Succession Lecture 24/10/2019

Institution of Heirs

Austria v. Reyes

31 SCRA 754

FACTS:

Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last
will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners, who are nephews and
nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently allowed with the bulk of her estate designated for
respondents, all of whom were Basilia’s legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be the
nearest of kin of Basilia, assert that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, thereby making them mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to
succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that this circumstance should have left the whole estate of Basilia
open to intestacy with petitioners being the compulsory heirs.

It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia was deceived into believing that
she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents as the latter’s
legitime, with the inference that respondents would not have instituted the respondents as heirs had
the fact of spurious adoption been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from the use of the
terms, “sapilitang tagapagmana” (compulsory heirs) and “sapilitang mana” (legitime), the impelling
reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix’s belief that under the law she
could not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil Code applies whereby, “the statement of a false
cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will
that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring the petitioners
nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her
will.

HELD:

No. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second,
the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The
decedent’s will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of
heirs. Absent such we look at other considerations. The decedent’s disposition of the free portion of
her estate, which largely favored the respondents, compared with the relatively small devise of land
which the decedent left for her blood relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give the
respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Excluding the
respondents from the inheritance, considering that petitioner nephews and nieces would succeed to
the bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy, would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention
on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this case.
Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should be allowed to prevail. Granted that
a probate court has found, by final judgment, that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity and
her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, it follows that
giving full expression to her will must be in order.

Preterition

Nuguid v. Nuguid

G.R. No. L-23445, 23 June 1966, 17 SCRA 449

FACTS:

Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on
November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to
probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother
of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor
is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors
— who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited
and that in consequence the institution is void.

RTC ruled the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of
the deceased Rosario Nuguid” and dismissed the petition on the ground of

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is preterition

HELD:

Yes. Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited.” Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving
any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. The will here does not
explicitly disinherit the testatrix’s parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether.
Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs
suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, “shall annul the institution
of heir”. This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions
in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code,
such disinheritance shall also “annul the institution of heirs”, put only “insofar as it may prejudice the
person disinherited”, which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have
been illegally deprived.

Acain v. IAC

G.R. No. 72706, 27 October 1987, 155 SCRA 100

FACTS:

Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his late
Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and his
brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court,
Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased
respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity
to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted
daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongson’s petition and ordered the trial
court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acain’s motion for
reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been preterited.
HELD:

Article 854 of the Civil Code:

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she
does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same
thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if
he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It
cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted
child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were
not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of
the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of
universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written.

NERI v. AKUTIN

GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943, 74 PHIL 185

FACTS:

This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his first
marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator
with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion of the inheritance, particularly a
land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which registration was denied for it
turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the respondents were
indebted to their father.
ISSUE:

Whether or not, upon the foregoing facts, the omission of the children of the first marriage annuls the
institution of the children of the second marriage as sole heirs of the testator, or whether the will may
be held valid, at least with respect to one-third of the estate which the testator may dispose of as
legacy and to the other one-third which he may bequeath as betterment, to said children of the
second marriage.

HELD:

Yes. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In the instant case, while the children of the first marriage were
mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any share in the hereditary property, without expressly
being disinherited. It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. The
omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if
the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest.

Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they are not inofficious" (art.
814 of the Civil Code), preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession.
In the instant case, no such legacies or betterments have been made by the testator. "Mejoras" or
betterments must be expressly provided, according to articles 825 and 828 of the Civil Code, and
where no express provision therefor is made in the will, the law would presume that the testator had
no intention to that effect. In the will here in question, no express betterment is made in favor of the
children by the second marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly made in their behalf consisting
of the third available for free disposal. The whole inheritance is accorded the heirs by the second
marriage upon the mistaken belief that the heirs by the first marriage have already received their
shares. Were it not for this mistake, the testator's intention, as may be clearly inferred from his will,
would have been to divide his property equally among all his children.

MORALES v. OLONDRIZ
GR No. 198994, Feb 03, 2016

FACTS:

Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his widow,
Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O.
Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O. Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz. His widow and children are collectively referred to as the respondent heirs.

Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the Las
Piñas RTC for the partition of the decedent's estate and the appointment of a special
administrator on July 4, 2003.

On July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.
However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the
decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the will and for hex
appointment as special administratrix.

The pertinent portions of the decedent's will reads:

1. Upon my death, IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ shall be the executor hereof and
administrator of my estate until its distribution in accordance herewith, x x x

2. My entire estate shall be divided into six (6) parts to be distributed equally among
and between (1) IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ, my children (2) ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ,
JR., (3) ALEJANDRO OLONDRIZ, (4) ISABEL OLONDRIZ, (5) ANGELO OLONDRIZ, and their
mother (6) MARIA ORTEGAS OLONDRIZ, SR.

Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the
decedent.

On September 1, 2003, Morales filed a manifestation and moved to suspend the intestate
proceedings in order to give way to the probate proceedings. The respondent heirs opposed
Morales' motion for suspension and her petition for allowance of the will.

On January 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate proceedings because
Francisco was preterited from the will.

On January 10, 2006, Morales agreed to the holding of an evidentiary hearing to resolve the
issue of preterition. Thus, the RTC ordered the parties to submit their factual allegations to
support or negate the existence of preterition. Only the respondent heirs complied with this
order.

After several postponements at the instance of Morales, the reception of evidence for the
evidentiary hearing was scheduled on May 29, 2006. However, Morales failed to appear,
effectively waiving her right to present evidence on the issue of preterition.

On June 23, 2006, the RTC suspended the intestate proceedings and set the case for probate.
The RTC reasoned that probate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings.

The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the suspension order but the RTC denied the
motion on September 1, 2006. The RTC also summarily revoked the Letters of Administration
previously issued to Alfonso Jr.

On July 12, 2007, the RTC resolved (1) the respondent heirs' motion for reconsideration of the
revocation of the Letters of Administration and (2) Morales' motion to be appointed Special
Administratrix of the estate. The RTC noted that while testacy is preferred over intestacy, courts
will not hesitate to set aside probate proceedings if it appears that the probate of the will might
become an idle ceremony because the will is intrinsically void.

The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz is an heir of the decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted from the will; and (3)
that based on the evidentiary hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated
Alfonso Jr. as administrator of the estate and ordered the case to proceed in intestacy.
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was preterition.

Whether or not it was proper for the RTC to (1) pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will during
probate proceedings and (2) order the case to proceed intestate because of preterition.

HELD:

Yes. Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is
not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor
assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited - tacitly depriving the heir of
his legitime. Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive
any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime.

In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the
testator's inheritance without the heir's express disinheritance.

Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the
institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not
impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.

In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee,
or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line.
Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion
of his preterition.

During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present evidence that
Francisco received donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime from the decedent.
However, Morales did not appear during the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to
present evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching the reasonable conclusion
that there was preterition.

The Court did not entertain the petitioner's factual allegation that Francisco was not preterited
because this Court is not a trier of facts. Furthermore, the CA concurred with the RTC's
conclusion. It sees no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the lower courts.

The remaining question is whether it was proper for the RTC to (1) pass upon the intrinsic validity
of the will during probate proceedings and (2) order the case to proceed intestate because of
preterition.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court's inquiry is limited to
questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only determine the will's
formal validity and due execution. However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute. It is not
beyond the probate court's jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so
warranted by exceptional circumstances. When practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should
meet the issue.
The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco's preterition
annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment effectively caused the total abrogation of the
will, resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance. The decedent's will, no matter how valid it
may appear extrinsically, is null and void.

SOLANO v. CA
GR L 41971, November 29, 1983

FACTS:

Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against Melita Solano Meliton died
during the pendency of the petition and his daughter substituted him while asking for the
probate of the will of the decedent. RTC specified the legal issues as 1) the recognition of Garcias,
2) correct status of Zonia, 3) the hereditary share of each of them in view of the probated will. In
deciding, RTC declared Garcias as illegitimate children of late Meliton.; the institution of Sonia as
sole heir declared null and void, the 3 children shall share equally the estate CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the institution of sole heir from
decedent’s will.

HELD:

That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Meliton’s will, and as a result,
Sonia’s institution as sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art. 854,

“The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir, but the devises and legacies shall be valid…”

The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his property which the
testator had the right to such so that it should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the
property that the testator could freely dispose of Sonia’s share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of
the estate and Garcias 1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of will should not be invalidated all
together.

AZNAR v. DUNCAN
17 SCRA 590

FACTS:

Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that Helen Garcia
was a natural child of the deceased. The Court of First Instance equally divided the properties of
the estate of Christensen between Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly recognized in his will
as his daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was preterited in
the will thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and the properties passed to
both of them as if the deceased died intestate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or whether
the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to
cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of the entire estate.

HELD:

The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia.

Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and limited her share
to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the
legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest
of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled
entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.

DY YIENG SEANGIO v. AMOR A. REYES

GR Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006

FACTS:

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa
D. Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of
the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will,
petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate
of the will.

The petitioner instituted a petition for the probation of the will. Private respondents moved for
the dismissal of the probate proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting
to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the
decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result
to intestacy.

RTC dismissed the petition for probate proceedings on the reason that there is preterition in the
will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the probate proceeding.

HELD:

Yes. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be
effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes
that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by
his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child
or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.

Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from
the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other
words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in
favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct
line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to
bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo
did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. Considering that the
questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over
intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides
that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to
dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.

Substitution of Heirs

Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin

G.R. Nos. L-27936 and L-27937, 29 March 1974, 56 SCRA 266

FACTS:

Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas, made a will in 1952. Unfortunately, she
passed away in 1957 while she was domiciled in Iloilo City. In her will, she left all her estate in
favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie, however, also stated in her will that
should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.
In 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled in the Philippines). While the probate
proceeding on the will of Linnie was pending, Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles, filed a
motion before the probate court so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the
administratrix of the estate. The latter was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were
alive.

Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in
Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he would like to have Magno appointed as
administratrix. The said motion was approved by Judge Venicio Escolin.

Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since
said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed
the said petition.

Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.

Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s
brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected.

Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that
under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that
under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’
share in the estate).

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was
domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

HELD:

The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court since both parties failed to
adduce proof as to the law of Texas.
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be
resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court
further emphasized that Texas law is the applicable law at the time of Linnie’s death.