G.R. No. L-36049 May 31, 1976 Naga enacted Ordinance No.
Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360 entitled "An ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 4, as amended, imposing a sales tax on the quarterly
CITY OF NAGA, VICENTE P. SIBULO, as Mayor, and JOAQUIN C. CLEOPE, as Treasurer of the City of Naga, petitioners,
vs.
CATALINO AGNA, FELIPE AGNA and SALUD VELASCO, respondents.
Ernesto A. Miguel for petitioners.
Bonot, Cledera & Associates for respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari, which We treat as special civil action, of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in
Civil Case No. 7084, entitled Agna, et al. versus City of Naga, et al., declaring Ordinance No. 360 of the City of Naga enforceable in
1971 the year following its approval and requiring petitioners to pay to private respondents the amounts sought for in their complaint
plus attorney's fees and costs. Included in the present controversy as proper parties are Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the
City Mayor and City Treasurer of the City of Naga, respectively.
On June 15, 1970, the City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360 changing and amending the graduated tax on quarterly gross sales of
merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to percentage tax on gross sales provided for in Section 2
thereof. Pursuant to said ordinance, private respondents paid to the City of Naga the following taxes on their gross sales for the quarter
from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970, as follows:
Catalino Agna paid P1,805.17 as per Official Receipt No. 1826591;
Felipe Agna paid P625.00 as per Official Receipt No. 1826594; and
Salud Velasco paid P129.81 as per Official Receipt No. 1820339.
On February 13, 1971, private respondents filed with the City Treasurer of the City of Naga a claim for refund of the following amounts,
together with interests thereon from the date of payments: To Catalino Agna, P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud
Velasco, P127.81, representing the difference between the amounts they paid under Section 3, Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga,
i.e., P250.00; P65.00 and P12.00 respectively. They alleged that under existing law, Ordinance No. 360, which amended Section 3,
Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga, did not take effect in 1970, the year it was approved but in the next succeeding year after the year
of its approval, or in 1971, and that therefore, the taxes they paid in 1970 on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to
September 30, 1970 were illegal and should be refunded to them by the petitioners.
The City Treasurer denied the claim for refund of the amounts in question. So private respondents filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance of Naga (Civil Case No. 7084), seeking to have Ordinance No. 360 declared effective only in the year following the year
of its approval, that is, in 1971; to have Sections 4, 6 and 8 of Ordinance No. 360 declared unjust, oppressive and arbitrary, and
therefore, null and void; and to require petitioners to refund the sums being claimed with interests thereon from the date the taxes
complained of were paid and to pay all legal costs and attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000.00. Private respondents further prayed that
the petitioners be enjoined from enforcing Ordinance No. 360.
In their answer, the petitioners among other things, claimed that private respondents were not "compelled" but voluntarily made the
payments of their taxes under Ordinance No. 360; that the said ordinance was published in accordance with law; that in accordance
with Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of the City of Naga) an ordinance takes effect after the tenth day following its passage unless
otherwise stated in said ordinance; that under existing law the City of Naga is authorized to impose certain conditions to secure and
accomplish the collection of sales taxes in the most effective manner. As special and affirmative defenses, the petitioners allege that the
private respondents have no cause of action against them; that granting that the collection of taxes can be enjoined. the complaint does
not allege facts sufficient to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; that the refund prayed for by the private respondents
is untenable; that petitioners Vicente P. Sibulo and Joaquin C. Cleope, the City Mayor and Treasurer of the City of Naga, respectively
are not proper parties in interest; that the private respondents are estopped from questioning the validity and/or constitutionality of the
provisions of Ordinance No. 360. Petitioners counterclaimed for P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, for the alleged unlawful and
malicious filing of the claim against them, in such amount as the court may determine.
During the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and at the pre-trial conference as well as at the trial
on the merits of the case, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts: That on June 15, 1970, the City Board of the City of
sales or receipts on all businesses in the City of Naga," which ordinance was transmitted to the City Mayor for approval or veto on June
25, 1970; that the ordinance was duly posted in the designated places by the Secretary of the Municipal Board; that private respondents
voluntarily paid the gross sales tax, pursuant to Ordinance No. 360, but that on February 15, 1971, they filed a claim for refund with the
City Treasurer who denied the same.
On October 9, 1971, the respondent Judge rendered judgment holding that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga was
enforceable in the year following the date of its approval, that is, in 1971 and required the petitioners to reimburse the following sums,
from the date they paid their taxes to the City of Naga: to Catalino Agna, the sum of P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to Salud
Velasco, P127.81 and the corresponding interests from the filing of the complaint up to the reimbursement of the amounts plus the sum
of P500.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the proceedings.
Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, took effect in the quarter of the year of its approval, that
is in July 1970, invoking Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, 1 as amended, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Naga, which,
among others, provides that "Each approved ordinance ... shall take effect and be enforced on and after the 10th day following its
passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance ... ". They contend that Ordinance No. 360 was enacted by the Municipal Board of
the City of Naga on June 15, 1970 2 and was transmitted to the City Mayor for his approval or veto on June 25, 1970 3 but it was not
acted upon by the City Mayor until August 4, 1970. Ordinarily, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, said ordinance should
have taken effect after the 10th day following its passage on June 15, 1970, or on June 25, 1970. But because the ordinance itself
provides that it shall take effect upon its approval, it becomes necessary to determine when Ordinance No. 360 was deemed approved.
According to the same Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, "if within 10 days after receipt of the ordinance the Mayor does not return it
with his veto or approval 4 the ordinance is deemed approved." Since the ordinance in question was not returned by the City Mayor with
his veto or approval within 10 days after he received it on June 25, 1970, the same was deemed approved after the lapse of ten (10)
days from June 25, 1970 or on July 6, 1970. On this date, the petitioners claim that Ordinance No. 360 became effective. They further
contend that even under Section 2, of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Acts) 5 which expressly provides: "A tax ordinance shall
go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise', Ordinance No. 360 could have taken
effect on June 30, 1970, which is the fifteenth day after its passage by the Municipal Board of the City of Naga on June 15, 1970, or as
earlier explained, it could have taken effect on July 6, 1970, the date the ordinance was deemed approved because the ordinance itself
provides that it shall take effect upon its approval. Of the two provisions invoked by petitioners to support their stand that the ordinance
in question took effect in the year of its approval, it is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) that is more relevant
because it is the provision that specifically refers to effectivity of a tax ordinance and being a provision of much later law it is deemed to
have superseded Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of the City of Naga) in so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is
concerned.
On the other hand, private respondents contend that Ordinance No. 360 became effective and enforceable in 1971, the year following
the year of its approval, invoking Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:
Section 2309. Imposition of tax and duration of license.—A municipal license tax already in existence shall be subject to change only by
ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December of any year after the next succeeding year, but an entirely new tax may be created
by any ordinance enacted during the quarter year effective at the beginning of any subsequent quarter.
They submit that since Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City of Naga, is one which changes the existing graduated sales tax on
gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari merchants provided for in Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to a
percentage tax on their gross sales prescribed in the questioned ordinance, the same should take effect in the next succeeding year
after the year of its approval or in 1971.
Evidently, the divergence of opinion as to when Ordinance No. 360 took effect and became enforceable is mainly due to the seemingly
apparent conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy
Act). Is there really such a conflict in the above-mentioned provisions? It will be easily noted that Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code contemplates of two types of municipal ordinances, namely: (1) a municipal ordinance which changes a municipal
license tax already in existence and (2) an ordinance which creates an entirely new tax. Under the first type, a municipal license tax
already in existence shall be subject to change only by an ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December of any year after the
next succeeding year. This means that the ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December changing or repealing a municipal
license tax already in existence will have to take effect in next succeeding year. The evident purpose of the provision is to enable the
taxpayers to adjust themselves to the new charge or burden brought about by the new ordinance. This is different from the second type
of a municipal ordinance where an entirely new tax may be created by any ordinance enacted during the quarter year to be effective at
the beginning of any subsequent quarter. We do not find any such distinction between an ordinance which changes a municipal license
tax already in existence and an ordinance creating an entirely new tax in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)
which merely refers to a "tax ordinance" without any qualification whatsoever.
Now to the meat of the problem in this petition. Is not Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code deemed repealed or abrogated
by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) in so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned? An examination of
Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) fails to show any provision expressly repealing Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative
Code. All that is mentioned therein is Section 9 which reads:
Section 9 — All acts, executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations or parts thereof, inconsistent with any of the provisions of
this Act are hereby repealed and modified accordingly.
The foregoing provision does not amount to an express repeal of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. It is a well
established principle in statutory construction that a statute will not be construed as repealing prior acts on the same subject in the
absence of words to that effect unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is evidently intended
to supersede all prior acts on the matter in hand and to comprise itself the sole and complete system of legislation on that subject.
Every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be
made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation ... . 6 It will also be noted that
Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) refer to the same
subject matter-enactment and effectivity of a tax ordinance. In this respect they can be considered in pari materia. Statutes are said to
be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or
object. 7 When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be construed together. This is
because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later
statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to
have in mind the existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. 8 Having thus in mind
the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the
new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and
they all should be construed together. 9 In construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be compared with
the new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so construed that effect may be given to every provision
of each. However, when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is
the latter expression of the legislative will. 10 Actually we do not see any conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative
Code and Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act). The conflict, if any, is more apparent than real. It is one that is
not incapable of reconciliation. And the two provisions can be reconciled by applying the first clause of Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code when the problem refers to the effectivity of an ordinance changing or repealing a municipal license tax already in
existence. But where the problem refers to effectivity of an ordinance creating an entirely new tax, let Section 2 of Republic Act No.
2264 (Local Autonomy Act) govern.
In the case before Us, the ordinance in question is one which changes the graduated sales tax on gross sales or receipts of dealers of
merchandise and sari-sari merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to percentage tax on their gross
sale-an ordinance which definitely falls within the clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. Accordingly it should be
effective and enforceable in the next succeeding year after the year of its approval or in 1971 and private respondents should be
refunded of the taxes they have paid to the petitioners on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 plus
the corresponding interests from the filing of the complaint until reimbursement of the amount.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-13862 April 15, 1918
In re R. McCULLOCH DICK.
Kincaid & Perkins, W. H. Lawrence and D. R. Williams for petitioner.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for the Government.
CARSON, J.:
The Solicitor-General moves the court to revoke its orders providing for a stay of execution of its judgment pending proceedings looking
to a review of the judgment by the supreme Court of the United States and not exceed three months; and, further, to remand the
petitioner to the custody of the chief of police of the city of Manila, so that the order of deportation may be executed forthwith.
Since the enactment by Congress of the Amendments to the Judicial Code which require litigants in this court, seeking review of our
judgment by the supreme court of the United States, to institute proceedings to that end by filing an application for a writ of certiorari in
the clerk's office of the Supreme Court of the United States, we have adopted the practice of temporarily staying or suspending the
execution of our judgments, when timely application is made therefor, in any case wherein it is made to appear that the applicant
desires to make application for such writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States; that he will diligently prosecute the
prescribed remedy and intends to take necessary steps to submit his application without unnecessary delay; that his application for
suspension of execution of our judgment is made in good faith and not merely for the purpose of securing delay, nor based on frivolous
grounds; and that the execution of the judgment would subject him to irreparable loss, damage, or injury in the event of its subsequent
reversal by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In the absence of the statutory rules governing the procedure in such case, our practice has been to direct the clerk of the court, in case
heard on appeal, to retain the record of the cause in his hands without certifying our judgment to the court below, and in cases heard in
the exercise of our original jurisdiction, to retain control over the record without certifying our judgment to the inferior tribunal corporation
board or person charged with its execution or with obedience to its mandate until, a day fixed in the order, or until the further order of
the court.
Suspensions or stays of execution under this practice have usually been limited to a period of from two to three months, which
experience has shown to be sufficient, under ordinary circumstances, to give the application an opportunity to file his petition for the writ
of certiorari in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In the instance case timely application was made for suspension of the execution of our judgment remanding the petitioner to the
custody of the chief of police for compliance with the deportation order; and it was shown to the satisfaction of the court that the
application was made in good faith, and that the application would suffer irreparable injury by the execution of the deportation order, if
reverse our judgment and accept the views of the four members of this court who dissented therefrom and were of opinion that the
deportation order was "without warrant of law."
No objection having been made to the motion for a stay of execution of our judgment remanding the petitioner, an order was entered in
accordance with the established practice above set out.
At the same time, the petitioner (who, by virtue of the suspending order remained in the custody of the court) was released from the
technical custody of our sheriff, and set at liberty upon his filing an approved bond in the sum of P2,000 which under the exceptional
circumstances of the case, was conditioned not merely upon his remaining within the jurisdiction of the court and subject to its order at
all times pending the proceedings looking to the review of our judgment, but also upon his keeping the peace and not being guilty of
any offense against the public order and tranquility, nor inciting others to like conduct throughout that period.
The Solicitor-General prays for an order vacating these orders providing for a stay or suspension of the execution of our judgment and
setting the petitioner at liberty on bail, on the ground that we have no jurisdiction to issue such orders; and on the further ground that,
granting, for the sake of argument, that we have jurisdiction in the premises, the facts disclosed by the record do not justify us in
maintaining these orders in force under existing conditions in the Philippine Islands.
The Solicitor-General contends that this court having declared, upon full consideration of law and the facts, that the Governor- General
is vested with power to deport the petitioner, we have no power, under our own rulings, to interfere with or to control his action in the
premises.
But is equally true that by entering upon the inquiry as to whether the Governor-General was lawfully clothed with power to deport the
petitioner, we recognized the power and duty of the court to adjudicate the question raised by the petitioner as to the power of the
Governor-General in the premises; and asserted our authority, under the law, to have the body of the petitioner brought before us
in habeas corpus proceedings, and placed at our disposal pending the final disposition of the question thus submitted for adjudication.
In the very nature of things the right of the Chief Executive to exercise his lawful powers without the interference of the court must give
way, so far that may be necessary to secure a full, fair, and final adjudication by the courts of a question as to the legality and existence
of powers which he assumes to exercise, when that question is raised in habeas corpus proceedings by a petitioner alleging that he has
been unlawfully deprived of his liberty.
The petitioner in the instant case is now under the custody of this court, pending the final adjudication of the question raised by him as
to the existence and legality of the power raised by the Governor-General in ordering his deportion; and although this court has
solemnly declared that the Governor-General is lawfully vested with such power, there can be no question as to the right of the
petitioner to apply to the Supreme Court of the United States for a review of our judgment.
We are satisfied that under the law and the settled practice of this court, we have jurisdiction to suspend the execution of our judgment,
and to withhold the order remanding the petitioner for deportation for a period of time sufficient to give him a suitable opportunity to
apply for a writ of certiorari form the Supreme Court of the United States. (U. S. vs. Lim, 36 Phil. Rep., 682; Campagnie de Commerce
et de Navigation D'Extreme Orient vs. Hamburg Amerika Packetfacht Actien Gesellschaft, 36 Phil. Rep., 590; E. Viegelmann &
Co. vs. Collector of Customs, 37 Phil. Rep., 10; R. G. No. 11899, Ynchausti & Co. Board of Public Utility Commissioner. 1)
As a corollary to our ruling that we have jurisdiction temporarily to stay or suspend execution of our judgment remanding petitioner to
the custody of the officer who delivered him to the custody of the court in compliance with the writ of habeas corpus, it flows that it is our
duty and that we have the power to adopt such measures as may be appropriate and necessary for his safe-keeping while in our
custody, and to secure of the chief of police for deportation if and when the order staying or suspending execution of that judgment is
vacated.
But while we entertain no doubt as to our jurisdiction to provide for a temporary stay or suspension of execution of our judgment
remanding the petitioner, and pending such stay, to provide, his retention in our custody, either in the ands of our sheriff or at liberty
under bail; we are forcibly impressed with the representations of the Solicitor-General as to the impropriety of maintaining the order
letting him to bail, over the objection of the chief Executive, who is primarily charged with maintenance of the peace, good order, and
safety of these Island.
As the Solicitor-General well says, the logical and necessary conclusion to be derived from the record of these proceedings, read
together with the opinion of the court, is that the petitioner is an undesirable alien, who presence in the Philippine islands is a menace to
the peace and safety of the community. The Governor-General in the lawful exercise of the authority conferred upon him under section
69 of the Administrative Code, has so declared, after prior investigation f the course of which the petitioner had full opportunity to be
head in his own behalf; and this court has expressly held that we are not at liberty in the course of these proceedings to reexamine or to
controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he based his conclusions.
Indeed, it was the knowledge of these findings by the Governor-General as disclosed by the record, which caused us to condition the
letting of the petitioner to bail upon the execution of a bond in a substantial sum, conditioned not merely upon his holding himself
subject to the orders of the court pending the stay of execution of our judgment, but also upon his keeping the peace throughout that
period.
At that time no objection had been filed by the Solicitor-General to the motion of petitioner to suspend our judgment pending
proceedings looking to its review by the supreme court of the United States; and, in the absence of objection, we conceived that the
convenience of the petitioner might properly be consulted by setting him at liberty under a substantial bond conditioned as we have just
indicated.
But it now becomes our duty to consider whether the order letting the petitioner to bail should be maintained in force over objection
interposed by Solicitor-General on behalf of the Chief Executive; and notwithstanding his representations that as an undesirable alien
who presence in the Philippine Islands is a menace to the peace and safety of the community the petitioner should be deported
forthwith, and certainly should not be at large to continue his pernicious activities at will, during the more or less prolonged period of the
suspension of execution of our judgment remanding him to the custody of the chief of police.
In this connection, our attention has been called to the fact that the petitioner is the proprietor and editor of a weekly newspaper of
considerable circulation and as such has it within his power, if at large to place more or less serious obstacles in the way of measures
contemplated by the executive legislative authorities for the recruiting and organization of native troops destined to the serve of the
United States in the present war. Indeed, the Solicitor-General asserts that the first issued of that newspaper following the promulgation
of the decision of this court, contains matter well calculated to create and foment racial prejudices and differences, highly detrimental to
the general welfare and good order of the Island, and especially to be deprecated at this time and when the utmost peace and harmony
should prevail in the face of a common enemy.
But without stopping to consider whether there is anything in this issue of the Free Press which supports the contentions that there is a
manifest inconsistency between the rulings upon which our judgment was based, and the maintenance in force of our order stetting the
petitioner at large on bail, over the objection of the Solicitor-Genral representing the Chief Executive.
Having held that he Governor-General was lawfully authorized to institute and maintain deportation proceedings against the petitioner
under the provisions of section 69 of the Administrative code; and having declared that we have no jurisdiction in these habeas
corpus proceedings to reexamine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he based his ruling in the course of these
proceedings; and the Governor-General having declared, as a result of an investigation lawfully held under his direction, that the
petitioner is an undesirable alien, whose presence in the Philippine Islands is a menace tot he peace and safety of the community; it
would seem to be a flagrant abuse of our discretion to turn him loose upon the community at such ta time as this, in the face of the
insistent objection of the Chief Executive who is primarily charge with the maintenance of the safety, peace, and good order of these
Islands.
The most that the petitioner is entitled to demand, as of right, is that under the transcendent authority of its writ of habeas corpus, this
court should stay the course of the deportation proceedings, and if necessary take him into the custody of the court itself, long enough
to secure a full and final adjudication of the legality of the deportation order. He cannot demand that he be released from custody until
that question is determined in his favor; though, as we have said, the court may, in its discretion, let him to bail pending the
proceedings.
But this discretion is a sound judicial discretion to be exercised in the light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances. After having
held that a petitioner in habeas corpus proceedings had been lawfully adjudged a dangerous lunatic or a desperate criminal no court
would be justified, except under the most extraordinary circumstances, a letting him to bail merely for the purpose of securing a review
of the proceedings by a superior court. So this court, after upholding the legality of the order deporting the petitioner and of the
proceedings wherein he was adjudged an undesirable alien whose presence in the Philippine Island is a menace to the pace and safety
of the community cannot consistently turn him loose upon the community under bail, for the more or less prolonged period necessary to
secure a review of the proceedings by the Supreme Court of the United States, when objection to that course is interposed by the
executive officer more especially charged with the maintenance of the peace and safety of the community.
What has been said in some of the federal courts of the United Sates as to the propriety of exercising the discretionary power to grant
bail in favor of Chinese person, pending deportation proceedings against them, in ordinary cases wherein it was not asserted that he
presence of such person was a menace to the peace, safety, good order o health of the community, or a dangerous anarchist, or a
person afflicted with a loathsome and communicable disease, or the like.
We have conclude, therefore, that while we should and must deny the motion of the Solicitor-General to vacate our order staying the
execution of our judgment and to turn the petitioner over to the chief of police for deportation forthwith, we would not be justified in
maintaining in force the order letting the petitioner to bail, over the well-founded objection of the Chief Executive who is primarily
charged with the conservation of the peace, safety and good order of the Islands. Accordingly, we will entertain a new or an amended
motion by the Solicitor-general to take the petitioner into the immediate custody of the court, to cancel the bond upon which he is now at
large, and thereafter to turn him over to the custody of the chief of police of the city of Manila or such other officer as may be designated
by the chief Executive, for detention pending the stay of execution of our judgment in these habeas corpus proceedings.
The motion of the Solicitor-General, in the form in which it has been submitted, should be and is hereby denied.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Avanceña, J., reserves his vote.
G.R. No. L-52819 October 2, 1980 not dissipate the well founded doubt as to whether its legislative franchise justitifies its plea to establish the branch or station in
question. There is no need to repeat what has been set forth in the answer to the effect that there was such a limitation concerning the
PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner, ingress and egress of its messages or signals only thru a "sole gateway" (Manila) or only thru any point or single location in the
vs. Philippines. Absent such clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise a legal question arises which is more appropriate for the
HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First instance of Manila, Branch XI, judiciary than for an administrative agency to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for application when there is such
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION, CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC. and RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF competence to act on the part of an administrative body. Petitioner assumes that such is the case. That is to beg the question. There is
THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents. merit, therefore, to the approach taken by private respondents to seek judicial remedy as to whether or not the legislative franchise
could be so interpreted as to enable the National Telecommunications Commission to act on the matter. A jurisdictional question thus
arises and calls for an answer.
FERNANDO, C.J.: 2. The conclusion reached is reinforced by the nature of the assailed order of respondent Judge. It was merely a denial of a motion to
1
dismiss the suit for declaratory relief for the reason that the ground relied upon "is not indubitable." There is thus the appearance and
The competence of respondent Judge Benjamin Relova to act on a matter, which, according to petitioner Philippine Global
the reality of an unseemly haste in which the matter was brought to this Court considering that the well-known doctrine that certiorari to
Communications, Inc., should be appropriated dealth with by the Board of Communications, is the issue that has to be resolved by the
be available as set forth in Panaligan vs. Adolfo, 14 requires a showing of "a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the
Court in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. Petitioner filed on May 10, 1976 with the Board of Telecommunications an application
very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions." 15
for authority to establish a branch or station in Cebu City "for the purpose of rendering international telecommunications services from
Cebu City to any point outside the Philippines where it is authorized to operate. 2 The Solicitor General and private respondents 3. Nor does it avail petitioners that a motion for reconsideration by private respondents still pending before the National
opposed such application. 3 Thereafter, on March 9, 1979, the Board of Communications rendered a decision, recognizing the right of Telecommunications Commission. Reliance on the doctrine of ripeness for judicial review is not always attended with success.
petitioners under its legislative franchise to establish branches or stations anywhere in the Philippines, subject to its prior approval. 4 A Precisely, in Arrow Transportation Corp. vs. Board of Transportation, 16 the mere fact that at the time the case was elevated to this
joint motion for reconsideration, dated June 14, 1979, came from private respondents, followed as could be expected by an opposition Court, a motion for reconsideration was still pending with respondent Board did not suffice to preclude a rulling on the decisive question
from petitioner. 5 In a reply to such opposition, private respondents put in issue the jurisdiction of the Board of Communications, now the raised. A noted authority on Administrative Law, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, was referred to as being "of the view that the resolution
National Telecommunications Commission, to act on such application. Such motion is still pending. 6 On August 27, 1979, private of what could be a debilitating uncertainty with the conceded ability of the judiciary to work out a solution of the problem posed is a
respondents filed before respondent Judge an action for declaratory judgment to ascertain the scope and coverage of the legislative potent argument for minimizing the emphasis laid on its technical aspect. 17 An excerpt from Radio Communications of the Philippines,
franchise of petitioner, it was ratified to Branch XI, presided by respondent Judge. 7 Inc. Santiago, 18 is even more persuasive as to why the stage has been reached for the judiciary to act considering that the question
raised is one of jurisdiction. Thus: "Except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself,
There was a motion to dismiss by petitioner on the ground that the question raised in such suit pertained to the National
a public official must locate in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it. It need not be express. It may be
Telecommunications Commission, the body with primary jurisdiction. 8 Private respondents in submitted their opposition, with a reply
implied from the wording of the law. Absent such a requisite, however, no warrant exists for the assumption of authority. The act
from petitioner and a rejoinder to such pleading from respondents. 9 Respondent Judge, in an order dated January 15, 1980, denied
performed, if properly challenged, cannot meet the test of validity It must be set aside. So it must be in these two petitions. That is to
petitioner's motion to dismiss as in his opinion the ground relied is not indubitable. 10 Hence this certiorari and prohibition proceeding.
defer to a principle reiterated by this Court time and time again. 19
On March 6, 1980, two days after the certiorari proceeding was filed, this Court issued the following resolution: "Considering the
WHEREFORE, the petition to certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit. The restraining order issued on March 6, 1980 is hereby set aside.
allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
No pronouncement as to costs.
injunction with prayer for a restraining order, the Court Resolved (a) to require the respondents to file an [Answer] within ten (10) days
from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition and (b) to [Issue a Temporary Restraining Order], effective as of this date and Barredo, Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.
continuing until otherwise ordered by the Court." 11 Thereafter on April 21, 1980, a joint answer was filed by the respondents. It met the
issue squarely. Their principal contention is that what confronts this Court is not the question of primary jurisdiction as it challenged Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
such jurisdiction of the National Telecommunications Commission. It made clear that from the very legislative franchise of petitioner
Philippine Global Communications, Inc. the right to establish a branch or station in Cebu City "for the purpose of rendering international
telecommunications services" from such city to any point outside the Philippines is to say the least, debatable. The matter is far from
clear. Its franchise does not, in express terms, grant it. What is worse, to quote from its answer: "... petitioner, being an 'International
record carrier' is authorized to engage only in international communications service. Now, private respondents take the position that
since Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4617 [the franchise in question] limits ingress and egress of [petitioner's] messages or signals only
thru a 'Sole Gateway' (Manila) or only thru '[any point]' or single location in the Philippines, therefore: a.) [petitioner] cannot establish
branches or distribution systems (direct connections to end-users) at any other point or locality within the country for the purpose of
transmitting and receiving messages between the gateway (Manila) and these branches or stations located say, at Cebu or Davao. [For
that is to constitute] domestic service within the context of [its] franchise; b.) [Petitioner] cannot even establish distribution systems in
Manila other than its main office or gateway to transmit and receive messages to or from the end-users destined for external
transmission; this phase of operation (between the main office at gateway to the distribution system or individual equipment installed in
the end-users' offices in Manila) being 'domestic service'; c.) Assuming arguendo, that [petitioner] shall not charge any additional fee for
the extra service mentioned does not detract from the fact that the same still constitutes 'domestic service' since they are rendered from
one point in the Philippines to another point within the same country. 12

The issue is thus clear-cut and well-defined. Considering the question raised, is this a case appropriate for a suit for declaratory relief
which falls within the competence of the Judiciary or is this a case calling for the applicability of the concept of primary jurisdiction thus
necessitating an action by the administrative agency concerned before resort to a judicial remedy? To our mind, the answer is that a
suit for declaratory relief lies and, therefore, the petition must be dismissed.

1. Reliance is placed by petitioners on Quintos, Jr. vs. National Stud Farm 13 It is undoubted that fidelity to the basic concept of
exhausting administrative remedies calls for. the equally fundamental principle of junction to be respected. Petitioner, however, could
G.R. No. L-8580 September 30, 1957 work; the other deals with the length of a working day in terms of hours with express provision for compensation for service rendered
beyond the required hours of work. Also, the penalties prescribed in one are different from those in the other. Moreover, the rule pari
materia is resorted to only as an aid to statutory construction. We do not think its application should be widened to the extent of
EMILIO FLORES, ET AL., petitioners, supplying a deficiency of a prescriptive period provided for in another.
vs.
VICENTE SAN PEDRO, ET AL., respondents.
On the other hand, the rule is that the general law shall supply deficiencies in special laws. (Art. 16, old Civil Code; Leyte A & M. Oil Co.
vs. Block, Johnston & Greenbaum, 52 Phil. 429; see also art. 18, new Civil Code.) In the absence, therefore, of any prescriptive period
Acssay, Rayos, Apilado and Cruz for petitioners. in the Eight-Hour Labor Law, the statute of limitations provided for in the general law-in this case Act No. 190 (the old Code of Civil
Antonio Fa. Quesada, Victoria S. Alejandro and Jose Fenoy for respondent Vicente San Pedro and the respondent Company. Procedure) or the new Civil Code-applies.

REYES, A., J.: On the theory that the laws in force at the time a contract is entered into, in so far as applicable form part of the contract, actions for
recovery of wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standard Act of the United States are regarded by most courts there
This case deals with the prescription of action for the recovery of overtime compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Com. Act as actions upon contract. We find this view reasonable, and there being no dispute that the contracts of employment in the present case
No. 444). were oral, we have to hold that the period of prescription applicable to petitioners' actions in the lower court was, both under Act 190
and the new Civil Code, six years. (Section 43, par. 2, Act 190; art. 1145, new Civil Code; art. 1150 of the new.) And such actions could
have been brought at the end of each regular pay period when payment of overtime compensation became due.
The petitioners, former employees in respondents' electric and ice plants in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, filed three suits on May 7, 1954, in
the Court of First Instance of that province to recover compensation for overtime work alleged to have been rendered by them during
the period of their employment, the aggregate sum claimed, including damages, interests and attorney's fees, being P152,473.34. The In view of the foregoing, the order complained of is modified in the sense that the petitioners' complaints shall be amended to include
defendants, now respondents herein, moved for the dismissal of the suits on the ground of prescription, invoking the three-year only those portion of petitioners' claims for overtime payment as are within the period of six years counted from the accrual of their
prescriptive period provided for in the Minimum Wage Law (Rep. Act No. 602)in default of a prescriptive period for actions under the respective causes of action.1âwphïl.nêt
Eight-Hour Labor Law. Upholding defendants' theory that claims for overtime compensation prescribe in three years, the lower court
ordered the complaints amended "so as to include only the claims for overtime payments due to plaintiffs within three years before the Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.
filing of said complaints and which accrued after May 7, 1951." Reconsideration of the order having been denied, plaintiffs brought the
present petition for certiorari to have the said order annulled as violative of their vested rights and rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. Respondents in their answer question the propriety of the remedy, but they did not press that point of law, the same may well
be decided on the merits.
G.R. No. 87119 April 16, 1991
It is settled that the right to extra compensation for overtime work cannot be validly waived and that the action for its recovery is not
barred by laches or estoppel. (Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., 90 Phil., 665; Manila Terminal
Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., 91 Phil., 625; 48 Off. Gaz., 2725.) But this does not necessarily mean that such action is HON. GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., in his capacity as City Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
imprescriptible, for the principles underlying prescription on the one hand and laches and estoppel on the other are not exactly the vs.
same. Moreover, as this Court said in the case of Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Luzon Marine Department et al., 101 Phil., 257, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. DANILO R. LACUNA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the City
"there may be cases in which the silence of the employee or laborer who lets the time go by for quite a long period without claiming or Council of Manila, and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA, respondents.
asserting his right to overtime compensation may favor the inference that he has not worked any such overtime or that his extra work
has been duly compensated." And the Congress, by the enactment of the law for the recovery of overtime compensation could not have The City Legal Officer for petitioner.
intended that an employee might, before bringing his action, wait until the passing of time had destroyed all the documentary evidence Lacuna, Bello & Associates Law Offices for Danilo B. Lacuna.
and the memory of witnesses had faded or become dim (157 A. L. R. 546), for that would render the action practically indefensible and
might cause such great accumulation of unpaid overtime wages as would bankrupt an employer who is ordered to pay them and
necessitate the closure of his business to the detriment of the employees themselves.

A similar situation has confronted the courts of the United States under the Fair Labor Standards Act of that country, which contains no
provision limiting the time for commencing action thereunder. The courts there hold that the right to overtime compensation under that SARMIENTO, J.:
Act may neither be waived nor its enforcement defeated on the ground of estoppel (56 C. J. S. 736-739);but they are also unanimous in
the opinion that actions for the recovery of such compensation are subject to state statutes of limitations. (56 C. J. S.776; 157 A. L. R.
The only question in this petition, denominated as a "direct appeal under Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (e), of the Constitution and Section
545-546.) Considering that our labor laws are patterned after those of the United States, the ruling of the courts there is entitled to great
9(3), of Batas Blg. 129," is whether the City Council of Manila still has the power to appoint Council officers and employees under
weight.
Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Manila, or whether the power is now vested with the City Mayor
pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Law, and Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code. The facts are as
The next question to determine is what period of prescription to apply where the law itself, i.e., the Eight-Hour Labor Law, has not fixed follows:
the period.1âwphïl.nêt
On September 13, 1988, the Vice-Mayor of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, the Hon. Danilo R. Lacuna,
The court below ruled that the three year period prescribed in the Minimum Wage Law for enforcing a cause of action arising submitted to the Civil Service Commission, through the Regional Director of the National Capital Region, the appointments of nineteen
thereunder should also apply to actions for enforcing the Eight-Hour Labor Law since the latter law did not provide for a prescriptive officers and employees in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer, City Council of Manila, pursuant to the provisions of
period of its own (It should here be explained that on June 22, 1957 an amendment was approved-Rep. Act No. 1993-providing for such Section 15, of said Republic Act No. 409, as amended, which reads:
a period but with the proviso that the same shall not affect actions already commenced). The ruling below cannot be upheld. The
prescriptive period provided for in the Minimum Wage Law (section 17, Rep. Act No. 602) specifically refers to the enforcement of any
Sec. 15. . . . .
cause of action under that Act and its application cannot be extended to causes of action arising under the Eight-Hour Labor Law on the
theory propounded by the lower court that the two laws are in pari materia, because in point of fact they are not. Both, it is true, relate to
labor. But they are distinct and separate measures. One treats of minimum daily wages with no provision for compensation for overtime
 xxx xxx xxx
. . . The Board shall appoint and the Vice Mayor shall sign all appointments of the other employees of the Board. 1
The City Budget Officer of Manila later sought from the Personnel Bureau of the Mayor's office "comment and/or recommendation" on
whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees of the City Council may be paid on the basis of appointments signed by the Vice-
Mayor.2 The Personnel Bureau then forwarded the query to the City Legal Officer who, in a 3rd endorsement dated September 19,
1988,3 rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. This opinion was transmitted by
the Secretary to the City Mayor to the Commission.
On February 1, 1989, the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-075, and held that contrary to the opinion of the City Legal
Officer, it is the City Council to which the appointing power is vested. The dispositive portion thereof is as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to rule, as it hereby rules that the proper
appointing authority of the officers and employees of the City Council of Manila is the City Council and the signatory of
individual appointments thus issued is the City Vice-Mayor of Manila.4
As we stated at the outset, the issue is whether or not Section 15, supra, of the Charter of the City of Manila has been repealed, and as
a result, the City Council can no longer tender appointments to Council positions.
As we also mentioned at the outset, this petition has been brought by way of a "direct appeal" from the resolution of the Civil Service
Commission pursuant supposedly to the Constitution and Batas Blg. 129. In this connection, we have held that no appeal lies from the
decisions of the Civil Service Commission, and that parties aggrieved thereby may proceed to this Court alone on certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to Section 7, Article IX, of the Constitution. We
quote:
Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. 5
As we held, the Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service and as
such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court's certiorari jurisdiction.6
The petitioner's omission notwithstanding, we are nevertheless accepting the petition and because of the important public interest it
involves, we are considering it as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, considering further that it was filed within the thirty-day period.7
As the petitioner contends, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 409 as amended has supposedly been repealed by Republic Act No. 5185,
specifically, Section 4 thereof, which we quote, in part:
xxx xxx xxx
The City Assessor, City Agriculturist, City Chief of Police and City Chief of Fire Department and other heads of offices
entirely paid out of city funds and their respective assistants or deputies shall, subject to civil service law, rules and
regulations, be appointed by the City Mayor: Provided, however, That this section shall not apply to Judges, Auditors,
Fiscals, City Superintendents of Schools, Supervisors, Principals, City Treasurers, City Health Officers and City Engineers.
xxx xxx xxx
All other employees, except teachers, paid out of provincial, city or municipal general funds, road and bridge funds, school
funds, and other local funds, shall, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the Provincial
Governor, City or Municipal Mayor upon recommendation of the office head concerned. . . .8
and by Batas Blg. 337, we likewise quote:
Sec. 171. Chief Executive; Compensation, Powers, and Duties. —
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The city mayor shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Appoint, in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulations, all officers and employees of the city, whose
appointments are not otherwise provided in this Code;9
There is no doubt that Republic Act No. 409, which provides specifically for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila, is
a special law, and whereas Republic Act No. 5185 and Batas Blg. 337, which apply to municipal governments in general, are general
laws. As the Solicitor General points out, and we agree with him, it is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a
general law — regardless of their dates of passage — and the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general.10
So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes. If reasonable construction is possible, the laws must be
reconciled in that manner.
Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and the mere repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear to
warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the other.11
Why a special law prevails over a general law has been put by the Court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The Legislature consider and make provision for all the circumstances of the particular case.1âwphi1 The Legislature
having specially considered all of the facts and circumstances in the particular case in granting a special charter, it will not be
considered that the Legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions repugnant to the provisions of the charter,
and without making any mention of its intention to amend or modify the charter, intended to amend, repeal, or modify the
special act. (Lewis vs. Cook County, 74 I11. App., 151; Philippine Railway Co. vs. Nolting 34 Phil., 401.)12
In one case, we held that Republic Act No. 5185 did not divest the Mayor of Manila of his power under the Charter of the City of Manila
to approve the city budget.13
We also agree with the Civil Service Commission that the provisions of Republic Act No. 5185, giving mayors the power to appoint all
officials "entirely paid out by city funds14 and those of Batas Blg. 337, empowering local executives with the authority to appoint "all
officers and employees of the city,"15 were meant not to vest the city mayors per se with comprehensive powers but rather, to
underscore the transfer of the power of appointment over local officials and employees from the President to the local governments and
to highlight the autonomy of local governments. They were not meant, however, to deprive the City Council of Manila for instance, its
appointing power granted by existing statute, and after all, that arrangement is sufficient to accomplish the objectives of both the
Decentralization Act and the Local Government Code, that is, to provide teeth to local autonomy.
In the light of an the foregoing, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 of the 27 May 2005 Decision2 and 2 August 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 87710. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Office of the President, which in turn affirmed the decision of the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying petitioner’s request to revert to the use of her maiden name in her replacement passport.
The Facts
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000.
Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: "Rallonza" as her surname, "Maria
Virginia" as her given name, and "Remo" as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose
marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois,
U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.
Petitioner’s request having been denied, Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III, representing petitioner, wrote then Secretary of Foreign
Affairs Domingo Siason expressing a similar request.
On 28 August 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota, denied the request, stating thus:
This has reference to your letter dated 17 August 2000 regarding one Ms. Maria Virginia V. Remo who is applying for renewal of her
passport using her maiden name.
This Office is cognizant of the provision in the law that it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husband’s name. Use of
maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Implementing
Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a woman applicant may revert to her
maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remo’s case does not meet any
of these conditions.4 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied in a letter dated 13 October 2000.5
On 15 November 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President.
On 27 July 2004, the Office of the President dismissed the appeal6 and ruled that Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or
the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 "offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or
declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes." The Office of the President
further held that in case of conflict between a general and special law, the latter will control the former regardless of the respective
dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA 8239.
On 28 October 2004, the Office of the President denied the motion for reconsideration.7
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In its Decision of 27 May 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the resolution dated July 27, 2004, and the order dated October 28,
2004 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 001-A-9344 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 2 August 2005.
Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
The Court of Appeals found no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code9 and Section 5(d) of RA 8239.10 The Court of Appeals held
that for passport application and issuance purposes, RA 8239 limits the instances when a married woman applicant may exercise the
option to revert to the use of her maiden name such as in a case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage.
Since there was no showing that petitioner's marriage to Francisco Rallonza has been annulled, declared void or a divorce decree has
been granted to them, petitioner cannot simply revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport after she had adopted her
husband’s surname in her old passport. Hence, according to the Court of Appeals, respondent was justified in refusing the request of
petitioner to revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport.1avvphi1
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert to the
use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
We agree with petitioner that the use of the word "may" in the above provision indicates that the use of the husband’s surname by the
wife is permissive rather than obligatory. This has been settled in the case of Yasin v. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court.11
In Yasin,12 petitioner therein filed with the Shari’a District Court a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name" in view of the dissolution
of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to
another woman. In ruling in favor of petitioner therein, the Court explained that:
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband’s name by prefixing the word
"Mrs." before her husband’s full name or by adding her husband’s surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art.
370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as
authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to
revert to her maiden name as use of her former husband’s is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.;
Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her but only her civil status. Neither was she required to
secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370
of the Civil Code.13 She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name
upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries,
she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames
indicate descent.14
In the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and who opted to use her husband’s surname in her old passport,
requested to resume her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name.
Petitioner cites Yasin as the applicable precedent. However, Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which
involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already married to another woman, petitioner’s marriage remains subsisting.
Another point, Yasin did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to resume one’s
maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s marriage.
The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the applicable provision in this case is Section 5(d), which states:
Sec. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. — No passport shall be issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly
authorized representative is satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the following requirements: x x x
(d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced or widowed or whose marriage has been annulled or declared by court as
void, a copy of the certificate of marriage, court decree of separation, divorce or annulment or certificate of death of the deceased
spouse duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce decree,
annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the woman applicant may revert to the use of her maiden name: Provided, further, That
such divorce is recognized under existing laws of the Philippines; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, argues that the highlighted proviso in Section
5(d) of RA 8239 "limits the instances when a married woman may be allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport."
These instances are death of husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage. Significantly, Section 1, Article 12 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239 provides:
The passport can be amended only in the following cases:
a) Amendment of woman’s name due to marriage;
b) Amendment of woman’s name due to death of spouse, annulment of marriage or divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or
c) Change of surname of a child who is legitimated by virtue of a subsequent marriage of his parents.
Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside of the purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the
instances when a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name), she may not resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport.15 This prohibition, according to petitioner, conflicts with and, thus, operates as an implied repeal of Article 370 of
the Civil Code.
Petitioner is mistaken. The conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section 5(d) of RA 8239 is more imagined than real. RA
8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport.
In fact, in recognition of this right, the DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden
name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband's surname.16
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. If
she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated
copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not
prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.17
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden
name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3)
annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the
severance of the marriage.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with
passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A
basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law, 18 thus:
[I]t is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and a special law or
provision, the latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates of passage.19
Moreover, petitioner’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. T he apparently
conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective. 20 For a law to
operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with
the latter act.21 This petitioner failed to establish.1avvphi1
The Court notes that petitioner would not have encountered any problems in the replacement passport had she opted to continuously
and consistently use her maiden name from the moment she was married and from the time she first applied for a Philippine passport.
However, petitioner consciously chose to use her husband’s surname before, in her previous passport application, and now desires to
resume her maiden name. If we allow petitioner’s present request, definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert
to the use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior
to all other official documents,22 cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport
holders will arise. Thus, for passport issuance purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage subsists, may not
change her family name at will.
The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicant’s constitutional right to travel.
However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents
proceeding from it23 as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a
possessor of the passport as long as it is valid and the same may not be surrendered to any person or entity other than the government
or its representative.24
As the OSG correctly pointed out:
[T]he issuance of passports is impressed with public interest. A passport is an official document of identity and nationality issued to a
person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries. It is issued by the Philippine government to its citizens requesting other
governments to allow its holder to pass safely and freely, and in case of need, to give him/her aid and protection. x x x
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, it is within respondent’s competence to regulate any amendments intended to be made therein,
including the denial of unreasonable and whimsical requests for amendments such as in the instant case. 25
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 May 2005 Decision and 2 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 87710.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent.
E. M. Banzali for petitioner.
Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent.
TUASON, J.:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been
bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court
of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the
strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this
proceeding.
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of his motion, the accused,
assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges
and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the
complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form
provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In
view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace
forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was
committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his
jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein.
In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the peace
had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so
that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail
the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of
justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence
what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the
constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the
absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation
may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority and denied even any discretion on
the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify
anew.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.
FERIA, J., dissenting:
I am sorry to dissent from the decision.
The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of the Peace of Masantol, Pampanga,
and after being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, pleaded not guilty. "Then the
counsel for the petitioner moved that the complainant present her evidence so that her witnesses could be examined and cross-
examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to petitioner's motion invoking
section 11, Rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence, and the case was
forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the Court of First Instance praying that the record of the case be remanded to
the justice of the peace of Masantol, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection
with their testimony. The motion was denied, and for that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was instituted.
It is evident that the refusal or waiver of the petitioner to present his evidence during the investigation in the justice of the peace, was
not a waiver of his alleged right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, that is, of the preliminary
investigation provided for in General Order No. 58 and Act No. 194, to which he claims to be entitled, as shown by the fact that, as soon
as the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, counsel for the petitioner filed a motion with said court to remand the case to
the Justice of the Peace of Masantol ordering the latter to make said preliminary investigation. His motion having been denied, the
petitioner has filed the present action in which he squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11, Rule 108, on the ground
that it deprives him of the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, contrary to the provision of
section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution.
In the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we did not discuss and decide the question of validity or
constitutionality of said section 11 in connection with section 1 of Rule 108, because that question was not raised therein, and we
merely construed the provisions on preliminary investigation or Rule 108. In said case the writer of this dissenting opinion said:
It may not be amiss to state that, modesty aside, the writer of this dissenting opinion, then a practising attorney, was the one
who prepared the draft of the Rules of Court relating to criminal procedure, and the provisions on preliminary investigation in
the draft were the same as those of the old law, which gave the defendant the right to be confronted with and to cross-
examine the witnesses for the prosecution. But the Supreme Court approved and adopted in toto the draft, except the part
referring to preliminary investigation which it modified, by suppressing said right and enacting, in its stead, the provisions of
section 11 of Rule 108 in its present form. I prefer the old to the new procedure. But I can not subscribe to the majority
decision, which is a judicial legislation and makes the exercise of the right of a defendant to be confronted, with and cross-
examine the witnesses against him, to depend entirely upon the whim or caprice of a judge or officer conducting the
preliminary investigation.
But now the question of the validity of said section 11, Rule 108, is squarely presented to this Court for decision, we have perforce to
pass upon it.
Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the Supreme Court shall have power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, but said rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." The constitution
added the last part of the above-quoted constitutional precept in order to emphasize that the Supreme Court is not empowered, and
therefore can not enact or promulgate substantive laws or rules, for it is obvious that rules which diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights, are substantive and not adjective laws or rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
It does not require an elaborate arguments to show that the right granted by law upon a defendant to be confronted with and cross-
examine the witnesses for the prosecuted in preliminary investigation as well as in the trial of the case is a substantive right. It is based
on human experience, according to which a person is not prone to tell a lie against another in his presence, knowing fully well that the
latter may easily contradict him, and that the credibility of a person or veracity of his testimony may be efficaciously tested by a cross-
examination. It is substantive right because by exercising it, an accused person may show, even if he has no evidence in his favor, that
the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are not sufficient to indicate that there is a probability that a crime has been
committed and he is guilty thereof, and therefore the accused is entitled to be released and not committed to prison, and thus avoid an
open and public accusation of crime, the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and the corresponding anxiety or moral suffering
which a criminal prosecution always entails.
This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law to an accused outside of the City of Manila because of the usual
delay in the final disposition of criminal cases in provinces. The law does not grant such right to a person charged with offenses triable
by the Court of First Instance in the City of Manila, because of the promptness, actual or presumptive, with which criminal cases are
tried and disposed of in the Court of First Instance of said city. But this right, though not a constitutional one, can not be modified,
abridged, or diminished by the Supreme Court, by virtue of the rule making power conferred upon this Court by the Constitution.
Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this Court in several cases, (in which the question of constitutionality or
validity of said section had not been squarely raised) do away with the defendant's right under discussion, it follows that said section 11
diminishes the substantive right of the defendant in criminal case, and this Court has no power or authority to promulgate it and
therefore is null and void.
The fact that the majority of this Court has ruled in the above cited case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, that the inferior or
justice of the peace courts have discretion to grant a defendant's request to have the witnesses for the prosecution recalled to testify
again in the presence of the defendant and be cross-examined by the latter, does not validate said provision; because to make the
exercise of an absolute right discretionary or dependent upon the will or discretion of the court or officer making the preliminary
investigation, is evidently to diminish or modify it.
Petition is therefore granted.
The petitioner filed a petition for review with the Tax Court, which on February 26, 1982 held the petitioner liable only for the income tax
for the period from January 1 to August 3, 1969 or before the passage of Republic Act No. 6020 which reiterated its tax exemption. The
petitioner appealed to this Court.
It contends that the Tax Court erred (1) in not holding that the franchise tax paid by the petitioner is a commutative tax which already
includes the income tax; (2) in holding that Republic Act No. 5431 as amended, altered or repealed petitioner's franchise; (3) in holding
that petitioner's franchise is a contract which can be impaired by an implied repeal and (4) in not holding that section 24(d) of the Tax
Code should be construed strictly against the Government.
We hold that Congress could impair petitioner's legislative franchise by making it liable for income tax from which heretofore it was
exempted by virtue of the exemption provided for in section 3 of its franchise.
The Constitution provides that a franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so
requires (Sec. 8, Art. XIV, 1935 Constitution; Sec. 5, Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution),
Section 1 of petitioner's franchise, Republic Act No. 3247, provides that it is subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the
terms and conditions established in Act No. 3636 whose section 12 provides that the franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by Congress.

Republic Act No. 5431, in amending section 24 of the Tax Code by subjecting to income tax all corporate taxpayers not expressly
exempted therein and in section 27 of the Code, had the effect of withdrawing petitioner's exemption from income tax.
G.R. No. L-60126 September 25, 1985
The Tax Court acted correctly in holding that the exemption was restored by the subsequent enactment on August 4, 1969 of Republic
CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT CO., INC., petitioner, Act No. 6020 which reenacted the said tax exemption. Hence, the petitioner is liable only for the income tax for the period from January
vs. 1 to August 3, 1969 when its tax exemption was modified by Republic Act No. 5431.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
It is relevant to note that franchise companies, like the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, have been paying income tax in
Quasha, De Guzman Makalintal & Barot for petitioner. addition to the franchise tax.

AQUINO, J.:
This is about the liability of petitioner Cagayan Electric Power & Light Co., Inc. for income tax amounting to P75,149.73 for the more
than seven-month period of the year 1969 in addition to franchise tax.
The petitioner is the holder of a legislative franchise, Republic Act No. 3247, under which its payment of 3% tax on its gross earnings
from the sale of electric current is "in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever authority upon privileges, earnings, income,
franchise, and poles, wires, transformers, and insulators of the grantee, from which taxes and assessments the grantee is hereby
expressly exempted" (Sec. 3).
On June 27, 1968, Republic Act No. 5431 amended section 24 of the Tax Code by making liable for income tax all corporate
taxpayers not specifically exempt under paragraph (c) (1) of said section and section 27 of the Tax Code notwithstanding the
"provisions of existing special or general laws to the contrary". Thus, franchise companies were subjected to income tax in addition to
franchise tax.
However, it cannot be denied that the said 1969 assessment appears to be highly controversial. The Commissioner at the outset was
not certain as to petitioner's income tax liability. It had reason not to pay income tax because of the tax exemption in its franchise.
For this reason, it should be liable only for tax proper and should not be held liable for the surcharge and interest. (Advertising
Associates, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Court of Tax Appeals, G. R. No. 59758, December 26, 1984,133 SCRA
765; Imus Electric Co., Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 125 Phil. 1024; C.M. Hoskins & Co., Inc. vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, L-28383, June 22, 1976, 71 SCRA 511.)
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed with the modification that the petitioner is liable only for the tax proper and that
it should not pay the delinquency penalties. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

However, in petitioner's case, its franchise was amended by Republic Act No. 6020, effective August 4, 1969, by authorizing the
petitioner to furnish electricity to the municipalities of Villanueva and Jasaan, Misamis Oriental in addition to Cagayan de Oro City and
the municipalities of Tagoloan and Opol. The amendment reenacted the tax exemption in its original charter or neutralized the
modification made by Republic Act No. 5431 more than a year before.

By reason of the amendment to section 24 of the Tax Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in a demand letter dated February
15, 1973 required the petitioner to pay deficiency income taxes for 1968-to 1971. The petitioner contested the assessments. The
Commissioner cancelled the assessments for 1970 and 1971 but insisted on those for 1968 and 1969.
G.R. No. 149743 February 18, 2005
LEONARDO TAN, ROBERT UY and LAMBERTO TE, petitioners,
vs.
SOCORRO Y. PEREÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The resolution of the present petition effectively settles the question of how many cockpits may be allowed to operate in a city or
municipality.
There are two competing values of high order that come to fore in this case—the traditional power of the national government to enact
police power measures, on one hand, and the vague principle of local autonomy now enshrined in the Constitution on the other. The
facts are simple, but may be best appreciated taking into account the legal milieu which frames them.
In 1974, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 449, otherwise known as the Cockfighting Law of 1974, was enacted. Section 5(b) of the
Decree provided for limits on the number of cockpits that may be established in cities and municipalities in the following manner:
Section 5. Cockpits and Cockfighting in General. –
(b) Establishment of Cockpits. – Only one cockpit shall be allowed in each city or municipality, except that in cities or municipalities with
a population of over one hundred thousand, two cockpits may be established, maintained and operated.
With the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991,1 the municipal sangguniang bayan were empowered, "[a]ny law to the
contrary notwithstanding," to "authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate
cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks."2
In 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Daanbantayan,3 Cebu Province, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 6 (Ordinance
No. 6), Series of 1993, which served as the Revised Omnibus Ordinance prescribing and promulgating the rules and regulations
governing cockpit operations in Daanbantayan.4 Section 5 thereof, relative to the number of cockpits allowed in the municipality, stated:
Section 5. There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of Daanbantayan, Province of Cebu, not more than its equal number of
cockpits based upon the population provided for in PD 449, provided however, that this specific section can be amended for purposes
of establishing additional cockpits, if the Municipal population so warrants.5
Shortly thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan passed an amendatory ordinance, Municipal Ordinance No. 7 (Ordinance No. 7), Series of
1993, which amended the aforequoted Section 5 to now read as follows:
Section 5. Establishment of Cockpit. There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of Daanbantayan, Province of Cebu, not more
than three (3) cockpits.6
On 8 November 1995, petitioner Leonardo Tan (Tan) applied with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission for the issuance of a
permit/license to establish and operate a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay, in Daanbantayan. At the time of his application, there was
already another cockpit in operation in Daanbantayan, operated by respondent Socorro Y. Pereña (Pereña), who was the duly
franchised and licensed cockpit operator in the municipality since the 1970s. Pereña’s franchise, per records, was valid until 2002. 7
The Municipal Gamefowl Commission favorably recommended to the mayor of Daanbantayan, petitioner Lamberto Te (Te), that a
permit be issued to Tan. On 20 January 1996, Te issued a mayor’s permit allowing Tan "to establish/operate/conduct" the business of a
cockpit in Combado, Bagay, Daanbantayan, Cebu for the period from 20 January 1996 to 31 December 1996.8
This act of the mayor served as cause for Pereña to file a Complaint for damages with a prayer for injunction against Tan, Te, and
Roberto Uy, the latter allegedly an agent of Tan.9 Pereña alleged that there was no lawful basis for the establishment of a second
cockpit. She claimed that Tan conducted his cockpit fights not in Combado, but in Malingin, at a site less than five kilometers away from
her own cockpit. She insisted that the unlawful operation of Tan’s cockpit has caused injury to her own legitimate business, and
demanded damages of at least Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) per month as actual damages, One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱150,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as exemplary damages. Pereña also prayed that the permit
issued by Te in favor of Tan be declared as null and void, and that a permanent writ of injunction be issued against Te and Tan
preventing Tan from conducting cockfights within the municipality and Te from issuing any authority for Tan to pursue such activity.10
The case was heard by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),11 Branch 61 of Bogo, Cebu, which initially granted a writ of preliminary
injunction.12 During trial, herein petitioners asserted that under the Local Government Code of 1991, the sangguniang bayan of each
municipality now had the power and authority to grant franchises and enact ordinances authorizing the establishment, licensing,
operation and maintenance of cockpits.13 By virtue of such authority, the Sangguniang Bayan of Daanbantayan promulgated Ordinance
Nos. 6 and 7. On the other hand, Pereña claimed that the amendment authorizing the operation of not more than three (3) cockpits in
Daanbantayan violated Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law of 1974, which allowed for only one cockpit in a municipality with a
population as Daanbantayan.14
In a Decision dated 10 March 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. The court observed that Section 5 of Ordinance No. 6, prior to its
amendment, was by specific provision, an implementation of the Cockfighting Law. 15 Yet according to the RTC, questions could be
raised as to the efficacy of the subsequent amendment under Ordinance No. 7, since under the old Section 5, an amendment allowing
additional cockpits could be had only "if the municipal population so warrants."16 While the RTC seemed to doubt whether this condition
had actually been fulfilled, it nonetheless declared that since the case was only for damages, "the [RTC] cannot grant more relief than
that prayed for."17 It ruled that there was no evidence, testimonial or documentary, to show that plaintiff had actually suffered damages.
Neither was there evidence that Te, by issuing the permit to Tan, had acted in bad faith, since such issuance was pursuant to municipal
ordinances that nonetheless remained in force.18 Finally, the RTC noted that the assailed permit had expired on 31 December 1996,
and there was no showing that it had been renewed.19
Pereña filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated 24 February 1998. In this Order, the RTC categorically
stated that Ordinance Nos. 6 and 7 were "valid and legal for all intents and purpose[s]."20 The RTC also noted that the Sangguniang
Bayan had also promulgated Resolution No. 78-96, conferring on Tan a franchise to operate a cockpit for a period of ten (10) years
from February 1996 to 2006.21 This Resolution was likewise affirmed as valid by the RTC. The RTC noted that while the ordinances
seemed to be in conflict with the Cockfighting Law, any doubt in interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grant of more power to
the local government unit, following the principles of devolution under the Local Government Code.22
The Decision and Order of the RTC were assailed by Pereña on an appeal with the Court of Appeals which on 21 May 2001, rendered
the Decision now assailed.23 The perspective from which the Court of Appeals viewed the issue was markedly different from that
adopted by the RTC. Its analysis of the Local Government Code, particularly Section 447(a)(3)(V), was that the provision vesting unto
the sangguniang bayan the power to authorize and license the establishment of cockpits did not do away with the Cockfighting Law, as
these two laws are not necessarily inconsistent with each other. What the provision of the Local Government Code did, according to the
Court of Appeals, was to transfer to the sangguniang bayan powers that were previously conferred on the Municipal Gamefowl
Commission.24
Given these premises, the appellate court declared as follows:
Ordinance No. 7 should [be] held invalid for allowing, in unconditional terms, the operation of "not more than three cockpits in Daan
Bantayan" (sic), clearly dispensing with the standard set forth in PD 449. However, this issue appears to have been mooted by the
expiration of the Mayor’s Permit granted to the defendant which has not been renewed.25
As to the question of damages, the Court of Appeals agreed with the findings of the RTC that Pereña was not entitled to damages.
Thus, it affirmed the previous ruling denying the claim for damages. However, the Court of Appeals modified the RTC’s Decision in that
it now ordered that Tan be enjoined from operating a cockpit and conducting any cockfights within Daanbantayan. 26
Thus, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioners present two legal questions for determination: whether the Local Government Code has rendered inoperative the
Cockfighting Law; and whether the validity of a municipal ordinance may be determined in an action for damages which does not even
contain a prayer to declare the ordinance invalid.27 As the denial of the prayer for damages by the lower court is not put in issue before
this Court, it shall not be passed upon on review.
The first question raised is particularly interesting, and any definitive resolution on that point would have obvious ramifications not only
to Daanbantayan, but all other municipalities and cities. However, we must first determine the proper scope of judicial inquiry that we
could engage in, given the nature of the initiatory complaint and the rulings rendered thereupon, the exact point raised in the second
question.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals, in declaring Ordinance No. 7 as invalid, embarked on an unwarranted collateral attack on
the validity of a municipal ordinance.28 Pereña’s complaint, which was for damages with preliminary injunction, did not pray for the nullity
of Ordinance No. 7. The Municipality of Daanbantayan as a local government unit was not made a party to the case, nor did any legal
counsel on its behalf enter any appearance. Neither was the Office of the Solicitor General given any notice of the case.29
These concerns are not trivial.30 Yet, we must point out that the Court of Appeals did not expressly nullify Ordinance No. 7, or any
ordinance for that matter. What the appellate court did was to say that Ordinance No. 7 "should therefore be held invalid" for being in
violation of the Cockfighting Law.31 In the next breath though, the Court of Appeals backtracked, saying that "this issue appears to have
been mooted by the expiration of the Mayor’s Permit granted" to Tan.32
But our curiosity is aroused by the dispositive portion of the assailed Decision, wherein the Court of Appeals enjoined Tan "from
operating a cockpit and conducting any cockfights within" Daanbantayan.33 Absent the invalidity of Ordinance No. 7, there would be no
basis for this injunction. After all, any future operation of a cockpit by Tan in Daanbantayan, assuming all other requisites are complied
with, would be validly authorized should Ordinance No. 7 subsist.
So it seems, for all intents and purposes, that the Court of Appeals did deem Ordinance No. 7 a nullity. Through such resort, did the
appellate court in effect allow a collateral attack on the validity of an ordinance through an action for damages, as the petitioners argue?
The initiatory Complaint filed by Pereña deserves close scrutiny. Immediately, it can be seen that it is not only an action for damages,
but also one for injunction. An action for injunction will require judicial determination whether there exists a right in esse which is to be
protected, and if there is an act constituting a violation of such right against which injunction is sought. At the same time, the mere fact
of injury alone does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. In other words, in order that the law
will give redress for an act causing damage, there must be damnum et injuria¾that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.34
Indubitably, the determination of whether injunction or damages avail in this case requires the ascertainment of whether a second
cockpit may be legally allowed in Daanbantayan. If this is permissible, Pereña would not be entitled either to injunctive relief or
damages.
Moreover, an examination of the specific allegations in the Complaint reveals that Pereña therein puts into question the legal basis for
allowing Tan to operate another cockpit in Daanbantayan. She asserted that "there is no lawful basis for the establishment of a second
cockpit considering the small population of [Daanbantayan],"35 a claim which alludes to Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law which
prohibits the establishment of a second cockpit in municipalities of less than ten thousand (10,000) in population. Pereña likewise
assails the validity of the permit issued to Tan and prays for its annulment, and also seeks that Te be enjoined from issuing any special
permit not only to Tan, but also to "any other person outside of a duly licensed cockpit in Daanbantayan, Cebu."36
It would have been preferable had Pereña expressly sought the annulment of Ordinance No. 7. Yet it is apparent from
her Complaint that she sufficiently alleges that there is no legal basis for the establishment of a second cockpit. More importantly, the
petitioners themselves raised the valid effect of Ordinance No. 7 at the heart of their defense against the complaint, as adverted to in
their Answer.37 The averment in the Answer that Ordinance No. 7 is valid can be considered as an affirmative defense, as it is the
allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the complaint, would nevertheless bar
recovery.38 Clearly then, the validity of Ordinance No. 7 became a justiciable matter for the RTC, and indeed Pereña squarely raised the
argument during trial that said ordinance violated the Cockfighting Law.39 1awphi1.nét
Moreover, the assailed rulings of the RTC, its Decision and subsequent Order denying Pereña’s Motion for Reconsideration, both
discuss the validity of Ordinance No. 7. In the Decision, the RTC evaded making a categorical ruling on the ordinance’s validity because
the case was "only for damages, [thus the RTC could] not grant more relief than that prayed for." This reasoning is unjustified,
considering that Pereña also prayed for an injunction, as well as for the annulment of Tan’s permit. The resolution of these two
questions could very well hinge on the validity of Ordinance No. 7.
Still, in the Order denying Pereña’s Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC felt less inhibited and promptly declared as valid not only
Ordinance No. 7, but also Resolution No. 78-96 of the Sangguniang Bayan dated 23 February 1996, which conferred on Tan a
franchise to operate a cockpit from 1996 to 2006.40 In the Order, the RTC ruled that while Ordinance No. 7 was in apparent conflict with
the Cockfighting Law, the ordinance was justified under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code.
This express affirmation of the validity of Ordinance No. 7 by the RTC was the first assigned error in Pereña’s appeal to the Court of
Appeals.41 In their Appellee’s Brief before the appellate court, the petitioners likewise argued that Ordinance No. 7 was valid and that
the Cockfighting Law was repealed by the Local Government Code.42 On the basis of these arguments, the Court of Appeals rendered
its assailed Decision, including its ruling that the Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law remains in effect notwithstanding the enactment
of the Local Government Code.
Indubitably, the question on the validity of Ordinance No. 7 in view of the continuing efficacy of Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law is
one that has been fully litigated in the courts below. We are comfortable with reviewing that question in the case at bar and make
dispositions proceeding from that key legal question. This is militated by the realization that in order to resolve the question whether
injunction should be imposed against the petitioners, there must be first a determination whether Tan may be allowed to operate a
second cockpit in Daanbantayan. Thus, the conflict between Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law and Ordinance No. 7 now ripens for
adjudication.
In arguing that Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law has been repealed, petitioners cite the following provisions of Section 447(a)(3)(v)
of the Local Government Code:
Section 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section
22 of this Code, and shall:
....
(3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, grant franchises, enact ordinances authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses,
or enact ordinances levying taxes, fees and charges upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality, and pursuant to this legislative authority shall:
....
(v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits,
and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks; Provided, that existing rights should not be prejudiced;
For the petitioners, Section 447(a)(3)(v) sufficiently repeals Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law, vesting as it does on LGUs the power
and authority to issue franchises and regulate the operation and establishment of cockpits in their respective municipalities, any law to
the contrary notwithstanding.
However, while the Local Government Code expressly repealed several laws, the Cockfighting Law was not among them. Section
534(f) of the Local Government Code declares that all general and special laws or decrees inconsistent with the Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly, but such clause is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the acts
that are intended to be repealed.43 It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are disfavored and will not be so
declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.44 As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with knowledge of
all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing a statute it is not intended to interfere with or abrogate a former
law relating to the same subject matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing
as a result of the language used, or unless the latter Act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier.45
Is the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule under the Cockfighting Law clearly and convincingly irreconcilable with Section 447(a)(3)(v) of
the Local Government Code? The clear import of Section 447(a)(3)(v) is that it is the sangguniang bayan which is empowered to
authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of
gamecocks, notwithstanding any law to the contrary. The necessity of the qualifying phrase "any law to the contrary notwithstanding"
can be discerned by examining the history of laws pertaining to the authorization of cockpit operation in this country.
Cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture and was prevalent even during the Spanish
occupation. When the newly-arrived Americans proceeded to organize a governmental structure in the Philippines, they recognized
cockfighting as an activity that needed to be regulated, and it was deemed that it was the local municipal council that was best suited to
oversee such regulation. Hence, under Section 40 of Act No. 82, the general act for the organization of municipal governments
promulgated in 1901, the municipal council was empowered "to license, tax or close cockpits". This power of the municipal council to
authorize or license cockpits was repeatedly recognized even after the establishment of the present Republic in 1946.46 Such authority
granted unto the municipal councils to license the operation of cockpits was generally unqualified by restrictions. 47 The Revised
Administrative Code did impose restrictions on what days cockfights could be held.48
However, in the 1970s, the desire for stricter licensing requirements of cockpits started to see legislative fruit. The Cockfighting Law of
1974 enacted several of these restrictions. Apart from the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule, other restrictions were imposed, such as
the limitation of ownership of cockpits to Filipino citizens.49 More importantly, under Section 6 of the Cockfighting Law, it was the city or
municipal mayor who was authorized to issue licenses for the operation and maintenance of cockpits, subject to the approval of the
Chief of Constabulary or his authorized representatives.50 Thus, the sole discretion to authorize the operation of cockpits was removed
from the local government unit since the approval of the Chief of Constabulary was now required.
P.D. No. 1802 reestablished the Philippine Gamefowl Commission51 and imposed further structure in the regulation of cockfighting.
Under Section 4 thereof, city and municipal mayors with the concurrence of their respective sangguniang panglunsod or sangguniang
bayan, were given the authority to license and regulate cockfighting, under the supervision of the City Mayor or the Provincial Governor.
However, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1802 was subsequently amended, removing the supervision exercised by the mayor or governor and
substituting in their stead the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. The amended provision ordained:
Sec. 4. City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective "Sanggunians" shall have the authority to license and
regulate regular cockfighting pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission and subject to its review and
supervision.
The Court, on a few occasions prior to the enactment of the Local Government Code in 1991, had opportunity to expound on Section 4
as amended. A discussion of these cases will provide a better understanding of the qualifier "any law to the contrary notwithstanding"
provided in Section 447(a)(3)(v).
In Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court,52 theCourt, through Justice Cruz, asserted that the conferment of
the power to license and regulate municipal cockpits in municipal authorities is in line with the policy of local autonomy embodied in the
53
Constitution. The Court affirmed the annulment of a resolution of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission which ordered the revocation
of a permit issued by a municipal mayor for the operation of a cockpit and the issuance of a new permit to a different applicant.
According to the Court, the Philippine Gamefowl Commission did not possess the power to issue cockpit licenses, as this was vested by
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1802, as amended, to the municipal mayor with the concurrence of the sanggunian. It emphasized that the
Philippine Gamefowl Commission only had review and supervision powers, as distinguished from control, over ordinary cockpits.54 The
Court also noted that the regulation of cockpits was vested in municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid down by the
Philippine Gamefowl Commission.55 The Court conceded that "[if] at all, the power to review includes the power to disapprove; but it
does not carry the authority to substitute one’s own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in the exercise of its sound
discretion."
The twin pronouncements that it is the municipal authorities who are empowered to issue cockpit licenses and that the powers of the
Philippine Gamefowl Commission were limited to review and supervision were affirmed in Deang v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,56 Municipality of Malolos v. Libangang Malolos Inc.57 and Adlawan v. Intermediate Appellate Court.58 But notably in Cootauco v.
Court of Appeals,59 the Court especially noted that Philippine Gamefowl Commission did indicate that the Commission’s "power of
review includes the power to disapprove."60 Interestingly, Justice Cruz, the writer of Philippine Gamefowl Commission, qualified his
concurrence in Cootauco "subject to the reservations made in [Philippine Gamefowl Commission] regarding the review powers of the
PGC over cockpit licenses issued by city and municipal mayors."61 1awphi1.nét
These cases reiterate what has been the traditional prerogative of municipal officials to control the issuances of licenses for the
operation of cockpits. Nevertheless, the newly-introduced role of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission vis-à-vis the operation of
cockpits had caused some degree of controversy, as shown by the cases above cited.
Then, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted. There is no more forceful authority on this landmark legislation than Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., its principal author. In his annotations to the Local Government Code, he makes the following remarks relating to
Section 447(a)(3)(v):
12. Licensing power. In connection with the power to grant licenses lodged with it, the Sangguniang Bayan may now regulate not only
businesses but also occupations, professions or callings that do not require government examinations within its
jurisdiction.l^vvphi1.net It may also authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, regulate
cockfighting, and the commercial breeding of gamecocks. Existing rights however, may not be prejudiced. The power to license
cockpits and permits for cockfighting has been removed completely from the Gamefowl Commission.
Thus, that part of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipality of Malolos v. Libangang Malolos, Inc. et al.,
which held that "…the regulation of cockpits is vested in the municipal councils guidelines laid down by the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission" is no longer controlling. Under [Section 447(a)(3)(v)], the power of the Sanggunian concerned is no
longer subject to the supervision of the Gamefowl Commission.62
The above observations may be faulted somewhat in the sense that they fail to acknowledge the Court’s consistent position that the
licensing power over cockpits belongs exclusively to the municipal authorities and not the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. Yet these
views of Senator Pimentel evince the apparent confusion regarding the role of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission as indicated in the
cases previously cited, and accordingly bring the phrase Section 447(a)(3)(v) used in "any law to the contrary notwithstanding" into its
proper light. The qualifier serves notice, in case it was still doubtful, that it is the sanggunian bayan concerned alone which has the
power to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial
breeding of gamecocks within its territorial jurisdiction.
Given the historical perspective, it becomes evident why the legislature found the need to use the phrase "any law to the contrary
notwithstanding" in Section 447(a)(3)(v). However, does the phrase similarly allow the Sangguniang Bayan to authorize more cockpits
than allowed under Section 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law? Certainly, applying the test of implied repeal, these two provisions can stand
together. While the sanggunian retains the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits,
its discretion is limited in that it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such cities or municipalities have
a population of over one hundred thousand, in which case two cockpits may be established. Considering that Section 447(a)(3)(v)
speaks essentially of the identity of the wielder of the power of control and supervision over cockpit operation, it is not inconsistent with
previous enactments that impose restrictions on how such power may be exercised. In short, there is no dichotomy between affirming
the power and subjecting it to limitations at the same time.
Perhaps more essential than the fact that the two controverted provisions are not inconsistent when put together, the Court recognizes
that Section 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law arises from a valid exercise of police power by the national government. Of course, local
governments are similarly empowered under Section 16 of the Local Government Code.l^vvphi1.net The national government ought to
be attuned to the sensitivities of devolution and strive to be sparing in usurping the prerogatives of local governments to regulate the
general welfare of their constituents.
We do not doubt, however, the ability of the national government to implement police power measures that affect the subjects of
municipal government, especially if the subject of regulation is a condition of universal character irrespective of territorial jurisdictions.
Cockfighting is one such condition. It is a traditionally regulated activity, due to the attendant gambling involved 63 or maybe even the fact
that it essentially consists of two birds killing each other for public amusement. Laws have been enacted restricting the days when
cockfights could be held,64 and legislation has even been emphatic that cockfights could not be held on holidays celebrating national
honor such as Independence Day65 and Rizal Day.66
The Whereas clauses of the Cockfighting Law emphasize that cockfighting "should neither be exploited as an object of commercialism
or business enterprise, nor made a tool of uncontrolled gambling, but more as a vehicle for the preservation and perpetuation of native
Filipino heritage and thereby enhance our national identity."67 The obvious thrust of our laws designating when cockfights could be held
is to limit cockfighting and imposing the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule is in line with that aim. Cockfighting is a valid matter of police
power regulation, as it is a form of gambling essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national productivity and self-
reliance.68 Limitation on the number of cockpits in a given municipality is a reasonably necessary means for the accomplishment of the
purpose of controlling cockfighting, for clearly more cockpits equals more cockfights.
If we construe Section 447(a)(3)(v) as vesting an unlimited discretion to the sanggunian to control all aspects of cockpits and
cockfighting in their respective jurisdiction, this could lead to the prospect of daily cockfights in municipalities, a certain distraction in the
daily routine of life in a municipality. This certainly goes against the grain of the legislation earlier discussed. If the arguments of the
petitioners were adopted, the national government would be effectively barred from imposing any future regulatory enactments
pertaining to cockpits and cockfighting unless it were to repeal Section 447(a)(3)(v).

A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, otherwise it is void. 69 Ordinance No. 7 unmistakably
contravenes the Cockfighting Law in allowing three cockpits in Daanbantayan. Thus, no rights can be asserted by the petitioners arising
from the Ordinance. We find the grant of injunction as ordered by the appellate court to be well-taken.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., CJ., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.