DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

NAME OF THE PROJECT TOPIC

CONTRIBUTORY AND COMPOSITE NEGLIGENCE

SUBJECT
LAW OF TORTS

NAME OF THE FACULTY

Prof. SUNEETHA BVS

NAME OF THE STUDENT: SHIVANSH PAMNANI

REGD NO: 2019LLB121
SECTION: B
1ST SEMESTER
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Firstly, I would like to be extremely grateful to my History teacher, Prof. SUNEETHA BVS for
giving me an opportunity to do this project. I will be forever indebted to him lending his
extraordinary support during the process of making the project. I would also like to thank my
friends and family for encouraging me, thus helping me complete the project in a limited time
frame.
I would also like to thank DSNLU for providing all necessary resources and a suitable
workplace, thus helping me come up with a satisfactory project.

.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION:- .................................................................................................................................. 3
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ......................................................................................................... 6
HISTORY ................................................................................................................................................. 8
GENERAL PRINCIPLES ........................................................................................................................ 9
THE LAST OPPORTUNITY RULE...................................................................................................... 10
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF CHILDREN ............................................................................ 13
SOME “RECENT” CASES: ................................................................................................................... 14
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................... 17
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................... 19

INTRODUCTION:-
Contributory Negligence is the concept that the defendant did something that caused more
damage than would ordinarily have occurred due to the plaintiff’s negligence, or that the
defendant did not do something that could have mitigated the damage caused by the plaintiff’s
negligence. The purpose of contributory negligence is to reduce the damages ordered by the
court by the rough proportion of negligence “owned” by the defendant, so as to discourage
people from acting negligently in general, and to prevent the defendant from gaining a
“windfall” that was partly caused by their own negligence. Whereas Composite negligence refers
to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of
negligence on the part of two or more wrong doers, it is said that the person was injured on the
account of the composite negligence of those wrong-doers.

In this project, we will completely cover the concepts of Contributory Negligence and Composite
Negligence all its aspects, rules, case laws will be studied.

OBJECT OF THE STUDY:-

 To completely understand the terms Contributory Negligence and Composite Negligence.
 To study different case laws related to Contributory Negligence and Composite
Negligence.
 To substantiate and elaborate the concepts.
 To differentiate between the concepts Contributory Negligence and Composite
Negligence.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY:-

 The study is limited to the concepts of Contributory and Composite negligence, its
important case laws related to it.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY:-

 The study helps us to understand the concepts of Contributory Negligence and Composite
Negligence in Law of Torts. It also helps us to study different case law by which the
concept has been evolved.
LITERATURE REVIEW:-

 The Researcher has taken information from various Books, Web sources, Articles,
Journals and Case laws.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:-

 The study is based on the doctrinal method of research.

TYPES OF RESEARCH:-

 This Research is critical, explanatory Study.

RESEARCH QUESTION:-

 What are the elements to constitute Contributory negligence and composite negligence?
 How far is contributory negligence a defence?
 What is the rule of Last Opportunity in Contributory negligence?
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

The negligence of a person which, while not being the primary cause of a tort, nevertheless
combined with the act or omission of the primary defendant to cause the tort, and without which
the tort would not have occurred.

Contributory negligence is a common law defense to a claim based on

negligence, an action in tort. It applies to cases where a plaintiff has, through his own negligence,
contributed to the harm he suffered. For example, a pedestrian crosses a road negligently and is
hit by a driver who was driving negligently.

Contributory negligence differs from contribution, which is a claim brought by one tortfeasor
against another to recover some or all of the money damages awarded to the plaintiff.

Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945:

Section 1
(1) “Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and
partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be
defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable
in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent a1s the court thinks just and equitable having
regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage ....”

This small sub-section provides for many things:

(1) “... suffers damage as the result ...”. This provides that in order for the claimant’s acts or
omissions to entitle the court to make a reduction, those acts or omissions must have been part of
the cause of the damage. A claimant's careless or unlawful behaviour, however reckless or
heinous, which does not cause the damage claimed for cannot be the basis for areduction in his
damages.

1
Rural transport service v. Bezlum Bibi AIR 1980 Cal 165, 84 CWN 616
(2) “... partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other ...”. Thisprovides that in order
for the claimant’s conduct to result in a reduction of hisdamages, that conduct must be “partly”
the cause of the damage. If it is thesole cause, then there is no causation between the defendant’s
wrongfulconduct and the damage sustained and the claim fails.

(3) “... fault ...”. This is defined in Section 4 of the Act as meaning “negligence, breach of
statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort or would, apart from
this Act, give rise to the defence of contributory negligence”. It includes carelessness, breach of
statutory duty, including strict liability. It includes intentional acts (such as assault/battery
(Murphy v Culhane[1977] QB 94 (CA)) and suicide (Reeves v Commissioner of the
Metropolitan Police [2000] 1 AC 360). It includes strict liability under the Animals Act 1971 and
under Part 1 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. It includes vicarious liability (liability for the
fault ofanother). It includes breach of contract if the contractual duty was coextensive with a
coexistent but independent common law duty of care –FirsikringsaktieselskapetVesta v Butcher

(4) “... a claim shall not be defeated ...”. This abolishes the position at common law where
contributory negligence was a complete (all or nothing) defence and any negligence of the
plaintiff (however slight) afforded a complete defence if it was part, even a small part, of the
cause of the damage.

(5) “... the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage ...”. This provides that the
reduction is to reflect the extent to which each party is “responsible” for the damage.
“Responsibility” refers to more than mere causal responsibility; it includes the amount of blame
that attaches to the conduct. The more blameworthy the conduct, then the greater the share of the
responsibility.

(6) “... just and equitable ...”. Provided that both the claimant’s and defendant’s fault were each
responsible for the damage, the deduction is to be what is just and equitable. What is just and
equitable may reflect considerations other than the causative potency or blameworthiness of the
fault. For instance in Russell v Smith [2003] EWHC 2060 (QB), 147 Sol Jo LB 1118, because
the 10 year old cyclist was a vulnerable road user it was just and equitable to reduce his damages
by only 50% instead of the 75% which reflected his share of the blame.

HISTORY
The doctrine of contributory negligence was dominant in U.S. jurisprudence in the 19th and 20th
century. The English case Butterfield v. Forrester is generally recognized as the first appearance,
although ironically in this case the judge found the victim to be the sole proximate cause of the
injury.

A generation ago, tort law's majority approach to treating negligence by plaintiffs changed from
the contributory negligence doctrine to various comparative negligence doctrines. Almost all of
the courts that made the change adopted the pure form of comparative negligence. Where
legislatures made the change, the vast majority chose modified forms of the doctrine. This
Article shows that legal scholars had argued strongly in favor of the pure form. It also uses a
hypothetical form of modified comparative negligence (“symmetrical” or “balanced”) to show
that the forms of modified comparative negligence actually adopted fail to remedy the unfairness
they ostensibly were designed to address

To help understand contemporary tort reform debates, the Article seeks to explain the
discrepancies between scholarly recommendations and legislative actions and between the stated
goals of legislation and the actual statutory systems adopted. It suggests that scholarly articles
unwisely used extreme examples to illustrate the flaws of the contributory negligence doctrine.
Partial remedies, such as the modified forms of comparative fault, can redress the problems
shown in extreme examples. The use of extreme examples may pave the way for weak societal

responses, particularly if legislatures are motivated to resist full-scale reform. Another

fundamental framing issue was treatment of payments by defendants and loss-bearing by
plaintiffs as different, even though they are each examples of allocation of losses related to
accidental injuries. Treating plaintiffs and defendants differently (as the modified comparative
negligence systems do) was facilitated by this fundamentally illogical world view.

Historically the doctrine grew out of distrust of juries, which have usually been more
sympathetic to plaintiffs in personal injury lawsuits. The policy of not apportioning liability
between parties to lawsuits (that is, charging each with some fraction of the blame) also
encouraged the doctrine.

Contributory negligence should be distinguished from several other doctrines often applied in
negligence cases: assumption of risk, which relieves the defendant of an obligation of due care
toward the plaintiff when the latter voluntarily exposes himself to certain dangers; last clear
chance, which allows the plaintiff to recover even though contributorily negligent—if the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap.

Contributory negligence is criticized by some authorities because it excuses one party

(defendant) even though both were negligent. One solution is loss apportionment—charging both
parties when both were at fault. This practice operates in maritime law in Canada and Australia
and in most civil-law countries (e.g., France and Germany).

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
In trying claim arising out of death or injury caused by negligence, the court may be faced with a
situation where both the parties were negligent in some respect. The court is then to decide as to
whose negligence caused the death or injury. There are three possible answers to such an query
depending upon the circumstances of the case.

I. The defendant’s negligence alone caused the injury.

II. The deceased’s or the plaintiff’s negligence was solely responsible the injury.
III. The negligence of both the parties caused the injury.

It is obvious that if the finding is that the defendant’s negligence alone caused the death or
injury, then the plaintiff would succeed even if the plaintiff or the deceased was negligent in
some respect. Similarly, if there is no difficulty in holding that the plaintiff will fail if the
deceased’s or his negligence was solely responsible for the injury, as the case maybe even if
defendant was in some respect was negligent. In the third case, where the negligence of both the
parties caused the death or injury, the common law rule was that the plaintiff was to fail even if
the defendant was more at fault. In other words, if the deceased’s negligence contributed in some
degree to the death or injury, the defendant succeeded by pleading contributory negligence
irrespective of the fact that death or injury was largely caused by the defendant’s negligence. The
defence of contributory negligence means that the defendant or the plaintiff failed to take the
reasonable care of his own safety which was a material contributory to his injury.2As the defence
enabled the defendant to escape completely even when he was more at fault, the courts were
slow to infer that the negligence of the plaintiff was a contributory factor.

THE LAST OPPORTUNITY RULE

The Courts devised the Last Opportunity Rule which meant that if the defendant had the last
opportunity to avoid the accident resulting in injury he was held solely responsible for the injury
in spite of the fact that the plaintiff was also negligent.3This rule was further extended to cover
cases of constructive last opportunity.4 A more rational approach was made in cases involving
maritime collisions where the courts had the opportunity apportioning the damages under the
Maritime Conventions Act, 1911. In Admiralty Commissioners v. S.S volute 5 a collision had
occurred between merchant ship volute and the destroyer Radstock.

2
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v LaxmanIyer,(2003) 8 SCC 731, p. 737.
3
Davies v. Mann : (1842) 10 M7W 546 : 62 RR 698 is often referred to as the originator of the rule though the
words ‘last opportunity’ do not occur there. The plaintiff in this case fettered the forefeet of his donkey and turned it
into a narrow lane. It was run over by a heavy wagon not properly looked after longing to the defendant. The wagon
was going a little too fast and was not properly looked after by the driver. In suit for damages, the plaintiff
succeeded as the defendant by using ordinary care could have avoided the accident even though the plaintiff was
also at fault in turning the donkey into the lane with its forefeet fettered.
4
British Columbia Electric Ry. V. Loach (1916) 1 AC 719
5
(1922) 1 AC 129:38 TLR 255:126 LT 425:66 SJ 156 (HL). The Maritime Conventions Act, 1911, applies to India.
Under this act where by the fault of two or more vessels, damage or loss is caused to one or more of them, to their
cargoes, or freight or to any property on board, the liability to make good the damage or loss shall be in proportion
to the degree in which each vessel was in fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally. Where loss of life or
personal injuries are suffered by any person on board of a vessel owing to the fault of that vessel and any other
vessels or vessel, the liability of the owner of the vessels shall be joint and several subject to any defence which
could have been pleaded to an action for the death or personal injury inflicted.
The volute was at fault in changing her course without giving any proper signal and the Radstock
was at fault in increasing speed although she had the knowledge of the danger caused by the
change of course of Volute. It was held that both the ships were responsible for the collision even
though the last opportunity for avoiding the accident was with the Radstock. The decision in the
case of Volute was followed by the HOUSE OF LORDS in a non-maritime collision case and
was regarded as one of general application.6 In this case a crossroad collision between car and a
motorcycle was occurred. Who was negligent in this action was not clear. The HOUSE OF
LORDS held that that it was a sufficient direction. The defendant in this case while driving the
car at about thirty miles an hour along a main road, approached a point in the road without
keeping a proper look out or slowing down where it was crossed by a side road, when a man
driving a motorcycle came into the road into the side road without warning and a collision
occurred in which the motor cyclist was killed. In a suit for the the damages filed by the widow
of the deceased, the defendant was not held liable under the common rule as the deceased was
also negligent. The case lays down that where the negligence of parties is contemporaneous as so
nearly contemporaneous as to make it impossible to say that either could have avoided the
consequences of others negligence, it would be said that negligence of both contributed to the
accident. Had it been a case of maritime collision the court could have apportioned the damages
as in case of Volute. But the question of contributory negligence has all cases to be decided on
same principles.

The common law rule is that if the plaintiff’s or the deceased’s (in case of death) negligence
contributed in some degree to the injury or death, the action failed, was illogical and its origin
lay possibly in procedural and pleading anomalies of the common law.7The Madhya Pradesh
case of Vidya Devi contains an elaborate discussion why the principle of English Act should be
followed in India even though there is no corresponding act in India.8The Supreme Court without

6
American Main Line Ltd. V. Afrika, AIR 1937 PC 168
7
LORD WRIGHT, 13 Modern Law Review 5; Vidyadevi v. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation,1974 ACJ 374 (MP)
89
8
Vidyadevi v. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation, supra : In this case there was a collision between a bus
and a motorcycle at a road intersection when the bus was going on the main road and the motorcycle came
from a side road. The person riding the motor cycle was killed. In a claim for damages by the widow and the
any reference to the English act, has held that “it is now well settled that in case of contributory
negligence, courts have the power to apportion the loss between the parties as seems just and
equitable.

In Municipal corporation grater Bombay v. LaxmanIyer9, the deceased who was riding a bicycle
came from the left side and took right turn contrary to traffic regulations. At that time he was hit
by corporation bus which was running at a moderate speed and the deceased was visible from a
distance of 30 feet. It was found that the deceased was negligent in taking a wrong turn contrary
to traffic regulations and the bus driver was negligent in not stopping the bus by quickly applying
the brakes and in omitting to blow the horn. The deceased’s negligence was held to have 25%
contributed to the damage and the compensation was reduced to that extent.

The act applies when the plaintiff’s act contributes to the ‘the damage’ and not
necessarily to the accident which results in damage although in most of the cases it would be so.
Thus the damage would be reduced if a motorcyclist involved in an accident and suffering a
head injury did not wear a crash helmet.10 It may be noticed that a omission to wear a helmet is
not negligence contributing to the accident but only to the damage suffered in the accident. This
example also illustrates that for being responsible for contributory negligence the plaintiff need
not be in breach of duty to the defendant. The question simply is whether the plaintiff or the
deceased had failed to take reasonable care of his own safety which had contributed to the
damage.11As observed by BALAKRISHNAN, J. “Negligence ordinarily means breach of a legal
duty to care, but when used in expression contributory negligence it does not mean breach of any
duty. It only means the failure by a person to use reasonable care for the safety of himself or his
property, so that he becomes the ‘author of his own wrong’”

children it was found that the bus driver was negligent in not having a proper look out while approaching
the intersection and the deceased was negligent as he was driving at excessive speed while coming from the
side road to the intersection.It was further held that negligen ce of both the parties was liable for the
accident but the motorcyclist was far more to blame than the bus driver. The responsibility was apportioned
in form of two-third and one-third.

9
(2003) 8 SCC 731
10
Oconell v. Jackson, (1972) 1 QB 270 : (1971) 3 A11 ER 129; (Damages were reduces by fifteen percent)
11
SushmaMitra v. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation, 1974 ACJ 87 (MP) pp, 92, 95
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF CHILDREN
The rule as to contributory negligence is not inflexibly applied in cases where young children are
concerned. Allowance is made for their inexperience and infirmity of judgement.12 The correct
principle is that the children do not form a separate category either for deciding whether the
defendant any duty to the child plaintiff and was guilty of negligence being in breach of that
duty, or for deciding whether the child plaintiff was guilty of negligence, but in deciding both
these questions, the age of the child plaintiff and the experience and the intelligence of ordinary
children of that age are to be taken into account with other relevant information. The madras
High Court had held that the children capable of discrimination and perceiving danger can be
guilty of contributory negligence. In this case a girl of seven years was knocked down by an
engine while she was crossing the railway track after passing through a wicket gate. It was held
that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the girl as she was old enough in
apportioning the danger.13 But a child of six, standing near a footpath when knocked down by a
lorry14 and the child of same age when knocked down by a motor vehicle while trying to cross a
road15 will not be held guilty of contributory negligence for the children of that age do not have
adequate road sense. Similarly, a child of four years was not held guilty of contributory
negligence in accepting a ride on motor cycle driven by his uncle with another person sitting on
pillion.16

By an untrue statement a boy aged nine years who was accompanied by his brother aged
seven, prevailed on an employee of the defendant company to sell him a small quantity of petrol.
The children wanted the petrol for use in a game in which they enacted a Red Indian scene they
had witnessed a cinematograph theatre. In the result, the boy was seriously burned. It was held
that a Privy Council that the defendants having an explosive substance to a boy who had limited
knowledge of the likelihood of an explosion and its possible effect, and the boy having done that
which a child of his age might be expected to do, the defendants could not avail themselves of

12
Lynch v. Nurdin, (1841) 1 QB 29 : 5 Jur 797 : 55 RR 191
13
M. & S.M. Railway company ltd. V. Jayammal,(1942) ILR 48 MAD 417
14
R. Srinivasa v. K.M Parsivamurthy, AIR 1976 Karnataka 92.
15
Motias Costa v. RoqueAugustihnojacinto
16
M.P. State Road transport corporation v. Abdul Rahman, Supra
the defence of contributory negligence, that the employee’s negligence contributed to cause
injuries suffered by the boy and that they were liable.17

SOME “RECENT” CASES:

Parker v PFC Flooring Supplies Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1533

C was second in command to his father in his family’s small business and shortly due to take
charge. An employee told him that some cable was hanging from the roof so C went to
investigate. The employee warned C against going onto the roof but C did so, despite wearing
leather soled boots and knowing it was slippery. He slipped and fell through a skylight. The
judge found that D was in breach of Reg 13 of the Workplace Regs (duty to prevent falls so far
as reasonably practicable) as it was foreseeable that employees would gain access to the roof and
yet it was not prevented or forbidden.
However, C was equally to blame. 50% reduction. Appeal dismissed.

Boyce v Wyatt Engineering (2001) Times 14.6.2001

C was up scaffolding when his boss called him by mobile phone. In order to get better reception,
the claimant climbed an unsecured ladder which then fell away. He sued under the Construction
Regs. At the defendants’ invitation, the trial judge dismissed the claim at half time (end of the
claimant’s case) on the ground that the accident was entirely C’s own fault. The Court of Appeal
allowed the claimant’s appeal, not only on the basis that dismissing cases at half time was wrong
in principle (as the defendant had not been put to an election as to whether to call any evidence)
but also on the basis that the evidence before the judge disclosed that the defendant was in
breach of absolute and non-delegable statutory duties (to provide a safe place of work and to
prevent falls) which, if not breached, would have prevented the accident. Therefore, the
Defendant must bare a share of the responsibility. The matter was remitted for retrial by a
different judge.

Nixon v Chanceoption Developments Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 558

17
Yachuk v. Oliver Blais, (1949) AC 386 : (1949) 2 A11 ER 150 : 65 TLR 300
C fell from a scaffold in high winds. The trial judge found that he should never have gone onto
the scaffold in high wind and that he was the cause of his own misfortune. Again the Court of
Appeal found that as there were clear breaches of the Construction Regs in relation to the
absence of guard rails, the defendant had to be held responsible for the damage. Furthermore, the
Court found that a claimant could not be found be guilty of contributory negligence simply for
doing his job as he was told. No contributory negligence.

Young v The Post Office [2002] EWCA Civ 661

A stress claim. New computers were introduced which C was required to master without formal
training or support. After a few months of symptoms, C had a break down and went off work. 4
months later C returned to what was agreed would be light duties. However, although his hours
were reduced, there was still plenty of work that needed to be done and, as a result, C worked
longer than agreed. After 7 weeks he was unable to continue due to stress and gave up work. The
trial judge found D liable with no reduction for contributory negligence. D appealed. The Court
of appeal dismissed the appeal, pointing out that C could not be described as contributorily
negligent in inflicting stress upon himself, as he was
a hardworking and conscientious employee who was likely to carry out whatever he was asked to
do, and was also psychiatrically vulnerable. It would be a very rare case where such a man would
be blamed for working hard under such circumstances.

Wells v Tinder (2002) unrep CA 9.7.2002

C got out of a car in a bus layby and crossed the road but was struck by D. The trial judge found
D 100% liable for driving too fast, using only sidelights instead of head lights. D appealed. The
Court of Appeal upheld the finding of negligence but found C contributorily negligent — just as
D failed to see C who was visible, so too C failed to see D. The greater duty was on D as he was
in charge of potentially very dangerous equipment (his car) and so the reduction was 25%.
Purdue v Devon Fire & Rescue Service (2002) unrep CA 9.10.2002
C stopped at red lights to turn right. From his right was coming a fire engine with flashing lights
but nosiren on. C did not look to his right and after the lights turned green pulled across the fire
engines pathresulting in collision. The trial judge found D’s driver of the fire engine liable for
failing to sound the siren and for continuing across the red-light despite seeing that C had not
looked to his right. The judge madeno reduction for contributory negligence. D appealed. The
Court of Appeal ruled that a prudent driver would have looked right and would have noticed the
flashing lights and C’s failure to do so was thus negligent. The Court of appeal deducted 20%.

Butcher v Cornwall CC [2002] EWCA Civ 1640

The retaining hook to a shed door (whereby the door could be secured open) was missing. As C
was working outside the door having left it ajar, it blew against him injuring him. The trial judge
found that if the hook had been present, C would have used it but that C was 10% to blame for
the accident as he had failed to close the door properly. The defendant appealed, arguing that the
reduction was too low. The Court of Appeal said that a reduction of 10% is so low that it calls
into question whether C was in any way responsible for the accident. Such a minimal reduction
means that C is hardly blameworthy at all [this is the converse of Toole, see above]. As the judge
had found that C ought to but did not shut the door properly and was negligent in so doing, then
the reduction must be greater than a trifling 10%. The Court of Appeal awarded 50%.

Clench v Tanner [2002] EWHC 184 (QB)

Cyclist in a designated cycle lane who collided with the rear of a breakdown recovery vehicle
that turned left into a petrol station across his path was held to be 50 per cent contributorily
negligent for riding with his head down. If he had paid attention, he would have seen D
signalling his intentions. They were equally to blame.

Wight v Romford Blinds & Shutters Ltd [2003] EWHC 1165 (QB)

While standing on the roof of a van to load materials on to it, C slipped and fell. The employer
was negligent and in breach of statutory duty. C was simply following the method of work
adopted by D. His slipping was the result of momentary inattention and should not be held
against him.
 CONCLUSION
Thus, contributory negligence is a good defence available with the defendant wherein, he can
show some negligence on part of the plaintiff and this helps a lot to the defendant as the amount
of compensation to be paid is reduced to great extent or even becomes nil. Where "contributory
negligence" principles are applied, if the plaintiff in any way contributed to his or her own
injury, the plaintiff is barred from recovering damages. The extreme consequence of this
approach has led to its being limited or abandoned in many jurisdictions.

Since, this defense was utilized by the defendants in all the cases of negligence,
the last opportunity rule was brought in place wherein whoever among the defendant and the
plaintiff had the last opportunity to prevent the accident from happening was held liable.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lal, Ratan and Jatan.The Law of Torts.Wadhwa and Company : Nagpur 2006.

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