HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN P. CALIMOSO AND LIBY P. CALIMOSO, PETITIONERS, VS. AXEL D. ROULLO, RESPONDENT. (G.R. No.

198594, January 25, 2016)

Topic: Easement (Art. 650)

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ordered the establishment of an "easement of right of way" in favor of respondent Axel D. Roullo.

The petitioners objected to the establishment of the easement because it would cause substantial damage to the two (2) houses
already standing on their property. They alleged that the respondent has other right-of-way alternatives, such as the existing
wooden bridge over Sipac Creek bounding the respondent's lot on the northeast; that the bridge, if made concrete, could provide
ingress or egress to the Fajardo Subdivision Road.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent has met all the requisites for the establishment of a legal easement of right-of-way on the lot
owned by the petitioners?

HELD: NO.

To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following requisites should be met:

1.
The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and
The right-of-way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where
4.
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest

The immovable in whose favor the easement is established is called the dominant estate, and the property subject to the easement
is called the servient estate. Here, the respondent's lot is the dominant estate and the petitioners' lot is the servient estate.

That the respondent's lot is surrounded by several estates and has no access to a public road are undisputed. The only question
before this Court is whether the right-of-way passing through the petitioners' lot satisfies the fourth requirement of being
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

Three options were then available to the respondent for the demanded right-of-way: the first option is to traverse directly through
the petitioners' property, which route has an approximate distance of fourteen (14) meters from the respondent's lot to the Fajardo
Subdivision Road; the second option is to pass through two vacant lots located on the southwest of the respondent's lot, which
route has an approximate distance of forty-three (43) meters to another public highway, the Diversion Road; and the third option is
to construct a concrete bridge over Sipac Creek and ask for a right-of-way on the property of a certain Mr. Basa in order to reach the
Fajardo Subdivision Road.

Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-of-way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the right-of-way must
be established on the tenement where the distance to the public road or highway is shortest and where the least damage would be
caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have held in the past that
the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest distance criterion.[9]

In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners' lot would cause the destruction of the wire fence and a
house on the petitioners' property.Although this right-of-way has the shortest distance to a public road, it is not the least prejudicial
considering the destruction pointed out, and that an option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage, albeit longer, is
available.
Natividad C. Cruz and Benjamin Dela Cruz Vs. Pandacan Hiker’s Club, Inc.
(G.R. No. 188213; January 11, 2016)
Topic: Nuisance (Arts. 700, 702 and 704, Civil Code)

FACTS:

Petitioner Natividad C. Cruz (Cruz) was Punong Barangay or Chairperson of Barangay 848, Zone 92, City of Manila. On November 10,
2006, within the vicinity of her barangay, she allegedly confronted persons playing basketball and Barangay Tanod Benjamin dela
Cruz (Dela Cruz), to destroy the basketball ring by cutting it up with a hacksaw thus, rendering the said basketball court unusable.

Respondents PHC then filed a complaint before the Prosecutor’s Office and the Office of the Ombudsman, claiming to be the
basketball court’s owners. In the complaint, they alleged that PHC is the group that had donated, administered and operated the
subject basketball court for the Pandacan community until its alleged destruction by petitioners.

Cruz alleged that the basketball court affected the peace in the barangay and was the subject of many complaints from residents
asking for its closure and that the destruction was allegedly also a response to the ongoing clamor of residents to stop the basketball
games.

The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground that the act of destroying the basketball ring was only
motivated by Cruz and Dela Cruz performing their sworn duty, as defined in the Local Government Code. It found the act to be a
mere response to the clamor of constituents and that though the cutting of the ring was “drastic,” it was done by the barangay
officials within their lawful duties, as the act was only the result of the unauthorized removal of and failure to return the steel bar
and padlock that were earlier placed thereon.

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. The appellate court ruled that petitioners
performed an abatement of what they thought was a public nuisance but did the same without following the proper legal
procedure, thus making them liable for said acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for the summary abatement of basketball court?

HELD: YES.

Prevailing jurisprudence holds that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be summarily abated.

There is a nuisance when there is “any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1)
injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) annoys or offends the senses; or (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; or (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or
impairs the use of property.”

A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the object it affects; or (2) according to its susceptibility to summary abatement.

As for a nuisance classified according to the object or objects that it affects, a nuisance may either be:

(a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which “affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the
extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal”; or
(b) a private nuisance, or one “that is not included in the foregoing definition” which, in jurisprudence, is one which “violates only
private rights and produces damages to but one or a few persons.”

A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is susceptible to a legal summary abatement, in which case, it may either be:

(a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate safety of persons and property, which may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity; or,
(b) a nuisance per accidens, which “depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it
cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a
nuisance;” it may only be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose and may not be summarily abated without judicial
intervention.
A basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate harm or danger to anyone but is merely an object of recreation. Neither is it, by its
nature, injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community and, thus, it may not be abated as a nuisance
without the benefit of a judicial hearing.

But even if it is assumed, ex gratia argumenti, that the basketball ring was a nuisance per se, but without posing any immediate
harm or threat that required instantaneous action, the destruction or abatement performed by petitioners failed to observe the
proper procedure for such an action which puts the said act into legal question.

Under Article 700 of the Civil Code, the abatement, including one without judicial proceedings, of a public nuisance is the
responsibility of the district health officer. Under Article 702 of the Code, the district health officer is also the official who shall
determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against & public nuisance. The two articles
do not mention that the chief executive of the local government, like the Punong Barangay, is authorized as the official who can
determine the propriety of a summary abatement.

Petitioners do not claim to have acted in their private capacities but in their capacities as public officials, thus, they are held
administratively liable for their acts. And even in their capacities as private individuals who may have abated a public nuisance,
petitioners come up short of the legal requirements. They do not claim to have complied with any of the requisites laid down in
Article 704 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by
destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is
necessary:

(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been rejected;
(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of the local police; and
(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, et.al.
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014
Topic: Nuisance per accidens

Facts:
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West
Cove). In 2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. While the company
was already operating a resort in the area, the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a
three-storey hotel over a parcel of land which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by
the DENR in favor of Boracay West Cove.
The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within
the "no build zone" demarcated in the ordinance. Petitioner continued with the construction, expansion, and operation of the resort
hotel.
In 2011, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort while the Office of
the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10 ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
Petitioner posits that the hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-
worth of capital infused in the venture. Petitioner also argues that respondents should have first secured a court order before
proceeding with the demolition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent mayor committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued EO 10?
HELD: NO.
As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens. The first is recognized as a
nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason,
may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The second is that which depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized
to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per se since this type of nuisance is generally defined as an
act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding.
Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident––its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise
stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without
issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s
demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government.
Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations to promote the general welfare.
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief
executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as
the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and
to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.
PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. RAMON DUMADAG, et al.
G.R. No. 194336, March 11, 2013
TOPIC: PUBLIC EASEMENT / PROPER PARTY TO FILE AN ACTION FOR RECOVERY

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a Complaint for accion publiciana against respondents for allegedly building their shanties, without its knowledge and
consent, in its property in Las Piñas City. It claims that said parcel of land, which is duly registered in its name was designated as an
open space of Pilar Village Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and amenities for subdivision residents.
Respondents however asserted that it is the local government, not petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority over them.

The trial court dismissed petitioner's complaint, finding that the land being occupied by respondents are situated on the sloping area
going down and leading towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek, and within the three-meter legal easement; thus, considered as public
property and part of public dominion under Article 502 of the New Civil Code (Code), which could not be owned by petitioner.

The trial court opined that respondents have a better right to possess the occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved for public
easement purposes and that only the local government of Las Piñas City could institute an action for recovery of possession or
ownership.

Anchoring its pleadings on Article 630 of the Code, petitioner argues that although the portion of the subject property occupied by
respondents is within the 3-meter strip reserved for public easement, it still retains ownership thereof since the strip does not form
part of the public dominion. As the owner of the subject parcel of land, it is entitled to its lawful possession, hence, the proper party
to file an action for recovery of possession against respondents conformably with Articles 428 and 539 of Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is the proper party to file an action for recovery of possession of the property in question?

HELD: NO.

The Code defines easement as an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.
There are two kinds of easement according to source: by law or by will of the owners, the former are called legal and the latter
voluntary easement. A legal easement or compulsory easement, or an easement by necessity constituted by law has for its object
either public use or the interest of private persons.

While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that "[t]he owner of the servient estate retains the ownership of the
portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the
easement," Article 635 thereof is specific in saying that "[a]ll matters concerning easements established for public or communal
use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto.

Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a stream, like the Mahabang
Ilog Creek in this case, is required and shall be considered as forming part of the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216
dated October 14, 1977. Said law is explicit: open spaces are "for public use and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men"
and that "[the] areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable."

Thus, the above prove that petitioner's right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with respect to the 3-meter
strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Hence, both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local
government of Las Piñas City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved.
JAIME S. PEREZ vs. SPOUSES FORTUNITO L. MADRONA and YOLANDA B. PANTE
G.R. No. 184478, March 21, 2012
TOPIC: SUMMARY ABATEMENT

FACTS:
Respondent-spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante are registered owners of a residential property in Marikina City and
covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title. In 1989, respondents built their house thereon and enclosed it with a concrete fence and
steel gate.
Respondents however, received a letter from petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Marikina Demolition Office giving them them 7
days to remove the structure for violation of the National Bldg Code and Anti-squatting law and for illegally occupying/constructing
improvements within the road right-of-way.
More than a year later or on February 28, 2001, petitioner sent another letter with the same contents as the May 25, 1999 letter but
this time giving respondents ten days from receipt thereof to remove the structure allegedly protruding to the sidewalk. This
prompted respondents to file a complaint for injunction before the Marikina City RTC.
The RTC ruled that there is no showing that respondents’ fence is a nuisance per se and presents an immediate danger to the
community’s welfare, nor is there basis for petitioner’s claim that the fence has encroached on the sidewalk as to justify its summary
demolition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent’s fence can be summarily abated/demolished?
HELD: NO.
Respondents’ fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. If petitioner
believes that respondents’ fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose.
Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement without judicial intervention is
unwarranted.
EMETERIA LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 189755 July 4, 2012
TOPIC: Continuous and Apparent Easements

FACTS:
In 1978, F.G.R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, obtained a loan from Ernesto Marcelo (Marcelo), the owner of T.P.
Marcelo Realty Corporation. To settle its debt after failing to pay its obligation, F.G.R. Sales assigned to Marcelo all its rights over
several parcels of land in the Subdivision, as well as receivables from the lots already sold.
As the successor-in-interest of the original developer, Marcelo represented to subdivision lot buyers, the National Housing Authority
(NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility was available in the Subdivision. For almost 30
years, the residents of the Subdivision relied on this facility as their only source of water.
Marcelo eventually sold Lot 11, Block No. 5 to Hermogenes, then President of Happy Glen. When Hermogenes died in 2003, his wife,
the petitioner, subsequently wrote a letter to respondent Association, demanding the removal of the overhead water tank from the
subject parcel of land.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can demand for the removal of the water facility?
HELD: NO.
An easement for water facility exists on Lot 11, Block 5 of Happy Glen Loop Subdivision.
In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on Lot 11, Block 5 of the Subdivision for the benefit of the community. It is
continuous and apparent, because it is used incessantly without human intervention, and because it is continually kept in view by
the overhead water tank, which reveals its use to the public.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention that the existence of the water tank on Lot 11, Block 5 is merely tolerated, we find that the
easement of water facility has been voluntarily established either by Marcelo, the Subdivision owner and developer; or by F.G.R.
Sales, his predecessor-in-interest and the original developer of the Subdivision. For more than 30 years, the facility was continuously
used as the residents’ sole source of water.31 The Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by
virtue of a title or by prescription of 10 years.32 It is therefore clear that an easement of water facility has already been acquired
through prescription.
MARGARITA F. CASTRO vs. NAPOLEON A. MONSOD
G.R. No. 183719 February 2, 2011
TOPICS: Easement / Annotation of Easement

FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Manuela Homes, Pamplona, Las Piñas City. Respondent, on the other
hand, is the owner of the property adjoining the lot of petitioner. There is a concrete fence, more or less two (2) meters high,
dividing Manuela Homes from Moonwalk Village. 3
Respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim against sixty-five (65) sq.m. of the property of petitioner. The adverse claim
was filed without any claim of ownership over the property. Respondent was merely asserting the existing legal easement of lateral
and subjacent support at the rear portion of his estate to prevent the property from collapsing, since his property is located at an
elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet, more or less, above the level of petitioner’s property.
Petitioner averred that when she bought the property from Manuela Homes in 1994, there was no annotation or existence of any
easement over the property. For his part, respondent asserted that the affidavit of adverse claim was for the annotation of the
lateral and subjacent easement of his property over the property of petitioner, in view of the latter’s manifest determination to
remove the embankment left by the developer of Manuela Homes.
The trial court ratiocinated that the adverse claim of respondent was non-registrable considering that the basis of his claim was an
easement and not an interest adverse to the registered owner, and neither did he contest the title of petitioner.
The CA ruled that while respondent’s adverse claim could not be sanctioned because it did not fall under the requisites for
registering an adverse claim, the same might be duly annotated in the title as recognition of the existence of a legal easement of
subjacent and lateral support.
ISSUES:
(1). Whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support exists on the subject adjacent properties?
(2). Whether the same may be annotated at the back of the title of the servient estate?
HELD:
(1). Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent
land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land,
but his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent
support. Between two adjacent landowners, each has an absolute property right to have his land laterally supported by the soil of
his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbor’s land as to cause it,
or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to fall away or slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable.
In the instant case, an easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of respondent.1avvphi1 It was established that the
properties of petitioner and respondent adjoin each other. The residential house and lot of respondent is located on an elevated
plateau of fifteen (15) feet above the level of petitioner’s property. The embankment and the riprapped stones have been in
existence even before petitioner became the owner of the property.
(2). However, an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer necessary. It exists whether or not it is
annotated or registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and the owner of
the same, including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come to court or have the easement of
subjacent and lateral support registered in order for it to be recognized and respected.
SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON vs. SPS. SANTOS AND ERLINDA TAN
G.R. No. 185240 January 20, 2010
Topic: Extinguishment of easement

The Facts:
Guillermo Ceniza died intestate leaving a parcel of land. His children Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr., Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos executed
an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition, adjudicating and dividing the land into Lots A, B, C, D and E. Lot E was adjudicated
to petitioner.
Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and E were not, they being interior lots. To give these interior lots access to
the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide alley
between Lots D and E that continued on between Lots A and B and on to the street. The partition that embodied this easement of
right of way was annotated on the individual titles issued to the heirs.
Realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the property, the heirs modified their agreement by eliminating the
easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E, and in its place, imposed a 3-meter wide alley, an easement of right of way, that ran
exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street.
Victoria (now petitioner Victoria Salimbangon) later swapped lots with Benedicta with the result that Victoria became the owner of
Lot A, one of the three lots adjacent to the city street. She then constructed a residential house on this lot and built two garages on
it. One garage abutted the street while the other, located in the interior of Lot A, used the alley or easement of right of way existing
on Lot B to get to the street.
Respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and E from all their owners. The Tans built improvements
on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. They also closed the gate that the Salimbangons built. The Salimbangons lodged a
complaint with the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans. On the other hand, the Tans filed an action against the Salimbangons
for the extinguishment of the easement on Lot B.
RTC upheld the Salimbangons’ easement of right of way over the alley on Lot B, the lot that belonged to the Tans.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and extinguished the easement of right of way established on the alley in Lot B of the Tans. The
court ruled that based on the testimony of one of the previous owners, Eduardo Ceniza, the true intent of the parties was to
establish that easement of right of way for the benefit of the interior lots, namely, Lots D and E. Consequently, when ownership of
Lots B, D, and E was consolidated into the Tans, the easement ceased to have any purpose and became extinct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement of right of way established by the partition agreement among the heirs for the benefit of Lot A
has been extinguished?
HELD: Yes.HEvvphi1
As originally constituted in that agreement, each of Lots A and B was to contribute a strip of 1.5 meters between them that when
combined formed a 3-meter wide alley leading from Lots D and E to the street. To the extent that Lots A and B retained the right to
use the 1.5-meter portion that they contributed to the establishment of the easement, the agreement gave their owners the right to
use the common alley as well. As Eduardo testified, however, the true intent of the heirs was to give Lots D and E access to the
street. Lots A and B did not need this alley since they were facing the street.1avvphi1
Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the owner of Lot B, the easement of right of way on Lot B became
extinct by operation of law. The existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates
belong to the same person.
HEIRS OF THE LATE JOAQUIN LIMENSE vs. RITA VDA. DE RAMOS et. al
GR NO. 152319, October 28, 2009
FACTS:
Dalmacio Lozada was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by an Original Certificate of Title (OCT). He subdivided his
property into five (5) lots, namely: Lot Nos. 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, 12-D and 12-E. Through a Deed of Donation, he donated the subdivided
lots to his daughters, namely: Isabel, Salud, Catalina, and Felicidad, all surnamed Lozada.
In 1969, TCT No. 96886 was issued in the name of Joaquin Limense covering the area of Lot No. 12-C.
Joaquin Limense secured a building permit for the construction of a hollow block fence on the boundary line between his aforesaid
property and the adjacent parcel of land designated as Lot No. 12-D, which was being occupied by respondents. The fence, however,
could not be constructed because a substantial portion of respondents' residential building in Lot No. 12-D encroached upon
portions of Joaquin Limense's property in Lot No. 12-C.
Joaquin Limense instituted a Complaint against respondents for removal of obstruction and damages.
RTC dismissed the complaint of Joaquin Limense. It ruled that an apparent easement of right of way existed in favor of respondents.
During the pendency of the appeal with the CA, Joaquin Limense died in 1999 and was substituted by petitioners.
Petitioners contend that respondents are not entitled to an easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C, because their Lot No. 12-D is
not duly annotated at the back of TCT No. 96886 which would entitle them to enjoy the easement. Respondents, on the other hand,
allege that they are entitled to an easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C, which has been continuously used as an alley by the
heirs of Dalmacio Lozada, the residents in the area and the public in general from 1932 up to the present.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are entitled to an easement of right of way?
HELD: Yes.
As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must
refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or
tenement.
Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent.
Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant, without the intervention of any act of man. Discontinuous
easements are those which are used at intervals and depend upon the acts of man. Apparent easements are those which are made
known and are continually kept in view by external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same. Non-apparent easements
are those which show no external indication of their existence.
In the present case, the easement of right of way is discontinuous and apparent. It is discontinuous, as the use depends upon the
acts of respondents and other persons passing through the property. Being an alley that shows a permanent path going to and from
Beata Street, the same is apparent.
Being a discontinuous and apparent easement, the same can be acquired only by virtue of a title.
In the case at bar, TCT No. 96886, issued in the name of Joaquin Limense, does not contain any annotation that Lot No. 12-D was
given an easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C. However, Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully aware that
Lot No. 12-C has been continuously used and utilized as an alley by respondents and residents in the area for a long period of time.
It has been held that "where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest that was unregistered at the time he acquired a
right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him."
In the case at bar, Lot No. 12-C has been used as an alley ever since it was donated by Dalmacio Lozada to his heirs. It is undisputed
that prior to and after the registration of TCT No. 96886, Lot No. 12-C has served as a right of way in favor of respondents and the
public in general.
BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, INC. (BAPCI) vs.
EDMUNDO O. OBIAS, et al.
GR No. 172077 October 9, 2009
TOPIC: Prescription / Laches

FACTS:
Sometime in 1972, the Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) was established at Himaao, Pili, Camarines
Sur. In the same year, BISUDECO constructed a road ("the disputed road") which was used in hauling and transporting
sugarcane to and from its mill site (Pensumil) and has thus become indispensable to its sugar milling operations.
In 1992, petitioner BAPCI acquired the assets of BISUDECO and in 1993, it filed a Complaint against respondents alleging
that respondents unjustifiably barricaded the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods, placards and stones across it,
preventing petitioner’s and the other sugar planter’s vehicles from passing through the disputed road, thereby causing
serious damage and prejudice to petitioner.
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant to an agreement with the owners of the
ricefields the road traversed. The agreement provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives of the
landowners in exchange for the construction of the road on their properties. Petitioner contends that through prolonged
and continuous use of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the properties of the landowners,
which right of way in turn was acquired by it when it bought BISUDECO’s assets.
Respondents denied having entered into an agreement with BISUDECO regarding the construction and the use of the
disputed road. They alleged that BISUDECO, surreptitiously and without their knowledge and consent, constructed the
disputed road on their properties and has since then intermittently and discontinuously used the disputed road for
hauling sugarcane despite their repeated protests. Respondents claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in the construction
and the use of the road since BISUDECO was a government-owned and controlled corporation, and the entire country
was then under Martial Law.
The RTC ruled that petitioner failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that there was an agreement between
BISUDECO and respondents for the construction of the disputed road. Moreover, it held that petitioner did not acquire
the same by prescription.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was no conclusive proof to sufficiently establish the existence of an
agreement between BISUDECO and respondents regarding the construction of the disputed road. Moreover, the CA also
declared that an easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has acquired an easement of right of way by prescription?
Whether or not respondents are barred from exercising ownership rights over the disputed road by laches?
HELD:
(1). NO.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they
are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such
easements. Thus, easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man,
like the easement of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the
easement of right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on
somebody else’s land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes over another's
property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or intervention of man which is the
very essence of discontinuous easements.
Article 622 of the New Civil Code states that discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only
by virtue of a title.
(2). NO.
There is no absolute rule on what constitutes laches. It is a rule of equity and applied not to penalize neglect or sleeping
on one’s rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly unfair situation. The
question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and each case must be decided according to its
particular circumstances. It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, should not be guided or bound
strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches if wrong or injustice will result.56
In herein petition, the CA denied petitioner’s argument in the wise:
As previously explained in our Decision, the applicable law is Article 622 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
provides:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only
by virtue of a title.
This Court agrees with the CA. The fact that the law is categorical that discontinuous easements cannot be acquired by
prescription militates against petitioner’s claim of laches. To stress, discontinuous easements can only be acquired by
title. More importantly, whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual
determination by the trial court. Hence, the same being a question of fact, it cannot be the proper subject of herein
petition. On the other hand, as to the issue of estoppel, this Court likewise agrees with the finding of the CA that
petitioner did not present any evidence that would show an admission, representation or conduct by respondents that
will give rise to estoppel.