trip and
is billeted at the Century Plaza Hotel in Pasay City. Sheriff Pluto went to the hotel and personally served
Scylla the summons, but the latter refused to receive summons for Charybdis as she was not authorized
to do so. Sheriff Pluto requested Scylla for the email address and fax number of Charybdis which the
latter readily gave. Sheriff Pluto, in his return of the summons, stated that Summons for Scylla was
served personally as shown by her signature on the receiving copy of the summons. Summons on
Charybdis was served pursuant to the amendment of Rule 14 by facsimile transmittal of the summons
and complaint on defendant's fax number as evidenced by transmission verification report automatically
generated by the fax machine indicating that it was received by the fax number to which it was sent on
the date and time indicated therein."
Circe, sixty (60) days after her receipt of Sheriff Pluto's return, filed a Motion to Declare
Charybdis in default as Charybdis did not file any responsive pleading. Accordingly, Charybdis was
declared in default. What is the effect of Scylla's answer to the complaint?
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
a) No, the court should not declare Charybdis in default.
Under the Rules of Court, the amendment of Rule 14 allowing service of summons by facsimile
transmittal refers only to service of summons upon a foreign private juridical entity under Section 12 of
Rule 14, not to a non-resident defendant under Section 15 of Rule 14. Service of summons by facsimile
cannot be effected under Section 15 unless leave of court was obtained specifically permitting service by
facsimile transmittal.
Here the defendant is not a foreign private juridical entity but a non-resident defendant and no
leave of court was obtained to serve summons by facsimile.
Hence there was no valid service of summons and thus the court could not declare Charybdis
in default.
b) The effect of Scylla’s answer to the complaint is that the court shall try the case against both
Scylla and Charybdis upon the answer filed by Scylla.
Under Section 3(c) of Rule 9, when a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action
against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try
the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
Here there was a common cause of action against Scylla and Charybdis since both were co-
signatories to the mortgage deed.
Hence the court should not render judgment by default against Charybdis but should proceed to
try the case upon the answer filed and the evidence presented by Scylla.
 XIV
Aldrin entered into a contract to sell with Neil over a parcel of land. The contract stipulated a
P500,000.00 down payment upon signing and the balance payable in twelve (12) monthly installments of
P100,000.00. Aldrin paid the down payment and had paid three (3) monthly installments when he found
out that Neil had sold the same property to Yuri for P1.5 million paid in cash. Aldrin sued Neil for specific
performance with damages with the RTC. Yuri, with leave of court, filed an answer-in-intervention as he
had already obtained a TCT in his name. After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering Aldrin to pay
all the installments due, the cancellation of Yuri's title, and Neil to execute a deed of sale in favor of
Aldrin. When the judgment became final and executory, Aldrin paid Neil all the installments but the
latter refused to execute the deed of sale in favor of the former. Aldrin filed a "Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Execution" with proper notice of hearing. The petition alleged, among others, that the
decision had become final and executory and he is entitled to the issuance of the writ of execution as a
matter of right. Neil filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it lacked the required
certification against forum shopping.
(A) Should the court grant Neil's Motion to Dismiss?
Despite the issuance of the writ of execution directing Neil to execute the deed of
sale in favor of Aldrin, the former obstinately refused to execute the deed.
(B) What is Aldrin's remedy? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
a) No, the court should not grant Neil’s Motion to Dismiss.
Under Section 5 of Rule 7, a certification against forum shopping is required only for initiatory
pleadings or petitions.
Here the “Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution,” although erroneously denominated as
a petition is actually a motion for issuance of a writ of execution under Rule 39.
Hence the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of a certification against forum shopping
should be denied.
b) Aldrin’s remedy is to file a motion for judgment for specific act under Section 10(a) of Rule
39.
Under Section 10(a) of Rule 39, if a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land and
the party fails to comply, the court may direct the act to be done at the disobedient party’s cost by some
other person appointed by the court or the court may by an order divest the title of the party and vest it
in the movant or other person.
What are the provisional remedies under the rules?
Suggested answer: The provisional remedies under the Rules are preliminary attachment, preliminary
injunction, receivership, replevin, and support pendente lite.
XIX
JK’s real property is being attached by the sheriff in a civil action for damages against LM. JK
claims that he is not involved in said case; and that he is the sole registered owner of said property.
Under the Rules of Court, what must JK do to prevent the sheriff from attaching his property?
Suggested answer: If the real property has been attached, the remedy is to file a third party claim. The
third-party claimant should make an affidavit of his title to the property attached, stating the grounds of
his title thereto, and serve such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has possession of the attached
property, and a copy thereof upon the attaching party (Rule 57, Section 1). The third-party claimant may
also intervene or file a separate civil action to vindicate his claim to the property involved and secure the
necessary reliefs, such as preliminary injunction, which will not be considered as interference with a
court of coordinate jurisdiction (Ong v. Tating, 149 SCRA 265).
XX
Distinguish attachment rom garnishment. (2%)
Suggested answer: Attachment and garnishment are distinguished from each other as follows:
Attachment is a provisional remedy that effects a levy on property of a party as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered, while garnishment is a levy on debts due to the
judgment obligor or defendant and other credits, including bank deposits, royalties, and other personal
property not capable of manual delivery under a writ of execution or a writ of attachment.
XXI
In a case, the property of an incompetent under guardianship was in custodia legis. Can it be
attached? Explain.
Suggested answer: Although the property of an incompetent under guardianship is in custodia legis, it
may be attached as in fact it is provided that in such case, a copy of the writ of attachment shall be filed
with the proper court and notice of the attachment served upon the custodian of such property (Rule 57,
Section 7).
XXII
May damages be claimed by a party prejudiced by a wrongful attachment even if the judgment
was adverse to him? Explain.
Suggested answer: Yes, damages may be claimed by a party prejudiced by a wrongful attachment even if
the judgment is adverse to him. This is authorized by the Rules. A claim for damages may be made on
account of improper, irregular, excessive attachment, which shall be heard with notice to the adverse
party and his surety or sureties (Rule 57, Section 20; Javellana v. D.O. Plaza Enterprises, Inc., 32 SCRA
281).
XXIII
 (A) May a preliminary attachment be issued ex parte? Briefly state the reason(s) for your
answer.
(B) May a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte?
Suggested answer:
(A) Yes, an order of attachment may be issued ex parte or upon motion with notice and hearing
(Section 2). The reason why the order may be issued ex parte is that requiring notice to the
adverse party and hearing would defeat the purpose of the provisional remedy and enable the
adverse party to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment or dispose of
his property before a writ of attachment issues (Mindanao Savings and Loan Assn. v. Court of
Appeals, 172 SCRA 480).
(B) No, a writ of preliminary injunction may not be issued ex parte. As provided in the Rules, no
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person
sought be enjoined (Rule 58, Section 5). The reason is that a preliminary injunction may cause
grave and irreparable injury to the party enjoined.
XXIV
The plaintiff obtained a writ of preliminary attachment upon a bond of P1 million. The writ was
levied on the defendant‘s property, but it was discharged upon the posting by the defendant of a
counter bond in the same amount of P1 million. After trial, the court rendered judgment finding that the
plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendant and that he had sued out the writ of attachment
maliciously. Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint and ordered the plaintiff and its surety to
pay jointly to the defendant P1.5 million as actual damages, P0.5 million as moral damages and P0.5
million as exemplary damages. Evaluate the soundness of the judgment from the point of view of
procedure.
Suggested answer: The judgment against the surety is not sound if due notice was not given to him of
the application for damages (Rule 57, Section 20). Moreover, the judgment against the surety cannot
exceed the amount of its counterbond of P1 million.
XXV
A default judgment was rendered by the RTC ordering D to pay P a sum of money. The
judgment became final, but D filed a petition for relief and obtained a writ of preliminary injunction
staying the enforcement of the judgment. After hearing, the RTC dismissed D’s petition, whereupon P
immediately moved for the execution of the judgment in his favor. Should P’s motion be granted? Why?
Suggested answer: P’s immediate motion for execution of the judgment in his favor should be granted
because the dismissal of D’s petition for relief also dissolves the writ of preliminary injunction staying the
enforcement of the judgment, even if the dismissal is not yet final (Golez v. Leonidas, 107 SCRA 187
[1981]).
XXVI
Katy filed an action against Tyrone for collection of the sum of P1 million in the Regional Trial
Court, with an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Upon posting of an attachment
bond, the court granted the application and issued a writ of preliminary attachment. Apprehensive that
Tyron might withdraw his savings deposit with the bank, the sheriff immediately served a notice of
garnishment on the bank to implement the writ of preliminary attachment. The following day, the sheriff
proceeded to Tyrone‘s house and served him the summons, with copies of the complaint containing the
application for writ of preliminary containing the application for writ of preliminary attachment, Katy‘s
affidavit, order of attachment, writ of preliminary attachment and attachment bond. Within fifteen (15)
days from service of the summons, Tyrone filed a motion to dismiss and to dissolve the writ of
preliminary attachment on the following grounds: (i) the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person because the writ was served ahead of the summons; (ii) the writ was improperly implemented;
and (iii) said writ was improvidently issued because the obligation in question was already fully paid.
Resolve the motion with reasons. (4%)
Suggested answer: The fact that the writ of attachment was served ahead of the summons did not affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant. The effect is that the writ is not enforceable (Rule 57,
Sec. 5). But, as pointed out by jurisprudence, all that is needed to be done is to re-serve the writ (Onate
v. Abrogar, 241 SCRA 659 [1985]). The writ was improperly implemented. Serving a notice of
garnishment, particularly before summons is served, is not proper. What should be served on the
defendant are a copy of the writ of attachment and notice that the bank deposits are attached pursuant
to the writ (Rule 57, Section 7[d]). The proper remedy where there is a payment is a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16, Section 1[h]. A motion to discharge on the ground that the writ was improvidently issued
will not lie, since such a motion would be tantamount to trial on the merits of the action which cannot be
ventilated at a mere hearing of the motion instead of a regular trial. The writ is only ancillary to the main
case (Rule 57, Section 3; Mindanao Savings and Loans Assn. v. v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 480 [1989];
Davao Light & Power Co. v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 343 [1991])
XXVII
After his properties were attached, defendant Porfirio filed a sufficient counterbond. The trial
court discharged the attachment. Nonetheless, Porfirio suffered substantial prejudice due to the
unwarranted attachment. In the end, the trial court rendered a judgment in Porfirio‘s favor by ordering
the plaintiff to pay damages because the plaintiff was not entitled to the attachment. Profirio moved to
charge the plaintiff‘s attachment bond. The plaintiff and his sureties opposed the motion, claiming that
the filing of the counterbond had relieved the plaintiff‘s attachment bond from all liability for the
damages. Rule on Porfirio‘s motion. (4%)
Suggested answer: Porfirio‘s motion to charge the plaintiff‘s attachment bond is proper. The filing of the
counterbond by the defendant does not mean that he has waived his right to proceed against the
attachment bond for damages. The attachment bond is posted to answer for any damage that a party
may suffer if the attachment is wrongful or improper (DM Wenceslao & Associates, Inc. v . Readycon
Trading & Construction Corp., GR No. 154106, 29 June 2004).
XXVIII
The writ of execution was returned unsatisfied. The judgment obligee subsequently received
information that a bank holds a substantial deposit belonging to the judgment obligor. If you were the
counsel of the judgment obligee, what steps would you take to reach the deposit to satisfy the
judgment? (3%)
Suggested answer: I would ask for a writ of garnishment against the deposit in the bank (Rule 57, Section
9[c]).
XXIX
What is a TRO?
Suggested answer:
A TRO is an order to maintain the status quo between and among the parties until the
determination of the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. A writ of preliminary injunction cannot
be granted without notice and hearing. A TRO may be granted ex parte if it shall appear from facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the May the Regional Trial Court issue injunction without bond?
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court in which the application for preliminary Suggested answer: Yes, if the injunction that is issued is a final injunction. Generally, however,
injunction was made may issue a TRO ex parte for a period not exceeding 20 days from service to the preliminary injunction cannot issue without bond unless exempted by the trial court (Rule 58, Section
party sought to be enjoined. 4[b]).
XXXV
(A) What is the duration of a TRO issued by the Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court?
(B) Differentiate a TRO from a status quo order.
Suggested answer:
(A) In cases of extreme urgency, when the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable
injury, the duration of a TRO issued ex parte by and Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court
XXX (RTC) is 72 hours (Rule 58, Section 5). In the exercise of his regular functions over cases
An application for a writ of preliminary injunction with a prayer for a temporary restraining assigned to his sala, an Executive Judge may issue a TRO for a duration not exceeding a total of
order is included in a complaint and filed in a multi-sala Regional Trial Cout (RTC) consisting of Branches 20 days.
1, 2, 3, and 4. Being urgent in nature, the Executive Judge, who was sitting in Branch 1, upon the filing of (B) A status quo order (SQO) is more in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it does not
the aforesaid application, immediately raffled the case in the presence of the judges of Branches 2, 3, direct the doing or undoing of acts, as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief.
and 4. The case was raffled to Branch 4 and the judge thereof immediately issued a temporary A TRO is only good for 20 days if issued by the RTC; 60 days if issued by the CA; until further
restraining order. Is the temporary restraining order valid? Why? notice if issued by the Supreme Court. The SQO is without any prescriptive period and may be
Suggested answer: No. It is only the Executive Judge who can issue immediately a temporary restraining issued without a bond. A TRO dies a natural death after the allowable period; the SQO does
order effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from issuance. No other judge has the right or power to not. A TRO is provisional. SQO lasts until revoked. A TRO is not extendible, but the SQO may
issue a temporary restraining order ex parte. The judge whom the case is assigned will then conduct a be subject to agreement of the parties.
summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended. But in no
case beyond 20 days, including the original 72 hour period (Rule 58, Section 5).
XXXI
May a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte? Why? -end –
Suggested answer: No, a writ of preliminary injunction may not be issued ex parte. As provided in the
Rules, no preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person
sought to be enjoined (Rule 58, Section 5). The reason is that a preliminary injunction may cause grave
and irreparable injury to the party enjoined.
XXXII
Can a suit for injunction be aptly filed with the Supreme Court to stop the President of the
Philippines from entering into a peace agreement with the National Democratic Front?
Suggested answer: No, a suit for injunction cannot be aptly filed with the Supreme Court to stop the
President of the Philippines from entering into a peace agreement with the National Democratic Front,
which is purely political question. The President of the Philippines is immune from suit during his term
(Madarang v. Santamaria, 37 Phil. 304 [1917]).
XXXIII
What are the requisites for the issuance of (a) a writ of preliminary injunction; and (b) a final
writ of injunction?
Suggested answer: Requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are a verified complaint
showing the existence of a right in esse, violation or threat of violation of such right, damages or injuries
sustained or that will be sustained by reason of such violation, notice to all parties of raffle and of
hearing, hearing on the application, and filing of an appropriate bond and service thereof. On the other I
hand, a final writ of injunction may be rendered by judgment after trial, showing applicant to be entitled
to the writ (Rule 58, Section 9). (A) Explain the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment.
(B) What are the exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of judgment?

XXXIV Answer: FGU Insurance Corporation vs. RTC of Makati City, et al., G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011

(A) Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this
principle must immediately be struck down.
(B) But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.[13] The exception to the doctrine of immutability of judgment has been applied in several
cases in order to serve substantial justice. The early case of City of Butuan vs. Ortiz[14] is one where the
Court held as follows:
Shortly after Obviously a prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to a writ
of execution of the final judgment obtained by him within five years from its entry
(Section 443, Code of Civil Procedure). But it has been repeatedly held, and it is now
well-settled in this jurisdiction, that when after judgment has been rendered and the
latter has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution
impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the
judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts (Molina vs. De la Riva, 8
Phil. 569; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. McMicking, 11 Phil. 276; Warner, Barnes & Co. vs.
Jaucian, 13 Phil. 4; Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Guash, 14 Phil. 588; Flor Mata vs.
Lichauco and Salinas, 36 Phil. 809). In the instant case the respondent Cleofas alleged
that subsequent to the judgment obtained by Sto. Domingo, they entered into an
agreement which showed that he was no longer indebted in the amount claimed of
P995, but in a lesser amount. Sto. Domingo had no right to an execution for the
amount claimed by him. (De la Costa vs. Cleofas, 67 Phil. 686-693).
City of Butuan v. Ortiz, the case of Candelario v. Caizares was promulgated, where it was
written that:
After a judgment has become final, if there is evidence of an event or
circumstance which would affect or change the rights of the parties thereto, the
court should be allowed to admit evidence of such new facts and circumstances, and
thereafter suspend execution thereof and grant relief as the new facts and
circumstances warrant. We, therefore, find that the ruling of the court declaring that
the order for the payment of P40,000.00 is final and may not be reversed, is
erroneous as above explained.
These rulings were reiterated in the cases of Abellana vs. Dosdos,[16] The City
of Cebu vs. Mendoza[17] and PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v Antonio Milan.[18] In these cases, there were
compelling circumstances which clearly warranted the exercise of the Courts equity jurisdiction.
In the case at bench, the Court agrees with the RTC that there is indeed a need to find out the
whereabouts of the subject refrigerators. For this purpose, a hearing is necessary to determine the issue
of whether or not there was an actual turnover of the subject refrigerators to FGU by the assured CII. If
there was an actual turnover, it is very important to find out whether FGU sold the subject refrigerators
to third parties and profited from such sale. These questions were brought about by the contention of
GPS in its Opposition to Motion for Execution[19] that after the assured, CII, was fully compensated for its
claim on the damaged refrigerators, it delivered the possession of the subject refrigerators to FGU as
shown in the certification of the Accounting/Administrative Manager of CII. Thereafter, the subject
refrigerators were sold by FGU to third parties and FGU received and appropriated the consideration and
proceeds of the sale. GPS claims that it verified the whereabouts of the subject refrigerators from the CII
because it wanted to repair and sell them to compensate FGU.
If, indeed, there was an actual delivery of the refrigerators and FGU profited from the sale after
the delivery, there would be an unjust enrichment if the realized profit would not be deducted from the
judgment amount. The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn
adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for
technicality.[20]
II
In a complaint for recovery of real property, the plaintiff averred, among others, that he is the
owner of the said property by virtue of a deed of sale executed by the defendant in his favor. Copy of
the deed of sale was appended to the complaint as Annex ―A‖ thereof. In his unverified answer, the
defendant denied the allegation concerning the sale of the property in question, as well as the appended
deed of sale, for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof. Is it
proper for the court to render judgment without trial? Explain?
Suggested Answer: Defendant cannot deny the sale of the property for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof. The answer, being defective amounts to an admission
(Rule 8, Section 10) . Moreover, the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale can only be
denied by the defendant under oath and failure to do so is also an admission of the deed. Hence, a
judgment on the pleadings can be rendered by the court without need of a trial (Phil. Advertising
Counselors, Inc. v. Revilla, G.R. No. L-31869, August 8, 1973; Sec. 10, Rule 8) 52 SCRA 246 [1973];
Gutierrez v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 127 [1976])
III
After defendant has served and filed his answer to plaintiff’s complaint for damages before the
proper Regional Trial Court, plaintiff served and filed a motion (with supporting affidavits) for a summary
judgment in his opposition (with supporting affidavits) to the motion. After due hearing, the court issued
an order (1) stating that the court has found no genuine issue as to many material fact and thus
concluded that plaintiff is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law except as to the amount of
damages recoverable, and (2) accordingly ordering that the plaintiff shall have judgment summarily
against defendant for such amount as may be found due plaintiff for damages to b ascertained by trial on
October 7, 2004, at 8:30 o‘clock in the morning. May defendant properly take an appeal from said order?
Or may defendant properly challenge sad order thru a special civil action for certiorari? Reason.
Suggested Answer: No, plaintiff may not properly take an appeal from said order because it is an
interlocutory order and not a final and appealable order (Sec. 4, Rule 35) . It does not dispose of the
action or proceeding. Partial summary judgments are interlocutory. There is still something to be done,
which is the trial for the adjudication of damages (but the defendant may properly challenge said order
thru a special civil action for certiorari (Section 1(c), Rule 41; Province of Pangasinan vs. CA, 220 SCRA
726 [1993]).
IV
Distinguish between a judgment on the pleadings and a summary judgment.
Suggested answer:
V
After Plaintiff in an ordinary civil action before the ZZ Regional Trial Court has completed
presentation on his evidence, defendant without prior leave of court moved for dismissal of plaintiff‘s
complaint for insufficiency of plaintiff‘s evidence. After due hearing of the motion and the opposition
thereto, the court issued an order, reading as follows: ―The Court hereby grants defendant‘s motion to
dismiss and accordingly orders the dismissal of plaintiff‘s complaint, with the cost taxed against him. It is
so ordered.‖ Is the order of dismissal valid? May plaintiff properly take an appeal? Reason.
Suggested Answer: The order or decisions is void because it does not state findings of fact and of law, as
required by Sec. 14, Article VII of the Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Being void, appeal is not available. The proper remedy is certiorari un
I
Pedro filed a complaint against Carlos in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamis City for the
recovery of the ownership of a car. Pedro filed his answer within the reglementary period. After the pre-
trial and actual trial, and after Pedro has completed with the presentation of his evidence, Carlos filed a
demurrer to evidence, which the RTC granted. Pedro appealed and the appellate court reversed the
order of the trial court. Thereafter, Carlos filed a motion with the RTC asking the latter to allow him to
present his evidence. Resolve the motion.
Suggested Answer: The motion should be denied. Carlos can no longer present evidence. The Rules
provide that the motion for dismissal is granted by the trial court but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. (Section 1, Rule 33)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: No, because when the appellate court reversed the order of the trial court it
should have rendered judgment in favor of Carlos. (Quebral v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, 1996)
II
Sonny Ty filed in the RTC of Iligan City an action against Jerome Uy for collection of sum of
money. For his failure to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, Uy was declared in
default, Ty was allowed to present his evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of Court, and judgment
was rendered by the RTC for Ty. Uy appealed on the ground that the presentation of Ty’s evidence was
void because it should have been done before the judge and not the Branch Clerk of Court. Rule on the
appeal.
Suggested answer:
Dy, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 97130, July 19, 1991
With regard to the validity of the proceedings before the Branch Clerk of Court, we agree with the
observations of the Court of Appeals that:
Appellant is now estopped from questioning the retention of the proceedings held on August
19, 1983 before the Branch Clerk of Court since her husband agreed to the same during the
pre-trial conference held on November 12, 1987. Agreements reached at the pre-trial
conference and embodied in the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the trial
and should not be disturbed unless there could be manifest injustice.
The agreement is not unjust to appellant. Aside from appellant having the right to adduce
evidence on her behalf, the parties agreed that the evidence presented by appellee before the
Branch Clerk of Court would be retained, with appellant having the right to cross-examine
appellee's witnesses.
xxx xxx xxx
The agreement of the parties as contained in the pre-trial order is not invalid. The parties are
authorized by the Rules of Court to consider "[s]uch other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the action." An authority believes this includes "agreement on certain matters so
that witnesses need not and will not be called." Undoubtedly, the procedure agreed upon by
the parties in this case would have greatly accelerated the trial and the decision therein, which,
at the, time of the pre-trial conference, had been pending for three years and had already gone
up on appeal to this Court. (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)
The presentation of the plaintiff's evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court was not void. The Supreme
Court, in the case of Continental Bank vs. Tiangco, et al. (94 SCRA 715) departing from its contrary
statement in the Lim Tan Hu case (66 SCRA 425), declared that a decision based on evidence heard by a
deputy clerk of court as commissioner is valid and enforceable because it was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, was not impaired by extrinsic fraud, nor by lack of due process, and there was no
showing that the private respondents were prejudiced by such a procedure, or that the commissioner
committed any mistake or abuse of discretion, or that the proceedings were vitiated by collusion and
collateral fraud. That ruling applies four square to this case.
The practice of designating the clerk of court as a commissioner to receive evidence in the event of the
non-appearance of the defendant and its counsel, is not irregular and is sanctioned by Rule 33 of the
Rules of Court on trial by commissioner (J.M. Tuazon, Inc. vs. Dela Rosa, 18 SCRA 591; Wassmer vs. Velez,
12 SCRA 648).
The petitioner was not denied due process. As pointed out by the appellate court:
. . . Appellant retained her right to present evidence on her behalf and the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses already presented by appellee. At any rate, if appellant believes
that her right to procedural due process had been curtailed, the same was due to a voluntary
waiver by her husband. (p. 28, Rollo)
III
Juana filed with the RTC of Iligan City an action to quiet title against Jose. Answer was in due
course filed by Jose. The case was set for pre-trial on January 25, 2010. Jose’s counsel moved for
cancellation of this setting. The court reset the pre-trial to February 27, 2010, but again Jose’s counsel,
pleading illness, sought to have this second pre-trial setting cancelled by motion. The motion contained
no notice of hearing, hence denied by the court. At the scheduled pre-trial on February 27, 2010, neither
Jose nor his counsel appeared. The court consequently authorized Juana to present evidence ex parte.
On certiorari, Jose questions the orders of the court contending that (1) while his counsel’s motion for
postponement was defective in that it had not been set for hearing, the flaw was but a formal one
caused by its having been hastily drawn up when counsel was suffering from headache; and (2) the pre-
trial setting was void since notice thereof had not been given to Jose personally, only his counsel has
been notified. Are Jose’s contentions tenable?
Suggested answer:
(a) The omission in defendants' motion for cancellation of the pre-trial scheduled on February 27, 1978
of a notice of hearing was not a mere formal defect, as defendants seem to imagine. The motion for
cancellation or postponement was not one that could be granted by the Court as a matter of
course, and thus be acted on ex parte. No party has a right to a postponement of a trial or hearing,
or pre-trial; and his adversary has the right to oppose any move towards this end. A party or counsel
desiring a postponement of a pre-trial or trial must comply with the requisites of motions in general
set out in Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, i.e., the motion shall be made in writing, shall state the
grounds upon which it is based and if necessary be accompanied by supporting affidavits and other
papers and notice thereof — specifying the date of hearing which is supposed to be specified by the
movant himself — shall be served by the applicant on all parties concerned at least three (3) days
before said hearing, together with a copy of the motion and of any affidavits and other relevant
papers. Such notice of hearing, it must be added, is essential. Its importance is underscored by the
prohibition of action by the court on any motion which is not accompanied by proof of service
thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not
affected. And if the motion be grounded on illness of a party or counsel, the Rules further require an
"affidavit that the presence of such party or counsel at the trial (or pre-trial) is indispensable and
that the character of his illness is such as to render his non- attendance excusable." 8
The defendants' counsel, Atty. Pacamarra, attributes his omission to include a notice of hearing in
his motion in question to his headache at the tune. But neither his motion nor its supporting
medical certificate showed "that the character of his illness is such as to render his non-attendance
excusable," i.e., that the headache was so severe and expected to last for such a period of time as to
make it impossible or extremely difficult for him to attend the pre-trial, still a month away. Indeed,
since rest was apparently all that was needed to relieve him of his indisposition at the time, January
27, 1978 (the date of his motion), he had enough time therefor, as the Trial Court tartly observed,
"from that date to the date of the next hearing of the case" (February 27, 1978). There was, too, a
not unreasonable hesitancy on the part of the Trial Court to give full credence to the medical
certificate attached to the motion, since it was not verified and was only a xerox copy.
Furthermore, as shown by the record, notice of the denial of his motion for postponement had been
served on Atty. Pacamarra on February 24, 1978, three (3) days before the pre-trial set on February
27, 1978. There is nothing in the record to excuse his failure to exert any effort to himself appear at
the pre-trial, or cause his client, or any other representative, to present himself before the Court to
advise it of his predicament.
(b) The objection that notice of pre-trial was not served personally on the defendants as well as on
their attorney is, in the premises, utterly without merit. Atty. Pacamarra did not protest against this
defect in relation to the pre-trial settings on January 25 and again on February 27, 1978. If he
believed that failure of notice to be a grave defect, he should have brought it to the Court's
attention forthwith, and the matter would have immediately been set aright. He did not do so.
Moreover, this Court has already ruled that service of the notice of pre-trial on a party through his
counsel is not only proper but is the preferred mode. 9

Explain briefly your answer.
I. (A) Distinguish action from cause of action.
(B) What is the rule on joinder of causes of action?
II. After working for 25 years in the Middle East, Arlene returned to the Philippines to retire in
Manila, the place of her birth and childhood. Ten years before her retirement, she bought for cash in her
name a house and lot in Malate, Manila. Six months after her return, she learned that her house and lot
were the subject of foreclosure proceedings commenced by ABC Bank on the basis of a promissory note
and a deed of real estate mortgage she had allegedly executed in favor of ABC Bank five years earlier.
Knowing that she was not in the country at the time the promissory note and deed of mortgage were
supposedly executed, Arlene forthwith initiated a complaint in the RTC of Manila praying that the subject
documents be declared null and void.
ABC Bank filed.a motion to dismiss Arlene's complaint on the ground of improper venue on the
basis of a stipulation in both documents designating Quezon City as the exclusive venue in the event of
litigation between the parties arising out of the loan and mortgage. Should the motion to dismiss of ABC
Bank be granted?
III. Give the effects of the following:
(A) Splitting a single cause of action, and
(B) Non-joinder of a necessary party.
IV. A filed a complaint against B for cancellation of title. B filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
because C, to whom he mortgaged the property as duly annotated in the TCT, was not impleaded as
defendant. Resolve the motion.
V. Elise obtained a loan of P3 Million from Merchant Bank. Aside from executing a promissory note
in favor of Merchant Bank, she executed a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot as
security for her obligation. The loan fell due but remained unpaid; hence, Merchant Bank filed an action
against Elise to foreclose the real estate mortgage. A month after, and while the foreclosure suit was
pending, Merchant Bank also filed an action to recover the principal sum of P3 Million against Elise based
on the same promissory note previously executed by the latter.
In opposing the motion of Elise to dismiss the second action on the ground of splitting of a single
cause of action, Merchant Bank argued that the ground relied upon by Elise was devoid of any legal basis
considering that the two actions were based on separate contracts, namely, the contract of loan
evidenced by the promissory note, and the deed of real estate mortgage. Is there a splitting of a single
cause of action? Explain your answer.
VI. Perry is a resident of Manila, while Ricky and Marvin are residents of Batangas City. They are
the co-owners of a parcel of residential land located in Pasay City with an assessed value of P100,000.00.
Perry borrowed P100,000.00 from Ricky which he promised to pay on or before December 1, 2004.
However, Perry failed to pay his loan. Perry also rejected Ricky and Marvin’s proposal to partition the
property. Ricky filed a complaint against Perry and Marvin in the RTC of Pasay City for the partition of the
property. He also incorporated in his complaint his action against Perry for the collection of the latter’s
P100,000.00 loan, plus interests and attorney’s fees.
State with reasons whether it was proper for Ricky to join his causes of action in his complaint
for partition against Perry and Marvin in the RTC of Pasay City.
VII. A purchased a lot from B for P1,500,000.00. He gave a down payment of P500,000, signed a
promissory note payable thirty days after date, and as a security for the settlement of the obligation,
mortgaged the same lot to B. When the note fell due and A failed to pay, B commenced suit to recover
from A the balance of P1,000,000.00. After securing a favorable judgment on his claim, B brought
another action against A before the same court to foreclose the mortgage. A now files a motion to
dismiss the second action on the ground of bar by prior judgment. Rule on the motion.
-end-
Answer key:
I
After working for 25 years in the Middle East,
Evan returned to the Philippines to retire in Manila, the place of his birth and childhood. Ten years
before his retirement, he bought for cash in his name a house and lot in Malate, Manila. Six months after
his return, he learned that his house and lot were the subject of foreclosure proceedings commenced by
ABC Bank on the basis of a promissory note and a deed of real estate mortgage he had allegedly
executed in favor of ABC Bank five years earlier.
Knowing that he was not in the country at the time the promissory note and deed of mortgage
were supposedly executed, Evan forthwith initiated a complaint in the RTC of Manila praying that the
subject documents be declared null and void.
ABC Bank filed a motion to dismiss Evan's complaint on the ground of improper venue on the basis
of a stipulation in both documents designating Quezon City as the exclusive venue in the event of
litigation between the parties arising out of the loan and mortgage.
Should the motion to dismiss of ABC Bank be granted? Explain your answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the motion to dismiss of ABC Bank should not be granted.
In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that a party is not bound by a venue
stipulation where he directly assails on the ground of forgery the validity of the contracts containing the
venue stipulation. The reason is that such a party cannot be expected to comply with the venue
stipulation since his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of the validity of the
contracts he assails. [Briones v. Cash Asia Credit Corp., 14 January 2015]
II
Hanna, a resident of Manila, filed a complaint for the partition of a large tract of land located in
Oriental Mindoro. She impleaded her two brothers John and Adrian as defendants but did not implead
Leica and Agatha, her two sisters who were permanent residents of Australia.
Arguing that there could be no final determination of the case without impleading all
indispensable parties, John and Adrian moved to dismiss the complaint.
Does the trial court have a reason to deny the motion? Explain your answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the trial court has a reason to deny the motion to dismiss.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, non-joinder of parties, even indispensable ones, is not a ground
of a motion to dismiss. [S11 R3; Vesagas v. CA, 371 SCRA 508 (2001)]
III
Elise obtained a loan of P3 Million from Merchant Bank. Aside from executing a promissory note in
favor of Merchant Bank, she executed a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot as security
for her obligation. The loan fell due but remained unpaid; hence, Merchant Bank filed an action against
Elise to foreclose the real estate mortgage. A month after, and while the foreclosure suit was pending,
Merchant Bank also filed an action to recover the principal sum of P3 Million against Elise based on the
same promissory note previously executed by the latter.
In opposing the motion of Elise to dismiss the second action on the ground of splitting of a single
cause of action, Merchant Bank argued that the ground relied upon by Elise was devoid of any legal basis
considering that the two actions were based on separate contracts, namely, the contract of loan
evidenced by the promissory note, and the deed of real estate mortgage.
Is there a splitting of a single cause of action? Explain your answer.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, there is a splitting of a single cause of action.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, there is a splitting of a single cause of action if two or more
suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action. [S4 R2]. A cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another. [S2 R2].
Here, both suits, the foreclosure and the collection suit, arose from the same cause of action, that
is, the non-payment by Elise of her P3 million loan from Merchant Bank. The fact that the two actions
were based on separate contracts is irrelevant, what matters is that both actions arose from the same
cause of action.
IV
Eduardo, a resident of the City of Manila, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a
complaint for the annulment of a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage he signed in favor of Galaxy Bank
(Galaxy), and the consequent· foreclosure and auction sale of his mortgaged Makati property. Galaxy
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue alleging that the complaint should be filed
with the RTC of Makati since the complaint involves the ownership and possession of Eduardo's lot.
Resolve the motion with reasons. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue should be granted.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the venue of real actions shall be with the proper court
having jurisdiction over the area where the real property involved is situated. An action for annulment
of mortgage is a real action if there has already been a foreclosure sale. (See Chua v. Total Office
Products and Services, 30 September 2005).
Here there was already a foreclosure sale. Hence, the action for annulment of mortgage is a
real action which should have been filed in Makati where the real property is situated.
V
Lender extended to Borrower a P100,000.00 loan covered by a promissory note. Later,
Borrower obtained another P100,000.00 loan again covered by a promissory note. Still later, Borrower
obtained a P300,000.00 loan secured by a real estate mortgage on his land valued at P500,000.00.
Borrower defaulted on his payments when the loans matured. Despite demand to pay the P500,000.00
loan, Borrower refused to pay. Lender, applying the totality rule, filed against Borrower with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a collection suit for P500,000.00.
(A) Did Lender correctly apply the totality rule and the rule on joinder of causes of action?
At the trial, Borrower's lawyer, while cross-examining Lender, successfully elicited an admission
from the latter that the two promissory notes have been paid. Thereafter, Borrower's lawyer filed a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground that as proven only P300,000.00 was the amount due to
Lender and which claim is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. He
further argued that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.
(B) Should the court dismiss the case? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
 (A) No. Lender did not correctly apply the totality rule and the rule on joinder of causes of action.
None of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. All causes of action are governed by a
special rule, i.e. Rules on Small Claims.
Alternative answer: Yes. Lender correctly applied the totality rule and the rule on joinder of causes of
action.
Under the rule on joinder of causes of action, a party may in one pleading assert as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party. Under the totality rule, where the claims in
all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the
test of jurisdiction.
Here, the causes of action by Lender are all against borrower and all the claims are principally
for recovery of money. Hence, the aggregate amount claimed, which is P500,000 shall be the test of
jurisdiction and thus it is the RTC of Manila which has jurisdiction.
Although the rules on joinder of causes of action state that the joinder shall not include special
civil actions, the remedy resorted to with respect to the third loan was not foreclosure but
collection. Hence joinder of causes of action would still be proper.
b) Yes, the court should dismiss the case. RTC has no jurisdiction.
Alternative answer: No, the court should not dismiss the case.
The Supreme Court has held that subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by the amount of
the claim alleged in the complaint and not the amount substantiated during the trial. (Dionisio v Sioson
Puerto, 31 October 1974).
Here, the amount claimed was P500,000. Even if the claim substantiated during the trial was
only P300,000 that is not determinative of subject-matter jurisdiction. Hence, the argument that lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time is misplaced since in the first place the RTC has
jurisdiction.
VI
Juliet invoking the provisions of the Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children filed
with the RTC designated as a Family Court a petition for issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
against her husband, Romeo. The Family Court issued a 30-day TPO against Romeo. A day before the
expiration of the TPO, Juliet filed a motion for extension. Romeo in his opposition raised, among others,
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262 (The VAWC Law) arguing that the law authorizing the issuance of a
TPO violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the 1987 Constitution. The Family Court
judge, in granting the motion for extension of the TPO, declined to rule on the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 9262. The Family Court judge reasoned that Family Courts are without jurisdiction to pass upon
constitutional issues, being a special court of limited jurisdiction and R.A. No. 8369, the law creating the
Family Courts, does not provide for such jurisdiction. Is the Family Court judge correct when he declined
to resolve the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the Family Court judge was not correct when he declined to resolve the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 9262.
The Supreme Court has held that despite its designation as a Family Court, a Regional Trial
Court remains possessed of authority as a court of general jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of
a statute. (Garcia v. Drilon, 25 June 2013)
VII
Strauss filed a complaint against Wagner for cancellation of title. Wagner moved to dismiss the
complaint because Grieg, to whom he mortgaged the property as duly annotated in the TCT, was not
impleaded as defendant.
(A) Should the complaint be dismissed?
(B) If the case should proceed to trial without Grieg being impleaded as a party to the case,
what is his remedy to protect his interest?
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(A) No, the complaint should not be dismissed.
The Supreme Court has held that non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a ground of a
motion to dismiss. (Vesagas v. CA, 371 SCRA 508).
Here, although Grieg, the registered mortgagee, is an indispensable party (Metrobank v. Alejo,
364 SCRA 813 [2001]), his non-joinder does not warrant the dismissal of the complaint.
(B) The remedy of Grieg is to file a motion for leave to intervene. Under Rule 19, a person who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation may intervene in the action.
Here, Grieg is a mortgagee and such fact was annotated in the title. Hence, he has a legal interest
in the title subject-matter of the litigation and may thus intervene in the case.
VIII
A law was passed declaring Mt. Karbungko as a protected area since it was a major watershed.
The protected area covered a portion located in Municipality A of the Province I and a portion located in
the City of Z of Province II. Maingat is the leader of Samahan ng Tagapag-ingat ng Karbungko (STK), a
people's organization. He learned that a portion of the mountain located in the City of Z of Province II
was extremely damaged when it was bulldozed and leveled to the ground, and several trees and plants
were cut down and burned by workers of World Pleasure Resorts, Inc. (WPRI) for the construction of a
hotel and golf course. Upon inquiry with the project site engineer if they had a permit for the project,
Maingat was shown a copy of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the DENR-EMB,
Regional Director (RD-DENR-EMB).
Immediately, Maingat and STK filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing
mandamus against RD-DENR-EMB and WPRI with the RTC of Province I, a designated environmental
court, as the RD-DENR-EMB negligently issued the ECC to WPRI.
On scrutiny of the petition, the court determined that the area where the alleged actionable
neglect or omission subject of the petition took place in the City of Z of Province II, and therefore
cognizable by the RTC of Province II. Thus, the court dismissed outright the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.
(A) Was the court correct in motu proprio dismissing the petition?
Assuming that the court did not dismiss the petition, the RD-DENR-EMB in his Comment moved
to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners failed to appeal the issuance of the ECC and to
exhaust administrative remedies provided in the DENR Rules and Regulations.
(B) Should the court dismiss the petition?
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(A) No, the court was not correct in motu proprio dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that the requirement that the petition be
filed in the area where the actionable neglect or omission took place relates to venue and not to subject-
matter jurisdiction. Since what is involved is improper venue and not subject-matter jurisdiction, it was
wrong for the court to dismiss outright the petition since venue may be waived. (Dolot v. Paje, 27 August
2013).
(B) No, the court should not dismiss the petition.
The Supreme Court has held that in environmental cases, the defense of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies by appealing the ECC issuance would apply only if the defect in the issuance of
the ECC does not have any causal relation to the environmental damage.
Here the issuance of the ECC has a direct causal relation to the environmental damage since it
permitted the bulldozing of a portion of the mountain and the cutting down and buring of several trees
and plants. (See Paje v. Casiño, 3 February 2015).
IX
Landlord, a resident of Quezon City, entered into a lease contract with Tenant, a resident of
Marikina City, over a residential house in Las Piñas City. The lease contract provided, among others, for a
monthly rental of P25,000.00, plus ten percent (10%) interest rate in case of non-payment on its due
date. Subsequently, Landlord migrated to the United States of America (USA) but granted in favor of his
sister Maria, a special power of attorney to manage the property and file and defend suits over the
property rented out to Tenant. Tenant failed to pay the rentals due for five (5) months. Maria asks your
legal advice on how she can expeditiously collect from Tenant the unpaid rentals plus interests due.
(A) What judicial remedy would you recommend to Maria?
(B) Where is the proper venue of the judicial remedy which you recommended?
(C) If Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, when do you reckon the one (1)-
year period within which to file the action?
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(A) The judicial remedy that I would recommend to Maria is to file a collection suit for the
P125,000 rentals in arrears and the P12,500 interest due. The remedy would be expeditious since it
would be governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure as the amount of the demand, excluding
interest, does not exceed P200,000.
(B) The proper venue of the collection suit would be in Marikina City, where Tenant resides.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, venue in personal actions is with the residence of either the
plaintiff or the defendant, at the plaintiff’s election.
Since the Plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, venue may be laid only in Marikina City
where the defendant Tenant resides.
(C) If Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, the one-year period within which to
file the action shall be reckoned from the expiration of 5-days from notice of the last demand to pay and
vacate. (Cruz v. Atencio, 28 February 1959; Sy Oh v. Garcia, 30 June 1969).
X
Prince Chong entered into a lease contract with King Kong over a commercial building where
the former conducted his hardware business. The lease contract stipulated, among others, a monthly
rental of P50,000.00 for a four (4)-year period commencing on January 1, 2010. On January 1,
2013, Prince Chong died. Kin Il Chong was appointed administrator of the estate of Prince Chong, but the
former failed to pay the rentals for the months of January to June 2013 despite King Kong’s written
demands.
Thus, on July 1, 2013, King Kong filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an action for rescission
of contract with damages and payment of accrued rentals as of June 30, 2013.
(A) Can Kin Il Chong move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC is without
jurisdiction since the amount claimed is only P300,000.00?
(B) If the rentals accrued during the lifetime of Prince Chong, and King Kong also filed the
complaint for sum of money during that time, will the action be dismissible upon Prince Chong’s death
during the pendency of the case?
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(A) No, Kin II Chong cannot move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC is without
jurisdiction since the amount claimed is only P300,000.
 Under B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Here, the action is for rescission which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The P300,000
accrued rentals is only incidental to the main purpose of the action which is to rescind the lease
contract.
(B) No, the action will not be dismissible upon Prince Chong’s death during the pendency of the case.
Under S20 R3, when the action is on a contractual money claim and the defendant dies before
entry of final judgment, the action shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until
entry of final judgment.
Here, the action is on a contractual money claim, that is, a claim for rentals based on a lease
contract. Hence it shall be allowed to continue until final judgment. (S20 R3, S5 R86).
XI
While leisurely walking along the street near her house in Marikina, Patty unknowingly stepped
on a garden tool left behind by CCC, a construction company based in Makati. She lost her balance as a
consequence and fell into an open manhole. Fortunately, Patty suffered no major injuries except for
contusions, bruises and scratches that did not require any hospitalization. However, she lost self-esteem,
suffered embarrassment and ridicule, and had bouts of anxiety and bad dreams about the accident. She
wants vindication for her uncalled for experience and hires you to act as counsel for her and to do
whatever is necessary to recover at least Php100,000.00 for what she suffered.
What action or actions may Patty pursue, against who, where (court and venue), and under
what legal basis?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Patty may avail any of the following remedies:
a) She may file a complaint for damages arising from fault or negligence under the Rules on
Small Claims against CCC Company before the MTC of Marikina City where she resides or Makati City
where the defendant corporation is holding office, at her option (A.M. No. 8-8-7-SC in relation to Section
2, Rule 4, Rules of Court).
b) She may also file an action to recover moral damages based on quasi delict under Article
2176 of the New Civil Code. The law states that, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi delict.
Since moral damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation, Patty should file the action before
the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City where she resides or Makati City, where the defendant
corporation is holding office, at her option (Section 19[1], B.P. 129).
c)Patty can also file a civil action for damages against the City of Marikina for maintaining an
open manhole where she unfortunately fell. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, provinces, cities, and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason
of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision. The proper court having jurisdiction over the case is at least Php100,000 for as
long as the aggregate of the claims for damages does not exceed Php400,000.00
XII
A bought a Volvo Sedan from ABC Cars for P5.0M. ABC Cars, before delivering to A, had the car
rust proofed and tinted by XYZ Detailing. When delivered to A, the car’s upholstery was found to be
damaged. ABC Cars and XYZ Detailing both deny any liability. Who can A sue and on what cause(s) of
action? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
XIII
Distinguish action from cause of action.
XIV
Give the effects of the following:
(A) Splitting a single cause of action; and
(B) Non-joinder of a necessary party.
XV
(A) What is the rule on joinder of causes of action?
(B) A secured two loans from B, one for P500,000.00 and the other for P1,000,000.00, payable on different
dates. Both have fallen due. Is B obliged to file only one complaint against A for the recovery of both
loans? Explain.
XVI
Perry is a resident of Manila, while Ricky and Marvin are residents of Batangas City. They are the co-
owners of a parcel of residential land located in Pasay City with an assessed value of P100,000.00. Perry
borrowed P100,000.00 from Ricky which he promised to pay on or before December 1, 2004. However,
Perry failed to pay his loan. Perry also rejected Ricky and Marvin’s proposal to partition the property.
Ricky filed a complaint against Perry and Marvin in the RTC of Pasay City for the partition of the property.
He also incorporated in his complaint his action against Perry for the collection of the latter’s
P100,000.00 loan, plus interests and attorney’s fees.
State with reasons whether it was proper for Ricky to join his causes of action in his complaint for
partition against Perry and Marvin in the RTC of Pasay City.
XVII
(A) What is the rule against splitting a cause of action and its effect on the respective rights of the parties for
failure to comply with the same?
(B) A purchased a lot from B for P1,500,000.00. He gave a down payment of P500,000, signed a promissory
note payable thirty days after date, and as a security for the settlement of the obligation, mortgaged the
same lot to B. When the note fell due and A failed to pay, B commenced suit to recover from A the
balance of P1,000,000.00. After securing a favorable judgment on his claim, B brought another action
against A before the same court to foreclose the mortgage. A now files a motion to dismiss the second
action on the ground of bar by prior judgment. Rule on the motion.
XVIII
Raphael, a warehouseman, filed a complaint against V Corporation, X Corporation and Y Corporation to
compel them to interplead. He alleged therein that the three corporations claimed title and right of
possession over the goods deposited in his warehouse and that he was uncertain which of them was
entitled to the goods. After due proceedings, judgment was rendered by the court declaring that X
Corporation was entitled to the goods. The decision became final and executory
Raphael filed a complaint against X Corporation for the payment of P100,000.00 for storage charges and
other advances for the goods. X Corporation filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
judicata. X Corporation alleged that Raphael should have incorporated in his complaint for interpleader
his claim for storage of fees and advances and that for his failure he was barred from interposing his
claim. Raphael replied that he could not have claimed storage fees and other advances in his complaint
for interpleader because he was not yet certain as to who was liable therefor. Resolve the motion with
reasons.
XIX
Rolando filed a petition for declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Carmela because of the alleged
psychological incapacity of the latter.
After trial, the court rendered judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that Rolando failed to
prove the psychological incapacity of his wife. The judgment having become final, Rolando filed another
petition, this time on the ground that his marriage to Carmela had been celebrated without a license. Is
the second action barred by the judgment in the first? Why?
XX
In an action for unlawful detainer in the MTC, defendant X raised in his answer the defense that plaintiff
A is not the real owner of the house subject of the suit. X filed a counterclaim against A for the collection
of a debt of P80,000.00 plus accrued interest of P15,000.00 and attorney’s fees of P20,000.00. Does the
MTC have jurisdiction over the counterclaim?
Answer: The counterclaim is within the jurisdiction of the MTC which does not exceed P100,000.00,
because the principal demand is P80,000 exclusive of interest and attorney’s fees (Sec. 33, BP 129, as
amended). However, inasmuch as all actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are subject to
summary procedure and since the counterclaim is only per
Part III. 5-point Questions
1. Santa filed against Era in the RTC of Quezon City an action for specific performance praying for the
delivery of a parcel of land subject of their contract of sale. Unknown to the parties, the case was
inadvertently raffled to an RTC designated as a special commercial court. Later, the RTC rendered
judgment adverse to Era, who, upon realizing that the trial court was not a regular RTC, approaches you
and wants you to file a petition to have the judgment annulled for lack of jurisdiction. What advice would
you give to Era? Explain your answer.
Answer: The advice I would give to Era is that the petition for annulment of judgment on lack of
jurisdiction will not prosper.
The Supreme Court has held that a special commercial court is still a court of general jurisdiction and can
hear and try a non-commercial case. (Concorde Condominium Inc. vs. Baculi, 17 Feb 2016)
2. An amicable settlement was signed before a Lupon Tagapamayapa on January 3, 2001. On July 6, 2001,
the prevailing party asked the Lupon to execute the amicable settlement because of the non-compliance
by the other party of the terms of the agreement. The Lupon concerned refused to execute the
settlement/ agreement. Is the Lupon correct in refusing to execute the settlement/agreement?
Answer: Yes. The Lupon is correct in refusing to execute the settlement/ agreement because the
execution sought is already beyond the period of six months from the date of the settlement within
which the Lupon is authorized to execute. (Sec. 417, Local Government Code of 1991)
After the six-month period, the prevailing party should move to execute the settlement/agreement in
the appropriate city or municipal trial court.
3. A brings an action in the MTC of Manila against B for the annulment of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
of real property with an assessed value of P50,000.00 located in Laguna. The complaint alleged
prematurity of the sale for the reason that the mortgage was not yet due. B timely moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the action should have been brought in the RTC of Laguna. Decide with reason.
Answer: The motion should be granted. The MTC of Manila has no jurisdiction because the action for the
annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure is not capable of pecuniary estimation and is therefore under
the jurisdiction of the RTCs. (Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738 [1999])
However, the action for annulment is a personal action and the venue depends on the residence of
either A or B. Hence, it should be brought in the RTC of the place where either of the parties resides.
4. A files an action in the Municipal Trial Court against B, the natural son of A’s father, for the partition of a
parcel of land located in Taytay, Rizal with an assessed value of Php20,000.00. B moves to dismiss the
action the ground that the case should have been brought in the RTC because the action is one that is
 not capable of pecuniary estimation as it involves primarily a determination of hereditary rights and not
merely the bare right to real property. Resolve the motion.
Answer: The motion should be granted. The action for partition depends on a determination of the
hereditary rights of A and B, which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, even though the
assessed value of the land is P20,000, the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction. (Russel vs. Vestil)
5. P sued A in the RTC Manila to recover the following sums: (1) 200,000.00 on an overdue promissory
note, (2) P80,000.00 on the purchase price of a computer, (3) P150,000.00 for damages to his car and (4)
P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Can A move to dismiss the case on the ground
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter? Explain.
Answer: No. Because the RTC-Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter. P may sue A in one
complaint asserting as many causes of action as he may have and since all the claims are principally for
recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Rule 2, Sec. 5[d]). The
aggregate amount claimed is P450,000.00, exclusive of the amount of P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees
and expenses for litigation. Hence, the RTC- Manila has jurisdiction.
What about the rule that it must not be governed by a special rules. Joinder of action.
6. A filed with the MTC of Manila an action for specific performance against B, a resident of Quezon City, to
compel the latter to execute a deed of conveyance covering a parcel of land situated in Quezon City
having an assessed value of P19,000.00. B received the summons and a copy of the Complaint on 02
January 2003. On 10 January 2003, B filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction contending that the subject matter of the suit was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
court denied the motion. Was the denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint correct?
Answer: The denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was not correct. Although the assessed value
of the parcel of land involved was P19,000.00, within the jurisdiction of the MTC of Manila, the action
filed by A for Specific Performance against B to compel the latter to execute a Deed of Conveyance of
said parcel of land was not capable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore the action was within the
jurisdiction of RTC. (Russel vs. Vestil; Copioso vs. Copioso, G.R. No. 149243, October 28, 2002; Cabutihan
vs. Land Center Construction, 383 SCRA 353[2002]).
Alternative answer: If the action affects title to or possession of real property then it is a real action and
jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the property. It is within the jurisdiction therefore of
the Metropolitan Trial Court.
7. P sued A and B in one complaint in the RTC Manila, the cause of action against A being on an overdue
promissory note for P300,000.00 and that against B being on an alleged balance of P300,000.00 on the
purchase price of good sold on credit. Does the RTC-Manila have jurisdiction over the case? Explain.
Answer: No. The RTC-Manila has no jurisdiction over the case. A and B could not be joined as defendants
in one complaint because the right to relief against both defendants do not arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there is no common question of law or fact common to both.
(Rule 3, Sec. 6). Hence, separate complaints will have to be filed and they would fall under the
jurisdiction of the MeTC.
8. Amorsolo, a Filipino citizen permanently residing in New York City, filed with the RTC of Lipa City a
complaint for Rescission of Contract of Sale of Land against Brigido, a resident of Barangay San Miguel,
Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The subject property, located in Barangay Talisay, Lipa City has an assessed value
of 19,700. Appended to the complaint is Amorsolo’s verification and certification of non-forum shopping
executed in New York City, duly notarized by Mr. Joseph Brown, Esq., a notary public in the State of New
York. Brigod filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
(a) The court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of Amorsolo because he is not a resident of the
Philippine.
(b) The RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action involving the real property with
an assessed value of P19,700; exclusive and original jurisdiction is with the Municipal Trial Court.
Assume you’re the judge, resolve the motion.
Answer: The first ground raised lacks merit because jurisdiction over the person of a plaintiff is acquired
by the court upon the filing of plaintiff’s complaint therewith. Residency or citizenship is not a
requirement for filing a complaint, because plaintiff thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the court.
The second ground raised is also without merit because the subject of the litigation, Rescission of
Contract, is incapable of pecuniary estimation the exclusive original jurisdiction to which is vested by law
in the Regional Trial Courts. The nature of the action renders the assessed value of the land involved
irrelevant.
9. Josefa filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Alicia and Mabili, a petition for the probate of the will
of her husband, Martin, who died in the Municipality of Alicia, the residence of the spouses. The
probable value of the estate which consisted mainly of a house and lot was placed at P195,000.00 and in
the petition for the allowance of the will, attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00, litigation
expenses in the amount of P5,000.00 and costs were included. Pedro, the next of kin of Martin, filed an
opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that the total amount included in the relief of the
petition is more than P200,000.00, the maximum jurisdiction amount for municipal circuit trial courts.
The court overruled the opposition and proceeded to hear the case. Was the municipal circuit trial court
correct in its ruling?
Answer: Yes. The MCTC was correct in proceeding to hear the case. It has exclusive jurisdiction in all
matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the value of the estate does not exceed
P100,000.00 (now P200,000.00). The value in this case is P195,000.00 is within its jurisdiction. In
determining the jurisdictional amount, excluded are attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs; these
are considered only for determining the filing fees.
10. Agatha filed a complaint against Yana in the RTC in Makati City to collect Php350,000.00, an amount
representing the unpaid balance on the price of the car Yana had bought from Agatha. Realizing a
jurisdictional error in filing the complaint in the RTC, Agatha filed a notice of dismissal before she was
served with the answer of Yana. The RTC issued an order confirming the dismissal.
 Three months later, Agatha filed another complaint against Yana based on the same cause of action this
time in the MeTC of Makati City. However, for reasons personal to her, Agatha decided to have the
complaint dismissed without prejudice by filing a notice of dismissal prior to the service of the answer of
Yana. Hence, the case was dismissed by the MeTC.
A month later, Agatha refiled the complaint against Yana in the same MeTC.
May Yana successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint? Explain your
answer.
Answer: No, Yana may not successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint.
Under the Two-Dismissal Rule, the notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the
merits provided it is filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on
or including the same claim. (S1, R17)
Here the first dismissal by the plaintiff was not in a competent court as the RTC in Makati City
did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over an action seeking to recover P350,000. Hence Agatha’s
third complaint is not barred by the Two-Dismissal Rule.
Part III. 5-point Questions
11. Santa filed against Era in the RTC of Quezon City an action for specific performance praying for the
delivery of a parcel of land subject of their contract of sale. Unknown to the parties, the case was
inadvertently raffled to an RTC designated as a special commercial court. Later, the RTC rendered
judgment adverse to Era, who, upon realizing that the trial court was not a regular RTC, approaches you
and wants you to file a petition to have the judgment annulled for lack of jurisdiction. What advice would
you give to Era? Explain your answer.
Answer: The advice I would give to Era is that the petition for annulment of judgment on lack of
jurisdiction will not prosper.
The Supreme Court has held that a special commercial court is still a court of general jurisdiction and can
hear and try a non-commercial case. (Concorde Condominium Inc. vs. Baculi, 17 Feb 2016)
12. An amicable settlement was signed before a Lupon Tagapamayapa on January 3, 2001. On July 6, 2001,
the prevailing party asked the Lupon to execute the amicable settlement because of the non-compliance
by the other party of the terms of the agreement. The Lupon concerned refused to execute the
settlement/ agreement. Is the Lupon correct in refusing to execute the settlement/agreement?
Answer: Yes. The Lupon is correct in refusing to execute the settlement/ agreement because the
execution sought is already beyond the period of six months from the date of the settlement within
which the Lupon is authorized to execute. (Sec. 417, Local Government Code of 1991)
After the six-month period, the prevailing party should move to execute the settlement/agreement in
the appropriate city or municipal trial court.
13. A brings an action in the MTC of Manila against B for the annulment of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
of real property with an assessed value of P50,000.00 located in Laguna. The complaint alleged
prematurity of the sale for the reason that the mortgage was not yet due. B timely moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the action should have been brought in the RTC of Laguna. Decide with reason.
Answer: The motion should be granted. The MTC of Manila has no jurisdiction because the action for the
annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure is not capable of pecuniary estimation and is therefore under
the jurisdiction of the RTCs. (Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738 [1999])
However, the action for annulment is a personal action and the venue depends on the residence of
either A or B. Hence, it should be brought in the RTC of the place where either of the parties resides.
14. A files an action in the Municipal Trial Court against B, the natural son of A’s father, for the partition of a
parcel of land located in Taytay, Rizal with an assessed value of Php20,000.00. B moves to dismiss the
action the ground that the case should have been brought in the RTC because the action is one that is
not capable of pecuniary estimation as it involves primarily a determination of hereditary rights and not
merely the bare right to real property. Resolve the motion.
Answer: The motion should be granted. The action for partition depends on a determination of the
hereditary rights of A and B, which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, even though the
assessed value of the land is P20,000, the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction. (Russel vs. Vestil)
15. P sued A in the RTC Manila to recover the following sums: (1) 200,000.00 on an overdue promissory
note, (2) P80,000.00 on the purchase price of a computer, (3) P150,000.00 for damages to his car and (4)
P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Can A move to dismiss the case on the ground
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter? Explain.
Answer: Yes, A can move to dismiss the case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Under Section 5(c), Rule 2, the joinder shall not include actions governed by special rules.
Here, the action for collection of P200,000.00 is governed by a special rule, i.e. the Rule of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases. Hence, the joinder of causes of action is not proper and consequently the totality
rule cannot come into play. The RTC Manila would not have jurisdiction since the claim in each cause of
action falls below the jurisdictional amount of P400,000.00.
Previous answer, before small claims. No. Because the RTC-Manila has jurisdiction over the subject
matter. P may sue A in one complaint asserting as many causes of action as he may have and since all the
claims are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of
jurisdiction. (Rule 2, Sec. 5[d]). The aggregate amount claimed is P450,000.00, exclusive of the amount of
P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses for litigation. Hence, the RTC- Manila has jurisdiction.
16. A filed with the MTC of Manila an action for specific performance against B, a resident of Quezon City, to
compel the latter to execute a deed of conveyance covering a parcel of land situated in Quezon City
having an assessed value of P19,000.00. B received the summons and a copy of the Complaint on 02
January 2003. On 10 January 2003, B filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction contending that the subject matter of the suit was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
court denied the motion. Was the denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint correct?
 Answer: The denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was not correct. Although the assessed value
of the parcel of land involved was P19,000.00, within the jurisdiction of the MTC of Manila, the action
filed by A for Specific Performance against B to compel the latter to execute a Deed of Conveyance of
said parcel of land was not capable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore the action was within the
jurisdiction of RTC. (Russel vs. Vestil; Copioso vs. Copioso, G.R. No. 149243, October 28, 2002; Cabutihan
vs. Land Center Construction, 383 SCRA 353[2002]).
Alternative answer: If the action affects title to or possession of real property then it is a real action and
jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the property. It is within the jurisdiction therefore of
the Metropolitan Trial Court.
17. P sued A and B in one complaint in the RTC Manila, the cause of action against A being on an overdue
promissory note for P300,000.00 and that against B being on an alleged balance of P300,000.00 on the
purchase price of good sold on credit. Does the RTC-Manila have jurisdiction over the case? Explain.
Answer: No. The RTC-Manila has no jurisdiction over the case. A and B could not be joined as defendants
in one complaint because the right to relief against both defendants do not arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there is no common question of law or fact common to both.
(Rule 3, Sec. 6). Hence, separate complaints will have to be filed and they would fall under the
jurisdiction of the MeTC.
18. Amorsolo, a Filipino citizen permanently residing in New York City, filed with the RTC of Lipa City a
complaint for Rescission of Contract of Sale of Land against Brigido, a resident of Barangay San Miguel,
Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The subject property, located in Barangay Talisay, Lipa City has an assessed value
of 19,700. Appended to the complaint is Amorsolo’s verification and certification of non-forum shopping
executed in New York City, duly notarized by Mr. Joseph Brown, Esq., a notary public in the State of New
York. Brigod filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
(c) The court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of Amorsolo because he is not a resident of the
Philippine.
(d) The RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action involving the real property with
an assessed value of P19,700; exclusive and original jurisdiction is with the Municipal Trial Court.
Assume you’re the judge, resolve the motion.
Answer: The first ground raised lacks merit because jurisdiction over the person of a plaintiff is acquired
by the court upon the filing of plaintiff’s complaint therewith. Residency or citizenship is not a
requirement for filing a complaint, because plaintiff thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the court.
The second ground raised is also without merit because the subject of the litigation, Rescission of
Contract, is incapable of pecuniary estimation the exclusive original jurisdiction to which is vested by law
in the Regional Trial Courts. The nature of the action renders the assessed value of the land involved
irrelevant.
19. Josefa filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Alicia and Mabili, a petition for the probate of the will
of her husband, Martin, who died in the Municipality of Alicia, the residence of the spouses. The
probable value of the estate which consisted mainly of a house and lot was placed at P195,000.00 and in
the petition for the allowance of the will, attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00, litigation
expenses in the amount of P5,000.00 and costs were included. Pedro, the next of kin of Martin, filed an
opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that the total amount included in the relief of the
petition is more than P200,000.00, the maximum jurisdiction amount for municipal circuit trial courts.
The court overruled the opposition and proceeded to hear the case. Was the municipal circuit trial court
correct in its ruling?
Answer: Yes. The MCTC was correct in proceeding to hear the case. It has exclusive jurisdiction in all
matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the value of the estate does not exceed
P100,000.00 (now P200,000.00). The value in this case is P195,000.00 is within its jurisdiction. In
determining the jurisdictional amount, excluded are attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs; these
are considered only for determining the filing fees.
20. Agatha filed a complaint against Yana in the RTC in Makati City to collect Php350,000.00, an amount
representing the unpaid balance on the price of the car Yana had bought from Agatha. Realizing a
jurisdictional error in filing the complaint in the RTC, Agatha filed a notice of dismissal before she was
served with the answer of Yana. The RTC issued an order confirming the dismissal.
Three months later, Agatha filed another complaint against Yana based on the same cause of action this
time in the MeTC of Makati City. However, for reasons personal to her, Agatha decided to have the
complaint dismissed without prejudice by filing a notice of dismissal prior to the service of the answer of
Yana. Hence, the case was dismissed by the MeTC.
A month later, Agatha refiled the complaint against Yana in the same MeTC.
May Yana successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint? Explain your
answer.
Answer: No, Yana may not successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint.
Under the Two-Dismissal Rule, the notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the
merits provided it is filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on
or including the same claim. (S1, R17)
Here the first dismissal by the plaintiff was not in a competent court as the RTC in Makati City
did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over an action seeking to recover P350,000. Hence Agatha’s
third complaint is not barred by the Two-Dismissal Rule.