2E | 2017-2018 | Atty.
Pascasio
CASE NO. 1
Irineo Moya vs Agripino Ga. Del Fierro
November 18, 1939; J. Laurel
This is a Petition For Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner MOYA and respondent DEL FIERRO are rival
candidates for the Mayoralty position in the Municipality of Paracale,
Province of Camarines Norte. In the general elections held on
December 14, 1937, the municipal council, acting as board of
canvassers, proclaimed MOYA as the winner with a majority of 102
votes. DEL FIERRO filed a Motion of Protest in the CFI of Camarines
Norte which sustained the election of MOYA with a plurality of 91
votes. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of DEL
FIERRO. Thereafter, MOYA filed the instant petition wherein he
alleged the following errors: In admitting and counting in favor of
respondent DEL FIERRO,
1. 8 ballots either inadvertently or contrary to the controlling
decisions of the Supreme Court
2. 3 ballots marked “R. del Fierro
3. 7 ballots marked “Rufino del Fierro
4. 72 ballots marked “P. del Fierro”
WHO IS THE ELECTED MAYOR?
DEL FIERRO is the elected Mayor. Technical rules should
not defeat the intention of the voters. Even though the electorate
made mistakes in writing the name of their desired candidate, it is
apparent that they voted for Del Fierro.
Republicanism, In so far as it implies the adoption of a
representative type of government, necessarily points to the
enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the
ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his
Government and whenever possible it is the duty of the judiciary,
when called upon to act in justiciable cases, to give it efficacy and
not to stifle or frustrate it. This, fundamentally, is the reason for the
rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with
utmost, with reasonable, liberality. No technical rule or rules
should be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that
intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from
evidence aliunde. This must be the justification for the suggested
liberalization of the rules on appreciation of ballots which are now
incorporated in Section 144 of the Election Code (C.A. No. 357).
CASE NO. 2
Mariano Badelles vs Camilo Cabili
Bonifacio Legaspi and Cecilio Barazon vs Felix Aztub,
Providencio Abragan, Manuel Celdran, Casimero Cabigon and
Benito Ong.
February 27, 1969; J. Fernando
This is an Appeal from an order of CFI of Lanao del Norte.
In the case at bar are two election protests against the duly
proclaimed Mayor (Cabili) and Councilors (Aztub et al) of Iligan City,
which are based on the allegations of flagrant violations of certain
mandatory provisions of the Election Code. The protestants alleged
that there are more than 200 voters per precinct contrary to the 200
voters per precinct limit, no list of voters for each precinct that made
way for around 8,300 individuals to vote illegally, and that around
8000 qualified voters were prevented from voting because they were
not included in the list of voters.
The election protests were dismissed in a single order by the
CFI of Lanao del Norte. In the order of dismissal, even though
irregularities as well as misconduct on the part of election officers
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
were alleged in the election protests filed, there was however an
absence of an allegation that they would change the result in favor of
the protestants (Badelles, Legazpi and Barazon) against the
protestees (Cabili and Aztub et al), that such irregularities would
destroy the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast, or that the
protestees knew of or participated in the commission thereof. For the
lower court, there was lack of cause of action.
WHETHER THE ORDERS OF DISMISSAL WERE PROPER?
No. If there be a failure to observe the mandates of the
Election Code, the aggrieved parties should not be left remediless.
Under the law as it stands, it is precisely an election protests that fitly
serves the purpose.
The seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have
the elections conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities
alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and honest, as to who were the
duly elected officials. Such allegations would have to be accepted at
their face value for the purpose of determining whether there is a
cause of action, a motion to dismiss amounting to a hypothetical
admission of facts thus pleased. Without the lower court having
so intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial abnegation
of a sworn duty to inquire into and pass upon in an appropriate
proceeding allegations of misconduct and misdeeds of such
character.
The order of dismissal is reversed and the two cases are
remanded to the lower court for proceeding and trial.
Dissenting Opinion of J. Puno in the case of Tolentino v.
COMELEC
Facts/ Background of the Case:
After her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination
of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9
February 2001.
The Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84
("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the
Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular
elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators were due to be elected
in that election, and also provided that "Senatorial candidate
garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which
ends on 30 June 2004.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming
13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also
provided that "the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of
six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the
unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona,
3
Jr. who was appointed Vice-President." Respondents Ralph Recto
("Recto") and Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan") ranked 12th and 13th,
respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica,
filed the petition for prohibition, impleading COMELEC as respondent
contending that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without
jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the
position to be filled in the special election as required under Section
4
2 of Republic Act No. 6645 ("R.A. No. 6645"); (2) it failed to require
senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy
whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as
allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
5
881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters
Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special
or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section
4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 ("R.A. No.
6646").Petitioners add that because of these omissions, COMELEC
canvassed all the votes without distinction such that there were no
two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single
election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Issue:
Whether a special election for the single Senate seat with a
three-year term was validly held simultaneous with the general
elections on May 14, 2001
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
Yes.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to
the failure to give notice of the special election is whether want of
notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as
would change the result of special election. If the lack of official
notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed
that there was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small
percentage of voters would be void.
There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which
the COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14,
2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document
separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast
for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election
laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the
COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if necessary, and state among
others, the office/s to be voted for.
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting
the special election on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the
procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the
original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco
Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by
former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the
suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the
resolution by providing as it now appears, that “the senatorial
cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve
only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.
Dissenting Opinion of J. Puno:
J. Puno voted to grant the petition.
With all due respect, I cannot subscribe to
the ponencias position for it leaves the purity of elections and
the ascertainment of the will of the electorate to chance,
conjecture and speculation. Considering that elections lie at the
heart of the democratic process because it is through the act of
voting that consent to government is secured, I choose to take a
position that would ensure, to the greatest extent possible, an
electorate that is informed, a vote that is not devalued by ignorance
and an election where the consent of the governed is clear and
unequivocal.
With respect to the lack of notice of the manner by which the
special election would be conducted, i.e., that the 13th placer would
be declared winner in the special election, there can be no debate
that statutory notice will not operate as notice to the electorate as
there is no law providing that a special election held simultaneously
with a general election could be conducted in the manner adopted by
the Senate and the COMELEC. Instead, the ponencia buttresses its
holding by stating that the petitioner has not claimed nor proved that
the failure of notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would
change the result of the special senatorial election. It relies on actual
notice from many sources, such as media reports of the enactment
of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during the campaign but
without even identifying these media reports and election
propaganda. Suffice to state that before the ponencia can require
proof that a sufficient number of voters was misled during the May
14, 2001 elections, it must first be shown that in the absence of
official notice of the procedure for the special election, there was
nevertheless actual notice of the electorate so that the special
election could be presumed to be valid. Only then will the duty arise
to show proof that a sufficient number of voters was misled to rebut
the presumption of validity.
I respectfully submit that the electorate should have been
informed of the time, place and manner of conduct of the May 14,
2001 special election for the single senatorial seat for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Tolentino, UNIDO,
Blo Umpar Adiong and Hassan all deepened the doctrine that a
meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage in a genuinely free,
orderly and honest election is predicated upon an electorate
informed on the issues of the day, the programs of government laid
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
out before them, the candidates running in the election and the time,
place and manner of conduct of the election. It is for this reason that
the Omnibus Election Code is studded with processes, procedures
and requirements that ensure voter information.
The procedure adopted in the case at bar for holding the May
14, 2001 special senatorial election utterly failed to ascertain the
peoples choice in the special election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7166
provides that the special election shall be held simultaneously with
such general election. It does not contemplate, however, the
integration of the special senatorial election into the regular
senatorial election whereby candidates who filed certificates of
candidacy for the regular elections also automatically stand as
candidates in the special election. The Omnibus Election Code is
crystal clear that a candidate can run for only one position in an
election. Consequently, there were no candidates in the special
election to vote for. Separate sets of candidates for the special
election and the regular elections are decisive of the election results.
Each independent-minded voter could have a variety of reasons for
choosing a candidate to serve for only the unexpired term of three
years instead of the regular term of six years or not choosing a
candidate at all. A voter might choose a neophyte to serve the three-
year term as a shorter trial period. Another might be minded to
choose an old timer to compel him to hasten the completion of his
projects in a shorter period of three years. Still another might want to
afford a second termer who has not performed too satisfactorily a
second chance to prove himself but not for too long a period of six
years. In not allowing the voter to separately indicate the
candidate he voted for the three-year senatorial term, the voter
was deprived of his right to make an informed judgment based
on his own reasons and valuations. Consequently, his true will in
the special election was not ascertained. As a particle of sovereignty,
it is the thinking voter who must determine who should win in the
special election and not the unthinking machine that will
mechanically ascertain the 13th placer in the general election by
mathematical computations.
CONCEPTS DISCUSSED : ( maraming concepts na na-discuss
dito.since, under to sa topic ng background or history, yun na lang
yung nilagay ko na part)
Elections and the Right to Vote
A. Theory
 The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a
democratic and republican framework because it is
through the act of voting that government by consent is
secured. Through the ballot, people express their will on
the defining issues of the day and they are able to
choose their leaders in accordance with the
fundamental principle of representative democracy that
the people should elect whom they please to govern
them.
 The right to vote or of suffrage is an important political
right appertaining to citizenship. Each individual
qualified to vote is a particle of popular sovereignty.
 In People v. Corral, it was held that (t)he modern
conception of suffrage is that voting is a function of
government. The right to vote is not a natural right but it
is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted
by the State to such persons as are most likely to
exercise it for the public good. The existence of the
right of suffrage is a threshold for the preservation
and enjoyment of all other rights that it ought to be
considered as one of the most sacred parts of the
constitution.
 In Geronimo v. Ramos, et al., it was held that the right
is among the most important and sacred of the
freedoms inherent in a democratic society and one
which must be most vigilantly guarded if a people
desires to maintain through self-government for
themselves and their posterity a genuinely functioning
democracy in which the individual may, in accordance
with law, have a voice in the form of his government
and in the choice of the people who will run that
government for him.
 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Yick Wo v.
Hopkinsthat voting is a fundamental political right,
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
because [it is] preservative of all rights. In Wesberry
]
v. Sanders, the U.S. Supreme Court held that no right
is more precious in a free country than that of having a
voice in the election of those who make the laws, under
which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights,
even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote
is undermined. Voting makes government more
responsive to community and individual needs and
desires. Especially for those who feel disempowered
and marginalized or that government is not responsive
to them, meaningful access to the ballot box can be one
[40]
of the few counterbalances in their arsenal.
 Thus, elections are substantially regulated for them to
be fair and honest, for order rather than chaos to
accompany the democratic processes. In the case
of Gardiner v. Romulo it was held that the purpose of
election laws is to safeguard the will of the people, the
purity of elections being one of the most important and
fundamental requisites of popular government. We
have consistently made it clear that we frown upon any
interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in
any way not only the free and intelligent casting of
the votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results. To preserve the purity of
elections, comprehensive and sometimes complex
election codes are enacted, each provision of which -
whether it governs the registration and qualifications of
voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the
voting process itself - inevitably affects the individuals
right to vote.
 The 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC to
ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
B. History of Suffrage in the Philippines
 In primitive times, the choice of who will govern the
people was not based on democratic principles. Even
then, birth or strength was not the only basis for
choosing the chief of the tribe. When an old chief has
failed his office or committed wrong or has aged and
can no longer function, the members of the tribe could
replace him and choose another leader. Among the
Muslims, a council or ruma bechara chooses the sultan.
An old sultan may appoint his successor, but his
decision is not absolute. Among the criteria for choosing
a sultan were age, blood, wealth, fidelity to Islamic faith
and exemplary character or personality. In times of
crises, the community may choose its leader voluntarily,
irrespective of social status. By consensus of the
community, a serf or slave may be voted the chief on
account of his ability.
 As far back as the Spanish regime, the Filipinos did not
have a general right of suffrage.
 It was only in the Malolos Constitution of 1899 that the
right of suffrage was recognized; it was a by-product of
the Filipinos struggle against the Spanish colonial
government and an offshoot of Western liberal ideas on
civil government and individual rights. The life of the
Malolos Constitution was, however, cut short by the
onset of the American regime in the Philippines.
 But the right of suffrage was reiterated in the Philippine
Bill of 1902.
 The first general elections were held in 1907under the
first Philippine Election Law, Aci No. 1582, which took
effect on January 15, 1907. This law was elitist and
discriminatory against women. The right of suffrage was
carried into the Jones Law of 1916.
 Whereas previously, the right was granted only by the
Philippine Legislature and thus subject to its control, the
1935 Constitution elevated suffrage to a constitutional
right. It also provided for a plebiscite on the issue of
whether the right of suffrage should be extended to
women. On April 30, 1937, the plebiscite was held and
the people voted affirmatively.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

 In the 1973 Constitution, suffrage was recognized not
only as a right, but was imposed as a duty to broaden
the electoral base and make democracy a reality
through increased popular participation in government.
The voting age was lowered, the literacy requirement
abolished, and absentee voting was legalized.
 The 1987 Constitution likewise enshrines the right of
suffrage in Article V, but unlike the 1973 Constitution, it
[59]
is now no longer imposed as a duty. The 1948
[60]
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1976
[61]
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also protect the
right of suffrage.
Purisima v Salanga
Facts:
Purisima again called attention to the erasures and discrepancies
and asked for suspension of canvass — for him to have recourse to
judicial remedy. The board of canvassers denied the claim, finished
the canvass and proclaimed Cordero the winner.
Purisima filed a petition in the Commission on Elections to annul the
canvass and proclamation above-mentioned. The Commission on
Elections issued a resolution annulling the canvass and
proclamation, as regards Cordero and Purisima.
Purisima filed in the Court of First Instance a petition for recount
under Section 163 of the Revised Election Code. Subsequently,
motions to dismiss the same were filed by the board of canvassers
and by Cordero. In his motion to dismiss, Cordero admitted the
erasures and discrepancies on the face of the returns from 41
precincts, but denied that said erasures were due to tampering or
falsification.

In the election of November 12, 1963, Amante Purisima and After a preliminary hearing on the motions to dismiss, the Court of
Gregorio Cordero were among the candidates for any of the three First Instance, dismissed the petition for recount. Cordero filed in the
offices of Provincial Board Member of Ilocos Sur. After the election or Commission on Elections a motion for resumption of the canvass.
on November 25, 1963 the provincial board of canvassers met and
started canvassing the returns for said office. Purisima noted during
Purisima, on January 2, 1964, moved for reconsideration of the
the canvass that the returns from 41 precints showed that the words
Court of First Instance's order of dismissal. He also filed a petition for
and figures for Cordero's votes had been "obviously and manifestly
preliminary injunction to restrain the holding of another canvass.
erased" and superimposed with other words and figures. For
Furthermore, Purisima filed with the Commission on Elections an
purposes of comparison, the Nacionalista Party copies of the returns
opposition to the resumption of the canvass.
for the aforesaid precincts were submitted to the board. A
discrepancy of 5,042 votes in favor of Cordero was thereby found
between the copy of the Provincial Treasurer and that of the Purisima came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari with
Nacionalista Party. preliminary injunction praying that the lower court's order dismissing
his petition for recount be set aside and that the Commission on
Elections be enjoined from ordering resumption of the canvass until
Purisima requested for suspension of the canvass. The board of
after the judicial recount.
canvassers denied said request upon the ground that it was not yet
ascertainable if the discrepancies would materially affect the result.
Canvass proceeded. After the returns had all been read, Cordero Issue:
won as the third member of the Provincial Board, with a difference of
1 857 votes than that of Purisima. Whether or not the dismissed petition for recount should be set aside
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

Held: decide — that the Nacionalista Party copies are not copies that may
be the basis of a petition for recount, the fact remains that the
Yes. Commission on Elections' copies were said to reflect the same
discrepancy with the Provincial Treasurer's copies. It is settled that
the Commission on Elections' copies are authentic copies within the
The requisites for judicial recount are set forth in Section 163 of the
meaning of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code (Laws in v.
Revised Election Code:
Escalona, L-22540, July 31, 1964; Matanog v. Alejandro, L-22502-
08, June 30, 1964.)
When statements of precinct are contradictory. — In case it
appears to the provincial board of canvassers that another
It is the duty of the board of canvassers to suspend the canvass in
copy or other authentic copies of the statement from an
case of patent irregularity in the election returns. In the present case,
election precinct submitted to the board give to a candidate a
there were patent erasures and superimpositions, in words and
different number of votes and the difference affects the result
of the election, the Court of First Instance of the province, figures on the face of the election returns submitted to the board of
upon motion of the board or of any candidate affected, may canvassers. It was therefore imperative for the board to stop the
canvass so as to allow time for verification of authentic copies and
proceed to recount the votes cast in the precinct for the sole
recourse to the courts (Javier v. Commission on Elections, L-22248,
purpose of determining which is the true statement or which
January 30, 1965). A canvass or proclamation made notwithstanding
is the true result of the count of the votes cast in said
such patent defects, without awaiting proper remedies, is null and
precinct for the office in question. Notice of such proceeding
void (Ibid.). In fact, as stated, the Commission on Elections declared
shall be given to all candidates affected.
the canvass and proclamation, made by respondent provincial board
of canvassers, null and void.
It is not disputed that a candidate affected can file the petition for
recount, even if he does so alone, without the concurrence of the
Since the board of canvassers prevented Purisima from securing the
provincial board of canvassers (Cawa v. Del Rosario, L-16837-40,
May 30,1960). From the fact that the provincial board of canvassers Commission on Elections' copies of the returns to establish a
discrepancy between them and the Provincial Treasurer's copies, the
has not petitioned for a recount it cannot be inferred that they were
failure to submit the Commission on Elections' copies to said board
not convinced a discrepancy existed. In fact, when Purisima first
should not prejudice Purisima's right to petition for recount before the
called attention to the discrepancy between the Nacionalista Party
court. It was therefore grave abuse of discretion for respondent court
copies and the Provincial Treasurer's copies, the board of
canvassers admitted the discrepancy but stated that it was not yet to refuse to consider the Commission on Elections' copies,
ascertainable whether the discrepancy would amount to enough regardless of the patent and admitted irregularities on the face of the
Provincial Treasurer's copies and the alleged discrepancy amounting
votes as to affect the result. There is no more question that the
to thousands of votes sufficient to affect the results.
number of votes involved in said discrepancy is more than enough to
alter the result.

The basis of the petition for recount was not merely a discrepancy
between the Nacionalista Party copies and the Provincial Treasurer's
copies of the returns. Paragraph 8 of said petition shows that, in
addition, the Commission on Elections' copies were relied upon.
Accordingly, even assuming for the nonce — a point we do not here
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
G.R. No. L-25467 April 27, 1967
LUCAS V. CAUTON, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and PABLO
SANIDAD, respondents.
FACTS:
 National election (November 9, 1965) petitioner Lucas V.
Cauton and respondent Pablo Sanidad, along with
Godofredo S. Reyes, were candidates for the office of
Representative in the second congressional district of Ilocos
Sur.
 respondent Sanidad brought to the attention of the Board the
fact that the entries of votes for the candidates for
Representative in those copies of the election returns that
came from the envelopes presented by the provincial
treasurer differed from the entries appearing in the copies of
the returns from the same election precincts that were in the
possession of the Liberal Party.1äwph
 Commission on Elections found "that it had been clearly
established that the copies of the election returns for the
Municipal Treasurer, for the Commission on Elections and
for the Provincial Treasurer for the municipality of Santa
Cruz have uniform alterations in the entries of the votes cast
for representative showing different number of votes
compared with the Liberal Party copies, while the copies of
the election returns for the Commission on Elections and the
Provincial Treasurer for the municipalities of Candon and
Santiago have likewise uniform alterations and showing
different numbers compared with the Liberal Party copies
...."
 December 22, 1965: COMELEC issued an order to direct
immediately the opening of the ballot boxes
 Pursuant to the instructions, ballot boxes were opened
 Cauton filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, praying that the resolution of the
COMELEC ordering the opening of the ballot boxes used in
all be annulled and set aside
ISSUE: W/N the resolution of COMELEC which orders the opening
of the ballot boxes is valid
HELD: Yes.
The power of the Commission on Elections in this respect is simply
administrative and supervisory — intended to secure the
proclamation of the winning candidate based on the true count of the
votes cast. When the Commission on Elections exercises this power
the purpose is not for the Commission to help a candidate win the
election but to bring about the canvass of the true results of the
elections as certified by the boards of election inspectors in every
precinct. The object of the canvass is to determine the result of the
elections based on the official election returns. In order that the result
of the canvass would reflect the true expression of the people's will in
the choice of their elective officials, the canvass must be based on
true, genuine, correct, nay untampered, election returns. It is in this
proceedings that the Commission on Elections exercises its
supervisory and administrative power in the enforcement of laws
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
relative to the conduct of elections, by seeing to it that the canvass is
based on the election returns as actually certified by the members of
the board of inspectors. Once the Commission on Elections is
convinced that the elections returns in the hands of the board of
canvassers do not constitute the proper basis in ascertaining the true
result of the elections, it should be its concern, nay its duty, to order
the taking of such steps as may be necessary in order that the
proper basis for the canvass is obtained or made available.
The election law requires the board of inspectors to prepare four
copies of the election return in each precinct — one to be deposited
in the ballot box, one to be delivered to the municipal treasurer, one
to be sent to the provincial treasurer, and one to be sent to the
Commission on Elections. In the case of the canvass of the election
returns for candidates for provincial or national offices, the election
returns received by the provincial treasurer from the boards of
inspectors are used. It is the duty of the provincial treasurer to turn
over to the provincial board of canvassers the election returns
received by him from the boards of inspectors. If the Commission on
Elections is duly informed and it so finds, in appropriate proceedings,
that the election returns in the hands of the provincial treasurer are
tampered, then the Commission should afford the candidate
adversely affected by the tampering an opportunity to show that
there exist authentic copies of the same election returns which are
not tampered. A recourse may be had to the copies received by the
Commission on Elections and to the copies received by the
municipal treasurer. If it is shown, that the copies in the hands of the
Commission on Elections and of the municipal treasurer are similarly
tampered as the copies in the hands of the provincial treasurer, then
it becomes evident that all the three copies of the election returns
outside the ballot box do not constitute a reliable basis for a canvass.
The only copies left to be checked, whether they are also tampered
or not, are the ones inside the ballot boxes. Certainly, the
Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its power to administer
and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections, may order
the opening of the ballot boxes to ascertain whether the copy inside
each ballot box is also tampered like the three copies outside the
ballot box, corresponding to each precinct. The Commission on
Elections may do this on its own initiative, or upon petition by the
proper party. Once it is found that the copy of the election return
inside the ballot box is untampered, the Commission on Elections
would then have accomplished two things, namely: (1) secured a
basis for the prosecution for the violation of the laws relative to
elections, and (2) afforded the party aggrieved by the alteration of
the election returns outside the ballot box a basis for a judicial
recount of the votes as provided for in Section 163 of the Revised
Election Code. Thus, the Commission on Elections has thereby
made available the proper and reliable basis for the canvass of the
votes that will lead to the proclamation by the board of canvassers of
the true winner in the elections. In so doing the Commission on
Elections, as we have said, had performed its constitutional duty of
administering and enforcing the laws relative to the conduct of
elections with a view to promoting clean and honest elections — the
very purpose for which the Commission on Elections was created by
constitutional mandate.
Commission on Elections has the power to inquire whether there
exist discrepancies among the various copies of the election
11
returns. Of all the copies prepared by the board of inspectors the
copy least susceptible to being tampered with is the one deposited in
the ballot box. Where the three copies outside the ballot boxes
appear to have been uniformly altered, there is no plausible reason
why the copy deposited in the ballot box may not be used to
determine whether discrepancies exist in the various copies.
Inasmuch as the Commission on Elections has the right to determine
whether said discrepancies exist, it must also have the right to
consult said returns, which cannot be done unless the ballot boxes
are opened. It is noteworthy that the Revised Election Code does not
provide that it is the courts that have the power to order the opening
of the ballot box in a situation like this.
G.R. No. 188456 February 10, 2010
H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL R.
BAGARES, ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL, GILBERT T.
ANDRES, IMMACULADA D. GARCIA, ERLINDA T. MERCADO,
FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, MA. AZUCENA P. MACEDA, and
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
ALVIN A. PETERS, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by HON.
CHAIRMAN JOSE MELO, COMELEC SPECIAL BIDS and
AWARDS COMMITTEE, represented by its CHAIRMAN HON.
FERDINAND RAFANAN, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and
MANAGEMENT, represented by HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA,
TOTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and
SMARTMATIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Respondents.
PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, Petitioner-in-Intervention.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Movant-Intervenor.
Facts
 23 January 2007: Congress passed RA 9369 amending the
[2]
first automated election law, RA 8436. Section 5 of RA
8436, as amended by RA 9369, which amendment took
effect on 10 February 2007, authorized the COMELEC to:
Use an automated election system or systems in the
same election in different provinces, whether paper-
based or a direct recording automated election system
as it may deem appropriate and practical for the
process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidation and transmittal of results of
electoral exercises: Provided, that for the regular
national and local election, which shall be held
immediately after effectivity of this Act, the AES
shall be used in at least two highly urbanized cities
and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao, to be chosen by the Commission x x x x
In succeeding regular national or local elections, the
AES shall be implemented nationwide. (Emphasis
supplied)
 The COMELEC did not use any automated election system
in the 14 May 2007 elections, the national and local elections
held after RA 9369 took effect.
 10 July 2009: the COMELEC, on the one hand, and TIM
and Smartmatic (Provider), on the other, signed the Contract
for the automated tallying and recording of votes cast
nationwide in the 10 May 2010 elections. For
P7,191,484,739.48, the COMELEC leased for use in the 10
May 2010 elections 82,200 optical scanners (and related
equipment) and hired ancillary services of theProvider.

[4]
9 July 2009, petitioners, filed this petition to enjoin the
signing of the Contract or its implementation and to compel
disclosure of the terms of the Contract and other agreements
[5]
between the Provider and its subcontractors. Petitioners:
o sought the Contract's invalidation for non-
compliance with the requirement in Section 5 of RA
8436, as amended, mandating the partial use of an
automated election system before deploying it
nationwide.
o alleged that:
 (1) the optical scanners leased by the
COMELEC do not satisfy the minimum
systems capabilities" under RA 8436, as
amended and
 (2) the Provider not only failed to submit
relevant documents during the bidding but
also failed to show "community of interest"
among its constituent corporations as
required in Information Technology
Foundation of the Philippines v.
COMELEC (Infotech).
Issue
Whether or not, the COMELECgravely abuse its discretion when it
entered to contract with Smartmatic TIM Corporation and assailing to
an automated election.
Ruling
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

NO. Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the enabling

automation law, RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, the RFP and .This independent constitutional commission, it is true, possesses
even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners invoked as an extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in the
afterthought, the Court finds the project award to have complied with discharge of its functions. The road, however, towards successful
legal prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of the 2010 automation elections would certainly be rough and bumpy. The
corresponding automation contract in question to be valid. No grave comelec is laboring under very tight timelines. It would accordingly
abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all
respondent COMELEC. And surely, the winning joint venture should men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist
not be faulted for having a foreign company as partner. comelec personnel address the fears expressed about the integrity
of the system. Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish
The COMELEC is an independent constitutional body with a distinct automated elections to succeed, credibly.
and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its
awesome functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it
should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be
justified in the case of an organization of lesser responsibility.[103] It
should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in
devising means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the
great objective for which it was created--to promote free, orderly,
honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too often,
COMELEC has to make decisions under difficult conditions to
address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election
and in the process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the
Court has steered away from interfering with the COMELEC’s
exercise of its power which, by law and by the nature of its office
properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion on comelec’s part, as here, the Court should
refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let
alone nullify, the acts of that body.

There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time

and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
laws relative to the conduct of elections, x x x we must not by any
excessive zeal take away from the comelec the initiative which by
G.R. No. 199082 September 18, 2012 July 23, 2013
constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard
(motion for reconsideration)
to the independent character of the Commission x x x requires that
the power of this court to review the acts of that body should, as a
general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate FACTS: On August 2, 2011, the Comelec issued Resolution
cases. No. 9266 approving the creation of a committee jointly with the
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies
committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections. On August 15, 2011,
the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating
and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the
2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation
cases. Section 2 of the Joint Order lays down the mandate of the
Joint Committee to wit:
Section 2. Mandate. – The Committee shall conduct the necessary
preliminary investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered and
the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team created and
referred to in Section 4 hereof. Resolutions finding probable cause
for election offenses, defined and penalized under the Omnibus
Election Code and other election laws shall be approved by the
Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. For
other offenses, or those not covered by the Omnibus Election Code
and other election laws, the corresponding criminal information may
be filed directly with the appropriate courts.
The Fact-Finding Team, on the other hand, was created for the
purpose of gathering real, documentary, and testimonial evidence
which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted
by the Joint Committee. The Fact-Finding Team concluded that
manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections
in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao
was indeed perpetrated. It recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S.
Abalos et al, and Gloria Arroyo (GMA) be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the
election results in North and South Cotabato. Several persons were
also recommended to be charged administratively, while others,
including petitioner Mike Arroyo, were recommended to be subjected
to further investigation.
After the preliminary investigation, the Joint Committee promulgated
a Joint Resolution which was later indorsed to the Comelec. The
COMELEC en banc adopted the resolution ordering that
information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against
GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo,
among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioners claim that in creating the Joint Panel, the Comelec has
effectively abdicated its constitutional mandate to investigate and,
where appropriate, to prosecute cases of violation of election laws
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses,
and malpractices in favor of the Executive Department acting
through the DOJ Secretary. Under the set- up, the Comelec
personnel is placed under the supervision and control of the DOJ.
The chairperson is a DOJ official. Thus, the Comelec has willingly
surrendered its independence to the DOJ and has acceded to share
its exercise of judgment and discretion with the Executive Branch.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011
"Creating and Constituting a Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary
Investigation Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and
2007 National Elections Electoral Fraud and Manipulation Cases" is
constitutional in light of the independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional body.
2) Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction under the
law to conduct preliminary investigation jointly with the DOJ.
HELD: 1) YES. Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as
independent. Although essentially executive in nature, they are not
under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge
of their respective functions. The Constitution envisions a truly
independent Comelec committed to ensure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections and to serve as the guardian of the
people’s sacred right of suffrage – the citizenry’s vital weapon in
effecting a peaceful change of government and in achieving and
promoting political stability.
Prior to the amendment of Section 265 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the Comelec had the exclusive authority to investigate and
prosecute election offenses. In the discharge of this exclusive power,
the Comelec was given the right to avail and, in fact, availed of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government such as the
prosecutors of the DOJ.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

As pointed out by the Court in Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission
on Elections, the grant of exclusive power to investigate and
prosecute cases of election offenses to the Comelec was not by
virtue of the Constitution but by the Omnibus Election Code
which was eventually amended by Section 43 of R.A. 9369.
Thus, the DOJ now conducts preliminary investigation of election
offenses concurrently with the Comelec and no longer as mere
deputies.
initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary
investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and
the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with another office
(such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the
second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a
settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no impediment for the

creation of a Joint Committee. While the composition of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team is dominated by DOJ
officials, it does not necessarily follow that the Comelec is
inferior. Under the Joint Order, resolutions of the Joint Committee
finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by
the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
This shows that the Comelec, though it acts jointly with the DOJ,
remains in control of the proceedings. In no way can we say that the
Comelec has thereby abdicated its independence to the executive
department. Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the
creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should
be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional body’s
independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN
adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013 October 22, 2013
(motion for reconsideration)
2) YES. Although it belongs to the executive department,
as the agency tasked to investigate crimes, prosecute FACTS: On October 31 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro
offenders, and administer the correctional system, the DOJ is Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
likewise not barred from acting jointly with the Comelec. It must Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to
be emphasized that the DOJ and the Comelec exercise concurrent Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of
jurisdiction in conducting preliminary investigation of election petitioner on the ground that it contained material
offenses. The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when she is
jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas; (2)
contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is
exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her
is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Quezon City; (3) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964 when other
documents show that her birthdate is either July 8, 1959 or July 3,
1960; (4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country
when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant of the United
States of America; and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is,
in fact, an American citizen.
Petitioner countered all the allegations of Tan. On March 27, 2013,
the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling
petitioner’s COC. The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary
to the declarations that she made in her COC, petitioner is not a
citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. The COMELEC First
Division ruled that she did not have the one year residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the
lone district of Marinduque.
On May 14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
However, on May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the
May 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc
issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution
of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that
more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of
promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its
execution. On same day, petitioner took her oath of office before
Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts
at noon of 30 June 2013.
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction
when she was duly proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the
"sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction
over Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already
taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque.
HELD: NO. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the
COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal.
Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action. Second,
the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. x x x
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have
jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House of
Representatives, to wit:
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications
after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after
a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is
obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the
question. (Emphasis supplied.)
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a
Member of the House of Representatives?
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and
Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet
assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of
office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only "at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Thus,
until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 157013
July 10, 2003
FACTS: Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking a declaration that
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. RA No. 9189,
entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting
by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes, appropriates funds under Section
29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the
General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall
provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions.
Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain
officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) of the assailed law is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes
to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution
does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to
perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that
the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement
of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition
thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence
requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the
right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of
the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N RA 9189 is unconstitutional
HELD: No. Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically
provides that suffrage may be exercised by (1) all citizens of the
Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least
eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election. Under Section
5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an
immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the
host country unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her
registration under said Act.
Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an
affidavit to qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or
permanent residents, to vote. He focuses solely on Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity to Section
5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2
empowering Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress
shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must
be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the
exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the
absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly
exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The Legislative
Department) of the Constitution.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person
cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee
However, under our election laws and the countless
pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee
remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile.
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant
or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country
because immigration or permanent residence in another country
implies renunciation of ones residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident
abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an
affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in
pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2
of Article V that all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage
and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for
otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required,
there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate
Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself

is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in
Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or
permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression
that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is
not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section
5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes provisional registration
or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote
in a political exercise.

The Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas

absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such
mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of
absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the qualified
citizen of the Philippines abroad is not physically present in the
country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of
the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No.
9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is
deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is
presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from
this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident
of his host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his
intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore,
under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he
has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by
executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. AMADEO

CORRAL

G.R. No. L-42300

2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
January 31, 1936
FACTS: Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general
elections held on June 5, 1934. After due trial, he was convicted on
the ground that he had voted while laboring under a legal
disqualification. The judgment of conviction was based on section
2642, in connection with section 432. of the Revised Administrative
Code. Said Section 432 provides that any person who, since the
thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, has
been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen
months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by
plenary pardon is disqualified from voting.
It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final
judgment of the court to suffer eight years and one day of presidio
mayor. No evidence was presented to show that prior to June 5,
1934, he had been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise
undisputed that at the general elections held on June 5, 1934, the
voted in election precinct No. 18 of the municipality of Davao,
Province of Davao.
Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter
voted in 1928 his offense had already prescribed, and he could no
longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the general election held on
June 5, 1934.
ISSUE: W/N appellant is disqualified to vote.
HELD: Yes. The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a
function of government. The right to vote is not a natural right but is a
right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to
such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the
public good. The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of
suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of crime, is beyond
question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is
to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one
rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense
indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of
suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be
adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and not for
punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a
personal right.
Upon the facts established in this case, it seems clear that the
appellant was not entitled to vote on June 5 1934, because of
section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code which disqualified
from voting any person who, since the 13th day of August, 1898, had
been sentenced by final judgment to offer not less than eighteen
months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by
plenary pardon. As above stated, the appellant had been sentenced
by final judgment to suffer eight years and one day of presidio
mayor, and had not been granted a plenary pardon.
The disqualification for crime imposed under section 432 of the
Revised Administrative Code having once attached on the appellant
and not having been subsequently removed by a plenary pardon,
continued and rendered it illegal for the appellant to vote at the
general elections of 1934.
Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for
the appellant that the disqualification imposed on the latter must be
considered as having been removed at the expiration of his
sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the
nature of the disqualification. It regards it as a punishment when, as
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

already indicated, the correct view is that it is imposed, "for HELD: NO, section 404 of the election law states that to
protection and not for punishment,. the withholding of a prvilege and run for public office, one must be a qualified elector. One
not the denial of a personal right." Judicial interpretation and long
established administrative practice are against such a view.
of the requirements to be a qualified elector is to be a
qualified voter. Section 431 states the requirements for a
YRA v ABANO qualification of a voter, while section 432 states the
disqualification. All of these are needed in able to be
G.R. No. L-30187 November 15, 1928
register and vote. However, registration and voting is
NOT a requirement in order to run for public office. What
is needed is to be a qualified elector and a qualified
FACTS: Maximo Abano is a native of the municipality of
voter, which Abano complied with. Registration only
Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the proper age, he transferred
regulates the exercise to vote.
to Manila to complete his education. While temporarily
residing in Manila, Abano registered as a voter there.
Shortly after qualifying as a member of the bar and after
the death of his father, Abano returned to Meycauayan to
live. From May 10, 1927, until the present, Abano has
considered himself a resident of Meycauayan. When the
1928 elections were approaching, he made an
application for cancellation of registration in Manila which
was dated April 3, 1928, but this application was rejected
by the city officials for the reason that it was not
deposited in the mails on or before April 4, 1928.
Nevertheless Abano presented himself as a candidate for
municipal president of Meycauayan in the 1928 elections
and was elected by popular vote to that office. Petitioner AKBAYAN YOUTH v COMELEC
now questions the qualifications of Abano through a quo
warranto proceeding. G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001

ISSUE: Whether registration is a qualification to run for

a public office
FACTS: Akbayan—Youth seek to direct the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a
special registration before the May 14, 2001 General
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to
petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on
or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the
respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189
(Voter's Registration Act of 1996). COMELEC issued a
resolution denying the petition for a Special Registration
of new voters. COMELEC claims that Section 8 of R.A.
8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty
(120) days before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-
election activities.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC may be compelled by
Mandamus to hold a Special Registration beyond the
deadline.
petitioners' argument, registration cannot and should not
be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory
requirement. Proceeding from the significance of
registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote,
the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent
police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and
regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate
purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important end,
that even pre-election activities could be performed by
the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly
manner - one which is not indifferent and so far removed
from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times.

HELD: NO. The right of a citizen to vote is necessarily

conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he
must undergo: among others, the process of registration.
Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise
his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements
set by fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register,
at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No.
8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of
1996. The act of registration is an indispensable
precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is
part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable
element in the election process. Thus, contrary to
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
KABATAAN PARTY LIST vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 221318 December 16, 2015
FACTS:
RA 10367 or the Mandatory Biometrics Registration Act of
2013 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics
registration system for new voters in order to establish a clean,
complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption
of biometric technology.
RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters whose
biometrics have not been captured shall submit themselves for
validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the
last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May
2016 elections shall be deactivated x x x.”
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by
Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013. Among others, the said Resolution
provides that: “the registration records of voters without biometrics
data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of
filing of applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9,
2016 National and Local Elections shall be deactivated.
Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the
biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well
as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related
thereto.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics
validation is an unconstitutional requirement of literacy and
property.
2. Whether or not biometrics validation passes the strict
scrutiny test.
3. Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline
for validation on October 31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA
8189.
HELD:
1) NO. The Court held that biometrics validation is not a
“qualification” to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere
aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right
to reasonably regulate.
The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that
registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a
qualification for such right. The process of registration is a procedural
limitation on the right to vote.
Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,”
he must nonetheless still comply with the registration procedure in
order to vote.
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises
to the level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement as
contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution -that is, one which
propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
basis to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further
the public good -the same cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional, as in this case.
2) YES. In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the
burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.
Presence of compelling state interest
Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation
requirement under RA 10367 advances a compelling state interest. It
was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest,
and credible elections by containing -if not eliminating, the perennial
problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple
registrants. The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a
compelling state interest.
Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means for achieving
the above-said interest
Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for
biometrics validation, whereby the registered voter is only required
to: (a) personally appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b)
present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo,
signature, and fingerprints recorded.
Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not
mandate registered voters to submit themselves to validation every
time there is an election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo
the validation process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in
succeeding elections, provided that he remains an active voter.
Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated
voters from exercising their right to vote in the succeeding elections.
To rectify such status, they could still apply for reactivation.
3) NO.
Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:
System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x No registration
shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days
before a special election.
The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods stated
therein refer to the prohibitive period beyond which voter registration
may no longer be conducted. The subject provision does not
mandate COMELEC to conduct voter registration up to such time;
rather, it only provides a period which may not be reduced, but may
be extended depending on the administrative necessities and other
exigencies.
Poe-Llamanzares v Comelec
GR no. 221697 221698 -700
Grace Poe was found abandoned in a church in Jaro, Iloilo
in 1968. Parental care was passed to the relatives of Edgardo Militar,
the person who found the child. The relatives then reported and
registered the child as a founding with the Civil Registrar of Iloilo.
The child was then named Mary Grace Militar. The child was
subsequently adopted adopted by Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan
Roces in 1974. Necessary annotations were placed in the child’s
foundling certificate but it was only in 2005 that Susan Roces
discovered that their lawyer failed to secure a Certificate of Live Birth
indicating Poe’s new name as well as the name of the adoptive
parents. Roces then submitted an affidavit in 2006, a Certificate of
Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Poe was released by the Civil
Registry of Iloilo.
At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan.
In 1988, she was issued a Philippine passport. In 1991, Poe married
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Teodoro Llamanzares and flew to the US right after the wedding.
She then gave birth to her eldest child in the US. In 2001, Poe
became a naturalized American Citizen and she obtained a US
Passport that same year.
In April 2004, Poe came back to the Philippines in order to
support her father’s candidacy. It was at this time that she gave birth
to her youngest daughter. She then returned to the US in July 2004
with her two daughters. Poe returned in December 2004 after
learning of her father’s deteriorating condition. The latter died and
Poe stayed until February 2005 to take care of the funeral
arrangements.
Poe stated that she wanted to be with her grieving mother
hence, she and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines sometime first quarter of 2005. They
prepared for resettlement including notification of their children’s
schools, coordination with property movers and inquiry with
Philippine authorities as to how they can bring their pet dog.
According to Poe, as early as 2004, she already quit her job in the
US.
Poe came home on May 24, 2005 and immediately secured
a TIN while her husband stayed in the US. She and her family stayed
with her mother until she and husband was able to purchase a
condominium in San Juan sometime February 2006. On February
14, 2006, Poe returned to the US to dispose the other family
belongings. She travelled back in March 2006. In early 2006, Poe
and husband acquired a property in Corinthian Hills in Quezon City
where they built their family home.
On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 9225. On July 10, 2006,
she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together
with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children.
The Bureau of Immigration acted in favor of the petition on July 18,
2006. She and her children were then considered dual citizens. Poe
then registered as voter in August 2006 and secured a Philippine
passport thereafter.
On October 6, 2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of
the MTRCB. Before assuming her post, she executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the US before a notary public in Pasig
City on October 20, 2010. The following day, she submitted the
Affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration and took her oath as MTRCB
Chairperson. According to Poe, she stopped using her American
passport from then on.
On July 12, 2011, Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the US before the Vice Consul of the
US Embassy in Manila. On December 9, 2011, the US Vice Consul
issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US effective October
21, 2010.
On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with COMELEC her
Certificate of Candidacy for Senator stating that she was a resident
of the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months before May
13, 2013. She was then proclaimed a Senator on May 16, 2013.
On October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the Presidency
for the May 2016 elections. She declared that she is a natural born
and her residence in the Philippine up to the day before election
would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
Several petitions were filed against Poe alleging that (1) she
committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she stated
that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years 11
months up to the day before May 9, 2016 Elections, (2) she is not
natural born considering that Poe is a foundling. It was argued that
international law does not confer natural born status and Filipino
citizenship to foundlings hence, she is not qualified to apply for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A.9225 as she is not a
natural citizen to begin with. Assuming that Poe was a natural born
citizen, she lost it when she became a US Citizen.
ISSUES: 1) Whether it can be concluded that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos.
2) Whether as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Citizen.
 2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
3) Whether Poe’s repatriation resulted to reacquisition of
natural born citizenship.
4) Whether Poe is a resident of the Philippine for 10 years.
HELD:
1) YES. Presumption regarding paternity is neither unknown
nor unacceptable in Philippine Law. There is more than sufficient
evidence that Poe has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-
born Filipino. Hence, the burden of proof was on private respondents
to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen.
Private respondents should show that Poe’s parents were aliens.
Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her
because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents
were Filipinos. In fact, there is a high probability that her parents are
Filipinos. The Solicitor General offered official Statistics from the
Philippine Statistics office that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos
born in the country were more than 10 Million. On this basis, there is
a 99% chance that the child born in the Philippines would be a
Filipino which in turn, would indicate more than ample probability that
Poe’s parents are Filipinos.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poe’s parents
are the fact that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features.
There are disputable presumptions that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature. On this basis,
it is safer to assume that Poe’s parents are Filipinos. To assume
otherwise is to accept the absurd.
2) YES. Foundlings are, as a class, natural born citizens. While
the 1935 Constitution is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language that would exclude them either. Because of silence and
ambiguity in the enumeration, there is a need to examine the intent of
the framers.
The argument that the process to determine that the child is
a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate are acts
to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship is without merit. Hence,
the argument that as a foundling, Poe underwent a process in order
to acquire or perfect her Philippine citizenship, is untenable.
“Having to perform an act” means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In this case, the determination of
foundling status was done by authorities, not by Poe. Second, the
object of the process is to determine the whereabouts of the parents,
not the citizenship of the child and lastly, the process is not
analogous to naturalization proceedings.
Under international law, foundlings are citizens. Generally
accepted principles of international law which include international
customs form part of the laws of the land. The common thread of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the International Convent on Civil and
Political Rights obligates the Philippines to grant nationality from birth
and to ensure that no child is stateless. The principles stated in the:
1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of
Nationality laws (that a foundling is presumed to have the nationality
of the country of birth)
2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is
presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found) bind the
Philippines although we are not signatory to these conventions.
Although we are not a signatory to the Hague Convention,
we are a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) which affirms Article 14 of the Hague Convention. Likewise,
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness affirms Article 15
of the UDHR. By analogy, although the Philippines has not signed
the International Convention for the Protection of Persons from
Enforced Disappearance, we (the Supreme Court) ruled that the
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
proscription against enforced disappearance was nonetheless
binding as a generally accepted principle of international law.
Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia,
North and South America and Europe have passed legislation
recognizing foundlings as its citizens. 166 out of 189 countries
accept that foundlings are recognized as citizens. Hence, there is a
generally accepted principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born and a national of the country in
which it is found.
Hence, as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Filipino citizen.
3) YES. The COMELEC arrogantly disregarded
jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation which states that
repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. A
natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality will be
restored to his former status as natural born Filipino after repatriation
(Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc). In passing
R.A. 9225, Congress saw it fit to decree that natural born citizenship
may be reacquired even if it has been lost. It is not for the
COMELEC to disagree with the Congress’ determination.
Neither is repatriation an act to ‘acquire or perfect’ one’s
citizenship. In the case of Bengson, the Court pointed out that there
are only two types of citizens under the 1987 constitution: natural
born and naturalized. There is no third category for repatriated
citizens. The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. Hence,
COMELEC’s decision is wrapped with grave abuse of discretion.
4) YES. Poe alleged that her residency should be
counted from May 24, 2005 when she returned for good from the US.
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile 1. Residence or
bodily presence in a new locality 2. Intention to remain (animus
manendi) and 3. Intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non-
revertendi). The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time, the change of residence
must be voluntary and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
SC held that the other cases previously decided by the court
wherein residence was counted only from the acquisition of
permanent residence were decided as such because there is sparse
evidence on establishment of residence. These cases cannot be
applied in the present case. In the case at bar, there is overwhelming
evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe decided to
permanently abandon her US residence and reside in the Philippines
as early as May 24, 2005.
These evidence, coupled with her eventual application to
reacquire Philippine citizenship is clear that when she returned in
May 2005, it was for good.
The stamp in her passport as a balikbayan does not make
Poe an ordinary transient.
Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2012 COC
was only a mistake in good faith. Such a mistake could be given in
evidence against her but it was by no means conclusive considering
the overwhelming evidence submitted by Poe. Considering that the
COMELEC failed to take into consideration these overwhelming
evidence, its decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
decision of the COMELEC is hereby annulled and set aside. Poe is
thus declared qualified to be a candidate for President in the
National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.
Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen who lost his
citizenship upon naturalization as a citizen of the United States.
Subsequently, he availed of the benefits of RA 922, the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 and ran as Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 2010 local elections.
Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado, contending that Arnado is foreigner. It turned out
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and
departing the Philippines.
The Comelec annulled the proclamation of Arnado and
consequently directed that order of succession under Section 44 of
the Local Gov’t Code of 1991 be followed. It ruled that Arnado’s act
of consistently using his US Passport after renouncing his US
citizenship negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
Petitioner Casan Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest votes in the 2010
elections, intervened. He argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Sec. 44,
LGC is not applicable in this case. He claims that due to the
cancellation of Arnado’s candidady and nullification of the latter’s
proclamation, he should be proclaimed as the winner.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the use of foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship affects one’s qualification to run for public office?
2) Whether the rule on succession in the Local Government
Code is applicable in this case.
HELD:
1) YES. The act of using foreign passport after renouncing
one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public
office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, Arnado was deemed
to be solely a Filipino Citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. However, this
legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to
attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen
performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a
foreign citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the
acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an
act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a
former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position.
The Court agrees with the Comelec En Banc that such act of
using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself, as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and
effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado
represented himself as an American citizen by using his US
passport.
Thus, by the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, Arnado
was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and
American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by express
disqualification under Section 40 (d) of the LGC, he was not qualified
to run for a local elective position.
2) NO. The rule on succession under the LGC will not
apply.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s awareness of
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach
to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who place second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed
as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the
first-placer among the qualified candidates.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s
candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence
of Sec 68, Ominibus Election Code, the effect of which is to
disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
already been elected, from holding the office.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate,
his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor
should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
disqualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
Thus, the rule on succession under the LGC will not apply.
Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC et al G.R. NO.
221697 221698-700
J. Carpio – Dissenting Opinion
PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS:
 A presidential candidate who is deemed a natural born
citizen by less than a majority and deemed not a natural-
born Filipino citizen by five Justices and with no opinion from
three Justices is now allowed to run for President of the
Philippines. J. Carpio dissents.
 He notes that the ruling of the majority will lead to absurd
results by allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain
citizenship status to be potentially elected. The majority
wants to resolve the citizenship status only after the election,
and if the petitioner wins.
 Poe failed to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
and a resident of the Philippines for the last ten years hence,
she is not eligible to run as President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
ON COMELEC JURISDICTION:
Section 2(1), Article IX-C vests in the COMELEC the power, among
others, to “enforce and administer all laws... relative to the conduct of
the election.” Screening initially the qualifications of the candidates
lies within this specific power. Pursuant to this constitutional
mandate, the COMELEC can initially disqualify those lacking any of
the qualifications before the conduct of the election.
The Supreme Court in the case of Timbol upheld the COMELEC’s
power to disqualify a nuisance candidate. It cannot be disputed that
a person not a natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore, ineligible,
who files a certificate of candidacy for President, “puts the election
process in mockery”. Such person is therefore a nuisance candidate.
Under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is
empowered, motu propio, to cancel a COC if it has been filed “to put
the election process in mockery”. The electorate is needlessly misled
to cast their votes if an ineligible candidate is allowed to run.
COMELEC cannot be a party to such a mockery; otherwise, it will be
committing a grave abuse of discretion .
ON CITIZENSHIP:
The 1935 Constitution, which is applicable in Poe’s case, allows only
two methods of acquiring Philippine citizenship:
1. By blood relation to the father or mother who must
be a Filipino citizen
2. By naturalization according to law
The Philippines adheres to the jus sanguinis principle or the
“law of the blood” to determine citizenship at birth. An individual
acquires Filipino citizenship at birth solely by virtue of biological
descent from a Filipino mother or father. This view is made evident
by the suppression from the Constitution of the jus soli principle.
Poe contends that as a foundling, she is deemed included in
par. 3 and 4 of Article IV of the 1935 constitution (Par 3 - Those
whose father are citizens of the Philippines and Par 4 - those whose
mother are citizens of the Philippines, and upon reaching the age of
majority, elects Philippine citizenship).
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Poe is gravely mistaken as the framers of the 1935
Constitution voted to categorically reject the proposal to include
foundlings as Citizens of the Philippines. The delegates actually
voted to reject Rafol’s amendment to consider children of
unknown parentage as Filipino citizens. Three delegates even
voiced out their objections to this amendment and stated that
the Congress should instead provide an enabling law for
foundlings to be considered as Filipino citizens.
Poe argues that the reason why the provision on foundlings
was not included in the 1935 Constitution was because there is
already a clear principle existing in domestic and international law on
foundlings. Carpio comments that there is no such domestic law as
well as international law existing during the proceedings of the 1935
Constitutional Convention explicitly governing citizenship of
foundlings and thus there could not have been any redundancy to
speak of. The Spanish Civil Code which has a provision on
foundlings ceased to have any effect in our land upon the cession by
Spain of the Philippines to the US.
Likewise, only the 1930 Hague Convention relating to the
Conflict of Nationality law, which articulated the presumption on the
place of birth of foundlings, was in existence during the deliberations
of the 1935 constitution. This Convention does not guarantee a
nationality to a foundling at birth and there is no prevailing customary
international law at the time, as there is still none today, conferring
automatically a nationality to foundlings at birth.
While the framers of the 1935 Constitution discussed the
matter of foundlings, they not only rejected the proposal to include a
provision relating to them (foundlings) but also clearly manifested
that foundlings could not be citizens of the Philippines at birth like
children of Filipino fathers. The framers intended to exclude
foundling from the definition of natural born Filipino citizens by
expressly rejecting Rafol’s proposal.
Clearly, it was the intent of the framers of the 1935
Constitution to refer to natural-born citizens as only those who were
Filipino citizens by the mere fact of being born to fathers who were
Filipino citizens – nothing more nothing less. As a matter of course,
those whose parents are neither Filipino citizens or are both
unknown, as the case of foundlings, cannot be considered natural
born Filipino citizens.
FOUNDLINGS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
It is a fundamental principle that every independent state has
the right and prerogative to determine who its citizens are. This
principle is applied in the Philippines as early as 1912 in the case of
Roa. The 1930 Hague Convention explicitly recognizes this principle.
Hence, it is the municipal law, both constitutional and statutory,
which determines and regulates the conditions on acquiring
citizenship.
There is no customary international law presuming a
foundling as a citizen of the country where the foundling is found.
Poe anchors her claims on the Convention of the Rights of the Child,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1930 Hague
Convention, and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness (CRS).
1. Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) was ratified by
the Philippines only on August 21, 1990. This convention
binds the Philippines only on the day of ratification. Since
Poe was born in 1968, her citizenship at birth cannot be
affected in any way by the Convention. Moreover, the CRC
does not guarantee a child a nationality at birth much less a
natural citizenship at birth as understood under the
Philippine constitution, but merely the right to acquire a
nationality in accordance with a domestic law.
2. ICCPR – the ICCPR entered into force on 23 March 1976.
The ICCPR does not obligate states to automatically grant a
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
nationality to children at birth. The covenant does not
guarantee a foundling a nationality at birth.
3. UDHR – The UDHR (Art. 15 on the right to a nationality) is
merely a declaration. It does not obligate states to
automatically confer nationality to a foundling.
4. 1930 Hague Convention – the Philippines is not a signatory
to this convention, hence, Philippines is not bound by it. Poe
claims that this convention is evidence of “generally
accepted principles of international law.” Note that Article 14
of this convention states that foundlings shall have the
nationality of the country OF birth”. It does not say that a
foundling shall have the nationality AT birth. There is nothing
in this article that guarantees the nationality of a foundling at
birth, much less natural born citizenship at birth as
understood under the Philippine constitution. Moreover,
Article 15 of the convention acknowledges the fact that
acquisition of nationality by reason of birth in a state’s
territory is not automatic. It actually states that municipal law
determines the conditions governing the acquisition of
nationality.
5. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness – the
Philippines is not a signatory to this convention. The
convention does not bind the Philippines. Likewise, Art. 2 of
the CRS which states that “foundling found in the territory of
a contracting state, shall in the absence of proof to the
contrary, to have been born within that territory of parents
possessing the nationality of that state” binds only
contracting states, of which, the Philippines is not.
In sum there is no international treaty to which the
Philippines is a contracting party, which provides expressly or
impliedly that a foundling is deemed a natural born citizen of the
country in which the founding is found.
On the issue of customary international law, one of its
elements (widespread and consistent practice of states) was not duly
proven by Poe. She failed to show that Article 2 of the CRS is an
established, widespread and consistent practice of a majority of
sovereign states. On the other hand, international law writers
generally accept that the CRS does not constitute customary
international law precisely because of the small number of states that
have ratified the convention. Since the first element of customary
international law is missing, the second element (opinion juris) is
lacking as well. There is no general international law, whether
customary international law or generally accepted principle of
international law, obligating the Philippines, or any state, to
automatically confer citizenship to foundlings at birth.
There are only two general principles of international law applicable
to foundlings;
1. First, that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country
where the foundling is found
(they have a domicile at birth, not a nationality at birth)
2. A founding is deemed born in the country where the
foundling is found.
These two general principles have nothing to do with conferment of
nationality.
Assuming that there was in the 1935 and thereafter, a
customary international law conferring nationality to foundlings at
birth, still foundlings could not be considered as natural born Filipino
citizens as such would conflict with the concept of jus sanguinis
under the 1935 Constitution. In case of conflict between customary
international law and the Constitution, the constitution prevails.
Moreover, there is a difference between citizenship at birth
because of jus soli and citizenship at birth because of jus
sanguisinis. The former may be granted to foundlings under the
constitution but the citizenship granted is not of a natural-born
citizenship but that of naturalized citizenship. Only those citizens at
birth because of jus sanguisinis, which required blood relation to a
parent are natural citizens under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitution.
ON STATISTICS
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
The statistics shown speak of foreign and Filipino births in
the Philippines with known parents, either Filipino or foreigner. It
does not show the number of foundlings born in the Philippines. This
data also do not show the number of foundlings who were later
determined to have Filipino parentage. If there is 99% probability that
a child born in the Philippines is a natural born citizen, it does not
automatically follow that there is 99% probability that a foundling
born in the Philippines is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The data on
foundlings, if any, may show a different statistical data. For the
Solicitor General to assert that a foundling with a blond hair, blue
eyes and milky white Caucasian skin is a natural born citizen is the
height of absurdity.
Philippine laws and jurisprudence on adoption is not
determinative of natural born citizenship. The term “natural born
Filipino citizen” does not appear in the domestic or inter-country
adoption act. In fact, while the term “Filipino” is mentioned, it is only
in the title of these laws. The text of the adoption laws do not contain
the term “Filipino.” There is no specific provision in these adoption
laws requiring that adoptees must be Filipinos, much less natural
born Filipinos. These adoption laws do not distinguish between a
Filipino child and an alien child found in the Philippines. Hence they
apply to both Filipino and alien child found in the Philippines over
which the government exercises jurisdiction. The case of Ellis and
Duncan does not apply in the case at bar because: 1) the case do
not involve foundlings 2) the issues raised therein do not involve
citizenship.
On burden of proof
Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the
burden of proving his or her Philippine citizenship. A person who
claims to be qualified to run for the position of President, because he
or she, is a natural born citizen, has the burden of proving that
he/she is indeed a natural born citizen. Any doubt should be resolved
against him/her. In this case, there is no dispute that petitioner is a
foundling with unknown biological parents. Hence, her certificate of
live birth does not show on its face that she is a natural born Filipino
citizen. This shifted the burden of evidence to the petitioner that she
is eligible to run and she could have used evidence such as DNA.
Summary: Petitioner is not a natural born citizen because:
1. No Philippine law automatically confers Philippine citizenship to a
foundling at birth
2. The 1935 constitution clearly excluded foundlings from being
considered natural born citizens
3. There is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship,
whether natural or naturalized.
4. There is no treaty, customary international law or general principle
of international law granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a
foundling at birth.
5. Assuming that there is a customary law presuming that foundling
is a citizen of the country where it is found, such presumption cannot
prevail over the Philippine constitution which adopts the jus
sanguinis principle
6. Petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a
natural born Filipino citizen
7. Foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his/her status as a
foundling to acquire a Philippine citizenship. This being so, a
foundling can only be deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because
he/she has to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Not being a natural born citizen, petitioner is a nuisance
candidate whose certificate of candidacy for President can motu
propio be cancelled by the COMELEC. There is no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner,
v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORANTE CAPITAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the United
States of America (USA). Subsequently, and in preparation for his
plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for
repatriation under Republic Act No. 92255 (RA 9225) before the
Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10,
2008 and, on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship
Retention and Re- acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3,
2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy
(CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the
May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed
a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the
ground, among others, that Arnado remained a US citizen because
he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the
Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation.
While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections
proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes for
the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He was proclaimed the winning
candidate.
On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division issued a Resolution
holding that Arnado's continued use of his US passport effectively
negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was
disqualified to run for public office for failure to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225. The Comelec First Division accordingly
nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on succession should
be followed.
Arnado moved for reconsideration. In the meantime, Casan Macode
Maquiling (Maquiling), another mayoralty candidate who garnered
the second highest number of votes, intervened in the case. He
argued that the Comelec First Division erred in applying the rule on
succession.
On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc rendered a Resolution
reversing the ruling of the Comelec First Division. It held that
Arnado's use of his US passport did not operate to revert his status
to dual citizenship. The Comelec En Banc found merit in Arnado's
explanation that he continued to use his US passport because he did
not yet know that he had been issued a Philippine passport at the
time of the relevant foreign trips. The Comelec En Banc further noted
that, after receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used the same
for his subsequent trips.
On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling.
Voting 10-5, it annulled and set aside the Comelec En Banc's
February 2, 2011 Resolution, disqualified Arnado from running for
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
elective position, and declared Maquiling as the duly elected mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections. In so
ruling, the majority of the Members of the Court opined that in his
subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado effectively disavowed or
recalled his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Issue:
WHETHER or NOT THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER WHO HAS
FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RA 9225
BEFORE THE FILING OF HIS COC ON OCTOBER 1, 2012
Held:
Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) of
RA 9225 at the time he filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013 elections;
subsequent compliance does not suffice.
Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with
"dual citizenship" is disqualified from running for any elective local
position. In Mercado v. anzano,44 it was clarified that the phrase
"dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance.''45 Subsequent, Congress enacted RA
9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to
reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political
rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law. They may
now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1)
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time
of filing of their CoC, thus:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities- Those who retain
or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by
the Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the
second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held in
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,47 his April 3, 2009 Affidavit
of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US
passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he
filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013
elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement.
The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit
dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been belatedly
executed.
The Comelec En Banc did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of
discretion, in upholding the Resolution of the Comelec Second
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Division disqualifying Arnado from running for public office. It is worth
noting that the reason for Arnado's disqualification to run for public
office during the 2010 elections — being a candidate without total
and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines - still
subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1,
2012. The Comelec En Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this
Court in Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of
discretion had it departed therefrom.
Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that Arnado should be given
the opportunity to correct the deficiency in his qualification because
at the time this Court promulgated its Decision in Maquiling on April
16, 2013, the period for filing the CoC for local elective office had
already lapsed. Or, as Justice Arturo D. Brion puts it in his Dissenting
Opinion, "[t]o the extent that Arnado was denied the chance to
submit a replacement oath of renunciation in 2013, then there was
an unfair and abusive denial of opportunity equivalent to grave abuse
of discretion." Besides, shortly after learning of the Court's April 16,
2013 ruling in Maquiling or on May 9, 2013, Arnado substantially
complied therewith by executing an affidavit affirming his April3,
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR
G.R. No. 209835 September 22, 2015
FACTS:
Rogelio Batin Caballero, the petitioner and Jonathan Enrique V.
Nanud, Jr., the respondent were both candidates for the mayoralty
position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the
May 13, 2013 elections. The private respondent filed a petition for
the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy claiming that
he was not eligible eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
However, the petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on
October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada
on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian
citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.Furthermore, he
asserted that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Batanes despite becoming a
Canadian citizen.
On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution
that the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent Caballero was
cancelled. Petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes, on
May 14, 2013. On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc but the same was
denied. Thus, on December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution and private respondent took
his Oath of Office on December 20, 2013. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was eligible to run for Mayor of
Uyugan, Batanes.
HELD:
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc canceling the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero.
Upon the numerous claims of the petitioner, the court was not
persuaded. It is true that the petitioner was a natural born Filipino
who wasborn and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus he had his
domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. Nevertheless, he later worked
in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. It is settled ruled that
naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of
domicile in the Philippines. In the case at bar, the petitioner
permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of
Canadian citizenship. Therefore, he had in effect abandoned his
domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in
Canada. Furthermore, the court held that the frequent visits of the
petitioner visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in
Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment. More
so, in this case, the records showed that petitioner failed to prove
that he had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year
immediately preceding the day of elections as required under
Section 39 of the Local Government Code. The Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 or RA No. 9225 , declares
that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of the law. However, it does not mention any
effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on
the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. The
petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenshipunder RA No. 9225
did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan,
Batanes.
Frivaldo vs COMELEC
GR No 120295; 1996
Facts:
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the
May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee,
another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec docketed as
SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking
or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a
citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be
cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec
promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted
upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy
continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said
date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the
aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the
election returns and a Certificate of Votes dated May 27, 1995
wherein Frivaldo garnered the highest vote followed by Lee, who
filed a supplemental petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-
elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the
petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the
purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning
gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June
29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995,
Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11
docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June
30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his
oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special
Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted."
As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the
Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal
impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In
the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs.
Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor not Lee should occupy said position
of governor.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office.

Held:
No. First, petitioner’s loss of his naturalized American citizenship did
not and could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his
Philippine citizenship.
Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is
a natural born Filipino citizen, is not a sufficient act of repatriation.
Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and
must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once any
of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS
MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
FACTS: On the May 11, 1998 elections for vice-mayoralty of Makati
City, three candidates competed for the post: Eduardo B. Manzano,
Ernesto S. Mercado, and Gabriel V. Daza III. Manzano won the
elections but his proclamation was suspended due to a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril alleging
that Manzano was an American citizen. He was born September 4,
1955 in San Francisco, California, USA to Filipino parents.
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought
under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160), which declares as “disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship.” This
provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.

On May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC cancelled

the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the grounds of his dual-
citizenship, which disqualifies him according to Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code. Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.
Manzano opposed the motion to intervene. The motion was
unresolved. But on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc (with 1
commissioner abstaining) reversed the Second Division’s ruling on
the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and directing the
proclamation of Manzano as winner, saying:
Manzano, being born in the USA, obtained US citizenship by
operation of the US constitution and laws under principle of jus soli
(basis is place of birth).Yet, by being born to Filipino parents,
Manzano natural born Filipino citizen, by operation of the 1935
Philippine Constitution and laws under principle jus sanguinis (the
right of blood).
Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration and holds and American passport, he has not lost his
Filipino citizenship since he has not renounced it and has not taken
an oath of allegiance to the USA. Manzano, after the age of majority,
registered himself as a voter and voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998
Philippine elections which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US
citizenship.
Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as vice-mayor of
Makati City.
ISSUES:
1) WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if so, WON he is
disqualified from being a candidate for vice-mayor in Makati City.
2) WON, petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit
considering that he was not an original party in the case for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril.
3) WON there was a valid election of citizenship?
RULING:
1) No. The Court said that dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. Dual citizenship is invol untary; it arises out of
circumstances of birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to
be a national by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a result of a
person’s volition; it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. In Sec.5
Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship, the concern was not with
dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain
allegiance to their countries of origin even after naturalization.
Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d)
and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to
“dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship
do not fall under this disqualification.
It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy, such
persons with dual citizenships have elected their Philippine
citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In private respondent’s
certificate of candidacy, he made these statements under oath on
March 27, 1998: “I am a Filipino citizen…Natural-born”. “I am not a
permanent resident of, or immigrant to , a foreign country.” “I am
eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto…” The filing of such certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing
any disqualification he might have as a dual-citizen. Manzano’s oath
of allegiance, together with the fact he has spent his life here,
received his education here, and practiced his profession here, and
has taken part in past Philippine elections, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
2) Yes, petitioner Mercado, has the right to bring suit. At the time
Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20,
1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's
purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from
running for [an] elective local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No.
7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
bring the action, so was Mercado since the he was a rival candidate
for vice mayor of Makati City. Mercado had a right to intervene at
that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 or the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987 which provides that intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has been no final
judgment rendered. Failure of COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner’s
motion for intervention was tantamount to denial of the motion, justifying this petition
for certiorari.
3) Yes. There was a valid election of citizenship. It should suffice
that upon filing of certificates for candidacy, such persons with dual
citizenship have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their
dual citizenship. In private respondent’s certificate of candidacy, he
made these statements under oath on March 27, 1998: “I am a
Filipino citizen…Natural-born”. “I am not a permanent resident of, or
immigrant to, a foreign country.” “I am eligible for the office I seek to
be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto…”The
filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual-citizen.
PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were
rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao
del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate
of candidacy for Congressman on February 19, 2001, while Cagas
filed his on February 28, 2001.
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor of COMELEC Davao del Sur, a consolidated
petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter’s certificate of
candidacy due to the fact that Villaber was convicted by the RTC for
violation of BP22 and was sentenced to suffer 1 year imprisonment.
The check that bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00. Cagas
further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for
any public office. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari assailing the CA’s Decision.
However, in its Resolution of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third
Division) dismissed the petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution
became final and executory. Cagas also asserted that Villaber made
a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he
is “Eligible for the office I seek to be elected” – which false statement
is a ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant
to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly
that his conviction has not become final and executory because the
affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for
promulgation in his presence. Furthermore, even if the judgment of
conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for
his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve
moral turpitude. After the opposing parties submitted their respective
position papers, the case was forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila,
for resolution. On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC finding merit in
Cagas’ petition, issued the challenged Resolution declaring Villaber
disqualified as “a candidate for and from holding any elective public
office” and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC
ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the
administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Villaber filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en
banc in a Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude and if so would it result to the Villaber’s disqualification?
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
.RULING : The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner
Villaber from being a candidate for Congressman, the COMELEC
applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
“Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
“The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be
deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.”
As to the meaning of “moral turpitude,” we have consistently adopted
the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary as “an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”
In In re Vinzon,the term “moral turpitude” is considered as
encompassing “everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
or good morals.” We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs.
Commission on Elections that “not every criminal act involves moral
turpitude,” and that “as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for
the Supreme Court to determine.”We further pronounced therein
that:
“…in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC, the Court
admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral
turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as
malum in se or as malum prohibitum. In the final analysis, whether or
not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact
and frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the case.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he
admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. At
any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral
turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did
in Dela Torre which involves the crime of fencing punishable by a
special law.
The elements are as follows:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to
account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she
does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment.[19]
The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. We
held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 “imports deceit” and
“certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person….”Thus, paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer who
issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties
he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted
and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good
morals.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTION and EUFEMIO MULI, repondents.'
FACTS: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two
consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida
ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed
winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His
proclamation in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an
election protest. The court rendered a judgment declaring the results
of the said election last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the ground
that there was a failure of election.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and was
proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timely filed a
petition to disqualify him from running on the ground that he had
served three consecutive terms in the same post. The COMELEC
found that Lonzanida’s assumption of office by virtue of his
proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before
the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full
term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the
Local Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution
granting the petition for disqualification. Petitioner Lonzanida
challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions maintaining that
he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that
his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a
term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local
government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of
San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. The private respondent
maintains that the petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should be
considered as service of one full term because he discharged the
duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a
few months before the next mayoral elections.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San
Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as
service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term
limit for elective local government officials.
RULING: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, “the
term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such
officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.” Section 43 of the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: “No
local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.” The petitioner cannot be deemed to have
served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Pursuant to the
constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does
not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption
of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months
before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but
in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by
the COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of

candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of
insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending
before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of
Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said
court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private
respondent on account of his alleged “flight” from that country.
Petitioner’s subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the
COMELEC’s May 8, 1992 resolution was dismissed without
prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-
election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC for cancellation of respondent’s COC on account of the
candidate’s disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29
May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings
(EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy, is said to be facing a criminal charge before
a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the
term “fugitive from justice” contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC
and is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby
ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.

Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889
GR No. 112889
April 18, 1995
Facts: Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of
Quezon filed a petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the
COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his petition for quo warranto
against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from
justice.
Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
provides:
Article 73. Disqualifications – The following persons shall be
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
“xxxx(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here
or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been
convicted by final judgment.”
It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to
persons who has been convicted by final judgment. However,
COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

private respondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly denied

the petition for quo warranto. The Court opted to remand the case to
COMELEC to resolve and proceed with the case.
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious
apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section
40(e) of RA 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so
taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges.
A similar concern was expressed by Senator R. A. V. Saguisag who,
during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, made this reservation: “de ipa-refine lang
natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo
bothered ako doon, a.”
N.B. Niremand lang sa COMELEC yung case na to. But later on
naayos din naman yung definition ng fugitive from justice.
The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991. It provided:
Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified
from running for any elective local position: (e) Fugitives from justice
in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice
refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. It
includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution.
The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in
conformity of the given clarification with the term “fugitive from
justice”.

Dela Cruz vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 192221. November 13, 2012
Facts: In the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections, Casimira Dela Cruz ran
for and was elected member of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of
Bugasong, Antique. On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed her
certificate of candidacy 3 for the position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique under the ticket of the
National People's Coalition (NPC).
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Subsequently, Aurelio N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a certificate of
candidacy 4 for the same position. IATSHE On December 6, 2009,
petitioner filed a petition 5 to declare Aurelio a nuisance candidate on
the ground that he filed his certificate of candidacy for the vice-
mayoralty position to put the election process in mockery and to
cause confusion among voters due to the similarity of his surname
with petitioner's surname.
On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution 7 declaring Aurelio as a nuisance candidate and
cancelling his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position
in Bugasong. Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance
candidate, however, his name was not deleted in the Certified List of
Candidates 8 and Official Sample Ballot 9 issued by the COMELEC.
Consequently, petitioner filed on March 23, 2010, an Urgent Ex -
Parte Omnibus Motion 10 praying, among other things, that
COMELEC issue an order directing the deletion of Aurelio's name
from the Official List of Candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor,
the Official Ballots, and other election paraphernalia to be used in
Bugasong for the May 2010 elections. She also prayed that in the
event Aurelio's name can no longer be deleted in time for the May
10, 2010 elections, the COMELEC issue an order directing that all
votes cast in favor of Aurelio be credited in her favor, in accordance
with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 dated May 7, 2001. Her petition
were affirmed by the COMELEC.
Consequently, on May 13, 2010, private respondent John Lloyd M.
Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of
Bugasong by a margin of 39 votes over Casimira Dela Cruz’s 6,389
votes. There were 532 votes in favor of Aurelio Dela Cruz. Casimira
filed a petition to consider the stray votes in favor of Aurelio to her.
Respondent COMELEC denies this reasoning that the rule in stray
votes in the manual elections is different and cannot be applied in
the automated elections because the names of the candidates are
clearly printed on the ballots, unlike in manual elections when these
were only listed in a separate sheet of paper attached to the ballot
secrecy folder, the voter's intention is clearly to vote for the candidate
corresponding to the shaded oval.
Issue: Whether the stray votes in favor of Aurelio be credited to
Casimira Dela Cruz.
Held: Yes. COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the
finality of resolutions or decisions in special action cases, provides:
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate,
particularly where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the
bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of
five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed.
In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but
shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate .
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, this Court likewise applied the rule in COMELEC
Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance
candidate stray but to count them in favor of the b o n a fid e
candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as
such was issued only after the elections. As illustrated in Bautista
vs. COMELEC, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance
candidate on election day inevitably exposes the bonafide candidate
to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voter's
will and frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario in
Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case, mainly because the
Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate
was issued before and not after the elections, with the electorate
having been informed thereof through newspaper releases and other
forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably, however, the
adverse effect on the voter's will was similarly present in this case, if
not worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with only
"MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for
Representative — over five thousand — which have been declared
as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to
overcome private respondent's lead of only 453 votes after the
recount.
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before
the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of Resolution No. 4116,
the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray
but counted in favor of petitioner. COMELEC's changing of the
rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
of significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private
respondent by a slim margin.
The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral
exercise into an uneven playing field where the b o n a fi d e
candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant
number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the
mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any
delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes
lost in this manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray
votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their
candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance
candidates persist.
The Court holds that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the
votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final
judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same
surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but counted in
favor of the latter, remains a good law. A petition to cancel or deny
a COC under Section 69 of the OEC should be distinguished
from a petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal
effect of such cancellation of a COC of a nuisance candidate
cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified on grounds
provided in the OEC and Local Government Code. Moreover,
private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of
the cancellation of COC of Aurelio because COMELEC published the
same before election day.
As the court pronounced in Bautista , the voters' constructive
knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more
determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes
cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate
candidate, petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of
candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the
ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even
under the automated voting system especially considering that
voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the
nuisance candidate instead of the b o n a fi d e candidate they
intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to
correct the same.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM PETITIONER-
INTERVENOR,
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
Facts: On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted
former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the
Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former
President Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate
[7]
of Candidacy for the position of President but was opposed by
three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases
prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only
managed to garner the second highest number of votes on the May
10, 2010 synchronized elections.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured
[10]
into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this
time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against
former President Estrada before the COMELEC because of
Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing
Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual
Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division,
dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President
Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by
the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second highest votes
intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the
contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as
Mayor of Manila.
In her petition, Risos-Vidal starts her discussion by pointing out that
the pardon granted to former President Estrada was conditional as
evidenced by the latter’s express acceptance thereof. The
"acceptance," she claims, is an indication of the conditional natureof
the pardon, with the condition being embodied in the third Whereas
Clause of the pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office."
Issue: Whether former President Joseph Estrada run for public office
despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried
an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public
office.
Held: Yes. Former President Joseph Estrada was granted an
absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the
focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended
to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to
and accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify
which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former
President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former
President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto
otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld
based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by
legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and
Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the
Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other
acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence
for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted
by the President without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the
only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain
to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted
in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election
laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be
argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to
delimit the pardoning power of the President.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that
attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even
if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties
of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were
expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is
not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does
not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make
its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned
commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely
an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin
of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its
operation much less prevail over its text.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional
the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him. former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the
pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained
LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a
legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada.
other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been
granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment
of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold
any public office, whether local or national position.
It should be noted that the third preambular clause of the
pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional. Contrary
to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the
pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither
makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion
that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly
impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified
use of the term "civil and political rights" as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part QUINTO VS COMELEC (2009)
of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that
explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by FACTS:
the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act
because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled “An Act Authorizing The Commission On
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Elections To Use An Automated Election System In The May 11,
1998 National Or Local Elections And In Subsequent National And
Local Electoral Exercises, Providing Funds Therefor And For Other
Purposes.” Section 11 thereof reads, among others:
xxx
For this purpose, the deadline for the
filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the
election shall not be later than one hundred
twenty (120) days before the
elections: Provided, That, any elective official,
whether national or local, running for any office
other than the one which he/she is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for president and
vice president, shall be deemed resigned only
upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the position for which he/she
is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts
or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period:
xxx
Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law by
enacting R.A. No. 9369, entitled "An Act Amending Republic
Act No. 8436, Entitled "An Act Authorizing The Commission
On Elections To Use An Automated Election System In The
May 11, 1998 National Or Local Elections And In
Subsequent National And Local Electoral Exercises, To
Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness And
Accuracy Of Elections, Amending For The Purpose Batas
Pampansa Blg. 881, As Amemded, Republic Act No. 7166
And Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor
And For Other Purposes." Section 13 of the amendatory law
modified Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, thus:
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 15. Official Ballot.- xxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the
deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to
participate in the election. Any person who files his
certificate of candidacy within this period shall only
be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active
members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his/her office and must vacate the same at the
start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of
candidacy. xxx
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and
administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
4
8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy
(CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political
Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any person
holding a public appointive office or position including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers
and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be
considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for
the same or any other elective office or position.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned
from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners
Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold
appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in
the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition
and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted
Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
Petitioners contend, among others, that the advance filing of
CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of
early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time
limitations. Such advance filing does not automatically make the
person who filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. In fact,
the law considers him a candidate only at the start of the campaign
period. Petitioners then assert that this being so, they should not be
deemed ipso facto resigned from their government offices when they
file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law
as candidates. They should be considered resigned from their
respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they
are, by law, already considered as candidates.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
should be declared unconstitutional.
RULING:
YES.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto
resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not
considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the
elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class.
Applying the four requisites for valid classification to the instant case,
the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is
not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use
of a governmental position to promote one's candidacy, or even to
wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and
discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the
discharge of official duty would be motivated by political
considerations rather than the welfare of the public.The restriction is
also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the
electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or
inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be
attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law,
then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the
ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that
the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law.
Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one,
the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials
differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to
meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law.
The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the
OEC violates the equal protection clause.
The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of
being overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding
appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high
positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the
government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he
files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for,
indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the
government to wield influence in the political world.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who
seek public elective office are those who occupy relatively high
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or
with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is
universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification
standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws. These
qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow
the widest participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the
pursuit of one's highest aspirations to public office. Such is the
essence of democracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking
any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in
character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay
level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict
the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
QUINTO VS COMELEC (2010)
*Resolution
FACTS: (In relation to sa prior case)
The assailed Decision struck down Section 4(a) of
Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, on the following grounds: (1) They violate
the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those
holding elective positions; (2) They are overbroad insofar as they
prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts:
(a) without distinction as to whether or not they occupy
high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they limit these
civil servants’ activity regardless of whether they be partisan or
nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in the national,
municipal or barangay level; and (3) Congress has not shown a
compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right of these
public appointive officials.
In support of their respective motions for reconsideration,
respondent COMELEC and movants-intervenors submit the following
arguments: (1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative
of, the constitutional proscription against the participation of public
appointive officials and members of the military in partisan political
activity; (2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal
protection clause when they accord differential treatment to elective
and appointive officials, because such differential treatment rests on
material and substantial distinctions and is germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity
of overbreadth; and (4) There is a compelling need to reverse the
assailed Decision, as public safety and interest demand such
reversal.
RULING:
We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional, and accordingly
reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.
A. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with
Law
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of
the present state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which
reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to
17
Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed
18
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code and rendered ineffective
Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as
resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to
19
the positions for which they are running, an elected official is not
deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or
position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position
without forfeiting his seat.
These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and
employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political
campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil
service officers and employees in partisan political campaigns is
unmistakable.
B. Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the
Equal Protection Clause
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.
On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive
officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority. Another substantial distinction between the two sets of
officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A.
Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and
employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in
any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except
to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed
to take part in political and electoral activities.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon
material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging
under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
C. Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Suffer from
Overbreadth
i. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Incumbent Appointive
Official’s Position, Valid
According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law
are overly broad because they apply indiscriminately to all civil
servants holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of
position being held by the employee running for elective office and
the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.Its underlying
assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are
extant only when the incumbent appointive official running for
elective office holds an influential post.Such a myopic view obviously
fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the
government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing
bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a
"powerful political machine" that has amassed "the scattered powers
of government workers" so as to give itself and its incumbent
80
workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power." As
81
elucidated in our prior exposition:
Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or
to make use of their respective positions (apparently) to promote
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
their own candidacy may seem tolerable – even innocuous –
particularly when viewed in isolation from other similar attempts by
other government employees. Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to
discount the equally (if not more) realistic and dangerous possibility
that such seemingly disjointed attempts, when taken together,
constitute a veiled effort on the part of an emerging central party
structure to advance its own agenda through a "carefully
orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective] officials" coming from
various levels of the bureaucracy.
ii. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Type of Office Sought,
Valid
Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws
on the matter will show that the alleged overbreadth is more
apparent than real. Our exposition on this issue has not been
repudiated, viz.:
A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules
and guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing of certificates of
candidacy and nomination of official candidates of registered political
parties, in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
83
Elections. Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the
restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued
specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections, which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in
character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA
8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for
partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. On this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against
Section 4(a) is clearly unsustainable.
Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code, in conjunction with other related
laws on the matter, will confirm that these provisions are likewise not
intended to apply to elections for nonpartisan public offices.
The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the
elections for barangay offices, since these are the only elections in
this country which involve nonpartisan public offices.
The probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive
officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue elective
posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected
candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially
overly broad statute.a1f
In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the
challenged statutes – which are, at best, bold predictions – cannot
justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State
from enforcing them against conduct that is, and has for more than
100 years been, unquestionably within its power and interest to
97
proscribe. Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal
with these conceivably impermissible applications through case-by-
case adjudication rather than through a total invalidation of the
98
statute itself.
Indeed, the anomalies spawned by our assailed Decision have taken
place. In his Motion for Reconsideration, intervenor Drilon stated that
a number of high-ranking Cabinet members had already filed their
99
Certificates of Candidacy without relinquishing their posts. Several
COMELEC election officers had likewise filed their Certificates of
Candidacy in their respective provinces.
For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4(a) of
Resolution 8678 and Section 13 of RA 9369, which merely reiterate
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not unconstitutionally
overbroad.
MENDOZA VS COMELEC
FACTS:
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed the winner of the
2007 gubernatorial election for the province of Bulacan, besting
respondent Roberto M. Pagdangana. Respondent filed the Election
Protest which, anchored on the massive electoral fraud allegedly
perpetrated by petitioner. COMELEC ordered a order a revision of
the ballots from the contested precincts indicated in said pleadings
COMELEC Second Division annulled and set aside petitioner’s
proclamation as governor of Bulacan and proclaimed respondent
duly elected to said position. It ordered petitioner to immediately
vacate said office, to cease and desist from discharging the functions
pertaining thereto and to cause a peaceful turn-over thereof to
respondent.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
foregoing resolution with the COMELEC En Banc. Against
respondent’s Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner also filed an Opposition to the Motion for
Execution before the COMELEC Second Division. COMELEC En
Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and
held that “Considering the proximity of the end of the term of office
involved, this Resolution is declared immediately executory.” It
issued a writ of execution.
Petitionerfiled before the COMELEC an Urgent Motion to Recall the
Resolution Promulgated on February 8, 2010 on the following
grounds: (a) lack of concurrence of the majority of the members of
the Commission pursuant to Section 5, Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure; (b) lack of re-hearing pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 18 of the Rules; and (c) lack of notice for the promulgation of
the resolution pursuant to Section 5, Rule 18 of said Rules. Invoking
Section 13, Rule 18 of the same Rules, petitioner additionally argued
that the resolution pertained to an ordinary action and, as such, can
only become final and executory after 30 days from its promulgation.
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari with an Urgent
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a
Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Directed against
the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, the petition is noticeably
anchored on the same grounds raised in petitioner’s urgent motion to
recall the same resolution before the COMELEC. In addition, the
petitioner disputes the appreciation and result of the revision of the
contested ballots.
In the meantime, it appears that the COMELEC En Banc issued an
Order, scheduling the case for re-hearing on the ground that "there
was no majority vote of the members obtained in the Resolution of
the Commission En Banc promulgated on February 8, 2010." At said
scheduled re-hearing, it further appears that the parties agreed to
submit the matter for resolution by the COMELEC En Banc upon
submission of their respective memoranda, without further argument.
As it turned out, the deliberations which ensued again failed to
muster the required majority vote since, with three (3)
Commissioners not taking part in the voting, and only one dissent
therefrom, the assailed 1 December 2009 Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division only garnered three concurrences.
In their respective Comments thereto, both respondent and the
Office of the Solicitor General argue that, in addition to its premature
filing, the petition at bench violated the rule against forum shopping.
Claiming that he received the 10 February 2010 Order of the
COMELEC En Banc late in the morning of 12 February 2010 or
when the filing of the petition was already underway, petitioner
argued that: (a) he apprised the Court of the pendency of his Urgent
Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on 8 February 2010;
and, (b) that the writ of execution ensconced in said resolution
compelled him to resort to the petition for certiorari before us.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution of COMELEC is null and void.
RULING.
YES. even before petitioner’s filing of his Urgent Motion to Recall the
Resolution and the instant Petition for Certiorari, the record shows
that the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution, ordering the re-
hearing of the case on the ground that "there was no majority vote of
the members obtained in the Resolution of the Commission En."
Having conceded one of the grounds subsequently raised in
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution, the COMELEC
En Banc significantly failed to obtain the votes required under
Section 5(a), Rule 3 of its own Rules of Procedure for a second time.
The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required
majority vote even after the re-hearing should have caused the
dismissal of respondent’s Election Protest. The COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is clear on this matter. Without any trace of ambiguity,
Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule categorically provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the
Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary
majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on
rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be
dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed
cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and
in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
The propriety of applying the foregoing provision according to its
literal tenor cannot be gainsaid. As one pertaining to the election of
the provincial governor of Bulacan, respondent’s Election Protest
was originally commenced in the COMELEC. Although initially raffled
to the COMELEC Second Division, the elevation of said election
protest on motion for reconsideration before the Commission En
Banc cannot be considered an appeal. Tersely put, there is no
appeal within the COMELEC itself.
Thus was made the conclusion to the effect that since no decision
was reached by the COMELEC En Banc, then the decision of the
Second Division should stand, which is squarely in the face of the
Rule that when the Commission En Banc is equally divided in
opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be
re-heard, and if on re-hearing, no decision is reached, the action or
proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the
Commission. The reliance is on Section 3, Article IX(C) of the
Constitution which provides:
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit En Banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission En Banc.
We cannot, in this case, get out of the square cover of Section 6,
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. The provision is not violative of the
Constitution. The Rule was issued "in order to expedite disposition of
election cases" such that even the absence of a majority in a
Commission En Banc opinion on a case under reconsideration does
not result in a non-decision. Either the judgment or order appealed
from "shall stand affirmed" or the action originally commenced in the
Commission "shall be dismissed."
It is easily evident in the second sentence of Section 3 of Article
IX(C) that all election cases before the COMELEC are passed upon
in one integrated procedure that consists of a hearing and a decision
"in division" and when necessitated by a motion for reconsideration,
a decision "by the Commission En Banc."
What is included in the phrase "all such election cases" may be seen
in Section 2(2) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution which states:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
xxxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal of officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Section 2(2) read in relation to Section 3 shows that however the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC is involved, either in the exercise of
"exclusive original jurisdiction" or an "appellate jurisdiction," the
COMELEC will act on the case in one whole and single process: to
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

repeat, in division, and if impelled by a motion for reconsideration, en
banc.
There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the
COMELEC over election contests. The difference inheres in the kind
of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the case
brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial court is
brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction,
the division decides the appeal but, if there is a motion for
reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where a majority is
needed for a decision. If the process ends without the required
majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed. Upon
the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what
is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest invoking the
original jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one whole
process, is first decided by the division, which process
is continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the
division ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the
protest, which is an original action, shall be dismissed. There is no
first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.
Indeed, the grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is patent in
the fact that despite the existence in its books of the clearly worded
Section 6 of Rule 18, which incidentally has been acknowledged by
this Court in the recent case of Marcoleta v.
COMELEC, it completely ignored and disregarded its very own
decree and proceeded with the questioned Resolution of and Order
annulling the proclamation of petitioner, declaring respondent
Pagdanganan as the duly elected governor, and ordering petitioner
to cease and desist from performing the functions of the Governor of
Bulacan and to vacate said office in favor of respondent Roberto M.
Pagdanganan.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned
Resolution of the COMELEC promulgated are NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE. The election protest of respondent Pagdanganan is
hereby DISMISSED.

It is easy to understand the reason for the difference in the result of

the two protests, one as original action and the other as an appeal, if
and when the protest process reaches the COMELEC En Banc. In a
protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no completed
process comes to the banc. It is the banc which will complete the
process. If, at that completion, no conclusive result in the form of a
majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other choice
except to dismiss the protest. In a protest placed before the
Commission as an appeal, there has been a completed proceeding
that has resulted in a decision. So that when the COMELEC, as an
appellate body, and after the appellate process is completed,
reaches an inconclusive result, the appeal is in effect dismissed and
resultingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed.1avvphi1

To repeat, Rule 18, Section 6 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

follows, is in conformity with, and is in implementation of Section 3 of
Article IX(C) of the Constitution.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
SOCRATES vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 154512
November 12, 2002
Petitioner: VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto
Princesa City
Respondent: COMELEC, THE PREPARATORY RECALL
ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City
FACTS:
Members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the
Puerto Princesa convened into a Preparatory Recall Assembly
(PRA) to initiate the recall of Mayor Victorino Socrates of Puerto
Princesa’s Mayor. The PRA issued a Recall Resolution on July 2,
2002 which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for
his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall
election which was given due course. COMELEC then scheduled the
recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition to nullify and
deny due course to the Recall Resolution but it was dismissed (G.R.
No. 154512)
Meanwhile, Edward Hagedorn filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor in the recall election. On August 17, 2002,
Adovo and Gilo filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify
Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his
certificate of candidacy on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified
from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and
having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms
immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. In a
resolution, the COMELEC dismissed for lack of merit the petition for
disqualification. The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run
in the recall election. The COMELEC also reset the recall election
from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.
Hence, the consolidated petition.
G.R. No. 154512
Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc
resolution which gave due course to the Recall Resolution and
scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution. Socrates cites the
following circumstances as legal infirmities attending the convening
of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not all
members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the
resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally
deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves seeking a
new electoral mandate from their respective constituents; (4) the
adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of
authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner
that violated his and the public’s constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul
COMELEC Resolution insofar as it fixed the recall election on
September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign
period. He prayed that the COMELEC be enjoined from holding the
recall election on September 7, 2002 and that a new date be fixed
giving the candidates at least an additional 15 days to campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued
a Resolution giving the candidates an additional 15 days from
September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC
reset the recall election to September 24, 2002. Thus, the petition
became moot.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

G.R. Nos. 155083-84 (*this case is discussed under the topic Term
of Office of Local Officials)

ISSUE: In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed

grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall
Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto
Princesa.

HELD: NO.
Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite
the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective
service of notice to other PRA members. The COMELEC, however,
found that:

On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents

for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates
sent notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof
pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government Code. Copies of the
said notice are in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise,
Proof of Service for each of the said notices were attached to the
Petition and marked as Annex G of Volumes II and III of the Petition.

Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places

particularly at the Barangay Hall. Photos establishing the same were
attached to the Petition and marked as Annex H. The proponents
likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the dissemination of
the convening of the PRA.

Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were

also sent to the following: a list of 25 names of provincial elective
officials, print and broadcast media practitioners, PNP officials,
COMELEC city, regional and national officials, and DILG officials.
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on
matters within the competence and expertise of the COMELEC,
unless the findings are patently erroneous.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
PAMATONG VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 161872
April 13, 2004
Petitioner: REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE
Respondent: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for President. COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as
nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by
a registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the
Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to
“equal access to opportunities for public service” under Section 26,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC
supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified
among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the
constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president,
he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous
national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity
to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in
other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE: Whether there is a constitutional right to run for or hold
public office.
HELD: NONE
What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither
bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the
provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of
the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II
of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State
Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered
not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a
different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain
any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the
provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts
The provision is not intended to compel the State to enact
positive measures that would accommodate as many people as
possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive
rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence
of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed
under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and
phrases such as “equal access,” “opportunities,” and “public service”
are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent
impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to
inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from
which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office
may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on
the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the
limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not
sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance
candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not
evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises
are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

into account the practical considerations in conducting elections.

Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is
onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious
intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually
impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies
which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The
poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every
step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of
these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the
part of the State.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
TIMBOL VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 206004
February 24, 2015
Petitioner: Joseph Timbol
Respondent: COMELEC
FACTS:
On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a certificate of candidacy
for councilor of the Second District of Caloocan City.
On January 15, 2013, Timbol was ordered to appear before
the Comelec for a clarificatory hearing in connection with his
certificate of candidacy.
Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election
Officer Valencia. During the clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that
he was not a nuisance candidate and contended that in the 2010
elections, he ranked eight among all the candidates who ran for
councilors in the second district. He allegedly had sufficient
resources to sustain his campaign.
He pointed out before the clarificatory hearing panel that his
name already appeared in the list of nuisance candidates posted in
the COMELEC. The clarificatory hearing panel allegedly assured him
that his name would be deleted from the list and that his Certificate
of Candidacy would be given due course.
Despite Election Officer Valencia’s favorable
recommendation, Timbol’s name was not removed from the list of
nuisance candidates posted in the Comelec website.
With the printing of ballots for the automated elections set on
February 4, 2013, Timbol filed on February 2, 2013, a petition
praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidates.
In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, the
Comelec denied the petition for being moot considering that the
printing of ballots had already begun.
ISSUE: Whether Timbol was denied due process for being
considered a nuisance candidate without affording him an
opportunity to be heard.
HELD: YES
Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates
of candidacy "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or
to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names
of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which
clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to
run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed
and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate.
To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance
candidates, their certificates of candidacy may be denied due course
or cancelled by COMELEC. This denial or cancellation may be "motu
proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party," "subject to
an opportunity to be heard."
The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of." In election cases, due process requirements
are satisfied "when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand
In Cipriano v. Commission on Elections, the court explained:
The determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he
is seeking involves a determination of fact where both
parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of
their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may
result to a deprivation of one's right to run for public office,
or, as in this case, one's right to hold public office, it is only
proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of
the proceedings against him and that he be given the
opportunity to refute the allegations against him. It should be
stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims,
that the candidate be notified of the Commission's inquiry
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of
candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his own
evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for
the office he seeks.
In the case at bar, COMELEC declared petitioner a nuisance
candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide
intention to run for office. COMELEC had already issued Resolution
on January 11, 2013 when Timbol appeared before Election Officer
Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013. This was an
ineffective opportunity to be heard.
CANDIDATES
PETRONILLA RULLODA vs COMELEC
J. Ynares-Santiago; January 20, 2003
Romeo Rulloda and private respondent Remegio Placido
were the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto.
Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June 20, 2002, Romeo
Rulloda suffered a heart attack that caused his death. His widow,
petitioner Petronilla “Betty” Rulloda sought permission from the
COMELEC to be substituted in his husband’s place. Her Appeal-
Petition was supported by several signatures of people that are
purporting to be members of the electorate of Brgy. Sto. Tomas. On
July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico Asuncion issued a directive
to the Chairman and Members of the Board of Canvassers of Sto.
Tomas not to count ballots that contain the names “Betty”,
“Petronilla” or “Rulloda”. In the elections held on July 15, petitioner
garnered 516 votes while Placido only received 290 votes. Despite
the fact that petitioner garnered the majority votes, they still
proclaimed Placido as the winner. Respondents invoke Section 77 of
the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or
withdrawal of another. – If after the last day of the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered
or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified
by the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew
or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by
the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of the election. If
the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur
between the day before the election and mid-day of election
day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate
or, in the case of candidates to be voted by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.
WHETHER PETITIONER CAN BE SUBSTITUTED AS CANDIDATE
FOR THE BARANGGAY CHAIRMAN ELECTIONS?
YES. It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and
unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case of
doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to
the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. The
absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates
in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said
substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the
law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more reason to
allow the substitution of candidates where no political parties are
involved than when political considerations or party affiliations reign,
a fact that must have been subsumed by law.
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of
votes in the contested election. Technicalities and procedural
niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of
the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must
be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. Election contests involve public interest, and
technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an
obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the
choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the
free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the
correct ascertainment of the results.
The Board of Canvassers is ordered to proclaim petitioner as
the winner.
Case no. 36
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
RENATO FEDERICO vs
COMELEC, COMELEC EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND OSMUNDO
MALIGAYA
January 22, 2013; J. Mendoza
This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Resolution of the
Comelec En Banc.
Edna Sanchez and private respondent Osmundo Maligaya
were candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas
Batngas, in the May 10, 2010 Autoated National and Local Elections.
Sanchez is from the Nacionalista Party while Maligaya is from the
Liberal Party. On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, the husband of
Edna and the gubernatorial candidate for the province of Batangas,
died. Two days after, Edna withdrew her COC for the position of
Mayor. She filed a new one and the corresponding Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as
substitute candidate. On May 5, 2010, petitioner Renato Federico
filed with the Office of the Election Officer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas,
his COC and CONA, as the official candidate of NP and as substitute
for Edna. Maligaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Federico before the Comelec. He
reasoned that Federico is ineligible for the period to file for substitute
candidates had already lapse after December 14, 2009, pursuant to
Section 13 of Com. Res. No. 8678. In Resolution No. 8889,
COMELEC gave due course to both Edna’s and Federico’s
substitution. However, the official ballots were already printed. The
name “SANCHEZ, Edna P.” was retained in the list of candidates for
Mayor and garnered the highest number of votes – 28, 389
compared to Maligaya’s 22, 577. The Municipal Board of Canvassers
printed the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of
Winning Candidates (COCVP) showing Sanchez as the winner for
Mayor. Maligaya then filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation of
Sanchez as the winner but was later withdrawn, as agreed upon by
the parties. A second print-out of the COCVP was issued wherein
the votes garnered by Edna were credited to Federico, hence, the
latter was proclaimed as the winner. Maligaya filed a Petition to
Annul the Proclamation of Federico.
WHETHER THE SUBSTITUTION MADE BY FEDERICO AS A
MAYORALTY CANDIDATE WAS VALID?
NO, Federico’s substitution was not valid. Federico posits that when
he filed his COC and CONA on May 5, 2010, he timely filed it as it
was not later that midday of the day of the election pursuant to
Section 77 of the OEC. Section 77 provides:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or
withdrawal of another. – If after the last day of the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered
or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by
the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the
political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy
for the office affected in accordance with the preceding
sections not later than mid-day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors
in the political subdivision where he is a candidate or, in the
case of candidates to be voted by the entire electorate of the
country, with the Commission.
The Comelec is empowered to prescribe such rules so as to
make efficacious and successful the conduct of the first national
automated elections. Comelec issued Resolution No. 8678 in order
to safeguard and improve on the Automated Election System.
Section 13 thereof provides:
SEC. 13. Substitution of Candidates, in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day
for the filing of certificate of candidacy, an official candidate
of a registered political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, he may be substituted by a
candidate belonging to, and nominated by, the same political
party. No substitute shall be allowed for any independent
candidate.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
The substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his
certificate of candidacy as herein provided for the office
affected not later than December 14, 2009.
The substitute for a candidate who died or suffered
permanent incapacity or disqualified by final judgment,
may file his certificate of candidacy up to mid-day of
election day. If the death or permanent disability should
occur between the day before the election and mid-day of
election day, the substitute candidate may file the certificate
with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or in the case of a
candidate for President, Vice-President or Senator, with the
Law Department of the Commission on Elections in Manila.
No person who has withdrawn his candidacy for a position
shall be eligible as substitute candidate for any other position
after the deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, it is clear from the
foregoing that different deadlines were set to govern the specific
circumstances that would necessitate the substitution of a candidate
due to death, disqualification or withdrawal. In case of death or
disqualification, the substitute had until midday of the election day to
file the COC. In case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench,
the substitute should have filed a COC by December 14, 2009. The
reason for the distinction can easily be divined. Unlike death or
disqualification, withdrawal is voluntary. Generally, a candidate has
sufficient time to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw while the
printing has not yet started. If a candidate withdraws after the
printing, the name of the substitute candidate can no longer be
accommodated in the ballot and a vote for the substitute will just be
wasted.When Batangas Governor Armando Sanchez died on April
27, 2010, Edna withdrew her candidacy as mayor and substituted
her late husband as gubernatorial candidate for the province on April
29, 2010. The party actually had the option to substitute another
candidate for Governor aside from Edna. By fielding Edna as their
substitute candidate for Governor, the party knew that she had to
withdraw her candidacy for Mayor. Considering that the deadline for
substitution in case of withdrawal had already lapsed, no person
could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden death of
then Governor Armando Sanchez and the substitution by his
widow in the gubernatorial race could not justify a belated
substitution in the mayoralty race. In addition, Comelec
Resolution No. 8889 which gave due course to the substitution of
both Edna and Federico is not bining on Maligaya. Edna Sanchez is
qualified to substitute her husband for the gubernatorial seat. Res.
No. 8889 is void as it was in contravention of the guidelines set forth
in Res. No. 8678. With respect to Federico, it cannot be a valid
source of right, like the right to be voted for public office. A void
judgment can never be final and executory and may be assailed at
any time. Lastly, the second COCVP in favor of Federico had no
legal basis. The votes garnered by Edna cannot be credited to
Federico for the latter was never a valid candidate. In effect, the
second COCVP in his name had no legal basis. Granting that those
who voted for Edna had in mind to vote for Federico, nonetheless,
the fact that there was no compliance with the rules cannot be
ignored. In a choice between provisions on material
qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will
of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe
and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate will. The
balance must always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the
law. To rule otherwise is to slowly gnaw at the rule of law.
IF FEDERICO IS DISQUALIFIED, WHO SHOULD BE
PROCLAIMED AS MAYOR: Armenius Silva (the elected Vice
Mayor pursuant to the rule on succession in the LGC) or
Osmundo Maligaya (the second placer to Edna Sanchez)?
Osmundo Maligaya. There being no vlid substitution, the candidate
with the highest number of votes should be proclaimed as the duly
elected Mayor. There was only one qualified candidate – Maligaya.
There is simply no vacancy. When there is no vacancy, the rule on
succession under Section 44 of the LGC cannot be invoked.
VICE MAYOR MARCELINA ENGLE vs COMELEC EN BANC AND
WINSTON MENZON
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition challenging
the Resolution of the Comelec En Banc upholding the Resolution of
its Second Division denying due course to and/or cancelling
petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy, annulling her proclamation as
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte; and proclaiming
private respondent Winston Menzon in her stead.
Petitioner’s late husband, James Engle, was the original
candidate for the contested position but he died of cardiogenic shock
on February 2, 2013. Petitioner filed her COC on February 22, 2013
as a substitute candidate for her deceased spouse. Private
respondent Menzon filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or
Cancel the COC arguing that Marcelina Engle misrepresented that
she is qualified to substitute her husband who was declared an
independent candidate by the Comelec. It would appear that James
L. Engle’s Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) was
signed by Lakas Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD) Leyte
Chapter President, Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez (Romualdez).
However, Lakas-CMD failed to submit to the COMELEC Law
Department the authorization of Romualdez to sign the CONAs of
Lakas-CMD candidates in Babatngon as prescribed by Section 6(3)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518. Thus, the COMELEC Law
Department considered all Lakas-CMD candidates whose CONAs
were signed by Romualdez as independent candidates. For this
reason, private respondent charged petitioner with violation of
Section 15, COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 which disallows the
substitution of an independent candidate. He argued that petitioner’s
declaration that she was a member of the political party, Lakas-CMD,
was intended to deceive the electorate that she was qualified to
substitute her husband. Additionally, private respondent claimed that
“[t]he false representation of the [petitioner] that she is qualified for
public office consisted of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform,
or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible”.
WHETHER THERE WAS MATERIAL REPRESENTATION
DONE BY PETITIONER THUS MERITING THE CANCELLATION
OF HER CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY? NO.
WHETHER PETITIONER CAN VALIDLY SUBSTITUTE
HER HUSBAND AFTER THE LATTER’S UNEXPECTED DEATH?
YES.
The discussion is joint.
There was no material misrepresentation made by petitioner.
The false representation which is a ground for a denial of due course
to and/or cancellation of a candidate’s COC (as provided in Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in correlation to Section 74
regarding the Contents of a COC) refers to a material fact relating
to the candidate’s qualification for office such as one’s citizenship
or residence. In Sinaca v. Mula, it was stated that: “A certificate of
candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole
world of the candidate's political creed or lack of political creed. It is a
statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that
he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is
eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he
belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all
election purposes being as well stated.” Verily, it was publicly known
that James L. Engle was a member of Lakas-CMD. As far as the
party and his wife were concerned, James L. Engle, as a member of
Lakas-CMD, may be substituted as a candidate upon his death.
There was no evidence on record that the party or petitioner had
notice or knowledge of the COMELEC’s classification of James L.
Engle as an independent candidate prior to February 22, 2013 when
petitioner filed her COC as a substitute for her deceased husband.
The only document in the record indicating that Lakas-CMD had
been notified of James L. Engle’s designation as an independent
candidate is the Letter dated March 21, 2013 sent by the COMELEC
Law Department to Romualdez stating that James L. Engle was
declared an independent candidate due to the failure of Lakas-CMD
to submit the authority of Romualdez to sign James L. Engle’s CONA
to the Law Department as required under Section 6(3) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9518 and in view thereof petitioner’s COC as her
husband’s substitute was denied due course. First, the COMELEC
Law Department’s “ruling” was issued only after the filing of
petitioner’s COC. Second, with respect to the denial of due course to
James L. Engle’s COC as a nominee of Lakas-CMD and to
petitioner’s COC as his substitute, the COMELEC Law Department’s
letter is not binding and at most, recommendatory. It is settled in
jurisprudence that the denial of due course or cancellation of
one’s COC is not within the administrative powers of the
COMELEC, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. The COMELEC, in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers, is mandated by the Constitution to hear and
decide such cases first by Division and, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the En Banc. In resolving cases to deny due
course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, the COMELEC cannot
merely rely on the recommendations of its Law Department but must
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
conduct due proceedings through one of its divisions. Returning to
the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division only formally ruled
on the status of James L. Engle as an independent candidate and
the invalidity of petitioner’s substitution on July 5, 2013, months after
the May 13, 2013 Elections. Under these premises, the COMELEC
correctly did not cancel petitioner’s COC on the ground of false
material representation as there was none. Despite the fact that
there was no material representation, the COMELEC still cancelled
the petitioner’s COC on the ground of an invalid substitution. The
Comelec relied on Section 6 of Res. No. 9518. It provides:
Section 6. Filing of Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance of Official Candidates of a Political Party /
Coalition of Political Parties. - The Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) of the official
candidates of the duly registered political party or coalition of
political parties shall be, in five (5) legible copies, attached to
and filed simultaneously with the Certificate of Candidacy.
The CONA shall also be stamped received in the same
manner as the Certificate of Candidacy.
The CONA, sample form attached, shall be duly signed
and attested to under oath, either by the Party President,
Chairman, Secretary-General or any other duly
authorized officer of the nominating party and shall bear
the acceptance of the nominee as shown by his signature in
the space provided therein.
For this purpose, all duly registered political parties or
coalition of political parties shall, not later than October
1, 2012, submit to the Law Department, the names and
specimen signatures of the authorized signatories of
their official party nominations.
No duly registered political party or coalition of political
parties shall be allowed to nominate more than the number
of candidates required to be voted for in a particular elective
position; otherwise, in such a situation, all of the nominations
shall be denied due course by the Commission.
The Commission stressed that the belated filing of
Romualdez’s authority to sign James L. Engle’s COC only in
connection with the proceedings for cancellation of petitioner’s own
COC is fatal to petitioner’s cause in view of the categorical directive
in the above provision that said authority must be submitted to its
Law Department on or before October 1, 2012. This Court
recognizes that the COMELEC is empowered by law to
prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful
the conduct of elections. However, it is a long standing
principle in jurisprudence that rules and regulations for the
conduct of elections are mandatory before the election, but
when they are sought to be enforced after the election they are
held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if
they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived
of their votes without any fault on their part. Over time, the Court
have qualified this doctrine to refer only to matters of form and
cannot be applied to the substantial qualifications of candidates.
In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, it was stated:
We have applied in past cases the principle that the manifest
will of the people as expressed through the ballot must be
given fullest effect; in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate.
Thus, we have held that while provisions relating to
certificates of candidacy are in mandatory terms, it is an
established rule of interpretation as regards election laws,
that mandatory provisions, requiring certain steps before
elections, will be construed as directory after the elections, to
give effect to the will of the people.
The Court made a distinction from other rulings they’ve made in the
past. COC defects beyond matters of form and that
involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit
of our ruling that COC mandatory requirements before elections
are considered merely directory after the people shall have
spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement
involves more than the will of the people in any given locality.
Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made,
thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are
faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the
Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between
provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the
one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on
the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the
electorate will. The Court compared the case at bar with Frivaldo vs
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Comelec, Rulloda vs Comelec, Sinaca vs Mula, Guzman vs Board of
Canvassers and Federico vs Comelec.
In Frivaldo v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court provided for the test:
To successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that
the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would
ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote.
Petitioner’s deceased husband’s name remained on the
ballot notwithstanding his death even before the campaign period for
the local elections began on March 29, 2013. Yet, he received
almost twice the number of votes as the second placer, private
respondent, in a decisive victory. Since the people of Babatngon,
Leyte could not have possibly meant to waste their votes on a
deceased candidate, we conclude that petitioner was the undisputed
choice of the electorate as Vice-Mayor on the apparent belief that
she may validly substitute her husband. That belief was not
contradicted by any official or formal ruling by the
COMELEC prior to the elections.
In Rulloda v. Commission on Elections, the Court said that:
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases
should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the
electorate. Laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections. Election contests involve public interest,
and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they
constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of
the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The
Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would
hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of
the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of
the results.
In Sinaca, it was provided that “an election in which the voters have
fully, fairly, and honestly expressed their will is not invalid even
though an improper method is followed in the nomination of
candidates.” In the same case, the Court proceeded to enumerate
examples of formal defects in a COC that may be treated with
liberality once the electorate has spoken in an election, to wit: It has
been held that the provisions of the election law regarding
certificates of candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the same,
as well as the information required to be stated therein, are
considered mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are
regarded as merely directory. With respect to election laws, it is
an established rule of interpretation that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before election will be construed as
directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the
electorate. Thus, even if the certificate of candidacy was not duly
signed or if it does not contain the required data, the proclamation of
the candidate as winner may not be nullified on such ground. The
defects in the certificate should have been questioned before the
election; they may not be questioned after the election without
invalidating the will of the electorate, which should not be done.
In Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, the Court held that the “will of
the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is
mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would
be fatal to the status of the candidate before the [election], but after
the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot
be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his
certificate of candidacy.”
The late submission of Romualdez’s authority to sign
the CONA of James L. Engle to the COMELEC was a mere
technicality that cannot be used to defeat the will of the
electorate in a fair and honest election. The Court has likewise
ruled in the past that non-compliance with formal requirements
laid down in election laws when not used as a means for
fraudulent practice will be considered a harmless irregularity.
Allowing the belated submission of Romualdez’s authority to sign
CONAs will not result in the situation proscribed by Section 77 of the
OEC – that an independent candidate will be invalidly substituted. In
the case at bar, neither the COMELEC nor private respondent
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
contended that James L. Engle was not in fact a bona fide member
of Lakas-CMD. The record is bereft of any allegation that the
authority in favor of Romualdez was inexistent, forged or in any way
defective. The only issue was that it was not submitted within the
prescribed deadline. Nonetheless, said authority was submitted as
early as October 4, 2012 to the local election officer and
subsequently to the COMELEC itself in the course of the
proceedings on private respondent’s petition to deny due course to,
or cancel petitioner’s COC, thereby putting election officials on notice
that such authority exists even before the conduct of the May 13,
2013 Elections.
The case at bar was distinguished with Federico v.
Commission on Elections wherein the Court strictly applied election
rules on substitution, particularly the deadline to file certificates of
candidacy for substitutes of candidates who voluntarily withdraw
from the electoral race. In Federico, a liberal interpretation of the rule
would have led to a violation of the clear policy that no substitution
for a voluntarily withdrawing candidate can be made beyond the
mandated deadline. In the case at bar, the intention behind setting a
deadline for the filing by political parties of an authority to sign
CONAs was to give the COMELEC reasonable opportunity to
determine who are members of political parties and who are
independent candidates. This is so the COMELEC may prevent a
violation of Section 77 of the OEC which reserves the right to field a
substitute candidate to duly registered political parties. A relaxation
of the rules in the present case would not result in the evil
sought to be prevented. On the contrary, it is the strict
application of the rules that would lead to the iniquitous
situation that a candidate who was in fact a member of a
political party would be considered an independent, thus
infringing the right of the nominating political party to replace
him in the event of death, withdrawal or disqualification
pursuant to election laws. To be sure, we have held that a political
party has the right to identify who its members are. From the
evidence it can be concluded that James L. Engle was not an
independent candidate but indeed a nominee of Lakas-CMD and he
may be validly substituted by his wife, who was nominated by the
same political party, in light of his unexpected demise prior to the
elections.
Case 38
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by its Chairman,
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA, in her
capacity as Acting Director IV, National Capital Judicial Region,
Commission on Elections, and the SOLICITOR
GENERAL, respondents.
AUGUST 31, 2004; AZCUNA, J.:
In this petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, Francisco I. Chavez stands as a
taxpayer and a citizen asking this Court to enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution
No. 6520, dated January 6, 2004. The assailed provision is, as
follows:
Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters,
streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials
showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all
advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the
image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to
the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public
office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio
station, print media or television station within 3 days after the
effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said
radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed
to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with
certain establishments to endorse their products: 96 North, a clothing
company; Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation;
and G-Box, a corporation involved in the amusement and video
games business. These last two agreements were entered into
on October 14, 2003 and November 10, 2003, respectively. Pursuant
to these agreements, three billboards were set up along the
Balintawak Interchange of the North Expressway. On December 30,
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa, a tripartite alliance of
three political parties: PROMDI, REPORMA, and Aksyon
Demokratiko. On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32, the provision
assailed herein. On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to
comply with the said provision by the COMELECs Law
Department. Petitioner Chavez asks this Court that the COMELEC
be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He urges this
Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same
is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an
invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto
law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to
overbreadth.
WHETHER PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS ARE CORRECT?
NO.
It is not an invalid exercise of Police Power. The primary
objectives of the provision are to prohibit premature campaigning
and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to
equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one
hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by
preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure
and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. Moreover,
petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product
endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his
candidacy. It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or
agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private
individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these
products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed
partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his
candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its
scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display
of the subject billboards.
It is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The
non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier
purposes targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer
oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial
resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to
the public. The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to
safeguard this interest. Contracts affecting public interest contain an
implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing
legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the
provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the
promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not
militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited
by the paramount police power.
It is not in the nature of an ex post facto law. Section 32,
although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a
penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate
prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused. It
should be noted, however, that the offense defined in the assailed
provision is not the putting up of propaganda materials such as
posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials
showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all
advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image
or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the
placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office.
Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of
contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who
subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely
does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private
parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products prior
to his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as
expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of
the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the
effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for
public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the
given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it
indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate
retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
It is not in violation of the Fair Elections Act. According to
him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful
election propaganda. He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in
effectively prohibiting the use of billboards as a form of election
propaganda through the assailed provision, violated the Fair
Elections Act. The Solicitor General rightly points out that the
assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election
propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of
all candidates by preventing popular and rich candidates from
gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of
their resources and popularity.
It is not invalid because of overbreadth. A statute or
regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the
constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to State regulations may not
be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedom. The provision in
question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only
disallows the continued display of a persons propaganda materials
and advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and
before the start of the campaign period. Said materials and
advertisements must also show his name and image. There is no
blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and
advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be used
subject only to reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to
achieving the purpose of preventing premature campaigning and
promoting equality of opportunities among all candidates. The
provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of overbreadth.
Case no. 39
ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T.
ANDANAR, Respondents.
DECISION: September 11, 2009; CHICO-NAZARIO, J. – Penera is
disqualified
RESOLUTION: November 25, 2009; CARPIO, J. – Decision is
Reversed
ANTECEDENT FACTS
Rosalinda “Datty” Penera and private respondent Edgar T.
Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica, Surigao Del
Norte during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar
filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED),
Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against
Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang
Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in
election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the
commencement of the campaign period. The petition was docketed
as SPA No. 07-224. Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 – a day
before the start of the authorized campaign period on 30 March 2007
– Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in
Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the
people to vote for them on the day of the elections. Penera admitted
that a motorcade did take place, but she explained that it was simply
in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces,
where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by
a motorcade, which dispersed soon after the completion of such
filing. In fact, Penera claimed, in the motorcade held by her political
party, no person made any speech, not even any of the candidates.
Instead, there was only marching music in the background and "a
grand standing for the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates
in the motorcade." While SPA No. 07-224 was pending before the
COMELEC Second Division, the 14 May 2007 elections took place
and, as a result thereof, Penera was proclaimed the duly elected
Mayor of Sta. Monica. Penera soon assumed office on 2 July 2002.
On 24 July 2007, the COMELEC Second Division issued its
Resolution in SPA No. 07-224, penned by Commissioner Nicodemo
T. Ferrer (Ferrer), which disqualified Penera from continuing as a
mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, for engaging in premature
campaigning, in violation of Sections 80 and 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in
finding that the act of Penera in conducting a motorcade before
the filing of her certificate of candidacy constitutes premature
campaigning thus meriting her disqualification pursuant to
Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code?
DECISION – Yes, Penera should be disqualified.
The prohibited act of premature campaigning is defined
under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
SECTION 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity
outside campaign period. — It shall be unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any
party, or association of persons, to engage in an
election campaign or partisan political activity except
during the campaign period: Provided, That political
parties may hold political conventions or meetings to
nominate their official candidates within thirty days before
the commencement of the campaign period and forty-five
days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.
If the commission of the prohibited act of premature
campaigning is duly proven, the consequence of the violation is
clearly spelled out in Section 68 of the said Code, which reads:
SECTION. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an
action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having xxx (e) violated any of Sections 80,
83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as
a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the
office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for
any elective office under this Code, unless said person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphases
ours.)
In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established, not
just by Andanar’s evidence, but also those of Penera herself, that
Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs on 29 March
2007, participated in a motorcade which passed through the different
barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and
threw candies to the onlookers.
THE PONENTE OF THE DECISION OF THIS CASE
REFUTED THE DISSENTING OPINION WHICH ULTIMATELY
BECAME THE BASIS OF THE RESOLUTION.
The dissenting opinion, however, raises the legal issue that
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9369, provides a new definition of the term "candidate," as a
result of which, premature campaigning may no longer be
committed. In view of the third paragraph of Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 8436, as amended, the Dissenting Opinion argues that
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot be applied to the
present case since, as the Court held in Lanot v. Commission on
Elections (Lanot Doctrine), the election campaign or partisan
activity, which constitute the prohibited premature campaigning,
should be designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates. Under present election laws, while a person
may have filed his/her COC within the prescribed period for doing so,
said person shall not be considered a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. Thus, prior to the start of the campaign period,
there can be no election campaign or partisan political activity
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate
to public office because there is no candidate to speak of. According
to the Dissenting Opinion, even if Penera’s acts before the start of
the campaign period constitute election campaigning or partisan
political activities, these are not punishable under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code given that she was not yet a candidate at
that time. On the other hand, Penera’s acts, if committed within the
campaign period, when she was already a candidate, are likewise
not covered by Section 80 as this provision punishes only acts
outside the campaign period. The Dissenting Opinion ultimately
concludes that because of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended, the prohibited act of premature campaigning in Section 80
of the Omnibus Election Code, is practically impossible to commit at
any time.
RESOLUTION
Whether the Decision should be reversed?
YES. Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable
for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of
the campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan political
acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion
of his/her election as a candidate." Thus, such person can be
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start
of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person
who files a certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before
the start of the campaign period. The assailed Decision is contrary to
the clear intent and letter of the law. The Decision reverses Lanot v.
COMELEC, which held that a person who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign
period. In Lanot, this Court explained:
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an
election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the
campaign period.
The second element requires the existence of a "candidate."
Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who "has filed a certificate of
candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his
certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element
requires that the campaign period has not started when the election
campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their
certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of
the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the
campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of
Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day,
there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaign for or
against. On the day immediately after the last day of filing, the
campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section
80 covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period. Thus, if all
candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section
80 may only apply to acts done on such last day, which is before the
start of the campaign period and after at least one candidate has
filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why
those running for elective public office usually file their certificates of
candidacy on the last day or close to the last day. Under Section 11
of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of
candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of official ballots.
Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who
explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal
framework for an automated election system. There was no express
provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress
decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law,
realizing that Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in
holding that —
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods
as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files
to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a
candidate.” Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a
certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the
automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any
partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period.
Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote the Lanot
doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph of the amended
Section 15 of RA 8436, thus:
xxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for
the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the
start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided,
finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the armed forces, and
officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the
day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by
specifically inserting it as the second sentence of the third paragraph
of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by
this Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The
Decision cannot reverse Lanot without repealing this second
sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
second sentence. The assailed Decision, however, in reversing
Lanot does not claim that this second sentence or any portion of
Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional.
In fact, the Decision considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus,
the Decision is self-contradictory — reversing Lanot but
maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which
embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the Decision is
irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second
sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by
RA 9369. In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the
first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436. The
original provision in RA 8436 states —
x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of
the aforesaid campaign period, x x x.
In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the
first proviso now reads —
x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to
a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period x x x.
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also
strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can
be committed by a candidate "only" upon the start of the
campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the
campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.
When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA
9369, are read together, these provisions of law do not consider
Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots,
until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for
any other interpretation.
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March
2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed her certificate of
candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29
March 2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March
2007, the law still did not consider Penera a candidate for
purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by
Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a
"candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or
partisan political activities, are not punishable under Section 80
of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of
a citizen’s protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by
Penera within the campaign period are not covered by Section
80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign
period. As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC
but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of
the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or
partisan political activity, However, only after said person officially
becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can
said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially
becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can
his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature
campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period,
when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and
iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature
campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other
candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a
candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning
already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.
A candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts
done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as
daylight — any election offense that may be committed by a
candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the
start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for
premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of
the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and
express provision of the law. The Decision rationalizes that a
candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified
or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not
what the law says. What the law says is "any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is
that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful
as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the
start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are
lawful. The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that
partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the
campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political
acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily
lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period.
This is clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as
envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails
freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for
election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period.
This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of
the law that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within
[the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of
the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy."
Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao Del Norte.
Case no. 40
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and
KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as
MANILA STANDARD, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
May 5, 2001; MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private
non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in
various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social
development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly
reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner
Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation, which features newsworthy items
of information including election surveys. Petitioners brought this
action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
enforcing Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which
provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published
fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting
local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days
before an election.
To implement 5.4, Resolution 3636, 24(h), dated March 1,
2001, of the COMELEC enjoins Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election
and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven
(7) days before an election.
WHETHER THE ASSAILED PROVISION AND ITS
CORRESPONDING IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
YES, Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and
the press. The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice
Warren, held in United States v. OBrien:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government;
[2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of
speech, expression and press] is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the OBrien test
because the causal connection of expression to the asserted
governmental interest makes such interest not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. By prohibiting the publication of
election survey results because of the possibility that such
publication might undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4 actually
suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the
expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by
newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair
theorists, and other opinion makers. In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a
particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring personal
opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom
of expression means that the government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content. Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be
promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting
restriction of free expression is only incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails
to meet criterion [4] of the OBrien test, namely, that the restriction be
not greater than is necessary to further the governmental
interest. Section 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure
on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, junking of weak or
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
losing candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called
dagdag-bawas. Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might
be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right
of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by
punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of
apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. To
summarize then, 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved
by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
Case 41: GMA V COMELEC
G.R. No. 205357, September 02, 2014
( 5 Consolidated Petitions)
Petitioners: ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN), ABC Development
Corporation (ABC), GMA Network, Incorporated (GMA), Manila
Broadcasting Company, Inc. (MBC), Newsounds Broadcasting
Network, Inc. (NBN), Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN),
Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP)
Respondent: COMELEC
Facts:
The heart of the controversy revolves upon the proper interpretation
of the limitation on the number of minutes that candidates may use
for television and radio advertisements, as provided in Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9006 (R.A. No. 9006), otherwise known as the Fair
Election Act. Pertinent portions of said provision state, thus:
Sec. 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space. - All registered
parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media
time and space. The following guidelines may be amplified on by the
COMELEC:
x x x x
6.2 (a) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a
nationally elective office shall be entitled to not more than one
hundred twenty (120) minutes of television advertisement and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement whether by
purchase or donation.
b. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally
elective office shall be entitled to not more than sixty (60) minutes of
television advertisement and ninety (90) minutes of radio
advertisement whether by purchase or donation.
For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast station
or entity to submit to the COMELEC a copy of its broadcast logs and
certificates of performance for the review and verification of the
frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements broadcast for
any candidate or political party.
During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010,
COMELEC issued Resolutions implementing and interpreting
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime limitations, to mean
that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes “per
7
station.” For the May 2013 elections, however, respondent
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 dated January 15,
2013, changing the interpretation of said candidates' and political
parties' airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements
from a “per station” basis, to a “total aggregate” basis.
Petitioners sent their respective letters to the COMELEC questioning
the provisions of the aforementioned Resolution, thus, the
COMELEC held public hearings. Thereafter, on February 1, 2013,
respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9631 amending
provisions of Resolution No. 9615. Nevertheless, petitioners still
found the provisions objectionable and oppressive, hence, the
present petitions.
All of the petitioners assail the following provisions of the Resolution:
a) Section 7 (d),which provides for a penalty of suspension or
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
revocation of an offender's franchise or permit, imposes criminal
liability against broadcasting entities and their officers in the event
they sell airtime in excess of the size, duration, or frequency
authorized in the new rules;
b) Section 9 (a) which provides for an “aggregate total” airtime
instead of the previous “per station” airtime for political campaigns
or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for
candidates' television and radio guestings and appearances; and
c) Section 14 which provides for a candidate's “right to reply.”
On March 15, 2013, Senator Alan Peter S. Cayetano (Petitioner-
Intervenor) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and
Admit the Petition-in-Intervention, which was granted by the Court
per its Resolution dated March 19, 2013. Petitioner-Intervenor also
assails Section 9 (a) of the Resolution changing the interpretation of
candidates' and political parties' airtime limitation for political
campaigns or advertisements from a “per station” basis, to a “total
aggregate” basis.
Petitioners allege that Section 9:
 provides for a very restrictive aggregate airtime limit and a
vague meaning for a proper computation of “aggregate total”
airtime, and violates the equal protection guarantee, thereby
defeating the intent and purpose of R.A. No. 9006.
 is vague and infringes on the constitutionally protected
freedom of speech, of the press and of expression, and on
the right of people to be informed on matters of public
concern
 is a cruel and oppressive regulation as it imposes an
unreasonable and almost impossible burden on broadcast
mass media of monitoring a candidate's or political party's
aggregate airtime, otherwise, it may incur administrative and
criminal liability.
Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, providing for a candidate's or
political party's “right to reply,” is likewise assailed to be
unconstitutional for being an improper exercise of the COMELEC's
regulatory powers; for constituting prior restraint and infringing
petitioners' freedom of expression, speech and the press; and for
being violative of the equal protection guarantee.
Issue:
Whether or not the assailed provisions are constitutional
Held:
The petition is partly meritorious.
A. Section 9: Aggregate Time Limits
The Court holds that it is not within the power of the Comelec to
reduce the allowable minutes within which the candidates and
political parties would be able to campaign through air.
It does appear that the Comelec did not have any other basis for
coming up with a new manner of determining allowable time limits
except its own idea as to what should be the maximum number of
minutes based on its exercise of discretion as to how to level the
playing field.
There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally
and statutorily authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot
exercise its powers without limitations – or reasonable basis. It could
not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it
is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does
have discretion, but such discretion is something that must be
exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is
not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently
interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever
it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with
sufficient basis.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Based on the transcripts of the hearing conducted by the COMELEC
after it had already promulgated the Resolution, the respondent did
not fully explain or justify the change in computing the airtime
allowed candidates and political parties, except to make reference to
the need to “level the playing field
The COMELEC went beyond theauthority granted it by the law in
adopting “aggregate” basis in the determination of allowable airtime.
The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum
allowable airtime should be based on the totality of possible
broadcast in all television or radio stations
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits
also goes against the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the
ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing
field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would
justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates
and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in
the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a
prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the COMELEC
has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped its
wings.
B. Resolution No. 9615 does not impose
an unreasonable burden on the
broadcast industry
The legal duty of monitoring lies with the Comelec. Broadcast
stations are merely required to submit certain documents to aid the
Comelec in ensuring that candidates are not sold airtime in excess of
the allowed limits. These documents include: (1) certified true copies
of broadcast logs, certificates of performance, and certificates of
acceptance, or other analogous record on specified dates (Section
3
9[d] , Resolution No. 9615, in relation to Section 6.2, R.A. 9006; and
(2) copies of all contract for advertising, promoting or opposing any
political party or the candidacy of any person for public office within
five (5) days after its signing (Section 6.3, R.A. 9006).
The Court holds, accordingly, that, contrary to petitioners’ contention,
the Reporting Requirement for the Comelec’s monitoring is
reasonable.
Further, it is apropos to note that, pursuant to Resolution No. Such a
requirement is a reasonable means adopted by the COMELEC to
ensure that parties and candidates are afforded equal opportunities
to promote their respective candidacies. Unlike the restrictive
aggregate-based airtime limits, the directive to give prior notice is not
unduly burdensome and unreasonable, much less could it be
characterized as prior restraint since there is no restriction on
dissemination of information before broadcast.
C. The right to reply provision is reasonable
SECTION 14. Right to Reply. – All registered political parties, party-
list groups or coalitions and bona fide candidates shall have the right
to reply to charges published or aired against them. The reply shall
be given publicity by the newspaper, television, and/or radio station
which first printed or aired the charges with the same prominence or
in the same page or section or in the same time slot as the first
statement.
The Constitution itself provides as part of the means to ensure free,
orderly, honest, fair and credible elections, a task addressed to the
66
COMELEC to provide for a right to reply. Given that express
constitutional mandate, it could be seen that the Fundamental Law
itself has weighed in on the balance to be struck between the
freedom of the press and the right to reply. Accordingly, one is not
merely to see the equation as purely between the press and the right
to reply. Instead, the constitutionally-mandated desiderata of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections would necessarily
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
have to be factored in trying to see where the balance lies between
press and the demands of a right-to-reply.
Case 43: EJERCITO V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 212398 November 25, 2014
PETITIONER: EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO,
Respondents.HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR
"EGA Y" S. SAN LUIS,
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari.
Edgar San Luis filed a petition for disqualification against Ejercito
who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate based on the following:
First cause of action
[Ejercito], during the campaign period for 2013 local election,
distributed to the electorates of the province of Laguna the so-called
"Orange Card" with an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters in voting for his favor. It was alleged that the"Orange Card"
could be used in any public hospital within the Province of Laguna
for their medical needs.
The so-called "Orange Card" is considered a material consideration
in convincing the voters to cast their votes for [Ejercito’s] favor in
clear violation of the provision of the Omnibus Election Code :
"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an
action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other
materialconsideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c)
spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if hehas been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in
the election laws
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
A candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of
Laguna is only authorized to incur an election expense
amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-
SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX
(P4,576,566.00) PESOS. However, in total disregard and
violation of the afore-quoted provision of law, [Ejercito]
exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign for the
2013 election. For television campaign commercials alone,
[Ejercito] already spent the sum of PhP23,730.784 Even
assuming that [Ejercito] was given 30% discount as
prescribed under the Fair Election Act, he still exceeded in
the total allowable expenditures for which he paid the sum
of P16,611,549;
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, it is evident that
[Ejercito] committed an election offense as provided for
under Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 It is
crystal clear that [Ejercito] violated Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Subsequently, on May 16, 2013, San Luis filed a Very Urgent
ExParte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of
Respondent and Supplemental to the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent wich
were not acted upon by COMELEC. The next day, Ejercito and
Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers as the duly-elected Governor and Vice-Governor,
respectively, of Laguna.
The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of
8 87
Conference on June 4, 2013. Ejercito then filed his Verified
Answeron June 13, 2013 that prayed for the dismissal of the petition
due to procedural and substantive irregularities and taking into
account his proclamation as Provincial Governor.
On September 26, 2013, the COMELEC First Division promulgated a
Resolution granting the petition for disqualification against Ejercito.
In his petition before the Supreme Court, Ejercito alleged that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in violating his right
to due process as there is no finding of guilt by a competent court
that he actually committed the alleged offense of overspending.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the decision of the COMELEC to disqualify Ejercito
was proper
2. Whether or not the legislature imposes no legal limitation on
campaign donations
Held:
Yes. Ejercito failed to prove that the COMELEC renderd its assailed
decision with grave abuse of discretion.
Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN
Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed
by an identified supporter without his knowledge and consent as, in
fact, his signature thereon was obviously forged. Even assuming that
such contract benefited him, Ejercito alleges that he should not be
penalized for the conduct of third parties who acted on their own
without his consent. We refuse to believe that the advertising
contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept
International, Inc. were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and
consent. As found by the COMELEC First Division, the advertising
contracts submitted in evidence by San Luis as well as those in legal
custody of the COMELEC belie his hollow assertion. His express
conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must because
non-compliance is considered as an election offense.
Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast
advertisements donated to the candidate shall not be broadcasted
without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be
attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the
COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be
signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly-
authorized representative of the political party. COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 also unambiguously states thatit shall be
unlawful to broadcast any election propaganda donated or given free
of charge by any person or broadcast entity to a candidate
withoutthe written acceptance of the said candidate and unless they
bear and be identified by the words "airtime for this broadcast was
provided free of charge by" followed by the true and correct name
and address of the donor.
2. No.
Ejercito vigorously asserts that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476
distinguishes between "contribution" and "expenditure" and makes
no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution madeby
third parties in favor of the candidates, while the limit set by law, as
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
appearing in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, applies only to
election expenditures of candidates.
We deny.
118
Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 sets the current allowable limit on
expenses of candidates and political parties for election campaign,
thus:
SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. –
The aggregate amount that a candidate or registered politicalparty
may spend for election campaign shall be as follows:
(a) For candidates – Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and
Vice President; and for other candidates, Three pesos
(P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the
constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy:
Provided, That, a candidate without any political party and
without support from any political party may be allowed to
spend Five pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and
(b) For political parties - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter
currently registered in the constituency or constituencies
where it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution
in cash or in kind to any candidate or political party or coalition of
parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the Commission,
shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax.
Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are not repealed by R.A. No.
120
7166. These provisions, which are merely amended insofar as the
allowable amount is concerned, read:
SECTION 100. Limitations upon expenses of candidates.– No
candidate shall spend for his election campaign an aggregate
amount exceeding one peso and fifty centavos for every voter
currently registered in the constituency where he filed his candidacy:
Provided, That the expenses herein referred to shall include those
incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate, whether in cash
or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or aircraft,
equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the
campaign: Provided, further, That where the land, water or aircraft,
equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by
the candidate, his contributor or supporter, the Commission is hereby
empowered toassess the amount commensurate with the expenses
for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and
shall be included in the total expenses incurred by the candidate.
SECTION 101. Limitations upon expenses of political parties.– A
duly accredited political party may spend for the election of its
candidates in the constituency or constituencies where it has official
candidates an aggregate amount not exceeding the equivalent of
one peso and fifty centavos for every voter currently registered
therein. Expenses incurred by branches, chapters, or committees of
such political party shall be included in the computation of the total
expenditures of the political party.
Expenses incurred by other political parties shall be considered as
expenses of their respective individual candidates and subject to
limitation under Section 100 of this Code.
SECTION 103. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures.–
No person, except the candidate, the treasurer of a political party or
any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer, shall make
any expenditure in support of or in opposition to any candidate or
political party. Expenditures duly authorized by the candidate or the
treasurer of the party shall be considered as expenditures of such
candidate or political party.
The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of which
shall be furnished the Commission signed by the candidate or the
treasurer of the party and showing the expenditures so authorized,
and shall state the full name and exact address of the person so
designated. (Emphasis supplied)
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
When the intent of the law is not apparent as worded, or when the
application of the law would lead to absurdity, impossibility or
injustice, extrinsic aids of statutory construction may be resorted to
such as the legislative history of the law for the purpose of solving
doubt, and that courts may take judicial notice of the origin and
history of the law, the deliberations during the enactment, as well as
prior laws on the same subject latter in order to ascertain the true
intent or spirit of the law.
Looking back, it could be found that Sections 100, 101, and 103 of
123
the OEC are substantially lifted from P.D. No. 1296, as amended.
Sections 51, 52 and 54 of which specifically provide:
Section 51. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. No candidate
shall spend for his election campaign an amount more than the
salary or the equivalent of the total emoluments for one year
attached to the office for which he is a candidate: Provided, That the
expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred by the
candidate, his contributors and supporters,whether in cash or in kind,
including the use, rental or hire of land, water or air craft, equipment,
facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign:
Provided, further,That, where the land, water or air craft, equipment,
facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the
candidate, his contributor or supporter, the Commission is hereby
empowered to assess the amount commensurate with the expenses
for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and
shall be included in the total expenses incurred by the candidate.
In the case of candidates for the interim Batasang Pambansa, they
shall not spend more than sixty thousand pesos for their election
campaign.
Section 52. Limitation upon expenses of political parties, groups or
aggrupations.A political party, group or aggrupation may not spend
for the election of its candidates in the constituency or constituencies
where it has official candidates anaggregate amount more than the
equivalent of fifty centavos for every voter currently registered
therein: Provided, That expenses incurred by such political party,
group or aggrupation not duly registered with the Commission and/or
not presenting or supporting a complete list of candidates shall be
considered as expenses of its candidates and subject to the
limitation under Section 51 of this Code. Expenses incurred by
branches, chapters or committees of a political party, group or
aggrupation shall be included in the computation of the total
expenditures of the political party, group or aggrupation. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 54. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures.No
person, except the candidate or any person authorized by him or the
treasurer of a political party, group or aggrupation, shall make any
expenditure in support of, or in opposition to any candidate or
political party, group or aggrupation. Expenditures duly authorized by
the candidate of the treasurer of the party, group or aggrupation shall
be considered as expenditure of such candidate or political party,
group or aggrupation.
The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of which
shall be furnished the Commission, signed by the candidate or the
treasurer of the party, group or aggrupation and showing the
expenditure so authorized, and shall state the full nameand exact
address of the person so designated. (Emphasis supplied)
In tracing the legislative history of Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the
OEC, it can be said, therefore, that the intent of our lawmakers has
been consistent through the years: to regulate not just the election
expenses of the candidate but also of his or her
contributor/supporter/donor as well as by including in the aggregate
limit of the former’s election expenses those incurred by the
latter.The phrase "those incurred or caused to be incurred by the
candidate"is sufficiently adequate to cover those expenses which are
contributed or donated in the candidate’s behalf. By virtue of the
legal requirement that a contribution or donation should bear the
written conformity of the candidate, a contributor/supporter/donor
certainly qualifies as "any person authorized by such candidate or
treasurer." Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
126
debemus. (Where the law does not distinguish, neither should
disinguish)
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Th expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’
rights of speech and of expression under Section 4, Artticle III of the
127
Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation, the law’s concern is
not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting
a particular candidate but to ensure equality between and among
aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less financial
resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only
incidentaland is no more than necessary to achieve the substantial
governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political
advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
constitutional objectives set out in Section 26, Article II, Section 4,
128
Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited
expenditure for political advertising, which skews the political
process and subverts the essence of a truly democratic form of
government.
No. 42
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST
REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP
HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER
OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON, Respondents.
PONENTE: Leonen
FACTS: February 21, 2013: petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins
within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet
(10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
“IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of
2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject
of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with
a checkmark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH
Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”
TEAM BUHAY: Estrada, JV; Honasan, Gregorio; Magsaysay, Mitos;
Pimentel, Koko; Trillanes, Antonio; Villar, Cynthia; Party List Buhay;
Party List Ang Pamilya
TEAM PATAY: Angara, Juan Edgardo; Casiño, Teddy ;Cayetano,
Alan Peter; Enrile, Jackie; Escudero, Francis; Hontiveros, Risa
;Legarda, Loren; Party List Gabriela; Party List Akbayan; Party List
Bayan Muna; Party List Anak Pawis
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored
nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the
tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but
not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were
not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the
tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the
Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by
private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of
expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or
content-neutral regulation.
 2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered
religious speech.
HELD:
1. No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the
exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It
can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction
granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial
review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo
that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging
the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the
determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-
justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether
there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if
there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence
of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting
the officialactions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference
to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may
be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into
any doubt that a political question brings.
2. No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this
case, organ of government before a court may come into the
picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the
message and their medium, had understandable relevance
especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the
filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal
litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their
administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings
prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
3. No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence
to support their position that they had the power to regulate the
tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain
to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates.
Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not
have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
4. Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is
election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of
endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this
does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin
was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions
are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering
informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand,
commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more
than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting
from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political
speech.
5. Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions
“based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents
of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is
content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the
size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule
as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents
failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial
state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post
the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does
not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
NOTE: Size (of the tarpaulin) does matter
First, it enhances efficiency in communication.
Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of
the message to the reader.
Third, larger spaces allow for more messages.
These points become more salient when it is the electorate, not the
candidates or the political parties, that speaks. Too often, the terms
of public discussion during elections are framed and kept hostage by
brief and catchy but meaningless sound bites extolling the character
of the candidate. Worse, elections sideline political arguments and
privilege the endorsement by celebrities. Rather than provide
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
obstacles to their speech, government should in fact encourage it.
Between the candidates and the electorate, the latter have the better
incentive to demand discussion of the more important issues.
Between the candidates and the electorate, the former have better
incentives to avoid difficult political standpoints and instead focus on
appearances and empty promises.
Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and
158
place. They are fundamentally part of expression protected under
Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
6. Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily
seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of
petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by
the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective
confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that
regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad
that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.
7. No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by
petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the
Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not
suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as
religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its
nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not
hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion
under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the
government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or
effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of,
a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take
religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally
applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious
beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to
create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary
religious exercise may flourish.”
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face,
"does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic
332
church." That the position of the Catholic church appears to
coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law
does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious
speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

classified under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay" according to their 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,
respective votes on the RH Law. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
The same may be said of petitioners’ reliance on papal encyclicals to
support their claim that the expression onthe tarpaulin is an REYES, J.:
ecclesiastical matter. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the
church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this FACTS:
court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of
January 15, 2013: the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
9615, which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes
connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and
any doubtas to its nature as speech with political consequences and
subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the
not religious speech. prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides:

SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda.– During the

campaign period, it is unlawful:

xxxx

(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or

propaganda material outside of authorized common poster
areas, in public places, or in private properties without the
consent of the owner thereof.

(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f)

include any of the following:

xxxx

5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi

cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or
not;

6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as

bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations,
NO. 43
and the like.
G.R. No. 206020 April 14, 2015
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
The violation of items [5 and 6]under subsection (g) shall be
a cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise and
will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation
service and/or terminal liable for an election offense under
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by
3
Section 18 (n) of these Rules.
Petitioner sought clarification from the COMELEC as regards the
application of Resolution No. 9615, particularly Section 7(g) items (5)
and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public
utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals.
The petitioner:
 explained that the prohibition stated in the aforementioned
provisions impedes the right to free speech of the private
owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
 requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation
of the assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs
and transport terminals to post election campaign materials
on their vehicles and transport terminals.
The COMELEC en banc:

5
issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied the
petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation of
Section 7(g) items(5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615.
 opined that:
From the foregoing, x x x the primary fact in consideration
here is actually whether 1-UTAK or any other [PUV] owners
in the same position do in fact possess a franchise and/or
certificate of public convenience and operate as a public
utility. If it does not, then the ruling in Adiong applies
squarely. If it does, then its operations, pursuant to Section
4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, will be placed directly
under the supervision and regulation of the Commission for
the duration of the election period so as to ensure equality of
opportunity, time, and space for all candidates in the
placement of political advertisements. Having placed their
property for use by the general public and having secured a
license or permit to do so, 1-UTAK and other PUV owners,
as well as transport terminal owners, cannot now complain
that their property is subject to regulation by the State.
Securing a franchise or a certificate of public convenience in
their favor does not exempt them from the burdens imposed
by the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9006 x x x, and other
related statutes. It must be stressed that the Constitution
itself, under Section 6, Article XII, commands that the use of
property bears a social function and all economic agents
shall contribute to the common good; and there is no higher
common good than that as espoused in R.A. No. 9006 – the
equalization of opportunities for all candidates for political
office during elections – a policy which Res. No. 9615 merely
implements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are constitutional.
HELD: No.
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No.
9615 are null and void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints on speech
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the
people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the
freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport
 2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election
campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree
with them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting
an election campaign material during an election period in PUVs and
transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the
public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an
election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to
free expression of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport
terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from
expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an
election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit
to operate.
The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials
is an invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free
speech clause.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined
standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right
to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
1. The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the
Government;
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are
content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place where
election campaign materials may be posted. However, the
prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to
satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615, are not within
the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under
Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is
absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to
operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport
terminals.
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional
grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during
an election period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory
powers over the enjoyment or utilization “of all franchisesor permits
for the operation,” inter alia, of transportation and other public
utilities. The COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers of
supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of
PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to
operate the same.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not
within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to
supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of
transportation utilities. The posting of election campaign material
on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is not
only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership – it
has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or
transport terminal.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not
justified under the captive-audience doctrine.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot,
as a practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech
can be restricted. The “captive-audience” doctrine recognizes
that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted
message in circumstances in which the communication cannot
be avoided.
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of
censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the public from
some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive
than others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when
the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of
captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling
viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine may not be justified if the supposed “captive audience” may
avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition
under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is
not justified under the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are
not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials
posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of
declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election
campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they
find the same unbearably intrusive.
Lehman’s case not applicable
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting
of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals,
cites Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a case decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government, which
prohibits political advertisements on government-run buses, was
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that the advertising space on the buses was not a public forum,
pointing out that advertisement space on government-run buses,
“although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a part
of commercial venture.” In the same way that other commercial
ventures need not accept every proffer of advertising from the
general public, the city’s transit system has the discretion on the type
of advertising that may be displayed on its vehicles.
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned
by the city government; the city government, as owner of the buses,
had the right to decide which type of advertisements would be placed
on its buses.
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility
vehicles, i.e., the city government, in choosing the types of
advertisements that would be placed on its properties. In stark
contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 curtail
the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals on the
advertisements that may be posted on their properties.
Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to
refuse political advertisements on their buses. Considering that what
were involved were facilities owned by the city government,
impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a necessity. In the
instant case, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals remains
private; there exists no valid reason to suppress their political views
by proscribing the posting of election campaign materials on their
properties.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from
posting election campaign materials violates the equal
protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run
afoul of the free speech clause, but also of the equal protection
clause. One of the basic principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right, which is embodied in Section
1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and
(6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and
applies equally to the members of the purported class. However, the
classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is not
based on substantial distinction and is not germane to the purpose of
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
the law. A distinction exists between PUVs and transport
terminals and private vehicles and other properties in that the
former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the
government either a franchise or a permit to operate.
Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition imposed
under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615
regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport
terminals; the prohibition does not in any manner affect the
franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport
terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between
owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private
vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the ownership
of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by
the public, remains private. If owners of private vehicles and
other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and
opinion by posting election campaign materials on their
properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same
preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In
terms of ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs
and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and
properties is merely superficial. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available
for use by the public is likewise not substantial justification to
set them apart from private vehicles and other properties.
Admittedly, any election campaign material that would be posted on
PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by many people.
However, election campaign materials posted on private vehicles
and other places frequented by the public, e.g.,commercial
establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus, there is
no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in
the prohibition against posting of election campaign materials.
Summary
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 violate the free speech clause; they are
content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional
power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the
objective of ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the
candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause,
but are also violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no
substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and transport
terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one’s
political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of
expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is
a violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life.
No. 45.1
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000
Petitioners: Veterans Federation Party et al
Respondents: Commissions on Elections et al
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature
into our presidential system of government -- the party-list method of
representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral
party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections
may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon
their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of
Representatives as regular members. In effect, a voter is given two
(2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman and another
for a party-list representative.
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list…….
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the
selection or election of party-list representatives, Congress enacted
RA 7941 on March 3, 1995.
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the
House are prescribed by this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the
following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, that those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes; Provided, finally, that each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list
representation was held simultaneously with the national elections. A
total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and
coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc
proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12)
parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of
the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. The Comelec
en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut
Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for
having garnered 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list
system.
Thereafter, several party-list organizations (respondents)
filed a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution." alleging that the filling
up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in
the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution,
was mandatory. The Comelec Second Division granted the petition
and ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in
addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives.
The 12 parties and organizations (petitioners), which had
earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at
least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected
to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA
7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two
percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in
the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not
exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had
garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
However, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the second division
decision.
ISSUE: 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words,
should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-
seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should
the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
HELD: The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with
petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but
disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
1. NO. Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not
mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list
seats in Congress. We rule that a simple reading of
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys
the equally simple message that Congress was vested
with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The
Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of
the total membership in the House of Representatives
reserved for party-list representatives.
2. YES. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. The two percent threshold is consistent
not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence
of "representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority emanates
from the people, but is exercised by representatives
chosen by them.
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's
pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to
three (3) for each qualified party, organization or
coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two
percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the
entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its
membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not
the entire House.
3. To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-
list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA)
No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable
parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined
number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in
the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless
of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two
additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in
proportion to their total number of votes.
SC hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion
in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to
a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two
requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and
proportional representation.
(Note: Guys, sorry ang haba. Ung sa #3 di ko na sinama ung
mismong formula kasi ang dami saka di naman siguro tayo
pagsosolve-in ni Sir. Haha Ung sa #3 ung doctrine mismo
nung case)
No. 45.2
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
Petitioner: ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY
Respondents: COMELEC, CITIZENS DRUG WATCH et al
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Facts: The Comelec gave due course or approved the
Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations,
but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the
Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein
respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the
Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said
certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an
alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be
counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth
also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination
against some of herein respondents.
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition before this Court on April
16, 2001 assailing the Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. On
April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that
the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most
objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution. For its part,
Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of major political
parties.
Issue: 1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the
party-list elections.
2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
Held: 1. YES. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private
respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House
of Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the
Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list
system.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-
list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered
under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters'
registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x. Section 3 expressly states
that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition
of parties.
2. NO. That political parties may participate in the party-list
elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any
organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with
the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution
and RA 7941. (See: Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution).
The foregoing provision (RA 7941) mandates a state policy of
promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style
party-list system, which will enable the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are proportional representation,
marginalized and underrepresented, and lack [of] well-defined
constituencies.
Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of
people in a particular district, because the party-list election is
national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a
distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941; namely,
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals.
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of
the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is
easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must
factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies mentioned in Section
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented
sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the
law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list
system.
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only
to give more law to the great masses of our people who have
less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the
enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make
the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive
recipients of the States benevolence, but active participants in
the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all
individuals and groups, including those which now dominate
district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in
party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and
mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious
veneer for traditional politics.
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be
remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this
Decision.
47
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 179271
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Petitioners: BANAT et al
Respondent: COMELEC
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
FACTS: The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the
party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes
cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. On 27 June 2002,
BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No.
07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he
Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been
quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to
and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated
NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed
thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely:
Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle
Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela),
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher,
Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers
Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO),
Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono.
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section
11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,the
following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the
additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. The COMELEC
used the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in the case of
Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC which is:
Number of votes of first party
Proportion of votes of first
__________________________ = party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system
party-list system
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

(4) How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

Whereas in determining the additional seats for the other qualified

parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as
expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows: (5) Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political
parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

No. of votes of

concerned party No. of additional HELD: (1) The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely
a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not
Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated to exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house.
a concerned party No. of votes of first party However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

first party
(2) Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that
no one party shall dominate the party-list system.
Petitioners question the decision of the COMELEC in
using the

Veterans formula contending that it violates the (3) The Court ruled that, in computing the allocation of additional
Consititution. seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. The Court finds
that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
ISSUES: (1) Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
mandatory or merely a ceiling? additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling
that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives.
(2) Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there

are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list
(3) Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA
elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one
7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the
two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we
increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
The Court therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in
relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent
threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
(4) In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:
1.The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3.Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats
are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no
longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available
seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in
R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. (Please
pakicheck yung NOTE sa baba for computation)
(5) Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major
political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and
in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the
sectoral groups.
In defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a
political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended
that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law. However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court
decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

indirectly. (Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7

other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of
the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who How is this done?
ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that
only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the
party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply
in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.) it against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall
not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for
the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
_______________________________________________________
____
Example:
NOTE: In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall
no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of
seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats
1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
elections (15,950,900).
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in
R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x

(remaining seats) = number of additional seat
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the
seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat
each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. For
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79
example, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a
remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a
total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats.
remaining seats.
Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will
still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having
more than 3 seats.
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the
second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats
for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the
additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats
process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
FACTS: Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A.
No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531,
approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. However, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued a Resolution disqualifying them from participating in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations. Petitioners
now filed a Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-
list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.

(2) Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid
down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
49
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections.
G.R. No. 203766

April 2, 2013
HELD: (1) The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in following prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying
Petitioners: Atong Paglaum et al petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new
Respondent: COMELEC parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral
parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in
Ponente: CARPIO, J the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners,
the Court remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the
party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-
list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to
include in the party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties
is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which
states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of
not more that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there
shall be "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words
"national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from
sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended
national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they
would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did
not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-
list system exclusively sectoral.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups:
(1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or
organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and
regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties
or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need
not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any
particular sector.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure
ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties
only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-
list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is
to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented
political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political
party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not
represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No.
7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and policies,
regardless of their economic status as citizens.
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer
only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature,
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These
sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the
members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party
either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one
must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that
one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically,
the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those
who fall in the low income group as classified by the National
Statistical Coordination Board.
______
(2) To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second
guideline for the accreditation of parties under the party-list system,
that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA
7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they
must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling ‘Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx
to be elected to the House of Representatives.’ "However, the
requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the
political party xxx must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. This inherent
inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the
COMELEC’s refusal to register sectoral wings officially organized by
major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing
practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from
participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral
wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5)
major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from
59
participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. Thus, major
political parties can participate in subsequent party-list
elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the
1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should
participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings.
The participation of major political parties through their sectoral
wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties
to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list
elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the
House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to
participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields
candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a
sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-
list system.
Yung full text po nito magkasama talaga sila, 2 cases, so sinama ko
na yung abayon though yung palparan lang nakaassign.
49.
G.R. No. 189466 February 11, 2010
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON vs. THE HONORABLEH
OUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DELA CRUZ
and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA
G.R. No. 189506
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR.
vs.
HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL(H
RET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., CRISTINAP A
LABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLIND
A CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ
G.R. No. 189466 (Abayon vs. HRET)
FACTS: Dar yl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the
Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of
Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents
filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET
against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon.
According to them, Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat
in the House of Representatives because it does not represent the
marginalized and unrepresented sectors. Also, they
questioned the eligibility of Abayon as a party-list nominee
since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-
list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray
in the immediately preceding elections (2004).
Abayon's contention:
1) COMELEC already confirmed that Aangat Tayo is a national multi-
sectorial party-list organization organization representing the
workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she
belonged to the women sector.
2) She was second nominee of An Waray during the2004 elections
but she could not be regarded as having losta bid for an elective
office.
3) HRET had no jurisdiction overthe petition for quo warranto
because the respondents the registration of Aangat Tayo as a
party-list organization is within the jurisdiction of COMELEC.
4) It was Aangat Tayo who won the seat and she was just a mere
nominee; so her eligibility is an internal concern of Aangat Tayo.
HRET: Dismissed petition against Aangat Tayo but
upheld jurisdiction over qualifications of Abayon. Abayon moved for
reconsideration which was denied. Hence this petition for special civil
action of certiorari.
G.R. No. 189506
FACTS: Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the
Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the
members of the House of Representatives. Respondents
filed with HRET petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its
nominee, petitioner Palparan. According the respondents Palparan
was not eligible to sit as a party-list nominee because he did not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that
Bantay represented, namely, the victims
of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical
Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards.
Palparan's contention: HRET had no jurisdiction over his
person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he,
that was elected. He was just a nominee and any questioninvolving
his eligibility was an internal concern of Bantay.
HRET: Dismissed petition against Bantay on the ground that the
issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List
System Act but HRET upheld its jurisdiction over the question
of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications. Palparan moved for
reconsideration which was denied. Hence this petition
for special civil action of certiorari.
ISSUE: W hether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction
over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of
Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007elections.
HELD: Yes. Petitioners Abayon and Palparan pointed out
that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-l i s t
nominee belongs to the party or organization that
nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness
of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five f r o m
among them after all belongs to the party or
organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made
that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified
nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House,
the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among
other things, the qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives. Since party-list nominees are
"elected members" of the House of Representatives not less t h a n
the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy
with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office
as member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins.
for a p e r i o d of not less than one (1) year
i m m e d i a t e l y preceding the day of the election, able to read
and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which
he s e e k s t o r e p r e s e n t f o r a t l e a s t n i n e t y ( 9 0 )
d a y s preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-
five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a
nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative
who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue until the expiration of his term. In the case
before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of
petitioner Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to
represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee
must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent." But the Court did not decide on the
issue of Palparan because it is for the HRET to interpret the
above stated provision (Sec.9).]

***

[Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set

thequalifications and grounds for disqualification of party-
listnominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution,
states:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. –

N o person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
50.
ROQUE VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 188456. SEPTEMBER 10, 2009
FACTS:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
(RA) 8436 authorizing the adoption of an automated election system
(AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards.
The 1998, 2001, and 2004 national and local polls, however, came
and went but purely manual elections were still the order of the day.
On January 23, 2007, the amendatory RA 9369 was passed
authorizing anew the Comelec to use an AES. Of particular
relevance are Sections 6 and 10 of RA 9369 originally Secs. 5 and 8,
respectively of RA 8436, as amended each defining Comelec’s
specific mandates insofar as automated elections are concerned.
The AES was not utilized in the May 10, 2000 elections, as funds
were not appropriated for that purpose by Congress and due to time
constraints.
In August 2008, Comelec managed to automate the regional
polls in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), using
direct recording electronics (DRE) technology in
the province of Maguindanao; and the optical mark reader/recording
(OMR) system, particularly the Central Count Optical Scan
(CCOS), in the rest of ARMM. What scores hailed as successful
automated ARMM 2008 elections paved the way for Comelec, with
some prodding from senators, to prepare for a nationwide
computerized run for the 2010 national/local polls, with the many
lessons learned from the ARMM experience influencing, according to
the NCC, the technology selection for the 2010 automated elections.
Accordingly, in early March 2009, the Comelec released
the Request for Proposal (RFP), also known as Terms of
Reference (TOR), for the nationwide automation of the voting,
counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes for the
May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections. What is
referred to also in the RFP and other contract documents as the
2010 Elections Automation Project (Automation Project) consists of
three elaborate components.
Of the ten (10) invitation-responding consortia which
obtained the bid documents, only seven (7) submitted sealed
applications for eligibility and bids which, per Bid Bulletin No. 24,
were to be opened on a pre-set date, following the convening of the
pre-bid conference. Among the submitted bids was that of the joint
venture (JV) of TIM and Smartmatic, the former incorporated under
the Corporation Code of the Philippines. Smartmatic, on the other
hand, was organized under the laws of Barbados. For a stated
amount, said JV proposed to undertake the whole automation
project, inclusive of the delivery of 82,200 PCOS machines. After
declaring TIM-Smartmatic as the best complying bidder, the SBAC
then directed the joint venture to undertake post-qualification
screening, and its PCOS prototype machines the Smarmatic
Auditable Electronic System (SAES) 1800to undergo end-to-
end testing to determine compliance with the pre-set criteria.
On July 9, 2009, petitioners interposed the instant
recourse which, for all intents and purposes, impugns the
validity and seeks to nullify the July 10, 2009 Comelec-
Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation contract adverted
to. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMELEC AND COMELEC-
SBAC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN AWARDING THE 2010 ELECTIONS AUTOMATION
PROJECT TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TIM AND
SMARTMATIC FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
 COMELEC DID NOT CONDUCT ANY PILOT
TESTING OF THE PCOS MACHINES
OFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
SMARTMATIC AND TIM, IN VIOLATION OF
[RA] 8436 (AS AMENDED BY [RA] 9369)
 THE [PCOS] MACHINES [THUS] OFFERED BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DO NOT SATISFY
THE MINIMUM SYSTEM CAPABILITIES SET
BY [RA] NO. 8436 (AS AMENDED BY [RA]
9369). PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed
grave abuse in its discretion?
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
HELD:
] refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let
No. The first function of the Comelec under the Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code for that matter relates to the enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relating to the conduct
of elections to public office to ensure a free, orderly and honest
electoral exercise. And how did petitioners come to their conclusion
about their abdication theory? By acceding to Art. 3.3 of the
automation contract, Comelec relinquished, so petitioners claim,
supervision and control of the system to be used for the automated
elections. To a more specific point, the loss of control, as may be
deduced from the ensuing exchanges, arose from the fact that
Comelec would not be holding possession of what in IT jargon are
the public and private keys pair.
Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the
enabling automation law, RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, the
RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners invoked as an
afterthought, the Court finds the project award to have complied with
legal prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of the
corresponding automation contract in question to be valid. No grave
abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of
respondent Comelec. And surely, the winning joint venture should
not be faulted for having a foreign company as partner.
The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a
distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the
discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair elections,
administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of
elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions that would
perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of lesser
responsibility. It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough
wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would enable it to
accomplish the great objective for which it was created to promote
free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be
for, too often, Comelec has to make decisions under difficult
conditions to address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of
the election and in the process the voice of the people. Thus, in the
past, the Court has steered away from interfering with the Comelec’s
exercise of its power which, by law and by the nature of its office
properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion on Comelec’s part, as here, the Court should
alone nullify, the acts of that body.
No. 50
Capalla v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 201112 June 13, 2012
Plaintiff/Appellee: Archbishop Fernando R. Capalla, et al.
Defendant/Appellant: Commission on Elections, et al.
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Doctrine: A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or
amending certain provisions of the contract bidded upon. However,
such changes must not constitute substantial or material
amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract
and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity
to bid on the same terms.
Facts: Pursuant to its authority to use an Automated Election
System (AES), the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) posted
and published an invitation to apply for eligibility and to bid for the
2010 Poll Automation Project. Comelec awarded the contract for the
project to respondent Smartmatic-TIM. Thereafter, COMELEC and
Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for the Provision of an
Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized
National and Local Elections (AES Contract, for brevity). The
contract between the COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM was one of
“lease of the AES with option to purchase (OTP) the goods listed in
the contract.” In said contract, the Comelec was given until
December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the option.
In a letter, Smartmatic-TIM, through its Chairman Cesar
Flores (Flores), proposed a temporary extension of the option period
to buy the PCOS machines until March 31, 2011. The COMELEC did
not exercise the option within the extended period. Several
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
extensions were given for the COMELEC to exercise the OTP until
its final extension on March 31, 2012. On March 29, 2012, the
COMELEC issued a resolution resolving to accept Smartmatic-TIM’s
offer to extend the period to exercise the OTP until March 31, 2012.
Archbishop Capalla, et al.thus assailed the validity and
constitutionality of the COMELEC Resolutions for the purchase of
the subject PCOS machines as well as the Extension Agreement
and the Deed of Sale covering said goods mainly on the ground
that the option period provided for in the AES contract between the
COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM had already lapsed and, thus,
could no longer be extended, such extension being prohibited by
the contract and in violation of RA 9369 or the Automated Election
Systems Act and Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government
Procurement Reform Act..
Issue: Whether the unilateral extension of the option period which
Smartmatic-TIM granted to COMELEC and which the latter accepted
constitutes circumvention of the law on public bidding.
Held: It is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that an
instrument must be construed so as to give effect to all the
provisions of the contract. In essence, the contract must be read and
taken as a whole. While the contract indeed specifically required the
COMELEC to notify Smartmatic-TIM of its OTP the subject goods
until December 31, 2010, a reading of the other provisions of the
AES contract would show that the parties are given the right to
amend the contract which may include the period within which to
exercise the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the
extension of the period, provided that the contract is still effective.
Considering, however, that the AES contract is not an
ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a government
agency, the rights and obligations of the parties are governed not
only by the Civil Code but also by RA 9184. In this jurisdiction, public
bidding is the established procedure in the grant of government
contracts. The award of public contracts, through public bidding, is a
matter of public policy. The parties are, therefore, not at full liberty to
amend or modify the provisions of the contract bidded upon.
A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or
amending certain provisions of the contract bidded upon.
However, such changes must not constitute substantial or material
amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract
and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity
to bid on the same terms. The determination of whether or not a
modification or amendment of a contract bidded out constitutes a
substantial amendment rests on whether the contract, when
taken as a whole, would contain substantially different terms
and conditions that would have the effect of altering the
technical and/or financial proposals previously submitted by
the other bidders. The modifications in the contract executed
between the government and the winning bidder must be such as to
render the executed contract to be an entirely different contract from
the one bidded upon.
Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that was not
previously available to the other bidders. Admittedly, the AES contract was
awarded to Smartmatic-TIM after compliance with all the requirements
of a competitive public bidding. Although the AES contract was
amended after the award of the contract to Smartmatic-TIM, the
amendment only pertains to the period within which the COMELEC
could exercise the option because of its failure to exercise the same
prior to the deadline originally agreed upon by the parties.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

a. Sec. 70, LGC unconstitutional because:(1) the people have the sole
and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate recall proceedings,(2) it
violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to
equal protection of law.
No. 51
Garcia v. COMELEC SC: Granted petition on the narrow ground that the sending of selective
G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993 notices to members of the PRAC violated the due process protection of the
Constitution and fatally flawed the enactment of Resolution No. 1 (and not ruling on
alleged constitutional infirmity of Sec.70).
Plaintiff: ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL.
In accord with the SC Resolution, Mayor De los Reyes AGAIN sent
Defendant: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LUCILA NOTICE OF SESSION to the members of the PRAC to convene andonce more,
PAYUMO, ET AL. PRAC passed a resolution calling for the recall of PETITIONER
Ponente: PUNO, J. Petitioner filed a supplemental Petition Petition and Reiteration of
Extremely Urgent Motion presiding for a resolution of theircontention that section 70
Doctrine: The idea of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the
of R.A. 7160 is unconstitutional:
recall from office of local elective officials originated from the House of
Representatives and not the Senate. The legislative records reveal that there were
Issue: Whether Sec. 70 of RA 7160 is unconstitutional.
two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process
thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish thedifficulty of initiating recall thru
Held: NO. Every law enjoys the presumption of validity. The universal rule of legal
the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.
hermeneutics is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a law.
Facts: On May 11, 1992, Enrique Garcia (petitioner) was elected governor of
Bataan but in the early evening of July 1, some mayors, vice-mayors and
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the
members of the Sangguinang Bayan of the 12 municipalities of Bataan met at the
end of his term of office. The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an
National Power Corporation Compound and the following day, they
incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the
proceeded to constitute themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRAC)
power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be
to initiate the recall election of PETITIONER. Vice-Mayor Roque (Limay) moved
indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs.
that a resolution be passed for therecall of PETITIONER on the ground of “loss of
confidence”, which was “unanimously seconded”.
During the Edsa Revolution, our people more than exercised their right of
recall for they resorted to revolution and they booted out of office the highest
On July 7, PETITIONER filed with COMELEC a petition to deny due
elective officials of the land. The 1987 Consti: XIII, Sec 15 and 16 (People’s
course to Resolution No. 1 alleging failure of PRAC to comply with the "substantive
Participation) and X, Sec3(Similar to 1973 Consti) and RA 7160 was enacted in
and procedural requirements" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (LGC).
response to these constitutional provisions. In this Code, Congress provided for a
second mode of initiating the recall process through a preparatory recall
COMELEC: DISMISS petition, schedule recall elections on October 11.
assembly which in the provincial level is composed of all mayors, vice-mayors
and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities.
PETITIONER filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of
preliminary injunction to annul COMELEC Resolution (argument):
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
The legislative records reveal that there were two (2) principal reasons why
this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted,
viz:
(a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of
the people
The Constitution did not provide that only the people have the right to decide
on to initiate a recall; did not provide mode for initiating recall but gave Congress the
power to choose the effective mechanism of recall. Congress has made its choice
as called for by the Constitution and it is not the prerogative of this Court to supplant
this judgment. The choice may be erroneous but even then, the remedy against a
bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of
separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom and expediency of any law.
(b) to cut down on its expenses.
Initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly
through their representatives. It is not constitutionally impermissible for the people to
act through their elected representatives. PRA resolution of recall merely starts the
process. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official
concerned to appear before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why
he should be allowed to continue in office. Before the people render their
sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office but his right to continue
in office is subject to question. This is clear in section 72 of the Local Government
Code which explicitly states that "the recall of an elective local official shall be
effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of
the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on
recall.”
(Court’s rebuttal of Petitioner’s Argument: Sec. 69 of the Code provides
that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of
confidence of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be
premised on mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution
encourages the multi-party system for the existence of opposition parties is
indispensable to the growth and nurture of the democratic system. Clearly then, the
law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against elected local officials
belonging to the minority.)
JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 140560. May 4, 2000
Facts:
Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay
City in the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1,
1998.
Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of
several barangays in Pasay City gathered to discuss the possibility
of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of
confidence.
On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of
barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs of
Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled
RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O.
CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF
CONFIDENCE.
In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the
petition for recall and dismissed the oppositions against it. On the
issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its
members, the COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who
attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to
constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the total
membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that
the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since
only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority
had been obtained in support of the recall resolution. Based on the
verification made by election officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC
found the signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient. On
whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of
petitioner was a prejudicial question which must first be decided
before any recall election could be held, the COMELEC ruled that it
was not and that petitioner was merely using the pendency of the
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
case to delay the recall proceedings. Finally, on whether the petition
for recall violated the bar on recall within one year from the elective
official's assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the negative,
holding that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the
petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly
one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, it
was held that the petition was filed on time.
Issue:
Whether the Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local
Government Code Includes the Convening of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution
Held:
We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the
convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of the
signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local
government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution
or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or
petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of
[5]
the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph
(b) of 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which
voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect
his replacement. Several reasons can be cited in support of this
conclusion.
First, Section 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It
is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the other hand,
Section 69 provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by
the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local
elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is
not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an
official into office, the limitations in Section 74 cannot be deemed to
apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term
"recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding
the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the
COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the
voters for a petition for recall.
Thus, there may be several PRAs held (as in the case of Bataan
Province in 1993) or petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC -
there is no legal limit on the number of times such processes may be
resorted to. These are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of
initiating a recall. The limitations in 74 apply only to the exercise of
the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this -
and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate
a recall - which paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to limit by providing that no
recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of
office of an elective local official.
[7]
Indeed, this is the thrust of the ruling in Garcia v. COMELEC where
two objections were raised against the legality of PRAs: (1) that even
the power to initiate recall proceedings is the sole prerogative of the
electorate which cannot be delegated to PRAs, and (2) that by
vesting this power in a PRA, the law in effect unconstitutionally
authorizes it to shorten the term of office of incumbent elective local
officials. Both objections were dismissed on the ground that the
holding of a PRA is not the recall itself. With respect to the first
objection, it was held that it is the power to recall and not the power
to initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the people. With respect
to the second objection, it was held that a recall resolution "merely
sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the
people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in
office. [But until] the people render their sovereign judgment, the
official concerned remains in office . . . ." Sdaadsc
If these preliminary proceedings do not produce a decision by the
electorate on whether the local official concerned continues to enjoy
the confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in paragraph (b)
against the holding of a recall, except one year after the official's
assumption of office, cannot apply to such proceedings.
The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers
to recall election is to be found in the purpose of the limitation
itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding
of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take place within one year from
the date of assumption of office of the official concerned, and
(2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately
preceding a regular local election.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for
judging the performance of an elective local official. In
[8] [9]
the Bower case cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC, it
was held that "The only logical reason which we can ascribe for
requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a
recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in
voting to remove a newly elected official before having had
sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and
decisions." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of
a petition for recall because the Municipal Code involved in that case
expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed against any
officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve months."
But however the period of prohibition is determined, the principle
announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a
reasonable basis for evaluating the performance of an elective local
official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside
the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall
can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local
official.
It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated
before the official concerned has been in office for one-year would
be to allow him to be judged without sufficient basis. As already
stated, it is not the holding of PRA nor the adoption of recall
resolutions that produces a judgment on the performance of the
official concerned; it is the vote of the electorate in the Election that
does. Therefore, as long as the recall election is not held before the
official concerned has completed one year in office, he will not be
judged on his performance prematurely. Rtcspped
Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including
the convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the
performance in office of elective local officials would be to
unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of
assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the
day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials.
The crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes
time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b)
includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and
opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most
cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that
such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the
contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the
incumbent.
Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the
purpose of the one-year period in paragraph (b) is to provide the
local official concerned a "period of repose" during which "[his]
attention should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by
disturbance due to political partisanship." Unfortunately, the law
cannot really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in
politics. From the day an elective official assumes office, his acts
become subject to scrutiny and criticism, and it is not always easy to
determine when criticism of his performance is politically motivated
and when it is not. The only safeguard against the baneful and
enervating effects of partisan politics is the good sense and self
restraint of the people and its leaders against such shortcomings of
our political system. A respite from partisan politics may, have the
incidental effect of providing respite from partisanship, but that is not
really the purpose of the limitation on recall under the law. The
limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient basis for evaluating
and judging the performance of an elected local official.
To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall
election and not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall
-
1. Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according
to 69, is a power which shall be exercised by the registered
voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not
exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the
initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-
year period provided in paragraph (b);
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is
to provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective local
official, and final judging is not done until the day of the
election; and
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as
including the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly
curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the
Constitution.
As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more
than one year after petitioner assumed office as mayor of that
city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.
Case no. 54
JOSEPH PETER S. SISON, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 134096 March 3, 1999
Plaintiff/Appellee: Joseph Peter S. Sison
Defendant/Appellant: Commission on Elections, et al.t.
Ponente: ROMERO, J.
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court impugning the Resolution of COMELEC
dismissing his petition to suspend the canvassing of votes and
proclamation in Quezon City and to declare failure of elections.
While the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon City
Board of Canvassers but before the winning candidates were
proclaimed, petitioner filed the suit before the COMELEC pursuant to
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) on the ground
of massive and orchestrated fraud and acts analogous thereto which
occurred after the voting and during the preparation of election
returns and in the custody or canvass thereof which resulted in a
failure to elect.
While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City Board
of Canvassers proclaimed the winners of the elections in Quezon
City, including the winning candidate for the post of vice mayor. On
June 22, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition on the ground
(1) that the allegations therein were not supported by sufficient
evidence, and (2) that the grounds recited were not among the pre-
proclamation issues set fourth in Section 17 of Republic Act No.
7166.
Issue: Whether or not the action to declare failure of elections shall
prosper.
Held: No. Under the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3)
instances
where a failure of elections may be declared:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. Nothing in the
petition supports an action for declaration of failure of elections. He
never alleged at all that elections were either not held or suspended.
Petitioners claim of failure to elect stood as a bare conclusion bereft
of any substantive support to describe just exactly how the failure to
elect came about. Although the petitioner anchors his petition under
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code regarding failure of
elections, his allegations were grounds for pre-proclamation
controversy under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
rule is, what co-jointly determines the nature of a pleading are the
allegations therein made in good faith, the stage of the proceeding at
which it is filed, and the primary objective of the party filing the same.
However, with the proclamation of the winning candidate for the
position contested, the question of whether the petition raised issues
proper for a pre-proclamation controversy is already of NO
consequence since the well-entrench rule in such situation is that a
pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is no longer viable, the
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
more appropriate remedies being a regular election protest or a
petition for quo warranto.
NOTE:
Allegations made by the petitioner in the case:
1. The Board of Canvassers announced that election returns with no
inner seal would be included in the canvass;
2. Board of Election Inspectors brought home copies of election
returns meant for the City Board of Canvassers;
3. Petitioner, through counsel, raised written objections to the
inclusion in the canvass of election returns which were either
tampered with, altered or falsified, or otherwise not authentic;
4. According to the minutes of the City Board of Canvassers, there
were precincts with missing election returns;
5. Several election returns with no data on the number of votes cast
for vice mayoralty position;
6. Highly suspicious persons sneaking in some election returns and
documents into the canvassing area;
7. Concerned citizen found minutes of the counting, keys, locks and
metal seal in the COMELEC area for disposal as trash;
8. Board of Election Inspectors have volunteered information that
they placed the copy of the election returns meant for the City Board
of Canvassers in the ballot boxes deposited with the City Treasurer
allegedly due to fatigue and lack of sleep;
9. Ballot boxes were never in the custody of the COMELEC and
neither the parties nor their watchers were allowed to enter the
restricted area where these boxes passed through on the way to the
basement of the City Hall where they were supposedly kept; and
10. In the elections in Barangay New Era, there was a clear pattern
of voting which would show that the election returns were
manufactured and that no actual voting by duly qualified voters took
place therein.
Case no. 55
Ampatuan, et al. vs. COMELEC
G. R. No. 149803. January 31, 2002
Plaintiff/Appellee: Datu Andal S. Ampatuan et al.
Defendant/Appellant: Commission on Elections, et al.t.
Ponente: PARDO, J.
Facts: Petitioner Ampatuan and Respondent Candao were opposing
candidates for the position of Governor of Maguindanao during the
2001 elections. Respondents filed with the Commission on Elections
a petition for declaration of failure of election due to filling up the
ballots en masse by a few persons before election day and failure to
deliver the election paraphernalia. Petitioners were proclaimed
winners and assumed office. Petitioners argued that because of their
proclamation, the petition for declaration of failure of election should
be an election protest instead.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec has no right to hear and decide
respondents’ petition for declaration for failure of elections after
petitioners had been proclaimed
Held: No. Petition dismissed. The fact that a candidate proclaimed
has assumed office does not deprive Comelec of its authority to
annul any canvas and illegal proclamation. Validity of the
proclamation may be challenged even after the irregularly
proclaimed candidate has assumed office. In the case at bar, the
Comelec is duty-bound to conduct an investigation as to the veracity
of respondents’ allegations of massive fraud and terrorism that
attended the conduct of the May 2001 election. It is well to stress
that the Comelec has started conducting the technical examination
on Nov 2001. However, by an urgent motion for a TRO filed by the
petitioners, in virtue of which we issued a TRO, the technical
examination was held in abeyance until the present. In order not to
frustrate the ends of justice, we lift the TRO and allow technical
examination to proceed with deliberate dispatch.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Dissent: Justice Melo
Issue: is the declaration of failure of elections by the Comelec an
executive-administrative function or a judicial function?
Held: The authority given to Comelec to declare a failure of elections
and to call for the holding and continuation of the failed election falls
under its administrative function. There are only 3 instances where a
failure of elections may be declared: 1) the election in any polling
place has not been declared 2) election in any polling place had not
been suspended 3) after voting and during transmission of election
results, such election results in a failure to elect on the ground of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous cause.
Under the circumstances of the present case and based on
applicable law, an election protest is the appropriate remedy.
Complex matters which necessarily entail the presentation of
conflicting testimony should not be resolved in random, technical and
summary proceedings
No. 56
PEOPLE VS. FERRER
G.R. No. L-8957 April 29, 1957
Plaintiff/Appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendant/Appellant: Andres O. Ferrer
Ponente: Padilla, J.
Facts: On November 10,1953, (Election Day), and for sometime
prior in the municipality of Binmaley, Pangasinan, Andres G. Ferrer,
being then and there a Foreign Affairs Officer, Class III, Department
of Foreign Affairs, induce and influenced the electors to vote in favor
of the candidates of the Liberal Party. Before the said elections,
Ferrer, delivered a speech during a political rally of the Liberal Party
in Barrio Caloocan Norte, of the said municipality of Binmaley,
Pangasinan, inducing the electors to vote for the candidates of the
Liberal Party but more particularly for President Quirino and Speaker
Perez. Also, on said political meeting the said accused caused to be
distributed to the people who attended said meeting cigarettes and
pamphlets concerning the Liberal Party. Furthermore, he
campaigned in the Barrio of Caloocan Norte, of the said municipality
of Binmaley, going from house to house and induced the electors to
whom he distributed sample, ballots of the Liberal Party.
His acts are contrary to sections 51 and 54 in relation to Sections
183, 184 and 185 of Republic Act No. 180, as amended.
RTC: Causing cigarettes or pamphlets concerning the Liberal Party
to be distributed to the people who attended a political meeting,
charged against the defendant, does not constitute a violation of
section 51 of the Revised Election Code, because it is not giving
"food" for tobacco is not food.
The trial court is also of the opinion that the defendant is not a
classified civil service officer or employee, because to be such it is
necessary that he be assigned in the Department of Foreign Affairs
under section 6, Republic Act. No. 708.
RTC granted the motion to quash by defendant because it
charges two offenses in the Election code Sec 51 and Sec 54.
Issue: Whether the RTC rightfully dismissed the case.
Held: YES. The information is defective, because it charges two
violations of the Revised Election Code, to wit: section 51 to which a
heavier penalty is attached, and section 54 for which a lighter penalty
is provided. And the prosecuting attorneys had that in mind when at
the end of the information filed by them they stated: "Contrary to
Sections 51 and 54 in relation to Sections 183, 184 and 185 of
Republic Act No. 180, as amended." Causing cigarettes which are
things of value to be distributed, made unlawful by section 51 and
punished by section 183, cannot be deemed a necessary means to
commit the lesser violation of section 54 were the penalty attached to
it taken into consideration. The rule in the case of People vs.
Buenviaje, 47 Phil., 536, cited and invoked by the State, has no
application to the case, because there the defendant, who was not a
duly licensed physician, gave medical assistance and treatment to a
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

certain person and advertised himself and offered services as a

physician by means of cards or letterheads and advertisement in the
newspapers, latter being a means to commit the former, and both
violations are punishable with the same penalty, whereas in the
present case causing cigarettes or things of value to be
distributed by the defendant to the people who attended a
political meeting is a violation distinct from that of
electioneering committed by a classified civil service officer or
employee. The former has no connection with the latter.

That a violation of section 51 is distinct from that of section 54

is further shown by the fact that a violation of the former may be
committed by any candidate, political committee, voter or any
other person, whereas a violation of the latter may only be
committed by a justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of
any province, officer or employee of the Army, member of the
national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and
classified civil service officer or employee.
No. 57
N.B. Dinismiss lang naman yung case na to kasi dalawang offense MAPPALA vs. NUÑEZ
sa isang information pero dahil election offenses ang topic dito, focus
kayo sa Sec 51 and Sec 54. Last paragraph. A.M. No. RTJ-94-1208 January 26, 1995

Complainant: JACINTO MAPPALA

Respondent: JUDGE CRISPULO A. NUÑEZ, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela

Ponente: Quiason, J.

Facts: Several informations were filed against Alejandro Angoluan.

The information was for illegal possession of a firearm in violation of
P.D. No. 1866, frustrated murder (together with 5 other people and
for violation of the Omnibus election code (together with Honorato
Angoluan. The complaining witness was Jacinto Mappala, the
complainant against respondent in this administrative case.

After consideration of the facts of the case, Judge Nuñez convicted

the accused and the others for the other charges except for the
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
charge for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Whereupon,
complainant charged respondent with, among others, serious
misconduct for acquitting Alejandro Angoluan of violation of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Issue: Whether Judge Nunez is administratively liable for serious
misconduct for acquitting Alejandro Angoluan of violation of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Held: Yes. Respondent acquitted Alejandro Angoluan of violation of
Section 261 (p) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Deadly weapons. — Any person who carries any
deadly weapon in the polling place and within a
radius of one hundred meters thereof during the
days and hours fixed by law for the registration of
voters in the polling place, voting, counting of votes,
or preparation of the election returns. However, in
cases of affray, turmoil, or disorder, any peace
officer or public officer authorized by the
Commission to supervise the election is entitled to
carry firearms or any other weapon for the purpose
of preserving and enforcing the law.
In his decision, respondent found that Alejandro shot complainant
herein inside Precinct No. 2 located at the elementary school
building in Santo Tomas, Isabela, during the barangay elections on
March 28, 1989. Respondent also found that Alejandro was the one
who surrendered the gun. To respondent, the surrender of the
weapon was an implied admission that it was the one used by
Alejandro in shooting complainant. Inspite of all these findings,
respondent acquitted Alejandro of illegally carrying a deadly weapon
inside a precinct on the theory that the gun was not seized from him
while he was the precinct. According to respondent:
. . . With respect to the other accused Alejandro
Angoluan, although there is evidence to prove that
he shot the complainant Jacinto Mappala, the gun
which he allegedly used was surrendered by him
two (2) days after the incident and he was not
apprehended in possession of the gun within
100 meters radius of the precinct. This Court
believes that he should not be prosecuted (sic) in
violation of Article 22, Section 261, Subsection (p) of
the Omnibus Election Code (Rollo, p. 45; Emphasis
supplied).
To support a conviction under Section 261(p) of the Omnibus
election Code, it is not necessary that the deadly weapon
should have been seized from the accused while he was in the
precinct or within a radius of 100 meters therefrom. It is enough
that the accused carried the deadly weapon "in the polling place
and within a radius of one hundred meters thereof" during any
of the specified days and hours. After respondent himself had
found that the prosecution had established these facts, it is difficult to
understand why he acquitted Alejandro of the charge of violation of
Section 261(p) of the Omnibus Election Code.
CASE NO. 58
PEOPLE VS BAYONA
Plaintiff-appellee: The People of The Philippine Islands
Defendant-appellant: Cornelio Bayona
Vickers, J.; February 16, 1935
FACTS:
While the general elections were held in the Municipality of
Pilar, Province of Capiz, the accused Bayona was caught carrying in
his belt a 32-caliber Colt revolver at a distance of 22 meters from the
said polling station. It was then seized by the representative of
Department of Interior who was inspecting the elections.
The accused contends that he is not guilty of a violation of
the Election Law, because he was called by a friend and merely
approached him to find out what he wanted and had no interest in
the election; that there were many people in the public road in front
of the polling place, and the defendant could not leave his revolver in
his automobile, which he himself was driving, without running the risk
of losing it and thereby incurring in a violation of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayona may be held guilty of the said
violation of Election Law even without a criminal intent.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
RULING: YES. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory
provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may
be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any
elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when he got out of
his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence
surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of,
and he committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law
was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere
otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the
offense. Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver,
it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he
intended to intimidate the voters.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal
intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act
was intentionally done
If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that the appellant
should be acquitted because it was not proved that he tried to
influence or intended to influence the mind of any voter, anybody
could sell intoxicating liquor or hold a cockfight or a horse race on
election day with impunity.
CASE NO. 59
LOZANO VS YORAC
G.R. No. 94521
Petitioner: Oliver O. Lozano
Respondents: Hon. Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac Of The
COMELEC
G.R. No. 94626
Petitioner: Oliver O. Lozano
Respondents: COMELEC and JEJOMAR C. BINAY
Regalado, J.; October 28,1991
FACTS:
On January 11, 1988, prior to the January 18, 1988 local
elections, petitioner and Agcorpa, a registered voter of Makati, filed
with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against then
candidate for mayor Jejomar C. Binay on the ground that respondent
Binay used P9.9 million of municipal funds to enhance his candidacy
and his entire ticket under the Lakas ng Bansa by giving Christmas
gifts to the less fortunates and indigent residents of Makati.
Respondent Binay counters that Christmas gift-giving is an
annual project of the Municipal Government of Makati ever since the
time of Mayors Estrella and Yabut in the spirit of yuletide season
wherein basic and essential items are distributed to the less
fortunate and indigent residents of Makati out of funds appropriated
for the purpose duly budgeted and subject to audit by the COA and
same were prepared long before he filed my certificate of candidacy
and ceased to be the Acting Mayor of Makati.
The disqualification case was assigned to the Second
Division of the COMELEC composed of Commissioner Haydee B.
Yorac, as presiding officer..
COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2050 which
provides that petitions for disqualification filed prior to the January
18, 1988 local elections based on Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code but not resolved before the elections shall be referred
for preliminary investigation to the Law Department which shall
submit its report to the Commission en banc. Pursuant to said
resolution, the Second Division on even date referred back the
disqualification case against respondent Binay to the Law
Department "before taking any action thereon."
The Law Department submitted its investigation
report recommending that criminal charges be filed against
respondent Binay for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus
Election Code
Petitioner filed several motions for inhibition and/or
disqualification of Commissioners Yorac for having issued a previous
memorandum addressed to the chairman and members of
respondent commission expressing her opinion that Binay should
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
first be convicted by the regular courts of the offense of vote buying
before he could be disqualified, among others.
COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition for disqualification and the
criminal complaint for vote buying against respondent Binay.
Petitioner now avers that respondent commission committed
a grave abuse of discretion amount to lack of jurisdiction in not
finding Binay guilty of vote- buying, contrary to the evidence
presented by petitioner.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent Commissioner Yorac should inhibit
from the hearing and decision of the case.
2. Whether or not Binay should be held guilty of vote buying.
RULING: 1. NO. Granting arguendo that the petition for inhibition of
Commissioner Yorac has not been mooted by the resolution en banc
dismissing the main case for disqualification, petitioner's postulation
that she should have inhibited herself form hearing the main case,
for allegedly having prejudged the case when she advanced the
opinion that respondent Binay could only be disqualified after
conviction by the regional trial court, is of exiguous validity. In the
first place, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 1,
Rule 4 thereof, prohibits a member from, among others, sitting in a
case in which he has proof. There is no showing that the
memorandum wherein Commissioner Yorac rendered her opinion
was ever made public either by publication or dissemination of the
same to the public. Furthermore, the opinion of Commissioner Yorac
was based on prior cases for disqualification filed with the
COMELEC wherein prior conviction of the respondent was
considered a condition sine qua non for the filing of the
disqualification case. We accordingly find no compelling reason to
inhibit Commissioner Yorac from participating in the hearing and
decision of the case.
2. NO. The Supreme Court upheld the factual findings and the
conclusions reached by COMELEC in dismissing the petition for the
disqualification of Binay which states, among others,” that the giver,
if any, of the Christmas gifts which were received by the witnesses
for the petitioners was in fact, the Municipality of Makati and not
respondent Binay. The presence of respondent Binay, if at all true at
the time the gifts were was incidental. It did not make respondent
Binay as the "giver" of those Christmas gifts. Nor did the giving of
such gifts by the Municipal Government of Makati influence the
recipients to vote for respondent Binay considering that the affiants
themselves who testified for the petitioners admitted and were aware
that the gift packages came from the Municipality of Makati and not
from respondent Jejomar C. Binay. There is one aspect of this case
which somehow lends credence to respondent Binay's claim that the
instant petition is a political harassment.”
No clear and convincing proof exists to show that
respondent Binay was indeed engaged in vote buying. That the
traditional gift-giving of the Municipality of Makati during the
Christmas season was implemented by respondent Binay as OIC
Mayor of Makati at that time does not sufficiently establish that
respondent was trying to influence and induce his constituents to
vote for him. This would be stretching the interpretation of the law too
far. Petitioner deduces from this act of gift-giving that respondent
was buying the votes of the Makati residents. It requires more than a
mere tenuous deduction to prove the offense of vote-buying. There
has to be concrete and direct evidence or, at least, strong
circumstantial evidence to support the charge that respondent was
indeed engaged in vote-buying.
The charge against respondent Binay for alleged
malversation of public funds should be threshed out and adjudicated
in the appropriate proceeding and forum having jurisdiction over the
same. Consequently, it was properly dismissed by the Commission
on Elections.
CASE No. 60
ONG VS MARTINEZ
G.R. No. 87743 August 21, 1990
Petitioner: Robert Ong
Respondent: Maria Teresita Herrera-Martinez, The City Council of
Manila and The City Treasurer of Manila
PARAS, J.:
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
CASE DOCTRINE:
The permanent vacancy for councilor exists and its filling up is
governed by the Local Government Code while the appointment that
is prohibited under Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code
referred to in the election ban provision is covered by the Civil
Service Law.
FACTS:
Saturnino Herrera was one of the Liberal Party candidates
duly elected as Councilor for Manila's Third District in the local
elections of January 18, 1988. He performed his duties as such
councilor until his death on October 14, 1988, thus leaving the
position open for the appointment of a qualified replacement from the
same political party where the deceased councilor belonged.
On February 9, 1989, Petitioner Robert Ong, based on an
indorsement by the Treasurer of LP, was appointed as member of
the City Council by the Secretary of Local Government to fill the
vacancy. On the same date he took his oath of office. Secretary of
Local Government informed Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. and Vice-
Mayor and Presiding Officer Danilo Lacuna of the appointment of
petitioner. However, the appointment of Ong was not recognized by
the City Councilors.
On the other hand, Respondent Maria Teresita Martinez was
appointed to the vacated position following the standard procedure of
appointment.
Meanwhile, the records show that respondent Martinez went
through the legal formalities or standard procedure prior to her
appointment to the vacated position. Martinez was nominated for
appointment for the vacated position by the Chairman of the Liberal
Party of the Manila Chapter. The Chairman sent a letter-nomination
to President Corazon Aquino thru the Secretary of Local
Government. On March 17, 1989, Secretary Luis Santos of DILG,
acting for the President issued an appointment to Teresita Martinez.
Subsequently, the City Council recognized the appointment of
Teresita Martinez as member of the City Council.
Ong filed a petition to annul the appointment of Martinez and
to declare him to be the holder of the position of Councilor. Ong
anchored his claim on the ground that the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government, in appointing respondent Martinez
on March 17, 1989, violated the election ban on appointments under
Res. No. 2054 of the Comelec dated December 7, 1988 since her
appointment was not cleared for exemption from the election ban
and, therefore, the same was made beyond and in excess of the
Secretary's authority and by reason of which, the appointment is null
and void.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Martinez for the vacant position
violated the election ban as provided in Sec. 161 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
HELD: NO.
Both petitioner and respondent have invoked the election
ban imposed under Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code. The
election ban covered the period from February 11 to March 27, 1989
by reason of the Barangay election held on March 28, 1989. Both
parties have capitalized on the prohibitive provision for the purpose
of having their respective appointments declared illegal or null and
void.
Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code provides thus:
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position,
promotion, or giving salary increases. During the period of
forty- five days before a regular election and thirty days
before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing
officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality,
whether national or local, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new
employee whether provisional, temporary or casual, or
creates and fills any new position, except upon prior
authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not
grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the
position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall

not be filled in a manner that may influence the election.

As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee

may be appointed in case of urgent need: Provided,
however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to
the Commission within three days from the date of the
appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of this
provision shall be null and void.

The aforequoted provision does not apply to both assailed

appointments because of the following reason:

The permanent vacancy for councilor exists and its filling up is

governed by the Local Government Code while the appointment
referred to in the election ban provision is covered by the Civil
Service Law.

For having satisfied the formal requisites and procedure for

appointment as Councilor, which is an official position outside the
contemplation of the election ban, Martinez’s appointment is
declared valid.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
CASE No. 6
REGALADO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 115962 February 15, 2000
Petitioner: Dominador Regalado Jr.
Respondent: Court of Appeals; People of the Philippines
MENDOZA, J.:
Case Doctrine:
Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code:
Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. -
Any public official who makes or causes any transfer or
detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service
including public school teachers, within the election period
except upon prior approval of the Commission.
The two elements of the offense prescribed under 261(h) of the
Omnibus Election Code, as amended, are: (1) a public officer or
employee is transferred or detailed within the election period as fixed
by the COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail was effected without
prior approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its implementing
rules and regulations.
FACTS:
On January 15, 1987, Editha Barba was appointed nursing attendant
in the Rural Health Office of Tanjay, Negros Oriental by then Officer-
In-Charge Mayor Rodolfo Navarro. Although she was detailed at,
and received her salary from, the Office of the Mayor, she reported
for work at the Puriculture Center, Poblacion, Tanjay. As Navarro
decided to run for mayor of Tanjay in the January 18, 1988 elections,
petitioner Dominador Regalado, Jr. was appointed substitute OIC-
Mayor.
On January 22, 1988, petitioner Regalado Jr., still sitting as OIC-
Mayor, issued a memorandum to Barba informing her that effective
January 25, 1988, she would be reassigned from Poblacion, Tanjay
to Barangay Sto. Nino. The transfer was made without the prior
approval of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Barba
continued to report at the Puriculture Center, Poblacion, Tanjay,
however. Hence, on February 18, 1988, Regalado issued another
memorandum to Barba directing her to explain, within 72 hours, why
she refuses to comply with the memorandum of January 22, 1988.
In response, Barba, on February 21, 1988, sent a letter to
petitioner protesting her transfer which she contended was illegal.
She then filed, on February 16, 1988, a complaint against Regalado
for violation of 261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended,
and after preliminary investigation, the Provincial Election Officer of
Negros Oriental, Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, charged petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Negros Oriental. The lower
court find Regalado guilty of the violation.
ISSUE: Whether Regalado is guilty for violating Sec. 261 (h).
HELD: YES
The two elements of the offense prescribed under 261(h) of the
Omnibus Election Code, as amended, are: (1) a public officer or
employee is transferred or detailed within the election period as fixed
by the COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail was effected without
prior approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its implementing
rules and regulations.
The implementing rule involved is COMELEC Resolution No. 1937,
which pertinently provides:
Section 1. Prohibited Acts.
Effective November 19, 1987 up to February 17, 1988, no
public official shall make or cause any transfer or detail
whatsoever of any officer or employee in the Civil Service,
including public school teachers, except upon prior approval
of the Commission.
Section 2. Request for authority of the Commission. - Any
request for . . . . approval to make or cause any transfer or
detail must be submitted in writing to the Commission stating
all the necessary data and reason for the same which must
satisfy the Commission that the position is essential to the
proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
that the . . . . filling thereof shall not in any manner influence
the election.
Petitioner admits that he issued the January 22, 1988 memorandum
within the election period set in Resolution No. 1937 without the prior
approval of the COMELEC. He contends, however, that he did not
violate 261(h) because he merely effected a "re-assignment" and not
a "transfer" of personnel by moving Barba from one unit or place of
designation (Poblacion, Tanjay) to another (Sto. Nino, Tanjay) of the
same office, namely, the Rural Health Office of Tanjay, Negros
Oriental. In support of his contention, he relies upon the following
portions of 24 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law):
(c) Transfer a movement from one position to another which
is of equivalent rank, level, or salary without break of service
involving the issuance of an appointment.
....
(g) Reassignment an employee may be reassigned from one
organizational unit to another in the same agency. Provided,
that such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank,
status, or salary.
Petitioner, however, ignores the rest of 24(c) which provides that:
[A transfer] shall not be considered disciplinary when made
in the interest of the public service, in which case, the
employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons
therefor. If the employee believes that there is no justification
for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the Commission.
The transfer may be from one department or agency to
another or from one organizational unit to another in the
same department or agency: Provided, however, That any
movement from the non-career service to the career service
shall not be considered a transfer.
Moreover, 261(h) of B.P. No. 881, as amended, provides that it is an
election offense for
Any public official who makes or causes any transfer or
detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service
including public school teachers, within the election period
except upon prior approval of the Commission.
As the Solicitor General notes, "the word transfer or detail, as used
[above], is modified by the word whatever. This indicates that any
movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or not
in the same office or agency, during the election is covered by the
prohibition."
Case no. 62
Aquino vs COMELEC
Petitioner: DR. REY B. AQUINO
Respondent: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
On January 8, 2010, Aquino, as President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), issued
PhilHealth Special Order No. 16, Series of 2010 (reassignment
order) directing the reassignment of several PHIC officers and
employees stating therein that:
“xxx In the interest of the service and further enhance
organizational efficiency and synergy, the following PhilHealth
officials and personnel are hereby re-assigned to the offices
opposite their names. This is also being made to strengthen
PhilHealth’s organizational capability by providing
opportunities to its key personnel for professional growth and
development in strategic management, which is imperative in
view of the impending vacancies in crucial 3rd level positions.
xxx”
On the same date, Aquino released the reassignment order, via the
PHIC’s intranet service, to all PHIC officers and employees, including
the following: (1) Dennis Adre, PHIC Regional Vice-President (VP);
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
(2) Masiding Alonto, PHIC Regional VP; and (3) Khaliquzzaman
M. Macabato, PHIC Assistant Regional VP.
On February 1, 2010, Adre, Alonto and Macabato, along with Romeo
D. Albertoand Johnny Y. Sychua (PHIC Regional VPs) likewise filed
before the COMELEC a similar complaint for violation of Resolution
No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881 against Tito M.
Mendiola, PHIC Senior VP for Operations Sector, and Ruben John
A. Basa, PHIC Group VP for Corporate Affairs.
Aquino posited that the reassignment order is beyond the
coverage of this COMELEC resolution as he issued it on
January 8, 2010, or prior to the start of the election period that
began on January 11, 2010.
Aquino essentially argues that, first, the COMELEC exceeded its
authority to implement the election laws when, in interpreting Section
261(h) of BP 881, it added reassignments as a covered offense
when the prohibitions speaks only of transfer and detail. To him, the
COMELEC could not legally and validly add a third mode of
personnel action and hold him accountable for its violation, when the
legislative intent clearly and specifically prohibited only transfer and
detail from among the several modes of personnel action
enumerated under the various laws governing the civil service, i.e.,
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 807 and Executive Order (EO) No.
292.
He argues that while the COMELEC indeed has the exclusive
authority to implement the election laws, and with it the authority to
issue rules and regulations to supply details or clarify gaps in the
law, it cannot validly extend what these laws provide without running
afoul of the basic precept that the power to make laws is exclusively
lodged in the legislature.
Second, the reassignment order did not violate Section 261(h) of BP
881 because he issued it on January 8,2010, or before the start of
the election period on January 10, 2010. He points out that by its
terms, the "reassignments" were immediately executory; it was also
released and disseminated via the PHIC’s intranet service and
facsimiles, to all concerned officers and employees on the same date
of issue.
The COMELEC declared that Aquino violated Section 261(h) of
BP 881 when he directed the transfer/reassignment of the PHIC
officers and employees within the declared election period
without its prior approval. It pointed out that Section 261(h)
considers an election offense for "any public official who makes
or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any public officer or
employee in the civil service x x x within the election period
except upon prior approval of the Commission."
The COMELEC pointed out, too, that in promulgating Resolution No.
8737, it merely laid down the guidelines relative to the transfer, detail
or reassignment of officers and employees of the civil service for the
January 10, 2010 to June 9, 2010 election period set for the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections (May 10, 2010 elections) which
guidelines still fall well within the provisions of Section 261(h) of BP
881. It emphasized that Resolution No. 8737 merely reiterated
Section 261(h)’s prohibition and the requirement of prior COMELEC
approval in any case of personnel transfers or details; and provided
penalties in case of violation of the prohibition.
Issues
1.) Whether the COMELEC validly issued Resolution No. 8737
that defined transfer, as contemplated under Section 261(h)
of BP 881, to include all personnel action including
reassignments
2.) Whether the COMELEC validly found prima facie case
against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737 in
relation to Section 261(h).
Held:
1. Yes. In Regalado, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court already
clarified the interpretation of the term whatever as used in
Section 261(h) of BP 881 in relation to the terms transfer and
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
detail. In agreeing with the Solicitor General’s position, this
Court declared that the terms transfer and detail are
modified by the term whatever such that "any movement of
personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the
same office or agency, during the election period is covered
by the prohibition."
The Court affirms the COMELEC’s interpretation of the
phrase "transfer or detail whatever" as we find the Regalado
interpretation consistent with the legislative intent. Indeed, as
used in Section 261(h) of BP 881, the term whatever should
be not be read strictly in conjunction with only either the term
transfer or the term detail; nor should the phrase transfer or
detail whatever be read in isolation from the purpose of the
legal prohibition. Rather, consistent with our rules in reading
provisions of law, the term – whatever – as well as the
phrase – transfer or detail whatever– should be understood
within the broader context of the purpose of BP881. They
should likewise be understood within the context of all other
laws that the COMELEC is required to administer and
enforce. This is the proper approach that anyone, including
this Court, should take when reading Section 261(h), as well
as all other provisions of BP 881 and other election laws.
From this perspective, the Court reiterates its observation in
Regalado that any personnel action, when caused or made
during the election period, can be used for electioneering or
to harass subordinates with different political persuasions.
This possibility – of being used for electioneering purposes
or to harass subordinates – created by any movement of
personnel during the election period is precisely what the
transfer ban seeks to prevent.
2. No. The facts and the clear terms of the law does not
support the COMELEC’s prima facie finding of violation of
Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881.
Under Section 261(h) of BP 881, a person commits the
election offense of violation of the election transfer ban when
he makes or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any
official or employee of the government during the election
period absent prior approval of the COMELEC.
During the making or causing phase of the entire transfer or
reassignment process – from drafting the order, to its
signing, up to its release – the issuing official plays a very
real and active role. Once the transfer or reassignment order
is issued, the active role is shifted to the addressee of the
order who should now carry out the purpose of the order. At
this level – the implementation phase – the issuing official’s
only role is to see to it that the concerned officer or
employee complies with the order. The issuing official may
only exert discipline upon the addressee who refuses to
comply with the order.
Following these considerations, the Court finds that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in this case based
on the following facts:
First, Aquino made or caused the reassignment of the
concerned PHIC officers and employees before the election
period. Second, Aquino sent out, via the PHIC’s intranet
service, the reassignment order to all affected PHIC officers
and employees before the election period. Third, the
reassignment order was complete in its terms, as it
enumerated clearly the affected PHIC officers and
employees as well as their respective places of
reassignments, and was made effective immediately or on
the day of its issue, which was likewise before the election
period. Fourth, the subsequent orders that Aquino issued
were not reassignment orders per se contrary to the
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
COMELEC’s assessment. Rather, they were, in fact, simply
either orders of retention, i.e., orders addressed to the
incumbent officer-occupant of the affected position to
effectively maintain the status quo and continue performing
the duties of the position while the reassigned officer or
employee had not yet assumed or had been refusing to
assume the position and its duties; or orders of temporary
discharge of additional duties, i.e., orders addressed to the
officer occupying the position next in rank to discharge the
duties of the affected position while the reassigned officer or
employee had not yet assumed or had been refusing to
assume the position and its duties.
Based on these clear facts, Aquino completed the act of
making or causing the reassignment of the affected PHIC
officers and employees before the start of the election
period. In this sense, the evils sought to be addressed by
Section 261 (h) of BP 881 is kept intact by the timely
exercise of his management prerogative in rearranging or
reassigning PHIC personnel within its various offices
necessary for the PHIC's efficient and smooth operation. As
Aquino's acts of issuing the order fell outside the coverage of
the transfer prohibition, he cannot be held liable for violation
of Section 261(h).
Case no. 63
COMELEC VS. TAGLE, ET AL.
Petitioner: COMMISSION ON ELECTION
Respondent: HON. LUCENITO N. TAGLE
Facts:
In connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, candidate for Mayor
Florentino A. Bautista filed a complaint against Mayor Federico
Poblete et al. for vote –buying in violation of Sec 261 (a) and (b) of
the Omnibus Election Code. The Information was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 7034-99 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
Subsequently, a complaint for vote-selling in violation of Sec 261 (a)
of the Omnibus Election Code was filed with the Prosecutor’s Office
as witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 and the Provincial
Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite filed separate Informations for vote-selling
against said witnesses. On appeal, the COMELEC en banc declared
that the witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 were exempt from
criminal prosecution pursuant to 4th paragraph of Sec 28, RA No.
6646, otherwise known as “The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987”
which grants immunity from criminal prosecution to persons who
voluntarily give information and willingly testify against those liable
for vote-buying or vote-selling. The Law Department of the
COMELEC moved to dismiss the Informations against the said
witnesses but the RTC in Imus, Cavite denied the motion to dismiss.
Issue:
Whether the grant of immunity from criminal liability is proper under
the law.
Held:
Yes. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-
buying and of prosecuting those committing it is the grant of
immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote was
bought. Sec 28 of RA No. 6646 concludes with the following
paragraph:
The giver, offeror, the promissory as well as the solicitor, acceptor,
recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as
principals: Provided, that any person, otherwise guilty under said
paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on
any violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall
be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the offenses with
reference to which his information and testimony were given:
Provided, further, that nothing herein shall exempt such person from
criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
To avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers,
especially by the latter’s opponents, Congress saw it fit to warn
“vote-sellers” who denounce the vote-buying that they could be liable
for perjury or false testimony should they not tell the truth.
The prosecution witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 are exempt
from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the proviso in
the last paragraph of Section 28, RA 6646. At the time when the
complaint for vote-selling was filed with the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, the respondents had already executed sworn statements
attesting to the corrupt practice of vote-buying. It cannot then be
denied that they had already voluntarily given information in the vote-
buying case. In fact, they willingly testified in Crim. Case No. 7034-
99.
Case no. 64
Tapispisan vs CA
Petitioner: LIBRADA D. TAPISPISAN
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL.
Facts:
Petitioner Tapispisan is a public school teacher and has been
occupying the position of Teacher III since September 1, 1992. She
has been teaching for the last thirty (30) years and is currently
assigned at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City.
On May 30, 1995, respondent Atty. Ricardo T. Sibug (Schools
Division Superintendent, Pasay City) issued Division Memorandum
No. 33 designating respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of
P. Villanueva Elementary School and respondent Teves as OIC-
Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School, both schools are in
Pasay City. Feeling that she had been unduly by-passed, petitioner
Tapispisan filed with respondent Sibug a protest contesting such
designation. The latter, however, denied the protest. The petitioner
then brought the matter to respondent Dr. Nilo L. Rosas, Regional
Director of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
for National Capital Region (NCR) who, likewise, denied the protest.
On December 11, 1995, the petitioner filed with the DECS a
Complaint/Protest Against the Illegal and Indiscriminate Appointment
and Promotion of Mesdames Aida Rumbaoa and Myrna Teves,
violating Resolution No. 2731 of the COMELEC which declared as a
prohibited act the transfer of officers and employees in the civil
service during the election period from January 8, 1995 up to June 7,
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
1995. Together with respondents Rumbaoa and Teves, also named
as respondents were Dr. Rosas, Atty. Sibug and Mrs. Alicia G.
Benzon (Principal IV, Coordinating Principal, South District).
In her complaint/protest, petitioner Tapispisan alleged that the
designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves was made with
evident favoritism and in gross violation of Civil Service and DECS
rules and regulations on promotions. The petitioner claimed that she
was more qualified for promotion than respondents Rumbaoa and
Teves. She pointed out that in the 1994-1995 annual qualifying
examination conducted for both teachers and principals, she placed
No. 4 in the Division List of Promotables for Head Teachers while the
names of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves did not appear therein.
Nonetheless, they were the ones recommended and designated to
the subject positions. The petitioner thus prayed in her
complaint/protest that the promotions of respondents Rumbaoa and
Teves be recalled and that they be disallowed from occupying, in
acting capacity, the positions to which they were designated.
Secretary of the DECS Hon. Ricardo T. Gloria issued the Order
dated April 10, 1996 dismissing the complaint/protest as he found
the appointment of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves as Head
Teacher III and Master Teacher II, respectively, as well as their
subsequent designation as OIC-Head Teacher and OIC-Principal,
respectively, to be in order. Secretary Gloria based his conclusion on
the findings that, with respect to respondent Teves, she was
appointed Master Teacher II effective February 18, 1987. This
appointment had been attested by the CSC; hence, such final and
completed promotional appointment could no longer be the subject
of protest nor set aside by recall. The bases of her appointment as
Master Teacher II were respondent Teves Performance Efficiency
Ratings, which had been outstanding for the last five consecutive
years, and the several awards conferred on her by civic
organizations, including Outstanding Teacher of Pasay City in 1993.
Also, the DECS Division authorities obviously had trust and
confidence in respondent Teves competence and dedication as
shown by the fact that they would designate her as OIC of Don
Carlos Elementary School when its former principal was on leave or
on assignment elsewhere. It was emphasized that respondent Teves
designation as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School was
of temporary nature, not a permanent movement from Villamor Air
Base Elementary School nor a promotion. Being temporary, it may
be recalled any time. As to Rumboa, the appointment was based on
her Performance Efficiency Ratings, which had been outstanding for
the last four consecutive years (1991-1995), and her being recipient
of several achievement awards for teaching excellence at Villamor
Air Base Elementary School.
Issue:
Whether the designation of Teves and Rumbao violates Resolution
No 2731.
Held:
No. The designation of respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-Head
Teacher of P. Villanueva Elementary School and respondent
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School merely
imposed on them additional duties on top of those corresponding
to their incumbent positions at Villamor Air Base Elementary
School. Such designation did not confer upon them security of
tenure in the positions which they occupy in acting capacity. This
point
was underscored by Secretary Gloria as he explained that the
designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves as OIC-Head
Teacher and OIC-Principal, respectively, was temporary in
nature, not a permanent transfer nor a promotion.
As a corollary, such designation did not violate Resolution No.
2731 dated December 5, 1994 of the Commission on Elections,
which declared as a prohibited act the transfer of officers and
employees in the civil service during the election period from
January 8, 1995 up to June 7, 1995. Transfer is defined as a
movement from one position to another which is of equivalent
rank, level or salary without break in service involving the
issuance of an appointment. The designation of respondents
Rumbaoa and Teves did not involve a movement from one
position to another. Neither did it involve the issuance of any
appointment to the said positions in their favor. In fact,
respondents Rumbaoa and Teves retained their incumbent
positions at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School. As such,
their designation could not be considered as a transfer within the
meaning of a prohibited act during the election period.
There is a marked difference between an appointment and
a designation. The Court had the occasion to expound the
distinction in this wise:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by
the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a
given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of
tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his
office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties
of an incumbent official . It is said that
appointment is essentially executive while
designation is legislative in nature. Designation
may also be loosely defined as an appointment
because it, likewise, involves the naming of a
particular person to a specified public office. That is
the common understanding of the term.
However, where the person is merely designated
and not appointed, the implication is that he
shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity
and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment,
which does not confer security of tenure on the
person named.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Case no.65
Causing vs COMELEC
Petitioner: ELSIE S. CAUSING
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAND.
BIRON, SR.
Facts:
Elsie Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Mayor Biron issued Memorandum No. 12,
Series of 2010 (Office Order No. 12), commanding for the detailing of
Causing at the Office of the Municipal Mayor. Causing filed the
complaint claiming that issuance made by Mayor Biron ordering her
detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the
election period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was
illegal and it violated of Section 1, Par. A, No. 1, in connection with
Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737. Mayor Biron
countered that the purpose of transferring the office of Causing was
to closely supervise the performance of her functions after
complaints regarding her negative behavior in dealing with her co-
employees and with the public transacting business in her office. The
Provincial Election Supervisor recommended the dismissal of the
complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause.
Issue:
Is the relocation of Causing by Mayor Biron during the election
period from her office as the Municipal Civil Registrar to the Office of
the Mayor constitutes prohibited act under
the Omnibus Election Code and the relevant Resolution of the
COMELEC?
Held:
No. Mayor Biron’s acts did not violate the Omnibus Election Code
and the COMELEC Resolution. On the merits, the petition should
also fail.
E.O. Case No. 10-131 was founded on Mayor Biron’s alleged
violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737,Series of 2009, in
relation to Section 261(g), (h) and (x) of the Omnibus Election Code,
which respectively provide:
Resolution No. 8737
Section 1. Prohibited Acts
A. During the election period from January 10, 2010 to June 09,
2010, no public official shall, except upon prior authority of the
Commission:
1. Make or cause any transfer or detail whatsoever of any officer or
employee in the civil service, including public school teachers.
"Transfer" as used in this provision shall be construed as any
personnel movement from one government agency to another or
from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a
government agency to another withor without the issuance of an
appointment.
xxxx
Section 261(g), (h) and (x) of the Omnibus Election Code
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
xxxx
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position,
promotion, or giving salary increases. - During the periodof forty-five
days before a regular election and thirty days before a special
election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government
office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires
any new employee, whether provisional, temporary or casual, or
creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the
Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought
unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the
position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the
election.
As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be
appointed in case of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of
the appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days
from the date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in
violation of this provision shall be null and void.
(2) Any government official who promotes, or gives any increase of
salary or remuneration or privilege to any government official or
employee, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations.
(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. - Any
public official who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of
any officer or employee in the civil service including publicschool
teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval of the
Commission. x x x x
(x) Suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay
officer. - The provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding during
the election period, any public official who suspends, without prior
approval of the Commission, any elective provincial, city, municipal
or barangay officer, unless said suspension will be for purposes of
applying the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act in relation to the
suspension and removal of elective officials; in which case the
provisions of this section shall be inapplicable.
The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution
No. 8737 were transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the
Resolution as "any personnel movement from one government
agency to another or from one department, division,
geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to
another with or without the issuance of an appointment;" while
detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the
movement of an employee from one agency to another without
the issuance of an appointment. Having acquired technical and
legal meanings, transfer and detail must be construed as such.
Obviously, the movement involving Causing did not equate to either
a transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the law if Mayor
Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area from its old
location to the Office of the Mayor "some little steps" away. We
cannot accept the petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the phrase
"any transfer or detail whatsoever" encompassed "any and all kinds
and manner of personnel movement," including the mere change in
office location.
Equally material is that Mayor Biron’s act of transferring the office
space of Causing was rooted in his power of supervision and control
over the officials and employees serving in his local government unit,
in order to ensure the faithful discharge of their duties and
functions. His explanation that he transferred Causing’s work station
from her original office to his office in order to closely supervise her
after his office received complaints against her could not be justly
ignored. Verily, she thereafter continued to perform her tasks, and
uninterruptedly received her salaries as the Municipal Civil Registrar
even after the transfer to the Office of the Mayor.
Although Mayor Biron used the word detail in referring to the
personnel movement effected, the personnel action that actually took
place, albeit a reassignment was a valid reassignment, viz: In the
instant case, Causing is not stripped of her functions as Municipal
Civil Registrar (MCR). She was merely required to physically report
to the Mayor’s Office and perform her functions as Municipal Civil
Registrar therein. Definitely, she is still the MCR, albeit doing her
work physically outside of her usual work station. She is also not
deprived of her supervisory function over the staff as she continues
to review their work and signs documents they prepared. While she
may encounter difficulty in performing her duties as a supervisor as
she is not physically near her staff, that by itself, however, does not
mean that she has lost supervision over them. That difficulty,
nonetheless, is not tantamount to constructive dismissal. That Mayor
Biron prefers to ensure that Causing faithfully discharging her duties
as MCR is principally an exercise of his sound judgment and
discretion. He alone has the discretion to decide when to resort to
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

the necessity of implementing changes in the workplace as he

[4]
occupies the ideal vantage point and is in the best position to to serve as its Mayor. Jalosjos appealed his case to the Regional
determine the needs of his agency and how to satisfy those needs. [5]
Besides, contrary to the allegations of Causing, none of the elements Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City which affirmed the MCTC
of constructive dismissal is present.
Decision on September 11, 2009.THE SECOND DIVISION DENIED
JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC
THE PETITION OF ERASMO.
G.R. 192474; June 26, 2012
Ponente: J. Abad
While Erasmos motion for reconsideration was pending, the
FACTS: The Petitioner, Romeo Jalosjos, Jr ran and won as
May 10, 2010 elections took place, resulting in Jalosjos winning the
mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte in May 2007 election.
election. He was proclaimed winner on May 13, 2010.
While serving as mayor, he bought a house in Ipil, Zamboanga
Zibugay and bugun occupying the same in Sept. 2008. In may 6,
2009, he applied with the Election Registration Board of Ipil for the
On June 3, 2010 the En Banc granted Erasmos motion for
transfer of his voter’s registration to Ipil, Zamboanga Zibugay.
reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as

Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of

Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National
Elections. However, Dan Erasmo, Sr opposed said move of the
petitioner and file a petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC
[7]
before the COMELEC, claiming that Jalosjos made material
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction to pass upon the
residency qualification of Jalosjos to run for Representative of
Zamboanga Zibugay considering that he has been proclaimed
winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office.

misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it that he HELD: No. The proclamation of a congressional
resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. He contends that Jalosjos did candidate following the election divests COMELEC of
not abandon his domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the
[17]
HRET. HRET to consider and decide.

Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order

dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on

[18]
May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. Thus, the COMELEC LOKIN VS COMELEC

acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of G.R. 179431-321; JUNE 22, 2010

his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Ponente: J. Bersamin

Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.

For Erasmo, the COMELEC still has jurisdiction to issue its FACT: Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) submitted a

June 3, 2010 order based on Section 6 of Republic Act 6646 list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen

providing that Any candidate who has been declared by final should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes in MAY

judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast 2007 election. The nominees were were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J.

for him shall not be counted.However, the fact is that on election day Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona

of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.

appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification However, CIBAC, thru its president Emmanuel Villanueva filed a

case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of

deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the nominees dated May 7, 2007,whereby it withdrew the nominations of

congressional seat he sought. Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one

With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of of the nominees.

office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

After the election and it was settled that CIBAC is as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done without any

entitled to 2 seats in HOR, through its counsel, however CIBAC written Board approval, was accomplished with the Boards

filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the intent of

Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its the party should be given paramount consideration in the

second nominee. selection of the nominees. As a result, the COMELEC en

banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of

The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
CIBAC.

On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.

8219, whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the validity Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804

of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and promulgated E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBACs withdrawal of the

the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBACs second, third

and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-

In its decision, The COMELEC en banc explained that the Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to

actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of CIBAC were change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No.
[17]
presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the 7804). He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
[18]
president was charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. the law that the

By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate activities; that COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.

from all indications, Villanueva as the president of CIBAC had

always been provided the leeway to act as the party's The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the

representative and that his actions had always been considered winning party-list organization has been done and its nominee has
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the

qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls second nominee of CIBAC,

under the jurisdiction of the HRET.Thus, Lokin should raise the

question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action

special civil action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the

special civil action for certiorari in this Court. September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC, notwithstanding

the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales.

ISSUE: WON THE HRET HAS THE JURISDICTION OVER THE

MATTER? The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64

of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review

HELD: NO. A special civil action for quo warranto refers to of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and

questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is

winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in

ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly,

in his place, considering that the case does not involve the the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokins petitions

ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.

the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.

The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election

protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very

2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

ask them any questions. Due to the consistent denial by the SPBOC-
Maguindanao of the repeated and persistent motions made by
Pimentel’s counsel to propound questions to PES Bedol and the
AQUILINO PIMENTEL III VS COMELEC
Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao regarding the due
G.R.178413; MARCH 13, 2008
execution and authenticity of the Maguindanao MCOCs, Pimentel’s
Ponente: J.Chito- Lozario
counsel manifested her continuing objection to the canvassing of the
said MCOCs. All of the foregoing observations, manifestations, and
FACTS: Two months after the May 2007 senatorial elections, the 11
objections made by Pimentel’s counsel, as well as those made by
candidates for senators with the highest number of votes had already
the other candidates’ counsels, were simply noted by the SPBOC-
been officially proclaimed and had taken their oaths of office as such,
Maguindanao without specific action thereon.
the only remaining contenders for the twelfth and final senatorial post
were Pimentel and private respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri (Zubiri).
Pimentel’s objections to the Maguindanao MCOCs delve into
COMELEC acting as the National Board of Canvassers.
"matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation" of the said MCOCs by the SPBOC-Maguindanao.
A SPBOC-Maguindanao ( Special Provincial Board of
Pimentel insists that the SPBOC-Maguindanao and the NBC should
Canvassers) was created because the canvass proceedings held
hear his observations, accept his evidence, and rule on his
before the original Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao
objections to the Maguindanao MCOCs in what would undeniably be
(PBOC-Maguindanao), chaired by Provincial Election Supervisor
a pre-proclamation case. ON the other hand, Respondents contend
Lintang Bedol, were marred by irregularities, and the PCOC and
that Pimentel cannot initiate and pursue a pre-proclamation case
other electoral documents submitted by the said PBOC-
before the SPBOC-Maguindanao or the NBC, since such a case is
Maguindanao were tainted with fraud and statistical improbabilities.
prohibited in elections for Senators.
Hence, the Bedol PCOC was excluded from the national canvass
then being conducted by the NBC.
By 14 July 2007, Zubiri (with 11,004,099 votes) and Pimentel
(with 10,984,807 votes) were respectively ranked as the twelfth and
Although PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the Municipal
thirteenth Senatorial candidates with the highest number of votes in
Boards of Canvassers of Maguindanao (MBOCs-Maguindanao) were
the 14 May 2007 elections.
present during the canvass proceedings before the SPBOC-
Maguindanao, the candidates’ legal counsels were not allowed to
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

ISSUE: WON the SPBOC- Maguindanao can hear objections raised
by the petitioner?
HELD: NO. In elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule still is
that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or
certificates of canvass are prohibited. As with other general rules,
there are recognized exceptions to the prohibition, namely: (1)
correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition
or proceedings of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of
the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as
provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369.
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9369, with the duty to determine the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to it in accordance
with the four given criteria. There is no ambiguity in the said
provision, at least, as to whom it imposes the duty, namely:
(1) Congress as the NBC for the election for President and Vice-
President; and (2) COMELEC en banc as the NBC for the election
for Senators. This is a case where the law is clear. It speaks in a
language that is categorical. It is quite explicit; it is too plain to be
misread. No interpretation is needed. All that is called for is to apply
the statutory command.

The SPBOC-Maguindanao, in the conduct of its canvass

proceedings, properly refused to allow Pimentel to contest the
Maguindanao MCOCs at that stage by questioning PES Bedol and
the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and presenting
evidence to prove the alleged manufactured nature of the said
MCOCs, for such would be tantamount to a pre-proclamation case.

The SPBOC-Maguindanao, as its name suggests, was

constituted to be of the same stature and to perform the same
function as the PBOC-Maguindano: to canvass the Maguindanao
MCOCs and prepare the Maguindanao PCOC to be submitted to the
NBC. Undeniably, the SPBOC-Maguindanao is not Congress nor
COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, specifically charged by
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

TAN VS COMELEC and Benjamin Loong; respondent

G.R. 166143-47, 166891; November 20, 2006
Ponente: J. Velasco

FACTS: Petitioners Abdusakur M. Tan and Basaron Burahan

were the gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidates,
respectively, of Sulu Province in the May 10, 2004 elections.
Petitioners filed for Declaration of Failure of Elections in the towns
of Maimbung, Luuk, Tongkil, and Panamao. Tan and Burahan
alleged systematic fraud, terrorism, illegal schemes, and
machinations allegedly perpetrated by private respondents and their
supporters resulting in massive disenfranchisement of voters.

The COMELEC Second Division, acting on the Petitions for

Declaration of Failure of Elections, issued its May 17, 2004 Order
suspending the proclamation of the winning gubernatorial candidate
[23]
of Sulu, but lifted the suspension three (3) days later. In the May
20, 2004 lifting Order, the COMELEC Second Division directed the
Sulu PBOC to complete the canvass of votes and to bring all
canvass documents to Manila, and to proclaim the winning
candidates for Governor in Manila. However, on the same day that
the COMELEC First Division issued the said Order, private
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
respondent Benjamin Loong was proclaimed the winning governor of
Sulu and he assumed office.
ISSUES: 1. WON the Comelec is correct in dismissing the
petition for the declaration of failure of Election?
HELD: 1. YES. The COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petitions for
Declaration of Failure of Election since the electoral anomalies
alleged in the petitions should have been raised in an election
protest, not in a petition to declare a failure of election.
A resolution or decision of the COMELEC is considered
complete and validly rendered or issued when there is concurrence
by the required majority of the Commissioners. The Constitution and
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are silent as to what constitutes a
decision, whether it is solely the majority opinion or whether the
separate concurring or dissenting opinions are considered integral
parts of it.
The Court rules that a resolution or decision of the
COMELEC is considered complete and validly rendered or issued
when there is concurrence by the required majorityof the
Commissioners. Section 7 of Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution
pertinently provides that:
SEC. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority
vote of all its Members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission
for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.
Moreover, the dissenting opinion, which is only
Commissioner Sadains view, is not essential to nor does it affect the
ruling of the COMELEC en banc. Separate opinions not approved by
the required majority of the court members, whether they be
concurring or dissenting opinions, must be distinguished from the
opinion of the court. Verily, the joint resolution is the ruling being
assailed and not the dissenting opinion. It is clear that, not being
essential to the assailed joint resolution, the dissenting opinion
merely serves to comply with the constitutional proviso that any
member who dissented from a decision or resolution must state the
reason therefor.
No rule or law prohibits simultaneous prosecution
For one, there is no law or rule prohibiting the simultaneous
prosecution or adjudication of pre-proclamation controversies and
elections protests. Allowing the simultaneous prosecution scenario
may be explained by the fact that pre-proclamation controversies
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
and election protests differ in terms of the issues involved and the
[95]
evidence admissible in each case and the objective each seeks to
achieve. Moreover, the Court, under certain circumstances, even
encourages the reinforcement of a pre-proclamation suit with an
election protest.
Dumayas vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Dumayas, Jr. and respondent Bernal, Jr. were rival
candidates for the position of mayor in Carles, Iloilo last 11 May 1998
synchronized elections.
During the canvassing on 13 May 1998, election returns for precincts
nos. 61A, 62A, and 63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan were
protested for inclusion in the canvass before the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC for brevity) by petitioner-appellant Dumayas Jr.
The grounds relied upon for their exclusion are all the same- that
is, violation of Secs. 234, 235, 236 of the Omnibus Election Code
and other election laws; acts of terrorism, intimidation, coercion, and
similar acts prohibited by law.
Respondent attested that the incidents alleged by petitioners
watchers did not happen. The alleged terrorism, coercion, or
violation of election laws like the opening of ballots and reading the
votes allegedly done by certain public officials like SPO3 Sorongon,
Nody Mahilum, Anonia Barrios, Telesforo Gallardo and others are
not true, the truth being that these people were only inside the polling
place to exercise their right of suffrage.
In the afternoon of May 14, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
denied petitioners objection to the inclusion of the contested returns
and proceeded with the canvass. The results of the voting were as
follows:
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the MBC on May 15, 1998.
The appeal was given due course by the COMELEC Second
[3]
Division which rendered a resolution dated August 4, 1998,
disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, finding the preparation of the
contested election returns to be tainted with irregularities, this
Commission (SECOND DIVISION) RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to EXCLUDE Election Return No. 3000976 from
Precinct No. 61-A;
On August 10, 1998, private respondent Felipe Bernal, Jr., filed a
motion for reconsideration of the above-cited resolution with the
COMELEC en banc. No winner for the position of Mayor was
proclaimed since private respondent was able to present a copy of
his motion for reconsideration before the MBC.
On August 17, 1998, despite presentation of the August 12, 1998
order, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the election after
excluding from the canvass the election returns from the three
contested precincts in accordance with the COMELEC Second
Division Resolution. The following day, private respondent
immediately filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the
proclamation of petitioner on the ground that the resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division was not yet final and executory.
Meanwhile, on August 25, 1998, the duly-proclaimed Vice-Mayor
[5]
Arnold Betita filed an action for quo warranto against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 66. Docketed as Spl.
Civil Action No. 98-141, said petition included respondent Bernal as
one of the petitioners together with Vice-Mayor Betita.
On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed before the COMELEC en
banc a motion to expunge respondent Bernals motion for
reconsideration and motion to declare petitioners proclamation
void ab initio, on the ground that respondent Bernal should be
deemed to have abandoned said motions by the filing of Spl. Civil
Action No. 98-141 which, according to petitioner, is a formal election
protest via quo warranto brought before the regular courts.
COMELEC en banc denied petitioners motion to expunge,
Resolution of the Second Division is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the proclamation of Rodolfo Dumayas, Jr. is hereby
ANNULLED. A new Municipal Board of Canvassers of Carles, Iloilo
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
is hereby constituted. On March 13, 2000, respondent Bernal, Jr.
was proclaimed by the newly-constituted Municipal Board of
Canvassers as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality of Carles,
thereby unseating petitioner Dumayas.
Hence, this instant civil action filed by petitioner.
Issue: (1) Should respondent Bernal, who was named as petitioner in
the quo warranto proceedings commenced before the regular court,
be deemed to have abandoned the motions he had filed with
respondent Commission? (NO)
Held: As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a
pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment
of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the
authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee
or the validity of his proclamation.
The reason for this rule is that once the competent tribunal has
acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the
case itself and not in another proceeding, so as to prevent confusion
and conflict of authority The general rule is not absolute. It admits of
certain exceptions, as where: (a) the board of canvassers was
improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the proper remedy;
(c) what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an
election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation; (d) the filing of
a quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made
without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was
made ad cautelam; and (e) the proclamation was null and void.
An examination of the petition filed primarily by Vice-Mayor Betita
with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City reveals that it is neither
a quo warranto petition under the Omnibus Election Code nor an
[11]
election protest. In Samad vs. COMELEC , we explained that a
petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election Code raises in
issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a
proceeding to unseat the respondent from office but not necessarily
to install the petitioner in his place. An election protest is a contest
between the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of
frauds or irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or in
the preparation of the returns. It raises the question of who actually
obtained the plurality of the legal votes and therefore is entitled to
hold the office.
Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141 appears to be in the nature of an
action for usurpation of public office brought by Betita to assert
his right to the position of Mayor pursuant to the rules on succession
of local government officials contained in the Local Government
[12]
Code. Although said petition is also denominated as a quo
warranto petition under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, it is different in
nature from the quo warrantoprovided for in the Omnibus Election
Code where the only issue proper for determination is either
disloyalty or ineligibility of respondent therein.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that the nature of the
action is determined by the averments in the complaint or
[13]
petition and not the title or caption thereof.
Thus, respondent Commission did not err, much less abuse its
discretion, when it refused to consider as abandoned Bernals motion
for reconsideration and urgent motion to declare petitioners
proclamation as void ab initio.
On another note, with regards to the contested precincts, the
evidence presented by petitioner was only self-serving. The
presumption of regularity of official functions stand absent of a
finding that it has been tainted with irregularities.
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio
Miranda vs Abaya
Facts:
On March 24, 1998, Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor
of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the
same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections.
Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
The petition was GRANTED by the Comelec in its resolution dated
May 5, 1998 (pp. 36-43, Rollo). The Comelec further ruled to
DISQUALIFY Jose "Pempe" Miranda.
On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of
candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of
candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his
father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.
During the May 11, 1998 elections; petitioner and private respondent
vied for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner garnering 22,002 votes,
1,666 more votes than private respondent who got only 20,336
votes.
Thereafter, respondent prayed for the nullification of petitioner's
certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because the certificate
of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was
supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due
course.
the Comelec En Banc rendered the assailed decision aforequoted,
resolving to GRANT the motion for reconsideration, thus nullifying
the substitution by petitioner Joel G. Miranda. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether Miranda validly substituted his father?
Held: No. While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of
a registered or accredited political party may substitute for a
candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any
cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of
candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due
course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.
Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the
latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose
certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may
not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise,
they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons
whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or
cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.
More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the
Code, not just any person, but only "an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party" may be substituted.
In Bautista vs. Comelec) this Court explicitly ruled that "a cancelled
certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy"
(side note, evident purpose of COC)
The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates
of candidacy and in fixing the time limit therefor are: (a) to enable the
voters to know, at least sixty days before the regular election, the
candidates among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to
avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes
2E | 2017-2018 | Atty. Pascasio

cast. For if the law did not confine the choice or election by the
voters to the duly registered candidates, there might be as many
persons voted for as there are voters, and votes might be cast even
for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in
favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.

Also, under ejusdem generis rule, where a general word or phrase

(such as "disqualification for any cause" in this case) follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class (such
as the words "dies" and "withdraws" in the instant case) or where the
latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed
to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.

To include those disqualified candidates whose certificate of

candidacy had likewise been denied due course and/or cancelled
among those who may be substituted under Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code, leads to the absurdity where a substitute is
allowed to take the place of somebody who had not been a
candidate in the first place.

Hence, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy

seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.