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A Research Pioneer’s Wisdom: An Interview with Dr. Murray Sidman

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EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 2010, 12, 181 - 198 NUMBER 2 (WINTER 2010)
181

A Research Pioneer’s Wisdom: An Interview

with Dr. Murray Sidman
Per Holth
Akershus University College

One of the most outstanding contributors to modern behavior analysis answers questions regarding the
history of behavior analysis, behavior analysis and psychology, tactics of scientific research, philosophy
of science, behavior analysis and important social issues, research on coercion, and education. He also
reflects upon the usefulness of randomized controlled studies, his reservations against relational frame
theory, and on the future of behavior analysis.
Key words: Behavior analysis and psychology, tactics of scientific research, description vs.
explanation, social issues

Murray Sidman completed his Ph.D at Co-
lumbia University in 1952. His principal advi-
sors, Fred S. Keller and W. N. Schoenfeld, had
strong assists from Ralph Hefferline, Clarence
Graham, and a small group of fellow graduate
students. After that, he spent nine years in the
exciting and productive interdisciplinary envi-
ronment of the Neuropsychiatry Division at the
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, work-
ing with and learning from Joseph V. Brady and
many other innovative and productive research-
ers. He then joined the Neurology Service of the
Massachusetts General Hospital for another nine
years. His human and nonhuman behavioral
research laboratories moved eventually to the E.
K. Shriver Center and finally to Northeastern
University, where he remained as Professor of
Psychology until he retired from Academe, con-
tinuing his research at the New England Center
for Children. Although retired from there in
2001, he continues research and writing. One
outcome of his lifetime of research is his convic-
tion that extending experimental results out of
the laboratory not only adds an intrinsically valu-
able dimension to basic research, but is essential
Notes: 1. I thank Iver H. Iversen for his helpful suggestions
on the interview questions.
2. Send correspondence Per Holth, Faculty of Behavioral Sci-
ence, Akershus University College, PO box 423, 2001 Lillestrøm,
Norway; e-mail: per.holth@hiak.no
181
to its survival in a world of increasing competition
for ever more limited resources.
Per Holth is Professor of Behavior Analysis
at Akershus University College in Norway.
Per received his Ph.D. from the University of
Oslo. His doctoral research was conducted
in collaboration with Erik Arntzen and was
concerned with stimulus equivalence – very much
inspired by the basic experimental work in that
field by Dr. Sidman. At Akershus University Col-
lege, he teaches a variety of themes in behavior
analysis, including experimental and applied
behavior analysis, and theoretical and conceptual
issues. Akershus University College now offers
education in behavior analysis at all levels from
Bachelor through Master and Doctoral programs.
Important contributions
Holth: You have made major contributions
within several different areas of a science of behav-
ior. You are one of very few behavior analysts who
have had behavioral phenomena named after you.
We have “Sidman avoidance”, and people have
occasionally used the term “Sidman equivalence”.
A third major area of contribution is your work
on “Tactics of scientific research” (e.g., Sidman,
1960). Which one do you consider most impor-
tant of all your contributions?
182 Per Holth
Sidman: I think future developments will
prove or disprove judgments about the impor-
tance of any contributions. My own current
opinion is that the future will judge “Tactics”
to be my own most important contribution. It
is not that the book introduced new research
methodologies or principles. I have always
thought of the book as descriptive rather than in-
novative, as an account of the ways good research
has always been carried out. The illustrations, of
course, came from behavior analytic research
but I have always felt that the principles being
illustrated were common to other sciences also.
(As behavior analysis has entered new research
areas, of course, new illustrations of research
methodology become appropriate, and the lack
of such new examples is possibly a major criti-
cism of the book as it now stands.)
I am going to have more to say in a forth-
coming publication about what follows, but a
number of respected colleagues have told me
that they wished I had said more in the book
about the philosophy of science and had not
confined myself just to scientific methodology.
At first, I accepted this absence of philosophical
discussion as a justified criticism of the book. I
have always thought of myself as a reasonably
capable experimenter but as only a novice in
philosophy. I have long admired philosophers
of science and at one time, was well read in
the area because I felt that philosophers have
much to tell me about my own place in the
world of ideas and intellect. In the course of
writing “Tactics,” however, I realized that most
philosophers of science had little notion of what
really went on in the design and performance
of scientific experiments. Later, though, as my
own thinking matured, I came to realize that an
understanding of and an acquaintance with the
methodological details of any experiment was
critical to the understanding of the experiment’s
validity, generality, and overall significance. I
now believe, therefore, that an understanding
of research methods is a philosophic basic, a
requirement for any philosopher who wishes to
evaluate a particular science’s place in any more
general world view. That, then, is the outline of
a major reason why I judge my “Tactics” book to
be the most important of my own contributions.
Entering psychology
Holth: What were some of the things that
led you to enter the field of psychology, and
then, behavior analysis?
Sidman: At the time I was working for my
undergraduate and graduate degrees, few young
people thought of psychology as a profession
they might someday enter. Even most of those
already in the field had started in some other
area before they became interested in one or
more problems that turned out to be dealt with
by psychologists. That was true of me, also. Like
many idealistic young people, my ambition
was to change the world but I felt that people
made the world the way it was, so if it was to
be changed, people would have to be changed.
I became interested in the sciences because I
thought it was there I could learn all about how
to change people’s ways of dealing with their
environments. I even took an extra undergradu-
ate year of just science courses, looking for that
science which would tell me what I had to know.
I found it nowhere. Even in the lab courses, few
of the experiments actually worked out the way
the lab manuals said they would.
And then I found myself in Keller and
Schoenfeld’s pioneer introductory psychology
course that was based on B. F. Skinner’s work as
summarized in his “The Behavior of Organisms
(1938).” There, in the laboratory sessions, my
furry little subject did everything it was sup-
posed to do when I did what the lab manual
told me to do. It was not only my first science
course in which the lab results came out just
as predicted, but it was the first time I found
myself changing another organism’s behavior
not just by telling it in words what I wanted
it to do but by telling it nonverbally, simply
by changing the effects its behavior had on the
environment, and by changing the environ-
ment in which it could produce those effects.
I had found what I was looking for and I kept
on with it, doing what interested and excited
me until I finally received a Ph.D., discovered
I had become a psychologist, and had to find a
job somewhere in that field.
As for entering the field of behavior analysis, I
never did enter it because it did not exist at the time.
 A Research Pioneer’s Wisdom: An Interview with Dr. Murray Sidman
It just grew around me and enveloped me
within it as it grew. Now, mostly because the
field has extended out of the laboratory and has
come to deal effectively with important practi-
cal problems, young people are coming to see
behavior analysis as an occupation worthy of
becoming trained in and engaging in as a lifetime
profession.
Holth: What were the roles played by Keller
and Schoenfeld?
Sidman: As I noted before, Keller and
Schoenfeld’s introductory course was what really
got me started. I also took other courses with
them—verbal behavior, motivation, stimulus
discrimination—and they are among my most
memorable school experiences. I was also greatly
influenced by some of their earlier students.
Most noteworthy among those were Ralph Hef-
ferline, whose work led to my own dissertation
on avoidance behavior, and Jim Dinsmoor, who
was always available with sensible advice for
the solution of experimental problems. Several
other students also were most important to my
own development, most notably Donald Cook,
Michael Kaplan, and Carl Crocetti. The four of
us not only did experiments together and got
together outside for discussion and argument,
but probably made life a bit hectic for Keller and
Schoenfeld. We were continually cornering them
in the corridors and in their offices with questions
and requests for support of experiments. They
were always available to us.
Except for their interest in the same subject
matter—the behavior of organisms—their teach-
ing styles were poles apart. Schoenfeld’s most
frequent question of us was, “How do you know
that?” He continually questioned our most basic
assumptions, forcing us to think through and to
justify anything we said. He was always wondering
how we came to know things. I remember when
he asked once, “How do you suppose people
learned that pregnancy was the result of sexual
intercourse that had taken place nine months
before?” His kinds of questions made life difficult
for many students and many of them disliked his
courses intensely. I was enthralled with them,
exhiliarated not just by learning the answers to
questions but by learning how to ask questions of
nature and of my own understanding of nature.
183
Keller achieved the same results in an en-
tirely different way. He was positive reinforce-
ment personified. Instead of challenging us to
think in new ways, and making us justify our
thinking, he gradually shaped our thinking,
using positive reinforcement all the way. His
shaping technique, however, was not the simple
one that we learned in the laboratory, in which
we gradually taught our subjects to perform
the exact behavior we wanted from them.
He shaped us not to say what he wanted us to
say, but rather, to come up with a more pro-
ductive way of thinking that even he could not
necessarily have known beforehand. We would
go out of his office happy that he liked our idea
but not realizing that the idea we were going out
with was not the same one we had come in with.
I have tried at different times to imitate both
of them, but I could never really match either
of their teaching techniques. Still, I think that
because of them, I have been a better teacher
than I would have been otherwise.
Research on coercion and avoidance
Holth: In addition to your basic research
on avoidance, you wrote a book about Coer-
cion and its fallout. Avoidance still seems to be
prevalent in human behavior and a huge part
of psychopathology. Yet, there is very little basic
research going on in this area. Do you think
that work in this area is still needed both with
animals and with humans?
Sidman: I certainly do think that work on
coercive control should continue, with both
human and nonhuman subjects. I am aware
that because of the fairly generally accepted
conclusion that coercive control of behavior is
undesirable, some have come to the conclusion
that research on coercive control is no longer
justified. Although my book strongly supports
the notion that we should avoid coercive control
in everyday life, I strongly disagree with the
position that research in the area is undesir-
able. All research includes two activities: asking
questions and attempts to answer questions.
To proscribe the asking of questions—any
questions—is, to me, an unthinkable option.
Freedom of thought is essential to all progress.
184 Per Holth
And then, once asked, questions must be
answered, if possible. Some methods for an-
swering questions may, of course, be undesir-
able—for example, it is not permissible to find
out the effects of torture by torturing people or
animals—and good answers to some questions
must await the discovery of allowable investiga-
tive techniques, but the questions themselves
must always be allowed.
Holth: What do you think it would take to
get the proper research going?
Sidman: For me, the proper research
is any research in which good methods are
proposed to answer important questions.
I do not think the criteria are different for
research on coercion than on any other set
of problems. It is up to researchers to justify
their research proposals to potential support-
ers—granting agencies, private foundations,
individuals or organizations with particular
concerns—just as always. Research support
in general has become difficult to obtain. Re-
searchers must learn to argue persuasively for
their particular areas of concern.
Behavior analysis and psychology
Holth: In the Coercion book, you wrote
that:
“The science of behavior analysis had its roots in phi-
losophy, then separated itself off as a branch of the
emerging discipline of psychology, and is now in the
process of disengaging itself from psychology. The
parent has not yet let go (nor, for that matter, has the
grandparent), and struggles to maintain its adminis-
trative dominance within Academe, but the lines of
intellectual fracture are clear. Psychology as its name
suggests, is the science of mind. Behavior analysis is
the science of behavior” (Sidman, 1989, pp. 4-5).
In the Equivalence book, you mentioned
that you decided not to publish equivalence
research in traditional psychology journals (you
realized that it was too late). You described
psychology and behavior analysis as different
sciences – with different methodologies. Do
you picture psychology and behavior analysis
as two sciences flourishing side by side in the
future?
Sidman: I believe that both basic and ap-
plied behavior analysis will flourish for a long
time. About psychology, I am not so sure. I
cannot believe that some areas of psychology
will continue to exist.
Clinical psychology, for example, is a sham
and a disgrace. Whatever success it has achieved
has been accomplished by individuals who have
themselves learned useful techniques from ex-
perience. They have no scientific background
and produce little useful clinical data.
Physiological psychology should be a flour-
ishing field but for the most part researchers
in that area ask the wrong questions about the
behavior whose physiological and neurological
underpinnings they are trying to understand.
The field maintains itself because it has no
competitors. Behavior analysis, unfortunately,
has done little in that area but when it does
wake up to its potential contributions, it is
likely to place traditional physiological psychol-
ogy in the same disposable category as clinical
psychology.
Educational psychology places no value on
scientific data which have shown that learn-
ing is engendered by its consequences and
that learning can be errorless. It continues to
place its faith in trial-and-error learning and
in averaged continuous learning curves. When
educational psychology accepts the finding
that the true science of learning is the science
of teaching, that teachers rather than pupils
are responsible when learning takes place or
fails to take place, educational psychology will
then leave psychology and take its place within
behavior analysis.
So yes, I do believe that psychology and
behavior analysis are separate sciences, but I do
not believe that all areas of each can flourish
side by side. They differ in philosophy, in the
kinds of questions they ask, in the kinds of data
they value, and in investigative methodology. A
main reason I did not publish my equivalence
research in traditional psychology journals was
that I did not think the audience would be
receptive. The single-subject methodology and
my inductive rather than deductive approach
were pretty much proscribed in the standard
psychology literature.
 A Research Pioneer’s Wisdom: An Interview with Dr. Murray Sidman
Education
Holth: You have been quite critical of the
field of education. In the equivalence book, you
wrote that: “I know of no service area except
education in which practitioners habitually dis-
regard fundamental research” (Sidman, 1994,
p. 532). If you were in the position of an om-
nipotent secretary of state for education, how
would you go about to change this to make sure
that students benefit optimally from a science
of behavior?
Sidman: If I really were omnipotent, even
more so than a secretary of education could
possibly be, I would first wipe out most schools
of education and then restart each of them
when they could attract behavioral scientists
who were capable of applying behavior analytic
principles both in the basic learning laboratory
and in the classroom. That, of course, is never
going to happen. I would, however, support
the principle—one, incidentally, that I now see
being enunciated by the current Secretary of
Education in the United States—that teachers
should be evaluated by the performance of their
students. I would, however, also require that
teachers receive training in how to increase the
level their pupils’ performances reach. If they
are going to be judged by their pupils’ successes,
then they have themselves to be taught how to
teach successfully. Most teachers are justifiably
afraid of the requirement that they teach suc-
cessfully because they have never been trained
to do that. Along with their pupils, teachers,
too, deserve better. Their own educational sys-
tem has to be drastically revised. Basic teacher
training, then, is the area in which I believe that
improvement is most needed.
Past failure of behavior analysis to gain
popularity
Holth: Behavior analysis clearly has not
gained the ground and popularity that some
of us think it deserves. What do you think Be-
havior Analysts could have done better in order
to promote their science over the last 50 years?
Sidman: The language of Behavior Analysis
has been one of its strengths with respect to its
185
scientific development but at the same time
has kept it from gaining understanding and
popularity among the general public and other
scientists. Let me explain.
B. F. Skinner proposed Radical Behaviorism
as the philosophical foundation for his way of
looking at the world of behavior. A basic feature
of Radical Behaviorism is its avoidance of what
Skinner called explanatory fictions. These are
terms like “mind,” “representation,” “meaning,”
“knowledge,” “symbol,” “referent,” “memory,”
and many others. They are called explanatory
fictions not only because they are invisible but
because they explain nothing. Instead, they
move the search for explanation from observ-
able to unobservable variables, structures, and
processes. Many of the successes of experimental
and applied behavior analysis stem from this
philosophic background that calls for the rejec-
tion of explanatory fictions.
Unfortunately, explanatory fictions remain a
feature of our everyday vocabulary. For example,
we say that someone has a brilliant mind, or that
we get something done when we put our mind
to it, or that we store knowledge in our mind,
or that memory is an important feature of the
mind, and so on. When we say to nonbehavior-
ists that behavior analysis rejects the concept of
mind, the response is likely to be that behavior
analysts are interested only in mindless, or
trivial, behavior. Behaviorists have never popu-
larized the notion that they are interested in all
behavior but that they find explanations in other
places than in a mysterious thing called mind.
In both popular speech and in nonbehavioral
science, much of what we do is considered to
be the result of memory processes: A person
learns rapidly because she has a good memory;
a person frequently loses his keys because he has
a poor memory; I have no memory for names;
memory is said to deteriorate with age; and so
on. When behaviorists argue that there is no
such thing as memory, they are dismissed as
proponents of an empty organism. Behaviorists
have never made it clear that they are very much
interested in behavior that we call remembering
or forgetting, and that we explain such behavior
in other ways than by reference to an invisible
cause called memory.
186 Per Holth
Our insistence on purity of terminology
when we speak to each other has unfortunately
carried over into our communication with oth-
ers, with the result that nonbehaviorists, both
nonscientific and scientific, have concluded that
behaviorism has nothing of interest to say to
them. Such a conclusion has not been unreason-
able. After all, other sciences have recognized
that popular language refers to events that are so
interesting and even important in everyday life
that nonscientists have developed their own ter-
minology to describe and explain them. And so,
physicists do not scold us for talking about sun-
sets but instead say, “Here is what is really going
on when we see the sun set.” Behavior analysts,
instead of telling people that there is no such
thing as a mind to be looked for, should instead
be telling them how to create a mind—which
is really what behavior analysts are doing all the
time. They should not be telling people that
there is no such thing as memory but should
instead show them what factors determine
whether we remember or forget something.
Instead of insisting that representations do
not exist, we should be pointing out how the
formation of equivalence relations underlies
representations and symbols. Ordinary language
develops from ordinary experience. No science
can ignore that experience and hope to survive.
Tactics of Scientific Research
Holth: Let us turn to some issues raised in
your book Tactics of Scientific Research (Sidman,
1960). You mentioned that,
“Pilot studies that are not carried out in as rigorous a
fashion as possible have neither positive nor negative
value as indicators of subsequent results. A sloppy
experiment is a poor experiment, and can never be
justified by labeling it ‘pilot’” (p. 218).
Do you think that the practice of designating
studies as “pilot” is still used in an attempt to
justify sloppy experimenting?
Sidman: No, I think that is a fairly rare
occurrence in experimental behavior analysis.
I would say, rather, that experimental rigor
is a hallmark of behavioral experimentation.
I sometimes have the feeling, however, that
sloppy “pilot’ studies are more common in ap-
plied behavior analytic studies. The excuse there
is often that the uncontrolled environments
in which most applied studies must be carried
out do not permit the experimental rigor that
basic experimentation demands. It is argued
that uncontrolled studies must be carried out in
order to get some idea of whether or not some
hypothesis is worth the effort of applying the
kinds of controls that make valid data possible
even in uncontrolled environments. Whatever
the excuse, however, sloppy data are deceptive
data. For the purpose of determining whether
to pursue some line of research, such data are
just as likely to send one off on a wild goose
chase as a wild guess would have done.
Holth: A very thought provoking statement
that you made in Tactics was that “It is simply
not true that the larger the group, the greater
is the generality of the data” (Sidman, 1960, p.
47). To what extent do you feel that this point
got through to the researchers it was meant for?
Sidman: I think that this point has be-
come one of the basic foundations of both
experimental and applied behavior analysis.
The substitution of systematic replication
with individuals for large group averages has
proven itself to produce data of great generality.
Unfortunately, the success of well-controlled
individual studies in producing data of great
generality has led many to conclude that large
group studies have no value in the study of
behavior. I do not believe this is correct (see
below).
Holth: What is your opinion on the move-
ment towards evidence-based treatment and its
emphasis on the randomized controlled trials
(RCT) with large groups of subjects as the gold
standard?
Sidman: Evidence-based treatment is, of
course, highly desirable. Treatment that is not
based on evidence is so often just a scam that it
should always at least be looked at with suspi-
cion. What, however, constitutes evidence for
the effectiveness of a treatment? As I noted be-
fore, replicated studies with individuals rather
than groups have demonstrated themselves
again and again to produce generalizable data.
 A Research Pioneer’s Wisdom: An Interview with Dr. Murray Sidman
If a treatment works with just one person, then
it will work for others also. When it is found
not to work with some others, then instead of
discarding the treatment on the basis of the
average number of successes and failures, the
productive course is to investigate the reasons
for the differences; why does the treatment work
for some and not for others?
Although behavior analysts usually work
with individual responses and individual sub-
jects, people in general are interested in account-
ing for and changing large classes of behavior,
not restricted operants. They are also interested
in changing or accounting for large populations,
not particular individuals. Therefore, group data
are more meaningful to them.
Behavior analysts who work with individu-
als do not always realize that some questions
about the effectiveness of a treatment do require
population statistics. For example, people who
are in the position of having to deal with practi-
cal community and world problems—leaders
in government, the military, in diplomacy, in
education, and so on—do not want to be told
that some treatment or procedure has been
shown to work with a few individuals. They are
not concerned with any particular individual
at all and are not disturbed if some individuals
fail to show the desired behavior change when
the treatment is applied. Rather, they want to
know how much of the population will show
the desired effect, or how large the effect will be
within the population or organization in which
the treatment is applied.
For example, suppose we convince a com-
pany to eliminate coercive control—punish-
ment and threats of punishment for undesirable
behavior—and substitute consistent positive
reinforcement for desirable behavior. The
company will be concerned to know about
any resulting changes in average work pro-
ductivity, in the overall rate of absenteeism,
in the total number of altercations between
workers and supervisors, and in the profit and
loss statements reported by the accounting de-
partment. If these overall measurements show
consistent improvements, the company may
or may not try to do something about individ-
ual workers whose behavior failed to improve.
187
Without a significant average improvement to
start with, they will not be interested in finding
out why the treatment works for some individu-
als and not for others or even in knowing which
individual workers fall into each class. When
the aim is to produce large overall effects, the
effects of the treatment on any individual are
of no concern. In such situations, statistical
analysis is appropriate. I believe that one reason
for the failure of behavior analysis to achieve
wider recognition is the absence of data indi-
cating how effective it is in large populations.
What about the use of randomized con-
trol trials to determine whether a treat-
ment is effective? The use of control
groups in a statistical analysis of treat-
ment effects raises a number of problems.
One is the difficulty in finding control groups
with the same relevant properties as the experi-
mental group. This is often impossible and as
a result, many large-population studies receive
unfavorable interpretations. A second set of
problems stems from ethical considerations.
Can one justify the failure to apply a treatment
to those whom it would have helped if it were
found to be effective?
Both of these kinds of problems can be
avoided by using the same population both
as the experimental and control group. Before
applying the treatment, observe the groups
and take the relevant measurements. Then ap-
ply the treatment and observe whether or not
those measurements change. This of course is
a technique we have learned from our studies
with individuals. Establish baselines and then
determine whether or not a particular treat-
ment changes those baselines.
Definition of punishment
Holth: Two different definitions of punish-
ment figure in the behavior-analytic literature.
According to Skinner’s (1953) definition,
punishment is a procedure in which responses
are followed by either (a) the removal of a
positive reinforcer, or (b) the presentation
of a negative reinforcer (or aversive stimu-
lus). The second definition of punishment
was advocated by Azrin and Holz (1966).
188
They defined punishment in the same way as
reinforcement, only with the opposite effect:
Whereas reinforcement is defined by an in-
creased response rate, punishment is defined by
a decreased rate. The latter definition now seems
to have become standard in most behavior-
analytic texts (cf., Holth, 2005). However, you
have kept Skinner’s original definition of pun-
ishment. In the Coercion book, for instance,
you wrote that:
“Reinforcement differs in an important way from
punishment. We define reinforcers – positive or
negative – by their special effect on conduct; they
increase the future likelihood of actions that they fol-
low. But we define punishment without appealing to
any behavioral effect; punishment occurs whenever
an action is followed either by a loss of positive or
a gain of negative reinforcers. This definition says
nothing about the effect of a punisher on the action
that produces it” (Sidman, 1989, p. 39).
What are your main reasons for preferring
Skinner’s original definition of punishment?
Sidman: My own personal reasons for
preferring Skinner’s original definition of pun-
ishment have, first, to do with its parsimony.
As we all know, reinforcing events are identified
by observations of a particular consequence
of behavior—an increase in the future prob-
ability of that behavior. But then, to explain
a behavioral increase in behavior, we appeal
to reinforcement. The circularity here is evi-
dent; because we cannot know ahead of time
whether a particular behavioral consequence is
a reinforcer, we first have to observe whether it
does produce an increase in the frequency of
that behavior. Skinner restricts that inelegant
circularity to the definition of reinforcement; it
does not apply to his definition of punishment.
To identify a punisher he reqires no particular
behavioral outcome.
The Azrin and Holz definition of punish-
ment, however, which seems to have become
generally adopted without much discussion,
suffers from the same circularity as the defini-
tion of reinforcement. Punishment is identi-
fied by observations of a particular behavioral
consequence—a decrease in the future prob-
ability of that behavior. Again, we cannot know
Per Holth
ahead of time whether a particular behavioral
consequence is a punisher; we first have to
observe whether it produces a decrease in the
frequency of that behavior. If it does, then we
explain the decrease as the effect of punishment.
The same inelegant circularity exists in the iden-
tification of punishers as in the identification
of reinforcers.
Because Skinner confines the inelegance
of circularity to the concept of reinforce-
ment, whereas Azrin and Holz add the same
inelegance to the concept of punishment, I
prefer Skinner’s more parsimonious definitions.
What is the role of parsimony in science? A
preference for parsimony derives originally
from popular aesthetics. For example, Chi-
nese fortune cookies tell us, “There is beauty
in simplicity” and “The most valuable of all
talents is that of never using two words when
one will do.” This wisdom made its way into
science with the principle of Occam’s razor:
“Entities should not be multiplied unneces-
sarily.” Another form of this principle is, “The
explanation requiring the fewest assumptions
is most likely to be correct.” It has always been
my impression that whenever two hypotheses,
theories, or methodologies seem equally
capable of explaining or predicting particular
data, then the more parsimonious alternative
is the one that eventually wins out. Of the two
defintions of punishment, Skinner’s is clearly
the more parsimonious.
My second reason for rejecting the definition
of punishment as a behavioral consequence that
produces a decrease in the probability of some
particular behavior is that such a definition
seems to apply also to instances that I find it dif-
ficult to think of as punishment. For example,
when pupils decrease their error frequency after
being exposed to additional instruction, do we
classify this as punishment? When one stops
overeating after observing weight reductions on
a scale, has one been punished? In general, when
we get a person to stop one form of behavior
simply by providing positive reinforcement for
some other behavior, have we engaged in pun-
ishment? Such instances and many others like
them make me very uneasy about accepting the
Azrin-Holz definition of punishment.
 A Research Pioneer’s Wisdom: An Interview with Dr. Murray Sidman
Stimulus equivalence
Holth: You once wrote, when asked to reply
to Horne and Lowe’s (1996) criticisms of your
equivalence position, that you did not hold a
position, except the position that “data rather
than debate will show the way” (Sidman, 1997,
p. 258). What do you think are the current
most important research questions that you
would want to be able to answer with respect
to stimulus equivalence?
Sidman: When I referred here to data as
opposed to debate, I was not thinking of any
particular research questions that were out-
standing at the time. I was referring just to my
preference for using research to decide which
theory was the best rather than attending to
the seemingly endless verbal sparring about
which theory one should adopt. I did publish
a paper (Sidman, 2000), in which I suggested
a number of experiments that would serve to
test the theory I had proposed, with perhaps the
most far reaching being experiments to test the
prediction that in a reinforcement contingency,
the resulting equivalence class would include the
responses along with the stimuli. My general
point, however, that “data rather than debate
will show the way” simply reflected my con-
viction that competing theories are eventually
settled by the directions in which data lead the
field rather than by verbal persuasion.
Holth: There has been some speculation
about relations between stimulus equivalence
and language, such as whether one is necessary
for the other. Could you explain how your
own thinking about these issues has evolved
over time?
Sidman: Two major developments have
influenced my thinking about equivalence and
language. The first is the series of convincing
experiments from Schusterman’s laboratory in
which sea lions formed equivalence relations
(e.g., Kastak, Schusterman, & Kastak, 2001).
Complex as some of these experiments were,
language was clearly not involved.
On the other hand, everyday experience tells
us that language is often involved in equivalence
relations. Indeed, with humans, language is
perhaps the most important area in which
189
equivalence relations take part. The second
development handles this common observa-
tion. That development was my own suggestion,
at present confirmed by at least one published
experiment, that equivalence classes include the
responses as well as the stimuli in a reinforcement
contingency. A corollary of this suggestion is that
differential responses will facilitate the develop-
ment of equivalence relations. Such differential
responses are often words or phrases. I do not
believe that this suggestion, if proven, would dis-
prove the Horne and Lowe theory that language
is necessary for equivalence relations. Instead, it
would enfold that theory into my own.
These considerations do not, of course,
demonstrate either that equivalence relations
are necessary for language or that language is
primary. I do not believe that either alternative is
correct. Rather, I consider it a pseudo question.
Although it is clear that language is not necessary
for equivalence relations, it does play a role. It is
equally clear that language is much more compli-
cated a phenomenon than equivalence relations
by themselves can explain. And yet, I do not
believe that language would be possible without
equivalence relations. Consider, for example, just
simple nouns, verbs, and adjectives. When people
ask what such words mean (in this instance, what
are the dictionary definitions?), the answers show
them to be equivalent to some thing, action, or
property of things. Equivalence relations play a
necessary role in language but that role, along
with the relevance of equivalence to other factors
essential to language, has yet to be fully explicated.
Limits to generality
Holth: In the Coercion book, you wrote
that“any experimental science must contain self-
checking mechanisms for specifying the limits to
the generalizability of its methods and findings”
(Sidman, 1989, p. 53). What do you think are
the most important things that need to be done
in order to specify the limits to the generalizability
of stimulus equivalence?
Sidman: One can view generalizability in
several contexts. For example, an early question
concerned the generalizability of equivalence
relations to the behavior of nonhuman animals.
190 Per Holth
This is an area in which considerable research
remains to be done.
A second question concerns the generaliz-
ability of equivalence to stimuli of different
sensory modalities. This question has been
resolved; equivalence relations do not depend
on any particular stimulus modalities.
A third question concerns the generalizabil-
ity of the methods for establishing equivalence
relations. Although the original experiments
used four-term contingencies (conditional
discriminations) to establish and demonstrate
equivalence relations, it has become fairly clear
that three-term (simple discrimination) and
probably two-term (response-reinforcer and
stimulus-reinforcer) contingencies suffice to
establish equivalence relations. Unequivocal
demonstrations that equivalence relations
have been established still, however, do require
conditional discriminations. Mere stimulus
substitutability does not suffice because it is
possible to show that presumed establishing
procedures bring about the interchangeability
of some but not all stimuli in a reinforcement
contingency. For example, symmetry may be
demonstrated even in the absence of transitivity.
And so, we find that while the original condi-
tional-discrimination technique for establishing
equivalence relations is generalizable, other
techniques can accomplish the same effects.
Conditional discriminations, however, remain
the only technique for testing definitively
whether or not any establishing procedure has
succeeded.
As for the generalizability of any particular
finding, this has to be determined in the usual
ways: direct and systematic replication.
Description versus explanation
Holth: The issue of description versus expla-
nation is a difficult one. You have written that: “.
. . although set theory informs us how to find out
whether any particular event pair belongs to an
equivalence relation it is silent about the origin
of equivalence relations themselves” (Sidman,
1994, p. 553) and, in a later article (Sidman,
1997) that stimulus equivalence is descriptive
rather than explanatory. Yet, you added that:
“Having applied the set theory definition of the
equivalence relation to our behavioral observations.
. ., we now find that the emergent conditional
discriminations in our original experiment are no
longer mysterious. All those performances are
to be expected if the baseline contingencies have
established an equivalence relation.”
Hence, is there some way still in which you
consider equivalence to be explanatory rather
than just descriptive?
Sidman: It is not easy to draw distinctions
between description and explanation. Per-
haps the most general example would be the
comparison of theory and experimental data.
Theory is clearly a way to explain data. Data
by themselves, however, provide no explana-
tion of why they are predictable. In what sense
is the way my collaborators and I talk about
equivalence relations an explanatory theory
and in what sense does it simply provide a way
to describe the observations?
Theory plays a role in two aspects of our
formulation. The first is the question of where
equivalence relations come from. I have
presented a detailed answer to this question
elsewhere (Sidman, 2000) that is too lengthy
to be repeated here. Briefly, that theory holds
that equivalence relations arise directly from
reinforcement contingencies, that each ele-
ment of a reinforcement contingency becomes
a member of an equivalence class. I presented
a description of many experiments that have
already supported this theory and many oth-
ers that would help support or disprove it. In
what follows, I shall assume the validity of our
theory of the source of equivalence relations.
The second theoretical aspect of our for-
mulation is the use my colleagues and I have
made of the mathematical theory of sets; we
have adopted that theory as a model. The ques-
tion with which I have wrestled is whether the
mathematical theory of sets provides a theo-
retical or a descriptive model of equivalence
relations in behavior?
I have come to the conclusion that our
formulation does involve theory but not theo-
retical explanation. The theory consists only
of our assumption that the relations among
elements of a reinforcement contingency—
 A Research Pioneer’s Wisdom: An Interview with Dr. Murray Sidman
stimuli and responses—fit mathematical set
theory’s definition of the equivalence relation.
In set theory, equivalence relations must dis-
play certain regularities, described as reflexiv-
ity, symmetry, and transitivity. If our theory
that the elements of a reinforcement contin-
gency are related by equivalence is valid, then
the emergent relations that make our data so
interesting must display the regularities that set
theory specifies. Set theory itself is not a theory
of behavior; it does not explain the remarkable
explosion of performances that our behavioral
procedures produce. Although set theory itself
says nothing about behavior, however, it proves
useful in describing behavior. In particular,
the relations among the environmental and
behavioral components of reinforcement
contingencies turn out to be specific examples
of set theory’s more general definition of the
equivalence relation.
Given the validity of our assumption that
our data fit set theory’s definition of the equiva-
lence relation, then the emergent performances
are to be expected; they are simply examples of
set theory’s equivalence relations. No behav-
ioral theory has predicted them. Our theory
has simply placed our observations within an
already existing mathematical theory. That is
why I say that our theory does not explain the
data but just provides a way to describe them.
The theory simply places the data within a non-
behavioral theory that describes the emergent
performances that make our data so interesting.
Our data simply provide examples of set theory’s
equivalence relations.
The theoretical assumption that our data fit
set theory’s definition of equivalence relations is
strengthened by the finding that other aspects
of the data are also compatible with set theory.
For example, the abstractions, set union and set
intersection also contribute to the descriptive
framework. Set union describes instances in
which two or more equivalence classes merge
because they possess elements in common. Set
abstraction defines the opposite observation;
classes remain independent even though they
possess elements in common.
Set union provides a parsimonious descrip-
tion of what is commonly called transfer or
191
transformation of function, often presumed to
denote a separate behavioral process. Given set
union, we automatically come up with elements
that belong to more than one class. Transfer of
function, rather than being conceptualized as
an explanatory behavioral process, turns out to
be simply an example of set union. Like equiva-
lence relations, set union and set intersection
are concepts that belong to mathematical set
theory, not to behavioral theory. When transfer
of function takes place, it is simply a behavioral
example of mathematically defined set union.
The behavioral process that is involved here is
discrimination formation, in which contex-
tual factors determine whether set union or set
intersection will provide a description of the
observed behavior.
Perhaps because our way of talking about
our data has been remarkably productive—a
major characteristic of a good theory—oth-
ers have called our formulation theoretical. I
myself, however, consider it to be a descriptive
model, a useful framework within which to
describe our data.
Relational Frame Theory
Holth: Relational frame theory seems,
basically, to be very much inspired by your
early work on equivalence relations. How-
ever, in RFT, equivalence is just one of a
number of different derived relations that
can emerge from multiple exemplar training.
What do you consider to be the stronger and
weaker parts of this theory?
Sidman: The analytic technique we used in
our studies of equivalence showed that behav-
ioral equivalence relations exhibit reflexivity,
symmetry, and transitivity. RFT generalizes
our original type of analysis to other kinds of
relations that may exhibit different properties—
nonreflexivity, nonsymmetry, or nontransitivity
(e.g., Hayes, 1991).
In RFT’s analysis, symmetry and transitivity
are subsumed under mutual and combinatorial
entailment. For example, in an equivalence
relation, if A is related to B, then symmetry
requires B to bear that same relation to A. Thus,
“father” cannot be an equivalence relation.
192 Per Holth
If A is the father of B, B cannot be the father
of A; the relation is not symmetric. A relation
does, however, exist in both directions; B must
be a child of A. Therefore, the relational prop-
erty, mutual entailment, does apply. Even if the
relation were symmetric, mutual entailment
would still apply.
Furthermore, if A is the father of B, and
B is the father of C, then “father” cannot be
transitive; A cannot be the father of C. Like
nonreflexivity, nontransitivity shows the rela-
tion “father” not to be an equivalence relation.
A is, however, still related to C; that relation
is “grandfather.” Therefore, although the rela-
tion, “father,” is nontransitive and therefore is
not an equivalence relation, it does display the
relational property, combinatorial entailment.
If the relation were transitive, combinatorial
entailment would still apply.
Thus, the two types of entailment do provide
a more general way to classify relations than just
the limited properties of symmetry and transitiv-
ity. In spite of the greater generality of mutual
and combinatorial entailment, however, I ques-
tion the dismissal of the equivalence relation as
“just one of a number of different derived rela-
tions that can emerge from multiple exemplar
training.” What has been gained here? Whether
or not equivalence emerges from a training his-
tory (discussion of that point will come later),
equivalence relations remain unique in several
ways. For example, no other type of relation pro-
vides a basis for investigating and understanding
what both linguistic theory and everyday termi-
nology refer to as the representational power of
language. In RFT, linguistic representation is
subsumed under the third property of relational
frames, transformation of function. Upon close
examination, however, one can see that the
property, transformation of function, constitutes
a direct adoption of the equivalence relation as
an integral part of RFT. As I indicated before,
along with set (class) union, the formation of
equivalence classes accounts for observations of
function transfer or transformation. RFT does
not subsume the equivalence relation within a
more general classification but rather, adopts
equivalence as an essential ingredient. In support
of this assertion, I note that every experimentally
demonstrated instance of functional transforma-
tion has required the equivalence relation as the
vehicle of transformation.
This direct inclusion of equivalence relations
within the very definition of relational frames
suggests that the originators of RFT really did
understand that the relational frame, “equivalence,”
differs from all other frames in ways that require
RFT to adopt it as an integral part rather than
merely subsume it as just another frame. Equiva-
lence, therefore, is not another relation that can
be derived from RFT; it is itself the heart of one
of the basic properties of RFT.
I also have considerable difficulty with RFT’s
basic assumption that equivalence relations are
learned operants that arise from a history of mul-
tiple exemplar training. It is certainly true that
many relations do come about through learning.
For example, relations like those frequently used
as examples in RFT expositions—same, opposite,
different—certainly are learned. They are learned,
however, on the basis of shared physical charac-
teristics. That is to say, they involve stimulus dis-
criminations, the abstracting of physical properties
that are shared by all the examples. Equivalence
relations, however, are not based on the abstraction
of common physical stimulus elements. RFT tries
to take care of this difficulty by means of multiple
exemplar training, the discrimination process by
which we can learn relations simply by being ex-
posed to them many times (with reinforcement,
of course).
To be effective, however, multiple exemplar
training requires discrimination on the basis of
shared physical properties of stimuli. In equiva-
lence relations, the related elements need share
no physical characteristics. The only feature that
elements related by equivalence share in common
is the relation itself. For equivalence relations to be
learned, multiple experiences cannot be sufficient.
If the elements of an equivalence relation share no
physical characteristic, such learning could take
place only by linguistic mediation, but for such
mediation to teach the relation, the “meaning” of
equivalence relation must itself already have been
learned. The effectiveness of such mediation presup-
poses the existence of already established linguistic
equivalence relations. A similar situation exists
with respect to many nonequivalence relations.
 A Research Pioneer’s Wisdom: An Interview with Dr. Murray Sidman
For example, the relation, “father” cannot be
learned simply on the basis of multiple examples
because no common physical stimuli exist from
example to example. The “father” relation,
like equivalence relations, requires linguistic
mediation if it is to be learned. Successful lin-
guistic mediation requires preexisting linguistic
equivalences.
Although this reasoning leads to the conclu-
sion that multiple exemplar training cannot
suffice to teach equivalence relations, let us sup-
pose that it was found empirically that multiple
exemplar training could teach an equivalence
relation to a nonverbal human or nonhuman.
Such a finding would demonstrate a brand
new type of learning process, not included in
any current behavioral account of learning.
Until such a demonstration has been verified,
therefore, the validity of RFT’s requirement that
equivalence constitutes a learned operant would
depend on a process that has not yet been shown
to exist. The postulation of a currently unknown
learning process detracts considerably from the
parsimony and coherence of RFT.
A number of other features of RFT keep
me from espousing it, but I have already out-
lined those features in my book on equivalence
relations (Sidman, 1994, pp. 554-561) and
I need not repeat them here. An additional
point relevant to the concept of the relational
frame has, however, occurred to me recently.
RFT holds that particular occurrences of any
relation are to be explained as instances of a
more general relational frame. This notion is
reminiscent of a theory of discrimination and
concept learning proposed by Levine and his
collaborators that enjoyed great popularity in
the 1960’s (e.g., Levine, 1963). Without going
into the relevant experiments, one may summa-
rize the theory by citing Levine’s conclusion that
reinforcements do not affect particular instances
of a discriminative response or concept. More
generally, reinforcements affect hypotheses that
mediate many such instances. Hypotheses and
relational frames seem to me to be function-
ally equivalent. In their evaluation of RFT, I
wonder if its originators might do well to look
more closely at Levine’s theory with a view to
determining why it did not survive.
193
Facts and theory
Holth: In one of your Remarks in the jour-
nal Behaviorism, you wrote that:
“Their own failure to appreciate the inferential nature
of stimulus control has led some behaviorists to assert
that they, unlike cognitive theorists, are concerned
only with observable events. They have been guilty
here of false pride, one effect of which has been to
generate similarly inappropriate emotional reactions
among cognitive psychologists. But perhaps a more
regrettable consequence has been to prevent behav-
iorists from including some cognitive phenomena
within their avowed subject matter” (Sidman,
1979, pp.123-124).
Would you say that other core behavioral
phenomena, such as reinforcement and ex-
tinction are of a similar inferential nature as
stimulus control?
Sidman: Because I was concerned at the
time with problems of stimulus control, that
interesting question did not occur to me. My
conclusion that stimulus control is inferential
came from my recognition that a single observa-
tion can never suffice to identify control by any
specific stimulus aspect. Every stimulus presents
many aspects at the same time. Multiple obser-
vations are therefore necessary before one can
say that a particular stimulus aspect controls any
item of behavior. The question being asked here
makes me realize that the same reasoning ap-
plies to reinforcement and extinction; multiple
observations are required to infer those behav-
ioral phenomena also. Reinforcement requires
an increase and extinction requires a decrease
in probability; measurements of probability
require several observations.
The passage of time, however, usually
brings with it contextual changes. As a science
progresses, one must often evaluate known
phenomena under previously unconsidered
conditions. For example, errorless learning, ac-
complished by programmed instruction, yields
one-trial learning. One does not need several
observations to determine whether response
probability has increased. Having been taught
all the prerequisites for a particular perfor-
mance, a student’s “learning curve” will then
194 Per Holth
jump immediately from near zero to a perfect
performance. Errorless learning brings in new
behavior in one trial. Of course, if one wants
to identify the particular aspect of a response
that is being reinforced, one still needs several
trials to find out, even with errorless learning.
Lever pressing, for example, has several aspects:
force, distance, acceleration, the part of the
body that is involved, and so on. To identify
which of these is being reinforced still requires
several observations.
On the other hand, errorless extinction has
not been demonstrated, so extinction on any par-
ticular observation is always inferential. Errorless
discrimination learning has been demonstrated,
but because every stimulus has multiple aspects,
the development of control by any particular
aspect is still inferential. Even with errorless
discrimination learning, it takes many observa-
tions to determine which aspect of the stimulus
is being discriminated. Therefore, any conclusion
after a single observation is still inferential.
Holth: If the basic phenomena in behavior
analysis are of an inferential nature, is there a
simple way to distinguish the inferential nature
of these phenomena from those typically treated
in psychology?
Sidman: Although reinforcement, extinc-
tion, and stimulus control are inferential in
behavior analysis, inference refers here only to
the impossibility of identifying in just a single
observation whether these basic processes have
occurred. When measured by means of several
observations, they are observed directly and are
no longer inferential. Reinforcement, extinc-
tion, and stimulus control become names that
identify a set of behavioral observations but do
not explain those observations. The names do
not themselves represent inferred explanatory
processes. In psychology, however, the usual type
of inference is of a different nature. Psychology
infers unobservable properties, and even unob-
servable entities, to explain observable features of
behavior. For example, when they see behavior
that behavior analysts call “remembering,” they
explain it as being the product of something
called “memory.” When they see people respond-
ing to written numbers in the same way they
would respond to actual quantities, they explain
this behavior by appealing to “symbolization”
or “representation.” Each of these explanatory
processes is invisible and can be endowed with
whatever properties will include the observed
behavior. No independent measurement of the
inferred explanations is required. Just observe
interesting behavior and then invent an explana-
tory process that has the same properties as the
observed behavior. Behavior analysis explicitly
rejects the kind of explanatory inferences that
psychology typically espouses.
Behavioral science and socially
important issues
Holth: Ever since Watson, behaviorists
have been concerned with the application of
behavioral science to solve important social and
societal problems. Among many other things,
you have been concerned with diplomacy based
on empirical data (Sidman, 1989, p. 239) and
with problems of terrorism and how behavior
analysis principles may be relevant in these
areas. Regarding the issue of effective diplo-
macy, do you envision a sort of experimental
approach?
Sidman: If, by envision, you mean foresee or
predict, then I must admit to a pessimistic view
of the likelihood of an experimental approach to
diplomacy. Most high level diplomats come to
their positions because they have already shown
strong biases toward particular approaches to
such matters as world peace, disarmament,
economic cooperation, and so on. Experimen-
tation is a term that either they do not have in
their vocabularies or signifies something risky,
too dangerous to attempt. The very concept of
data is generally not understood at all, let alone
the concept of basing our own behavior on data.
What I have suggested is the establishment
within, say, the state department, of a group
composed of scientists of various kinds who
would examine current diplomatic problems
and come up with suggestions for securing
data on possible ways to solve those problems.
Behavior analysts could recommend a number
of techniques to apply first in noncritical areas.
Response shaping, stimulus shaping, establish-
ment of conditioned and generalized reinforcers,
 A Research Pioneer’s Wisdom: An Interview with Dr. Murray Sidman
or generating particular equivalence relations
could be tried out at first in noncritical areas
in which we would incur no great loss if our
reinforcement and shaping techniques did
not work. Ensuring that both parties benefit
from particular simple interactions could
gradually build up a context in which trust
and cooperation played more prominent
roles. Particular people and particular forms
of behavior would be observed and measured,
with future interactions being determined by
those data.
Other kinds of scientists would have their
own kinds of suggestions for experimentation.
Physicists might propose experimenting with
methods for exchanging previously secret
information that would benefit both parties
to such exchanges. Social psychologists might
come up with methods for persuading large
groups to entertain the possibility of friendly
cooperation instead of competition. Whatever
the field that generates a proposed experiment,
all suggestions would include methods for ob-
taining data that could be used for evaluating
the success of the methods being proposed.
Holth: Regarding Spread of terrorism,
you have been concerned with a presumably
inadvertent but important role that the me-
dia may play in their focus on major terror
events. In the Coercion book, you wrote that,
“The excuse that all the news must be reported
is patently false: it has never been possible to
report everything, and editors have always had
to choose what to publish” (Sidman, 1989, p.
248). Did media people ever respond to this?
Sidman: No, I have had no response to this
from media people, and little response even
from behavior analysts. Even though news
reports of events like shootings in schools and
other unusual acts of violence have predicted
that others would try to imitate those acts
just to obtain publicity, I have never seen a
suggestion that refraining from publicizing
such events might make them less likely to
be copied.
Holth: What are your thoughts on addi-
tional things that behavior analysts might do in
order to get this and similar points effectively
spread to the general public?
195
Sidman: Although behavior analysis has
much of value to offer the general public, it has
not succeeded in significantly influencing public
policy of any sort. As I indicated before, behavior
analysts have never taught themselves how to
converse effectively with the general public. That
must come first.
Second, it is always difficult for one group of
specialists to influence other groups because they
are viewed as outsiders trying to obtain power be-
yond their own areas of competence. Therefore, be-
havior analysts who want to influence other fields
would do well to take positions within those fields.
In education, for example, they must become
teachers, school principals, faculty members in
schools of education, and so on. By working
within the field they will be in advantageous
positions to accomplish the kinds of changes that
are needed. That, of course, is not an easy thing
to do. A major source of one’s own sources of
reinforcement is one’s environment. It is difficult,
therefore, to maintain the rigor of a behavior
analytic approach when one is working within
an environment dominated by traditional edu-
cational practices.
Similarly, if one wants to influence public
policy more generally, one should go into fields
where public policy is a primary concern—for
example, politics. One should run for election
to public office and become a representative,
senator, governor, and so on. Again, this is a dif-
ficult area in which to maintain a consistent data
oriented approach because success in influencing
one’s colleagues often depends on compromises
in which one has at least temporarily to give up
one’s reliance on objective data. Nevertheless, one
will more effectively influence public policy from
the inside than from the outside.
A real problem here comes from the fact that
behavior analysts are rarely taught to apply their
skills in areas beyond the treatment of behavior
problems. Diplomacy, which I discussed briefly
before, is a name for the behavior of resolving
conflicts. I do not believe that any behavior analy-
sis program has ever included courses on conflict
resolution. If they did, we would find behavior
analysts being sought not just in international
diplomacy but in all areas in which conflict reso-
lution is the dominant problem—labor relations,
196 Per Holth
civil and criminal legal proceedings, legislation,
financial dealings, marriage problems, business
contracts, religious differences, and many others.
Future of behavior analysis
Holth: What do you think Behavior Analy-
sis will develop into in the next 50 years, and
does that differ from what do you think it
should develop into?
Sidman: I would not venture to predict what
behavior analysis will look like 50 years from now.
In this interview I have made a number of
suggestions that may be summarized by, “Be-
havior analysis, heal thyself.” I hope, though,
that more than just healing will be going on.
Today’s students will determine the particular
new directions behavior analysis is going to
take. Future development implies that some-
thing new is going to happen, something that
nobody today can predict. Who is going to put
us on the path to radically new developments?
When will the changes happen? Nobody today
can answer those questions either. It may even
be that the seeds of major developments are
present now but that the field simply has not
yet recognized them.
Do I have some ideas about what behav-
ior analysis should develop into? No. If I did
have such ideas, I would already have tried to
implement them or to persuade someone else
to do so. At the moment, our science and our
practices have enough problems to keep us all
busy looking for solutions. I do not feel capable
of specifying new goals or new ways to reach
our present goals.
Holth: You have written that “Our basic
scientists need to reestablish productive col-
laborative ventures in other areas, and our ap-
plied scientists need to turn more to their basic
science for data, principles, and procedures.”
(Sidman, 2002, p. 12). What do you think it
will take for that to happen?
Sidman: You are really asking two questions
here. First, how can we reestablish collabora-
tion between behavior analysis and other areas
of science? Second, how can we encourage
applied behavior analysts to make use of their
basic science?
Regarding collaboration with other sciences,
the best I can do is to review some past instances
of such ventures and perhaps draw some lessons
from those examples. In this regard, I have had
some most instructive personal experiences.
For example, I spent approximately nine years
as a member of the psychology department that
Joe Brady started in the early 1950’s in the Neu-
ropsychiatry Division of the Walter Reed Army
Institute of Research. This was perhaps the most
stimulating and productive interdisciplinary
organization in which behavior analysis has ever
participated. Following Joe Brady’s lead, I took
part in many collaborative projects. For example:
with neuroanatomists in studies of relations be-
tween schedule-controlled behavior and central
nervous system structures; with endocrinologists
in studies that demonstrated two-way interac-
tions between behavior and pituitary-adrenal
cortical activity; with pharmacologists in studies
that followed up Peter Dews’ discovery that re-
inforcement schedules play a role in determining
the behavioral effects of drugs; with neuroanato-
mists and physiologists in demonstrating that
reinforcement schedules and other behavioral
variables could affect the extent to which intracra-
nial electrical brain stimulation would reinforce
behavior. Others in our group made original
contributions to various other basic scientific
and applied areas. For example: Findley’s work on
24-hour controlled environments led to Brady’s
participation in the preparation of monkeys as
test subjects during space flights; Schuster and
his collaborators came up with techniques for
teaching animals to self-administer drugs, in the
process demonstrating training and measurement
techniques that revolutionized screening for ad-
dictive properties of drugs.
Clearly, this was an exciting environment. In
it, behavior analysis played an important role,
sometimes a leading role. What were this environ-
ment’s main determining characteristics? What
lessons does it have for us today? How might one
recreate such productive collaboration? Upon
reflection, several features stand out.
First, the group consisted of first rate scientists
from each field. None of them were required to
do collaborative work. They were, however, able
to look beyond their own specialties and when
 A Research Pioneer’s Wisdom: An Interview with Dr. Murray Sidman
they saw others whose expertise they could
respect, they were open to collaborative ven-
tures. That is the kind of group one would have
to establish. We can no longer expect a scientist
from outside behavior analysis to include behav-
ior analysts in such a group; behavior analysts
have long since broken most of their connec-
tions with other sciences. It will, therefore,
take a behavior analyst to recruit capable and
intellectually curious scientists from other fields.
Perhaps someone from behavioral pharma-
cology could succeed in creating a group of
scientists from other areas who were capable
of recognizing techniques for establishing and
measuring kinds of behavior that would interest
them. Then they might be able to bring in other
kinds of behavior analysts, too, who were also
interested in scientific collaboration.
The second problem is how to encourage
applied behavior analysts to make more use of
their basic science. Such use is to a great extent
missing from the original training of many
applied workers. It is also largely unknown to
practitioners who have learned only enough
to pass qualifying exams. For example, single-
subject methodology is fundamental in basic
behavior analytic research; that aspect of the
methodology makes the science immediately
applicable to behavior therapy. Also, Skinner’s
recognition that experimental behavior analysis
consists of two-way interactions between subject
and experimenter makes the science compatible
with applied practice. Many applied workers,
however, have never been made aware of these
methodological differences between what they
are doing and what traditional clinical psy-
chologists do. Ignorance of the rationale for
single-subject methodology leads to ignorance
of the special importance of steady-state base-
lines and multiple baselines of various sorts
and of the necessity for refining such baselines
to evaluate the success or failure of their treat-
ments. Also, like a successful experimental
program, effective behavior therapy also re-
quires two-way interactions between therapist
and client. The behavior of each changes as
a function of what the other does. Not only
must the client’s behavior change in response
to therapeutic measures but the therapist must
197
also know how to change his/her therapeutic
procedures on the basis of what the client does.
Successful behavior analytic practice does not
depend on a set of fixed rules but consists of op-
tions that the practitioner can apply in response
to what the client does.
We have a situation now in which practitio-
ners who use methods that have come directly
from basic research are often unaware of the
source of those methods. For example, the most
basic applied technique, positive reinforcement,
originated in and continues to be refined by
basic research. Acquaintance with this research
would make applied workers more capable of
responding effectively to many seeming failures
in their standard reinforcement procedures.
Then too, applied workers regularly use tech-
niques designed to generate errorless learning
while remaining unaware that the elimination
of errors is at the heart of what they are doing.
Such understanding would permit them to
modify their teaching procedures to eliminate
seeming failures of a client to learn some new
and more adaptive behavior.
What I am saying here is that the practice of
behavior analysis would become more generally
effective if the training programs for applied
behavior analysts were made more rigorous
than many are at present. Also, the qualifying
tests for practitioners should also be made more
rigorous than they are at present.
Even more generally, I would suggest, as
I have before, that neglect of basic behavior
analytic science will eventually reduce and
even eliminate the public approval of behavior
analytic practice. The concept of empirically
grounded practice is becoming known and ap-
preciated by the general public. Any practice
that lacks scientific backing will sooner or later
lead to public rejection of that practice. Further-
more, even though basic science has provided
the underpinning for applied behavior analysis,
if the practitioners themselves are unaware of
that reality, then the public will assume that
no such relation exists. When that happens,
practitioners will lose their public acceptance.
Holth: Thank you for all your time and
patience in completing this interview. It has
really been marvelous to listen to your thoughtful
198 Per Holth
answers to all of my questions. You have speci-
fied very clearly a number of issues that current
and future behavior analysts will need to attend
to, and I also believe that your answers will serve
as an important source of inspiration to carry
on that work. Thank you so much!
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