Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
G.R. No. L-7083 May 19, 1955 and 122 of Act No. 2874. (Now Com. Act No. 141).
JUAN EUGENIO and BASILIA EUGENIO, petitioners,
vs. Under the existing classification, such contract would be "inexisting" and
SILVINA PERDIDO, ROSITA, JOSE, ROMUALDO, FELIX, "the action or defense for declaration" of such inexistence" does not
ALEJANDRINO, FRANCISCA, ASUNCION, FLORENCIA and AMADO, prescribe". (Art. 1410 New Civil Code). While it is true that this is a new
all surnamed Salang, respondents. provision of the New Civil Code, it is nevertheless a principle recognized
since Tipton vs. Velasco 6 Phil. 67 that "mere lapse of time cannot give
Guillermo E. Boñgolan for petitioners. efficacy to contracts that are null and void"1
Padilla, Carlos, and Fernando for respondents.
The imprescriptibility of plaintiff's action to recover is further strengthened
BENGZON, J.: by Sec. 46 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) providing that "no title
to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals, wherein the acquired by prescription or adverse possession".
relevant facts may be stated as follows:
In this connection it should be explained that the patent issued to the
1. On November 1, 1927 Homestead Patent No. 10847 was issued in the homesteader Teodoro Eugenio was recorded in the registry of deeds of
name of Teodoro Eugenio; 2. On March 12, 1932 Teodoro Eugenio in the Nueva Viscaya, and that Original Certificate of Title No. 62 dated
presence of his son Juan, and daughter Basilia, (plaintiffs in the case) December 5, 1927 Exhibit X was issued in his name. Such being the
sold the homestead and delivered possession thereof, for the sum of case his homestead was considered "registered within the meaning of
P1,300.00 to the defendant Silvina Perdido and her husband Clemente the Land Registration Act No. 496"2, and enjoys the same privileges as
Sadang, whose heirs are joined as defendants and respondents; 3. On Torrens titles issued under said legislations.3
May 4, 1949 this action was filed to recover the land, upon the theory that
the contract was mere mortgage of the homestead, which plaintiff The imprescriptibility of such title has recently been recognized in Acierto
inherited from their father; and that they had attempted unsuccessfully to vs. de los Santos, L-5828, Sept. 1954.
repay the debt; 4. The court of first instance held the contract to be a
contract of sale, which was void, because executed within five years from We are aware, of course, that title by adverse possession (acquisitive
the issuance of the homestead patent; therefore it ordered to return of the prescription) is distinct from the statute of limitations (extinctive
property upon repayment of P1,300.00 with interest; 5. On appeal, the prescription)4 and the operations and effects of such distinction has been
Court of Appeals reversed the award holding that plaintiffs had no explored during the discussions of this petitions for review.
personality to attack the validity of the sale, and that all they had was the
right to repurchase which they failed to exercise within five years from But we have finally agreed that as to lands registered under the Torrens
March 12, 1932. system, ten years' adverse possession may not be permitted to defeat
the owners' right to possession — which is the necessary incident
Denial of plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, led to the presentation of this ownership. Otherwise loss of the land by prescription would be indirectly
petition for review, which is based upon two legal propositions, to wit: (1) approved, in violation of Sec. 46 of the Land Registration Act. This
The action to annul the sale in 1932 had not prescribed; (2) the right to statute, being a later enactment, may be said to have partially amended
repurchase within the five-year period has not lapsed, inasmuch as the the Statute of Limitation established in Act No. 190 in so far as registered
sale was never registered. lands are concerned.
There is no question that the sale in March 1932 having been made Nevertheless petitioners' case may not so easily prevail on the foregoing
within five years from "the date of issuance of the patent" was "unlawful considerations, for respondents have vigorously pressed several points
needing particular attention.
Admitting arguendo, they say, that the Deeds of Sale violated the decided February 25, 1954, but they were there overruled, this
Homestead Law, nevertheless, the petitioners have no personality to Court holding that the pari delicto doctrine may not be invoked in
prosecute the instant suit, since it is the Government that is the real party a case of this kind since it would run counter to an avowed
in interest, and the object of its suit would be reversion of the property to fundamental policy of the State, that the forfeiture of the
the state. They cite section 124 of Public Land Law (2874) providing that homestead is a matter between the State and the grantee of his
sale "shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution; and shall heirs, and that until the State has taken steps to annul the grant
produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent etc. . and asserts title to the homestead the purchaser is, as against
. . and cause the reversion of the property" to the State. The answer to the vendor or his heirs, "no more entitled to keep the land than
this is that the reversion is not automatic, (Villacorta vs. Ulanday, 73 Phil. any intruder." (Acierto vs. De los Santos 95 Phil., 887).
655) and so long as the Government has not chosen to act, the rights of
the homesteader stand and must be recognized in the courts of law.5 Lastly respondents say, "Granting, without conceding, that petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, Teodoro Eugenio, could not have conveyed his
Respondents also content that, having executed the deed of the sale, homestead title on March 12, 1932, yet his subsequent acquisition of a
petitioners are estopped from denying defendants' ownership and complete homestead title sufficient for conveyancing under the
possession, or that, at least, being in pari delicto they should not be Homestead Law on November 1, 1932 validated whatever defect the title
allowed to recover. of Clemente Sadang might have had."
As to the first point, it is enough to remember that no estoppel can be A similar consideration was rejected in Sabas vs. Garma 66 Phil. 471,
predicted on an illegal act. (19 Am. Jur. p. 804). The principle of estoppel probably for the reason that a non-existent contract could not be ratified.
as contented by respondents would mean something like this: petitioners
having represented and led the respondents to believe, that the sale was Wherefore, in view of the foregoing consideration, the decision under
valid, they may not thereafter allege it is invalid. Yet the respondents are review should be, and is hereby reversed. Plaintiffs are permitted to
conclusively presumed to know the law, and should not be allowed to recover the homestead upon payment of P1,300.00 to defendants. Costs
plead estoppel which is founded in ignorance.. shall be paid by the latter. So ordered.
A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained There is also nothing in the commissioner's report that substantiates
and so a paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and petitioner's claim that the disputed land was inside his property. Petitioner
quantity of capitalizes on the lower court's statement in its decision 46 that "as
land. 38 A survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an reflected in the commissioner's report dated May 23, 1984 (Exhibit 3-3-
instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode in A), the area claimed is inside lot 3918 of the defendants(Exhibit 2)" 47 or
which a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of the common the private respondents. A careful reading of the decision would show
estate. 39Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of that this statement is found in the summary of defendants' (herein private
acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the respondents) evidence. Reference to Lot No. 3918 may, therefore, be
survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive attributed to mere oversight as the lower court even continues to state
as to ownership as it may refer only to a delineation of possession. 40 the defendants' assertion that the 2-hectare land is part of their 5.5-
hectare property. Hence, it is not amiss to conclude that either petitioner
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of misapprehended the lower court's decision or he is trying to
Lands in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the contumaciously mislead or worse, deceive this Court.
Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law
ordains that private surveyors send their original field notes, With respect to the awards of moral damages of P10,000.00 and
computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of attorney's fees of P2,000.00, the Court finds no cogent reason to delete
property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. 41 A survey the same. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings to the effect that where
plan not verified and approved by said Bureau is nothing more than a fraud and bad faith have been established, the award of moral damages
private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be is in order. 48 This pronouncement finds support in Art. 2219 (10) of the
proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The Civil Code allowing the recovery of moral damages for acts enumerated
circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence without any in Art. 21 of the same Code. This article states that "(a)ny person who
objection as to its due execution and authenticity does not signify that the wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each other. This Court damage." The moral damages are hereby increased to P30,000.00. We
cannot alter the conclusions of agree with the respondent court in holding that the award of attorney's
the Court of Appeals on the credibility accorded to evidence presented by fees is justified because petitioner filed a clearly unfounded civil
the parties. 42 action. 49
Similarly, petitioner's tax declaration issued under his name is not even WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
persuasive evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A DENIED and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals
tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against
ownership. 43 It is merely an indicium of a claim of petitioner. SO ORDERED.
CASE 3 that he acquired ownership over both the sugarland and the riceland by
G.R. No. 121157 July 31, 1997 donation propter nuptias from his parents Ramon Bauzon and Sotera
HEIRS OF SEGUNDA MANINGDING, represented by DELFIN, GIL, Zulueta on 21 April 1926 in consideration of his marriage to Petra
EMMA, MANUEL, RACQUEL, ESTER, REMEDIOS and JESSIE, all Loresco. Since the death of Ramon Bauzon in 1948, Roque had been in
surnamed PARAYNO, MAXIMA PARAYNO, LEONARDO PARAYNO open, continuous, notorious, adverse and actual possession of the
and FELICISIMA PARAYNO, petitioners, subject properties.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROQUE BAUZON (deceased), represented The trial court found that the parcels of land formed part of the estate of
by his heirs and co-defendants Luis and Eriberta Bauzon; LUIS Ramon Bauzon and his wife Sotera Zulueta which, upon their death,
BAUZON, ERIBERTA BAUZON (deceased), substituted by her devolved by right of succession to their children Segunda Maningding,
husband PLACIDO ZULUETA, and JOSE PARAYNO, respondents. Maria Maningding, Juan Maningding and Roque Bauzon in equal pro-
indiviso shares. The court a quo however awarded both parcels to
BELLOSILLO, J.: Segunda Maningding and Roque Bauzon as co-owners in equal shares
after finding that Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding had already
This is an action for annulment of documents, accounting and partition of executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation. It rejected the deed
two (2) parcels of land, a riceland and a sugarland, situated in Calasiao, of donation for failure to prove its due execution and authenticity and
Pangasinan. Petitioners claim that they, together with private ruled that the same was negated by the Affidavit of Quitclaim and
respondents Luis and Eriberta Bauzon, own the disputed lots in common Renunciation of Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding in favor of
and pro-indiviso. Luis and Eriberta, the latter represented by her husband Roque Bauzon and nullified the deed of sale by Roque Bauzon in favor of
Placido Zulueta, aver that their father Roque Bauzon was the owner of Luis Bauzon as regards the riceland and to Eriberta Bauzon with respect
the subject lots by virtue of a deed of donation propter nuptias. Roque, to the sugarland. It concluded that Roque Bauzon could not have validly
together with Juan Maningding, Maria Maningding and Segunda conveyed both parcels as one-half (1/2) of each parcel rightfully belonged
Maningding were the surviving children of Ramon Bauzon y Untalan who to Segunda Maningding and her heirs.
died intestate in 1948. According to petitioners, Roque Bauzon
repudiated the co-ownership over the sugarland in 1965 and adjudicated The Court of Appeals however ruled that the properties validly pertained
it to himself,1 and that in 1970 Juan and Maria Maningding renounced to Roque Bauzon by virtue of the donationpropter nuptias. Consequently,
and quitclaimed their shares over the riceland in favor of Roque Bauzon the transfers made by Roque Bauzon must be given effect. However,
by virtue of an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation.2 Subsequently, upon motion for reconsideration, the same deed of donation was
Roque Bauzon transferred the riceland to his son Luis Bauzon and the declared null and void by the appellate court for failure to comply with Art.
sugarland to his daughter Eriberta Bauzon, both transactions being 633 of the old Civil Code, the law then applicable, which required for the
evidenced by deeds of sale. validity of the deed of donation to be in a public instrument. Nevertheless,
the same court maintained that the properties belonged to Roque Bauzon
On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
discovered the transfers made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his children
only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the We agree with the Court of Appeals. Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership
properties as well as the accounting of the produce but were over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, in
unsuccessful. general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights
through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down
On the other hand private respondents aver that the Affidavit of Quitclaim by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an
and Renunciation over the riceland was executed not only by Juan owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.3 Acquisitive
Maningding and Maria Maningding but also by Segunda Maningding. prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary.4 Ordinary acquisitive
With regard to the sugarland, Roque Bauzon denied having executed prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication presented by petitioners. He claimed (10) years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights
over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good We do not need to stretch our mind to see that under such
faith.5 allegations plaintiffs intended to convey the idea that defendant
has possessed the lands openly, adversely and without
The disputed lots are unregistered lands, both parcels being covered only interruption from 1916 to 1949 for he is the one who has
by tax declarations formerly in the name of Ramon Bauzon and now possessed and reaped the whole benefit thereof. As to the
transferred to Luis and Eriberta Bauzon. While tax declarations and character of the possession held by defendant during that period
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled one cannot also deny that it is in the concept of owner
with proof of actual possession, as in the instant case, tax declarations considering that the lands were donated to him by his
and receipts are strong evidence of ownership.6 predecessors-in-interest on the occasion of his marriage even if
the same was not embodied in a public instrument. The essential
Even assuming that the donation proper nuptias is void for failure to elements constituting acquisitive prescription are therefore
comply with formal requisites,7 it could still constitute a legal basis for present which negative the right of plaintiffs to ask for partition of
adverse possession. With clear and convincing evidence of possession, said properties. On this point we find pertinent the following
a private document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of observation of the trial court; "Any person who claims right of
ownership.8 In Pensader v. Pensader9 we ruled that while the verbal ownership over immovable properties and does not invoke that
donation under which the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest right but instead tolerated others in possession for thirty years is
have been in possession of the lands in question is not effective as a guilty of laches and negligence and he must suffer the
transfer of title, still it is a circumstance which may explain the adverse consequence of his acts."
and exclusive character of the possession. In Espique v. Espique10 we
held — In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land
in the concept of owner by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and
because it involves an immovable property and the donation was cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were
not made in a public document as required by Article 633 of the manifest and visible to all. These acts were made more pronounced and
old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of the same Code public considering that the parcels of land are located in a municipality
(concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not follow that said wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally known
donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when to the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was
on the strength thereof the done has taken possession of the never ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His
property adversely and in the concept of owner, or, as this Court possession was uninterrupted and in good faith because of his well-
well said: "While the verbal donation, under which the defendants founded belief that the donation propter nuptias was properly executed
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective shares in
lands in question, is not effective as a transfer of title, yet it is a his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole produce of the
circumstances which may explain the adverse and exclusive parcels of land to the exclusion of all others.
character of the possession' (Pensader v. Pensader, 47 Phil. 673,
680). This also an action for partition. It was shown that the The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as 21 April 1926. It
donation of the property was made not even in a private was only in 1986 when the heirs of Segunda Maningding demanded
document but only verbally. It was also shown that the partition of the properties and conveyance of the produce. Sixty (60)
defendants, through their predecessors-in-interest, were in years have already elapsed. Even granting that Roque Bauzon
adverse and continuous possession of the lands for a period of possessed the properties only upon the death of his father in 1948, more
over 30 years. Yet, the court decided the case in favor of than thirty (30) years have already passed. In either case, acquisitive
defendants on the ground of acquisitive prescription. There is a prescription has already set in in favor of Roque Bauzon.
close parallelism between the facts of this case and the present.
Again, even if we assume the absence of good faith and just title, the
xxx xxx xxx ownership of the two (2) parcels would still appertain to Roque Bauzon.
As testified to by Delfin Parayno, one of petitioners, Roque Bauzon and
his heirs had been in continuous, adverse and public possession of the
property since 1948 up to 1986, or a period of thirty-six (36) years, which
is more than the required thirty-year extraordinary prescription.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 4 TCT No. 16007 in the names of the three sons, as follows : "DR.
G.R. No. 122047 October 12, 2000 CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, married to Cresenciana V. Alejo, 113.34
SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE SI, petitioners, Square Meters; JOSE R. ARMADA, married to Remedios Almanzor, 113.33
vs. Square Meters; and DR. SEVERO R. ARMADA, Jr., single, all of legal age,
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE ARMADA and REMEDIOS Filipinos."4 Annotated also in the title is the total cancellation of said title "...
ALMANZOR (deceased, and substituted by heirs: Cynthia Armada, by virtue of the Deed of Sale, (P.E. 77952/T-24751), dated March 28, 1979,
Danilo Armada and Vicente Armada) respondents. executed by CRESENCIANA V. ALEJO, as attorney-in-fact of
CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, conveying 113.34 square meters of the
DECISION property herein, in favor of ANITA BONODE SI, married to Serafin D. Si, for
QUISUMBING, J.: the sum of P75,000.00, issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.
24751, Reg. Book T-102. (Doc. No. 17, Page No. 5, Book No. 253 of Notary
This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 assails the Decision1 dated March Public of Pasay City, Manila, Julian Florentino)."5
25, 1994, of the Court of Appeals and its Resolutions 2 dated March 24, 1995
and September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727. The Court of Appeals On April 15, 1980, herein spouses Jose Armada and Remedios Almanzor,
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 113, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Title
and nullified the sale of the subject lot by the spouses Crisostomo and with Damages, against herein petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado
Cresenciana Armada to spouses Serafin and Anita Si. The dispositive portion Isada, brother-in-law of Cresenciana. Isada brokered the sale.
of the respondent court's decision reads:
The complaint alleged that Conrado Isada sold Crisostomo's share by
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is making it appear that Cresenciana, the attorney-in-fact of her husband, is a
hereby REVERSED, and a new one is rendered: Filipino citizen, residing with Isada at No. 13-4th Camarilla Street, Murphy,
1) Annulling and declaring as invalid the registration of the Deed of Cubao, Quezon City. By this time, Crisostomo and Cresenciana had
Absolute Sale dated March 27, 1979 executed by Cresenciana V. migrated and were already citizens of the United States of America. It also
Alejo in favor of Anita Bonode Si. stated that when petitioners registered the deed of absolute sale they
2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to annul and cancel inserted the phrase "... and that the co-owners are not interested in buying
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751, issued in the name of Anita the same in spite of notice to them.", and that petitioners knew of the
Bonode Si, married to Serafin D. Si., Jose R. Armada, married to misrepresentations of Conrado. Further, the complaint alleged that the other
Remedios Almanzor and Dr. Severo R. Armada Jr., single. owners, Jose and Severo, Jr., had no written notice of the sale; and that all
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to reconstitute and upon learning of the sale to the spouses Si, private respondents filed a
revive Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16007 in the names of Jose, complaint for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title with damages,
Crisostomo and Severo, Jr. claiming they had a right of redemption.
4) That plaintiffs be allowed to repurchase or redeem the share
corresponding to the share of Crisostomo Armada within thirty (30) Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that on October 2, 1954, Escolastica,
days from notice in writing by Crisostomo Armada. with the consent of her husband executed three separate deeds of sale
5) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to pay (Exhibits 1, 2, and 3)6 conveying 113.34 square meters of the property to
the plaintiffs-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages. Severo, and 113.33 square meters each to Crisostomo and Jose. The three
6) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to deeds of sale particularly described the portion conveyed to each son in
pay the plaintiff-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's metes and bounds. Petitioners contend that since the property was already
fees and litigation expenses and costs of suit. SO ORDERED."3 three distinct parcels of land, there was no longer co-ownership among the
brothers. Hence, Jose and Severo, Jr. had no right of redemption when
The factual background of the case is as follows: Crisostomo sold his share to the spouses Si. Petitioners point out that it was
The 340 square meters of land, situated in San Jose District, Pasay City, the only because the Armada brothers failed to submit the necessary subdivision
property in dispute, originally belonged to Escolastica, wife of Severo plan to the Office of the Register of Deeds in Pasay City that separate titles
Armada, Sr. This was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. were not issued and TCT No. 16007 was issued and registered in the names
(17345) 2460. During the lifetime of the spouses, the property was of Jose, Crisostomo, and Severo, Jr.
transferred to their children and the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, issued
After trial on the merits, the court ruled for petitioners: On December 5, 1994, petitioners filed their motion for new trial under
Section 1, Rule 53 of the Revised Rules of Court.9 Petitioners presented new
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED. evidence, TCT No. (17345) 2460, registered in the name of Escolastica de la
With costs against the plaintiffs."7 Rosa, married to Severo Armada, Sr., with annotation at the back stating that
the cancellation was by virtue of three deeds of sale in favor of Escolastica's
sons. On March 24, 1995, respondent court denied the motion, reasoning
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 25, 1994,
that when the motion was filed, the reglementary period had lapsed and the
the appellate court issued the decision now assailed by petitioners. In
reversing the decision of the trial court and ruling for private respondents, the decision had become final and executory. Petitioners' motion for
Court of Appeals found that: reconsideration of said resolution was denied.
"Rightfully, as early as October 2, 1954, the lot in question had already been The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners."
partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed of sales (sic) in favor
of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, all surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, & 3), Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose Armada was well informed
which documents purports to have been registered with the Register of of the impending sale of Crisostomo's share in the land. In a letter dated
Deeds of Pasay City, on September 18, 1970, and as a consequence TCT February 22, 1979, Jose told his brother Crisostomo: "Well you are the king
No. 16007 (Exh. A) was issued. Notably, every portion conveyed and of yourselves, and you can sell your share of Leveriza."25 Co-owners with
transferred to the three sons was definitely described and segregated and actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. A written notice is a
with the corresponding technical description (sic). In short, this is what we formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the
call extrajudicial partition. Moreover, every portion belonging to the three sale to enable them to exercise their right of redemption within the limited
sons has been declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of period of thirty days. But where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at
Pasay City on September 21, 1970. These are the unblinkable facts that the the time thereof and/or afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to
portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants Crisostomo Armada and them, would be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is
Cresenciana Armada was concretely determined and identifiable. The fact unnecessary.26
that the three portions are embraced in one certificate of title does not make
said portions less determinable or identifiable or distinguishable, one from
Considering that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that herein
the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their
private respondent could redeem the lot bought by petitioners, the issue of
respective owners. Hence, no right of redemption among co-owners
whether the appellate court erred in denying petitioners' motions for
exists."20 (citation omitted) reconsideration and new trial need not be delved into.1âwphi1 The same is
true with respect to the questioned award of damages and attorney's fees.
". . . [T]he herein plaintiffs cannot deny the fact that they did not have Petitioners filed their complaint in good faith and as repeatedly held, we
knowledge about the impending sale of this portion. The truth of the matter is cannot put a premium on the right to litigate.
that they were properly notified. Reacting to such knowledge and notification
they wrote defendant Dr. Crisostomo Armada on February 22, 1979, a WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the Court of
portion of said letter is revealing: 'Well you are the king of yourselves, and
Appeals dated March 25, 1994 and its Resolutions dated March 24, 1995
you can sell your share of Levereza."21 (emphasis omitted)
and September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727 are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 8023-P is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision
After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, promulgated on
ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each August 29, 1989, is REINSTATED.
brother was no longer available.22
SO ORDERED.
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code,23 there is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. There
is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are
already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described.24 This situation makes inapplicable the provision on the
right of redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code, as follows:
CASE 5 uncle, they did actually offer to sell said property to appellant and to other
relatives who jointly own another adjoining property of about 86 square
G.R. No. 51655 November 29, 1989 meters, prior to its sale to Alejandra Sanchez, but they refused to buy the
VICENTE DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, same because of financial incapacity. On the other hand, appellant's
vs. claim that he sincerely wanted to buy the said property is belied by the
SPOUSES JULIO BANSIL and JOSEFINA TAMAYO and ALEJANDRA fact that appellant, thru his wife Emiliana Gonzales, had consistently
SANCHEZ, respondents. offered and appealed to appellee Alejandra Sanchez, before and after
the latter bought the property, to likewise buy appellant's lot of about 86
square meters. The only reason why appellee Alejandra Sanchez failed
PARAS, J.: to buy the properties offered was due to disagreement over the price.
Said failure to sell was surmised to have brought great disenchantment
This case, filed with the Court of Appeals but forwarded to this Court for and ill will to appellant which eventually caused the filing of the instant
disposition since it involves purely questions of law, is an appeal from the complaint. At any rate, as additional proof appellees alleged that a
September 5, 1977 decision of the then Court of First Instance of signboard "House and Lot for Sale" was posted in appellant's premises
Pampanga, Branch VI, presided over by Hon. Mariano Castaneda, Jr. for several months prior to the filing of the complaint, to which several
dismissing the complaint of herein appellant. prospective buyers responded. Appellees argued further that under
appellant's own unfounded theory that adjoining property owners have
legal pre-emptive rights in the sale of adjoining properties, Alejandra
Herein appellant Vicente del Rosario and appellee Julio Bansil are uncle
Sanchez must certainly have as much right and should be preferred,
and nephew, and two (2) of the heirs of Pelagia Sanchez. On November
being an adjoining property owner herself of about 300 square meters, as
28, 1973, the heirs of Pelagia Sanchez executed an extrajudicial
compared to only about 86 square meters of the adjoining property
partition, and pursuant to the same, appellant was given Lot No. 2854-A,
belonging to appellant. (Record on Appeal, p. 32).
now registered in his name and that of his spouse Emiliana Gonzales
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125739-R of the Register of Deeds
of Pampanga. On the other hand, appellee Julio Bansil received as his On July 28, 1976, appellant filed his Reply with Answer to Counterclaim
share an adjacent lot, Lot No. 2654-B, which was registered in his name (Record on Appeal, pp. 17-21), to which appellees filed their Rejoinder on
and that of his spouse Josefina Tamayo under Transfer Certificate of September 1, 1976 (Record on Appeal, pp. 21-24).
Title No. 125740-R of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. On May 10,
1976, the said share of appellee Julio Bansil was sold to herein other On October 20, 1976, the parties filed a Joint Petition for Judgment on
appellee, Alejandra Sanchez, for P1,500.00 without first being offered to the Pleadings (Record on Appeal, p. 25) on the ground that the principal
appellant Vicente del Rosario as an adjoining owner. Said appellant, issue involved therein being a question of law, that is, the application or
claiming the right of preemption, on May 27, 1976, filed with the then non-application of either or both Articles 1622 and 1623 of the New Civil
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch VI, a complaint, praying for Code. The same, however, was denied by the trial court in an order
the annulment of the sale and for the reconveyance of the said lot in his dated November 15, 1976 (Record on Appeal, p. 26).
favor (Record on Appeal, pp. 4-10). On June 11, 1976, he deposited with
the Clerk of Court the sum of P1,500.00 so that his right of preemption After the hearing on March 28, 1977, wherein the lawyers of the parties
can be upheld (Record on, pp. 11-12). jointly requested the reconsideration of the order denying the joint motion
for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court, in a decision dated
On July 13, 1976, the appellees filed their Answer with Counterclaim September 5, 1977 (Record on Appeal, pp. 30-36), dismissed the
(Record on Appeal, pp. 12-16) controverting the material allegations of complaint—
the complaint and by way of special and affirmative defenses alleged that
the complaint states no valid cause of action as there is no law that grant IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered
such pre-emptive rights to adjoining owners with respect to the sale of dismissing the plaintiffs complaint dated May 27, 1976
adjoining properties. Appellees explained that despite the absence of without pronouncement as to cost.
legal obligation on their part, out of respect to appellant who is their
Not satisfied with the decision, appellant filed an appeal with the Court of As correctly found by the trial court, the two requisites as enumerated
Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 63585-R. above do not obtain in the case at bar as to warrant the exercise of the
right of preemption or redemption by the appellant. As pointed out, the 86
After the parties have submitted their respective briefs, appellant on June square meters lot in question cannot be considered so small for practical
5, 1978 (Rollo, p. 1 5) and appellees on October 19, 1978 (Rollo, p. 23), purposes as a residential house can be constructed thereon in the same
the case was considered submitted for decision (Rollo, p. 27); and in a manner as the residential houses built on two equally sized lots situated
resolution promulgated on September 25, 1979, the Court of Appeals on both sides of the litigated property, one of which belongs to petitioner
*ordered its Clerk of Court to forward to this Court the whole record of the himself. Likewise, true is the fact that the disputed lot had not been
case for final determination (Rollo, pp. 28-29). bought for speculation, the same having been inherited by appellee Julio
Bansil from his grandmother (Record on Appeal, pp. 34-35).
In the resolution dated October 15, 1979 of the First Division of this
Court, this case was ordered docketed and declared submitted for Neither can appellant claim the right of preemption or redemption as co-
decision (Rollo, p. 31). owner after the inherited property has been subdivided and distributed
among co-owners, for then the community has terminated and there is no
Appellant raised two (2) assignments of error, to wit: reason to sustain any right of preemption or redemption (Caro v. Court of
Appeals, 113 SCRA 17 [1982]; Caram et al. v. Court of Appeals et al.,
101 Phil. 315 [1957]).
I
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN APPLYING ART. 1622 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE INSTEAD OF ART. 1623 OF THE SAME CODE WHICH IS In the case at bar, not only was the inherited property partitioned but
APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. actually subdivided into several parcels which were assigned by lots to
II the heirs and Transfer Certificates of Titles have already been issued in
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT DECLARING TRANSFER their respective names.
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 130540-5 ISSUED BY THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT ALEJANDRA PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant appeal (petition) is hereby
SANCHEZ NULL AND VOID AFTER IT WAS SHOWN THAT THE DISMISSED.
REQUIREMENT PROVIDED UNDER THE PROVISION OF ART. 1623
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE WAS NOT COMPLIED, SO ORDERED.
Petitioners are now before this Court seeking the reversal of the decision There is no merit in this petition.
of the Court of Appeals. First, they contend that the subject property is
not conjugal but is owned exclusively by Gertrudes, who was described The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with
in the Deed of Sale between Gertrudes and the DANR as well as in TCT respect to his share alone (CIVL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE
No. 43100 as a widow. Second, assuming the land was conjugal (1889), art. 1514.). While the records show that petitioner redeemed
property, petitioners argue that the same became Gertrudes' exclusively the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that
when, in 1979, she mortgaged the property to the Daily Savings Bank did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to
and Loan Association. The bank later foreclosed on the mortgage in 1981 end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no
but Gertrudes redeemed the same in 1983. doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense.
Under the Civil Code:
The paraphernal or conjugal nature of the property is not determinative of
the ownership of the disputed property. If the property was paraphernal Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-
as contended by petitioners, Gertrudes Isidro would have the absolute owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or
right to dispose of the same, and absolute title and ownership was vested right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may
in petitioners upon the failure of Gertrudes to redeem the property. On exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his
the other hand, if the property was conjugal as private respondents undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses
and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co- all their rights to it, it still ruled against petitioners by affirming the
ownership. Regional Trial Court's decision on the premise that there was no
compliance with Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial hearing
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co- before registration of the property in the name of petitioners. This
ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, provision states:
"may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the
redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality Art. 1607. In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership
does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the in the vendee by virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with
co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the the provisions of article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry
property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been
But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right duly heard.
to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a
co-ownership.
The aforequoted article is intended to minimize the evils which the pacto
de retro sale has caused in the hands of usurers. A judicial order is
1âwphi1
It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only necessary in order to determine the true nature of the transaction and to
dispose of her share in the property owned in common. Article 493 of the prevent the interposition of buyers in good faith while the determination is
Civil Code provides: being made. 10
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another Registry of Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is
not a condition sine qua non to the transfer of ownership. Petitioners are
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with the owners of the subject property since neither Gertrudes nor her co-
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which owners redeemed the same within the one-year period stipulated in the
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the "Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and
co-ownership. ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a
retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a
retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to
Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was perform said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of
registered in TCT No. 43100 solely in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, law absolute title and ownership over the property sold. As title is already
widow." Where a parcel of land, forming past of the undistributed vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his title under
properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership for
widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering
title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser the consolidated title. 11
acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased
spouse. The rationale for this rule is that "a person dealing with
registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in that
condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens the petitioners are deemed owners of the property by reason of the
on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the failure of the vendor, Gertrudes Isidro, to repurchase the same within the
certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the period stipulated. However, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 130584, in
primary objects of the Torrens system."9 the name of Alexander M. Cruz, which was issued without judicial order,
is hereby ordered CANCELLED, and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
43100 in the name of Gertrudes Isidro is ordered REINSTATED, without
As gleaned from the foregoing discussion, despite the Court of Appeals' prejudice to compliance by petitioners with the provisions of Article 1607
finding and conclusion that Gertrudes as well as private respondents of the Civil Code. SO ORDERED.
1âwphi1.nêt
failed to repurchase the property within the period stipulated and has lost
CASE 9
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right
[G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000.] of his father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO, Petitioners, v. COURT
OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, Respondents. On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-
ownership right of his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the
DECISION first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
DE LEON, JR., J.: Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate
the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize
The victory 1 of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the the said area. They went through a series of meetings with the barangay
Municipal Circuit Trial Court 2 in an ejectment suit 3 filed against them by officials concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest
private respondent Silverio Pada, was foiled by its reversal 4 by the Regional efforts toward that end, failed.
Trial Court 5 on appeal. They elevated their cause 6 to respondent Court of
Appeals 7 which, however, promulgated a Decision 8 on May 20, 1998,
On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.clubjuris virtua| |aw |ibrary
Court of Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for ejectment with prayer for
The following facts are undisputed:clubjuris
damages against petitioner spouses.
One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-
Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a Pavo, Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed
parcel of land of residential and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, of Donation 9 transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their
Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
square meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is
the subject of the instant controversy. On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that
the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-
permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was
No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed
together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children
Pastor’s children, has been living in that house since 1960. who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was
effectuated only through a private document that was never registered in
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra- the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
judicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private
document which they, however, never registered in the Office of the The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte. spouses. It made the following findings:ClubJuris
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present "After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties, the court
while his other brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters, finds that the evidence adduced by plaintiff failed to establish his ownership
Valentina and Ruperta, both died without any issue. Marciano was over . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . while defendants has [sic] successfully
represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented by his proved by preponderance of evidence that said property is still under a
daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented by his son, Silverio who is community of ownership among the heirs of the late Jacinto Pada who died
the private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano, intestate. If there was some truth that Marciano Pada and Ananias Pada has
represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was [sic] been adjudicated jointly of [sic] the above-described residential property
allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died, his daughter, . . . as their share of the inheritance on the basis of the alleged extra judicial
Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property. settlement, how come that since 1951, the date of partition, the share of the
late Marciano Pada was not transferred in the name of his heirs, one of them
Maria Pada-Pavo and still remain [sic] in the name of Jacinto Pada up to the "x x x
present while the part pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was easily
transferred in the name of his heirs . . . . ". . . [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada, a brother
of Marciano Pada, took place only during the inception of the case or after
"The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing and the the lapse of more than 40 years reckoned from the time the extrajudicial
genuineness and due execution of said document was assailed as doubtful partition was made in 1951. Therefore, said donation is illegal and invalid
and it appears that most of the heirs were not participants and signatories of [sic] the donors, among others, were absolutely bereft of any right in donating
said settlement, and there was lack of special power of attorney to [sic] those the very property in question." 11
who claimed to have represented their co-heirs in the participation [sic] and
signing of the said extra judicial statement. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court reads as
follows:ClubJuris
"Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the above-
described property long before the sale of said property on November 17, "WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the judgment
1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as vendor and the plaintiff, earlier promulgated by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte,
as vendee. They are in possession of said portion of the above-described [sic] consequently, defendants-appellees are hereby ordered:ClubJuris
property since the year 1960 with the consent of some of the heirs of Jacinto
Pada and up to the [sic] present some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada has [sic] "1. To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful possession to the
donated . . . their share of [sic] the above-described property to them, appellant, being the lawful possessor in concept of owner;
virtually converting defendants’ standing as co-owners of the land under "2. To remove their house at their expense unless appellant exercises the
controversy. Thus, defendants as co-owners became the undivided owners option of acquiring the same, in which case the pertinent provisions of the
of the whole estate . . . . As co-owners of . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . their New Civil Code has to be applied;
possession in the northern portion is being [sic] lawful." 10 "3. Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for their
occupancy and use of the portion of the land in question in the sum of
From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional P100.00 commencing on June 26, 1995 when the case was filed and
Trial Court. On November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment of reversal. It
until the termination of the present case;
held:ClubJuris
"4. Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of P5,000.00
". . . [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada as moral damages and the further sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
Pavo were never questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for more than 40 "5. Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit." 12
years, thereby lending credence on [sic] the fact that the two vendors were
indeed legal and lawful owners of properties ceded or sold. . . . At any rate, Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the
granting that the co-heirs of Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo have some foregoing decision of the Regional Trial Court.
interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano and Ananias, nevertheless,
said interests had long been sadly lost by prescription, if not laches or On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment
estoppel. dismissing said petition. It explained: ClubJuris
"It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general rule, but "Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is
this doctrine of imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one of the heirs possession de facto or physical or material possession and not de jure.
possessed the property as an owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, the
by prescription because from the moment one of the co-heirs claim [sic] that court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of
he is the absolute owner and denies the rest their share of the community possession, specially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. It
property, the question then involved is no longer one for partition but of cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership, such issue being
ownership. . . . Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993 covers a period of 42 long years. inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of
Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs may have, was long possession . . . .
extinguished by laches, estoppel or prescription.
"Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of the vendor over Lot No. 5581 which include [sic] the portion occupied by
land possessed by petitioners on the Deed of Sale executed in his favor petitioners." 13
by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son of Jacinto
Pada who was the registered owner of the subject lot. The right of Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
vendee Maria Pada to sell the property was derived from the extra- decision.
judicial partition executed in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada,
which was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
subject land was adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo’s father, and denying said motion.
Ananias Pada. Although the authenticity and genuineness of the extra-
judicial partition is now being questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada, no Hence this petition raising the following issues: clubjuris
action was ever previously filed in court to question the validity of such "I.
partition. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE
"Notably, petitioners in their petition admitted among the antecedent facts PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF JACINTO PADA
that Maria Pavo is one of the co-owners of the property originally owned DONATED TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE
by Jacinto Pada . . . and that the disputed lot was adjudicated to PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
Marciano (father of Maria Pavo) and Ananias, and upon the death of
Marciano and Ananias, their heirs took possession of said lot, i.e. Maria "II.
Pavo the vendor for Marciano’s share and Juanita for Ananias’ share . . . WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
. Moreover, petitioners do not dispute the findings of the respondent court WHAT MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE
that during the cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of Maria PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No. 5581, while the share of Juanita
Pada was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that both Maria Pada Pavo "III.
and Juanita were in possession of their respective hereditary shares. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD
Further, petitioners in their Answer admitted that they have been FAITH." 14
occupying a portion of Lot No. 5581, now in dispute without paying any
rental owing to the liberality of the plaintiff . . . . Petitioners cannot now There is no merit to the instant petition. clubjuris.c om : law libr ar y
four (44) years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951
extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.
Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was
allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property which was a Costs against petitioners.
parcel of residential land in Sto. Niño, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-
half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Niño St., Sabang, SO ORDERED.
Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe,
Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the
subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners thereof. At
any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate
the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and
laches have equally set in.
Alfredo Bornales 2/16 Meanwhile, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of Original
Certificate of Title No. 18047. The reconstituted OCT No. RO-4541
Maria Bornales 2/16 initially reflected the shares of the original co-owners in Lot 162.
However, title was transferred later to Jose Regalado, Sr. who subdivided
Jose Bornales 1/16 the entire property into smaller lots, each covered by a respective title in
his name. One of these small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with an area of
Quirico Bornales 1/16 11,732 square meters which was registered on February 24, 1977 under
TCT No. 14566.
Rosalia Bornales 1/16
In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this
Julita Bornales 1/16
complaint for "repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against the heirs
of the now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that they
On July 14, 1940, Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for owned an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which
P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo. In the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by was erroneously included in TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado.
Petitioners alleged that they occupied the disputed area as residential II.
dwelling ever since they purchased the property from the Distajos way
back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation purposes and paid IN ANY EVENT, HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ALL
the corresponding taxes. ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THE RIGHT AND TITLE OF
HEREIN PETITIONERS.9
On April 1, 1987, summons were served on Regalado’s widow, Josefina
Buenvenida, and two of her children, Rosemarie and Antonio. Josefina In resolving petitioners’ appeal, we must answer the following questions:
and Rosemarie were declared in default on May 10, 1989 because only Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided
Antonio filed an answer to the complaint. property held in common be valid? Is respondent estopped from denying
petitioners’ right and title over the disputed area? Under the facts and
During trial, petitioners presented the Deed of Absolute Sale4 executed circumstances duly established by the evidence, are petitioners entitled
between Soledad Daynolo and Salome Bornales as well as the Deed of to ‘repartition, resurvey and reconveyance’ of the property in question?
Mortgage5 and Deed of Discharge6 signed by Jose Regalado, Sr. The
Deed of Absolute Sale7 showing the purchase by the Del Campos of the On the first issue, it seems plain to us that the trial court concluded that
property from the Distajos was likewise given in evidence. petitioners could not have acquired ownership of the subject land which
originally formed part of Lot 162, on the ground that their alleged right
Despite the filing of an answer, Antonio failed to present any evidence to springs from a void sale transaction between Salome and Soledad. The
refute the claim of petitioners. Thus, after considering Antonio to have mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-
waived his opportunity to present evidence, the trial court deemed the owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per
case submitted for decision. se render the sale a nullity. This much is evident under Article 49310 of
the Civil Code and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. More
On November 20, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the particularly in Lopez vs. Vda. De Cuaycong, et. al.11 which we find
complaint. It held that while Salome could alienate her pro-indiviso share relevant, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo, held that:
in Lot 162, she could not validly sell an undivided part thereof by meters
and bounds to Soledad, from whom petitioners derived their title. The trial …The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell
court also reasoned that petitioners could not have a better right to the a concrete portion of the hacienda does not render the sale void,
property even if they were in physical possession of the same and for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a
declared the property for taxation purposes, because mere possession contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do
cannot defeat the right of the Regalados who had a Torrens title over the so. "Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest."
land. (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force
as it can have.)12
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, with
no pronouncement as to costs.8 Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the
transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally
Petitioners now seek relief from this Court and maintain that: recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed
the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of
I. fact, the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly stipulated
that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome’s
4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly transfer in
THE FACT THAT THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PORTION
whole or in part even without the consent of the other co-owners.
CONSTITUTES A SALE OF A CONCRETE OR DEFINITE
Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned
PORTION OF LAND OWNED IN COMMON DOES NOT
property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-
ABSOLUTELY DEPRIVE HEREIN PETITIONERS OF ANY
owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to
RIGHT OR TITLE THERETO;
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its Be that as it may, we find that the area subject matter of this petition had
enjoyment13 Since Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part of her already been effectively segregated from the ‘mother lot’ even before title
aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made was issued in favor of Regalado. It must be noted that 26 years had
against it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent. lapsed from the time petitioners bought and took possession of the
property in 1951 until Regalado procured the issuance of TCT No. 14566.
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully Additionally, the intervening years between the date of petitioners’
dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition purchase of the property and 1987 when petitioners filed the instant
among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the complaint, comprise all of 36 years. However, at no instance during this
vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated time did respondents or Regalado, for that matter, question petitioners’
area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co- right over the land in dispute. In the case of Vda. De Cabrera vs. Court of
owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the Appeals,16 we had occasion to hold that where the transferees of an
contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to
such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an occupy a definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same for a
ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition or
In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co- right than said transferees. (Potior est condition possidentis). Such
owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial partition of the co-
common.A owner property which entitles the possessor to the definite portion which
he occupies. Conformably, petitioners are entitled to the disputed land,
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for a total of 49 years
when the sale was made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia up to the present.
and Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr.
on April 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three The lower court’s reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot
co-owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided defeat the right of a holder of a registered Torrens title over property is
property less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome to Soledad. misplaced, considering that petitioners were deprived of their dominical
Based on the principle that "no one can give what he does not rights over the said lot through fraud and with evident bad faith on the
have,"14 Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares part of Regalado. Failure and intentional omission to disclose the fact of
pertaining to Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his actual physical possession by another person during registration
share in the co-ownership. We have ruled many times that even if a co- proceedings constitutes actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly
owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of
share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the a third person.17 In this case, we are convinced that Regalado knew of
sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the the fact that he did not have a title to the entire lot and could not,
entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co- therefore, have validly registered the same in his name alone because he
owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the was aware of petitioners’ possession of the subject portion as well as the
property.15 sale between Salome and Soledad.
In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the That Regalado had notice of the fact that the disputed portion of Lot 162
extent of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly was under claim of ownership by petitioners and the latter’s predecessor
convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could validly is beyond question. Records show that the particular area subject of this
transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect on the second case was mortgaged by Soledad and her husband to Jose Regalado, Sr.
disposition is to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner as early as May 1, 1947 or one year prior to the alienation of the whole
of the land. Needless to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding lot in favor of the latter. Regalado never questioned the ownership of the
the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalado’s name in 1977. lot given by Soledad as security for the P400.00 debt and he must have
at least known that Soledad bought the subject portion from Salome
since he could not have reasonably accepted the lot as security for the
mortgage debt if such were not the case. By accepting the said portion of WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Lot 162 as security for the mortgage obligation, Regalado had in fact Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30438 is REVERSED and SET
recognized Soledad’s ownership of this definite portion of Lot 162. ASIDE. The parties are directed to cause a SURVEY for exact
Regalado could not have been ignorant of the fact that the disputed determination of their respective portions in Lot 162-C-6. Transfer
portion is being claimed by Soledad and subsequently, by petitioners, Certificate of Title No. 14566 is declared CANCELLED and the Register
since Regalado even executed a Release of Mortgage on May 4, 1951, of Deeds of Capiz is ordered to ISSUE a new title in accordance with said
three years after the entire property was supposedly sold to him. It would survey, upon finality of this decision.
certainly be illogical for any mortgagee to accept property as security,
purchase the mortgaged property and, thereafter, claim the very same Costs against respondents. 1âw phi1.nêt
government as defendant. As amended, the complaint alleges:2 3. Notwithstanding the willingness of U.P. to
proceed with the donation, Execution of the legal
5. That plaintiffs and their ascendants have been in open, instrument to formalize it failed because of the
peaceful, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of unreasonable demand of the residents for an area
an owner since memory can no longer recall of that parcel of bigger than 15.8 hectares.
riceland known [as] Sitio Libis, Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas, Quezon City
(now Diliman, Quezon City), as delineated in the Plan herein 8. That upon advise of counsel and close study of the said offer of
attached as Annex "B" while the members of the plaintiff defendant UP to Donate 15.8379 hectares, plaintiff Association
Association and their ascendants have possessed since time proposed to accept and the defendant UP manifested in writing
immemorial openly, adversely, continuously and also in the [its] consent to the intended donation directly to the plaintiff
concept of an owner, the rest of the area embraced by and within Association for the benefit of the bonafide residents of Barrio
the Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas, Diliman, Quezon City as shown in that Cruz-na-Ligas and plaintiffs' Association have agreed to comply
Plan herein attached as Annex "C" in all consisting of at least with the terms and conditions of the donation;
forty (42) hectares;
9. That, however, defendant UP backed-out from the
arrangement to Donate directly to the plaintiff Association for the
benefit of the qualified residents and high-handedly resumed to government, is to their best interests. Left alone, the
negotiate the donation thru the defendant Quezon City present land and physical development of the area leaves
Government under the terms disadvantageous or contrary to the much to be desired. Road and drainage networks have to
rights of the bonafide residents of the Barrio as shown in the Draft be constructed, water and electric facilities installed, and
of Deed of Donation herein attached as Annex "I"; garbage collection provided for. The residents, even
collectively, do not have the means and resources to
10. That plaintiff Association forthwith amended [its] petition in the provide for themselves such basis facilities which are
pending case LRC No. 3151 before Branch 100 of the Regional necessary if only to upgrade their living condition.
Trial Court of Quezon City by adding the additional cause of
action for specific performance aside from the exclusion from the Should the proposed donation push through, the
technical description of certificate of title of defendant UP the area residents would be the first to benefit.
embraced in the Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas, consisting of at least forty-
two (42) hectares, more or less, and praying in the said Amended thus, Branch 100 of this Honorable Court issued that Order dated
Petition for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain defendant April 2, 1986, lifting the injunction, a copy of which is hereby
UP from donating the area to the defendant Quezon City attached as Annex "M";
Government, a copy of the said Amended Petition is herein
attached as Annex "J"; 13. That, however, defendant UP took exception to the aforesaid
Order lifting the Order of Injunction and insisted [on] the dismissal
11. That, after due notice and hearing, the application for writ of of the case; thus, it was stated that:
injunction as well as the opposition of defendant UP, the Order
dared January 24, 1986 granting the writ of preliminary injunction 2. Respondent has consistently taken the position that
was issued, a copy of which is herein attached as Annex "K"; efforts to expedite the formalization of a Deed of Donation
for the benefit of the residents of Barangay Kruz-na-Ligas
12. That in the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by should not only be pre-conditioned on the lifting of the
defendant UP. Reconsideration is herein copy of the said Motion Writ of Preliminary Injunction, but also the dismissal of the
for attached as Annex "L", plaintiff Association finally agreed to Petition;
the lifting of the said Order (Annex K) granting the injunction after
defendant UP made an assurance in their said Motion for in defendant UP's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
Reconsideration that the donation to the defendant Quezon City dated April 2, 1986, a copy of the said Motion is herein
Government will be for the benefit of the residents of Cruz-Na- attached as Annex "N";
Ligas as shown in the following:
14. That plaintiff Association in [its] "Comment" on the Motion for
6. The execution of the Deed of Donation in favor of the Reconsideration of the Order dated April 2, 1986, filed on June 2,
Quezon City government will not work any injustice to the 1986, manifested [its] willingness to the dismissal of the case,
petitioners. aside from [its] previous consent to the lifting of the preliminary
injunction; provided, that the area to be Donated thru the
As well stated in Respondent's Opposition to the Prayer defendant Quezon City government be subdivided into lots to be
for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, it is to the given to the qualified residents together with the certificate of
best interest of the Petitioners that such a deed be titles, without cost, a copy of the said Comment is hereby
executed. attached as Annex "O";
The plan to Donate said property to the residents of Bgy. 15. That, that was why, in the hearing re-scheduled on June 13,
Krus-na-Ligas, that is, throughthe Quezon City 1986 of defendant UP's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated April 2, 1986 (Annex N), the Order dated June 13, 1986, xxx xxx xxx
was issued, the full text of which is quoted as follows:
2. The DONEE shall, within eighteen (18) months from the
After hearing the manifestation of Atty. Angeles signing hereof, undertake at its expense the following:
for the petitioners and Atty. Raval for the
respondent University of the Philippines, since the a. Cause the removal of structures built on the boundaries
petitioners' counsel was the first to make a of the Donated lot;
manifestation that this case which is now filed b. Relocate inside the Donated lot all families who are
before this court should be dismissed first without presently outside of the Donated lot;
prejudice but because of the vehement objection c. Relocate all families who cannot be relocated within the
of the University of the Philippines, thru counsel, boundaries of the Donated lot to a site outside of the
that a dismissal without prejudice creates a cloud University of the Philippines campus in Diliman, Quezon
on the title of the University of the Philippines and City;
even with or without this case filed, the University d. Construct a fence on the boundaries adjoining Kruz-na-
of the Philippines has already decided to have the Ligas and the University.
property subject of litigation Donated to the
residents of Cruz-na-ligas with, of course, the In the construction of the fence, the DONEE shall establish a ten-
conditions set therein, let this case be meter setback in the area adjacent to Pook Amorsolo and the
DISMISSED without pronouncement as to cost. Peripheral Road (C.P. Garcia Street);
As to the charging lien filed by Petitioners thru e. Construct a drainage canal within the area Donated
counsel, it will be a sole litigation between the along the boundary line between Kruz- na-ligas and Pook
petitioners and the oppositors both represented Amorsolo.
by counsel, with the University of the Philippines
being neutral in this case.
In the construction of the fence and the drainage canal,
the DONEE shall conform to the plans and specifications
and a copy of the said Order is herein attached as Annex "P"; prescribed by the DONOR.
xxx xxx xxx
16. That, true to [its] commitment stated in the aforesaid Order of
June 13, 1986, defendant UP executed that Deed of Donation on 5. The DONEE shall, after the lapse of three (3) years, transfer to
August 5, 1986, in favor of the defendant Quezon City the qualified residents by way of donation the individual lots
Government for the benefit of the qualified residents of Cruz-na- occupied by each of them, subject to whatever conditions the
Ligas; however, neither the plaintiffs herein nor plaintiff DONEE may wish to impose on said donation;
Association officers had participated in any capacity in the act of
execution of the said deed of donation, a copy of the said 6. Transfer of the use of any lot in the property Donated during
executed Deed of Donation is herein attached as Annex "Q"; the period of three (3) years referred to in Item 4 above, shall be
allowed only in these cases where transfer is to be effected to
17. That under the said deed of donation, the 15.8379 hectares immediate members of the family in the ascending and
were ceded, transferred and conveyed and the defendant descending line and said Transfer shall be made known to the
Quezon City Government accepted the Donation under the terms DONOR. Transfer shall be affected by the Donee;
and conditions, pertinent portions of which are quoted as follows:
7. The costs incidental to this Deed, including the registration of
This donation is subject to the following conditions: the property Donated shall be at the expense of the DONEE.
The Donee shall also be responsible for any other legitimate na-Ligas, was deceived into consenting to the lifting of the
obligation in favor of any third person arising out of, in connection injunction in said LRC Case No. Q-3151 and in agreeing to the
with, or by reason of, this donation. dismissal of the said LRC Case No. Q-3151 when defendant
unjustifiably revoked the donation which they undertook as a
18. That the defendant Quezon City Government immediately condition to the dismissal of LRC Case No. 3151;
prepared the groundworks in compliance with the afore-quoted
terms and conditions; however, defendant UP under the officer- 23. That by reason of the deception, the herein plaintiffs hereby
in-charge then and even under the incumbent President, Mr. Jose reiterate their claims and the claims of the bonafide residents and
Abueva, had failed to deliver the certificate of title covering the resident/farmers of Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas [to] the ownership of
property to be Donated to enable the defendant Quezon City forty-two (42) hectares area they and their predecessors-in-
Government to register the said Deed of Donation so that interest have occupied and possessed; parenthetically, the said
corresponding certificate of title be issued under its name; 42 hectares portion are included in the tax declaration under the
name of defendant UP who is exempted from paying real estate
19. That defendant UP had continuously and unlawfully refused, tax; hence, there is no assessment available;
despite requests and several conferences made, to comply with
their reciprocal duty, to deliver the certificate of title to enable the 24. That by reason of bad faith and deceit by defendant UP in the
Donee, the defendant Quezon City Government, to register the execution and in compliance with [its] obligations under the said
ownership so that the defendant Quezon City Government can Deed of Donation (Annex Q hereof) plaintiffs have suffered moral
legally and fully comply with their obligations under the said deed damages in the amount of at least P300,000.00;
of donation;
25. That because of wanton and fraudulent acts of defendant UP
20. That upon expiration of the period of eighteen (18) [months], in refusing to comply with what is incumbent upon [it] under the
for alleged non-compliance of the defendant Quezon City Deed of Donation (Annex Q) and in whimsically and oppressively
Government with terms and conditions quoted in par. 16 hereof, declaring the revocation of the said deed of donation and the
defendant UP thru its President, Mr. Jose Abueva, unilaterally, reversion of the 15.8 hectares Donated, [it] should be made liable
capriciously, whimsically and unlawfully issued that Administrative to pay exemplary damages in the sum of P50,000.00 to serve as
Order No. 21 declaring the deed of donation revoked and the example in the interest of public good;
Donated property be reverted to defendant UP;
26. That because of said defendant UP's unlawful acts, plaintiffs
21. That the said revocation and reversion without judicial have been compelled to retain the services of their attorneys to
declaration is illegal and prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiffs prosecute this case with whom they agreed to pay the sum of
who are the bonafide residents or who represent the bonafide Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and by
residents of the Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas because: firstly, they were way of:
not made bound to comply with the terms and conditions of the
said donation allegedly violated by the defendant Quezon City APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF
Government; secondly, defendant UP, as averred in the PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
preceding paragraphs 9 and 11, was the one who insisted that (a) Plaintiffs hereby reallege and reproduce herein by reference
the donation be coursed through the defendant Quezon City all the material and relevant allegations in the preceding
Government; and the said revocation or reversion are likewise paragraphs;
pre-judicial to third parties who acquired rights therefrom; (b) Having legally established and duly recognized rights on the
said parcel of lands as shown in the documents marked herein as
22. That, as it apparently turned out, the plaintiff Association, who Annexes "D"; E; F; G; and M, plaintiffs have the rights to be
duly represented the qualified or bonafide resident of Barrio Cruz-
protected by an injunctive writ or at least a restraining order to 2. Adjudging the defendant University of the Philippines to
restrain and to order defendant UP from: segregate the riceland or farmlands as additional area
1) Ejecting the plaintiffs-farmers and from demolishing the embraced by the Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas, pursuant to the
improvements in the parcel of riceland or farmlands situated at First Indorsement of August 10, 1984 (Annex E) and
Sitio Libis of Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas, embraced in the claims of the pursuant to Findings, Reports and Recommendation
plaintiffs as shown in these photographs herein attached as (Annex G) of the Bureau of Lands with an estimated
Annexes "R" to "R-3"; assessed value of P700,000.00;
2) Executing another deed of donation with different terms and 3. Ordering defendant UP to pay for plaintiffs' moral
conditions in favor of another and for the benefit of additional damages of P300,000.00, exemplary damages of
occupants who are not bonafide residents of the Barrio or P50,000.00, and costs of suit;
Barangay Cruz-na-Ligas; 4. Enjoining defendant UP to pay professional fees of
P50,000.00 of the undersigned attorneys for the plaintiffs;
(c) Defendant UP has already started ejecting the plaintiffs and and
demolishing their improvements on the said riceland and Plaintiffs further respectfully pray for other just and
farmlands in order to utilize the same for the residential house equitable reliefs.
project to the irreparable damages and injuries to the plaintiffs-
farmers, unless restrained or enjoined to desist, plaintiffs will Earlier, on May 15, 1992, the trial court denied petitioners' application for
continue to suffer irreparable damages and injuries; preliminary injunction. Its order stated:3
(d) Plaintiffs are ready and willing to file the injunctive bond in ORDER
such amount that may be reasonably fixed;
Acting on plaintiffs' application for the issuance of a temporary
PRAYER restraining order/preliminary injunction and the opposition thereto
of the defendant filed on April 3, 1992, as well as plaintiffs' reply
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court therewith filed on April 23, 1992, considered in the light of the
that before the conduct of the proper proceedings, a writ of affidavit executed on April 23, 1992 by Timoteo Baluyot, Sr. and
preliminary injunction or at least a temporary restraining order be by Jaime Benito, Benigno Eugenio, Rolando Gonzales and
issued, ordering defendant UP to observe status quo; thereafter, Fortunato Fulgencio executed on April 21, 1929, for the plaintiffs;
after due notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be and, the affidavit of merit executed on April 28, 1992, by Atty.
issued; (a) to restrain defendant UP or to their representative Carmelita Yadao-Guno, for the defendant, it appearing that the
from ejecting the plaintiffs from and demolishing their principal action in this case is one for the specific performance,
improvements on the riceland or farmland situated at Sitio Libis; apparently, of the Deed of Donation executed on August 8, 1986,
(b) to order defendant UP to refrain from executing another deed by defendant University of the Philippines in favor of the Quezon
of donation in favor another person or entity and in favor of non- City Government, involving the land in question, in virtue of
bonafide residents of Barrio Cruz-na-Ligas different from the which, it is clear that the plaintiffs are not parties to the said deed
Deed of Donation (Annex Q hereof), and after trial on the merits, of donation, by reason of which, consequently, there has not
judgment be rendered: been established by the plaintiffs a clear legal right to the
enforcement of the said deed of donation, especially as the said
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation (Annex Q) as valid and deed was already validly revoked by the University of the
subsisting and ordering the defendant UP to abide by the Philippines, thru its president, Jose Abueva, in his Administrative
terms and conditions thereof; Order No. 21, for which reason the same could no longer be
enforced, plaintiffs' prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. enforcement of said deed of donation which is their principal
cause of action; and
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the above order. Without
resolving petitioners' motion, the trial court ordered petitioners to amend 2. Under the factual circumstances obtaining, the respondent
their complaint to implead respondent Quezon City government as judge gravely erred in denying the joint motion to dismiss and
defendant.4 Hence, the amended complaint was filed on June 10, 1992, declaring that [petitioners] are entitled to acquire ownership over
in which it is alleged: the land in question by reason of laches through a trial on the
merits; such constitutes a collateral attack on [respondent UP's]
4. That the Quezon City Government . . . which should be joined title in the same suit for specific performance.
as party plaintiff is instead impleaded herein as party defendant,
because its consent can not be secured within a reasonable time; On November 24, 1995, the appellate court rendered a decision setting
aside the trial court's order of April 26, 1995 and ordering the dismissal of
On July 27, 1992, respondent city government filed its Answer to the Civil Case No. 4-92-11663. The appellate court ruled that —
Amended Complaint with Cross-Claim.5However, on November 29, 1993,
it moved to withdraw its cross-claim against UP6 on the ground that, after 1. Petitioners' complaint did not allege any claim for the annulment of
conferring with university officials, the city government had recognized UP's title over the portion of land concerned or the reconveyance thereof
"the propriety, validity and legality of the revocation of the Deed of to petitioners;
Donation."7 2. The alleged cause of action based on ownership of the land by
petitioners was tantamount to a collateral attack on the title of UP which
The motion was granted by the trial court in its order, dated December is not allowed under the law; and
22, 1994.8 On the same day, a Joint Motion to Dismiss was filed by UP 3. There is no acquisition of ownership by laches.
and the Quezon City government on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action.9 Petitioners opposed the motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari based on the following
grounds:
On April 26, 1995, the trial court denied respondents' motion to dismiss
on the ground that "a perusal of [petitioners'] amended complaint, I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS WAS IN ERROR IN
specifically paragraph 5 thereof, . . . shows that it necessarily alleges CONCLUDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE
facts entitling [petitioners] to acquire ownership over the land in question, ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE JOINT MOTION TO
by reason of laches, which cannot be disposed of and resolved at this DISMISS.
stage without a trial on the merits." 10 The trial court, however, reiterated
its ruling that petitioners did not have a cause of action for specific II. IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, THE RESPONDENT
performance on the ground that the deed of donation had already been APPELLATE COURT HAS ACTED IN EXCESS [OF] JURISDICTION
revoked as stated in its order denying injunction. WHEN IT MADE [THE] FINDING AND CONCLUSION THAT THE
REVOCATION OF THE DONATION IS VALID WHEN THAT IS THE
On August 14, 1995, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the PRIMARY AND CONTROVERTED ISSUE INVOLVING VARIED
Court of Appeals, charging the trial court with grave abuse of discretion in QUESTIONS OF FACTS.
refusing to dismiss the complaint filed by petitioners. Respondents
contended that — Petitioners argue that, on its face, their amended complaint alleges facts
constituting a cause of action which must be fully explored during trial.
1. Respondent Judge himself had declared that [petitioners] They cite paragraphs 18, 19, and 20 of their complaint questioning the
clearly are not parties to the deed of donation sought to be validity of the revocation of the donation and seek the enforcement of the
enforced thus they had not shown clear legal right to the donation through specific performance. 11
On the other hand, respondents contend that by seeking specific concept of owner, but they are not invoking laches. If at all, they are
performance of the deed of donation as their primary cause of action, claiming ownership by prescription which, as already stated, is untenable
petitioners cannot at the same time claim ownership over the property considering that the land in question is a registered land. Nor can
subject of the donation by virtue of laches or acquisitive prescription. petitioners question the validity of UP's title to the land. For as the Court
Petitioners cannot base their case on inconsistent causes of action. of Appeals correctly held, this constitutes a collateral attack on registered
Moreover, as the trial court already found the deed to have been validly title which is not permitted.
revoked, the primary cause of action was already thereby declared in
existent. Hence, according to respondents, the Court of Appeals correctly On the other hand, we think that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
dismissed the complaint. 12 petitioners' complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
First. The question is whether the complaint states a cause of action. The A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1)
trial court held that inasmuch as the donation made by UP to the Quezon a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law
City government had already been revoked, petitioners, for whose benefit it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to
the donation had been made, had no cause of action for specific respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part
performance. Nevertheless, it denied respondents' joint motion to dismiss of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
petitioners' action on the ground that respondent UP was barred from breach of the obligations of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
contesting petitioners' right to remain in possession on the ground of latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 14
laches.
We find all the elements of a cause of action contained in the amended
This is error. While prescription does not run against registered lands, complaint of petitioners. While, admittedly, petitioners were not parties to
nonetheless a registered owner's action to recover possession of his land the deed of donation, they anchor their right to seek its enforcement upon
may be barred by laches. As held in Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia: 13 their allegation that they are intended beneficiaries of the donation to the
Quezon City government. Art. 1311, second paragraph, of the Civil Code
[W]hile no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in provides:
favor of the defendant and that is, the equitable defense of
laches. No hold that the defense of prescription or adverse If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third
possession in derogation of the title of the registered owner person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated
Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of his acceptance to the obliger before its revocation. A mere
laches. Otherwise stated, we hold that while defendant may not incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The
be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a
predecessors' long continued possession for 37 years, the favor upon a third person.
original owner's right to recover back the possession of the
property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the long Under this provision of the Civil Code, the following requisites must be
period of 37 years and by patentee's inaction and neglect, been present in order to have a stipulation pour autrui: 15
converted into a stale demand.
(1) there must be a stipulation in favor of a third person;
Thus, laches is a defense against a registered owner suing to recover (2) the stipulation must be a part, not the whole of the contract;
possession of the land registered in its name. But UP is not suing in this (3) the contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately
case. It is petitioners who are, and their suit is mainly to seek conferred a favor upon a third person, not a mere incidental
enforcement of the deed of donation made by UP in favor of the Quezon benefit or interest;
City government. The appellate court therefore correctly overruled the (4) the third person must have communicated his acceptance to
trial court on this point. Indeed, petitioners do not invoke laches. What the obliger before its revocation; and
they allege in their complaint is that they have been occupying the land in
question from time immemorial, adversely, and continuously in the
(5) neither of the contracting parties bears the legal that petitioners have a cause of action against UP. Thus, in Kauffman
representation or authorization of the third party. v. National Bank, 17 where the facts were —
The allegations in the following paragraphs of the amended complaint are Stated in bare simplicity the admitted facts show that the
sufficient to bring petitioners' action within the purview of the second defendant bank for a valuable consideration paid by the
paragraph of Art. 1311 on stipulations pour autrui: Philippine Fiber and Produce Company agreed on October 9,
1918, to cause a sum of money to be paid to the plaintiff in New
1. Paragraph 17, that the deed of donation contains a stipulation that the York City; and the question is whether the plaintiff can maintain
Quezon City government, as donee, is required to transfer to qualified an action against the bank for the non performance of said
residents of Cruz-na-Ligas, by way of donations, the lots occupied by undertaking. In other words, is the lack of privity with the contract
them; on the part of the plaintiff fatal to the maintenance of an action by
him? 18
2. The same paragraph, that this stipulation is part of conditions and
obligations imposed by UP, as donor, upon the Quezon City government, it was held:
as donee;
In the light of the conclusions thus stated, the right of the plaintiff
3. Paragraphs 15 and 16, that the intent of the parties to the deed of to maintain the present action is clear enough; for it is undeniable
donation was to confer a favor upon petitioners by transferring to the that the bank's promise to cause a definite sum of money to be
latter the lots occupied by them; paid to the plaintiff in New York City is a stipulation in his favor
within the meaning of the paragraph above quoted; and the
4. Paragraph 19, that conferences were held between the parties to circumstances under which that promise was given disclose an
convince UP to surrender the certificates of title to the city government, evident intention on the part of the contracting parties that the
implying that the donation had been accepted by petitioners by plaintiff should have that money upon demand in New York City.
demanding fulfillment thereof 16 and that private respondents were aware The recognition of this unqualified right in the plaintiff to receive
of such acceptance; and the money implies in our opinion the right in him to maintain an
action to recover it; and indeed if the provision in question were
not applicable to the facts now before us, it would be difficult to
5. All the allegations considered together from which it can be fairly
conceive of a case arising under it.
inferred that neither of private respondents acted in representation of the
other; each of the private respondents had its own obligations, in view of
conferring a favor upon petitioners. It will be noted that under the paragraph cited a third person
seeking to enforce compliance with a stipulation in his favor must
signify his acceptance before it has been revoked. In this case
The amended complaint further alleges that respondent UP has an
the plaintiff clearly signified his acceptance to the bank by
obligation to transfer the subject parcel of land to the city government so
demanding payment; and although the Philippine National Bank
that the latter can in turn comply with its obligations to make
had already directed its New York agency to withhold payment
improvements on the land and thereafter transfer the same to petitioners
when this demand was made, the rights of the plaintiff cannot be
but that, in breach of this obligation, UP failed to deliver the title to the
considered to have been prejudiced by that fact. The word
land to the city government and then revoked the deed of donation after
"revoked," as there used, must be understood to imply revocation
the latter failed to fulfill its obligations within the time allowed in the
by the mutual consent of the contracting parties, or at least by
contract.
direction of the party purchasing the exchange. 19
For the purpose of determining the sufficiency of petitioners' cause of
It is hardly necessary to state that our conclusion that petitioners'
action, these allegations of the amended complaint must be deemed to
complaint states a cause of action against respondents is in no wise a
be hypothetically true. So assuming the truth of the allegations, we hold
ruling on the merits. That is for the trial court to determine in light of complaint which contained two or more causes of action where one of
respondent UP's defense that the donation to the Quezon City them clearly states a sufficient cause of action against the defendant. 24
government, upon which petitioners rely, has been validly revoked.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
Respondents contend, however, that the trial court has already found that the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
the donation (on which petitioners base their action) has already been Branch 89, for trial on the merits.
revoked. This contention has no merit. The trial court's ruling on this point
was made in connection with petitioners' application for a writ of SO ORDERED.
preliminary injunction to stop respondent UP from ejecting petitioners.
The trial court denied injunction on the ground that the donation had
already been revoked and therefore petitioners had no clear legal right to
be protected. It is evident that the trial court's ruling on this question was
only tentative, without prejudice to the final resolution of the question
after the presentation by the parties of their
evidence. 20
These are not inconsistent but, rather, alternative causes of action which
Rule 8, §2 of the Rules of Court allows:
Moreover, the subjects of these claims are not exactly and entirely the
same parcel of land; petitioners' causes of action consist of two definite
and distinct claims. The rule is that a trial court judge cannot dismiss a
CASE 13 Sometime in 1989 petitioners executed a deed of "Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale" over the subject property in favor of Mrs. Venancia
G.R. No. 132644 November 19, 1999 Ungson. Private respondents protested the sale claiming that they were
ERNESTO DAVID, RICARDO DAVID, NELIA DAVID, EMILIA DAVID, the true owners of the land. Ultimately, in any event, the sale in favor of
LOLITA DAVID, BASILIO LEMQUE, NICANOR LEMQUE, FELIX Mrs. Ungson was rescinded in view of the latter's failure to pay in full the
LEMQUE, NORMA LEMQUE, WILFREDO LEMQUE, RODOLFO consideration agreed upon. Subsequently petitioners executed another
LEMQUE, ROGELIO LEMQUE, VICTORIA LEMQUE, ESTATE OF deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale. In this new instrument, dated
MARIA ESPIRITU and ANDRES ADONA, MILAGROS DE UBAGO- 15 December 1990, petitioners divided the land equally among
UMALI, FELISA GUBALLA DE UBAGO, VANESSA DE UBAGO- themselves and sold their respective shares to their co-petitioners herein.
UMALI, ANTONIO DE UBAGO, JR., JOSEPH GUBALLA DE UBAGO, Antonio de Ubago, Jr., Milagros de Ubago-Umali, Felisa Guballa de
MARIETTA DE UBAGO-TAN, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF Ubago, Vanessa de Ubago-Umali and Marietta de Ubago-Tan and
ZAMBALES, petitioners, Joseph Guballa de Ubago. On 27 November 1992 Transfer Certificate of
vs. Title No. T-42320 was issued in favor of the de Ubagos.
CRISTITO MALAY and NORA MALAY, DIONISIO MALAY,
FRANCISCA T. CAPACILLO, PEPITO ALCANTARA, NICOLAS Less than a month later or on 07 December 1992 private respondents
SORIANO and JUAN MORA, respondents. filed a complaint docketed Civil Case No. RTC-905-1 for "Annulment of
Sale with Restraining Order Injunction and Damages" against petitioners
VITUG, J.: before Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of Zambales. In their
complaint private respondents averred that the disputed land sold by the
The instant case is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals heirs of Maria Espiritu to the de Ubagos was the subject of a homestead
reversing that of the Regional Trial Court on an action for reconveyance application by their great grandfather. Andres Adona, but that Original
of property. The issues submitted by the parties may not really be all that Certificate of Title No. 398 was instead fraudulently issued to Maria
novel. Espiritu, on 04 December 1933, upon her false representation that she
was the widow of Andres Adona.
The spouses Andres Adona and Leoncia Abad, husband and wife for a
good number of years, were blessed with five children among them being In its decision of 25 July 1995 after a hearing on the merits of the case,
Carmen Adona. Carmen married Filomeno Malay; three children were the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and on
begotten by the marriage, namely, Cristito, Nora and Dionisio (among the the ground of prescription. It opined that the action being one for
herein private respondents). Following the death of Leoncia Abad in annulment of sale anchored on a fraudulent titling of the subject property,
1923, Andres Adona cohabited with Maria Espiritu, herself a widow, the cause of action constituted a collateral attack on the Torrens
apparently without the benefit of marriage. Andres and Maria sired two Certificate of Title. The court a quo added that even if the action were to
children, Esperanza, represented herein by her heirs all surnamed David, be treated as being one for reconveyance, the suit would still have to fail
and Vicente Adona. Maria Espiritu likewise had a child by her previous since an action for reconveyance could only be brought within ten (10)
marriage, Fulgencio Lemque, now herein represented also by his own years counted from the date of issuance of the certificate of title (in
heirs. 1933).
During his lifetime, Andres Adona applied for a homestead patent over a On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its judgment of 11 February
parcel of agricultural land located at Dirita, Iba, Zambales, containing an 1998,1 set aside the order of dismissal of the case decreed by the trial
area of 22.5776 hectares. After Andres Adona had died, Maria Espiritu, court and directed the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners, succeeded in obtaining 42320 in the name of the de Ubagos and the reconveyance of the
Original Certificate of Title No. 398 over the land in her name. After Maria property to the estate of Andres Adona. Petitioners were additionally
Espiritu had died in 1945, the children, as well as descendants, of Andres ordered to pay damages and attorney's fees to private respondents. The
Adona by his marriage with Leoncia Abad, continued to be in peaceful appellate court, more particularly, ruled.
and quiet possession of the subject land.
The evidence on record shows that OCT No. 398 issued in favor of Maria Caro, supra., Casipit vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 684, 694
Espiritu was obtained by her fraudulent concealment of the existence of [1991]). This rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person
Adona's first marriage to Leoncia Abad, as shown by the affidavit she enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person
executed on September 21, 1928 and filed with the Director of Lands. claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, the right to seek reconveyance does not prescribe. The
Consequently, Maria Espiritu's fraudulent concealment of material facts reason for this is one who is in actual possession of a piece of
created an implied or constructive trust in favor of the plaintiffs, the land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his
excluded co-heirs and actual possessors of the subject land. Article 1456 possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps
of the Civil Code reads: to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him the
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person the nature of the adverse claim of third party and its effect on his
obtaining it is by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. (Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 108547, February 3,
1997).
Although it is true that after the lapse of one year, a decree of
registration is no longer open to review or attack, although its Hence, the undisturbed possession by plaintiffs and their
issuance was tainted with fraud; however, the aggrieved party is predecessors-in-interest gave them the continuing right to resort
not without a remedy at law. Notwithstanding the irrevocability of to judicial intervention once their claim to ownership was
the Torrens Title already issued in favor of Maria Espiritu, she challenged. It was therefore the defendant. Heirs act of executing
and her successors-in-interest, although the registered owner the "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale" which
under the Torrens system, may still be compelled under the law constituted the express act of repudiation of the constructive trust
to reconvey the subject property to the real owners. The Torrens which gave rise to plaintiffs cause of action.2
system was not designed to shield and protect one who had
committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad Aggrieved, petitioners have come to this Court and seek to dispute the
faith (Amerol vs. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396, 404 [1987]); judgment of the Court of Appeals ordering the cancellation of Original
Certificate of Title No. 398 issued on 16 November 1933. It is the
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is contention of petitioners that to allow private respondents to question
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the Original Certificate of Title No. 398 fifty-nine years after its issuance
transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously would undermine the Torrens system and sanctity of the certificate of
registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal title.
owner, or to one with a better right. (Amerol, supra.)
Private respondents, upon the other hand, ask this Court to sustain the
However, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or decision of the Court of Appeals on the thesis that the property in
constructive trust is not absolute. It is subject to existence question indubitably belongs to the estate of Andres Adona whose
prescription. (Amerol, supra.; Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 180 incontestable right to it is derived from the perfected homestead
SCRA 401, 405-407 [1989]; Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 112 application two years prior to his death as so admitted by Maria Espiritu
SCRA 542, 550 [1982]; Ramos vs. Ramos, 61 SCRA 284, 299- herself in her affidavit submitted to the Director of Lands.
300 [19741])
The Court rules for the affirmance of the challenged decision.
An action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being A certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to
the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of a homestead patent covering a disposable public land within the
the certificate of title over the property. (Amerol, supra., contemplation of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141 is
as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for
proceeding. Under the Land Registration Act, title to the property covered damages. 8
by a Torrens certificate becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one
year from the entry of the decree of registration. Such decree of The caption of the case before the court a quo while denominated as
registration is incontrovertible and becomes binding on all persons being one for "Annulment of Sale with Damages" is in reality an action for
whether or not they were notified of, or participated in, the in reconveyance since the ultimate relief sought by private respondents
rem registration process.3 There is no specific provision in the Public would be for the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 398
Land Law or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now Presidential to be reconveyed to the estate of Andres Adona. In this jurisdiction,
Decree 1529, fixing a similar one-year period within which a public land the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined, more
patent can be considered open to review on the ground of actual fraud, importantly, by the body of the pleading or complaint itself than by its title
such as that provided for in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, and or heading. The Court of Appeals did not err in treating the action brought
now Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529, and clothing a public land by private respondents as one for reconveyance or as one that seeks the
patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, this Court has transfer of the property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful
repeatedly applied Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529 to a patent and legal owner. 10 It would seem that Andres Adona did perfect his
issued in accordance with the law by the Director of Lands, approved by homestead application prior to his death, 11 the right to the issuance of the
the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President patent on which vests after complying with all the requirements of the
of the Philippines.4 The date of the issuance of the patent corresponds to law. 12
the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary cases. Just as the
decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled The next crucial issue focuses on the ruling of the Court of Appeals to the
to it, so also, the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and effect that if a person who claims to be the owner of the property is in
finally grants and conveys the land applied for to the applicant.5 actual possession thereof, the right to seek reconveyance does not
prescribe.
Original Certificate of Title No. 398 was issued in the name of Maria
Espiritu on 04 December 1933 and would have become indefeasible a There is no doubt about the fact that an action for reconveyance based
year thereafter had not its issuance been attended with fraud. The on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten years. 13 This rule assumes,
attendance of fraud created an implied trust in favor of private however, that there is an actual need to initiate that action, for when the
respondents and gave them the right of action to seek the remedy of right of the true and real owner is recognized, expressly or implicitly such
reconveyance of the property wrongfully obtained.6 In Javier vs. Court of as when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the statute of
Appeals7 this Court ruled: limitation would yet be irrelevant. An action for reconveyance, if
nonetheless brought, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title,
. . . The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree or its equivalent, an action that is imprescriptible. In Faja vs. Court of
of registration is no longer open to review or attack although its Appeals, 14the Court has held that a person in actual possession of a
issuance is attended with actual fraud. This does not mean piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is
however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right,
property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, and that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to
an action for reconveyance is still available. The decree becomes seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of
incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one (1) year the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. In the words of
from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the the Court —
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in court . . . There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual
for reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is always possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may
available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
third party for value. If the property has passed into the hands of taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being,
that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the in good faith (Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 283, 296
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his [1996]).
own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession. No better situation can be conceived at the moment It is well settled that one who deals with property registered under
for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners the Torrens system need not go beyond the same, but only has to
whose mother, Felipa Faja, was in possession of the litigated rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens
property for no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted and claims as are annotated on the title. (Sandoval, supra., at p.
with a claim that the land she had been occupying and cultivating 295).
all these years, was titled in the name of a third person. We hold
that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to The aforestated principle admits of an unchallenged exception:
seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on
accrued only from the time the one in possession was made the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of
aware of a claim adverse to his own and it is only then that the inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of
statutory period of prescription commences to run against such facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
possessor. 15 man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has some
knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of
The same dictum is reiterated in Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into
Appeals; 16 thus — the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of
anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt
With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title
number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who
parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent
ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and hence does
the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over not merit the protection of the law. (Sandoval, supra.) (Emphasis
the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this supplied)
rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in Applying the aforequoted jurisprudence, the defendant buyers
actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, can not be considered as innocent purchasers for value. A
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not perusal of defendant buyers' TCT No. 42320 reveals that it
prescribe. 17 contains an entry by the Register of Deeds which provides that
their ownership over the land is subject to prospective claims by
Finally, this Court sees no cogent reasons to disturb the finding of the any possible heirs and creditors who might have been deprived of
Court of Appeals that the de Ubagos may not be considered buyers in their lawful participation in the estate. The said entry reads as
good faith. Said the Appellate Court: follows:
. . . An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys property of Entry No. 102385 — Section 4 — The property described in this
another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or certificate of title is subject to the provisions of Section 4, Rule 74 of the
interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the Rules of Court for the period of two years in favor of in any other possible
same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the heir or heirs and creditors who might have been deprived of his or their
claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys lawful participations in the said estate.
the property with the belief that the person from whom he
receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the Date of Instrument — December 15, 1990
property. A purchaser can not close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted
Date of Inscription — November 27, 1992 at 2:00 p.m. (Exh. "E"; Rollo, p. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED Costs
137) against petitioners.
The record shows that the "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale"
was executed on December 15, 1990. Plaintiffs' complaint for
Reconveyance was filed on December 7, 1992. Hence, the two-year
period has not yet elapsed.
It likewise appears that the subject land was the object of a sale between
the defendant Heirs and one Mrs. Venancia Ungson which was
subsequently aborted due to the intervention of defendant Vicente Adona
and plaintiff Cristito Malay. (Exhs. "K", "K-1" and "L") However, defendant
Heirs nevertheless executed another sale in favor of defendant buyers
who are admittedly relatives of Mrs. Venancia Ungson. (TSN, January 23,
1995, p. 14) Plaintiff Cristito Malay's intervention in the previous sale
should have put defendant buyers on their guard.
The rule is settled that a buyer of real property which is in the possession
of persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the
rights of those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer
can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith. The buyer who has
failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in the adverse CASE 14
possession of another buyer in bad faith. (Embrado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102259 August 25, 2000
233 SCRA 335, 347 [1994]). 18 SALVADOR S. ESQUIVIAS, petitioner,
vs.
Altogether, the Court sees no reversible error on the part of the Court of HON. OMBUDSMAN, ROLANDO Q. VERGARA and ELENA G.
Appeals in its assailed decision. DOMALAON, respondents.
DECISION After preliminary investigation, at which respondents Rolando Vergara
and Elena Domalaon submitted their counter-affidavits, on December 8,
PARDO, J.: 1987, the deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor recommended the dismissal
of the charges finding no prima facie case. On July 26, 1989, the
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari assailing Ombudsman approved the recommendation of deputized prosecutor
the resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing for insufficiency of evidence Honesto J. Borromeo for the dismissal of petitioner's complaint for
the charges of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and Act insufficiency of evidence. He denied petitioner's motion for
496, Section 51 leveled against Rolando G. Vergara, deputy Register of reconsideration.
Deeds of Sorsogon and Elena G. Domalaon.1
Hence, this petition.4
We deny the petition for it is patently devoid of merit.
At issue in this petition is whether or not respondent Ombudsman acted
The facts are as follows: without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint against respondents
Rolando Vergara and Elena Domalaon.
On March 20, 1987, petitioner Salvador S. Esquivias filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman, through the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon, as
deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor, an affidavit/ complaint charging We agree with the Ombudsman that that there was no sufficient evidence
Rolando Q. Vergara, deputy Register of Deeds of Sorsogon, and Elena to support the charges. To begin with, petitioner avers that he was not
G. Domalaon with violation of Republic Act No. 3019,2 Section 3 (e), and paid the consideration stated in the deed of sale. However, this is
Act No. 496,3 Section 51. contradicted by the very deed he signed which states that he
acknowledged receipt of the consideration.
The complaint was based on the ground that on December 28, 1977,
petitioner executed a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of land covered by On the facts of the case, respondent deputy Register of Deeds
Original Certificate of Title No. P-10445 of the Register of Deeds of Vergara5 was just exercising the duties of his office in registering the deed
Sorsogon, situated in Sta. Barbara, municipality of Bulusan, province of of sale which complied with all the requirements for registration.6
Sorsogon, for a consideration of P2,000.00, which he sold to Jose G.
Domalaon, Romulo G. Domalaon, Emma G. Domalaon, Margarita Consequently, the Ombudsman is correct in finding that respondents did
Dematera Domalaon, and Rosario Domalaon-Gapas. not violate either the Land Registration Act7or the Anti-Graft Act.8 The
Ombudsman did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
When the vendees failed to pay petitioner the consideration of the sale, abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's complaint.
on August 3, 1981, he cancelled and nullified the same.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition. No costs.
On February 19, 1985, Elena Domaloan borrowed the original title of the
property from petitioner's wife on the pretext that she had a buyer, and SO ORDERED.
once in possession of the title, succeeded in registering the cancelled
deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds with the cooperation of deputy
Register of Deeds Vergara. A new title was issued in the names of Jose
G. Domalaon et al., the persons named in the deed. Allegedly, deputy CASE 15
Registrar Vergara ignored the affidavit of cancellation of the deed of sale, G.R. No. 126875 August 26, 1999
in violation of Act No. 496, Section 51 and also in violation of Rep. Act HEIRS OF MARIANO, JUAN, TARCELA and JOSEFA, all surnamed
No. 3019, Section 3 (a), (e) and (j), for which he is charged in the BRUSAS, petitioners,
affidavit-complaint together with Elena G. Domaloan. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF SPOUSES INES BRUSAS and grandfather Sixto Brusas during his lifetime. They asserted that Ines
CLETO REBOSA, respondents. Brusas was the absolute owner having entered the property as early as
1924. Since then Ines Brusas and her husband Cleto Rebosa were
BELLOSILLO, J.: clearing the land on their own by cutting down trees and removing their
roots it being a forested area. In 1957 Ines Brusas applied for a free
This is a bitter dispute spanning more than two (2) decades of protracted patent which was approved and the corresponding certificate of title
legal entanglements and deep-seated enmity among the protagonists, issued in 1967.
even descending to their children, each claiming ownership over a 19-
hectare land located in San Francisco, Baao, Camarines Sur. In view of Sometime in 1974 Ines Brusas filed a complaint for recovery of six (6)
the prolonged litigation, the original parties have since died and are now hectares of land alleging that her brothers and sisters forcibly entered
substituted by their heirs. and deprived her of that portion of the property.3 Juan, Josefa, Mariano
and Tarcela countered by instituting in the same court an action for
Petitioners, heirs of Juan, Mariano, Tarcela and Josefa, all surnamed reconveyance imputing fraud, misrepresentation and bad faith to Ines
Brusas, claimed that the disputed property, formerly a public land, was Brusas in using a forged affidavit to obtain title over Lots 1 and 2 despite
part of the 33-hectare land in the actual physical possession of their full knowledge that she owned only 1/5 portion thereof.4
grandfather Sixto Brusas since 1924, having inherited the same from
their great grandfather Pedro Brusas. Sometime in 1946 Sixto Brusas After the cases were consolidated trial dragged on for nineteen (19)
caused the property to be surveyed in the name of his five (5) children, years. The lower court finally rendered its decision in 1993 dismissing the
namely, Juan, Ines, Mariano, Tarcela and Josefa. The survey was complaint filed by Ines Brusas, declaring Lots 1 and 2 as the pro-
approved as Psu-116520.1 As indicated in the survey plan the property indiviso property of the Brusas siblings, and ordering Ines Brusas to
was traversed by the Barit River, and the eastern portion thereof with an reconvey to her brothers and sisters their respective shares in the
aggregate area of 19.8992 hectares was denominated as Lots 1 and 2, disputed property.
while the western portion measuring 13.2439 hectares was designated
as Lots 3 and 4. In the same year, the property was subdivided among On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals in its Decision of 16 July 1996
the five (5) children of Sixto Brusas. The partition was made lengthwise reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court thus —
so that each heir would have access to the river and, as was the custom
of the place, the distribution was made according to their age: the WHEREFORE . . . . the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
southernmost lot was assigned to Juan being the eldest, followed ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
successively by Ines, Mariano, Tarcela and Josefa.2 All of them
purportedly took immediate possession of their respective shares. 1âwphi 1.nêt
It is significant to note that aside from the supposedly falsified WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 16 July 1996 Decision of the
affidavit, Exhibit 4, another affidavit, was executed by Ines, Court of Appeals ordering petitioners to vacate the disputed property and
together with Tarcela, Juan and Josefa, all surnamed Brusas, restore respondents in possession thereof, as well as its 30 September
renouncing their rights to Lots 3 and 4 in favor of Mariano Brusas 1996 Resolution denying reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
(Exhibit 11). Both appear to have been notarized by the same petitioners.
1âwphi1.nêt
It is not for private respondents to deny forgery. The burden of proof that
the affidavit of waiver is indeed spurious rests on petitioners. Yet,
significantly, even as they insist on forgery they never really took serious
efforts in establishing such allegation by preponderant evidence. It must
be stressed that mere allegations of fraud are not enough. Intentional
acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner injure
him, must be specifically alleged and proved.
During the period from September to October, 1911, a survey On the West — Teofista Perez, measuring 84.32 sq.m.
was made of a parcel of land, located in Mandaue, Cebu,
identified as "Lot No. 896" of Plan No. II-5121, a part of the However, on April 26, 1935, Panfilo Retuerto purchased the
"Hacienda de Mandaue" occupied by the Spouses Esteban Perez aforementioned parcel of land, this time, from the Archbishop of
and Lorenza Sanchez. The survey was amended during the Cebu, under a "Deed of Absolute Sale," for the price of P150.00
period from November, 1926 to March 21, 1927, identified as (Exhibit "4") and declared the same for taxation purposes under
Amendment No. 2, Ap-6243, with an area of 20,486 square Tax Declaration No. 34652, effective 1937 (Exhibit "2").
meters, bearing the following boundaries:
In the meantime, the San Carlos Seminary in Cebu filed a Petition
"Northwest — Lots 1251 and 1252 (Remigio Judilla and Manuel with the then Juzgado de Primera Instancia in Cebu (now the
Judilla); Regional Trial Court) entitled and docketed "El Seminario de San
Carlos de Cebu," Solicitante, Expediente No. 3, G.L.R.O. Record
Southeast — Lot 894 (Gregorio Perez); 4030 for the issuance of titles over several parcels of land in
Southwest — Lot 895; "Hacienda de Mandaue," including Lot No. 896-A, earlier
Northwest — Lots 897 and 898 (Juan Perez)" purchased by Panfilo Retuerto from Juana Perez and from the
Archbishop of Cebu. In August, 1937, the Court promulgated a
Decision finding and declaring Panfilo Retuerto the owner of the "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale of the Estate of Panfilo
said lot (Exhibit "9"). On July 22, 1940, the Court issued an Order Retuerto" adjudicating unto themselves, as owners, the said
directing the General del Registro de Terrenos (later the Land property and deeding the same unto Loreto Retuerto a portion
Registration Commission) for the issuance of the appropriate thereof, with an area of 1,703 square meters, and the rest of the
Decree in favor of Panfilo Retuerto over the said parcel of land. property, with an area of 440 square meters, to Efigenia Retuerto,
However, no such Decree was issued as directed by the Court as follows:
because, by December 8, 1941, the Second World War ensued in
the Pacific. However, Panfilo Retuerto failed to secure the "FOR OR TO LORETO RETUERTO: 'a portion of the
appropriate decree after the war. above described parcel of land containing an area of ONE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWO (1,702) SQUARE
Two (2) decades elapsed. In the meantime, Juana Perez Barz METERS and bounded by the following: on the Northeast
died intestate and was survived by her son, Pedro Barz, who filed by Pagsabungan Road; on the Southeast by Lot 896; on
an application, with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, the Northwest by Lot 897; and on the Southwest by the
sometime in 1966, for the confirmation of his title over Lot 896 of portion sold to Efigenia Retuerto;
Plan No. II-5121, entitled and docketed as "IN THE MATTER OF
THE REGISTRATION OF TITLE, Pedro Barz, Applicant," Land FOR OR TO EFIGENIA RETUERTO: 'a portion of the
Registration Case No. N-529, LRC Record No. N24736. The parcel of land described in paragraph no. 7 hereof
Spouses Panfilo Retuerto did not file any opposition to the containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY (440)
application. After appropriate proceedings, the Court promulgated SQUARE METERS and bounded as follows: on the
a decision in favor of Pedro Barz declaring him the lawful owner Northeast by the portion sold to Loreto Retuerto; on the
of the said property. On August 18, 1966, Decree No. N-110287 Southeast by Lot 896; on the Northwest by Lot 897 and
was issued over the property, in favor of Pedro Barz, on the basis on the Southwest by Lot 896." (at page 38, Records)
of which Original Certificate of Title No. 521 was issued, on
November 13, 1968, by the Register of Deeds over the property Loreto Retuerto and Efigenia Retuerto then declared the property,
(Exhibit "A"). The property was then subdivided into four (4) lots for taxation purposes, under their names, under Tax Declaration
namely, Lot 896-A, with an area of 507 square meters (Exhibit "B- No. 69084, effective 1976 (Exhibit "7"). The property covered by
5"), Lot 896-B, with an area of 2,142 square meters (Exhibit "B- Tax Declaration No. 69084 was subdivided into two (2) lots, one
6"), Lot 896-C, with an area of 5,580 square meters (Exhibit "B- with an area of 440 square meters, and the other, with an area of
7"), and Lot 896-D, with an area of 12,253 square meters (Exhibit 1,702 square meters. Efigenia Retuerto declared the property,
B-8"). On October 18, 1967, Pedro Barz executed a "Deed of with an area of 440 square meters, under her name, under Tax
Absolute Sale" over subdivision Lot 896-C in favor of Jose Declaration No. 69083, effective 1976 (Exhibit "7-A") while Loreto
Gesalem for P7,000.00. On the basis of the said deed, Original Retuerto declared the property, with an area of 1,702 square
Certificate of Title was partially cancelled and, in lieu thereof, meters, for taxation purposes, under his name, under Tax
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7509 was issued over said lot in Declaration No. 01298 effective 1976. (Exhibit "7-B").
favor of the vendee.
In the meantime, Pedro Barz died intestate and was survived by
In the interim, Panfilo Retuerto declared the property covered by his heirs, Angelo P. Barz and Merlinda Barz. Loreto Retuerto
Tax Declaration No. 34652, under his name, under Tax likewise, died intestate and was survived by his heirs, namely,
Declaration No. 54960, effective 1974 (Exhibit "3"). Subsequently, Romeo Retuerto, Antonia Retuerto, Narcisa Retuerto, Corazon
Panfilo Retuerto died intestate, on December 29, 1975, and was Retuerto and Patrocinia Retuerto.
survived by his widow, Catalina Retuerto and their children,
namely Gaudencio Retuerto, Loreto Retuerto, Francisca
Ominously, the heirs of Panfilo Retuerto claimed ownership over
Retuerto, Francisco Retuerto, Efigenia Retuerto and Guillerma
subdivision Lot 896-B and a part of subdivision Lot 896-A,
Retuerto. The said heirs executed, on January 4, 1976,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 521 under the name of had been the subject of LRC Case No. 3 wherein Panfilo
Teofilo Barz. As it was, subdivision Lot 896-B was subdivided by Retuerto was declared the lawful owner of the property; that the
the heirs of Panfilo Retuerto, one of which subdivision lots, with inclusion of the subject property in Original Certificate of Title No.
an area of 440 square meters, was forthwith sold to the Spouses 521 issued to and under the name of Teofilo Barz did not vest
Jose Gesalem and Rosa Gesalem. When apprised of the ownership over the title in favor of Pedro Barz but constituted the
aforementioned events, Angelo Barz and Merlinda Barz, the heirs latter merely as a trustee under a constructive trust with the
of Teofilo Barz, and the heirs of Panfilo Retuerto, including the concomitant obligation to convey the said property to the
Spouses Jose Gesalem had a confrontation during which the Defendants Heirs of Panfilo Retuerto and to the Defendants
Spouses Jose Gesalem admitted having purchased a portion of Spouses, as vendees of the said property; Plaintiffs' action was
subdivision Lot 896-B with an area of 440 square meters. barred by laches. x x x
On September 5, 1989, Angelo P. Barz and Merlinda Barz filed a On April 3, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City promulgated
complaint against Catalina Retuerto and the other heirs of Panfilo its decision declaring herein respondents as the absolute owners in fee
Retuerto, including Loreto, who the Plaintiffs believed, was still simple of Lots 896-A and Lot 896-B; declaring the documents adduced
alive, and the Spouses Jose Gesalem, with the Regional Trial by herein petitioners unenforceable and ineffective against OCT No. 521;
Court of Mandaue for "Quieting of Title, Damages and Attorney's nullifying the deed of sale between herein petitioners and the spouses
Fees." The Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that subdivision Lots 896- Gesalem; and ordering herein petitioners to vacate the premises of Lots
A and 896-B were portions of Lot 896 subject of LRC 529 and 896-A and 896-B.1 The Court of Appeals, on December 29, 2000,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 521 under the name of affirmed the decision of the trial court except as to the award of attorney's
Teofilo Barz after whose death, the Plaintiffs inherited the fees which was deleted.2
property, despite which the Defendants claimed ownership over
Lots 896-A and 896-B covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Hence, this appeal by the heirs of Panfilo Retuerto and the spouses
521. x x x Gesalem, assigning the following errors:
Romeo Retuerto, Antonia Retuerto, Narcisa Retuerto, Corazon I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in concluding that petitioners had
Retuerto, Patrocinia Retuerto, the heirs of Loreto Retuerto, filed only ten years from the date of issuance of OCT No. 521, which
an Answer to the complaint alleging, inter alia, by way of erroneously included their Lot No. 896-A, within which to ask for its
affirmative defense, that their father, Loreto Retuerto, was already reconveyance, in the light of their judicially declared and recognized
dead and was survived, by them as his heirs; what was sold to possession thereof since time immemorial.
the Defendants Spouses Jose Gesalem was a portion of Lot 896,
with an area of 440 square meters, which was conveyed to II. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that it was respondents' right
Efigenia Retuerto and not that portion of Lot 896-B deeded to to question petitioners' ownership and possession over the subject
Loreto Retuerto under the "Extrajudicial Settlement of Real property that has been lost thru laches.
Property of Panfilo Retuerto, who was the lawful owner of the
said property, "that they were not aware of LRC Case No. 529
III. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners could not
and/or that the property, sold by Juana Perez to Panfilo Retuerto,
ventilate their claim of title over the subject property by way of affirmative
had been included in Original Certificate of Title No. 521 under
defense as this would constitute collateral attack on respondents' original
the name of Teofilo Barz. x x x
certificate of title.
In their Answer to the complaint, the Defendants Spouses Jose
We do not find merit in the petition. Both the Court of Appeals and the
Gesalem averred, inter alia, by way of affirmative defense, that
Regional Trial Court correctly applied the principles of the Torrens system
they purchased a portion of subdivision Lot 896-B, with an area of
of land registration to the present case.
440 square meters, more or less; Lot 896-B (formerly Lot 896-A)
which had been sold by Juana Perez Barz to Panfilo Retuerto
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title Pedro Barz misrepresented with the land registration court that he
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the inherited the whole of Lot 896 when in truth and in fact a portion thereof
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.3 Such designated as Lot 896-A had already been disposed of to Panfilo
indefeasibility commences after the lapse or expiration of one year from Retuerto; hence, a constructive trust was created over the property for
the date of entry of the decree of registration.4 The act of registration is and in behalf of Panfilo Retuerto and his heirs.
considered a constructive notice to all persons5 respecting title to
property; hence, after the lapse of one year, title to the property can no The contention is bereft of merit. Constructive trusts are created in equity
longer be contested. This system was so effected in order to quiet title to to prevent unjust enrichment, arising against one who, by fraud, duress
land. or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which
he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.6 Petitioners failed to
Records show that in 1966, an application for confirmation of title over substantiate their allegation that their predecessor-in-interest had
Lot 896 was filed by Pedro Barz, herein respondents' predecessor-in- acquired any legal right to the property subject of the present
interest, with the Court of First Instance of Cebu docketed as LRC Case controversy. Nor had they adduced any evidence to show that the
No. N-529. Thereafter, a decision declaring Pedro Barz as the lawful certificate of title of Pedro Barz was obtained through fraud.
owner of the said property was rendered by the court and consequently,
an original certificate of title, OCT No. 521, was issued in his name on Even assuming arguendo that Pedro Barz acquired title to the property
November 13, 1968. Thus, after the lapse of one year, which was through mistake or fraud, petitioners are nonetheless barred from filing
November 13, 1969, private respondent's title to the property already their claim of ownership. An action for reconveyance based on an implied
became indefeasible and can no longer be controverted. or constructive trust prescribes within ten years from the time of its
creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the property.7 Since
Petitioners contest such title and claim that as early as 1929, their registration of real property is considered a constructive notice to all
predecessor-in-interest, Panfilo Retuerto, bought the property from Juana persons, then the ten-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the time
Perez Barz and that in 1937, the then Juzgado de Primera Instancia de of such registering, filing or entering.8 Thus, petitioners should have filed
Cebu adjudicated said property to Panfilo Retuerto in GLRO Record No. an action for reconveyance within ten years from the issuance of OCT
4030. However, nowhere has it been shown that a decree of registration No. 521 in November 16, 1968. This, they failed to do so.
was ever issued affecting the property
Relying on the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of
The alleged earlier sale of the subject property by petitioners' Appeals,9 petitioners argue that the ten-year period for filing an action for
predecessor-in-interest to respondents' predecessor-in-interest was not reconveyance of property arising from an implied or constructive trust
registered. Also, despite the alleged decision in 1937 by the Juzgado de applies only when the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of
Primero Justancia in favor of Panfilo Retuerto, the latter failed to the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner is in actual
intervene and introduce the said decision in the petition for confirmation possession of the property, the action to seek reconveyance or to quiet
of title filed by Pedro Barz in 1966. Also, since the issuance of OCT No. title does not prescribe. Petitioners claim that they and their
521 in the name of Pedro Barz in 1968, no action had been taken by predecessors-in-interest were the ones in actual possession of the
petitioners directly attacking said title and seeking reconveyance of the subject property alleging that in the survey made by Geodetic Engineer
property. It was only sometime in 1989 or twenty-one (21) years later, Leopoldo Tuastumban, it was reported that there were "nine houses and
when they were finally impleaded by private respondents in an action for one rattan shop owned by the heirs of Loreto Retuerto constructed
quieting of title that petitioners actively asserted ownership of the subject thereon."10
property in their answer to the complaint.
Again, the contention does not persuade us. In the 1966 decision of the
Petitioners insist that despite the indefeasibility of private respondents' Land Registration Court in LRC No. 529, it was found that Pedro Barz,
title, they can still maintain an action for reconveyance of the said private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, was the lawful owner of the
property on the ground of fraud pursuant to Section 32 of Presidential subject property as he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
Decree No. 1529. It is alleged that respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
peaceful, continuous and open possession thereof in the concept of
owner since 1915. Said court declared that:
Lot 896: This lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 21969 in the
name of Juana Perez, Exh. "O-Pedro Barz," containing an area of
20,486 sq. meters. It originally belonged to the spouses Esteban
Perez and Lorenza Sanchez. After their death, the same was
inherited by Juana Perez who died in 1942 and was succeeded
by her lone heir son Pedro Barz, Filipino citizen, married to
Teofila Pedroza and resident of Mandaue, Cebu. Juana Perez
owned and possessed this lot since 1915 up to her death in 1942
when Pedro Barz reached the age of consciousness or when he
was around 8 years old; that her possession had been peaceful,
continuous, open and in concept of owner. From 1942 up to the
present, the possession of Pedro Barz over this property had
been likewise peaceful, continuous and in concept of owner as he
was religious in the payment of real estate taxes, as shown in
Exh. "N-2 Pedro Barz."11
SO ORDERED.