G.R. No. L-68097 January 16, 1986 up to P25,000 of COB Group Marketing for that area, Tomas C.

up to P25,000 of COB Group Marketing for that area, Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr. and his father
Tomas, Sr. (now deceased) executed a mortgage on their land in Nueva Ecija. Like Manahan,
the Lorenzos were solidarily liable with COB Group Marketing for its obligations under the sales
EDWARD A. KELLER & CO., LTD., petitioner-appellant,
agreement (Exh. E).
vs.
COB GROUP MARKETING, INC., JOSE E. BAX, FRANCISCO C. DE CASTRO, JOHNNY DE LA
FUENTE, SERGIO C. ORDOÑEZ, TRINIDAD C. ORDOÑEZ, MAGNO C. ORDOÑEZ, ADORACION C. The credit purchases of COB Group Marketing, which started on October 15, 1969, limited up
ORDOÑEZ, TOMAS C. LORENZO, JR., LUIZ M. AGUILA-ADAO, MOISES P. ADAO, ASUNCION to January 22, 1971. On May 8, the board of directors of COB Group Marketing were apprised
MANAHAN and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents-appellees. by Jose E. Bax the firm's president and general manager, that the firm owed Keller about
P179,000. Bax was authorized to negotiate with Keller for the settlement of his firm's liability
(Exh. 1, minutes of the meeting).
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano & Hernandez Law Office for petitioner.

On the same day, May 8, Bax and R. Oefeli of Keller signed the conditions for the settlement of
Vicente G. Gregorio for private respondents.
COB Group Marketing's liability, Exhibit J, reproduced as follows:

Roberto P. Vega for respondent Asuncion Manahan.

This formalizes our conditions for the settlement of C.O.B.'s account with
Edward Keller Ltd.

1. Increase of mortgaged collaterals to the full market value (estimated

by Edak at P90,000.00).
AQUINO, C.J.:
2. Turn-over of receivables (estimated outstandings P70,000.00 to
This case is about the liability of a marketing distributor under its sales agreements with the P80,000.00).
owner of the products. The petitioner presented its evidence before Judges Castro Bartolome
and Benipayo. Respondents presented their evidence before Judge Tamayo who decided the
3. Turn-over of 4 (four) trucks for outright sale to Edak, to be credited
case.
against C.0.B.'s account.

A review of the record shows that Judge Tamayo acted under a misapprehension of facts and
4. Remaining 8 (eight) trucks to be assigned to Edak, C.O.B will continue
his findings are contradicted by the evidence. The Appellate Court adopted the findings of
operation with these 8 trucks. They win be returned to COB after
Judge Tamayo. This is a case where this Court is not bound by the factual findings of the
settlement of full account.
Appellate Court. (See Director of Lands vs. Zartiga, L-46068-69, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA
346, 355).
5. C.O.B has to put up securities totalling P200,000.00. P100,000.00 has
to be liquidated within one year. The remaining P100,000.00 has to be
Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. appointed COB Group Marketing, Inc. as exclusive distributor of its
settled within the second year.
household products, Brite and Nuvan in Panay and Negros, as shown in the sales agreement
dated March 14, 1970 (32-33 RA). Under that agreement Keller sold on credit its products to
COB Group Marketing. 6. Edak wig agree to allow C.O.B. to buy goods to the value of the
difference between P200,000.00 and their outstandings, provided C.O.B.
is in a position to put up securities amounting to P200,000.00.
As security for COB Group Marketing's credit purchases up to the amount of P35,000, one
Asuncion Manahan mortgaged her land to Keller. Manahan assumed solidarily with COB Group
Marketing the faithful performance of all the terms and conditions of the sales agreement (Exh. Discussion held on May 8, 1971.
D).
Twelve days later, or on May 20, COB Group Marketing, through Bax executed two second
In July, 1970 the parties executed a second sales agreement whereby COB Group Marketing's chattel mortgages over its 12 trucks (already mortgaged to Northern Motors, Inc.) as security
territory was extended to Northern and Southern Luzon. As security for the credit purchases for its obligation to Keller amounting to P179,185.16 as of April 30, 1971 (Exh. PP and QQ).
However, the second mortgages did not become effective because the first mortgagee,
Northern Motors, did not give its consent. But the second mortgages served the purpose of
being admissions of the liability COB Group Marketing to Keller.
The stockholders of COB Group Marketing, Moises P. Adao and Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr., in a letter
dated July 24, 1971 to Keller's counsel, proposed to pay Keller P5,000 on November 30, 1971
and thereafter every thirtieth day of the month for three years until COB Group Marketing's
mortgage obligation had been fully satisfied. They also proposed to substitute the Manahan
mortgage with a mortgage on Adao's lot at 72 7th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City (Exh. L).
These pieces of documentary evidence are sufficient to prove the liability of COB Group
Marketing and to justify the foreclosure of the two mortgages executed by Manahan and
Lorenzo (Exh. D and E).
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him "as admissions of a party".
The admissions of Bax are supported by the documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that all
the invoices, with delivery receipts, were presented in evidence by Keller, Exhibits KK-1 to KK-
277-a and N to N-149-a, together with a tabulation thereof, Exhibit KK, covering the period
from October 15, 1969 to January 22, 1971. Victor A. Mayo, Keller's finance manager,
submitted a statement of account showing that COB Group Marketing owed Keller P184,509.60
as of July 31, 1971 (Exh. JJ). That amount is reflected in the customer's ledger, Exhibit M.
On the other hand, Bax although not an accountant, presented his own reconciliation
statements wherein he showed that COB Group Marketing overpaid Keller P100,596.72 (Exh. 7
and 8). He claimed overpayment although in his answer he did not allege at all that there was
an overpayment to Keller.
The statement of the Appellate Court that COB Group Marketing alleged in its answer that it
overpaid Keller P100,596.72 is manifestly erroneous first, because COB Group Marketing did
not file any answer, having been declared in default, and second, because Bax and the other
stockholders, who filed an answer, did not allege any overpayment. As already stated, even
before they filed their answer, Bax admitted that COB Group Marketing owed Keller around
P179,000 (Exh. 1).
Keller sued on September 16, 1971 COB Group Marketing, its stockholders and the mortgagors,
Manahan and Lorenzo.
COB Group Marketing, Trinidad C. Ordonez and Johnny de la Fuente were declared in default
(290 Record on Appeal).
After trial, the lower court (1) dismissed the complaint; (2) ordered Keller to pay COB Group
Marketing the sum of P100,596.72 with 6% interest a year from August 1, 1971 until the
amount is fully paid: (3) ordered Keller to pay P100,000 as moral damages to be allocated
among the stockholders of COB Group Marketing in proportion to their unpaid capital
subscriptions; (4) ordered the petitioner to pay Manahan P20,000 as moral damages; (5)
ordered the petitioner to pay P20,000 as attomey's fees to be divided among the lawyers of all
the answering defendants and to pay the costs of the suit; (6) declared void the mortgages
executed by Manahan and Lorenzo and the cancellation of the annotation of said mortgages
on the Torrens titles thereof, and (7) dismissed Manahan's cross-claim for lack of merit.
The petitioner appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed said judgment except the award of
P20,000 as moral damages which it eliminated. The petitioner appealed to this Court.
Bax and the other respondents quoted the six assignments of error made by the petitioner in
the Appellate Court, not the four assignments of error in its brief herein. Manahan did not file
any appellee's brief.
We find that the lower courts erred in nullifying the admissions of liability made in 1971 by Bax
as president and general manager of COB Group Marketing and in giving credence to the
alleged overpayment computed by Bax .
The lower courts not only allowed Bax to nullify his admissions as to the liability of COB Group
Marketing but they also erroneously rendered judgment in its favor in the amount of its
supposed overpayment in the sum of P100,596.72 (Exh. 8-A), in spite of the fact that COB Group
Marketing was declared in default and did not file any counterclaim for the supposed
overpayment.
The lower courts harped on Keller's alleged failure to thresh out with representatives of COB
Group Marketing their "diverse statements of credits and payments". This contention has no
factual basis. In Exhibit J, quoted above, it is stated by Bax and Keller's Oefeli that "discussion
(was) held on May 8, 1971."
That means that there was a conference on the COB Group Marketing's liability. Bax in that
discussion did not present his reconciliation statements to show overpayment. His Exhibits 7
and 8 were an afterthought. He presented them long after the case was filed. The petitioner
regards them as "fabricated" (p. 28, Appellant's Brief).
Bax admitted that Keller sent his company monthly statements of accounts (20-21 tsn,
September 2, 1976) but he could not produce any formal protest against the supposed
inaccuracy of the said statements (22). He lamely explained that he would have to dig up his
company's records for the formal protest (23-24). He did not make any written demand for
reconciliation of accounts (27-28).
As to the liability of the stockholders, it is settled that a stockholder is personally liable for the
financial obligations of a corporation to the extent of his unpaid subscription (Vda. de
Salvatierra vs. Garlitos 103 Phil. 757, 763; 18 CJs 1311-2).
While the evidence shows that the amount due from COB Group Marketing is P184,509.60 as G.R. No. L-44060 July 20, 1978
of July 31, 1971 or P186,354.70 as of August 31, 1971 (Exh. JJ), the amount prayed for in Keller's
complaint is P182,994.60 as of July 31, 1971 (18-19 Record on Appeal). This latter amount
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
should be the one awarded to Keller because a judgment entered against a party in default
vs.
cannot exceed the amount prayed for (Sec. 5, Rule 18, Rules of Court).
BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias "BENBEN", defendant-appellant.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the trial court and the Appellate Court are reversed and set aside.

COB Group marketing, Inc. is ordered to pay Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. the sum of P182,994.60
MAKASIAR, J.:
with 12% interest per annum from August 1, 1971 up to the date of payment plus P20,000 as
attorney's fees.
Bienvenido Paragsa, alias "Benben", appealed to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu (Judge Agapito Hontanosas, presiding), the dispositive portion of which
Asuncion Manahan and Tomas C. Lorenzo, Jr. are ordered to pay solidarity with COB Group
reads as follows:
Marketing the sums of P35,000 and P25,000, respectively.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused

The following respondents are solidarity liable with COB Group Marketing up to the amounts
of their unpaid subscription to be applied to the company's liability herein: Jose E. Bax P36,000;
Francisco C. de Castro, P36,000; Johnny de la Fuente, P12,000; Sergio C. Ordonez, P12,000;
Trinidad C. Ordonez, P3,000; Magno C. Ordonez, P3,000; Adoracion C. Ordonez P3,000; Tomas
C. Lorenzo, Jr., P3,000 and Luz M. Aguilar-Adao, P6,000.
If after ninety (90) days from notice of the finality of the judgment in this case the judgment
against COB Group Marketing has not been satisfied fully, then the mortgages executed by
Manahan and Lorenzo should be foreclosed and the proceeds of the sales applied to the
obligation of COB Group Marketing. Said mortgage obligations should bear six percent legal
interest per annum after the expiration of the said 90-day period. Costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 10-19, rollo).
Bienvenido Paragsa of the crime of Rape as charged in the Information
beyond reasonable doubt and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum and to
indemnify the complaining witness in the amount of P8,000.00 (People
vs. Rogato Rivera, 58, O.G. and People vs. Chan et al., CA No. 03545-GR,
August 11, 1967) with all legal accessories and to pay the costs. Being a
detention prisoner, he is entitled to the full credit of his preventive
imprisonment from the time of his confinement up to the date of the
promulgation of this judgment.
xxx xxx xxx

Because the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by the Court of Appeals on the accused,
this case is now before US for review pursuant to Section 34, Republic Act No. 296, as amended,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimony of Mirasol Magallanes, the alleged
rape victim, her aunt-in-law, Mrs. Lita Parochel, and Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco of the Bantayan
Emergency Hospital, Bantayan, Cebu, who examined the offended party and submitted Exhibit
A embodying his findings thereon,

Substantially, the records show that in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, Mirasol, who was then a
little over twelve and a half (12½) years old (Exhibit B, p. 7, rec.), was alone in her parents'
house in Sitio Tabagac of Barrio Bunacan, Municipality of Madridejos, Cebu, cooking hog feed.
Her parents were away at the time — her father was in Cadiz, while her mother was in Sagay,
both in Negros Occidental (p. 16, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972) while the rest of the family were with
Mirasol's grandmother in Barrio Codia; also in Madridejos, Cebu. Mirasol was a 6th grade
student of the Bunacan Elementary School (p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). Upon instruction of her
mother, she did not go to school that afternoon so that she could look after the pigs and cook
their feed. Thus, she was alone in the ground floor of their house cooking hog feed when the
accused, Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered the house and closed the
door after him. Approaching from behind, he placed his left arm around Mirasol's neck,
encircled her abdomen with his right arm, at the same time pointing the hunting knife with s
right hand at her breast, and threatened her not to shout otherwise she would be killed.
Thereafter, the accused pushed her to a bamboo bed nearby, rolled up her dress and, with his
two hands, removed her panties. The accused then placed his hunting knife on the bed by
Mirasol's side, opened the zipper of his pants while kneeling on the bed, opened Mirasol's
thighs, picked up the hunting knife again, placed himself on top of Mirasol, inserted his erect
penis into her sexual organ and then made four push and pull movement until he ejaculated
(pp. 7, 10-11, 12, 13, 14, t.s.n., Ibid). In the process, Mirasol's dress and panties were not torn,
since, because of fear, she allowed the accused to roll up her dress and pull her panties without
any resistance whatsoever. During the intercourse, the accused was not holding the hunting
knife. After the accused had discharged, he ran to the storeroom of the house upstairs because
he heard Mrs. Lita Parochel, wife of the younger brother of Mirasol's father, calling from
outside the gate of the house, asking Mirasol to open the gate. Mirasol did not answer because
she was then in the act of putting on her panties (p. 14, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 10, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972).
After she had put on her panties, she opened the gate and saw her aunt Lita, who asked her
what the accused did to her, but she did not answer because she was afraid as the accused was
still inside the house. She also did not tell her aunt Lita that the accused had sexual intercourse
with her under threats and against her will. Her aunt Lita then walked away.
Thereafter, the accused reappeared in the room and told Mirasol that if she would tell her aunt
Lita what he did, he would kill her (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). After the incident, Mirasol
went to Barrio Codia later in the afternoon of the same day and joined her brother and sister
and grandmother. She did not reveal to any of them what transpired between her and the
accused in Tabagac.
Mirasol's father returned from Cadiz, Negros Occidental that same day; but Mirasol did not also
reveal the incident to him because she was afraid her father might punish her. Her mother
returned home on July 16, 1971 from Sagay, Negros Occidental; but Mirasol did not also tell
her mother about what happened to her on July 13 in Tabagac It was her aunt Lita who revealed
the matter to Mirasol's mother, who thereupon confronted her daughter. Mirasol had to reveal
the incident of July 13 to her mother only when her mother asked her about it; because,
according to her, she wanted to take revenge on the accused (p. 15, Dec. 3, 1971). Three days
after her return from Sagay, Negros Occidental — on July 19, 1971 — Mirasol's mother brought
her to the Bantayan Emergency Hospital in Bantayan, Cebu, where she was examined by Dr.
Luis L. Gandiongco, who submitted his findings as follows:
Abrasion of inguinal region
Abrasion, left thigh, medial side
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Discharges sticky, milky in color, found at the anterior fornix but
negative for spermatozoa (Exh. A, p. 8, rec.; p. 2, t.s.n., Nov. 16, 1971).
Mrs. Lita Parochel, the aunt-in-law of Mirasol, testified that she is the wife of the younger
brother of Mirasol's father. Her house is fifty (50) meters away from the house of her brother-
in-law, Ruperto Magallanes. In the afternoon of July 13, 1971, she went to the house of her
brother-in-law in Tabagac Arriving there, she saw, through the gate which was made of split
bamboos, the accused running away when she shouted to Mirasol, who was then in the act of
putting on her panties, to open the gate (p. 10, t.s.n., Jan. 15, 1972). Mirasol opened the gate
after she had put on her panties. Entering the house, Mrs. Parochel asked Mirasol what the
accused did to her, but Mirasol did not answer. So, she hid and from her hiding place she saw
the accused emerge from his hiding place and run away, passing through the gate of the fence.
Thereupon, she told Mirasol to go home to barrio Codia because she was also going there (p.
15, t.s.n., Ibid).
Mrs. Parochel met Mirasol's father at about 4:00 o'clock the same afternoon but she did not
talk to him about what she saw earlier in Tabagak However, she revealed the incident to her
husband (p. 17, t.s.n., Ibid).
When Mirasol's mother returned from Sagay, Negros Occidental, Mrs. Parochel had a
conversation with her regarding the person of the accused and thereafter Mirasol's mother
filed the corresponding complaint against the accused (p. 18, t.s.n., Ibid).
Incidentally, in support of the complaint of Bernandina Magallanes, mother of Mirasol, Mrs.
Parochel executed an affidavit which she subscribed and swore to before the municipal judge
of Madridejos, Cebu, on July 30, 1971, wherein she stated, among other things:
1. That at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, I went to
the house of Ruperto Magallanes, my neighbor;
2. That when I entered their fence, I found out that one Benben Paragsa
ran from the bed where Mirasol Magallanes was sitting on while putting
on her panties;
3. That she, Mirasol Magallanes, upon my arrival, did not say anything to
me about the happening; and that I was only thinking that something
had happened (Exh. 1, p. 5, rec.).
In his typewritten brief, the appellant enumerated and discussed five errors as having been
committed by the trial court. These errors may, however, be boiled down to the issue of
credibility.
Appellant admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol, the complaining witness, but he
stoutly denied that he did so by employing force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he
and Mirasol were sweethearts; that on the day of the incident, it was Mirasol who invited him
to the latter's house where they had sexual intercourse after kissing each other; and that the
intercourse they had that afternoon was, as a matter of fact, their third sexual intercourse (pp.
2, 3, 5, 6, 8-9, t.s.n., March 21, 1972).
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the
statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a
party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and
understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the
statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested,
and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5) that
the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue
(IV Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 ed., p. 316). These requisites
of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts
asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth
of such assertion.

The foregoing testimony of the accused was substantially corroborated by two witnesses for
One more circumstance which engenders serious doubt on the truthfulness of Mirasol is the
the defense, Mercado Batosbatosan and Eduardo Ducay (pp. 5, 6-7, 12, 15-16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
testimony of Dr. Gandiongco that he did not notice any laceration in the walls of Mirasol's
25, t.s.n., Feb. 1, 1972).
vagina, thus —

A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory
Q Doctor, you testified that according to your
and inconclusive to justify a conviction.
findings a foreign body might have inserted the
internal organ of the offended party?
Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant of the crime charged and point
to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complaining
A Yes, sir.
witness was voluntary. Force and intimidation were not proven. Mirasol did not offer any
resistance or vocal protestation against the alleged sexual assault. She could have easily made
an outcry or resisted the appellant's advances without endangering her life. But she did not. Q And as a matter of fact, in your examination
She was allegedly raped in her own home, not far from her neighbors and during the daytime. there was no laceration?
If, indeed, she was raped under the circumstances narrated by her, she could have revealed
the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the
A There was no laceration (p 5, t.s.n., November
accused did to her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse took place and
16, 1971; Emphasis supplied).
when the accused ran from the bed to a storeroom of the house to hide upon seeing and/or
hearing the voice of her aunt Lita. or, she could have grabbed the hunting knife by her side
when the copulation was going on, and with it she could have possibly prevented the accused Considering Mirasol's tender age, if she had no previous sexual experience, she must have been
from consummating the sexual act. But she did not. a virgin when she was allegedly raped by the accused. Yet she did not state that she felt some
pain as the accused tried to insert his organ into her private part. Neither did she state that she
was bleeding during and after the alleged forced coition. Instead, she matter-of-factly narrated
Another circumstance is that Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was
that the accused made four push and pull movements after which the latter ejaculated —
raped. It was only after her mother arrived from Sagay, Negros Occidental, three (3) days after
indicating that he had an easy time doing it.
the incident, and confronted her about the rape incident that her mother learned through her
aunt Lita that she eventually revealed to her mother what the accused did to her in the
afternoon of July 13, 1971. If WE are to believe her story, certainly the doctor who examined her could have noticed the
lacerations even after the lapse of three (3) days from the coition, if the intercourse on July 13,
1971 was in fact her first experience. WE believe the absence of lacerations in the walls of
Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony
Mirasol's vagina, as testified to by Dr. Gandiongco, supra, eloquently confirms the truth of the
of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually
accused's assertion that before the incident in question, he and Mirasol had two prior
sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications before July 13, 1971,
copulations.
one of which happened on June 29, 1971 in the house of the accused, where Mirasol and the
accused slept together in the evening of the same day after the mother of the accused and
Mirasol had returned from the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu (p. 10, t.s.n., March 21, 1972). And still another circumstance which casts serious doubt on the credibility of the complaining
witness and her aunt Lita is the matter of the hunting knife. While it is true that on the witness
stand these two witnesses practically corroborated each other on this particular point, the
matter of the accused having a hunting knife with him on the day of the incident was not,
however, mentioned by Mrs. Parochel in her affidavit, Exhibit 1, which she executed on July 30,
1971 — five months before she testified in court. Besides, at the trial, the prosecution did not
bother to present such "hunting knife".
A last circumstance which also engenders serious doubt on the veracity of Mrs. Parochel, whose
testimony the trial court summarized, runs thus:
... The victim did not answer the call of her aunt nor did she open the
barred door.
... She returned to the opened door and asked Mirasol what had
happened. Mirasol was very pale, trembling and in a state of shock, did
not answer her inquiries ...(p. 3, Decision; p. 64, rec.; emphasis added).
5. She could have brought Mirasol to her own house which was on about 50 meters away (pp.
7, 20, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). But what did she do? She abandoned Mirasol "because" she Mirasol
had to feed her hogs (p. 24, Idem).
That Mirasol was pale, afraid and trembling can only be attributed to the fact that her aunt
discovered her having sexual intercourse at so young an age and that she feared that her aunt
would report the same to her parents.
And if Mrs. Parochel really believed that her niece Mirasol was raped by appellant about 3
o'clock that afternoon of July 13, 1971, why did she not report the outrage to Mirasol's father
— her husband's brother — whom she met about 4 o'clock that same afternoon, just one hour
after the alleged rape?
Mrs. Parochel's close relationship to her niece-daughter of her brother-in-law — vitiates her
credibility.

The Solicitor General adopted the above factual summary made by the trial court by stating Appellant cannot be legally convicted of simple seduction under Article 338 of the Revised
that — Penal Code, for the same is not warranted by the wording of the information, which does not
alleged deceit, although appellant testified that he promised to marry Mirasol if "something
happens to her body." Much less can simple seduction include rape.
Mirasol's aunt, Lita Parochel ... found her niece in a state of shock (p. 4,
Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee; p. 49, rec.; Emphasis supplied).
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, ALIAS "BENBEN", IS HEREBY ACQUITTED,
WITH COSTS de oficio AND HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED UNLESS HE IS BEING
A painstaking scrutiny of the record, particularly the transcript of stenographic notes, shows
DETAINED ON OTHER CHARGES.
that contrary to the finding of the trial court, Mirasol answered the call of her aunt and opened
the gate of the house after she had put on her panties (p. 14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971); and that
Mirasol only seemed to be afraid, besides trembling (p. 23, t.s.n., 1972); nowhere in the record SO ORDERED.
is any evidence of Mirasol having been in a state of shock.
Fernando, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
If Mirasol was in fact in a state of shock —
Muñoz-Palma, J., vote for the affirmance of the judgment.
1. How come she was able to put on her panties and thereafter open the gate of the house
when she heard her aunt Lita calling from the outside?

2. Her aunt Lita would feel so alarmed and so concerned that she would not lose any time to
bring her to a doctor or to a hospital for medical treatment or assistance;

3. Her aunt Lita would have confronted the accused who was still hiding in the closet in a corner
of the ground floor, or she would have gone to the nearest police authority or barrio captain,
who could have easily apprehended the accused: Separate Opinions

4. Her aunt could have sought the assistance of their barriomates or neighbors; or
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused-appellant in the light of the salient facts and
circumstances discussed in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Makasiar 1 which justly cast
serious doubts on the guilt of the accused and entitle him to a verdict of acquittal founded on
the constitutional presumption of innocence.
The ratio decidendi in the analogous case of People vs. Ramirez 2 (where the 15-year old
daughter of the accused's common-law wife charged him with double rape and his defense was
"that there was consent on her part, as indeed there had been previous instances where he
had access to her is fully applicable to the case at bar, thus: "The pronouncement in People vs.
Damayo 3 as to the extent of the protection accorded by the Constitution to a person indicted
for a criminal offense once again possesses relevance. Thus: 'Accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to d demonstrate
that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their
behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction
be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this
Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the
testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is
offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an
exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the text of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.
The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the
offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What
is required then is moral certain. 4
There as in tills case, we held that the accused could not be convicted of seduction under the
rape charge, citing the case of People vs. Castro 5 because "the rape charge did not place [the
accused] in jeopardy of being convicted for qualified seduction. He is entitled to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."
I have written this brief concurrence, principally, because I noted from the decision 6 that this
is a case where as against the prevailing view and practice under section 34 of Republic Act 296,
as amended (the Judiciary Act of 1948) and incorporated in Rule 124, section 12 of the Rules of
Court (whereby in any criminal case submitted to a division of the Court of Appeals whenever
said court should be of the opinion that the higher penalty of death or life imprisonment should
be imposed than the lesser penalty imposed by the trial court in the decision subject of the
appeal before it, said court "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith
certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought
before it on appeal") the Court of Appeals rendered judgment imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua instead of forthwith certifying by resolution the case to this Court as falling with this
Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction under section 17 of the Judiciary Act.
Some members of the Court have asked for re-examination of the prevailing view and practice
and to set down as the proper procedure that followed by the Court of Appeals in the case at
bar. But since the Court's verdict is one of acquittal, there was no need to take up the question
in this case. I make this of record so that the present decision may not be taken as impliedly
sanctioning such procedure, or as an indication of approval thereof on the part of any member
of the Court taking part herein. The question will be definitively resolved in several cases
pending before the Court where such reexamination has been squarely raised, e.g. in Case L-
40330, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Amado Danie alias "Amado Ato". submitted for
decision of August 5, 1975.
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The evidence for the prosecution was summarized by the Solicitor General in this wise:
Mirasol Magallanes, aged twelve-and-a-half, was alone in her parent's house in Sitio Tabagak
of Barrio Bunacan, in Madridejos Cebu in the early afternoon of July 13, 197 1, cooking hog
feed. Both of her parents were then away, in Negros Occidental, and the rest of the family were
with Mirasol's grandmother in Barrio Codia also in Madridejos, Cebu, Mirasol, although a six-
grader in the Bunacan Elementary School, was at home on this date, on instructions of her
mother to look after their pigs, and cook hog feed in the afternoon.
While thus alone on the ground floor of their house in Tabagak innocently cooking food for the
family's pigs, the a accused Bienvenido Paragsa, with a hunting knife in hand, stealthily entered
the house, barring the door as he entered, And approaching Mirasol from behind, he hooked
his left arm around the young girl's neck and simultaneously thrust his knife at Mirasol's tender
breast, barking at the same moment for the girl not to shout, under threat of instant death.
His left arm still hooked around the poor girl's neck, and the knife he held perilously poised
upon the girl's vulnerable breast, the accused pushed the girl to the bamboo bed nearby, and
there laid her down. He then removed her panties, and opened the fly of his own pants.
Forcibly, he opened the girl's thighs, and himself in between, he then penetrated young
Mirasol's private part with his erect private part, and hastily consummated his guilt-ridden
forcible, physical intrusion into the young girl's body.
Mirasol's aunt, Lita Parochel, arriving later, too late to prevent the dastardly abuse of her niece,
nevertheless, saw the accused as he surreptitiously fled the scene and found her niece in a
state of shock. Subsequently, report of the crime was made to the girl's parents, and a
complaint lodged against the accused for the crime of rape. (pp. 6-8, tsn Dec. 3, 1971; pp. 7-18,
tsn Jan. 5, 1972; pp 1-3, tsn Nov. 16, 1971; Exh. A).
The accused admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the complaint girl. His defense is that
the copulation was voluntary. The doctor, who examined the complainant, found that she
sustained an "abrasion, left thigh, medial side" in addition to an "abrasion of inguinal region" xxx xxx xxx
(Exh. A). He testified that there was laceration of the hymen. The pertinent portion of his
testimony is quoted below:
A Maybe the assailant used force. (3tsn).

Q Can you tell us your external findings?

The trial court and the Court of Appeals (Justice Lorenzo Relova, ponente) both held that rape
was committed. That conclusion is supported by the following testimony of the complainant:
A My external findings is that there was an
abrasion of inguinal region and abrasion, left
Q You said that in the afternoon of July 13, 1971,
thigh, medial side.
you saw Bienvenido Paragsa entered under your
house where you were cooking the hog feeds, can
Q How about your internal examination? you tell this Honorable Court what was he doing
when he entered your premises?
A I was able to get some of the secretion found at
the anterior fornix of the cervic. A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx Q What did he do?

Q From your findings, Doctor, there was A When he entered under the house he
something foreign which got inside the vaginal immediately held my neck and then embraced my
tract of the complainant. abdomen and he was carrying a hunting knife.

A There might be foreign body which got inside Q When he grabbed your neck and hugged you,
the vaginal tract not so deep that caused did he say anything to you?
laceration of the hymen.
A Yes, sir, he told me, 'Do not shout, if you will
Q In your study of medicine, when a foreign object shout, I will kill you.
is penetrated but not so deep, will that produce
laceration of the viginal tract or the hymem of the
Q After hugging you and telling you not to shout,
woman, is that possible?
what did Paragsa do next?

Q When there is a penetration but not deep, will

A He pushed me to bed and he let me lie on the
it produce laceration of the vaginal tract of a
bed and he immediately pulled out my panty,
woman?

Q After removing your panty, what next did

A Yes, sir.
Paragsa do.

xxx xxx xxx

A He tried to open my thigh but I insisted closing
them because I was ashamed.
Fiscal: Can you tell us what could have possibly
caused the on your external examination of the
Q In effect, was he able to open your thigh
woman Mirasol Magallanes?
 A Yes, sir, because he threatened me with his Q Did you tell anybody of what had happened to
hunting knife: You not open. if you will not open, I you as what you had testified?
will stab you.
A I did not.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Why?
Q After he succeeded in inserting his penis into
your sexual organ, what did he do next?
A I did not tell because I was warned by the
accused that if I would tell he would be coming
ATTY. FLORES: I want to make of record that back to kill me.
witness is spontaneous in answering the question,
considering that she is minor and this is her first
xxx xxx xxx
time.

Q And after that while he was holding your neck

WITNESS: He made a push and pull movement.
and embracing your abdomen you were then
sitting near the place where you were cooking
ATTY. SALGADO: your hog's feeds?

Q After he finished picking you, what was or where A When he entered under our house when he was
did Paragsa go? nearing I immediately stood up; I was no longer
sitting.
A He ran to one of the room of the house to hide.
Q So. you recognized him before he took hold of
your neck?
xxx xxx xxx

A Yes, sir.
Q Did you have a conversation with your Tia Lita
after you opened the door?
Q And when he took hold of your neck and
embraced your abdomen, what did he do next?
A Tia Lita asked me what Benben did to me but I
did not answer because I was afraid.
A He told me: 'Do not shout, if you will shout I will
kill you.
Q That was the only question that was being asked
on you by your Tia Lita?
Q He was uttering those words when he was
holding your neck and embracing your abdomen?
A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir.
Q You did not make any answer?

Q And after that he immediately carried you to the

A I did not.
bed inside your house?
 A He did not carry me but he pushed me to the
bed.
Q How far was the bed to the place where you
were pushed by accused Paragsa?
A One and one-half meters.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FLORES:
Q And how long did your Tia Lita went home after
the conversation?
A Tia Lita walked away passing thru our 'banguera
and Ka Benben appeared and he told me that if I
will tell Tia Lita he will kill me and I was afraid
because he was still holding the hunting knife.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You did not tell your father about the incident
that evening?
A No, I did not tell because I was afraid, he might
punish me and he might kill me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When your mother arrived home, did she
inquire from you about the incident?
A Yes, she asked me because Tia Lita related to her
the incident.
ATTY. FLORES:
Q You want to tell the Court that if your mother
had not inquired from you about the incident you
have not told Your mother about the incident.
A No, I will not tell.
Q How would you reconcile your testimony when
a moment ago you said that you told the incident
to your mother because you took revenge of what
Ka Benben had done to you'?
A Because before she asked one of the incident I
had in mind not to tell her of the incident but after
she asked me I (told) her of the incident because I
want to take revenge on Ka Benben. TSN, hearing
on December 3, 197 1, pp. 6 to 15).
The trial court's vivid summary of the prosecution's evidence, which reveals how the rape was
committed and why the complainant did not disclose the outrage right away to her aunt and
parents and which mentions the flight of the accused, and the trial court's reasons for
convicting the accused are as follows:
The prosecution thru the testimonies of the complaining witness', and
the other State witnesses has established the following facts: That at
about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of July 13, 1971. the offended party,
Mirasol Magallanes, aged 12 years, 6 months and 4 days as shown in
Exhibit "B", was in the house of her parents at Sitio Tabagak Barrio
Bunacan, Municipality of Madridejos, Province of Cebu. She was alone
and under the house cooking hog feeds. The house, the lower portion of
which, is fenced with bamboo strips, while the surrounding lawn is
likewise enclosed with fence. Her father at the time was in Cadiz, Negros
Occidental, where he was employed in one of the Fishing Outfits. Her
mother was in Sagay, Negros Occidental, while all her younger sisters
and brother were in the house of her grandmother at Barrio Codia
Madridejos, Cebu, where all of the children were left for care when their
mother left for Sagay on July 10, 1971.
The girl Mirasol Magallanes was a grade six pupil in tile Bunacan
Elementary School, and she did not attend her classes on that day upon
instruction of her mother not to attend her classes during the period of
her (mother's) absence. She was instructed to go to Bunacan in order to
feed their pig in the morning, cook its foods and the afternoon and after
feeding return to the house of her grandmother at Codia
While Mirasol was cooking the hog feeds, at about 1:30 in the afternoon
of July 13, 1971, the accused Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting
knife, surreptitiously entered the fenced ground floor of the house, then
barred the door after him. The accused approached Mirasol from behind,
hook his left forearm around her neck, at the same time thrust the knife
which was held by his right hand at the breast of Mirasol Magallanes, and
told her not to shout for help under the threat of instant death.
With his left forearm still around the neck of Mirasol and the knife's point
at her breast, the accused pushed the victim to a nearby bamboo bed
and laid her. He then placed the knife beside Mirasol, removed her
panty, and opened his pants. He forced the victim to open or spread her
legs by placing his hands on the inside portion of both thighs according
to the testimony of Mirasol and corroborated by Medical Certificate,
Exhibit "A", indicating confusion.
Placing himself between the legs, directly in front of the sexual organ of
Mirasol, the accused inserted his erected penis into her vagina and
hurriedly proceeded with the act of copulation by up and down
movement. After completing the act, the accused was about to leave
when, unexpectedly, Lita Parochel, aunt of Mirasol (wife of the younger
brother of victim's father), arrived outside the barred door. She called
for Mirasol, who was already sitting at the edge of the bamboo bed,
putting on her panty, to open the door, On hearing the call, the accused
ran away and hid himself in a closet located at the corner of the ground
floor.
The victim did not answer the call of her aunt nor did she open the barred
door. Lita Parochel, suspecting that something unusual had happened to
her niece, walked away from the door, making it appear t at she was
going out and hid herself behind an outside projection of the ground
floor where she could see and observe the door. No sooner had she
hidden herself when she saw the accused came out of the door, holding
a hunting knife in his right hand, and ran towards the general direction
of the seashore.
She returned to the opened door and asked Mirasol what had happened.
Mirasol was very pale, trembling and in a state of shock did not answer
her inquiries. Without pressing further, the aunt instructed her niece to
return immediately to her grandmother's home at Barrio Codia after
feeding the pig, then she (Lita) returned to her house which is about 50
fathoms away.
At about 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon, before Mirasol Magallanes
could return to her grandmother's house, her father arrived from Cadiz,
Negros Occidental. Lita Parochel, having only her suspicion as she did not
actually see the accused abuse her niece, did not report the incident to
her brother-in-law. But she reported the incident to her husband at 7:00
o'clock that evening on his return home.
On July 15, 1971, upon the return of Mirasol's mother from Sagay,
Negros Occidental, Lita Parochel personally reported the matter to the
mother. Acting upon the report, the mother immediately investigated
her daughter who, having been given the assurance that she would not
be subjected to physical punishment, and who had already recovered
from her fears and shock, readily told her mother that she was raped by
Bienvenido Paragsa. She was brought to the Bantayan Emergency
Hospital and subjected to an internal examination by Dr. Luis L.
Gandiongco, M.D. Medico- Legal-Incharge, who found her positive of
having sexual intercourse.
A complaint for rape was filed against Bienvenido Paragsa by the Chief
of Police of Madridejos, Cebu, at the instance of Bernardina R.
Magallanes, mother of the victim, who at the time she was raped was a
little more than 12 years old as stated above (Exhibit "B"). In the
meantime the accused had left Madridejos, Cebu and was finally
arrested at Danao City on the strength of a Warrant of Arrest issued by
the Municipal Judge of Madridejos, Cebu, before whom the Complain,
for rape was filed.
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful consideration of the evidence of the parties in its totality,
the Court is of the view that the prosecution has been able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime of RAPE
as charged in the Information. It is true that the offended party did not
exert strong and effective efforts to thwart the attack of the accused in
disgracing or dishonoring her womanhood but considering that the
accused was carrying with him a knife which he used in threatening her
to death, it is not unusual that the young and innocent girl of over 12
years of age would just meekly submit for fear of her life.
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, the accused admitted having sexual intercourse with
the complaining minor of a little over 12 years of age and his testimony
regarding their being sweetheart and especially as to the first intercourse
he allegedly had with the victim in their house in the first week of July
1971 and the second in the first week of June 1971 is so unnatural,
unbelievable and contrary to common sense that this Court is of the
opinion and so holds that his story is fabricated and self-serving and
untrustworthy for it if it were true that the victim was his own
sweetheart and he was her boyfriend then there could have been no
reason for this young innocent girl of a little above 12 years to tell her
mother about the criminal attack by the accused upon her womanhood
 and virginity. Her story regarding her being threatened to death by the
accused who carried with him a hunting knife is being corroborated by
witness Lita Parochel who had no motive whatsoever to declare falsely
against the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court had observed that Mirasol Magallanes is an intelligent, honest
and reliable witness notwithstanding the fact that she was of a very
tender age and the Court cannot accept the theory of the defense that
the intercourse that took place on July 13, 1971 was voluntary on her
part. It would be very hard to believe that the complainant would easily
submit to such an intercourse if her will to resist had not been
overpowered or overcome by threat, intimidation and force on the part
of the accused who was armed with a knife.
The accused was twenty-one (21) years old while the victim was twelve years and six months
old. The fact of the accused in taking advantage of the victim's immaturity is a form of
unpardonable sexual perversion which is worse than the offense committed by Roman Polanski
the Hollywood director who was convicted of cohabiting with thirteen-year old girl.
To acquit the accused would be a miscarriage of justice. The lower court's judgment of
conviction should be affirmed and the accused should be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused-appellant in the light of the salient facts and
circumstances discussed in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Makasiar 1 which justly cast
serious doubts on the guilt of the accused and entitle him to a verdict of acquittal founded on
the constitutional presumption of innocence.
The ratio decidendi in the analogous case of People vs. Ramirez 2 (where the 15-year old
daughter of the accused's common-law wife charged him with double rape and his defense was
"that there was consent on her part, as indeed there had been previous instances where he
had access to her is fully applicable to the case at bar, thus: "The pronouncement in People vs.
Damayo 3 as to the extent of the protection accorded by the Constitution to a person indicted
for a criminal offense once again possesses relevance. Thus: 'Accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to d demonstrate
that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their
behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction
be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this
Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the
testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is
offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an
exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the text of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.
The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the
offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What
is required then is moral certain. 4
There as in tills case, we held that the accused could not be convicted of seduction under the
rape charge, citing the case of People vs. Castro 5 because "the rape charge did not place [the
accused] in jeopardy of being convicted for qualified seduction. He is entitled to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."
I have written this brief concurrence, principally, because I noted from the decision 6 that this
is a case where as against the prevailing view and practice under section 34 of Republic Act 296,
as amended (the Judiciary Act of 1948) and incorporated in Rule 124, section 12 of the Rules of
Court (whereby in any criminal case submitted to a division of the Court of Appeals whenever
said court should be of the opinion that the higher penalty of death or life imprisonment should
be imposed than the lesser penalty imposed by the trial court in the decision subject of the
appeal before it, said court "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith
certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought
before it on appeal") the Court of Appeals rendered judgment imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua instead of forthwith certifying by resolution the case to this Court as falling with this
Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction under section 17 of the Judiciary Act.
Some members of the Court have asked for re-examination of the prevailing view and practice
and to set down as the proper procedure that followed by the Court of Appeals in the case at
bar. But since the Court's verdict is one of acquittal, there was no need to take up the question
in this case. I make this of record so that the present decision may not be taken as impliedly
sanctioning such procedure, or as an indication of approval thereof on the part of any member
of the Court taking part herein. The question will be definitively resolved in several cases
pending before the Court where such reexamination has been squarely raised, e.g. in Case L-
40330, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Amado Danie alias "Amado Ato". submitted for
decision of August 5, 1975.
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The evidence for the prosecution was summarized by the Solicitor General in this wise: xxx xxx xxx

Mirasol Magallanes, aged twelve-and-a-half, was alone in her parent's house in Sitio Tabagak Q From your findings, Doctor, there was
of Barrio Bunacan, in Madridejos Cebu in the early afternoon of July 13, 197 1, cooking hog something foreign which got inside the vaginal
feed. Both of her parents were then away, in Negros Occidental, and the rest of the family were tract of the complainant.
with Mirasol's grandmother in Barrio Codia also in Madridejos, Cebu, Mirasol, although a six-
grader in the Bunacan Elementary School, was at home on this date, on instructions of her
A There might be foreign body which got inside
mother to look after their pigs, and cook hog feed in the afternoon.
the vaginal tract not so deep that caused
laceration of the hymen.
While thus alone on the ground floor of their house in Tabagak innocently cooking food for the
family's pigs, the a accused Bienvenido Paragsa, with a hunting knife in hand, stealthily entered
Q In your study of medicine, when a foreign object
the house, barring the door as he entered, And approaching Mirasol from behind, he hooked
is penetrated but not so deep, will that produce
his left arm around the young girl's neck and simultaneously thrust his knife at Mirasol's tender
laceration of the viginal tract or the hymem of the
breast, barking at the same moment for the girl not to shout, under threat of instant death.
woman, is that possible?

His left arm still hooked around the poor girl's neck, and the knife he held perilously poised
Q When there is a penetration but not deep, will
upon the girl's vulnerable breast, the accused pushed the girl to the bamboo bed nearby, and
it produce laceration of the vaginal tract of a
there laid her down. He then removed her panties, and opened the fly of his own pants.
woman?
Forcibly, he opened the girl's thighs, and himself in between, he then penetrated young
Mirasol's private part with his erect private part, and hastily consummated his guilt-ridden
forcible, physical intrusion into the young girl's body. A Yes, sir.

Mirasol's aunt, Lita Parochel, arriving later, too late to prevent the dastardly abuse of her niece, xxx xxx xxx
nevertheless, saw the accused as he surreptitiously fled the scene and found her niece in a
state of shock. Subsequently, report of the crime was made to the girl's parents, and a Fiscal: Can you tell us what could have possibly
complaint lodged against the accused for the crime of rape. (pp. 6-8, tsn Dec. 3, 1971; pp. 7-18, caused the on your external examination of the
tsn Jan. 5, 1972; pp 1-3, tsn Nov. 16, 1971; Exh. A). woman Mirasol Magallanes?

The accused admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the complaint girl. His defense is that xxx xxx xxx
the copulation was voluntary. The doctor, who examined the complainant, found that she
sustained an "abrasion, left thigh, medial side" in addition to an "abrasion of inguinal region"
(Exh. A). He testified that there was laceration of the hymen. The pertinent portion of his A Maybe the assailant used force. (3tsn).
testimony is quoted below:
The trial court and the Court of Appeals (Justice Lorenzo Relova, ponente) both held that rape
Q Can you tell us your external findings? was committed. That conclusion is supported by the following testimony of the complainant:

A My external findings is that there was an Q You said that in the afternoon of July 13, 1971,
abrasion of inguinal region and abrasion, left you saw Bienvenido Paragsa entered under your
thigh, medial side. house where you were cooking the hog feeds, can
you tell this Honorable Court what was he doing
when he entered your premises?
Q How about your internal examination?

A Yes, sir.
A I was able to get some of the secretion found at
the anterior fornix of the cervic.
 Q What did he do? ATTY. SALGADO:

A When he entered under the house he Q After he finished picking you, what was or where
immediately held my neck and then embraced my did Paragsa go?
abdomen and he was carrying a hunting knife.
A He ran to one of the room of the house to hide.
Q When he grabbed your neck and hugged you,
did he say anything to you?
xxx xxx xxx

A Yes, sir, he told me, 'Do not shout, if you will

Q Did you have a conversation with your Tia Lita
shout, I will kill you.
after you opened the door?

Q After hugging you and telling you not to shout,

A Tia Lita asked me what Benben did to me but I
what did Paragsa do next?
did not answer because I was afraid.

A He pushed me to bed and he let me lie on the

Q That was the only question that was being asked
bed and he immediately pulled out my panty,
on you by your Tia Lita?

Q After removing your panty, what next did

A Yes, sir.
Paragsa do.

Q You did not make any answer?

A He tried to open my thigh but I insisted closing
them because I was ashamed.
A I did not.
Q In effect, was he able to open your thigh
Q Did you tell anybody of what had happened to
you as what you had testified?
A Yes, sir, because he threatened me with his
hunting knife: You not open. if you will not open, I
will stab you. A I did not.

xxx xxx xxx Q Why?

Q After he succeeded in inserting his penis into
your sexual organ, what did he do next?
ATTY. FLORES: I want to make of record that
witness is spontaneous in answering the question,
considering that she is minor and this is her first
time.
WITNESS: He made a push and pull movement.
A I did not tell because I was warned by the
accused that if I would tell he would be coming
back to kill me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And after that while he was holding your neck
and embracing your abdomen you were then
sitting near the place where you were cooking
your hog's feeds?
A When he entered under our house when he was
nearing I immediately stood up; I was no longer
sitting.
Q So. you recognized him before he took hold of
your neck?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when he took hold of your neck and
embraced your abdomen, what did he do next?
A He told me: 'Do not shout, if you will shout I will
kill you.
Q He was uttering those words when he was
holding your neck and embracing your abdomen?
A Yes, sir.
Q And after that he immediately carried you to the
bed inside your house?
A He did not carry me but he pushed me to the
bed.
Q How far was the bed to the place where you
were pushed by accused Paragsa?
A One and one-half meters.
ATTY. FLORES:
Q And how long did your Tia Lita went home after
the conversation?
A Tia Lita walked away passing thru our 'banguera
and Ka Benben appeared and he told me that if I
will tell Tia Lita he will kill me and I was afraid
because he was still holding the hunting knife.
Q You did not tell your father about the incident
that evening?
A No, I did not tell because I was afraid, he might
punish me and he might kill me.
Q When your mother arrived home, did she
inquire from you about the incident?
A Yes, she asked me because Tia Lita related to her
the incident.
ATTY. FLORES:
Q You want to tell the Court that if your mother
had not inquired from you about the incident you
have not told Your mother about the incident.
A No, I will not tell.
Q How would you reconcile your testimony when
a moment ago you said that you told the incident
to your mother because you took revenge of what
Ka Benben had done to you'?
A Because before she asked one of the incident I
had in mind not to tell her of the incident but after
she asked me I (told) her of the incident because I
want to take revenge on Ka Benben. TSN, hearing
on December 3, 197 1, pp. 6 to 15).
The trial court's vivid summary of the prosecution's evidence, which reveals how the rape was
committed and why the complainant did not disclose the outrage right away to her aunt and
parents and which mentions the flight of the accused, and the trial court's reasons for
convicting the accused are as follows:
The prosecution thru the testimonies of the complaining witness', and
the other State witnesses has established the following facts: That at
about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of July 13, 1971. the offended party,
Mirasol Magallanes, aged 12 years, 6 months and 4 days as shown in
Exhibit "B", was in the house of her parents at Sitio Tabagak Barrio
Bunacan, Municipality of Madridejos, Province of Cebu. She was alone
and under the house cooking hog feeds. The house, the lower portion of
which, is fenced with bamboo strips, while the surrounding lawn is
likewise enclosed with fence. Her father at the time was in Cadiz, Negros
Occidental, where he was employed in one of the Fishing Outfits. Her
mother was in Sagay, Negros Occidental, while all her younger sisters
and brother were in the house of her grandmother at Barrio Codia
Madridejos, Cebu, where all of the children were left for care when their
mother left for Sagay on July 10, 1971.
The girl Mirasol Magallanes was a grade six pupil in tile Bunacan
Elementary School, and she did not attend her classes on that day upon
instruction of her mother not to attend her classes during the period of
her (mother's) absence. She was instructed to go to Bunacan in order to
feed their pig in the morning, cook its foods and the afternoon and after
feeding return to the house of her grandmother at Codia
While Mirasol was cooking the hog feeds, at about 1:30 in the afternoon
of July 13, 1971, the accused Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting
knife, surreptitiously entered the fenced ground floor of the house, then
barred the door after him. The accused approached Mirasol from behind,
hook his left forearm around her neck, at the same time thrust the knife
which was held by his right hand at the breast of Mirasol Magallanes, and
told her not to shout for help under the threat of instant death.
With his left forearm still around the neck of Mirasol and the knife's point
at her breast, the accused pushed the victim to a nearby bamboo bed
and laid her. He then placed the knife beside Mirasol, removed her
panty, and opened his pants. He forced the victim to open or spread her
legs by placing his hands on the inside portion of both thighs according
to the testimony of Mirasol and corroborated by Medical Certificate,
Exhibit "A", indicating confusion.
Placing himself between the legs, directly in front of the sexual organ of
Mirasol, the accused inserted his erected penis into her vagina and
hurriedly proceeded with the act of copulation by up and down
movement. After completing the act, the accused was about to leave
when, unexpectedly, Lita Parochel, aunt of Mirasol (wife of the younger
brother of victim's father), arrived outside the barred door. She called
for Mirasol, who was already sitting at the edge of the bamboo bed,
putting on her panty, to open the door, On hearing the call, the accused
ran away and hid himself in a closet located at the corner of the ground
floor.
The victim did not answer the call of her aunt nor did she open the barred
door. Lita Parochel, suspecting that something unusual had happened to
her niece, walked away from the door, making it appear t at she was
going out and hid herself behind an outside projection of the ground
floor where she could see and observe the door. No sooner had she
hidden herself when she saw the accused came out of the door, holding
a hunting knife in his right hand, and ran towards the general direction
of the seashore.
She returned to the opened door and asked Mirasol what had happened.
Mirasol was very pale, trembling and in a state of shock did not answer
her inquiries. Without pressing further, the aunt instructed her niece to
return immediately to her grandmother's home at Barrio Codia after
feeding the pig, then she (Lita) returned to her house which is about 50
fathoms away.
At about 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon, before Mirasol Magallanes
could return to her grandmother's house, her father arrived from Cadiz,
Negros Occidental. Lita Parochel, having only her suspicion as she did not
actually see the accused abuse her niece, did not report the incident to
her brother-in-law. But she reported the incident to her husband at 7:00
o'clock that evening on his return home.
On July 15, 1971, upon the return of Mirasol's mother from Sagay,
Negros Occidental, Lita Parochel personally reported the matter to the
mother. Acting upon the report, the mother immediately investigated
her daughter who, having been given the assurance that she would not
be subjected to physical punishment, and who had already recovered
from her fears and shock, readily told her mother that she was raped by
Bienvenido Paragsa. She was brought to the Bantayan Emergency
Hospital and subjected to an internal examination by Dr. Luis L.
Gandiongco, M.D. Medico- Legal-Incharge, who found her positive of
having sexual intercourse.
A complaint for rape was filed against Bienvenido Paragsa by the Chief
of Police of Madridejos, Cebu, at the instance of Bernardina R.
Magallanes, mother of the victim, who at the time she was raped was a
little more than 12 years old as stated above (Exhibit "B"). In the
meantime the accused had left Madridejos, Cebu and was finally
arrested at Danao City on the strength of a Warrant of Arrest issued by
the Municipal Judge of Madridejos, Cebu, before whom the Complain,
for rape was filed.
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful consideration of the evidence of the parties in its totality,
the Court is of the view that the prosecution has been able to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime of RAPE
 as charged in the Information. It is true that the offended party did not
exert strong and effective efforts to thwart the attack of the accused in
disgracing or dishonoring her womanhood but considering that the
accused was carrying with him a knife which he used in threatening her
to death, it is not unusual that the young and innocent girl of over 12
years of age would just meekly submit for fear of her life.
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, the accused admitted having sexual intercourse with
the complaining minor of a little over 12 years of age and his testimony
regarding their being sweetheart and especially as to the first intercourse
he allegedly had with the victim in their house in the first week of July
1971 and the second in the first week of June 1971 is so unnatural,
unbelievable and contrary to common sense that this Court is of the
opinion and so holds that his story is fabricated and self-serving and
untrustworthy for it if it were true that the victim was his own
sweetheart and he was her boyfriend then there could have been no
reason for this young innocent girl of a little above 12 years to tell her
mother about the criminal attack by the accused upon her womanhood
and virginity. Her story regarding her being threatened to death by the
accused who carried with him a hunting knife is being corroborated by
witness Lita Parochel who had no motive whatsoever to declare falsely
against the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court had observed that Mirasol Magallanes is an intelligent, honest
and reliable witness notwithstanding the fact that she was of a very
tender age and the Court cannot accept the theory of the defense that
the intercourse that took place on July 13, 1971 was voluntary on her
part. It would be very hard to believe that the complainant would easily
submit to such an intercourse if her will to resist had not been
overpowered or overcome by threat, intimidation and force on the part
of the accused who was armed with a knife.
The accused was twenty-one (21) years old while the victim was twelve years and six months
old. The fact of the accused in taking advantage of the victim's immaturity is a form of
unpardonable sexual perversion which is worse than the offense committed by Roman Polanski
the Hollywood director who was convicted of cohabiting with thirteen-year old girl.
To acquit the accused would be a miscarriage of justice. The lower court's judgment of
conviction should be affirmed and the accused should be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y
ARCILLAS, and JESUS MEDALLA y CUDILLAN, defendants-appellants.
ANTONIO, J.:
This is an automatic review of a decision of the court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial
District, Branch VII, Pasay City finding all the accused, namely, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo,
Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, guilty of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing them as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Melecio Cudillan, ,Jesus Medalla,
Ramiro Alegre, and Mario Comayas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed with four (4) aggravating
circumstances, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, and hereby
sentences all of them to suffer the penalty of death, to be carried out
pursuant to the applicable provisions of law, to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of Adlina Sajo in the amount of P350,000.00,
representing the value of the pieces of jewelry unrecovered, to pay
jointly and severally also the heirs of Adelina Sajo the amount of
P12,000.00. and to pay the costs.
With or without appeal, let this case be elevated to the Supreme Court
for review, pursuant to law.
During the pendency of this appeal, Melecio Cudillan died on arrival at the New Bilibid Prison
Hospital on August 16, 1970, and the case as against the said accused, insofar as his criminal
liability is concerned, was dismissed on August 29, 1974. This decision, therefore, is limited to
appellants Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla.
This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body
was found in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay
City, in the early morning of July 26, 1966. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of
asphyxia by manual strangulation, and the time of her death was placed between eighteen to
twenty-two hours before 12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.
Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and
several cabinets were open, and some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered
on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the crime. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was
then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, Q. When you said there was a confrontation
was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, between the accused Melecio Cudillan and other
but was later released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime. suspects whom do you refer to as other suspects?

During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, A. Jesus Medalla, Celso Fernandez, Rosario Dejere
in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining and Mario. There was another person Eduardo
how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in Comayas. He was also one of those suspects but
the killing and robbery of Adlina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the Melecio Cudillan failed to point to him as his
police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-2"). In this companion.
statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated a certain
"Esok" of Villalon, Calubian, Leyte; Jesus Medalla, of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; Mario
Q. Who were those persons or suspects pointed to
Cudillan, also of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; one "Danny" Fernandez, of Balaquid,
by Melecio Cudillan in the Police Department of
Cabucgayan, Biliran Sub-province; and one "Rammy, " another Leyteno. When brought to
Pasay City as his companions?
Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan
again executed an extrajudicial confession (Exhibits "A ", "A-1 " to "A-6" on July 31, 1966. This
was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second A. To Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre and Mario
statement, he narrated in detail the participation in the commission of the crime of Jesus Comayas.
Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said statement, the declarant
went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, and Q. When Melecio Cudilla pointed to these persons
Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons he referred to as what did these three persons do?
Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned
extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was
filed by the Special Counsel of Pasay City against Celso Fernandez, alias "Esok," Jesus Medalla y A. They just stared at him and said nothing. (t.s.n.,
Cudillan, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas, pp. 15-16, Hearing of October 28, 1966).
and one John Doe."
According to the trial court, had the appellants "really been innocent (they) should have
When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and protested vigorously and not merely kept their silence."
Ramiro Alegre entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None
of them, however, testified on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City jail, declared that the three (3)
contained in the decision under review was based principally and mainly on the extrajudicial appellants admitted to him that they took part in the robbery and homicide committed in the
confessions of Melecio Cudillan. Thus, the details of the planning and the execution of the crime residence of the deceased, viz.:
were taken from the "Pasay Sworn Statement" (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to "A-6"). The only evidence,
therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are the testimonies of
Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo. ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City police is to the effect that when he was Q. Do you know the other accused Ramiro Alegre?
investigating Melecio Cudillan, the latter pointed to Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus
Medalla as his companions in the commission of the crime. According to him, said appellants A. Yes, sir.
"just stared at him (Melecio Cudilla) and said nothing."
Q. If he is inside the court room, will you please
Q. In what particular place in the Police point him out?
Department did you have to confront the accused
Melecio Cudillan with the other suspects'?
INTERPRETER:

A. In the office of the Secret Service Division.

Witness points to the fellow in the second row, Q. What year?
fourth from the left who, upon being asked, gave
his name as Ramiro Alegre.
A. 1967.

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Do you know the other accused Mario
Comayas?
Q. Did you have any occasion to talk to Ramiro
Alegre?
A. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you know him?

Q. Where?
A. He is also one of the prisoners and our cells are
near each other. Q. If he is inside the courtroom,
A. In the city jail because our cells are also near will you please point him out?
each other.
INTERPRETER:
Q. And what did you and Ramiro Alegre talk
about?
Witness indicating to the
fellow who gave his name
A. Concerning his case and he told me that he has as Mario Comayas.
also anticipated in the commission of the killing of
Adelina Sajo.
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. By the way, when did you talk with Ramiro

Q. Did you have any occasion to talk with the
Alegre, more or less?
accused Mario Comayas?

A. About the middle of June.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what else did Ramiro Alegre tell you, if

Q. When was that, more or less?
any?

A. In the month of June, about the middle part also

A. That he was also inside the room when they
of June.
killed Adelina Sajo.

Q. And what did you talk about?

Q. Now, regarding that conversation you had with
the accused Jesus Medalla, when did that take
place, more or less? A. Regarding this case of Adelina Sajo and he
admitted to me that he was one of those who
planned and killed Adelina Sajo.
A. About that month also of June, about the
middle of June.
Q. I see! And what, else did he tell you, if any?
A. That while the killing was being perpetrated Objection, Your Honor,
upstairs he was told to by the door. leading.

Q. How about the other accused Melencio COURT:

Cudillan, do you know him?
Witness may answer, there
A. Yes, sir. is already a basis.

Q. If he is in court, will you please point him out? A. That they were the ones who planned and killed
Adelina Sajo. (t.s.n., pp. 286-289, Hearing of July
21, 1967).
INTERPRETER:

However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City
Witness pointing to the
sworn statements as the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not
accused who gave his name
assisted by counsel when he was investigated by the police. Appellants Jesus Medalla and
as Melecio Cudillan.
Mario Comayas denied any involvement in the crime. They testified that at the time of the
incident in question. they were attending the internment of the deceased child of Ciriaco
ATTY. DEPASUCAT: Abobote. According to Jesus Medalla, he and his companions left the Maravilla compound at
10:00 o'clock in the morning of July 25, 1966 to attend the internment. 'They left the cemetery
Q. Why do you know Melecio Cudillan? at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and proceeded directly to his house at Leveriza Street
where he stayed the whole night. Mario Comayas confirmed that he and Jesus Medalla were
at the house of Ciriaco Abobote in the morning of July 25, 1966, until after 5:00 o'clock in the
A. Because he is with me in one cell. afternoon when he returned to the bakery where he was employed to resume his work.

Q. Were you able also to talk with Melecio
Cudillan?
A. Most of the time because we used to talk about
our case.
Q. When have you talked with Melecio Cudillan,
more or less?
A. Three days after my confinement and
subsequently thereafter up to about the first week
of June, 1967.
Q. And what did the accused Melecio Cudillan tell
you about this case?
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
Appellant Ramiro Alegre did not testify but presented three (3) witnesses to support his
defense. Thus, Urbano Villanueva testified that he was a sub-contractor of Jose Inton for the
welding project of David M. Consunji at the Sheraton Hotel construction; that Ramiro Alegre
began working at the construction as a welder on July 13, 1966, and that from 7:00 o'clock in
the morning to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Alegre worked in the project and that he knew
this because he is the foreman and timekeeper in the project. He Identified the Time Record of
Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1"). Rodolfo Villanueva and Romeo Origenes testified that from 7:00
o'clock in the morning up to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 25, 1966, appellant Ramiro
Alegre was at the Sheraton Hotel construction at Roxas Boulevard. Their testimony is confirmed
by the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1") which contained the number of hours he
actually worked at the Sheraton Hotel construction project.
Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of
Melecio Cudillan (now deceased) as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the
alleged "Silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as "his
companions" in the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt; and in giving undue weight
and credence to the testimony of an inmate of the Pasay City Jail that appellants admitted to
him their participation in the crime.

I
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1"
and "F-2"), on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan
committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof
against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta
alteri nocere non debet" 1 there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. 2 As a general
rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible
and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far
as the other accused are concerned. 3 While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the
facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such
exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their
purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by
Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of
the Pasay City jail.
II
The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self- incrimination is a fundamental
right. It is a personal right of great importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The
privilege against self-incrimination is an important development in man's struggle for liberty. It
reflects man's fundamental values and his most noble of aspirations, the unwillingness of
civilized men to subject those' suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may be obtained by inhumane
treatment and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the
right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life." 10
In the words of Chavez v. Court of Appeals: 11
... this right is 'not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of
which is left to the discretion of the court;' it is mandatory; it secures to
a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental to our
scheme of justice ...

The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of appellants while under police
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and
custody, in the face of statements of Melecio Cudillan implicating them as his companions in
against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as
the commission of the crime, could be considered as tacit admission on their part of their
resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable
participation therein.
against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to
prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand
to testify, may not be taken as evidence against him, 4 and that he may refuse to answer an — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.
incriminating question. 5 It has also been held that while an accused is under custody, his
silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence
It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law, the operations of our laws
when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would
governing the rights of an accused person are not open to doubt. Under the code for the
be illusory. 6 The leading case of Miranda v. Arizona7 held that the prosecution may not use at
administration of detainees, all officers, civilian and military personnel are sworn to uphold the
trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his privilege against self-incrimination,
rights of detainees. Among such fundamental rights are the right against compulsory
in the face of an accusation made at a police custodial interrogation. Prior to Miranda, it was
testimonial self-incrimination, the right, when under investigation for the commission of an
the view of many authorities that a man to whom a statement implicating him in a crime is
offense, to remain silent, to have counsel, and to be informed of his rights; the right not to be
directed may fail to reply if he is in custody under a charge of the commission of that crime, not
subjected to force, violence, threats, intimidation and degrading punishment or torture in the
because he acquiesces in the truth of the statement, but because he stands on his
course of one's detention, and the safeguard that any confession obtained in violation of the
constitutional right to remain silent, as being the safest course for him to pursue and the best
foregoing rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. 12 The 1973 Constitution gives explicit
way out of his predicament. 8 Other courts have held that the circumstance that one is under
constitutional sanction to the right to silence. Thus, in Section 20 of Article IV of the
arrest by itself does not render the evidence inadmissible, and that an accusation of a crime
Constitution, there is this categorical mandate: "Any person under investigation for the
calls for a reply even from a person under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses. 9
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
deny statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither
asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit
This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution protects, therefore, the
confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of
right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement would appear
own will, and to suffer no penalty for such silence. 13
incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination.
This aspect of the right has been comprehensively explained by then Associate Justice Enrique
M. Fernando, now Chief justice, in Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 14 thus:
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far
back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: 'The accused has a perfect
right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of
his guilt.' Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, speaking through
Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a
defendant 'to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to
take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own
free, genuine will.'
Identifying the right of an accused to remain silent with right to privacy, this Court, in Pascual
explained that the privilege against self-incrimination "enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force to surrender to its detriment."
We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while
under police custody, in the face of the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the
conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had tacitly admitted their guilt. We hold, further, that
in view of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating
herein appellants, the remaining evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt.
Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Indeed,
it is inherently improbable that herein appellants would have readily confessed their
participation in the commission of a heinous crime to a casual acquaintance in a prison
detention cell, considering that on the same occasion they strongly denied any involvement in
such crime before the police authorities.
WHEREFORE, the judgement appealed from is reversed, and appellants Ramiro Alegre y
Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan are hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime with which they are charged. Their immediate release from detention is ordered,
unless they or any one of them is otherwise held for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-7615. March 14, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. TIA FONG alias AH SAM, Defendant-
Appellant.
Honorato Hermosisimo for Appellant.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal by Tia Fong alias Ah Sam against a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental finding the said Ah Sam, Maximo Alcantar, Florencio Bahala and Rufino
Palarca guilty of homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Lian Kaw in the amount
of P3,000 and to pay the costs. Only the said Ah Sam has appealed.
It appears that early in the morning of February 21, 1950 the Municipal Mayor of Mambaiao,
Misamis Oriental, was informed that a dead body was lying in the coconut plantation of one by
the name of Juan Neri in said municipality. The Mayor and some of his policemen and the
President of the Sanitary Division went to the place indicated, and there they found the dead
body of a Chinaman named Lian Kao, 28 years of age, son of Chinaman Wong Kiat. The
President of the Sanitary Division found the body in a state of rigidity and calculated that death
must have occurred from 9 to 12 hours before the discovery. He found an incised wound one
inch in length on the right brow, a depressed wound 1/2 inch in depth at the vertex of the head,
ecchymosis with slight tumefaction of the head and the upper part of the neck above a line
which appeared to be the line of strangulation. The body was found with a belt tied around the
neck, and the president of the sanitary division was of the opinion that death was caused by
suffocation or by strangulation after the victim had become unconscious.
The authors of the crime could not be immediately determined until a lieutenant of the
Constabulary by the name of Alberto N. Chavez was detailed to conduct the investigation. He
began making inquiries in and about the place. He suspected Florencio Bahala, who was living
in the neighborhood, and subjected him to a rigid questioning. He noticed that his statements
did not agree with those of his common-law wife. After some time Chavez succeeded in
convincing him, through the help of the wife, to own his part in the crime. Bahala made a
confession on March 9, 1950. The confession of Maximo Alcantar and Rufino Palarca were also
secured. So an information was filed on March 9, 1950. This was amended on March 10, 1950.
The persons accused were the three above-mentioned who has confessed, and Heracleo
Limbaco and the Appellant Tia Fong alias Ah Sam. Both Limbaco and Ah Sam denied complicity
in the crime. At the trial, the other Defendants repudiated the confessions they had made. This
notwithstanding, the court found four of them guilty. Heracleo Limbaco was acquitted of the
charge. As only Ah Sam has appealed the decision, only such facts as are relevant to the charge
against him will be considered.
Sometime before the incident, Ah Sam was in partnership with Wong Kiat and other Chinamen.
Ah Sam separated from Wong Kiat and the others and established a store of his own. A
compadre of his by the name of Hermogenes Tago testified that at eight o’clock in the evening
of February 20, 1950, after he had closed the store and while he was outside, he saw Tia Fong
pass by and had occasion to converse with the latter. Ah Sam complained that his business was
dying because Wong Kiat, the father of the deceased, and his companions would not sell him
bread to sell in his store. Ah Sam after a while said it is better that Wong Kiat and Lian Kaw be
whipped.
The evidence mainly relied upon for the conviction of Ah Sam is his silent participation in the
reenactment of the crime by his co- accused Florencio Bahala, Maximo Alcantar and Rufino
Palarca. With the confessions of these three accused on hand, Lt. Chavez and a subordinate of
his, Sgt. Fernandez, asked the accused to reenact the crime and photography of the acts
reenacted were caused to be taken. In all the most important incidents and details of the
commission of the crime. Ah Sam took part, although silently, under the direction of the
Constabulary and his three co-accused.
In Exhibit “Q” Tia Fong reenacted his position while waiting for his co-accused. In Exhibit “R” he
reenacted his own position when he and his co-accused were talking together planning the
commission of the crime. In Exhibit “S” Ah Sam also reenacted his own position or participation
while he and his co-accused were waiting for Erak (Heracleo Limbaco), who had gone out to
look for the intended victim and present him to them. In Exhibit “K” Ah Sam also reenacted his
own position in relation to the other accused when Erak accompanied the victim and the other
accused followed them - Erak and the victim.
Exhibit “M” represents the positions of all the accused, Ah Sam included, as the victim fell
unconscious after he had been assaulted. In this same exhibit, Ah Sam reenacted the part he
took in untying the belt of the victim. In Exhibit “N” Ah Sam played his own part, showing the
method in which he strangled the victim. Exhibit “U” is the photograph of the manner in
which Appellant tied the belt which he took from the victim’s waist and with which the latter
was strangled, while Exhibit “W” reenacts the distribution of the money by him to his co-
accused.
The witnesses for the prosecution especially Lt. Chavez, testified that Ah Sam took part in the
reenactment of the crime and without any opposition on his (Ah Sam’s) part. He (Ah Sam)
neither opposed nor denied to take part. On one occasion Ah Sam himself, according to Lt.
Chavez, corrected his co-accused as they were reenacting their respective positions as Exhibit
“K” was being taken, as witness the following testimony —
A. Tia Fong did not object neither did he show signs of complaint when his co-accused
indicated their relative positions in the picture.
Q. In what pictures or scenes which were photographed, was it in all occasions in which Tia
Fong ever made any correction or complaint regarding their relative positions?
A. As a matter of fact, in one of those picture, Tia Fong after his co-accused indicated his
relative position in the picture, complained to the fact that his position was not right, and
consequently, he said that he was not supposed to be on the right side of the picture but on
the extreme left of the road or street.
Ah Sam testified that before the reenactment of the crime he was told before hand to obey
whatever instructions Sgt. Fernandez would give, and that he (Ah Sam) tried his best to obey
said instructions. According to him, Sgt. Fernandez would first read the paper (confession of his
co-accused), then direct the accused to assume the positions, and lastly ordered pictures to be
taken. Ah Sam further declared that he just followed the directions given by Sgt. Fernandez
because he had already been maltreated. The supposed maltreatment consisted in having been
boxed in the solar plexus as a result of which he involuntarily urinated.
The trial judge held that the guilt of Ah Sam was proved by his participation in the reenactment
of the crime. His counsel, on this appeal, argues that it was error for the trial court to consider
said participation as an evidence against him, because all that the Appellant did during the
entire period of the reenactment was to remain silent and do what he was told and directed to
do. Against this contention the Solicitor General argues that the Appellant himself voluntarily
took part in the reenactment and in one instance corrected the position which he was directed
to take.
We have carefully reviewed the evidence, especially the testimony of the Appellant on the
circumstances leading to his participation in the reenactment, and we find no evidence to
sustain the claim that he was forced against his will to participate therein. It is true that Ah Sam
stated that he was boxed on the solar plexus, and was later brought to a toilet where he was
compelled to put his face in the bowl, but these supposed instances of maltreatment relate to
attempts to extract a confession from him, not to compel him to take part in the reenactment
of the crime. He stated that Sgt. Fernandez had warned him to obey his orders in the
reenactment otherwise he would again be subject to maltreatment, but we find nothing to
corroborate the making of the supposed threat and Appellant’s willing conduct throughout the
reenactment does not evince the supposed threat. We have searched the record in vain for any
act or word of protest from Appellant, either before the reenactment or during the entire
period thereof, against his taking part therein. Appellant’s counsel himself admits that
the Appellant was silent, doing what he was told to do.
But counsel for the Appellant contends that as the Appellant was under arrest at the time of
the reenactment, his taking part therein should not be considered as evidence against him.
The principle that may govern the relevancy and admissibility of Appellant’s participation in the
reenactment is stated in section 8 of Rule 123 of the Rules, which provides:
“SEC. 8. Admission by silence. — Any act or declaration made in the presence and within the
observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally
to call for action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against him.”
In one case decided by us, U. S. vs. Bay, 27 Phil., 495, the Defendant was accused before the
councilman of a barrio with having criminally assaulted the offended party. The Defendant kept
silent as the latter explained the assault, neither admitting nor denying the imputation. At the
trial he allege that the imputation was false, but we held that if it were so, he would have
instantly and indignantly denied the imputation when made before the councilman.
But in another case, we also said that if a Defendant remains silent during an official
investigation by a Fiscal, such silence is no evidence of his guilt, as said official investigation was
no occasion for denying the imputation then being made against him (U. S. vs. De la Cruz, 12
Phil., 87).
There are other related principles, in connection with the silence of an accused in criminal
cases, namely, that his failure or refusal to testify may not be taken as evidence against him
(Rule 111, section 1 [c], and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question E Rule 123,
section 79]. It has also been held that while an accused is under custody his silence may not be
taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhis
silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise his right of silence
would be illusory.
“Section 1259 (d) Silence under Arrest. Some of the courts have held that the fact that one is
under arrest and in the custody of an officer, when he is silent under accusation, prevents his
silence or the statements themselves from being admissible against him, on the ground that
under such circumstances he is not called upon to speak. Other courts have held that this
circumstance alone does not render the evidence inadmissible, and that an accusation of crime
calls for reply even from a person under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where the
circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses so to
do cralaw .”, (16 C.J. 633.)
“SEC. 574. Accused under Arrest or in custody. — The authorities are divided as to the effect
on the admissibility of an incriminating statement made in the presence of an accused, and not
denied by him, of the fact that he was under arrest or in custody under a criminal charge at the
time the statement was made. According to some decisions, the mere fact of arrest, alone, is
not sufficient to render the testimony inadmissible, but such fact deserves consideration only
as one of the circumstances under which the accusation was made, in determining whether the
accused was afforded an opportunity to deny and whether he was naturally called to do so.
Another view supported by many authorities is that the mere fact that an accused was under
arrest is sufficient to render inadmissible the fact of the failure of the accused to deny
accusatory statements made in his presence and bearing. According to this view, it is common
knowledge and belief of men in general that silence while under arrest is most conducive to
the welfare of an accused, whether he is guilty or innocent cralaw .” (20 Am. Jur. 486.)
But the better rule is to consider the circumstances in each case and decide the admissibility of
the silence accordingly.
“(4) Certain situations in particular may furnish a positive motive for silence without regard to
the truth or falsity of the statement. Whether the fact that the party is at the time under arrest
creates such a situation has been the subject of opposing opinions; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarya few Courts (for the most part in acceptance of an early Massachusetts
precedent), by a rule of thumb exclude the statement invariably; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut the better rule is to allow some flexibility according to
circumstances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary cralaw “(IV Wigmore, pp. 80-81.)
Let us now examine the facts and circumstances of the reenactment in view of the above
principles.
The reenactment of the crime was not a part of a formal official investigation like one
conducted by a justice of the peace or a provincial fiscal. The reenactment was a police
contrivance, designed to test the truthfulness of the statements of the witnesses who had
confessed the commission of the offense. If the Appellant herein had not really taken part in
the commission of the crime, his immediate reaction when he became aware that the crime
was to be reenacted, should have been to protest against the implication of the reenactment
or to refuse his indicated participation therein. One of the accused, Heracleo Limbaco, did not
admit participation in the crime. Like the Appellant, he did not confess yet he was not asked to
participate in the reenactment. On the other hand the Appellant readily took part therein. If he
did own participation in the offense he should have refused, at least in the beginning, to
participate in the reenactment or to follow the directions indicated. Far from doing so, he
acquiesced and willingly took part in the reenactment as directed. If the Appellant had the
courage to refuse to own his guilt when he was boxed on the solar plexus, or when he was
forced to put his face in the toilet bowl, why did he not have the courage to protest his
participation in the reenactment before or while it was being conducted?
It is to be noted that the implication of guilt in the case at bar is not derived from mere
silence; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryit is inferred from Appellant’s silent acquiescence in
participating in the reenactment of the crime. More than mere silence, Appellant committed
positive acts without protest or denial when he was free to refuse. Had he not actually
participated in the commission of the offense for which he is charged, he would have protested
being made to take part in the reenactment thereof; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhe would have
informed the public officials at the time of the reenactment, or immediately prior thereto, that
he did not actually take part in the commission of the offense. We, therefore, find that the trial
court committed no error in taking into account Appellant’s participation in the reenactment
as voluntary and in considering it as evidence against him.
The circumstances or evidence submitted against the Appellant in this case are as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary he was the only one among the accused who had a motive
for causing the death of Lian Kaw; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhad he not actually participated
in the commission of the offense he would have been able to introduced positive evidence that
he was either not present or was somewhere else and, therefore, could not have taken part in
the said crime; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe confession of his co-accused as to the reason for
the killing and as to the manner in which the offense was committed corroborates or indicates
the probability of the Appellant having participated therein; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand his
silent acquiescence in taking part in the reenactment and his voluntary and ready participation
therein produce conviction as to his actual participation in the commission of the offense. The
above circumstances convince us that the Appellant Ah Sam participated in the commission of
the crime, inducing his co- accused to help him perpetrate it, he himself actually taking direct
part therein. We find, therefore, that the trial court committed no error in finding him guilty as
charged.
The Solicitor General calls attention to the fact that the crime committed is not mere homicide,
but murder. The information charges murder, and the facts found show that the killing of the
deceased is attended by one qualifying circumstance, that of evident premeditation. The other
aggravating circumstances possibly attending the commission of the crime cannot be imputed
to the Appellant herein, so the offense with which he may be convicted is that of simple murder
qualified by the circumstance of evident premeditation.
The judgment appealed from is hereby modified and instead of homicide the Appellant Tia
Fong alias Ah Sam is found guilty of murder, without any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. The sentence imposed upon him by the trial court is therefore raised to that of
reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the sentence imposed is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the Appellant.
[G.R. No. 117702. February 10, 1997] "x x x Physical examination externally no abnormal findings;

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRISPIN YPARRAGUIRRE, Accused- Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen not
Appellant. intact;

DECISION Internal examination -- admits one finger;

PUNO, J.: Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.

Accused-appellant Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape in an Information x x x."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
that reads as follows:
Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, Rosita was confined at the Davao City Mental
"That on or about July 6, 1990, in the Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, Hospital for observation and treatment. After a week of treatment, Rosita began to talk and
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a revealed that she was raped by appellant.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
hunting knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of Rosita Bacaling, against her
Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime charged. He claimed that on the night of the
will."1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
alleged rape he was selling fish at the public market. Allegedly, he was at the market at 4:00 in
the morning, and worked straight until 8:00 in the evening. He never left the fish stall until after
The prosecution established that Rosita Bacaling was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; 8:00 in the evening because of his many customers.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
that on or about 7:00 in the evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao,
Rosita was cooking porridge for the spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also
other nine months old. Accused-appellant arrived from work and found the two children
ordered him to indemnify Rosita Bacaling P50,000.00 as moral damages and pay P5,000.00 as
asleep. He approached Rosita and gave her a small white envelope said to contain medicine for
attorney's fees, thus:
her skin disease. Rosita was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and stomach which she allegedly
contracted from one of the children. Rosita opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15)
tablets inside. As instructed by appellant, Rosita took all the tablets. A few minutes later, she "WHEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds accused Crispin Yparraguirre guilty
felt weak and fell down. Suddenly, she realized that appellant was dragging her to the spouses' beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable under Article 335 of the Revised
bed. She tried to get up but appellant pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at Penal Code. Correspondingly, the court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer and
her neck. He ordered Rosita not to move or he would kill her. Then he removed her clothes and undergo the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties provided for by
went on top of her. He kissed her face, breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered law and to pay the costs.
her. Rosita cried out in pain but appellant continued entering her. After satisfying his lust,
appellant pulled out and punched Rosita in the stomach. She lost consciousness.Exsm Accused Crispin Yparraguirre is also ordered to indemnify the victim Rosita Bacaling the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus payment of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
A few minutes later, Rosita woke up and saw blood in her private parts. She wiped the blood
and changed her clothes. Seeing her awake, appellant threatened to kill her should she report SO ORDERED."6
the incident to her parents. Appellant then left the house.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In this appeal, accused-appellant contends that:

Rosita did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one
month before leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio Cagangohan. Her mother
found Rosita in a state of shock. She could not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary I
daily functions such as dressing herself. In short, Rosita became helpless. She was brought to
the Municipal Health Officer by her mother for examination. On August 22, 1990, the Municipal "THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE;
Health Officer, Dr. Imelda T. Bendijo, interviewed the girl and found her unresponsive and
unable to talk. She conducted a physical examination and also found that:
II The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of
alibi.19 It was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime.
The public market was merely a ten-minute walk from their rented room20 and during work
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT WITNESS MARY ANN YPARRAGUIRRE WENT TO THE
breaks, appellant would sometimes go home to bring food to his
MOTHER OF THE ACCUSED ON NOVEMBER 23, 1990 TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE DROPPING OF
children.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
THE CASE."7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated May 10, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4,
The appeal has no merit. After reviewing the records, we find that the prosecution evidence,
Panabo, Davao is affirmed. Costs against appellant.
which rests mainly on the testimony of Rosita Bacaling, is credible, reliable and trustworthy.
Rosita testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner and never wavered even
on cross-examination and rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which tend SO ORDERED.
to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion that her testimony was not
contrived.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The question of whether Rosita contracted the skin disease from the children of appellant is
not important. The undisputed fact is that she was afflicted with the disease and that appellant
gave her tablets for treatment of the disease. Appellant's allegation that Rosita should have
fallen asleep for hours after ingesting the tablets is speculative. There is no evidence that the
tablets were sleeping tablets. They, however, weakened Rosita and prevented her from making
any resistance to appellant's lewd acts.9 The delay in filing the complaint does not in any way
affect Rosita's credibility.10 She was afraid of appellant's threat to her life. The complaint was
filed three months after Rosita told her mother of the incident, and three months is not too
long a period to file a complaint for rape.

Rosita was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the
breadwinner of the family.11 It is hard to believe that Rosita would fabricate a story of
defloration, open herself to public trial and place her family, who depended on her, in a very
humiliating and compromising situation for no reason at all.12 Rosita suffered psychologically
from the incident. Before the rape, she had been working for the Yparraguirres for two
months13 and the spouses actually found her to be a good worker.14 When Rosita returned to
her family, however, she lost her speech and could not perform ordinary daily functions that
she had to seek psychiatric treatment. Indeed, Rosita's psychological condition could not have
been the product of ill-motive and fabrication.

Anent the second assigned error, there is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her
mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, Merlyn Bacaling,
fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the complaint.15 When Merlyn
refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00). Still Merlyn
refused to accept it.16 As pointed out by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the
time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known to
appellant's wife. Mary Ann herself testified that Merlyn told her about it on November 3, 1990,
the day when Mary Ann first offered the money.17 An offer to compromise does not require
that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the
offeror.18 What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative
makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.
G.R. Nos. 115908-09 December 6, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Often glossed over in the emotional arguments against capital punishment is the amplitude of
legal protection accorded to the offender. Ignored by the polemicist are the safeguards
designed to minimally reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the grain of human fault. Indeed,
there is no critique on the plethora of rights enjoyed by the accused regardless of how
ruthlessly he committed the crime. Any margin of judicial error is further addressed by the
grace of executive clemency. But, even before that, all convictions imposing the penalty of
death are automatically reviewed by this Court. The cases at bar, involving two death
sentences, apostrophize for the condemned the role of this ultimate judicial intervention.
Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before the
Regional Trial Court, for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, with rape and kidnapping
with serious illegal detention, respectively punished under Articles 335 and 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. 11640 for Rape:
That on or about the evening of the 21st day of January, 1994, at
Barangay Pulot Center, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of
Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a
knife and by means of deceit, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mia Taha to her damage and
prejudice.1
In Criminal Case No. 11641 for Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention:
That on or about the 22nd day of January, 1994, at Barangay Ipilan,
Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, a
private individual, and being a teacher of the victim, Mia Taha, and by
means of deceit did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap or detained (sic) said Mia Taha, a girl of 17 years old (sic), for a
period of five (5) days thus thereby depriving said Mia Taha of her liberty
against her will and consent and without legal justification, to the
damage and prejudice of said Mia Taha.2
During the arraignment on both indictments, appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges and,
after the pre-trial was terminated, a joint trial of the two cases was conducted by the trial
court.3
According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the
boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is
near the Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw
that the house was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because she
knew that there was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly
grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout. She
was then forced to lie down on the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to
recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the moon and through his voice, as accused-
appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS.
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding
the knife with the other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private
organ inside her private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was her first experience
and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened
because a knife was continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor plead with
appellant not to rape her because he was her teacher and she was afraid of him. She was
threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else she and her family would be killed.
Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with
blood. Appellant walked with her to the gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to the
boarding house where she lived. She did not see where appellant went after she left him at the
gate. When she arrived at her boarding house, she saw her landlady but she did not mention
anything about the incident.
The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house at
Ipilan, Brooke's Point. She likewise did not tell her parents about the incident for fear that
appellant might make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived
at the house of her parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could
accompany him to solicit funds because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her
parents agreed, she was constrained to go with appellant because she did not want her parents
to get into trouble.
Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence, with Mia following
behind appellant, towards the highway where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was
empty except for the driver and the conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because
appellant threatened to kill her if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the
Sunset Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted.
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they staye d for
three days. During the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not
allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked. She was continuously guarded and
constantly raped by appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless,
she was forced to have sex with appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife with
him.
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at
Edward's Subdivision where she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and
locked inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or on January 27, 1994,
they left the place because appellant came to know that complainant had been reported and
indicated as a missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem ** from
whom appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released but only after her parents
agreed to settle the case with appellant.
Immediately thereafter, Mia's parents brought her to the District Hospital at Brooke's Point
where she was examined by Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia who made the following medical findings:
GENERAL: Well developed, nourished, cooperative, walking, conscious,
coherent Filipina.
BREAST: Slightly globular with brown colored areola and nipple.
EXTERNAL EXAM.: Numerous pubic hair, fairly developed labia majora
and minora, hymenal opening stellate in shape, presence of laceration
superficial, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis, approximately 1/2 cm.
length.
INTERNAL EXAM.: Hymenal opening, stellate in shape, laceration noted,
hymenal opening admits 2 fingers with slight resistance, prominent
vaginal rugae, cervix closed.
CONCLUSION: Hymenal opening admits easily 2 fingers with slight
resistance, presence of laceration, longitudinal at the fossa navicularis
approximately 1/2 cm. length. Hymenal opening can admit an average
size penis in erection with laceration.4
Dr. Divinagracia further testified that the hymenal opening was in stellate shape and that there
was a laceration, which shows that complainant had participated in sexual intercourse. On the
basis of the inflicted laceration which was downward at 6 o'clock position, he could not say that
there was force applied because there were no scratches or bruises, but only a week-old
laceration. He also examined the patient bodily but found no sign of bruises or injuries. The
patient told him that she was raped.
During the cross-examination, complainant denied that she wrote the letters marked as
Exhibits "1" and "2"; that she never loved appellant but, on the contrary, she hated him because
of what he did to her; and that she did not notice if there were people near the boarding house
of her cousin. She narrated that when appellant started to remove her panty, she was already
lying down, and that even as appellant was doing this she could not shout because she was
afraid. She could not remember with which hand appellant held the knife. She was completely
silent from the time she was made to lie down, while her panty was being removed, and even
until appellant was able to rape her.
When appellant went to their house the following day, she did not know if he was armed but
there was no threat made on her or her parents. On the contrary, appellant even courteously
asked permission from them in her behalf and so they left the house with appellant walking
ahead of her. When she was brought to the Sunset Garden, she could not refuse because she
was afraid. However, she admitted that at that time, appellant was not pointing a knife at her.
She only saw the cashier of the Sunset Garden but she did not notice if there were other people
inside. She likewise did not ask the appellant why he brought her there.
Complainant described the lock in their room as an ordinary doorknob, similar to that on the
door of the courtroom which, even if locked, could still be opened from the inside, and she
added that there was a sliding lock inside the room. According to her, they stayed at Sunset
Garden for three days and three nights but she never noticed if appellant ever slept because
everytime she woke up, appellant was always beside her. She never saw him close his eyes.
Helen Taha, the mother of complainant, testified that when the latter arrived at their house in
the morning of January 22, 1994, she noticed that Mia appeared weak and her eyes were
swollen. When she asked her daughter if there was anything wrong, the latter merely kept
silent. That afternoon, she allowed Mia to go with appellant because she knew he was her
teacher. However, when Mia and appellant failed to come home at the expected time, she and
her husband, Adjeril, went to look for them at Ipilan. When they could not find them there, she
went to the house of appellant because she was already suspecting that something was wrong,
but appellant's wife told her that he did not come home.
Early the next morning, she and her husband went to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
station at Pulot, Brooke's Point and had the incident recorded in the police blotter. The
following day, they went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) at Puerto
Princess City, then to the police station near the NBI, and finally to the radio station airing the
Radyo ng Bayan program where she made an appeal to appellant to return her daughter. When
she returned home, a certain Naem was waiting there and he informed her that Mia was at
Brooke's Point. He further conveyed appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he could
marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen Taha readily acceded because she wanted to see her
daughter.
In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to
fetch complainant. She testified that when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that she
was raped by appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she did not return within an
hour. Because of this, she immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter was Appellant testified that on January 21, 1994, at around 7:00 P.M., Mia Taha went to his office
examined and then they proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape and asking for help with the monologue that she would be presenting for the Miss PNS contest. He
kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen Taha executed separate sworn statements before the PNP at agreed to meet her at the house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan. However, when he
Brooke's Point. reached the place, the house was dark and he saw Mia waiting for him outside. Accordingly,
they just sat on a bench near the road where there was a lighted electric post and they talked
about the matter she had earlier asked him about. They stayed there for fifteen minutes, after
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the
which complainant returned to her boarding house just across the street while appellant
settlement of the case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three
headed for home some fifteen meters away.
of them, Adjeril, Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where
they met with the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha
subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance in Criminal Case No. 7687 for kidnapping It appears that while complainant was then waiting for appellant, Filomena Pielago, a former
pending in the prosecutor's office, which was sworn to before Prosecutor II Chito S. teacher of Mia at PNS and who was then on her way to a nearby store, saw her sitting on a
Meregillano. Helen Taha testified that she agreed to the settlement because that was what her bench and asked what she was doing there at such a late hour. Complainant merely replied
husband wanted. Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not allowed to graduate. Her that she was waiting for somebody. Filomena proceeded to the store and, along the way, she
father died two months later, supposedly because of what happened. saw Inday Zapanta watering the plants outside the porch of her house. When Filomena Pielago
returned, she saw complainant talking with appellant and she noticed that they were quite
intimate because they were holding hands. This made her suspect that the two could be having
The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.
a relationship. She, therefore, told appellant that his wife had finished her aerobics class and
was already waiting for him. She also advised Mia to go home.
According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in August, 1993 at the Palawan
National School (PNS). Although he did not court her, he fell in love with her because she often
Prior to this incident, Filomena Pielago already used to see them seated on the same bench.
told him "Sir, I love you." What started as a joke later developed into a serious relationship
Filomena further testified that she had tried to talk appellant out of the relationship because
which was kept a secret from everybody else. It was on December 20, 1993 when they first had
his wife had a heart ailment. She also warned Mia Taha, but to no avail. She had likewise told
sexual intercourse as lovers. Appellant was then assigned at the Narra Pilot Elementary School
complainant's grandmother about her activities. At the trial, she identified the handwriting of
at the poblacion because he was the coach of the Palawan delegation for chess. At around 5:00
complainant appearing on the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2", claiming that she is
P.M. of that day, complainant arrived at his quarters allegedly because she missed him, and she
familiar with the same because Mia was her former student. On cross-examination, Filomena
then decided to spend the night there with him.
clarified that when she saw the couple on the night of January 21, 1994, the two were talking
naturally, she did not see Mia crying, nor did it appear as if appellant was pleading with her.
Exactly a month thereafter, specifically in the evening of January 20, 1994, Erna Baradero, a
teacher at the PNS, was looking inside the school building for her husband, who was a security
In the afternoon of the following day, January 22, 1994, appellant met Mia's mother on the
guard of PNS, when she heard voices apparently coming from the Orchids Room. She went
road near their house and she invited him to come up and eat "buko," which invitation he
closer to listen and she heard a girl's voice saying "Mahal na mahal kita, Sir, iwanan mo ang
accepted. Thirty minutes thereafter, complainant told him to ask permission from her mother
iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." Upon hearing this, she immediately opened the door and was
for them to go and solicit funds at the poblacion, and he did so. Before they left, he noticed
startled to see Mia Taha and Danny Godoy holding hands. She asked them what they were
that Mia was carrying a plastic bag and when he asked her about it, she said that it contained
doing there at such an unholy hour but the two, who were obviously caught by surprise, could
her things which she was bringing to her cousin's house. Appellant and Mia went to the
not answer. She then hurriedly closed the door and left. According to this witness, complainant
poblacion where they solicited funds until 6:30 P.M. and then had snacks at the Vic Tan Store.
admitted to her that she was having an affair with appellant. Desirous that such illicit
relationship must be stopped, Erna Baradero informed appellant's wife about it when the latter
arrived from Manila around the first week of February, 1994. Thereafter, complainant told appellant that it was already late and there was no more available
transportation, so she suggested that they just stay at Sunset Garden. Convinced that there
was nothing wrong in that because they already had intimate relations, aside from the fact that
Upon the request of appellant's wife, Erna Baradero executed an affidavit in connection with
Mia had repeatedly told him she would commit suicide should he leave her, appellant was
the present case, but the same was not filed then because of the affidavit of desistance which
prevailed upon to stay at the hotel. Parenthetically, it was complainant who arranged their
was executed and submitted by the parents of complainant. In her sworn statement, later
registration and subsequently paid P400.00 for their bill from the funds they had solicited. That
marked in evidence as Exhibit "7", Erna Baradero alleged that on January 21, 1994, she
evening, however, appellant told complainant at around 9:00 P.M. that he was going out to see
confronted Mia Taha about the latter's indiscretion and reminded her that appellant is a
a certain Bert Dalojo at the latter's residence. In truth, he borrowed a motorcycle from
married man, but complainant retorted, "Ano ang pakialam mo," adding that she loves
Fernando Rubio and went home to Pulot. He did not bring complainant along because she had
appellant very much.
refused to go home.
The following morning, January 23, 1994, appellant went to the house of complainant's parents
and informed them that Mia spent the night at the Sunset Garden. Mia's parents said that they
would just fetch her there, so he went back to Sunset Garden and waited for them outside the
hotel until 5:00 P.M. When they did not arrive, he decided to go with one Isagani Virey, whom
he saw while waiting near the road, and they had a drinking session with Virey's friends.
Thereafter, Virey accompanied him back to Sunset Garden where they proceeded to Mia's
room. Since the room was locked from the inside, Virey had to knock on the door until it was
opened by her.
Once inside, he talked to complainant and asked her what they were doing, but she merely
answered that what she was doing was of her own free will and that at that moment her father
was not supposed to know about it for, otherwise, he would kill her. What complainant did not
know, however, was that appellant had already reported the matter to her parents, although
he opted not to tell her because he did not want to add to her apprehensions. Isagani Virey
further testified that when he saw appellant and complainant on January 23 and 24, 1994, the
couple looked very happy.
Appellant denied that they had sexual intercourse during their entire stay at Sunset Garden,
that is, from January 22 to 24, 1994, because he did not have any idea as to what she really
wanted to prove to him. Appellant knew that what they were doing was wrong but he allegedly
could not avoid Mia because of her threat that she would commit suicide if he left her. Thus,
according to appellant, on January 24, 1994 he asked Isagani Virey to accompany him to the
house of Romy Vallan, a policeman, to report the matter.
Additionally, Virey testified that appellant and Mia went to see him at his aunt's house to ask
for assistance in procuring transportation because, according to appellant, the relatives of Mia
were already looking for them and so they intend to go to Puerto Princesa City. Virey
accompanied them to the house of Romy Vallan, whose wife was a co-teacher of appellant's
wife, but the latter refused to help because of the complicated situation appellant was in.
Nevertheless, Vallan verified from the police station whether a complaint had been filed against
appellant and after finding out that there was none, he told appellant to just consult a certain
Naem who is an "imam." Appellant was able to talk to Naem at Vallan's house that same day
and bared everything about him and Mia. Naem suggested that appellant marry complainant
in Muslim rites but appellant refused because he was already married. It was eventually agreed
that Naem would just mediate in behalf of appellant and make arrangements for a settlement
with Mia's parents. Later that day, Naem went to see the parents of complainant at the latter's
house.
The following day, January 25, 1994, allegedly because complainant could no longer afford to
pay their hotel bills, the couple were constrained to transfer to the house of appellant's friend,
Fernando Rubio, at Edward's Subdivision where they stayed for two days. They just walked
along the national highway from Sunset Garden to Edward's Subdivision which was only five
hundred to seven hundred meters away. The owner of the house, Fernando Rubio, as well as
his brother Benedicto Rubio, testified that the couple were very happy, they were intimate and
sweet to each other, they always ate together, and it was very obvious that they were having
a relationship.
In fact, Fernando Rubio recalled that complainant even called appellant "Papa." While they
were there, she would buy food at the market, help in the cooking, wash clothes, and
sometimes watch television. When Fernando Rubio once asked her why she chose to go with
appellant despite the fact the he was a married man, Mia told him that she really loved
appellant. She never told him, and Fernando Rubio never had the slightest suspicion, that she
was supposed to have been kidnapped as it was later claimed. He also testified that several
police officers lived within their neighborhood and if complainant had really been kidnapped
and detained, she could have easily reported that fact to them. Mia was free to come and go
as she pleased, and the room where they stayed was never locked because the lock had been
destroyed.
On cross-examination, Fernando Rubio declared that appellant was merely an acquaintance of
his; that it was Naem who went to the lodging house to arrange for Mia to go home; that
complainant's mother never went to his house; and that it was Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo
who fetched appellant from the lodging house and brought him to the municipal hall.
Shortly before noon of January 26, 1994, Naem again met with appellant at Edward's
Subdivision and informed him that complainant's parents were willing to talk to him at Naem's
house the next day. The following morning, or on January 27, 1994, appellant was not able to
talk to complainant's parents because they merely sent a child to fetch Mia at Edward's
Subdivision and to tell her that her mother, who was at Naem's house, wanted to see her.
Appellant permitted complainant to go but he told her that within one hour he was be going to
the police station at the municipal hall so that they could settle everything there.
After an hour, while appellant was already on his way out of Edward's Subdivision, he was met
by Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the
police station the whole afternoon but when complainant, her parents and relatives arrived at
around 5:00 P.M., he was not given the chance to talk to any one of them. That afternoon of
January 27, 1994, appellant was no longer allowed to leave and he was detained at the police
station after Mia and her parents lodged a complaint for rape and kidnapping against him.
During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered to appellant on different
occasions two letters from complainant dated February 27, 1994 and March 1, 1994,
respectively. As Mia's teacher, appellant is familiar with and was, therefore, able to identify the
handwriting in said letters as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know, through his
mother, that an affidavit of desistance was reportedly executed by complainants. However, he
claims that he never knew and it was never mentioned to him, not until the day he testified in
court, that his mother paid P30,000.00 to Mia's father because, although he did not dissuade
them, neither did he request his mother to talk to complainants in order to settle the case.
Under cross-examination, appellant denied that he poked a knife at and raped Mia Taha on
January 21, 1994. However, he admitted that he had sex with Mia at the Sunset Garden but
that was already on January 24, 1994. While they were at Edward's Subdivision, they never had
sexual relations. Appellant was told, when complainant visited him in jail, that her father would
kill her if she refused to testify against him, although by the time she testified in court, her
father had already died.
Appellant further testified that complainant has had several illicit relations in the boarding
house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, which was a well-known fact in Pulot. However, he
decided to have a relationship with her because he wanted to change her and that was what
they had agreed upon. Appellant denied that, during the time when they were staying together,
Mia had allegedly asked permission to leave several times but that he refused. On the contrary,
he claimed that on January 27, 1994 when she told him that her parents wanted to see her, he
readily gave her permission to go.
He also identified the clothes that Mia brought with her when they left her parents' house on
January 22, 1994, but which she left behind at the Rubios' lodging house after she failed to
return on January 27, 1994. The bag of clothes was brought to him at the provincial jail by
Benedicto Rubio.
Appellant likewise declared that he had been detained at the provincial jail since January 27,
1994 but the warrant for his arrest was issued only on January 28, 1994; and that he did not
submit a counter-affidavit because according to his former counsel, Atty. Paredes, it was no
longer necessary since the complainants had already executed an affidavit of desistance. He
admits having signed a "Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation" in connection with these
cases.
On rebuttal, Lorna Casantosan, the cousin of Mia Taha, denied that she delivered any letter to
appellant when the latter was still detained at the provincial jail. She admitted, on cross-
examination, that she was requested by Mia Taha to testify for her, although she clarified that
she does not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with appellant.
Mia Taha was again presented on rebuttal and she denied the testimony of Erna Baradero
regarding the incident at the Orchids Room because, according to her, the truth was that she
was at the boarding house of Toto Zapanta on that date and time. She likewise negated the
claim that Erna Baradero confronted her on January 21, 1994 about her alleged relationship
with appellant contending that she did not see her former teacher on that day. Similarly, she
disclaimed having seen and talked to Filemona Pielago on the night of January 21, 1994. She
vehemently disavowed that she and appellant were lovers, much less with intimate relations,
since there never was a time that they became sweethearts.
She sought to rebut, likewise through bare denials, the following testimonies of the defense
witnesses: that she told appellant "iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo;" that she
answered "wala kang pakialam" when Erna Baradero confronted her about her relationship
with appellant; that she was the one who registered them at Sunset Garden and paid for their
bill; that appellant left her at Sunset Garden to go to Ipil on January 22, 1994; that Isagani Virey
came to their room and stayed there for five minutes, because the only other person who went
there was the room boy who served their food; that they went to the house of Virey's aunt
requesting help for transportation; and that she was free to roam around or to go out of the
lodging house at Edward's Subdivision.
Mia Taha also rejected as false the testimony of appellant that she went to see him at Narra,
Palawan to have sex with him and claims that the last time she went to Narra was when she
was still in Grade VI; that she ever told him "I love you, sabik no sabik ako sa iyo" when she
allegedly went to Narra; that she wrote to him, since the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2"
are not hers; that she threatened to commit suicide if appellant would leave her since she never
brought a blade with her; and that at Sunset Garden and at Edward's Subdivison, she was not
being guarded by appellant.
However, on cross-examination, complainant identified her signature on her test paper marked
as Exhibit "4" and admitted that the signature thereon is exactly the same as that appearing on
Exhibits "1" and "2". Then, contradicting her previous disclaimers, she also admitted that the
handwriting on Exhibits "1" and "2" all belong to her.
On sur-rebuttal, Armando Pasion, a provincial guard of the Provincial Jail, Palawan who
volunteered to testify in these cases, identified Lorna Casantosan as the person who visited
appellant in jail on February 27, 1994 at around 4:00 P.M. Since he was on duty at that time,
he asked her what she wanted and she said she would just visit appellant. Pasion then called
appellant and told him he had a visitor. Lorna Casantosan and appellant talked at the visiting
area which is around ten meters away from his post, and then he saw her hand over to
appellant a letter which the latter immediately read. This witness declared that appellant never
requested him to testify.
Another sur-rebuttal witness, Desmond Selga, a jeepney driver, testified that in the afternoon
of January 22, 1994, he was plying his regular route in going to Brooke's Point and, when he
passed by Ipilan, he picked up appellant and Mia Taha. At that time, there were already several
passengers inside his jeepney. The two got off at the poblacion market. He denied that he
brought them to the Sunset Garden.
On May 20, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment5 finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and
sentencing him to the maximum penalty of death in both cases.6 By reason of the nature of the
penalty imposed, these cases were elevated to this Court on automatic review.
The records show that, on the basis of the complaints for rape7 and kidnapping with serious
illegal detention8 filed by Mia Taha and Helen Taha, respectively, the Municipal Trial Court of
Brooke's Point issued a resolution9 on February 4, 1994 finding the existence of a prima
facie case against appellant. On February 10, 1994, the spouses Adjeril Taha and Helen Taha
executed an affidavit of desistance withdrawing the charge of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention.10 However, pursuant to a joint resolution11 issued on March 11, 1994 by Prosecutor
II Reynaldo R. Guayco of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, two separate informations for
rape and for kidnapping with serious illegal detention were nevertheless filed against appellant
Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both charges.
Appellant is now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of the court below, on the
following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant (of) the crime
of rape despite the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
II. The trial court erred by failing to adhere to the doctrine/principle in
reviewing the evidence adduced in a prosecution for the crime of rape
as cited in its decision reiterating the case of People vs. Calixto (193 SCRA
303).
III. The trial court erred in concluding that the accused-appellant had
consummated the crime of rape against private complainant.
IV. The trial court erred by its failure to give any credence to Exhibits "1"
and "2" as evidence of the defense.
V. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
of kidnapping with serious illegal detention as the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
VI. The trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses and completely ignoring the
testimonies of the defense witnesses.
VII. The trial court erred in concluding that there was implied admission
of guilt on the part of the accused-appellant in view of the offer to
compromise.
VIII. The trial court erred in ordering that the complainant be indemnified
in the sum of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for each of the
alleged crimes committed.
IX. The trial court gravely erred by imposing the death penalty for each
of the crimes charged on the accused-appellant despite the fact that the
crimes were allegedly committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 7659.12
A. The Rape Case
A rape charge is a serious matter with pernicious consequences. It exposes both the accused
and the accuser to humiliation, fear and anxieties, not to mention the stigma of shame that
both have to bear for the rest of their
lives.13 By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely
on the credibility of the complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the
participants can testify as to its occurrence. 14 This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that
in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may
raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element,
and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to
carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused
must be acquitted.15
The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of State authority, the accused
is accorded the presumption of innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against
him. Mere accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is the weakness of his defense.
The evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se, strong enough to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.16 In other words, the accused may be convicted on the
basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman, provided such testimony
is clear, positive, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence
presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable
crime, and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an
accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party
accused, though innocent;17 (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where
only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with extreme caution;18 and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.19
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably
convince this Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that
the charge of rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for
redress of an actual wrong.
I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for conviction of the
crime of rape under paragraph (1), Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that the
accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, second, that the same was
accomplished through force or intimidation.
1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant
had sexual congress with complainant against her will. Complainant avers that on the night of
January 21, 1994, she was sexually assaulted by appellant in the boarding house of her cousin,
Merlelyn Casantosan. Appellant, on the other hand, denied such a serious imputation and
contends that on said date and time, he merely talked with complainant outside that house.
We find appellant's version more credible and sustained by the evidence presented and of
record.
According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was
already inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have
known that she was going there on that particular day and at that time, considering that she
does not even live there, unless of course it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful
desires on anybody who happened to come along. But then this would be stretching the
imagination too far, aside from the fact that such a generic intent with an indeterminate victim
was never established nor even intimated by the prosecution.
Moreover, any accord of credit to the complainant's story is precluded by the implausibility
that plagues it as regards the setting of the supposed sexual assault.20 It will be noted that the
place where the alleged crime was committed is not an ordinary residence but a boarding
house where several persons live and where people are expected to come and go. The
prosecution did not even bother to elucidate on whether it was the semestral break or that the
boarding house had remained closed for some time, in order that it could be safely assumed
that nobody was expected to arrive at any given time.
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house
upon the invitation of complainant because the latter requested him to help her with her
monologue for the Miss PNS contest. However, they were not able to go inside the house
because it was locked and there was no light, so they just sat on a bench outside the house and
talked. This testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by defense witness Filomena
Pielago. She affirmed that in the evening of January 21, 1994, she saw both appellant and
complainant seated on a bench outside the boarding house, and that she even advised them
to go home because it was already late and appellant's wife, who was the head teacher of
witness Pielago, was waiting for him at the school building. On rebuttal, complainant could only
deny that she saw Pielago that night. Doctrinally, where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.21
It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove that the accused was at the
scene of the crime are admissible as relevant, on the theory that such presence can be
appreciated as a circumstance tending to identify the appellant.23 Consequently, it is not in
accord with human experience for appellant to have let himself be seen with the complainant
immediately after he had allegedly raped her.24 It thus behooves this Court to reject the notion
that appellant would be so foolhardy as to accompany complainant up to the gate of the house,
considering its strategic location vis-a-vis complainant's boarding house which is just across the
street,25 and the PNS schoolbuilding which is only around thirty meters away.26
Complainant mentioned in her narration that right after the incident she went directly to her
boarding house where she saw her landlady. Yet, the landlady was never presented as a witness
to corroborate the story of complainant, despite the fact that the former was the very first
person she came in contact with from the time appellant allegedly left her at the gate of the
Casantosan boarding house after her alleged traumatic ordeal. Even though they supposedly
did not talk, the landlady could at least have testified on complainant's physical appearance
and to attest to the theorized fact that indeed she saw complainant on said date and hour,
possibly with dishevelled hair, bloody skirt and all.
We are, therefore, justifiedly inclined to believe appellant's version that it was Mia Taha who
invited him to the boarding house to help her with the monologue she was preparing for the
school contest. This is even consonant with her testimony that appellant fetched her the
following day in order to solicit funds for her candidacy in that same school affair.
In contrast, complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding house is vague and
tenuous. At first, she asserted that she was at the boarding house talking with a friend and
then, later, she said it was her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and said that she was
not able to talk to her cousin. Furthermore, she initially stated that on January 21, 1994 at
around 7:00 P.M., she was at the boarding house conversing with her cousin. Then in the course
of her narration, she gave another version and said that when she reached the boarding house
it was dark and there was nobody inside.
The apparent ease with which she changed or adjusted her answers in order to cover up or
realign the same with her prior inconsistent statements is readily apparent from her testimony
even on this single episode, thus:

It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty
Q Sometime on January 21, 1994, at about 7:00
and then appellant openly accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where they
o'clock in the evening, do you remember where
eventually parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the natural tendency of a man to remain
you were?
for long by the side of the woman he had raped,22 and in public in a highly populated area at
that. Given the stealth that accompanies it and the anxiety to end further exposure at the
scene, the logical post-incident impulse of the felon is to distance himself from his victim as far A Yes, sir.
and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery and apprehension. It is to be expected that one
who is guilty of a crime would want to dissociate himself from the person of his victim, the Q Where were you?
scene of the crime, and from all other things and circumstances related to the offense which
could possibly implicate him or give rise to even the slightest suspicion as to his guilt. Verily,
the guilty flee where no man pursueth.
 A I was in the boarding house of Merlylyn A I went to the boarding house of my cousin
Casantosan, Sir. Merlylyn Casantosan. I passed (through) the
kitchen and then when I opened the door
somebody grabbed me suddenly.
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Q Why were you there?

Q During that time were there other people

A I was conversing with my friend there, Sir.
present in that boarding house where you said
Danny Godoy raped you?
COURT:
A None, Sir.
Q Conversing with whom?
COURT:
A With my cousin, Your Honor.
Q So, the house was empty?
Q Your cousin's name?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A Merlylyn Casantosan, Your Honor.
Q I thought your cousin was there and you were
xxx xxx xxx conversing?

PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q You said that this Dane or Danny Godoy raped
you, will you please relate to this Honorable Court
how that rape happened?
A On Friday and it was 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
COURT:
A When I went there she was not there, Your
Honor.27 (Corrections and emphasis supplied.)
2. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation,
specifically by holding a knife to her neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently
established. The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as corroborative of the
prosecution's theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr.
Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that said findings neither support
nor confirm the charge that rape was so committed through forcible means by appellant
against complainant on January 21, 1994.

Q Of what date? The reported hymenal laceration which, according to Dr. Divinagracia, was a week old and
already healed, and the conclusion therefrom that complainant had sexual intercourse with a
A January 21, 1994, Your Honor. man on the date which she alleged, do not establish the supposed rape since the same findings
and conclusion are likewise consistent with appellant's admission that coitus took place with
the consent of complainant at Sunset Garden on January 24, 1994.28 Further, rather than
xxx xxx xxx substantiating the prosecution's aforesaid theory and the supposed date of commission of
rape, the finding that there were no evident signs of extra-genital injuries tends, instead, to
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO: lend more credence to appellant's claim of voluntary coition on a later date and the absence of
a struggle or the lack of employment of physical force.29 In rape of the nature alleged in this
Q Then what happened?
case, we repeat, the testimony of the complainant must be corroborated by physical evidence
showing use of force.30
Thus, on the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6 o'clock position, the
aforesaid medico-legal expert opined that it could not be categorically stated that there was
force involved. On further questioning, he gave a straightforward answer that force was not
applied.31 He also added that when he examined the patient bodily, he did not see any sign of
bruises.32 The absence of any sign of physical violence on the complainant's body is an
indication of complainant's consent to the act.33 While the absence in the medical certificate of
external signs of physical injuries on the victim does not necessarily negate the commission of
rape,34 the instant case is clearly an exception to this rule since appellant has successfully cast
doubt on the veracity of that charge against him.
Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report and the laceration corroborated
complainant's assertion that there was sexual intercourse, of course the same cannot be said
as to the alleged use of force. It has been held that such corroborative evidence is not
considered sufficient, since proof of facts constituting one principal element of the crime is not
corroborative proof of facts necessary to constitute another equally important element of the
crime.35
Complainant testified that she struggled a little but it was not really strong because she was
afraid of appellant. Again assuming that a sexual assault did take place as she claims, we
nevertheless strongly believe that her supposed fear is more imaginary than real. It is evident
that complainant did not use the manifest resistance expected of a woman defending her
honor and chastity.36 She failed to make any outcry when appellant allegedly grabbed her and
dragged her inside the house. There is likewise no evidence on record that she put up a struggle
when appellant forced her to lie on the floor, removed her panty, opened the zipper of his
trousers, and inserted his organ inside her genitals. Neither did she demonstrate that appellant,
in committing the heinous act, subjected her to any force of whatever nature or form.
Complainant's explanation for her failure to shout or struggle is too conveniently general and
ruefully unconvincing to make this Court believe that she tenaciously resisted the alleged sexual
attack on her by appellant. And, if ever she did put up any struggle or objected at all to the
involuntary intercourse, such was not enough to show the kind of resistance expected of a
woman defending her virtue and honor.37 Her failure to do anything while allegedly being raped
renders doubtful her charge of rape,38 especially when we consider the actual mise-en-scene in
the context of her asseverations.
There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress are not essential, and need
not be presented, as they are not indispensable evidence to prove rape.39 We incline to the
view, however, that this general rule holds true only if there exist other corroborative evidence
sufficiently and convincingly proving the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt. The rule should
go the other way where, as in the present case, the testimony of complainant is inherently
weak and no other physical evidence has been presented to bolster the charge of sexual abuse
except for the medical report which, as earlier discussed, even negated the existence of one of
the essential elements of the crime. We cannot, therefore, escape the irresistible conclusion
that the deliberate non-presentation of complainant's blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should
vigorously militate against the prosecution's cause.
II. The conduct of the outraged woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the
utmost importance as tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge. It may well be
doubted whether a conviction for the offense of rape should even be sustained from the
uncorroborated testimony of the woman unless the court is satisfied beyond doubt that her
conduct at the time when the alleged rape was committed and immediately thereafter was
such as might be reasonably expected from her under all the circumstances of the
case. 40
Complainant said that on the day following the supposed rape, appellant went to her parents'
house and asked permission from them to allow her to go with him to solicit funds for her
candidacy. Nowhere throughout her entire testimony did she aver or imply that appellant was
armed and that by reason thereof she was forced to leave with him. In brief, she was neither
threatened nor intimidated by appellant. Her pretense that she was afraid of the supposed
threat previously made by appellant does not inspire belief since appellant was alone and
unarmed on that occasion and there was no showing of any opportunity for him to make good
his threat, even assuming that he had really voiced any. On the contrary, complainant even
admitted that appellant respectfully asked permission from her parents for her to accompany
him.
Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment can only be described as
paradoxical: it was so strangely normal as to be abnormal.41 It seems odd, if not incredible, that
upon seeing the person who had allegedly raped her only the day before, she did not accuse,
revile or denounce him, or show rage, revulsion, and disgust.42 Instead, she meekly went with
appellant despite the presence of her parents and the proximity of neighbors which, if only for
such facts, would naturally have deterred appellant from pursuing any evil design. From her
deportment, it does not appear that the alleged threat made by appellant had instilled any fear
in the mind of complainant. Such a nonchalant, unconcerned attitude is totally at odds with the
demeanor that would naturally be expected of a person who had just suffered the ultimate
invasion of her womanhood.43
III. Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical:
admiration and sympathy for the courageous female publicly seeking retribution for her
outrageous violation, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law
and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities, and deal
with it with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural
tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and
demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and
humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in
mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.44
The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of the trial complainant now advances appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving
court on the credibility of witnesses45 will not apply where the evidence of record fails to subterfuge.
support or substantiate the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions; or where the lower
court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, would affect the
3. According to her, they stayed at Sunset Garden for three days and three nights and that she
outcome of the case; or where the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.46
never noticed if appellant slept because she never saw him close his eyes. Yet, when asked if
she slept side by side with appellant, complainant admitted that everytime she woke up,
The trial court here unfortunately relied solely on the lone testimony of complainant regarding appellant was invariably in bed beside her.51
the January 21, 1994 incident. Indeed, it is easy to allege that one was raped by a man. All that
the victim had to testify to was that appellant poked a knife at her, threatened to kill her if she
4. She alleged that she could never go out of the room because it was always locked and it
shouted and under these threats, undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. The
could not be opened from the inside. But, this was refuted by complainant's own testimony, as
question then that confronts the trial court is whether or not complainant's testimony is
follows:
credible.47 The technique in deciphering testimony is not to solely concentrate on isolated parts
of that testimony. The correct meaning of the testimony can often be ascertained only upon a
perusal of the entire testimony. Everything stated by the witness has to be considered in Q And yet the door could be opened by you from
relation to what else has been stated.48 the inside?

In the case at bar, the challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below A No, Sir, it was locked.
made no serious effort to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence
for the prosecution in spite of the teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony Q Can you describe the lock of that room?
of the offended party must not be accepted with precipitate credulity.49 In finding that the
crime of rape was committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the
testimony of complainant regarding the January 21, 1994 incident and conveniently deleted A It's like that of the door where there is a
the rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we doorknob.
are to consider the other portions of her testimony concerning the events which transpired
thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or declined to ATTY. EBOL:
appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed.
Let it be recorded that the lock is a doorknob and
There are easily perceived or discernible defects in complainant's testimony which inveigh may I ask that the door be locked and opened
against its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered from the inside.
independently of any other, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial court's judgment
of conviction; but assessed and weighed conjointly, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a
powerful compulsion towards reversal of said judgment.50 Thus: COURT:

1. Complainant said that she was continuously raped by herein appellant at the Sunset Garden Alright (sic) you go down the witness stand and
and around three times at Edward's Subdivision. In her sworn statement she made the same find out for yourself if you can open that door
allegations. If this were true, it is inconceivable how the investigating prosecutor could have from the inside.
overlooked these facts with their obvious legal implications and, instead, filed an information
charging appellant with only one count of rape. The incredibility of complainant's CLERK OF COURT:
representations is further magnified by the fact that even the trial court did not believe it, as
may be inferred from its failure to consider this aspect of her testimony, unless we were to
Witness holding the doorknob.
uncharitably assume that it was similarly befuddled.

COURT:
2. She claims that appellant always carried a knife, but it was never explained how she was
threatened with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in
to his innumerable sexual demands. We are not unaware that in rape cases, this claim that
 The key is made to open if you are outside, but as
you're were (sic) inside you can open it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is there no other lock aside from that doorknob
that you held?
A There was, Your Honor.
Q What is that?
A The one that slides, Your Honor.
Q And that is used when you are already inside?
A Yes, Your Honor.52 (Emphases ours.)
5. During their entire stay at the Sunset Garden or even at Edward's Subdivision, beyond
supposedly offering token or futile resistance to the latter's sexual advances, she made no
outcry, no attempt to flee or attract attention to her plight. 53 In her own declaration,
complainant mentioned that when they checked in at Sunset Garden, she saw the cashier at
the information counter where appellant registered. She did not do anything, despite the fact
that appellant at that time was admittedly not armed. She likewise stated that a room boy
usually went to their room and brought them food. If indeed she was bent on fleeing from
appellant, she could have grabbed every possible opportunity to escape. Inexplicably, she did
not. What likewise appears puzzling is the prosecution's failure to present these two people
she mentioned and whose testimonies could have bolstered or corroborated complainant's
story.
6. When appellant fetched complainant in the afternoon of January 22, 1994, they left the
house together and walked in going to the highway. In her own testimony, complainant stated
that appellant went ahead of her. It is highly improbable, if appellant really had evil motives,
that he would be that careless. It is likewise beyond comprehension that appellant was capable
of instilling such fear in complainant that she could not dare take advantage of the situation, in
spite of the laxity of appellant, and run as far away from him as possible despite all the chances
therefor.
7. Helen Taha, the mother of Mia, testified that as a result of the filing of the rape case,
complainant was dropped from school and was not allowed to graduate. This is absurd. Rather
than support and commiserate with the ill-fated victim of rape, it would appear that the school
authorities were heartless people who turned their backs on her and considered her an outcast.
That would be adding insult to injury. But what is more abstruse yet significant is that Mia and
her parents were never heard to complain about this apparent injustice. Such complacency
cannot but make one think and conclude that there must necessarily have been a valid
justification for the drastic action taken by the school and the docile submission thereto by the
Taha family.
On the other hand, in evaluating appellant's testimony, the trial court's decision was replete
with sweeping statements and generalizations. It chose to focus on certain portions of
appellant's testimony, declared them to be preposterous and abnormal, and then hastened to
conclude that appellant is indeed guilty. The court in effect rendered a judgment of conviction
based, not on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, but on the weakness of that of the
defense, which is totally repugnant to the elementary and time-honored rule that conviction
should be made on the basis of strong, clear and compelling evidence of the prosecution.54
IV. The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and complainant were sweethearts.
While the "sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the
case if the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related
except that, as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are
against it. It is not improbable that in some instances, when the relationship is uncovered, the
alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather take the risk of instituting a criminal
action in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to admit
to her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as the records reveal, is precisely what happened to
appellant.
Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible
testimonies of several witnesses for the defense, viz.:
1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and
complainant sitting on a bench in front of the house where the sexual attack allegedly took
place, and the couple were talking intimately. She had warned Mia about the latter's illicit affair
with appellant.
2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and owner of the house at Edward's
Subdivision, testified that he asked Mia why she decided to have an affair with appellant who
is a married man. Mia answered that she really loves him.55 He heard her call appellant
"Papa".56 The couple looked happy and were sweet to each other.57
3. Benedicto Rubio, the younger brother of Fernando, testified on redirect examination that he
asked Mia if she knew what she getting into and she answered, "Yes;" then he asked her if she
really loved Sir Godoy, and she again answered in the affirmative. When he was trying to give
counsel to appellant, complainant announced that if appellant left her, she would commit
suicide.58 He could see that the couple were happy together.59
4. Isagani Virey, who knew appellant because the Municipal Engineering Office where he
worked was located within the premises of PNS, attested that he was able to talk to the couple
and that when he was advising appellant that what he was doing is wrong because he is married
and Mia is his student, complainant reacted by saying that no matter what happened she would
not leave Godoy, and that if she went home her father would kill her.60 He also observed that
they were happy.61
5. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the couple the day before the alleged rape
incident, inside one of the classrooms and they were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell
appellant, "Mahal na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo."62 She tried to
dissuade complainant from continuing with her relationship with appellant.63
The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an intimate relationship with
complainant, which were substantially corroborated by several witnesses, were never
successfully confuted. The rebuttal testimony of complainant merely consisted of bare,
unexplained denials of the positive, definite, consistent and detailed assertions of
appellant.64 Mere denials are self-serving negative evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary
weight greater than the declarations of credible disinterested witnesses.65
Sir, sumulat ako sa inyo dahil gusto kong malaman mo ang situation ko.
Sir, kong mahal mo ako gagawa kang paraan na mailayo ako dito sa
bahay. nalaman ng nanay at tatay ko na delayed ang mens ko ng one
week. pinapainom nila ako ng pampalaglag pero ayaw ko. pagnalaman
nila na hindi ko ininom ang gamot sinasaktan nila ako.
Sir, kong maari ay huwag ng maabutan ng Martes. dahil naabutan nila
akong maglayas sana ako. kaya ngayon hindi ako makalabas ng bahay
kong wala akong kasama, kong gaano sila kahigpit noon doble pa ngayon.
ang mga gamit ko ngayon ay wala sa lalagyan ko. tinago nila hindi ko
makita, ang narito lang ay ang bihisan kong luma. Sir kong manghiram ka
kaya ng motor na gagamitin sa pagkuha sa akin. Sa lunes ng gabi
manonood kami Ng Veta eksakto alas 9:00 ay dapat dito ka sa lugar na
may Veta. tanungin mo lang kay Lorna kong saan ang Veta nila Navoor
Lozot. Mag busina ka lang ng tatlo bilang senyas na lalabas na ako at
huwag kang tatapat ng bahay dahil nandoon ang kuya ko. kong ano ang
disisyon mo maari bang magsulat ka at ipahatid kay Lorna.

Besides, appellant recounted certain facts that only he could have supplied. They were replete
alang-alang sa bata. Baka makainon ako ng gamot dahil baka pagkain ko
with details which could have been known only to him, thereby lending credence and reliability
hahaluan nila.
thereto.66 His assertions are more logical, probable and bear the earmarks of truth. This is not
to say that the testimony of appellant should be accorded full credence. His self-interest must
have colored his account, even on the assumption that he could be trusted to stick to the literal Please sir . . .
truth. Nonetheless, there is much in his version that does not strain the limits of credulity. More
to the point, there is enough to raise doubts that do appear to have some basis in reality.67

Thus, the trial court's hasty pontification that appellant's testimony is improbable, ridiculous,
nonsensical and incredible is highly uncalled for. The rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is
not mandatory. It is not a positive rule of law and is not an inflexible one.68 It does not apply
where there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the testimony and the supposed
inconsistencies arise merely from a desire of the witness to exculpate himself although not
completely.69

Complainant's denial that she and appellant were lovers is belied by the evidence presented by
the defense, the most telling of which are her two handwritten letters, Exhibits "1" and "2",
which she sent to the latter while he was detained at the provincial jail. For analysis and
emphasis, said letters are herein quoted in full:

27 Feb. 94

Dane,

Kumusta kana? Kong ako hito hindi na makatiis sa sakit.

Dane,
I'm sorry kong problem ang ipinadala o sinulat sa iyo sa halip sa
kasiyahan. oo nag usap na tayo nagawa ko lang naman ang sumulat sa
iyo dahil naiinis na ako sa pagmumukha ng mga magulang kong
suwapang. Ang paglayas ko sana ay dahil sa narinig ko. Sir narinig ko na
magreklamo si nanay kay Arquero yong superentende sa Palawan high
tapos ang sabi ay magreklamo itong si Arquero sa DECS para matanggal
ka sa pagtuturo yan ang dahilan kong bakit naisipan kong lumayas ng
wala sa oras at wala akong tensyon na masama laban so iyo. hindi ko
sinabi sa kanila na delayed ako ay sinabi sa iyo ni Eden na sa harap niya
mismo binigyan ako ng gamot samantalang noong Sabado ng gabi lang
nalaman dahil gusto kong masuka. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo,
pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako
sa sulsul nila. hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban ngunit kong
iniisip mong minahal lang kita dahil sa may kailangan lang ako sa iyo
nagkakamali ka. alam ng Diyos na hindi ganon ang hangarin ko sa iyo.
higit pa sa binilanggo ang kalagayan ko kong alam mo. kinukunsinsiya,
nagtitiis na saktan at pagsasakripisyo ng damdamin ko na gusto kang
makita at yakapin ka pero ano ang magagawa ko kong ang paglabas ko
ng bahay ay hindi ako makalabas ng mag isa may guardiya pa. tanungin
mo si Lorna kong ano ginagawa nilang pagbantay sa akin para akong
puganti. hindi ito ayon sa kagustuhan ng mga magulang ko sarili kong
plano ito. Magtitiis pa ba akong hindi makakain maghapon tubig lang ang
laman ng tiyan, kong may masama akong hangarin sa iyo.
Oo, magtiis ako para maipakita kong mahal rin kita. March 2 darating ako
sa bahay na sinasabi mo. hindi ko matiyak kong anong oras dahil kukuha
pa ako ng tiyempo na wala rito ang tatay ko. Alam mo bang pati ang
kapatid kong si Rowena ay inuutusan akong lumayas dahil naawa no siya
sa situation ko. siya lang ang kakampi ko rito sa bahay malaki ang pag-
asa kong makalabas ako ng bahay sa tulong niya.
There is absolutely nothing left to the imagination. The letters eloquently speak for themselves.
It was complainant's handwriting which spilled the beans, so to speak. Aside from appellant,
two other defense witnesses identified the handwriting on the letters as belonging to Mia Taha.
They are Filomena Pielago and Erna Baradero who were admittedly the former teachers of
complainant and highly familiar with her handwriting. The greatest blunder committed by the
trial court was in ignoring the testimonies of these qualified witnesses and refusing to give any
probative value to these two vital pieces of evidence, on the dubious and lame pretext that no
handwriting expert was presented to analyze and evaluate the same.
Well-entrenched by now is the rule that resort to questioned document examiners, more
familiarly called handwriting experts, is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably
useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting.72 This is so since under
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person
write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. The said section
further provides that evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.73
The defense witnesses were able to identify complainant's handwriting on the basis of the
examination papers submitted to them by her in their respective subjects. This Court has
likewise carefully examined and compared the handwriting
L on the letters with the standard
writing appearing on the test papers as specimens o for comparison and, contrary to the
observations and conclusions of the lower court,vwe are convinced beyond doubt that they
were written by one and the same person. More importantly,
e complainant herself categorically
admitted that the handwriting on the questioned letters
y belongs to her.
o
u
It is, therefore, extremely disconcerting, to say the least, why the trial court again chose to turn
a deaf ear to this conclusive portion of complainant's testimony:
(
S
ATTY. EBOL:
g
d
.
Q Did I get you right on rebuttal that Mrs. Erna A What subject is that?
Baradero and Filomena Pielago were your
teachers?
Q I am just asking you whether you are familiar
with that.
A Yes, sir.
A I cannot remember if I have this kind of subject,
Q And they have been your teachers for several sir.
months before this incident of January 21, 1994,
am I not correct?
Q How about this signature Mia Taha, are you not
familiar with that signature?
A That is true, sir.
A That is min(e), sir.
Q And you have (sic) during these past months
that they have been your teachers you took
Q I will show you Exhibit "4-C" which appears to
examinations in their classes in their particular
be that in Math, are you familiar with that
subject(s)?
signature?

A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.

Q And some of those test papers are in the

Q That is your signature?
possession of your teachers, am I correct?

A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.

Q In fact, these letters in alphabet here are in your

Q I will show you Exhibit "4" previously marked as
own handwriting?
Exhibit "4", it appears to be your test paper and
with your signature and the alphabet appears in
this exhibit appears to be that of Mia Taha, please A Yes, sir.
examine this and tell the Honorable Court if that is
your test paper? xxx xxx xxx

A Yes, sir. Q You will deny this Exhibit "1" your signature?

Q That signature Mia Taha I understand is also xxx xxx xxx

your signature?

Q You will deny that this is your handwriting?

A Yes, sir.

A That is my handwriting, sir.

Q I will show you Exhibit "4-A", will you please
examine this Exhibit "4-A" and tell this Honorable
Court if you are familiar with that. Q Also Exhibit "2"?
 A Yes, sir.74 In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most
probably written out of desperation and exasperation with the way she was being treated by
her parents, complainant threw all caution to the winds when she wrote: "Oo, aaminin ko
While rebuttal witness Lorna Casantosan insisted that she never delivered any letter of
nagkasala ako sa iyo, pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako
complainant to herein appellant, the witness presented by the defense on sur-rebuttal,
sa sulsul nila, hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban," obviously referring to her
Armando Pasion, who was the guard on duty at the provincial jail at that time, testified of his
ineptitude and impotence in helping appellant out of his predicament. It could, therefore, be
own accord because he knew that what Casantosan said was a blatant lie. Appellant never
safely presumed that the rape charge was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents
talked to Amando Pasion nor requested him to testify for the defense, as related by the witness
of the intimate relationship between her and appellant. In order to avoid retribution from her
himself. Hence, there exists no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the testimony of witness
parents, together with the moral pressure exerted upon her by her mother, she was forced to
Pasion to the effect that Lorna Casantosan actually went to visit appellant in jail and in truth
concoct her account of the alleged rape.
handed to him what turned out to be the letters marked as Exhibits "1" and "2" for the defense.

The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies
V. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an
are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that
admission of guilt. This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer
their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their
of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal
character humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be that complainant's mother
maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter
wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort
of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be
to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural
entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the
community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.
accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would
justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his Although the trial court did observe that a mother would not sacrifice her daughter to tell a
guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.75 story of defloration, that is not always the case as this Court has noted a long time ago. The
books disclose too many instances of false charges of rape.81 While this Court has, in numerous
cases, affirmed the judgments of conviction rendered by trial courts in rape charges, especially
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves
where the offended parties were very young and presumptively had no ill motives to concoct
appellant's innocence of the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not
a story just to secure indictments for a crime as grave as rape, the Court has likewise reversed
come from appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim
judgments of conviction and acquitted the accused when there are strong indications pointing
leader and who likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he
to the possibility that the rape charges were merely motivated by some factors except the truth
could marry complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was first made to appellant, he
as to their commission.82 This is a case in point. The Court, therefore, cannot abdicate its duty
declined because of the fact that he was already married. On top of these, appellant did not
to declare that the prosecution has failed to meet the exacting test of moral certainty and proof
know, not until the trial proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of
of guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the
negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was
never present in any of said meetings.76 This is not to say that the Court approves of the conduct of appellant. Indisputably, he took
advantage of complainant's feelings for him and breached his vow of fidelity to his wife. As her
teacher, he should have acted as adviser and counselor to complainant and helped her develop
It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary
in manners and virtue instead of corrupting her.83 Hence, even as he is freed from physical
consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the
detention in a prison as an instrument of human justice, he remains in the spiritual confinement
prosecution.77 In another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from
of his conscience as a measure of divine retribution. Additionally, these ruminations do not rule
the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in
out such other legal options against him as may be available in the arsenal of statutory law.
any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established
tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further
deterioration of the relations between the parties.78 VII. The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young
Filipina will not charge a person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally
disregarded the more paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed
VI. Generally, an affidavit of desistance by the complainant is not looked upon with favor. It
innocent until proven otherwise.
may, however, create serious doubts as to the liability of appellant, especially if it corroborates
appellant's explanation about the filing of criminal charges.79
It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved.
Sometimes the presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and
the other his innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each presumption
and determine what logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and then determine
which should be regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the other. It must,
however, be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating guilt does not in itself
destroy the presumption against innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with
all of the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until
the defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.84
The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been explained in this wise:
In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of the
complaining witness, on the theory that she will not choose to accuse
her attacker at all and subject herself to the stigma and indignities her
accusation will entail unless she is telling the truth. The rape victim who
decides to speak up exposes herself as a woman whose virtue has been
not only violated but also irreparably sullied. In the eyes of a narrow-
minded society, she becomes a cheapened woman, never mind that she
did not submit to her humiliation and has in fact denounced her
assailant. At the trial, she will be the object of lascivious curiosity. People
will want to be titillated by the intimate details of her violation. She will
squirm through her testimony as she describes how her honor was
defiled, relating every embarrassing movement of the intrusion upon the
most private parts of her body. Most frequently, the defense will argue
that she was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the sexual act.
Her motives will be impugned. Her chastity will be challenged and
maligned. Whatever the outcome of the case, she will remain a tainted
woman, a pariah because her purity has been lost, albeit through no fault
of hers. This is why many a rape victim chooses instead to keep quiet,
suppressing her helpless indignation rather than denouncing her
attacker. This is also the reason why, if a woman decides instead to come
out openly and point to her assailant, courts
are prone to believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its
consequences. . . .85
The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of
justice, and is not a mere form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere
suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact
that he had the opportunity to do so.86 Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would
otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People and all
the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and
influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be
proved beyond the whisper of a doubt.87 This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in
evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt
when it is possible to do so.88
On the basis of the foregoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in conjunction with the
overwhelming evidence in favor of herein appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in
concluding that the constitutional presumption on the innocence of an accused must prevail in
this particular indictment.
B. The Kidnapping/Illegal Detention Case
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of
the malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty.89 In the present charge for that
crime, such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact
that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted,
several grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and
cast serious doubts on the guilt of appellant, as hereunder explained:
To recall, complainant testified that appellant by himself went to fetch her at her parents'
house the day after the alleged rape incident. In her own words, appellant courteously asked
her parents to permit her to help him solicit contributions for her candidacy. When they left
the house, appellant walked ahead of her, obviously with her parents and their neighbors
witnessing their departure. It is difficult to comprehend how one could deduce from these
normal and innocuous arrangement any felonious intent of appellant to deprive complainant
of her liberty. One will look in vain for a case where a kidnapping was committed under such
inauspicious circumstances as described by complainant.
Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha family, complainant was bringing
with her a plastic bag which later turned out to contain her clothes. This bag was left behind by
Mia at Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore noted, and was later delivered to appellant by
Benedicto Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim
was first allowed to prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was merely leaving for a pleasant
sojourn with the criminal, all these with the knowledge and consent of her parents who
passively looked on without comment.
Complainant alleged that appellant always kept her locked inside the room which they
occupied, whether at Sunset Garden or at Edward's Subdivision, and that she could not unlock
the door from the inside. We must, however, recall that when she was asked on cross-
examination about the kind of lock that was used, she pointed to the doorknob of the
courtroom. The court then ordered that the door of the courtroom be locked and then asked
complainant to open it from the inside. She was easily able to do so and, in fact, she admitted
that the two locks in the room at Sunset Garden could also be opened from the inside in the
same manner. This demonstrably undeniable fact was never assailed by the prosecution. It also
failed to rebut the testimony of Fernando Rubio that the room which was occupied by the
couple at Edward's Subdivision could not even be locked because the lock thereof was broken.
When the couple transferred to Edward's Subdivision, they walked along the national highway
in broad daylight. Complainant, therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek the help
of other people and free herself from appellant if it were true that she was forcibly kidnapped
and abused by the latter.90 In fact, several opportunities to do so had presented themselves
from the time they left complainant's home and during their extended stay in the hotel and in
the lodging house.
According to appellant, he went to see the parents of complainant the day after they went to
Sunset Garden to inform them that Mia spent the night in said place. This was neither denied
nor impugned by Helen Taha, her husband, or any other person. On the other hand, the
allegation of Helen Taha that she made a report to the police about her missing daughter was
not supported by any corroborative evidence, such as the police blotter, nor was the police
officer to whom she allegedly reported the incident ever identified or presented in court.
We agree with appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his
part for the commission of the crime charged. In one case, this Court rejected the kidnapping
charge where there was not the slightest hint of a motive for the crime.91 It is true that, as a
rule, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and, not being an element of a
crime, it does not have to be proved.92 Where, however, the evidence is weak, without any
motive being disclosed by the evidence, the guilt of the accused becomes open to a reasonable
doubt and, hence, an acquittal is in order.93 Nowhere in the testimony of either the
complainant or her mother can any ill motive of a criminal nature be reasonably drawn. What
actually transpired was an elopement or a lovers' tryst, immoral though it may be.
As a closing note, we are bewildered by the trial court's refusal to admit in evidence the bag of
clothes belonging to complainant which was presented and duly identified by the defense, on
its announced supposition that the clothes could have easily been bought from a department
store. Such preposterous reasoning founded on a mere surmise or speculation, aside from the
fact that on rebuttal the prosecution did not even seek to elicit an explanation or clarification
from complainant about said clothes, strengthens and reinforces our impression of an
apparently whimsical exercise of discretion by the court below. Matters which could have been
easily verified were thus cavalierly dismissed and supplanted by a conjecture, and on such
inferential basis a conclusion was then drawn by said court.
We accordingly deem it necessary to reiterate an early and highly regarded disquisition of this
Court against the practice of excluding evidence in the erroneous manner adopted by the trial
court:
not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the
attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the
testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will
be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat
of the battle over which he presides, a judge of first instance may
possibly fall into error in judging the relevancy of proof where a fair and
logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the
proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often
finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the
error without returning the case for a new trial, a step which this court
is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof
in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality,
or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant,
because the trial judge is supposed to know the law and it is its duty,
upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and
material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and
the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court
then has all the materials before it necessary to make a correct
judgment.94
At any rate, despite that procedural lapse, we find in the records of these cases sufficient and
substantial evidence which warrant and demand the acquittal of appellant. Apropos thereto,
we take this opportunity to repeat this age-old observation and experience of mankind on the
penological and societal effect of capital punishment: If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if
injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment.
Finally, we are constrained to reiterate here that Republic Act No. 7659 which reimposed the
death penalty on certain heinous crimes took effect on December 31, 1993, that is, fifteen days
after its publication in the December 16, 1993 issues of the Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star,
Malaya and Philippine Times Journal,95 and not on January 1, 1994 as is sometimes
misinterpreted.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-
appellant Danny Godoy is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious
illegal detention charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640 and 11641 of the Regional Trial Court
for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 49. It is hereby ORDERED that he be released
forthwith, unless he is otherwise detained for any other valid cause.

SO ORDERED.
It has been observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously
administered where trivial objections to the admission of proof are
received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful
objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the
questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for
a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the
proof, to know with any certainty whether the testimony is relevant or