Canadian Water Resources Journal

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THE PMF DOES HAVE A FREQUENCY

C.D. Smith

To cite this article: C.D. Smith (1998) THE PMF DOES HAVE A FREQUENCY , Canadian Water
Resources Journal, 23:1, 1-7, DOI: 10.4296/cwrj2301001

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 THE PMF DOES HAVE A FREQUENCY
Submitted July 1997; accepted January 1998
Written comments on this paper will be accepted until September 1998

C.D. Smithl

Abstract
For a major dam, the probable maximum flood (PMF) is frequently specified as the
required inflow design flood (lDF). Often this specification is made to satisfy dam
safety regulations, the inference being that if the PMF is used, all the necessary
safety conditions will be satisfied. However, any rational design must be based on
the probability of dam failure and the acceptable level of risk. Any flood, including
the PMF, has some probability of occurrence, and it is necessary that probabilities
be assigned before rational analysis can proceed. lt is the thesis of this paper that
a frequency can and must be assigned to the PMF, and that this can be achieved
by decomposition of the event so that frequencies can be assigned to each of the
components which combine to produce the PMF. Application of this procedure will
allow rational selection of the lDF. In those cases where the PMF has a low prob-
ability of occurrence and the acceptable level of risk is high (relatively), the IDF
would be smaller than the PMF.

R6sum6
Pour les barrages majeurs, l'inondation maximale probable (lMP) est souvent
d6sign6e comme 6tant la crue de projet ou crue nominale. Cette sp6cification vise
bien souvent a r6pondre aux rdgles de s6curite etablies pour les barrages,
l'inf6rence voulant que si la m6thode IMP est utilis6e, toutes les conditions de
s6curite n6cessaires auront 6t6 observ6es. Toutefois, toute conception rationnelle
doit tenir compte de la probabilite d'une rupture de barrage et du niveau de risque
acceptable. Toute inondation, y compris l'lMP, a des chances de se produire et il
est n6cessaire de tenir compte des probabilit6s avant de se livrer d une analyse
rationnelle. C'est la la thdse de ce document qui veut qu'une fr6quence peut et doit
etre affect6e a l'lMP et qu'il est possible d'y arriver en d6composant l'evenement
de sorte que des fr6quences peuvent 6tre affect6es d chacun des 6l6ments qui,
combin6s, produisent l'lMP. L'application de cette m6thode permettra la s6lection
rationnelle de la crue nominale. Dans les cas oir l'lMP a de faibles oossibilit6s de
se produire et que le niveau de risque acceptable est 6lev6 (relativement), la crue
nominale serait plus petite que l'lMP.

Introduction
Since about 1980 increasing attention has
been given to risk analysis in structural,
geotechnical and hydrotechnical engineer-
ing. This period was preceded by a period
(1960-1980) of massive capital construction,
including mega-projects, some of which do
not satisfy today's requirements for public
safety and environmental protection. Many
of these projects are under review and
upgrading has been required. In the

1. Department of Civil Engineering, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK

Canadian Water Resources Journal

Vol.23, No.1.1998
hydrotechnical area, for example, increased
spillway capacities have been required.
Rational decision making requires an
assessment of the risk, including the level of
risk that society is willing to accept. Such an
assessment requires, a priori, that probabil-
ities be assigned to each event.
Vick (1992) makes the point that verbal
descriptors of risk are too ambiguous to per-
mit accurate transmission of intent to clients,
project owners, regulatory groups and the
public. Such terms as'highly probable,''rea-
sonably expected,"inf requent,''not likely,' or
'rare' can mean different things to different
people, but all can understand the signifi-
cance of 1 chance in 2, 1 chance in 100, or
1 chance in 10,000. Vick (1992) states "lf
uncertainty is to be accurately communicat-
ed, then it must be quantified, and this in
turn requires that verbal descriptors be
translated into probabilistic statements."
The purpose of this paper is to present
arguments that supporl the use of probabil-
ity theory in the determination of inflow
design floods, including the PMF. A method
is suggested for estimation of the probabil-
ity of the PMF, and criteria are given for the
level of societal risk that can be considered
as acceptable.
The Probable Maximum Flood
As defined by the Canadian Dam Safety
Association (1995) the PMF is a flood
event which results from the most severe
and reasonably possible combination of
rainstorm, snow accumulation, melt rate
and antecedent moisture conditions.
Antecedent moisture conditions include the
degree of ground saturation and filled
depression storage in the drainage basin.
The term 'reasonably possible' is a purely
qualitative verbal descriptor. lt tells nothing
about the frequency of this event, and may
easily be interpreted differently by a mete-
orologist, a hydrologist, a hydraulic engi-
neer, or a geotechnical engineer. The defi-
nition also suggests that the PMF is a
unique value. However, different values
could be obtained by different observers,
Revue canadienne des ressources hydriques
depending on their training, experience
and judgment. Judgment, in particular, can
be affected by personal characteristics
such as temperament. For example, is the
observer an optimist or a pessimist? As
noted by Newton and Herrin (1989), the
PMF is not an exact number, but depends
uoon the selected combination of causative
factors, including the variations between
estimators.
That the flood event that is reasonably
possible is not necessarily a unique value
is indicated by the studies for water sup-
plies in Oman reported by Meldrum (1995).
Meldrum states "Predicting flood flows is
difficult - a comparison of different fore-
casting methods for one dam in padicular
gave a range of PMF Peak flows of
between 6,600 m3/s and 14,400 m3/s." The
fact is that both of these discharges are
'reasonably possible'for this site, the differ-
ence being that the larger flow obviously
has a lower frequency. lf frequencies are
assigned, the selection process for the IDF
becomes relatively straightforward.
During the period 1950-1980 a mindset
seems to have developed that the PMF is
the be-all and end-all. As noted bY
Fahlbusch (1979) the IDF = PMF approach
has dominated design flood decisions for
decades. He criticizes this because it is
based on "...the questionable assumption
of the availability of unlimited funds to pro-
vide complete security for all members of
society" and that "...it purpons to provide
complete safety, which...cannot really be
guaranteed." The PMF is often chosen for
the IDE but as noted by Benson (1973), in
some cases this is done not because of the
merits of the choice but because it provides
the easiest way out of a delicate decision
problem. The practice has arisen of assum-
ing, without any supporting analysis, that a
design for the PMF is both necessary and
sufficient to satisfy all safety requirements.
lf loss of life is presumed to accompa-
ny dam failure, then it is assumed by many
agencies that the IDF must equal the PMF
as a matter of policy, regardless of the
number of lives under consideration. An
Vol. 23. No. 1, 1998
example is the recently enacted Dam and
Canal Safety Regulation under the Water
Resources Act of Alberta, which requires
the adoption of the PMF where failure
could be expected to result in increased
loss of life. Since it is imoossible to state
without equivocation that not even one life
will be lost following an oveftopping failure,
this regulation in effect requires design for
the full PMF for all major dams. However,
rational design requires that the level of risk
be related to the conseouences of the fail-
ure. lt seems reasonable that greater risk
can be taken where the potential for loss of
life is assessed at 10 lives, as opposed to
100 or 1000. As stated by Kuiper (1959)
"the fact that the value of a human life can-
not be expressed in dollars does not mean
it has an unlimited value. There are not
unlimited funds available to orovide com-
plete safety to every individual."
It is no longer satisfactory to design for
a flood with an unspecified frequency. As
stated by Newton and Herrin (1989), "The
need to define the probability of rare floods
has increased as development along
streams and economic and social damages
associated with flooding have increased"
and "the practicing hydrologist must define
flood frequencies throughout the full range
of potential floods up to the PMF."
Probability of the PMF
The frequency of rare flood events cannot
be determined from stream flow records
using normal frequency analysis methods
because the periods of record available are
too short to extrapolate with any degree of
reliability. A one hundred year record may
be used to predict a 1:1000 flood magni-
tude with reasonable confidence, but might
be 25"k in error in trying to predict a magnitude has probably already occurred
1:10,000 flood magnitude. Since PMFs are
presumed to fall in the 10-a to 10-6 per year
frequency range, stream flow records are
of little value for this purpose. An extieme
example used to demonstrate the weak-
ness of short periods of stream flow record
for rare flood prediction was quoted by
Canadian Water Resources Journal
Vol.23, No.1.1998
Kelman (1989). In the exercise, a 46 year
record was used to generate 37 sets of 'l 0
years each to simulate 37 flood frequency
analyses, giving 37 values for the 10,000
year flood. Ten of the 37 values were
smaller than the actual maximum flood
observed during the 46 year period.
The climatologists, meteorologists,
hydrologists and hydrotechnical engineers
who undertake PMF studies must, in the
first instance, deal with each of the compo-
nents comprising the PMF. lt is the writer's
contention that the responsibility of the
evaluators should be extended to include
the assignment of frequencies, as well as
magnitude, to each of these components.
In arriving at what is 'reasonably possible'
for the contribution of each event, the eval-
uators must make a judgment based on
observation of recorded and historical oast
events in the region of concern and, to
broaden the information base, in many
other regions with similar meteorological
and basin characteristics. Newton and
Herrin (1989) state that in their experience
with TVA projects "by judicious use of all
available data, particularly maximum storm
data, it is possible to generate a flood fre-
quency curve extending to the PMF which
is sufficiently accurate to permit a sound
risk analysis and decision."
The individual events comprising the
PMF, with the exception of the Probable
Maximum Precipitation (PMP), should
have recurrence intervals within 100 years,
and therefore can be estimated with some
degree of confidence. For prairie streams
with headwaters on the eastern slooes of
the Rocky Mountains, for example, these
events include heavy snowpack, fast melt,
high ground saturation and filled detention
storage. Each of these events of sufficient
within the last 100 years to satisfy the
requirements for a PMF. For example, it
might be appropriate to assign return peri-
ods of 20 years for the deep snowpack, 15
years for the fast melt, 10 years for the sat-
urated basin and 10 years for the filled
detention storage. lf each of these events
were completely independent, the return
oeriod for all of them to occur simultane-
ously would be the product of the individual
return periods, or 30,000 years. However,
there will be considerable correlation
between several of these factors. A high
level of basin saturation and filled detention
storage are produced by the same factors,
and in general would occur together, in
which case the conditional probability for
these two events would be 1 in 1O and not
1 in 100. Similarly, observations suggest
that a heavy winter snowpack would not be
completely independent of late fall or early
spring high levels of antecedent moisture.
Thus, the 20 year snowpack and the 10
year antecedent moisture condition may
have a return period of only 25 years,
rather than 200 years. lf it can be assumed
that the melt rate is an indeoendent vari-
able, it would be concluded that the return
oeriod of the simultaneous combination of
all of these events, not including the PMP,
would be 250 years.
Probable Maximum
Precipitation
The probable maximum precipitation (PMP)
is invariably a major component of the PMF.
This is true even in mountainous areas
where snowmelt runoff may be an important
contributor. The PMP is defined in the
Canadian Dam Safety Association manual
(1994) as the "Greatest depth of precipita-
tion for a given duration meteorologically
possible for a given size storm area at a
pafiicular location at a particular time of
year, with no allowance for long-term cli-
matic trends. The PMP is an estimate of the
upper physical bound to the precipitation
that the atmosphere can produce."
Rainfall intensities corresponding to the
PMP may very well be approached at some
time in a localized area somewhere on the
Canadian orairies on an annual basis.
However, what makes the PMP for a given
study area an extremely rare event is when
the time, storm duration, geographical
location and aerial extent of the PMP is
4 Revue canadienne des ressources hydriques
specified. For example, for prairie streams
with headwaters on the eastern slopes of
the Rocky Mountains, the time of the storm
must correspond to the period of mountain
snowmelt. This presents a four-week win-
dow for the PMP in late June or early July.
Also, for very large basins, there could be
many PMPs of such an extent and/or loca-
tion that only a portion of the basin is cov-
ered. The resolution of this aspect of the
analysis must be left to specialists, but it is
reasonable to expect that the return peri-
ods for the PMP would fall in the 100 to
1000 year range. lf the PMP is assumed to
be an independent variable, this would
place the PMF for this example in the 1 in
25,000 to 1 in 250,000 range. This range
should be narrowed considerably for appli-
cation to specific projects, where in-depth
analysis of all relevant factors is undertak-
en by specialists. At worst, it should be
possible to narrow the range lo x 20'/"
(e.9., 100,000 t 20,000 years). Whatever
range is assigned to the PMF, the range
will be smaller for all smaller floods
because the high frequency end of the fre-
quency curve is anchored by known dis-
charges from actual observations.
Synthesis of the flood-producing com-
ponents of the PMF normally allows con-
struction of the complete flood hydrograph
(including the peak). This is needed when
the spillway capacity is to be sized in con-
sideration of the effects of the flood reten-
tion capacity of the reservoir.
Acceptable Societal
Level of Risk
B.C. Hydro has been a Canadian leader in
risk analysis for dam safety. The BC Hydro
approach is reported in a paper by Salmon
and Hartford (1995), in which a societal risk
of 0.001 lives per year per dam is proposed
as an acceptable value. Thus, a loss of one
life would require that the risk of failure not
exceed 0.1'/" per year, 10 lives would
require 0.01% per year, and 100 lives would
require 0.001% per year (1 in 100,000). This
criterion is completely rational and provides
Vol.23" No.1,1998
a realistic basis for analysis. The value of
0.001 lives per year per dam appears to be
appropriate, and represents a lower level of
risk than is accepted by society in some
other areas of human activity.
The socio-economic risk proposed by
Salmon and Hartford is a loss not exceed-
ing $10,000 (Can.) per year per dam. On
this basis a million dollar loss due to failure
would require that the risk of failure not
exceed 1ok per year, and a billion dollar
loss would require that the risk not exceed
0.001% per year. Again, this approach pro-
vides a rational basis for design, and a
value of $10,000 per dam per year is a suf-
ficiently modest cost that it should be read-
ily acceptable to society. In fact, in the
writer's judgment, this value is too small for
a major project, and a value of 915,000 or
$20,000 per dam per year would not seem
an excessive amount.
Causes of Dam Failure
The acceptable level of risk suggested by
B.C. Hydro includes dam failure due to all
causes. Thus, it is necessary to identify dif-
ferent possibilities that could result in dam
failure. Studies by the U.S. Committee on
Large Dams (USCOLD) and others are
reported in a paper by Cheng (1993). The
USCOLD study included failure analysis of
5450 American dams, These dams includ-
ed all types (eafth, rockfill, gravity, arch,
buttress), all heights (from < 15 m to >
50 m), all ages (from pre-1900 to 1986),
and all modes of failure (overtopping, pip-
ing, sliding). These modes of failure include
eafihquake-induced failure, since overtop-
ping can be produced by an earthquake-
induced landslide into the reservoir, piping
can be produced by earthquake-induced
rupture of the core, and sliding can be pro-
duced by earthquake-induced liquefaction
of the dam or foundation.
The failure probability f rom the
USCOLD study for earth dams was 0.0009
per year per dam. This apparenily high rate
of failure is biased because the failure
probability is significantly higher for the
Canadian Water Resources Journal
Vol.23, No. 1.1998
older dams and smaller dams that were
included in the sample. Also, the probabili-
ty of failure for internal erosion (piping) was
0.00068 per year per dam and for overtop-
ping it was 0.00014 per year per dam (i.e.,
in the sample the risk of a piping failure
was five times more likely than a failure
due to overtopping). This result is also
borne out by the observation that half of all
the observed failures occurred in the first
five years, when any weakness leading to
piping in the earth dam and/or foundation is
most likely to show up. These numbers
strongly suggest there has been a mis-
placed emphasis on overtopping and
design of massive spillways to accommo-
date the PMF.
It is believed that the modern failure
rate for large new well-engineered earth
dams would be much smaller than 0.0009
per year per dam, and likewise the risk of
failure by overtopping and piping would be
correspondingly reduced. In the opinion of
the writer it would be acceptable to expect
an overtopping failure probability not
exceeding 0.0001 per year per dam for
large modern earth dams.
Estimation of Losses
Loss of life and socio-economic loss fol-
lowing dam failure depends on the flood
depths, flood extent and duration of the
flood. Depth, extent, and duration can be
calculated from dam-break studies. Dam-
break studies are now required as a regu-
lar component of risk analysis for major
dams. Considerable time, expense, experi-
ence and engineering judgment may be
required to determine reliable estimates of
loss from results of the dam-break study,
but the process may be justified by the
potential savings in the cost of the dam and
spillway if the IDF can be reduced.
As an aid to estimating losses, refer-
ence may be made to actual failures. The
failure of Teton Dam is an excellent exam-
ple. Teton Dam was a 93 m high dam which
failed by internal erosion (i.e., piping) on
June 4, 1976 (U.S. Department of Interior,
1976). The imminent failure of the dam was
recognized by 10:30 a.m., the dam
breached at 12:00 noon, and by 8:00 p.m.
the reservoir was drained. In spite of the fact
that 25,000 homes were flooded, only 11
lives were lost, a testament to the efficiency
of modern communications, transportation
and emergency measures procedures in
minimizing loss of life. This trend to small
loss of life is also borne out by the
Saguenay River flood in Quebec during the
summer of 1996, which produced a damage
estimated at $700 million (1997 Canadian
dollars). Although 3,500 homes were flood-
ed and 15,800 people were evacuated, only
five lives were lost (Gosselin, 1997). The
post failure damage for the Teton Dam fail-
ure was $500 million (1976 U.S. dollars),
including the loss of the $86 million capital
investment (Civil Engineering, 1977).
In assessing damage it is important to
note that it is the incremental damage that
is relevant. For example, if the failure mode
being considered is overtopping due to the
occurrence of a PMF, then the loss or dam-
age produced by this PMF, in the absence
of the dam, must be subtracted from the
larger loss or damage that would be pro-
duced by overtopping to determine the
incremental damage.
Calculation of the Inflow
Design Flood (lDF)
The BC Hydro proposal for limiting the soci-
etal losses to 0.001 lives per year per dam
and $10,000 per year per dam is intended
to cover all types of failure that could result
in loss of the dam. Thus, only a portion of
this acceptable loss can be assigned to any
one failure mode. For purposes of illustra-
tion, it is assumed that the societal loss for
overlopping failure produced by exceeding
the IDF must be limited to half of the limiting
values, or 0.0005 lives per year per dam,
and $5,000 per year per dam. lf these val-
ues are applied to losses of the magnitude
that occurred at Teton Dam (11 lives and
$500,000,000), then the required flood fre-
quency to satisfy the criteria for loss of life
o Revue canadienne des ressources hydriques
becomes 0.0005/11 = 0.0000455 (or 1 in
22p00), and for socio-economic loss
5,000/500,000,000=0.00001 (1 in 100,000).
lf the allowable socio-economic loss per
year was doubled, the return period would
be reduced to 1 in 50,000. In either case the
socio-economic loss would govern the
selection of the design flood for which over-
topping must be prevented.
Should it be argued that the risk of fail-
ure due to piping may exceed the risk due
to overtopping, then theoretically this could
be offset by reducing the risk allotted to
overlopping (i.e., by using a smaller flood
frequency) and still satisfy the B.C. Hydro
proposal. However, it does not make any
sense to argue that a bigger spillway
should be constructed to offset the higher
risk of a piping failure. Rather, the extra
expenditure should be used to further
reduce the risk of PiPing.
ln the rare instances where the calcu-
lated allowable return period for the IDF is
longer than the apparent return period for
the PMF, it is suggested that IDF = PMF
should prevail. However, if the IDF return
period is shofter than the PMF return peri-
od, for which IDF < PMF, an oppodunity
arises to effect some economies by design-
ing for the smaller value.
Theoretically, if the frequency can be
evaluated for the PMP, it can also be evalu-
ated by the same methods for 0.5 PME 0.75
PMF, etc. However, the work can be greatly
reduced by plotting the observed data and
the PMF on a frequency curve so that the
frequency for other flood peaks may be read
off the curve. lt has been suggested that the
observed data at one end of the frequency
curve may be connected to the PMF at the
other end with a straight line on a lognormal
plot. However, a different frequency distribu-
tion could be selected if it appears to give a
suoerior fit to the observed data.
Conclusion
This paper is intended to support the the-
sis that whenever possible a rational deci-
sion making process should be applied in
Vol. 23. No. 1, 1998
 arrivingat the IDF for a project. The
process requires that all of the relevant
flood producing factors for a PMF be quan-
tified and probabilities assigned, including
assessment of conditional probabilities, so
that a frequency can be estimated for the
PMF. The process will not be simple or
easy, but the potential reward may be
great where the IDF can be substantially
reduced. In any case, as noted by Salmon
and Hartford (1995), the undeftaking of a
probabilistic risk assessment provides an
excellent framework for making engineer-
ing judgments in setting the scope and pri-
ority of studies by pinpointing the greatest
sources of risk and uncertainty. The
assessment may also reveal areas where
additional study would not further improve
the analysis, and would therefore be
unproductive. Rational decision making is
intended to optimize the relationship
between cost and safetv.
References
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Design of Design Floods," Floods and
Droughts, Proceedings of the Second
lnternational Symposium in Hydrology,
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Cheng, S.T. 1993. "statistics on Dam
Failures," Report on Reliabitity and
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B.C. Yen and Y.K. Tung (editors), ASCE,
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